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22
40 - EVENTS/CONTRA_WAR/Bay of Pigs.md
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---
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-16
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Bay of Pigs Invasion
aliases:
- Bay of Pigs
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ The original air plan called for over 40 sorties before the invasion. Kennedy ap
The cover story required that the attacking aircraft appear to be defecting Cuban air force pilots. Exile pilot Mario Zuñiga was presented to the media as a Cuban defector who had participated in the attack. The story collapsed within hours: journalists noticed the B-26 had a solid metal nose cone with gun mounts, while Castro's B-26s used plastic nose cones with wing-mounted guns, and the guns were sealed with masking tape.
[[Adlai Stevenson]], the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, had been deliberately kept uninformed and had brandished CIA-provided photographs at the UN General Assembly insisting the raids were carried out by defecting Cuban pilots. When the Soviet ambassador exposed the deception, Stevenson was furious and pressed Washington to stop the operation. His exposure as an unwitting instrument of a collapsed cover story became a significant factor in the decision to cancel the D-Day follow-up strikes.[^1]
[[Adlai Stevenson]], the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, had been deliberately kept uninformed and had brandished CIA-provided photographs at the UN General Assembly insisting the raids were carried out by defecting Cuban pilots. When the Soviet ambassador exposed the deception, Stevenson was furious and pressed Washington to stop the operation. His exposure as an unwitting instrument of a collapsed cover story became a significant factor in the decision to cancel the D-Day follow-up strikes.[^1] On April 15, 1961 Stevenson told the General Assembly's First Committee that according to his information the raids had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had landed in Florida and asked for political asylum.[^2] On April 16 he cabled the Department of State, for Secretary of State Dean Rusk and [[Allen Dulles]], that he was "greatly disturbed by clear indications" that the bombing incidents "were launched in part at least from outside Cuba," that his answers to Cuban Foreign Minister [[Raúl Roa]] "were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba," and that he did not understand why he had not been "warned and provided pre-prepared material."[^3]
### The D-Day Air Strike Cancellation
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Four American volunteers flying B-26 combat missions were killed on April 19: Ma
The invasion was compromised through multiple simultaneous channels. Cuban G2 had penetrated Brigade 2506 training camps in Guatemala with double agents who filed detailed intelligence reports from at least January 1961. The scale of the Camp Trax operation could not be concealed from local populations or regional intelligence services.
The Miami exile community was equally porous. Plans were "common knowledge" among Cuban exiles and Havana's intelligence had ready access to refugee networks in [[Miami]]. On January 10, 1961, the New York Times published an account of exile training in Guatemala. On April 7, 1961, reporter Tad Szulc filed a story - toned down at Kennedy's personal request - reporting U.S. experts were training an exile invasion force. Kennedy's private reaction: "I can't believe what I'm reading! Castro doesn't need agents over here. All he has to do is read our papers!"[^2]
The Miami exile community was equally porous. Plans were "common knowledge" among Cuban exiles and Havana's intelligence had ready access to refugee networks in [[Miami]]. On January 10, 1961, the New York Times published an account of exile training in Guatemala. On April 7, 1961, reporter Tad Szulc filed a story - toned down at Kennedy's personal request - reporting U.S. experts were training an exile invasion force. Kennedy's private reaction: "I can't believe what I'm reading! Castro doesn't need agents over here. All he has to do is read our papers!"[^6]
### The Kirkpatrick IG Report and Its Suppression
@ -81,13 +81,13 @@ CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick completed "The Inspector General's Surve
Among the report's documented findings: the operation received the CIA's "lowest-ranked case officers"; staffing was insufficient at all levels; Spanish-language deficiencies plagued the training program; the CIA treated Cuban exile leaders as "puppets" rather than building genuine partnership; and the agency had "conducted an overt military operation beyond Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability."
Kirkpatrick distributed copies to [[Allen Dulles]], McCone, the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]], and [[Robert Kennedy]] - circumventing normal IG channels and causing what witnesses described as an "extremely stormy session" between Dulles and Kirkpatrick. McCone ordered all but one of approximately 20 copies destroyed; the surviving copy remained locked in the DCI's safe.
Kirkpatrick distributed copies to Allen Dulles, McCone, the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]], and [[Robert Kennedy]] - circumventing normal IG channels and causing what witnesses described as an "extremely stormy session" between Dulles and Kirkpatrick. McCone ordered all but one of approximately 20 copies destroyed; the surviving copy remained locked in the DCI's safe.
[[Tracy Barnes]], Bissell's deputy and the operation's Washington coordinator, authored a formal response characterizing the report as "an incompetent job," "biased," and "malicious." Bissell argued that political deniability requirements and senior policy makers bore primary responsibility. McCone bound both documents together as a paired submission to the PFIAB.
CIA historian Jack Pfeiffer's five-volume internal history (written 1979-1984) sided against Kirkpatrick across all five volumes, alleging he was motivated by desire for Bissell's position. CIA Chief Historian David Robarge, authorizing the 2016 public release of Pfeiffer's Vol. V, acknowledged Pfeiffer's draft suffered from "serious shortcomings in scholarship" and a "polemical tone."
The Kirkpatrick report remained classified for 36 years, declassified on February 22, 1998, following a two-year FOIA effort by the [[National Security Archive]]. It was published in full as Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New Press, 1998).[^2]
The Kirkpatrick report remained classified for 36 years, declassified on February 22, 1998, following a two-year FOIA effort by the [[National Security Archive]]. It was published in full as Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New Press, 1998).[^6]
### The Taylor Commission
@ -105,16 +105,18 @@ Of approximately 1,400 Brigade members: 114 were killed in battle; approximately
Robert Kennedy secretly recruited [[New York]] attorney James B. Donovan - who had negotiated the [[Rudolf Abel]] spy exchange - to reopen prisoner talks in June 1962. Donovan worked pro bono. Negotiations were disrupted by the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] in October 1962 but resumed. On December 21, 1962, Donovan and Castro signed an agreement: 1,113 surviving prisoners were exchanged for $53 million in food, medicines, and other humanitarian supplies, raised through private donations from pharmaceutical companies and other sources.
Kennedy welcomed the released prisoners at the Orange Bowl in Miami on December 29, 1962. Brigade 2506 presented Kennedy with their battle flag; Kennedy stated he would return it "to a free Havana." He never did.[^2]
Kennedy welcomed the released prisoners at the Orange Bowl in Miami on December 29, 1962. Brigade 2506 presented Kennedy with their battle flag; Kennedy stated he would return it "to a free Havana." He never did.[^6]
### Veterans and Later Operations
Brigade 2506 veterans became the CIA's organizational core for subsequent Cuba operations and reappeared across later covert programs. [[Felix Rodriguez]], a veteran who had participated in the capture of [[Che Guevara]] in Bolivia, managed the Contra resupply operation at [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]] in the 1980s under the alias "Max Gomez." [[Howard Hunt]], the Bay of Pigs political officer responsible for the [[Cuban Revolutionary Council]] exile leadership, recruited Bay of Pigs veterans for the Watergate burglary team. Three of the Watergate burglars - [[Bernard Barker]], Eugenio Martinez, and [[Frank Sturgis]] - were Bay of Pigs veterans with continuing CIA relationships. Hunt's Bay of Pigs role, and the CIA's desire to contain investigation into it, was a recurring element of the Watergate cover-up narrative.[^3]
Brigade 2506 veterans became the CIA's organizational core for subsequent Cuba operations and reappeared across later covert programs. [[Felix Rodriguez]], a veteran who had participated in the capture of [[Che Guevara]] in Bolivia, managed the Contra resupply operation at [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]] in the 1980s under the alias "Max Gomez." [[Howard Hunt]], the Bay of Pigs political officer responsible for the [[Cuban Revolutionary Council]] exile leadership, recruited Bay of Pigs veterans for the Watergate burglary team. Three of the Watergate burglars - [[Bernard Barker]], Eugenio Martinez, and [[Frank Sturgis]] - were Bay of Pigs veterans with continuing CIA relationships. Hunt's Bay of Pigs role, and the CIA's desire to contain investigation into it, was a recurring element of the Watergate cover-up narrative.[^7]
### Footnotes
[^1]: CIA Inspector General. "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation." October 1961; declassified February 22, 1998. Published in Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X (Cuba, January 1961-September 1962), Documents 108, 169, 198. U.S. Department of State, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10.
[^2]: Cuba Study Group (Taylor Commission). Final Report. June 13, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 169. CIA Official History, Vols. I-V (Pfeiffer, 1979-1984). National Security Archive, nsarchive.gwu.edu, NSAEBB353 (2011) and NSAEBB564 (2016). Wyden, Peter. *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story.* Simon & Schuster, 1979.
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Hougan, Jim. *Secret Agenda: Watergate, Deep Throat, and the CIA.* Random House, 1984.
[^2]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 104, editorial note on the meeting of the Political (First) Committee of April 15, 1961 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d104
[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Document 105, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, April 16, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d105
[^4]: Cuba Study Group, Memorandum No. 1, "Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation Zapata," June 13, 1961, paragraph 43, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 231. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d231
[^5]: Memorandum from General C.P. Cabell to the Cuba Study Group, May 9, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Volume X, Document 108. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d108
[^6]: Cuba Study Group (Taylor Commission). Final Report. June 13, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 169. CIA Official History, Vols. I-V (Pfeiffer, 1979-1984). National Security Archive, nsarchive.gwu.edu, NSAEBB353 (2011) and NSAEBB564 (2016). Wyden, Peter. *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story.* Simon & Schuster, 1979.
[^7]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Hougan, Jim. *Secret Agenda: Watergate, Deep Throat, and the CIA.* Random House, 1984.

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40 - EVENTS/HISTORICAL_PHENOMENA/Babalon Working.md
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@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ relations:
end: 1946-02-27
role: "the woman who arrived on January 19, 1946 and was taken by Parsons as his 'elemental' and magical partner; married Parsons October 19, 1946"
fn: 5
updated: 2026-10-12
---
The Babalon Working was a series of rituals carried out by [[Jack Parsons]] and [[L. Ron Hubbard]] at 1003 South Orange Grove Avenue in [[Pasadena]], California, in the first quarter of 1946. Parsons headed the [[Agape Lodge]] of the [[Ordo Templi Orientis]] under the authority of [[Aleister Crowley]]; Hubbard, a Naval Reserve lieutenant who had moved into the house, acted as scribe and seer.[^1]
@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ Bogdan names the partnership Allied Enterprises, formed in January 1946 to buy y
[[The Sunday Times]] of London published on October 5, 1969 an account by [[Alexander Mitchell]] headed "The Odd Beginning of Ron Hubbard's Career," based on papers owned by "a former admirer of Crowley," whom the article describes as an expert on Crowley's magic. It says that from January 4 to 15, 1946 Parsons and Hubbard held a nightly ritual, "faithfully described in Parsons' diary," played a Prokofiev violin concerto and later Rachmaninoff's Isle of the Dead, and that Hubbard served as high priest in a series of ceremonies in which Parsons and the girl shared sex. It quotes the Parsons record: "The Scribe (Hubbard) said ... She is the flame of life, power of darkness, she destroys with a glance, she may take thy soul." The owner of the papers is quoted as saying that Parsons "was completely under Hubbard's domination." A clipping of the article is in the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]]'s [[Scientology|Church of Scientology]] file (see the page on Hubbard).[^17] The Church of Scientology, which according to Bogdan paid a settlement to the newspaper, made a statement, printed in the issue of December 28, 1969, saying that the Ordo Templi Orientis practiced "savage and bestial rites" and that Hubbard had been "sent in to handle the situation" at 1003 Orange Grove: "Hubbard's mission was successful far beyond anyone's expectations. The house was torn down. Hubbard rescued a girl they were using. The black magic group was dispersed and destroyed and has never recovered."[^1] Bogdan writes that Hubbard never spoke publicly about Parsons or the Working.[^1]
In a letter of May 1951 to the [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]], preserved in an FBI file, Hubbard wrote that Sara Northrup "had attached herself to a Jack Parsons, the rocket expert, during the war and when she left him he was a wreck."[^18] The FBI opened its own file on Parsons in September 1950; the released file does not mention Hubbard.[^19]
In a letter of May 1951 to the [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]], preserved in an FBI file, Hubbard wrote that Sara Northrup "had attached herself to a Jack Parsons, the rocket expert, during the war and when she left him he was a wreck."[^18] The copy of the letter in the FBI headquarters file on Hubbard has the name after "attached herself to" blacked out under exemptions b6 and b7C, with "the rocket expert" following, while the copy in the FBI's Church of Scientology file, Part 5, prints it as "a Jack Parsons, the rocket expert."[^18][^19] The same letter continues that Northrup was "strangely intimate with many scientists of Los Alamos" (headquarters file copy).[^19] The FBI opened its own file on Parsons in September 1950; the released file does not mention Hubbard.[^20]
### Footnotes
@ -99,4 +100,5 @@ In a letter of May 1951 to the [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General
[^16]: Newspaper account of the complaint of Sara Northrup Hubbard, 1951, in FBI headquarters file "Hubbard, L. Ron HQ-1," archive.org/details/HubbardL.RonHQ1.
[^17]: Mitchell, Alexander, "The Odd Beginning of Ron Hubbard's Career," The Sunday Times (London), October 5, 1969, clipping in FBI file "Church of Scientology/L. Ron Hubbard," Part 6, forwarded by the FBI Washington Field Office in June 1974, archive.org/details/churchofscientologyl.ronhubbard.
[^18]: Hubbard, L. Ron, letter to the Attorney General, Wichita, Kansas, May 1951, FBI file "Church of Scientology/L. Ron Hubbard," Part 5, archive.org/details/churchofscientologyl.ronhubbard.
[^19]: FBI Parsons file 65-59589, Parts 1 and 2, archive.org/details/JohnParsons.
[^19]: L. Ron Hubbard, letter to the Attorney General, 1951, in FBI headquarters file "Hubbard, L. Ron HQ-1" (name redacted under b6/b7C). https://archive.org/details/HubbardL.RonHQ1
[^20]: FBI Parsons file 65-59589, Parts 1 and 2, archive.org/details/JohnParsons.

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@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
---
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
aliases:
- "Al-Yamamah"
- "Al Yamamah"
- "Al-Yamamah arms deal"
- "Al Yamamah arms deal"
- "Al-Yamamah contracts"
tags:
- Event
- ArmsDeal
- SaudiArabia
- UnitedKingdom
- BAESystems
- Corruption
- AlYamamah
- SeriousFraudOffice
summary: "Al-Yamamah was the British-Saudi government arms agreement series begun in September 1985 with British Aerospace as prime contractor, the subject of a suppressed 1992 audit and a halted 2004 fraud investigation."
start: 1985-09-26
location: "London, United Kingdom; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia"
created: 2026-10-12
updated: 2026-10-12
relations:
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Margaret Thatcher]]"
reverse: true
role: "Prime Minister during the 1985 negotiation of the first agreement"
start: 1985-04
end: 1985-09
fn: 3
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Michael Heseltine]]"
reverse: true
role: "Secretary of State for Defence; signed the 1985 Memorandum of Understanding"
start: 1985-09-26
fn: 1
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]]"
reverse: true
role: "Saudi Defence Minister; signed the 1985 Memorandum of Understanding"
start: 1985-09-26
fn: 1
- type: participant_in
with: "[[British Aerospace]]"
reverse: true
role: "prime contractor"
start: 1985
fn: 10
- type: investigated
with: "[[National Audit Office]]"
reverse: true
role: "report on the Saudi Arabian Airforce Project, not published"
start: 1992
fn: 4
- type: investigated
with: "[[Serious Fraud Office]]"
reverse: true
role: "investigation into BAE corruption allegations, one aspect of which concerned Al-Yamamah; discontinued December 14, 2006"
start: 2004-07-29
end: 2006-12-14
fn: 8
---
Al-Yamamah ("the Dove" in Arabic) was the series of government-to-government arms agreements between the [[United Kingdom]] and [[Saudi Arabia]], with [[British Aerospace]] (later [[BAE Systems]]) as prime contractor. The first agreement was a Memorandum of Understanding signed at Lancaster House on September 26, 1985 by the Secretary of State for Defence, [[Michael Heseltine]], and the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince [[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]]. It covered 72 Tornado aircraft and 30 Hawk trainers, among other equipment. Two further, more detailed agreements followed in 1986 and 1988, and the programme was extended in 1993 by an order for 48 more Tornados.[^1][^2]
### The Riyadh visit of April 1985
Foreign Office files released to the [[National Archives]] and reported in 2016 record that [[Margaret Thatcher]] stopped in [[Riyadh]] in April 1985 on her way back from South Asia and met King [[Fahd]]. Heseltine approved the stop-over on the basis that it would allow her to complete the sale, and Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], then Saudi ambassador to the United States, invited her. A briefing document stated that it "seems unlikely that Prince Bandar would seek to engineer such a meeting unless something positive was likely to come out of it." The official record of the meeting was billed as one about regional developments and does not mention the aircraft. After the visit Thatcher wrote to Fahd: "I was glad that we were able to discuss a further matter privately over lunch. I look forward to receiving your majesty's personal envoy soon, in order that we may conclude this matter successfully."[^3]
### The released papers of 2006
The Guardian published in October 2006 documents that had been released to the National Archives in May of that year and were withdrawn by the Ministry of Defence after the paper approached it. One was a January 1986 telegram from [[Colin Chandler]], head of the Ministry's arms sales unit, who was in Riyadh with BAE executives. The Guardian reported from it that the price of each Tornado had been raised by 32 percent, from £16.3 million to £21.5 million, and that the total was to reach £5 billion against the £3.5 billion to £4 billion stated in the Memorandum. The same release contained a Ministry of Defence briefing prepared for Thatcher that described Prince Sultan as "not highly intelligent," and Foreign Office correspondence of 1985 sending Thatcher's chief aide at Number 10, [[Charles Powell]], a copy of an Arab magazine that alleged £600 million in secret commissions, with advice that officials "should simply refuse all comment."[^1] Lord Gilmour, who had been a minister under Thatcher, told BBC2's Newsnight, as the Guardian quoted him: "You either got the business and bribed, or you didn't bribe and didn't get the business."[^1] The Guardian also wrote that all those involved had always denied the allegations of secret commissions.[^1]
### The National Audit Office report of 1992
In 1992 the [[National Audit Office]] reported on the Saudi Arabian Airforce Project. Its examination of project receipts and payments passing through the Ministry of Defence "found no evidence of commission payments being made to third parties." On February 27, 1992, in a private session of the [[Public Accounts Committee]], whose chairman was [[Robert Sheldon]], the Ministry's permanent secretary, Sir [[Michael Quinlan]], said: "The whole project operates under a seal of confidentiality. There is a very great sensitivity about the project on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government. Open Government is alien to them." Asked for an assurance that no public funds had gone the wrong way, Quinlan answered: "Yes, I can give you the assurance that there is no basis to support any suggestion that commission payments have been made using public funds."[^4] The report was not published. The Guardian reported in March 2024, after finding the papers in Sheldon's archive at the [[London School of Economics]], that only ten copies were printed and that only Sheldon and his deputy read it. The Guardian also reported that a Ministry memorandum disclosed at a later criminal trial showed that in 1988 the Ministry's head of arms sales had helped set up regular quarterly payments to Prince Bandar from Al-Yamamah funds, which BAE made on the Ministry's instruction. BAE said all payments were made with the express approval of the United Kingdom government, and the Ministry said the funds remained the property of the Saudi government.[^5]
### The Commons speech of January 1996
On January 24, 1996, in a Commons adjournment debate on Saudi Arabia, [[George Galloway]] told the House that the contract "was landed by British Aerospace as a result of corruption on an unprecedented scale," and that "enormous bribes and commissions of up to 30 per cent. of the multi-billion pound deal were paid," shared between the Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, his family, and the sons of King Fahd, "notably Prince Mohammed." He said a "whole gang of middlemen" in London made millions of pounds in pay-offs, among them [[Wafic Said]], whom he described as a business partner of [[Jonathan Aitken]], and [[Mark Thatcher]], "the son of the then Prime Minister, who gave 10 Downing street as his address at the time, but who was later given his own house and other lavish benefits by Wafic Said and who has become mysteriously and inordinately rich." He said that some of the secret commissions had been handled by British Aerospace through a British businessman, [[Douglas Leese]], and that the National Audit Office report of Sir [[John Bourn]] had been "suppressed by the Select Committee on Public Accounts for more than three years." He also described Colonel Thomas Dooley, an executive of [[Sikorsky]], as testifying in a United States court that Prince Bandar told him what bribes must be paid in a "competition for bribes" over Black Hawk helicopters.[^6]
The writer [[Paul Foot]] wrote in 1998 that it had become "common knowledge" that Mark Thatcher enriched himself by £12 million from the Al-Yamamah deals, that Thatcher himself never denied it or sued anyone for mentioning it, and that no one, including the authors of a book on the subject, could produce a single hard fact to prove it.[^7]
### The Serious Fraud Office investigation, 2004 to 2006
The [[Serious Fraud Office]] launched an investigation into allegations of corruption against BAE on July 29, 2004, one aspect of which concerned Al-Yamamah. By autumn 2006 it intended to examine Swiss bank accounts, and the judgment of the House of Lords records that the Saudi authorities responded with an explicit threat to withdraw from bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, to withdraw cooperation on the United Kingdom's strategic objectives in the Middle East and to end negotiations then in progress for the purchase of Typhoon aircraft. The ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir [[Sherard Cowper-Coles]], told the Director that "British lives on British streets were at risk." The Prime Minister, [[Tony Blair]], sent the Attorney General a personal minute on December 8, 2006.[^8]
On December 14, 2006, the Attorney General, [[Lord Goldsmith]], told the Lords that the Director of the Serious Fraud Office had decided to discontinue the investigation "following representations that have been made both to the Attorney General and the Director concerning the need to safeguard national and international security." He said he had obtained "the views of the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries," who had expressed "the clear view that continuation of the investigation would cause serious damage to UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic co-operation."[^9]
### Judicial review
[[The Corner House]] and Campaign Against Arms Trade challenged the decision. The Divisional Court quashed it on the ground that the Director had yielded to a threat. On July 30, 2008, the House of Lords allowed the Director's appeal in [[R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office]], holding the decision lawful. [[Lord Bingham]] wrote that what determined the decision was "the Director's judgment that the public interest in saving British lives outweighed the public interest in pursuing BAE to conviction."[^8]
### BAE Systems plea of 2010
On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems pleaded guilty in the [[United States District Court for the District of Columbia]] to conspiring to defraud the United States by making false statements about its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance program and to violating the Arms Export Control Act, and was fined $400 million by Judge John D. Bates. The Department of Justice stated that BAE took the role of prime contractor to the United Kingdom government in the mid-1980s after the formal understanding with Saudi Arabia, that its "support services" resulted in substantial benefits to a foreign public official of Saudi Arabia who was in a position of influence over sales of fighter jets, and that BAE undertook no adequate review or verification of more than $5 million in invoices submitted by one employee from May 2001 to early 2002.[^10]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Leigh, David, and Rob Evans, "The secret Whitehall telegram that reveals truth behind controversial Saudi arms deal," *The Guardian,* October 27, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/28/bae.whitehall
[^2]: Lewis, Mike, and Katherine Templar. *UK Personnel Supporting the Saudi Armed Forces: Risk, Knowledge and Accountability.* 2018, citing the Memorandum of Understanding for the Provision of Equipment and Services for the Royal Saudi Air Force, September 26, 1985, and UK National Archives file FCO 8/6055. https://www.mikelewisresearch.com/RSAFfinal.pdf
[^3]: "Thatcher held secret Saudi talks to win huge arms deal, archives show," *Middle East Eye,* August 25, 2016 (reporting on Foreign Office files released to the National Archives). https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/thatcher-held-secret-saudi-talks-win-huge-arms-deal-archives-show
[^4]: Ministry of Defence Appropriation Accounts 1990-91, Class I, Vote 2, Defence Procurement: The Saudi Arabian Airforce Project (National Audit Office report, 1992), and summary minutes of the private session of the Committee of Public Accounts, February 27, 1992 (Sir Michael Quinlan, Ministry of Defence), in the papers of Robert Sheldon, London School of Economics, as published by The Guardian. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/24502904/collected-files-sheldon-papers-reduced.pdf
[^5]: "Suppressed report on UK-Saudi arms deal discovered in archive," *The Guardian,* March 24, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
[^6]: Galloway, George, speech on Saudi Arabia, House of Commons, January 24, 1996, HC Deb vol. 270, cols. 453-62. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/jan/24/saudi-arabia
[^7]: Foot, Paul, "Prince and Pimp," *London Review of Books,* vol. 20, no. 1, January 1, 1998. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v20/n01/paul-foot/prince-and-pimp
[^8]: *R (on the application of Corner House Research and others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office* [2008] UKHL 60 (House of Lords, July 30, 2008), on appeal from [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin). https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2008/60.html
[^9]: Goldsmith, Lord (Attorney General), statement "BAE Systems: Al Yamamah Contract," House of Lords, December 14, 2006, HL Deb cols. 1711-8. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/61214-0014.htm
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, "BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine," press release, March 1, 2010 (*United States v. BAE Systems plc,* D.D.C., Crim. No. 10-035, Judge John D. Bates). https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine

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40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/CIA Family Jewels.md
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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
- Family Jewels
- Potential Flap Activities
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-12
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
tags:
- Event
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Schlesinger transmitted the document to his successor as DCI, [[William Colby]],
Colby's disclosure of the Family Jewels to the Church Committee in 1975 was part of what CIA traditionalists called the "Halloween Massacre" - the moment when Colby's approach to congressional oversight became apparent to the full intelligence community. President Ford fired Colby as DCI in November 1975 (and also fired Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, in the same announcement), though Colby continued serving through the transition to his successor George H.W. Bush.
The Family Jewels was partially declassified and released by the CIA under then-DCI [[Michael Hayden]] on June 26, 2007, following a FOIA lawsuit by the [[National Security Archive]]. The released version remains redacted in substantial portions. The unredacted document can be accessed through the CIA's FOIA Reading Room: cia.gov/readingroom/collection/family-jewels.[^1]
The Family Jewels was partially declassified and released by the CIA under then-DCI [[Michael Hayden]] on June 26, 2007. The [[National Security Archive]] posted the file on June 21, 2007 after Hayden announced that day that the agency was declassifying it, and wrote that the 702-page collection reached it on June 26, fifteen years after it filed a Freedom of Information Act request; [[Thomas S. Blanton]] called the release "the first voluntary CIA declassification of controversial material since George Tenet in 1998 reneged on the 1990s promises of greater openness at the Agency."[^2] The released version remains redacted in substantial portions. The unredacted document can be accessed through the CIA's FOIA Reading Room: cia.gov/readingroom/collection/family-jewels.[^1]
### Surveillance of Jack Anderson, 1972
@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ A separate memorandum in the compilation, signed by [[Ted Shackley]] of the West
### Footnotes
[^1]: CIA FOIA Reading Room, "The Family Jewels," cia.gov/readingroom/collection/family-jewels (released 2007). Church Committee, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976. Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. Doubleday, 2007, pp. 316-327.
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, submission of May 16, 1973 for the "Family Jewels" compilation, section "CELOTEX II," CIA Reading Room document 0001451843. https://archive.org/details/CIA-Family-Jewels
[^2]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, "The CIA's Family Jewels," posted June 21, 2007, updated June 26, 2007. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels" compilation, memorandum from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, September 9, 1972. https://archive.org/details/CIA-Family-Jewels
[^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels" compilation, memorandum on Anderson's column concerning ITT and Howard Hunt, 1973. https://archive.org/details/CIA-Family-Jewels

9
40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Operation NORTHWOODS.md
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@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ On March 6, 1962 Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wro
On March 16, 1962 President Kennedy met with [[John A. McCone]], General [[Maxwell Taylor]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Lemnitzer to discuss the Mongoose guidelines. [[U. Alexis Johnson]]'s handwritten note records that "The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action," and that "no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^9] On April 5, 1962 the Special Group concluded that Mongoose should re-examine its basic philosophy "with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention," and five days later (April 10) the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both questions put by General Maxwell Taylor, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so.[^10] At the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), according to McCone's notes, the "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^11]
Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction.[^1] In July 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint Lemnitzer as JCS Chairman when his term expired; Lemnitzer was transferred to command [[NATO]] forces in Europe. The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction.[^1] In July 1962 Kennedy announced Lemnitzer's move to Europe in place of a second term as Chairman; at his news conference of July 23, 1962 he said Norstad's resignation would take effect October 1 and that Lemnitzer "could have retired in October and there would have been a vacancy as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^12] Lemnitzer's term as Chairman ended on September 30, 1962, and he became Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command on November 1, 1962 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of [[NATO]] forces on January 1, 1963.[^13] The Joint Staff history records that Norstad announced his retirement in July 1962 and that his own departure, delayed by the Cuban missile crisis, took place on January 2, 1963.[^14] The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
### Declassification and Significance
The document remained classified for thirty-five years and was among the records released in 1997 under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required declassification of documents relating to the Kennedy assassination regardless of their original security designation. NORTHWOODS was included because it was part of the operational planning environment in which Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs were operating in 1962-1963.
James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^12]
James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^15]
### Footnotes
@ -79,4 +79,7 @@ James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Bo
[^9]: Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and editorial note quoting U. Alexis Johnson's handwritten covering memorandum of March 16, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 314. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314
[^10]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11, pp. 158-160. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
[^11]: Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone on the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
[^12]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.
[^12]: John F. Kennedy, news conference no. 39, July 23, 1962. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-39
[^13]: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, biography of General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2024). https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Lyman-Louis-Lemnitzer
[^14]: Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. VIII, chapter on NATO. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V008.pdf
[^15]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.

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40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Scott Inquiry.md
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@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ tags:
- ArmsToIraq
- Intelligence
- ParliamentaryDeception
summary: "The Scott Inquiry (formally the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions) was a British judicial inquiry conducted 1992-1996 by Lord Justice Richard Scott, which examined the Thatcher and Major governments' secret relaxation of arms export guidelines to Iraq and the subsequent deception of Parliament; it produced a 1,800-page report finding systematic ministerial concealment and the improper use of public interest immunity certificates to suppress evidence in the Matrix Churchill prosecution."
summary: "The Scott Inquiry (1992-1996), led by Lord Justice Richard Scott, examined British arms exports to Iraq and the Matrix Churchill prosecution, and reported on February 15, 1996."
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-12
start: 1992-11-10
end: 1996-02-15
location: "United Kingdom"
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The Matrix Churchill prosecution collapsed when the trial judge allowed the supp
Scott's 1,800-page report, published February 15, 1996, made the following principal findings:
- The Thatcher government had secretly relaxed the Howe Guidelines on arms exports to Iraq in 1988, following the Iran-Iraq War ceasefire, without public acknowledgment.
- The Thatcher government relaxed the Howe Guidelines on arms exports to Iraq after the 1988 ceasefire. In the words [[Ian Lang]] quoted from the report to the Commons, government policy "following the ceasefire in 1988, but not before, ... changed in a way that he believes should have been drawn to the attention of the House."[^3]
- Ministers had given "designedly uninformative" (Scott's phrase) answers to Parliamentary questions about the export guidelines, amounting to deliberate misleading of Parliament even if not technically false.
- Public Interest Immunity certificates had been improperly used in the Matrix Churchill prosecution - not to protect genuine national security secrets but to protect the government from political embarrassment.
- [[MI6]] had been running Paul Henderson as a source for years during the period when his company was being prosecuted; the prosecution of a cooperating intelligence source was characterized as a serious institutional failure.
@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ Scott's 1,800-page report, published February 15, 1996, made the following princ
Scott specifically declined to conclude that ministers had acted in bad faith, which became the subject of intensive political controversy: the government argued that Scott's findings did not amount to the condemnations they contained, while opposition parties argued the ministerial conduct described was dishonest by any reasonable standard.[^1]
### Government statement of February 15, 1996
On February 15, 1996, the President of the Board of Trade, Ian Lang, made a statement to the Commons on the report. He said that "Both Ministers and officials believed at the time that they were applying policy in a way that remained within the existing guidelines and Sir Richard expressly accepts that they were sincere in doing so." He said that the report "demonstrates that that allegation is false and without foundation," referring to the charge that ministers who signed public interest immunity certificates sought to deprive defendants of the means to clear themselves. Lang reported that Scott concluded "that all Ministers who signed PII certificates did so without any impropriety."[^3]
### Political Impact
The Scott Report's publication in February 1996 was a major political event. The government attempted to suppress the report's impact by giving ministers access to advance copies while giving opposition politicians only ninety minutes to read the 1,800-page document before the Parliamentary debate. The parliamentary session that followed - in which the government survived a vote of confidence on the Scott findings by a single vote - was one of the closest in post-war British parliamentary history.
@ -49,3 +53,4 @@ The [[Arms-to-Iraq]] affair and Scott Inquiry, taken together, established that
[^1]: Scott, Lord Justice Richard. *Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions.* HMSO, February 1996.
[^2]: Norton-Taylor, Richard. *Truth is a Difficult Concept: Inside the Scott Inquiry.* Fourth Estate, 1995.
[^3]: Lang, Ian, statement on the Scott Report, House of Commons, February 15, 1996, HC Deb vol. 271, cols. 1139-64. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/feb/15/scott-report

49
40 - EVENTS/MODERN_INCIDENTS/September 11 attacks.md
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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ relations:
role: "accountability review of CIA performance before the attacks"
fn: 25
created: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-12
---
The September 11 attacks were four coordinated hijackings of [[United States]] airliners carried out on September 11, 2001, by members of [[al-Qaeda]]. [[American Airlines]] Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the [[World Trade Center]] at 8:46:40, [[United Airlines]] Flight 175 struck the South Tower at 9:03:11, American Airlines Flight 77 struck the [[Pentagon]] at 9:37:46, and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03:11. The [[9/11 Commission]] counted 2,973 deaths, which it described as the largest loss of life from a hostile attack on United States soil.[^1]
@ -148,27 +148,27 @@ The 9/11 Commission's report reached the same conclusion and in a note described
### Able Danger
On September 21, 2005 the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]] held a hearing on Able Danger, a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program. Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000, that an official had been ordered to destroy up to 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data, and that an FBI employee had arranged three meetings with the FBI Washington Field Office in September 2000 that Defense Department officials cancelled at the last minute.[^42] Attorney [[Mark Zaid]] testified that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States and that a chart listing Atta under "Brooklyn, New York" prompted concern among Army lawyers about compiling data on United States persons.[^43]
On September 21, 2005 the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]] held a hearing on Able Danger, a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program. Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000, that an official had been ordered to destroy up to 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data, and that an FBI employee had arranged three meetings with the FBI Washington Field Office in September 2000 that Defense Department officials cancelled at the last minute.[^42] The hearing took witnesses from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Gary M. Bald), the Defense Department (William Dugan) and industry ([[Erik Kleinsmith]], then of [[Lockheed Martin]]), and a second panel of Attorney [[Mark Zaid]], who told the committee that most of his testimony was hearsay, because it rested on what he had been told by people associated with Able Danger.[^43][^44] Zaid also testified that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States and that a chart listing Atta under "Brooklyn, New York" prompted concern among Army lawyers about compiling data on United States persons.[^43]
A letter from former Commissioner [[Slade Gorton]] entered in the hearing record stated that the notes of Commission staff of a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel [[Anthony Shaffer]] made no mention of Atta, that the White House lawyer present agreed, and that the [[Department of Defense]] had provided all relevant Able Danger documents to the Commission. The letter stated that the Department of Defense said Shaffer worked on the program for a total of 27 days and lost his security clearance in March 2004.[^44]
A letter from former Commissioner [[Slade Gorton]] entered in the hearing record stated that the notes of Commission staff of a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel [[Anthony Shaffer]] made no mention of Atta, that the White House lawyer present agreed, and that the [[Department of Defense]] had provided all relevant Able Danger documents to the Commission. The letter stated that the Department of Defense said Shaffer worked on the program for a total of 27 days and lost his security clearance in March 2004.[^45]
The Department of Defense Inspector General report of September 18, 2006 concluded that Able Danger team members did not identify Atta or any other hijacker before the attacks. It found that the chart witnesses remembered was a May 1999 Orion Scientific chart of 53 terrorists, including a Brooklyn cell, which did not include Atta, that four witnesses who recalled seeing Atta on a chart gave recollections that were not accurate, and that witnesses in a position to know denied that Able Danger members were barred from meeting the FBI.[^45]
The Department of Defense Inspector General report of September 18, 2006 concluded that Able Danger team members did not identify Atta or any other hijacker before the attacks. It found that the chart witnesses remembered was a May 1999 Orion Scientific chart of 53 terrorists, including a Brooklyn cell, which did not include Atta, that four witnesses who recalled seeing Atta on a chart gave recollections that were not accurate, and that witnesses in a position to know denied that Able Danger members were barred from meeting the FBI.[^46]
### Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
Families of victims and others sued Saudi Arabia and other defendants in the multidistrict litigation *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 03-md-1570, in the Southern District of New York before Judge [[George B. Daniels]]. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first moved to dismiss in 2004 on grounds of sovereign immunity. On September 29, 2015, Daniels granted a motion to dismiss on that ground.[^46]
Families of victims and others sued Saudi Arabia and other defendants in the multidistrict litigation *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 03-md-1570, in the Southern District of New York before Judge [[George B. Daniels]]. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first moved to dismiss in 2004 on grounds of sovereign immunity. On September 29, 2015, Daniels granted a motion to dismiss on that ground.[^47]
On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted 71 to 27 to table a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39, a resolution disapproving a proposed sale of M1A1/A2 Abrams tank structures and other defense equipment to Saudi Arabia.[^47] On September 20, 2016, the law firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck had written to Saudi Foreign Minister [[Adel al-Jubeir]] accepting an engagement as "policy counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in connection with the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)," at $100,000 a month "until JASTA becomes law or until March 31, 2017, whichever is later." The firm registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] on September 22, 2016, describing its activity as communicating "with Members of Congress and members of the executive branch regarding" JASTA and its passage into law.[^48] Squire Patton Boggs registered on September 20, 2016 for the Center for Studies and Media Affairs at the Saudi Royal Court, to provide "legal and strategic policy advice and advocacy on foreign policy and related issues," and reported receiving $400,000 from that principal on April 1, 2017.[^49] The FARA bulk registry lists foreign principal registrations for Saudi Arabian principals in September 2016 by Squire Patton Boggs, S.G.R. LLC Government Relations and Lobbying and FGS Global on September 20, Brownstein on September 22, King & Spalding on September 26, and the Podesta Group on September 30.[^50]
On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted 71 to 27 to table a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39, a resolution disapproving a proposed sale of M1A1/A2 Abrams tank structures and other defense equipment to Saudi Arabia.[^48] On September 20, 2016, the law firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck had written to Saudi Foreign Minister [[Adel al-Jubeir]] accepting an engagement as "policy counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in connection with the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)," at $100,000 a month "until JASTA becomes law or until March 31, 2017, whichever is later." The firm registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] on September 22, 2016, describing its activity as communicating "with Members of Congress and members of the executive branch regarding" JASTA and its passage into law.[^49] Squire Patton Boggs registered on September 20, 2016 for the Center for Studies and Media Affairs at the Saudi Royal Court, to provide "legal and strategic policy advice and advocacy on foreign policy and related issues," and reported receiving $400,000 from that principal on April 1, 2017.[^50] The FARA bulk registry lists foreign principal registrations for Saudi Arabian principals in September 2016 by Squire Patton Boggs, S.G.R. LLC Government Relations and Lobbying and FGS Global on September 20, Brownstein on September 22, King & Spalding on September 26, and the Podesta Group on September 30.[^51]
On September 28, 2016, the Senate voted 97 to 1 to override the President's veto of S. 2040, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. [[Harry Reid]] voted no; [[Tim Kaine]] and [[Bernie Sanders]] did not vote.[^51] The act, Public Law 114-222, created an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for physical injury or death in the United States caused by an act of international terrorism and a tortious act of a foreign state or its officials, employees or agents acting within the scope of their office, employment or agency.[^52]
On September 28, 2016, the Senate voted 97 to 1 to override the President's veto of S. 2040, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. [[Harry Reid]] voted no; [[Tim Kaine]] and [[Bernie Sanders]] did not vote.[^52] The act, Public Law 114-222, created an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for physical injury or death in the United States caused by an act of international terrorism and a tortious act of a foreign state or its officials, employees or agents acting within the scope of their office, employment or agency.[^53]
The Second Circuit vacated the 2015 decision on request of the parties. In 2018 Daniels held that plaintiffs' allegations of direct liability were insufficient but that vicarious liability was reasonably articulated, and ordered limited jurisdictional discovery on whether Thumairy, Bayoumi and their agents acted at the direction of more senior Saudi officials in assisting Hazmi and Mihdhar. Magistrate Judge [[Sarah Netburn]] supervised the discovery. Saudi Arabia filed its renewed motion on October 6, 2023, and Daniels heard argument on July 31, 2024.[^53]
The Second Circuit vacated the 2015 decision on request of the parties. In 2018 Daniels held that plaintiffs' allegations of direct liability were insufficient but that vicarious liability was reasonably articulated, and ordered limited jurisdictional discovery on whether Thumairy, Bayoumi and their agents acted at the direction of more senior Saudi officials in assisting Hazmi and Mihdhar. Magistrate Judge [[Sarah Netburn]] supervised the discovery. Saudi Arabia filed its renewed motion on October 6, 2023, and Daniels heard argument on July 31, 2024.[^54]
On August 28, 2025, Daniels denied the motion. His decision records that Bayoumi worked for Saudi Arabia's civil aviation agency from 1977 and was sent to San Diego in 1994, paid through Dallah Avco, with the title of senior data processing technician and without performing that work; that plaintiffs contend he was a cooptee of Saudi intelligence and that he testified he never was a Saudi intelligence officer; that Thumairy held diplomatic status from 1996 to 2003 and that from 1999 to 2001 a bank account he had opened received significant funds from Prince Abdulaziz, a senior Saudi cabinet member, which Thumairy said were used for charitable donations and mosque expenses; that Thumairy testified he did not recall meeting Hazmi or Mihdhar and never gave instructions to assist them; and that a mosque congregant testified that no one, including Thumairy, told him to help the hijackers. It records that Akram Alzamari told the FBI that the congregant had said Thumairy asked him to look after two "significant" people, and that Alzamari testified in 2020 that the FBI's notes of that statement were erroneous.[^54]
On August 28, 2025, Daniels denied the motion. His decision records that Bayoumi worked for Saudi Arabia's civil aviation agency from 1977 and was sent to San Diego in 1994, paid through Dallah Avco, with the title of senior data processing technician and without performing that work; that plaintiffs contend he was a cooptee of Saudi intelligence and that he testified he never was a Saudi intelligence officer; that Thumairy held diplomatic status from 1996 to 2003 and that from 1999 to 2001 a bank account he had opened received significant funds from Prince Abdulaziz, a senior Saudi cabinet member, which Thumairy said were used for charitable donations and mosque expenses; that Thumairy testified he did not recall meeting Hazmi or Mihdhar and never gave instructions to assist them; and that a mosque congregant testified that no one, including Thumairy, told him to help the hijackers. It records that Akram Alzamari told the FBI that the congregant had said Thumairy asked him to look after two "significant" people, and that Alzamari testified in 2020 that the FBI's notes of that statement were erroneous.[^55]
The decision records that Bayoumi made at least 93 calls to the Saudi Embassy between January 19 and March 24, 2000, 30 of them to its Islamic Affairs Department; that from March to April 2000 his monthly compensation from Dallah Avco more than doubled, with the personnel form giving "promotion" as the reason; that he filmed a one-hour video of [[Washington, D.C.]] in June 1999 including the Capitol; and that a notepad seized from his home in the [[United Kingdom]] in September 2001 contained a sketch of an airplane with notes on height and distance, which he testified was an equation he had memorized. It records that the hijackers rented a room in Lemon Grove from Abdussattar Shaikh, an FBI informant since 1994 whom the Justice Department Inspector General's report described as given a $100,000 payment in July 2003, and that Shaikh told the FBI he believed Bayoumi was an agent of the Saudi government. It records that after the attacks Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry told Thumairy not to return to the United States, that Jarrah wrote on November 9, 2001 that Thumairy was not a suspect and asked that he return to work, that the King and the Foreign Ministry approved his return on November 28, 2001, and that the State Department revoked his visa on March 21, 2003.[^55]
The decision records that Bayoumi made at least 93 calls to the Saudi Embassy between January 19 and March 24, 2000, 30 of them to its Islamic Affairs Department; that from March to April 2000 his monthly compensation from Dallah Avco more than doubled, with the personnel form giving "promotion" as the reason; that he filmed a one-hour video of [[Washington, D.C.]] in June 1999 including the Capitol; and that a notepad seized from his home in the [[United Kingdom]] in September 2001 contained a sketch of an airplane with notes on height and distance, which he testified was an equation he had memorized. It records that the hijackers rented a room in Lemon Grove from Abdussattar Shaikh, an FBI informant since 1994 whom the Justice Department Inspector General's report described as given a $100,000 payment in July 2003, and that Shaikh told the FBI he believed Bayoumi was an agent of the Saudi government. It records that after the attacks Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry told Thumairy not to return to the United States, that Jarrah wrote on November 9, 2001 that Thumairy was not a suspect and asked that he return to work, that the King and the Foreign Ministry approved his return on November 28, 2001, and that the State Department revoked his visa on March 21, 2003.[^56]
The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the roles played by Bayoumi, Thumairy, and KSA," that Saudi Arabia's explanations were "either self-contradictory or not strong enough" to overcome the inference that it had employed them to assist the hijackers, and that many facts, including whether the February 2000 meetings were planned, were disputed and would be resolved at trial. It concludes: "Plaintiffs' claims will proceed to decision on their merits."[^56]
The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the roles played by Bayoumi, Thumairy, and KSA," that Saudi Arabia's explanations were "either self-contradictory or not strong enough" to overcome the inference that it had employed them to assist the hijackers, and that many facts, including whether the February 2000 meetings were planned, were disputed and would be resolved at trial. It concludes: "Plaintiffs' claims will proceed to decision on their merits."[^57]
### Footnotes
@ -215,16 +215,17 @@ The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the
[^41]: *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 172 and note 130 (p. 499).
[^42]: Statement of Representative Curt Weldon, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., S. Hrg. 109-311 (September 21, 2005), pp. 6-13. https://archive.org/details/gov.gpo.fdsys.CHRG-109shrg25409
[^43]: Testimony of Mark S. Zaid, S. Hrg. 109-311, p. 31.
[^44]: Slade Gorton to Senators Specter and Leahy, letter of September 20, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, pp. 57-58.
[^45]: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, *Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve*, September 18, 2006, p. 3 and Figure 1. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dia/FOIA-0238-2016.pdf
[^46]: *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, No. 03-md-1570 (GBD)(SN) (S.D.N.Y.), Memorandum Decision and Order of August 28, 2025, ECF No. 11182, pp. 1-2 (citing 134 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). https://assets.alm.com/56/48/0c58055d436488d8aaee80d07ca1/03-md-01570-11182-2.pdf
[^47]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 145 (September 21, 2016), motion to table the motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00145.htm
[^48]: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, registration statement exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 5870, received September 22, 2016, with fee agreement letter of September 20, 2016 to H.E. Adel Al-Jubeir. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5870-Exhibit-AB-20160922-4.pdf
[^49]: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 2165, received September 20, 2016, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Exhibit-AB-20160920-67.pdf; supplemental statement for January 1 to June 30, 2017, received August 1, 2017, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Supplemental-Statement-20170801-26.pdf
[^50]: Department of Justice, FARA bulk data file "FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals," foreign principal registration dates for registrants 2165, 6379, 5666, 5870, 6307 and 5926, accessed October 1, 2026. https://efile.fara.gov/bulk/zip/FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals.csv.zip
[^51]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 148 (September 28, 2016), "Shall the Bill S. 2040 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?" https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00148.htm
[^52]: Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (September 28, 2016), codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1605B. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-114publ222/html/PLAW-114publ222.htm
[^53]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 2-4.
[^54]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 10-13.
[^55]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 14-15, 23-24, 27-29.
[^56]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 43-45.
[^44]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing, September 21, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, Serial No. J-109-39 (Government Printing Office, 2006), witness list and testimony of Gary M. Bald, William Dugan, Erik Kleinsmith and Mark S. Zaid (pp. 21-22). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg25409/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25409.pdf
[^45]: Slade Gorton to Senators Specter and Leahy, letter of September 20, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, pp. 57-58.
[^46]: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, *Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve*, September 18, 2006, p. 3 and Figure 1. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dia/FOIA-0238-2016.pdf
[^47]: *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, No. 03-md-1570 (GBD)(SN) (S.D.N.Y.), Memorandum Decision and Order of August 28, 2025, ECF No. 11182, pp. 1-2 (citing 134 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). https://assets.alm.com/56/48/0c58055d436488d8aaee80d07ca1/03-md-01570-11182-2.pdf
[^48]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 145 (September 21, 2016), motion to table the motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00145.htm
[^49]: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, registration statement exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 5870, received September 22, 2016, with fee agreement letter of September 20, 2016 to H.E. Adel Al-Jubeir. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5870-Exhibit-AB-20160922-4.pdf
[^50]: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 2165, received September 20, 2016, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Exhibit-AB-20160920-67.pdf; supplemental statement for January 1 to June 30, 2017, received August 1, 2017, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Supplemental-Statement-20170801-26.pdf
[^51]: Department of Justice, FARA bulk data file "FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals," foreign principal registration dates for registrants 2165, 6379, 5666, 5870, 6307 and 5926, accessed October 1, 2026. https://efile.fara.gov/bulk/zip/FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals.csv.zip
[^52]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 148 (September 28, 2016), "Shall the Bill S. 2040 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?" https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00148.htm
[^53]: Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (September 28, 2016), codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1605B. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-114publ222/html/PLAW-114publ222.htm
[^54]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 2-4.
[^55]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 10-13.
[^56]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 14-15, 23-24, 27-29.
[^57]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 43-45.