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@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ On March 6, 1962 Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wro
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On March 16, 1962 President Kennedy met with [[John A. McCone]], General [[Maxwell Taylor]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Lemnitzer to discuss the Mongoose guidelines. [[U. Alexis Johnson]]'s handwritten note records that "The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action," and that "no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^9] On April 5, 1962 the Special Group concluded that Mongoose should re-examine its basic philosophy "with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention," and five days later (April 10) the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both questions put by General Maxwell Taylor, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so.[^10] At the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), according to McCone's notes, the "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^11]
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Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction.[^1] In July 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint Lemnitzer as JCS Chairman when his term expired; Lemnitzer was transferred to command [[NATO]] forces in Europe. The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
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Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction.[^1] In July 1962 Kennedy announced Lemnitzer's move to Europe in place of a second term as Chairman; at his news conference of July 23, 1962 he said Norstad's resignation would take effect October 1 and that Lemnitzer "could have retired in October and there would have been a vacancy as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^12] Lemnitzer's term as Chairman ended on September 30, 1962, and he became Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command on November 1, 1962 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of [[NATO]] forces on January 1, 1963.[^13] The Joint Staff history records that Norstad announced his retirement in July 1962 and that his own departure, delayed by the Cuban missile crisis, took place on January 2, 1963.[^14] The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
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### Declassification and Significance
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The document remained classified for thirty-five years and was among the records released in 1997 under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required declassification of documents relating to the Kennedy assassination regardless of their original security designation. NORTHWOODS was included because it was part of the operational planning environment in which Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs were operating in 1962-1963.
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James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^12]
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James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^15]
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### Footnotes
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@ -79,4 +79,7 @@ James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Bo
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[^9]: Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and editorial note quoting U. Alexis Johnson's handwritten covering memorandum of March 16, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 314. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314
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[^10]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11, pp. 158-160. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
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[^11]: Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone on the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
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[^12]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.
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[^12]: John F. Kennedy, news conference no. 39, July 23, 1962. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-39
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[^13]: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, biography of General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2024). https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Lyman-Louis-Lemnitzer
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[^14]: Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. VIII, chapter on NATO. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V008.pdf
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[^15]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.
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