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40 - EVENTS/MODERN_INCIDENTS/September 11 attacks.md
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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ relations:
role: "accountability review of CIA performance before the attacks"
fn: 25
created: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-12
---
The September 11 attacks were four coordinated hijackings of [[United States]] airliners carried out on September 11, 2001, by members of [[al-Qaeda]]. [[American Airlines]] Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the [[World Trade Center]] at 8:46:40, [[United Airlines]] Flight 175 struck the South Tower at 9:03:11, American Airlines Flight 77 struck the [[Pentagon]] at 9:37:46, and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03:11. The [[9/11 Commission]] counted 2,973 deaths, which it described as the largest loss of life from a hostile attack on United States soil.[^1]
@ -148,27 +148,27 @@ The 9/11 Commission's report reached the same conclusion and in a note described
### Able Danger
On September 21, 2005 the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]] held a hearing on Able Danger, a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program. Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000, that an official had been ordered to destroy up to 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data, and that an FBI employee had arranged three meetings with the FBI Washington Field Office in September 2000 that Defense Department officials cancelled at the last minute.[^42] Attorney [[Mark Zaid]] testified that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States and that a chart listing Atta under "Brooklyn, New York" prompted concern among Army lawyers about compiling data on United States persons.[^43]
On September 21, 2005 the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]] held a hearing on Able Danger, a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program. Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000, that an official had been ordered to destroy up to 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data, and that an FBI employee had arranged three meetings with the FBI Washington Field Office in September 2000 that Defense Department officials cancelled at the last minute.[^42] The hearing took witnesses from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Gary M. Bald), the Defense Department (William Dugan) and industry ([[Erik Kleinsmith]], then of [[Lockheed Martin]]), and a second panel of Attorney [[Mark Zaid]], who told the committee that most of his testimony was hearsay, because it rested on what he had been told by people associated with Able Danger.[^43][^44] Zaid also testified that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States and that a chart listing Atta under "Brooklyn, New York" prompted concern among Army lawyers about compiling data on United States persons.[^43]
A letter from former Commissioner [[Slade Gorton]] entered in the hearing record stated that the notes of Commission staff of a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel [[Anthony Shaffer]] made no mention of Atta, that the White House lawyer present agreed, and that the [[Department of Defense]] had provided all relevant Able Danger documents to the Commission. The letter stated that the Department of Defense said Shaffer worked on the program for a total of 27 days and lost his security clearance in March 2004.[^44]
A letter from former Commissioner [[Slade Gorton]] entered in the hearing record stated that the notes of Commission staff of a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel [[Anthony Shaffer]] made no mention of Atta, that the White House lawyer present agreed, and that the [[Department of Defense]] had provided all relevant Able Danger documents to the Commission. The letter stated that the Department of Defense said Shaffer worked on the program for a total of 27 days and lost his security clearance in March 2004.[^45]
The Department of Defense Inspector General report of September 18, 2006 concluded that Able Danger team members did not identify Atta or any other hijacker before the attacks. It found that the chart witnesses remembered was a May 1999 Orion Scientific chart of 53 terrorists, including a Brooklyn cell, which did not include Atta, that four witnesses who recalled seeing Atta on a chart gave recollections that were not accurate, and that witnesses in a position to know denied that Able Danger members were barred from meeting the FBI.[^45]
The Department of Defense Inspector General report of September 18, 2006 concluded that Able Danger team members did not identify Atta or any other hijacker before the attacks. It found that the chart witnesses remembered was a May 1999 Orion Scientific chart of 53 terrorists, including a Brooklyn cell, which did not include Atta, that four witnesses who recalled seeing Atta on a chart gave recollections that were not accurate, and that witnesses in a position to know denied that Able Danger members were barred from meeting the FBI.[^46]
### Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
Families of victims and others sued Saudi Arabia and other defendants in the multidistrict litigation *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 03-md-1570, in the Southern District of New York before Judge [[George B. Daniels]]. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first moved to dismiss in 2004 on grounds of sovereign immunity. On September 29, 2015, Daniels granted a motion to dismiss on that ground.[^46]
Families of victims and others sued Saudi Arabia and other defendants in the multidistrict litigation *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 03-md-1570, in the Southern District of New York before Judge [[George B. Daniels]]. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first moved to dismiss in 2004 on grounds of sovereign immunity. On September 29, 2015, Daniels granted a motion to dismiss on that ground.[^47]
On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted 71 to 27 to table a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39, a resolution disapproving a proposed sale of M1A1/A2 Abrams tank structures and other defense equipment to Saudi Arabia.[^47] On September 20, 2016, the law firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck had written to Saudi Foreign Minister [[Adel al-Jubeir]] accepting an engagement as "policy counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in connection with the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)," at $100,000 a month "until JASTA becomes law or until March 31, 2017, whichever is later." The firm registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] on September 22, 2016, describing its activity as communicating "with Members of Congress and members of the executive branch regarding" JASTA and its passage into law.[^48] Squire Patton Boggs registered on September 20, 2016 for the Center for Studies and Media Affairs at the Saudi Royal Court, to provide "legal and strategic policy advice and advocacy on foreign policy and related issues," and reported receiving $400,000 from that principal on April 1, 2017.[^49] The FARA bulk registry lists foreign principal registrations for Saudi Arabian principals in September 2016 by Squire Patton Boggs, S.G.R. LLC Government Relations and Lobbying and FGS Global on September 20, Brownstein on September 22, King & Spalding on September 26, and the Podesta Group on September 30.[^50]
On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted 71 to 27 to table a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39, a resolution disapproving a proposed sale of M1A1/A2 Abrams tank structures and other defense equipment to Saudi Arabia.[^48] On September 20, 2016, the law firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck had written to Saudi Foreign Minister [[Adel al-Jubeir]] accepting an engagement as "policy counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in connection with the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)," at $100,000 a month "until JASTA becomes law or until March 31, 2017, whichever is later." The firm registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] on September 22, 2016, describing its activity as communicating "with Members of Congress and members of the executive branch regarding" JASTA and its passage into law.[^49] Squire Patton Boggs registered on September 20, 2016 for the Center for Studies and Media Affairs at the Saudi Royal Court, to provide "legal and strategic policy advice and advocacy on foreign policy and related issues," and reported receiving $400,000 from that principal on April 1, 2017.[^50] The FARA bulk registry lists foreign principal registrations for Saudi Arabian principals in September 2016 by Squire Patton Boggs, S.G.R. LLC Government Relations and Lobbying and FGS Global on September 20, Brownstein on September 22, King & Spalding on September 26, and the Podesta Group on September 30.[^51]
On September 28, 2016, the Senate voted 97 to 1 to override the President's veto of S. 2040, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. [[Harry Reid]] voted no; [[Tim Kaine]] and [[Bernie Sanders]] did not vote.[^51] The act, Public Law 114-222, created an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for physical injury or death in the United States caused by an act of international terrorism and a tortious act of a foreign state or its officials, employees or agents acting within the scope of their office, employment or agency.[^52]
On September 28, 2016, the Senate voted 97 to 1 to override the President's veto of S. 2040, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. [[Harry Reid]] voted no; [[Tim Kaine]] and [[Bernie Sanders]] did not vote.[^52] The act, Public Law 114-222, created an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for physical injury or death in the United States caused by an act of international terrorism and a tortious act of a foreign state or its officials, employees or agents acting within the scope of their office, employment or agency.[^53]
The Second Circuit vacated the 2015 decision on request of the parties. In 2018 Daniels held that plaintiffs' allegations of direct liability were insufficient but that vicarious liability was reasonably articulated, and ordered limited jurisdictional discovery on whether Thumairy, Bayoumi and their agents acted at the direction of more senior Saudi officials in assisting Hazmi and Mihdhar. Magistrate Judge [[Sarah Netburn]] supervised the discovery. Saudi Arabia filed its renewed motion on October 6, 2023, and Daniels heard argument on July 31, 2024.[^53]
The Second Circuit vacated the 2015 decision on request of the parties. In 2018 Daniels held that plaintiffs' allegations of direct liability were insufficient but that vicarious liability was reasonably articulated, and ordered limited jurisdictional discovery on whether Thumairy, Bayoumi and their agents acted at the direction of more senior Saudi officials in assisting Hazmi and Mihdhar. Magistrate Judge [[Sarah Netburn]] supervised the discovery. Saudi Arabia filed its renewed motion on October 6, 2023, and Daniels heard argument on July 31, 2024.[^54]
On August 28, 2025, Daniels denied the motion. His decision records that Bayoumi worked for Saudi Arabia's civil aviation agency from 1977 and was sent to San Diego in 1994, paid through Dallah Avco, with the title of senior data processing technician and without performing that work; that plaintiffs contend he was a cooptee of Saudi intelligence and that he testified he never was a Saudi intelligence officer; that Thumairy held diplomatic status from 1996 to 2003 and that from 1999 to 2001 a bank account he had opened received significant funds from Prince Abdulaziz, a senior Saudi cabinet member, which Thumairy said were used for charitable donations and mosque expenses; that Thumairy testified he did not recall meeting Hazmi or Mihdhar and never gave instructions to assist them; and that a mosque congregant testified that no one, including Thumairy, told him to help the hijackers. It records that Akram Alzamari told the FBI that the congregant had said Thumairy asked him to look after two "significant" people, and that Alzamari testified in 2020 that the FBI's notes of that statement were erroneous.[^54]
On August 28, 2025, Daniels denied the motion. His decision records that Bayoumi worked for Saudi Arabia's civil aviation agency from 1977 and was sent to San Diego in 1994, paid through Dallah Avco, with the title of senior data processing technician and without performing that work; that plaintiffs contend he was a cooptee of Saudi intelligence and that he testified he never was a Saudi intelligence officer; that Thumairy held diplomatic status from 1996 to 2003 and that from 1999 to 2001 a bank account he had opened received significant funds from Prince Abdulaziz, a senior Saudi cabinet member, which Thumairy said were used for charitable donations and mosque expenses; that Thumairy testified he did not recall meeting Hazmi or Mihdhar and never gave instructions to assist them; and that a mosque congregant testified that no one, including Thumairy, told him to help the hijackers. It records that Akram Alzamari told the FBI that the congregant had said Thumairy asked him to look after two "significant" people, and that Alzamari testified in 2020 that the FBI's notes of that statement were erroneous.[^55]
The decision records that Bayoumi made at least 93 calls to the Saudi Embassy between January 19 and March 24, 2000, 30 of them to its Islamic Affairs Department; that from March to April 2000 his monthly compensation from Dallah Avco more than doubled, with the personnel form giving "promotion" as the reason; that he filmed a one-hour video of [[Washington, D.C.]] in June 1999 including the Capitol; and that a notepad seized from his home in the [[United Kingdom]] in September 2001 contained a sketch of an airplane with notes on height and distance, which he testified was an equation he had memorized. It records that the hijackers rented a room in Lemon Grove from Abdussattar Shaikh, an FBI informant since 1994 whom the Justice Department Inspector General's report described as given a $100,000 payment in July 2003, and that Shaikh told the FBI he believed Bayoumi was an agent of the Saudi government. It records that after the attacks Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry told Thumairy not to return to the United States, that Jarrah wrote on November 9, 2001 that Thumairy was not a suspect and asked that he return to work, that the King and the Foreign Ministry approved his return on November 28, 2001, and that the State Department revoked his visa on March 21, 2003.[^55]
The decision records that Bayoumi made at least 93 calls to the Saudi Embassy between January 19 and March 24, 2000, 30 of them to its Islamic Affairs Department; that from March to April 2000 his monthly compensation from Dallah Avco more than doubled, with the personnel form giving "promotion" as the reason; that he filmed a one-hour video of [[Washington, D.C.]] in June 1999 including the Capitol; and that a notepad seized from his home in the [[United Kingdom]] in September 2001 contained a sketch of an airplane with notes on height and distance, which he testified was an equation he had memorized. It records that the hijackers rented a room in Lemon Grove from Abdussattar Shaikh, an FBI informant since 1994 whom the Justice Department Inspector General's report described as given a $100,000 payment in July 2003, and that Shaikh told the FBI he believed Bayoumi was an agent of the Saudi government. It records that after the attacks Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry told Thumairy not to return to the United States, that Jarrah wrote on November 9, 2001 that Thumairy was not a suspect and asked that he return to work, that the King and the Foreign Ministry approved his return on November 28, 2001, and that the State Department revoked his visa on March 21, 2003.[^56]
The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the roles played by Bayoumi, Thumairy, and KSA," that Saudi Arabia's explanations were "either self-contradictory or not strong enough" to overcome the inference that it had employed them to assist the hijackers, and that many facts, including whether the February 2000 meetings were planned, were disputed and would be resolved at trial. It concludes: "Plaintiffs' claims will proceed to decision on their merits."[^56]
The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the roles played by Bayoumi, Thumairy, and KSA," that Saudi Arabia's explanations were "either self-contradictory or not strong enough" to overcome the inference that it had employed them to assist the hijackers, and that many facts, including whether the February 2000 meetings were planned, were disputed and would be resolved at trial. It concludes: "Plaintiffs' claims will proceed to decision on their merits."[^57]
### Footnotes
@ -215,16 +215,17 @@ The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the
[^41]: *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 172 and note 130 (p. 499).
[^42]: Statement of Representative Curt Weldon, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., S. Hrg. 109-311 (September 21, 2005), pp. 6-13. https://archive.org/details/gov.gpo.fdsys.CHRG-109shrg25409
[^43]: Testimony of Mark S. Zaid, S. Hrg. 109-311, p. 31.
[^44]: Slade Gorton to Senators Specter and Leahy, letter of September 20, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, pp. 57-58.
[^45]: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, *Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve*, September 18, 2006, p. 3 and Figure 1. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dia/FOIA-0238-2016.pdf
[^46]: *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, No. 03-md-1570 (GBD)(SN) (S.D.N.Y.), Memorandum Decision and Order of August 28, 2025, ECF No. 11182, pp. 1-2 (citing 134 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). https://assets.alm.com/56/48/0c58055d436488d8aaee80d07ca1/03-md-01570-11182-2.pdf
[^47]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 145 (September 21, 2016), motion to table the motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00145.htm
[^48]: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, registration statement exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 5870, received September 22, 2016, with fee agreement letter of September 20, 2016 to H.E. Adel Al-Jubeir. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5870-Exhibit-AB-20160922-4.pdf
[^49]: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 2165, received September 20, 2016, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Exhibit-AB-20160920-67.pdf; supplemental statement for January 1 to June 30, 2017, received August 1, 2017, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Supplemental-Statement-20170801-26.pdf
[^50]: Department of Justice, FARA bulk data file "FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals," foreign principal registration dates for registrants 2165, 6379, 5666, 5870, 6307 and 5926, accessed October 1, 2026. https://efile.fara.gov/bulk/zip/FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals.csv.zip
[^51]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 148 (September 28, 2016), "Shall the Bill S. 2040 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?" https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00148.htm
[^52]: Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (September 28, 2016), codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1605B. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-114publ222/html/PLAW-114publ222.htm
[^53]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 2-4.
[^54]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 10-13.
[^55]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 14-15, 23-24, 27-29.
[^56]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 43-45.
[^44]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing, September 21, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, Serial No. J-109-39 (Government Printing Office, 2006), witness list and testimony of Gary M. Bald, William Dugan, Erik Kleinsmith and Mark S. Zaid (pp. 21-22). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg25409/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25409.pdf
[^45]: Slade Gorton to Senators Specter and Leahy, letter of September 20, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, pp. 57-58.
[^46]: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, *Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve*, September 18, 2006, p. 3 and Figure 1. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dia/FOIA-0238-2016.pdf
[^47]: *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, No. 03-md-1570 (GBD)(SN) (S.D.N.Y.), Memorandum Decision and Order of August 28, 2025, ECF No. 11182, pp. 1-2 (citing 134 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). https://assets.alm.com/56/48/0c58055d436488d8aaee80d07ca1/03-md-01570-11182-2.pdf
[^48]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 145 (September 21, 2016), motion to table the motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00145.htm
[^49]: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, registration statement exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 5870, received September 22, 2016, with fee agreement letter of September 20, 2016 to H.E. Adel Al-Jubeir. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5870-Exhibit-AB-20160922-4.pdf
[^50]: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 2165, received September 20, 2016, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Exhibit-AB-20160920-67.pdf; supplemental statement for January 1 to June 30, 2017, received August 1, 2017, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Supplemental-Statement-20170801-26.pdf
[^51]: Department of Justice, FARA bulk data file "FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals," foreign principal registration dates for registrants 2165, 6379, 5666, 5870, 6307 and 5926, accessed October 1, 2026. https://efile.fara.gov/bulk/zip/FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals.csv.zip
[^52]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 148 (September 28, 2016), "Shall the Bill S. 2040 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?" https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00148.htm
[^53]: Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (September 28, 2016), codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1605B. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-114publ222/html/PLAW-114publ222.htm
[^54]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 2-4.
[^55]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 10-13.
[^56]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 14-15, 23-24, 27-29.
[^57]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 43-45.