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---
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---
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title: Dark Alliance
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aliases:
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- Dark Alliance
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@ -24,23 +24,24 @@ The series opened the first pipeline between [[Colombia]]'s cocaine cartels and
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### Public Reaction
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Initially published during the week between the Republican and Democratic national conventions, the series gained traction through talk radio and the Internet. The Web site recorded over one million hits in a single day. The Los Angeles City Council unanimously called for a federal investigation. Both [[California]] senators and a half-dozen congressmen demanded inquiries. CIA Director John Deutch ordered an internal investigation. [[Time]] magazine called it "the hottest topic in black America." Webb appeared on CNN, C-SPAN, MSNBC, and Dateline NBC.[^3]
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Initially published during the week between the Republican and Democratic national conventions, the series gained traction through talk radio and the Internet. The Web site recorded over one million hits in a single day. The Los Angeles City Council unanimously called for a federal investigation. Both [[California]] senators and a half-dozen congressmen demanded inquiries. CIA Director John Deutch ordered an internal investigation. [[Time]] magazine wrote that "the hottest topic in black America, bar none, is whether the CIA was responsible for introducing crack cocaine to the ghetto."[^3] Webb appeared on CNN, C-SPAN, MSNBC, and Dateline NBC.[^4]
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### Media Counterattack
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The [[Washington Post]] struck first on October 4, 1996, under the headline "The CIA and Crack: Evidence is Lacking of Alleged Plot." On October 20, 1996, both the [[New York Times]] and [[Los Angeles Times]] launched multi-day attack series, admitting the basic facts were true while arguing they did not prove CIA complicity. Webb discovered the Post's lead attacker, [[Walter Pincus]], had been a former CIA operative. The attacks alarmed Mercury News editors. [[Jerry Ceppos]] ordered Webb to stop advancing the story.[^4]
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The [[Washington Post]] struck first on October 4, 1996, under the headline "The CIA and Crack: Evidence is Lacking of Alleged Plot." On October 20, 1996, both the [[New York Times]] and [[Los Angeles Times]] launched multi-day attack series, admitting the basic facts were true while arguing they did not prove CIA complicity. Webb discovered the Post's lead attacker, [[Walter Pincus]], had been a former CIA operative. The attacks alarmed Mercury News editors. [[Jerry Ceppos]] ordered Webb to stop advancing the story.[^5]
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### Aftermath
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On May 11, 1997, Ceppos published a column acknowledging "shortcomings" in the series, a move the New York Times splashed on its front page. Ceppos killed all follow-up stories and transferred Webb to a suburban bureau. Webb resigned from the newspaper in November 1997. In March 1998, CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before Congress that the CIA had maintained relationships with dozens of suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war and had failed to cut off those relationships. [[The New York Times]] reported on July 17, 1998, that CIA higher-ups knew about the drug connections, confirming central elements of the series.[^5]
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On May 11, 1997, Ceppos published a column acknowledging "shortcomings" in the series, a move the New York Times splashed on its front page. Ceppos killed all follow-up stories and transferred Webb to a suburban bureau. Webb resigned from the newspaper in November 1997. In March 1998, CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before Congress that the CIA had maintained relationships with dozens of suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war and had failed to cut off those relationships. [[The New York Times]] reported on July 17, 1998, that CIA higher-ups knew about the drug connections, confirming central elements of the series.[^6]
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On May 11, 2000, the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] released a unanimously adopted report, having reviewed the CIA and [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]] inspector general reports and raw CIA files and held two town hall meetings in South Central Los Angeles, which concluded that the evidence did not support the implication "that the CIA was responsible for the crack epidemic in Los Angeles or anywhere else in the [[United States]] to further the cause of the Contra war in [[Central America]]."[^6]
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On May 11, 2000, the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] released a unanimously adopted report, having reviewed the CIA and [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]] inspector general reports and raw CIA files and held two town hall meetings in South Central Los Angeles, which concluded that the evidence did not support the implication "that the CIA was responsible for the crack epidemic in Los Angeles or anywhere else in the [[United States]] to further the cause of the Contra war in [[Central America]]."[^7]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue.
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[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue, Ch. 27.
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[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 27.
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[^3]: Jack E. White, "Dividing Line: Crack, Contras and Cyberspace," *Time*, September 30, 1996. https://time.com/archive/6729685/dividing-line-crack-contras-and-cyberspace/
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[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 27.
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[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
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[^6]: U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *Report on the Central Intelligence Agency's Alleged Involvement in Crack Cocaine Trafficking in the Los Angeles Area,* committee print, 106th Cong., February 2000; HPSCI press statement, May 11, 2000, quoted in *Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence During the 106th Congress,* H. Rept. 106-1054, 2001. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-106hrpt1054/html/CRPT-106hrpt1054.htm
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[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 27.
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[^6]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
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[^7]: U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *Report on the Central Intelligence Agency's Alleged Involvement in Crack Cocaine Trafficking in the Los Angeles Area,* committee print, 106th Cong., February 2000; HPSCI press statement, May 11, 2000, quoted in *Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence During the 106th Congress,* H. Rept. 106-1054, 2001. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-106hrpt1054/html/CRPT-106hrpt1054.htm
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@ -20,47 +20,84 @@ updated: 2026-10-08
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start: 1985-01-01
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end: 1993-12-31
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location: "Atlanta, Georgia"
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relations:
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- type: investigated
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with: "[[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]"
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reverse: true
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start: 1992
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end: 1993
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fn: 4
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- type: investigated
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with: "[[Frederick Lacey]]"
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reverse: true
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start: 1992-10-16
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end: 1992-12-09
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role: "special review of the Justice Department's handling of the case"
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fn: 15
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---
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The BNL scandal (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro scandal) grew from the discovery that the [[Atlanta|Atlanta, Georgia]] branch of [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] - Italy's largest state-owned bank - had illegally extended approximately $5 billion in unauthorized loans to [[Iraq]] between 1985 and 1989. The loans were used by [[Saddam Hussein]]'s government to finance purchases of weapons, weapons components, and dual-use industrial equipment. The FBI discovered the scheme on August 4, 1989, when agents raided the Atlanta branch and seized documents showing undisclosed credit facilities to Iraqi state enterprises.[^1]
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### The Atlanta Loans
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Branch manager Christopher Drogoul claimed to have acted alone, without authorization from BNL's Rome headquarters or his own supervisors in Atlanta. He subsequently recanted this claim, asserting that his superiors and U.S. government officials were aware of the transactions and that the loans were part of an authorized policy of providing financial cover for arms sales to Iraq. Drogoul was convicted in 1993 and sentenced to 37 months in federal prison.[^1]
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Branch manager Christopher Drogoul claimed to have acted alone, without authorization from BNL's Rome headquarters or his own supervisors in Atlanta. He subsequently recanted this claim, asserting that his superiors and U.S. government officials were aware of the transactions and that the loans were part of an authorized policy of providing financial cover for arms sales to Iraq. Drogoul was convicted in 1993 and sentenced to 37 months in federal prison.[^1] The Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of November 6, 1989, "Iraq-Italy: Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal," put the branch's unauthorized letters of credit for Iraq at $3.2 billion in 2,500 letters between February 1988 and July 1989, of which about $1.85 billion had been disbursed, including at least $800 million guaranteed by the Commodity Credit Corporation.[^2] The memorandum also stated that BNL's New York headquarters and its directors in Rome publicly denied knowing about the letters of credit, "although a BNL official in Chicago claims he notified New York and Rome several times about the unusual activity in Atlanta, according to press reports," and that Rome "appears satisfied to date with the cooperation of the US investigating agencies and appreciates the low-key manner in which Washington has reacted."[^2]
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The Iraqi entities that received the loans included the [[Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries]] and other procurement agencies that were simultaneously purchasing weapons components from Western suppliers. The loans were guaranteed in part by the U.S. [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] (CCC), a [[Department of Agriculture]] entity whose agricultural export guarantees to Iraq had been used to free up Iraqi hard currency for arms purchases - a mechanism separately documented in congressional investigations of the Iraq relationship.[^2]
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The Iraqi entities that received the loans included the [[Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries]] and other procurement agencies that were simultaneously purchasing weapons components from Western suppliers. The loans were guaranteed in part by the U.S. [[Commodity Credit Corporation]] (CCC), a [[Department of Agriculture]] entity whose agricultural export guarantees to Iraq had been used to free up Iraqi hard currency for arms purchases - a mechanism separately documented in congressional investigations of the Iraq relationship.[^3]
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### CIA Knowledge and Obstruction
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The key contested question in the BNL scandal was whether the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] knew about the BNL loans and used them as a conduit for authorized assistance to Iraq under the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations' policy of supporting Baghdad during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]. Evidence assembled by journalists, congressional staff, and House Banking Committee investigators suggested that CIA reports specifically identifying Iraq's use of BNL-Atlanta funding for weapons procurement had been available as early as 1988 and had been circulated within the intelligence community.
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Federal Judge [[Marvin Shoob]] in Atlanta became the focal point of the scandal when he publicly criticized the [[Department of Justice]]'s handling of the case. Shoob accused the DOJ of directing prosecution away from the central question of whether the loans had been authorized at high levels of the U.S. government. He recused himself from the case on October 1, 1992.[^2]
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The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff report of February 1993 recorded that CIA analysts concluded in January 1990 that "managers at BNL headquarters in Rome were involved in the scandal," and that in November 1991 CIA reports "confirmed press allegations that more senior BNL officials in Rome had been witting of BNL-Atlanta's activities." The staff wrote that "the evidence does not show that this failure was a deliberate attempt to withhold information from the Department of Justice," and that it "could find no legal support" for the CIA guidance that a report not formally disseminated outside the agency would not be discoverable in a criminal case.[^4]
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A CIA statement of February 5, 1993 said: "The CIA's Inspector General found no evidence of deliberate withholding of information or wrongdoing by any Agency employee in connection with the BNL case." In the attached memorandum of January 19, 1993 to the Inspector General, the Director of Central Intelligence, [[Robert Gates]], wrote: "None of the information available to CIA establishes that BNL-Rome did know of the activities of BNL-Atlanta that later became the subject of DoJ's investigation and prosecution." and, in the same paragraph, "Nonetheless, several of the CIA reports clearly contain indications that BNL-Rome may have been aware of BNL-Atlanta's actions." He also wrote that "In retrospect, mistakes clearly were made by Agency officers in their handling of events related to the BNL matter, and there was carelessness and a number of instances of poor judgment."[^5]
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Federal Judge [[Marvin Shoob]] in Atlanta became the focal point of the scandal when he publicly criticized the [[Department of Justice]]'s handling of the case. Shoob accused the DOJ of directing prosecution away from the central question of whether the loans had been authorized at high levels of the U.S. government. He recused himself from the case on October 1, 1992.[^3]
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### Congressional Investigation
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The [[House Banking Committee]] under Chairman [[Henry Gonzalez]] conducted the most sustained congressional investigation of the BNL scandal. Gonzalez publicly released thousands of pages of classified documents relating to the U.S.-Iraq relationship, including CIA reports on Iraq's use of BNL funds. The investigation documented the [[Reagan administration]] and early [[George H.W. Bush]] administration's consistent support for Iraq's weapons procurement networks, including knowledge of chemical weapons use, and revealed the internal government debate over whether to continue agricultural credit programs.[^1]
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### Sentencing Hearing and Recusal
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On September 23, 1992, at the sentencing hearing, Judge Marvin Shoob asked to see the intelligence underlying the Gonzalez summary of CIA reporting. He took the documents home and concluded that one of them did not support the summary's analytical comment. On October 1, 1992 he orally allowed [[Christopher Drogoul]] to withdraw his guilty plea and recused himself on the government's motion; the written order is dated October 5, 1992. His order stated: "The Court concludes that officials at BNL-Rome were aware of and approved Mr. Drogoul's activities."[^6]
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### Italian Senate Commissions
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The Italian Senate's commission of inquiry on the Atlanta branch (established February 19, 1991; Senator Gianuario Carta, president) approved a preliminary report on December 21, 1991 that put the exposures at about 4,000 billion lire, recorded $2,867.6 million in facilities outside the official books against $991 million registered at July 31, 1989, stated that the fraud-by-employees thesis had proved inconsistent with the evidence, and recorded that the Department of Justice had denied it access to documents and witnesses.[^7] The first commission's final report, presented April 22, 1992 as Doc. XXII-bis n. 4, stated that the severest of BNL's early-1980s crises was connected to "la accertata partecipazione di gran parte dei suoi alti dirigenti alla loggia massonica P2" (p. 6), recorded that credits to Rafidain Bank before June 1987 had been reported to the Rome head office under an internal circular of June 23, 1983 (p. 20), and named [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], [[Brent Scowcroft]] and [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]] among those who had worked for BNL or its Yugoslav bank partner (pp. 23, 34). It stated that Drogoul could confirm what he had told the commission, "la consapevolezza e la tolleranza dei vertici di Roma della BNL e delle autorità federali a fronte della macchina finanziaria attivata a favore dell'Iraq" (pp. 34-35).[^8] A second commission under Senator Giampaolo Mora was constituted on February 11, 1993 and approved its final report on February 23, 1994.[^9]
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### Connection to Broader Networks
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The BNL scandal intersected with other subjects documented in this vault. [[Carlos Cardoen]], the Chilean arms manufacturer who supplied cluster munitions to Iraq through CIA-connected channels, received financing through mechanisms connected to the BNL funding stream. [[Matrix Churchill]], the British machine-tool company at the center of the [[Arms-to-Iraq]] affair, exported equipment to the same Iraqi procurement entities that received BNL funding. The [[PROMIS]] software distribution to Iraqi intelligence is separately alleged by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] and others.[^2]
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The BNL scandal intersected with other subjects documented in this vault. [[Carlos Cardoen]], the Chilean arms manufacturer who supplied cluster munitions to Iraq through CIA-connected channels, received financing through mechanisms connected to the BNL funding stream. [[Matrix Churchill]], the British machine-tool company at the center of the [[Arms-to-Iraq]] affair, exported equipment to the same Iraqi procurement entities that received BNL funding. The [[PROMIS]] software distribution to Iraqi intelligence is separately alleged by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] and others.[^3]
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### Indictment and Pleas
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The indictment, No. 1:91-CR-078 in the [[United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia|Northern District of Georgia]], was returned on February 28, 1991, the day after the [[Gulf War]] ceasefire, and charged [[Christopher Drogoul]] on 347 counts with two branch officers, [[Entrade International]] and its manager [[Yavuz Tezeller]], [[Rafidain Bank]], and four Iraqi officials including [[Safa al-Habobi]]. Two branch employees, [[Leigh Ann New]] and [[Paul Von Wedel]], pleaded guilty to separate informations. Drogoul pleaded guilty to 60 counts in June 1992 and withdrew the plea on October 1, when Judge Marvin Shoob recused himself with the stated conclusion "that officials at BNL-[[Rome]] were aware of and approved Mr. Drogoul's activities." The [[United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|Eleventh Circuit]] ordered the depositions of thirteen Italian bank officers on September 2, 1993. Drogoul pleaded guilty to three counts and was sentenced in December 1993 to 37 months.[^3][^4]
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The indictment, No. 1:91-CR-078 in the [[United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia|Northern District of Georgia]], was returned on February 28, 1991, the day after the [[Gulf War]] ceasefire, and charged Christopher Drogoul on 347 counts with two branch officers, [[Entrade International]] and its manager [[Yavuz Tezeller]], [[Rafidain Bank]], and four Iraqi officials including [[Safa al-Habobi]]. Two branch employees, [[Leigh Ann New]] and Thomas Fiebelkorn, were dropped from the indictment after negotiating plea agreements (New pleaded guilty on March 6, 1991 and Fiebelkorn on April 3, 1991), and [[Paul Von Wedel]] pleaded guilty as a cooperating individual; the five Atlanta employees were sentenced by an order of August 24, 1993.[^10] Drogoul pleaded guilty to 60 counts in June 1992 and withdrew the plea on October 1, when Judge Marvin Shoob recused himself with the stated conclusion "that officials at BNL-[[Rome]] were aware of and approved Mr. Drogoul's activities." On September 2, 1993 the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|Eleventh Circuit]] held that the district court had abused its discretion in refusing depositions of thirteen Italian nationals in Rome, seven of whom had declared they would not testify in the United States.[^11] Drogoul pleaded guilty to three counts and was sentenced in December 1993 to 37 months.[^12][^13]
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### Court of Federal Claims suit
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On December 15, 1992, BNL filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington to recover over 340 million dollars in principal on defaulted Iraqi loans guaranteed under the Commodity Credit Corporation program of the Department of Agriculture. [[Henry B. Gonzalez]] told the House on January 21, 1993 that the suit followed the Department's refusal to pay the claims because of unanswered questions about BNL's role, that he had repeatedly asked the Department to withhold payment until it could be determined whether BNL had defrauded the program, and that the Department's administrative review, which was not assigned to its inspector general, was "a complete whitewash."[^5]
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On December 15, 1992, BNL filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington to recover over 340 million dollars in principal on defaulted Iraqi loans guaranteed under the Commodity Credit Corporation program of the Department of Agriculture. [[Henry B. Gonzalez]] told the House on January 21, 1993 that the suit followed the Department's refusal to pay the claims because of unanswered questions about BNL's role, that he had repeatedly asked the Department to withhold payment until it could be determined whether BNL had defrauded the program, and that the Department's administrative review, which was not assigned to its inspector general, was "a complete whitewash."[^14]
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### Lacey and the Senate Staff Report
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[[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[William Barr]] appointed the retired judge [[Frederick Lacey]] as special counsel on October 16, 1992. Lacey reported on December 8 that there were no grounds for an independent counsel and that he had "seen nothing" to suggest that [[Brent Scowcroft]] and [[Lawrence Eagleburger]] knew of the loans. Part of the report was classified. Representative Henry Gonzalez called it a whitewash. Acting [[United States Attorney]] [[Joseph D. Whitley]] had recused himself on June 1, 1990, because his former firm represented Matrix Churchill. The staff of the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] found in February 1993 that the CIA's grounds for withholding reports from prosecutors had "no legal support" and did not find deliberate concealment. In December 1992 prosecutors in [[Venice]] indicted 59 people, including executives of the bank, for financing arms sales to [[Iran]].[^6][^7][^8]
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[[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[William Barr]] appointed the retired judge [[Frederick Lacey]] as special counsel on October 16, 1992. Lacey reported on December 9, 1992 that there were no grounds for an independent counsel and that he had "seen nothing" to suggest that Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger knew of the loans. Part of the report was classified.[^15] Representative Henry Gonzalez called it a whitewash. Acting [[United States Attorney]] [[Joseph D. Whitley]] had recused himself on June 1, 1990, because his former firm represented Matrix Churchill. The staff of the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] found in February 1993 that the CIA's grounds for withholding reports from prosecutors had "no legal support" and did not find deliberate concealment. In December 1992 prosecutors in [[Venice]] indicted 59 people, including executives of the bank, for financing arms sales to [[Iran]].[^16][^17][^18] Gonzalez told the House on January 21, 1993 that the 523-page Venice indictment charged senior BNL executives in Rome and branch officials in Paris and Turin with providing over $100 million in support for secret arms shipments to Iran, and that in total 59 persons had been indicted.[^19]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq.* Bantam Books, 1993.
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[^2]: Gonzalez, Henry. Congressional Record, selected statements 1992-1993. https://www.congress.gov/member/henry-gonzalez/G000272
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[^3]: United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546 (11th Cir. 1993).
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[^4]: "Drogoul gets 37 months in BNL bank scandal," *United Press International,* December 9, 1993.
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[^5]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, p. H132. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm
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[^6]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro,* Serial No. 103-95, November 9, 1993. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
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[^7]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) Affair,* staff report, S. Prt. 103-12, February 1993.
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[^8]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, January 21, 1993.
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[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Iraq-Italy: Repercussions of the BNL-Atlanta Scandal," November 6, 1989, printed in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro,* Serial No. 103-95 (1994), pp. 194-195; CIA reading room document 0000491425, pp. 2, 6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0000491425 ; also https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
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[^3]: Gonzalez, Henry. Congressional Record, selected statements 1992-1993. https://www.congress.gov/member/henry-gonzalez/G000272
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[^4]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) Affair,* Committee Print S. Prt. 103-12, February 1993, pp. 26, 28, 34. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/10312.pdf
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[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Statement: Release of BNL-related Report," February 5, 1993, with Memorandum for the Inspector General from the Director of Central Intelligence, "BNL Investigation," January 19, 1993, pp. 1-2 (reading room document 0005617864). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005617864
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[^6]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) Affair,* Committee Print S. Prt. 103-12, February 1993, p. 24; Order of Judge Marvin H. Shoob, orally entered October 1, 1992 and dated October 5, 1992, printed in Serial No. 103-95, pp. 205-206. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
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[^7]: Senato della Repubblica, X Legislatura, Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul caso della filiale di Atlanta della Banca nazionale del lavoro e sue connessioni, Rapporto preliminare, December 21, 1991, Doc. XXII-bis n. 3, pp. 2-9. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/914635.pdf
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[^8]: Senato della Repubblica, X Legislatura, Doc. XXII-bis n. 4 (Relazione conclusiva, relatore Carta), April 22, 1992, pp. 6, 20, 23, 34-35. https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/relazioni/archiviostorico/commissioni/X%20LEG_BNL.ATLANTA_DOC_RELAZ/X_%20LEG_BNL-ATLANTA_DOC%20XXIIBIS_4_22.4.92.pdf
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[^9]: Senato della Repubblica, Archivio storico, repertorio of commissions, "Bnl Atlanta (monocamerale d'inchiesta)." https://patrimonio.archivio.senato.it/repertorio-commissioni/commissione/IT-SEN-COM001-000161/bnl-atlanta-monocamerale-d-inchiesta?t=sintesi
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[^10]: Lacey, "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," printed in Serial No. 103-95, pp. 362-366, 411, 413; hearing record, Serial No. 103-95, p. 200 (order of August 24, 1993 sentencing the Atlanta employees); General Accounting Office, T-NSIAD-91-13, March 14, 1991. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
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[^11]: United States v. Drogoul, No. 93-8964, 1 F.3d 1546 (11th Cir. September 2, 1993). https://static.case.law/f3d/1/cases/1546-01.json
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[^12]: United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546 (11th Cir. 1993).
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[^13]: "Drogoul gets 37 months in BNL bank scandal," *United Press International,* December 9, 1993.
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[^14]: Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record*, House of Representatives, January 21, 1993, p. H132. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm
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[^15]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) Affair,* Committee Print S. Prt. 103-12, February 1993, pp. 4-5; Lacey, "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," printed in Serial No. 103-95, pp. 344-345. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/10312.pdf
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[^16]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro,* Serial No. 103-95, November 9, 1993. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
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[^17]: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) Affair,* staff report, S. Prt. 103-12, February 1993.
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[^18]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, January 21, 1993.
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[^19]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, January 21, 1993, pp. H133-H134. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_cr/h930121-bnl.htm
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- ColdWar
|
||||
- 1960s
|
||||
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
|
||||
summary: "Operation NORTHWOODS was a March 13, 1962 document signed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposing a series of staged false-flag attacks against American citizens and military assets that could be blamed on Cuba to justify a U.S. invasion, rejected by Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Kennedy, and declassified in 1997 through the JFK Records Act as one of the most significant disclosures of Cold War government deception planning."
|
||||
summary: "Joint Chiefs of Staff paper of March 13, 1962 proposing staged incidents, blamed on Cuba, as pretexts for a U.S. invasion; declassified in 1997 and publicized by James Bamford in 2001."
|
||||
start: 1962-03-13
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Operation NORTHWOODS was a set of proposals developed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff under General [[Lyman Lemnitzer]] and formally submitted to Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] on March 13, 1962. The document, titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba," proposed creating or staging a series of violent incidents - including attacks on American citizens - that could be attributed to [[Cuba]] and used as a pretext for a U.S. military invasion. The proposals were rejected by McNamara and President [[John F. Kennedy]]; the document was declassified in 1997 through the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act and brought to wide public attention by journalist James Bamford.[^1]
|
||||
Operation NORTHWOODS was a set of proposals developed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff under General [[Lyman Lemnitzer]] and formally submitted to Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] on March 13, 1962. The document, titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba," proposed creating or staging a series of violent incidents - including attacks on American citizens - that could be attributed to [[Cuba]] and used as a pretext for a U.S. military invasion. [[James Bamford]] wrote that the proposals were rejected by McNamara and President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^1] The document was declassified in 1997 through the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act and brought to wide public attention by journalist James Bamford.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Context
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -43,15 +43,23 @@ Killing of Americans: The document explicitly contemplated staging incidents in
|
|||
|
||||
### Rejection
|
||||
|
||||
McNamara rejected the proposals and Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction. In July 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint Lemnitzer as JCS Chairman when his term expired; Lemnitzer was transferred to command [[NATO]] forces in Europe. The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
|
||||
On March 6, 1962 [[Edward Lansdale]], chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wrote that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^2] The Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 13 recommended that the paper be forwarded "as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes." The paper (JCS 1969/321) rested on the premise that intervention "will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances," and a draft memorandum appended to it stated that a plan built from the suggestions "would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 16, 1962 President Kennedy met with [[John A. McCone]], General [[Maxwell Taylor]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Lemnitzer to discuss the Mongoose guidelines. [[U. Alexis Johnson]]'s handwritten note records that "The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action," and that "no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^4] At the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), according to McCone's notes, the "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction.[^1] In July 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint Lemnitzer as JCS Chairman when his term expired; Lemnitzer was transferred to command [[NATO]] forces in Europe. The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Declassification and Significance
|
||||
|
||||
The document remained classified for thirty-five years and was among the records released in 1997 under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required declassification of documents relating to the Kennedy assassination regardless of their original security designation. NORTHWOODS was included because it was part of the operational planning environment in which Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs were operating in 1962-1963.
|
||||
|
||||
James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^2]
|
||||
James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.* Doubleday, 2001. Original document: "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (TS), JCS files, March 13, 1962; declassified 1997. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
|
||||
[^2]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.
|
||||
[^2]: Lansdale to Goodwin, March 6, 1962 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 310. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
|
||||
[^3]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, signed by L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, with Enclosure A, its appendix and annex, and Enclosure B, from JCS 1969/321 (Top Secret, Special Handling, Noforn; declassified 1997). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
|
||||
[^4]: Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and editorial note quoting U. Alexis Johnson's handwritten covering memorandum of March 16, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 314. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314
|
||||
[^5]: Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone on the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
|
||||
[^6]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -105,7 +105,9 @@ The Robertson Panel was a group of five scientists convened by the [[Office of S
|
|||
|
||||
### Origin in the Office of Scientific Intelligence
|
||||
|
||||
In the summer of 1952 the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Current Intelligence formed a study group on the flying saucer reports. [[Edward Tauss]], acting chief of the Office's Weapons and Equipment Division, reported that most sightings could be easily explained, recommended continued monitoring in coordination with the Air Technical Intelligence Center, and urged that the Agency conceal its interest from the press and public, "in view of their probable alarmist tendencies" to read it as confirmation. [[Robert Amory]], the Deputy Director for Intelligence, passed the matter to the Office's Physics and Electronics Division on the concerns of the [[Director of Central Intelligence]], [[Walter Bedell Smith]], who according to a memorandum of 20 August 1952 summarized by [[Gerald K. Haines]] of the Agency's history staff wanted to know whether the Air Force investigation was sufficiently objective, thought there was "only one chance in 10,000" that the phenomenon posed a threat but that "even that chance could not be taken," and asked what use could be made of the phenomenon in psychological warfare. The study group's members searched the Soviet press, found no flying saucer reports, and concluded that the absence resulted from Soviet Government policy.[^2]
|
||||
The 1952 sightings in the Washington area alarmed the Truman administration. Radar scopes at [[Washington National Airport]] and [[Andrews Air Force Base]] tracked unidentified blips on July 19 and 20, 1952, and the blips reappeared on July 27, when the Air Force scrambled interceptors that found nothing. [[Gerald K. Haines]] wrote that the White House wanted to know what was happening, and that the Air Force quickly offered the explanation that the radar blips might be the result of "temperature inversions."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In the summer of 1952 the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Current Intelligence formed a study group on the flying saucer reports. [[Edward Tauss]], acting chief of the Office's Weapons and Equipment Division, reported that most sightings could be easily explained, recommended continued monitoring in coordination with the Air Technical Intelligence Center, and urged that the Agency conceal its interest from the press and public, "in view of their probable alarmist tendencies" to read it as confirmation. [[Robert Amory]], the Deputy Director for Intelligence, passed the matter to the Office's Physics and Electronics Division on the concerns of the [[Director of Central Intelligence]], [[Walter Bedell Smith]], who according to a memorandum of 20 August 1952 summarized by Gerald K. Haines of the Agency's history staff wanted to know whether the Air Force investigation was sufficiently objective, thought there was "only one chance in 10,000" that the phenomenon posed a threat but that "even that chance could not be taken," and asked what use could be made of the phenomenon in psychological warfare. The study group's members searched the Soviet press, found no flying saucer reports, and concluded that the absence resulted from Soviet Government policy.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The Durant memorandum lists an "O/SI Study Group of August 1952" of [[Philip G. Strong]], a colleague named Eng and [[Frederick C. Durant]], which led to the briefing of the Director, an Air Technical Intelligence Center briefing on 21 November, consideration by the [[Intelligence Advisory Committee]] on 4 December, and a visit to the Center by Chadwell, [[H. P. Robertson]] and Durant.[^1] The Intelligence Advisory Committee, according to Haines, agreed that the Director should "enlist the services of selected scientists to review and appraise the available evidence in the light of pertinent scientific theories" and draft a National Security Council Intelligence Directive on the subject.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The composition of the commission drew criticism for the conflicts of interest a
|
|||
|
||||
[[C. Douglas Dillon]]: Nelson Rockefeller's confidant, Kennedy's treasury secretary, and chairman of the [[Rockefeller Foundation]] board of trustees. As undersecretary of state in the Eisenhower administration from June 1959 through January 1961, Dillon attended NSC meetings at which discussions of foreign leaders including [[Patrice Lumumba]] took place. In an affidavit submitted to the commission, Dillon stated that he had heard no discussion of assassination attempts against any foreign leader during his tenure, though he acknowledged to investigators that it was "perfectly possible" that [[Allen Dulles]] might have translated strong presidential language into operational orders.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
[[General Lyman Lemnitzer]]: Former chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], 1960-1962. Lemnitzer had actively supported the CIA's call for direct U.S. military intervention during the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]], only to be overruled by Kennedy. He also signed Operation Northwoods in March 1962, a Joint Chiefs proposal for staged false-flag terrorism on U.S. soil to justify military action against Cuba, which Kennedy rejected. Kennedy subsequently denied Lemnitzer another term as chairman, transferring him to command of U.S. [[European Command]] and NATO.[^7]
|
||||
[[General Lyman Lemnitzer]]: Former chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], 1960-1962. Lemnitzer had actively supported the CIA's call for direct U.S. military intervention during the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]], only to be overruled by Kennedy. He also signed Operation Northwoods in March 1962, a Joint Chiefs proposal for staged false-flag terrorism on U.S. soil to justify military action against Cuba. Kennedy subsequently denied Lemnitzer another term as chairman, transferring him to command of U.S. [[European Command]] and NATO.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Lane Kirkland]]: AFL-CIO researcher who had been a director of the CIA-funded [[AIFLD]] (American Institute for Free Labor Development) during the Kennedy-Johnson years. Kirkland had served on a Johnson administration commission that recommended continuing CIA-backed labor programs under overt funding as a workaround when CIA involvement was exposed. He was also a member of Nelson Rockefeller's Commission on Critical Choices. Kirkland was elected president of the AFL-CIO in November 1979.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ The commission's records, totaling approximately 41 cubic feet (82,000 pages), a
|
|||
[^4]: FRUS 1969-76, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 17, Editorial Note, covering the period December 20-22, 1974, including Colby's meeting with Hersh on December 20, 1974 and the Ford administration's response strategy coordinated by Kissinger and Rumsfeld.
|
||||
[^5]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995. Appendix B.
|
||||
[^6]: Church Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," November 20, 1975, pp. 14-15. Dillon testified that while present at NSC meetings in summer 1960, he had no memory of a direct presidential order for Lumumba's assassination, but acknowledged it was "perfectly possible" that Dulles had translated strong language into operational direction.
|
||||
[^7]: Lyman Lemnitzer, Operation Northwoods memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 13, 1962, presented to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Kennedy rejected the proposal on March 16, 1962 and denied Lemnitzer another term as chairman.
|
||||
[^7]: Lyman Lemnitzer, Operation Northwoods memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 13, 1962, presented to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. At a March 16, 1962 meeting on the Mongoose guidelines, Kennedy expressed skepticism that circumstances would arise that would justify overt military action, and no decision approving the use of such forces was expressed or implied (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 314). Kennedy denied Lemnitzer another term as chairman.
|
||||
[^8]: Colby and Dennett, Appendix B. Kirkland was elected AFL-CIO president on November 19, 1979.
|
||||
[^9]: Colby and Dennett, Appendix B.
|
||||
[^10]: [[National Security Archive]], "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975," NSAEBB, February 29, 2016. Griswold's footnote recommending CIA budget disclosure was among the items suppressed by the White House.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,9 +14,16 @@ tags:
|
|||
- 1960s
|
||||
- NSA
|
||||
category: "Major Conflict"
|
||||
summary: "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident refers to the August 2 and 4, 1964 incidents in which a genuine North Vietnamese attack on the USS Maddox was followed by a second 'attack' on August 4 that almost certainly never occurred, yet was used by the Johnson administration to obtain the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing open-ended military escalation in Vietnam - a deception confirmed by NSA declassified documents released in 2005."
|
||||
summary: "August 1964 incidents: a genuine North Vietnamese attack on the USS Maddox, then a second reported attack that NSA documents released in 2005 showed did not occur, used to obtain the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution."
|
||||
start: 1964-08-04
|
||||
location: "Gulf of Tonkin, off North Vietnam"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Robert S. McNamara]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1964-08-03
|
||||
role: "Secretary of Defense; briefed congressional leaders"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident refers to two separate events on August 2 and August 4, 1964, in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam, the second of which was used by the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration to obtain congressional authorization for the dramatic escalation of American involvement in [[Vietnam War|the Vietnam War]]. Subsequent declassification - principally of [[NSA]] documents released in 2005 - confirmed what internal doubts at the time suggested: the August 4 "attack" almost certainly did not occur.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,6 +34,14 @@ On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox, a destroyer conducting electronic intelligenc
|
|||
|
||||
The Maddox was conducting DESOTO patrols - intelligence-gathering missions that collected electronic signals from North Vietnamese radar and communications installations. The patrols ran in coordination with South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnamese coastal targets. North Vietnam apparently attacked the Maddox in response to those raids, believing American vessels were directly supporting the attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
### Secretary of Defense briefings, August 3 and 4, 1964
|
||||
|
||||
On August 3, 1964 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, [[Peter Solbert]], sent [[Robert S. McNamara]] a memorandum on the aftermath of the Maddox engagement. Among the actions it listed were the aerial mining of North Vietnamese naval bases or harbors and further covert [[Operation 34-A]] missions against those bases.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In a telephone call at 10:30 a.m. on August 3, McNamara proposed explaining the covert naval operations to Congress: "And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
At the meeting of congressional leaders on August 4, McNamara began his briefing: "The first indication we had of another attack on the destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy, was received at 7:30 A.M. today."[^4] In a 9:43 a.m. call that day, McNamara said of the destroyer: "this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked tonight." [[John Prados]] wrote that McNamara's later public statements on the 34-A link were made against this record.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### August 4: The Fabricated Attack
|
||||
|
||||
On August 4, 1964, the Maddox and USS Turner Joy reported that they were under attack in the Gulf of Tonkin at night in rough weather. Sonar operators reported torpedo sounds; the ships took evasive action and returned fire at targets that appeared on radar. No visual contact with attacking vessels was ever made. The ship commanders themselves were uncertain what had happened.
|
||||
|
|
@ -39,7 +54,7 @@ Despite these doubts, Johnson and McNamara presented the August 4 incident to Co
|
|||
|
||||
On August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (formally the Southeast Asia Resolution) with 98-2 votes in the Senate and unanimously in the House. The resolution authorized the President to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Only Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening voted against.
|
||||
|
||||
The resolution became the legal basis for the Johnson and [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] administrations' escalation of the [[Vietnam War]], including the introduction of ground combat troops in 1965 and the sustained bombing campaigns against North Vietnam. By 1968, over 500,000 American troops were deployed in Vietnam.[^1]
|
||||
The resolution became the legal basis for the Johnson and [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] administrations' escalation of the Vietnam War, including the introduction of ground combat troops in 1965 and the sustained bombing campaigns against North Vietnam. By 1968, over 500,000 American troops were deployed in Vietnam.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Subsequent Disclosure
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -51,9 +66,13 @@ In 2005, the NSA released previously classified documents including a 2001 inter
|
|||
|
||||
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is significant both as a historical event - the manufactured pretext for the most costly American military engagement of the Cold War - and as a paradigm case in discussions of false-flag operations and government deception. Read alongside the declassified [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] document proposing staged incidents to justify Cuba intervention (1962), Tonkin demonstrated that American officials were not only willing to plan such fabrications but to execute them.
|
||||
|
||||
The incident also illustrated the institutional dynamics of intelligence assessment under political pressure: the NSA analysis that confirmed the August 4 attack reflected what policymakers wanted to hear rather than what the evidence showed - a pattern subsequently analyzed in discussions of intelligence and policy.[^2]
|
||||
The incident also illustrated the institutional dynamics of intelligence assessment under political pressure: the NSA analysis that confirmed the August 4 attack reflected what policymakers wanted to hear rather than what the evidence showed - a pattern subsequently analyzed in discussions of intelligence and policy.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Hanyok, Robert J. "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964." *Cryptologic Quarterly.* NSA. Declassified 2005; available at nsarchive.gwu.edu. Moise, Edwin E. *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.* University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
|
||||
[^2]: The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel edition). Beacon Press, 1971. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam.* Basic Books, 2001.
|
||||
[^2]: Peter Solbert, memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, August 3, 1964 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 268. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d268
|
||||
[^3]: Telephone conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara, August 3, 1964, 10:30 a.m., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 132. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/tapes.htm
|
||||
[^4]: Notes of the Leadership Meeting, White House, August 4, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 280. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d280
|
||||
[^5]: John Prados, "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later," National Security Archive, August 4, 2004 (telephone conversation of August 4, 1964, 9:43 a.m.). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm
|
||||
[^6]: The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel edition). Beacon Press, 1971. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam.* Basic Books, 2001.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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