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40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Robertson Panel.md
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@ -105,7 +105,9 @@ The Robertson Panel was a group of five scientists convened by the [[Office of S
### Origin in the Office of Scientific Intelligence
In the summer of 1952 the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Current Intelligence formed a study group on the flying saucer reports. [[Edward Tauss]], acting chief of the Office's Weapons and Equipment Division, reported that most sightings could be easily explained, recommended continued monitoring in coordination with the Air Technical Intelligence Center, and urged that the Agency conceal its interest from the press and public, "in view of their probable alarmist tendencies" to read it as confirmation. [[Robert Amory]], the Deputy Director for Intelligence, passed the matter to the Office's Physics and Electronics Division on the concerns of the [[Director of Central Intelligence]], [[Walter Bedell Smith]], who according to a memorandum of 20 August 1952 summarized by [[Gerald K. Haines]] of the Agency's history staff wanted to know whether the Air Force investigation was sufficiently objective, thought there was "only one chance in 10,000" that the phenomenon posed a threat but that "even that chance could not be taken," and asked what use could be made of the phenomenon in psychological warfare. The study group's members searched the Soviet press, found no flying saucer reports, and concluded that the absence resulted from Soviet Government policy.[^2]
The 1952 sightings in the Washington area alarmed the Truman administration. Radar scopes at [[Washington National Airport]] and [[Andrews Air Force Base]] tracked unidentified blips on July 19 and 20, 1952, and the blips reappeared on July 27, when the Air Force scrambled interceptors that found nothing. [[Gerald K. Haines]] wrote that the White House wanted to know what was happening, and that the Air Force quickly offered the explanation that the radar blips might be the result of "temperature inversions."[^2]
In the summer of 1952 the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Current Intelligence formed a study group on the flying saucer reports. [[Edward Tauss]], acting chief of the Office's Weapons and Equipment Division, reported that most sightings could be easily explained, recommended continued monitoring in coordination with the Air Technical Intelligence Center, and urged that the Agency conceal its interest from the press and public, "in view of their probable alarmist tendencies" to read it as confirmation. [[Robert Amory]], the Deputy Director for Intelligence, passed the matter to the Office's Physics and Electronics Division on the concerns of the [[Director of Central Intelligence]], [[Walter Bedell Smith]], who according to a memorandum of 20 August 1952 summarized by Gerald K. Haines of the Agency's history staff wanted to know whether the Air Force investigation was sufficiently objective, thought there was "only one chance in 10,000" that the phenomenon posed a threat but that "even that chance could not be taken," and asked what use could be made of the phenomenon in psychological warfare. The study group's members searched the Soviet press, found no flying saucer reports, and concluded that the absence resulted from Soviet Government policy.[^2]
The Durant memorandum lists an "O/SI Study Group of August 1952" of [[Philip G. Strong]], a colleague named Eng and [[Frederick C. Durant]], which led to the briefing of the Director, an Air Technical Intelligence Center briefing on 21 November, consideration by the [[Intelligence Advisory Committee]] on 4 December, and a visit to the Center by Chadwell, [[H. P. Robertson]] and Durant.[^1] The Intelligence Advisory Committee, according to Haines, agreed that the Director should "enlist the services of selected scientists to review and appraise the available evidence in the light of pertinent scientific theories" and draft a National Security Council Intelligence Directive on the subject.[^2]