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40 - EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Gulf of Tonkin Incident.md
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@ -14,9 +14,16 @@ tags:
- 1960s
- NSA
category: "Major Conflict"
summary: "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident refers to the August 2 and 4, 1964 incidents in which a genuine North Vietnamese attack on the USS Maddox was followed by a second 'attack' on August 4 that almost certainly never occurred, yet was used by the Johnson administration to obtain the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing open-ended military escalation in Vietnam - a deception confirmed by NSA declassified documents released in 2005."
summary: "August 1964 incidents: a genuine North Vietnamese attack on the USS Maddox, then a second reported attack that NSA documents released in 2005 showed did not occur, used to obtain the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution."
start: 1964-08-04
location: "Gulf of Tonkin, off North Vietnam"
relations:
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Robert S. McNamara]]"
reverse: true
start: 1964-08-03
role: "Secretary of Defense; briefed congressional leaders"
fn: 4
---
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident refers to two separate events on August 2 and August 4, 1964, in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam, the second of which was used by the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration to obtain congressional authorization for the dramatic escalation of American involvement in [[Vietnam War|the Vietnam War]]. Subsequent declassification - principally of [[NSA]] documents released in 2005 - confirmed what internal doubts at the time suggested: the August 4 "attack" almost certainly did not occur.[^1]
@ -27,6 +34,14 @@ On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox, a destroyer conducting electronic intelligenc
The Maddox was conducting DESOTO patrols - intelligence-gathering missions that collected electronic signals from North Vietnamese radar and communications installations. The patrols ran in coordination with South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnamese coastal targets. North Vietnam apparently attacked the Maddox in response to those raids, believing American vessels were directly supporting the attacks.
### Secretary of Defense briefings, August 3 and 4, 1964
On August 3, 1964 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, [[Peter Solbert]], sent [[Robert S. McNamara]] a memorandum on the aftermath of the Maddox engagement. Among the actions it listed were the aerial mining of North Vietnamese naval bases or harbors and further covert [[Operation 34-A]] missions against those bases.[^2]
In a telephone call at 10:30 a.m. on August 3, McNamara proposed explaining the covert naval operations to Congress: "And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on."[^3]
At the meeting of congressional leaders on August 4, McNamara began his briefing: "The first indication we had of another attack on the destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy, was received at 7:30 A.M. today."[^4] In a 9:43 a.m. call that day, McNamara said of the destroyer: "this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked tonight." [[John Prados]] wrote that McNamara's later public statements on the 34-A link were made against this record.[^5]
### August 4: The Fabricated Attack
On August 4, 1964, the Maddox and USS Turner Joy reported that they were under attack in the Gulf of Tonkin at night in rough weather. Sonar operators reported torpedo sounds; the ships took evasive action and returned fire at targets that appeared on radar. No visual contact with attacking vessels was ever made. The ship commanders themselves were uncertain what had happened.
@ -39,7 +54,7 @@ Despite these doubts, Johnson and McNamara presented the August 4 incident to Co
On August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (formally the Southeast Asia Resolution) with 98-2 votes in the Senate and unanimously in the House. The resolution authorized the President to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Only Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening voted against.
The resolution became the legal basis for the Johnson and [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] administrations' escalation of the [[Vietnam War]], including the introduction of ground combat troops in 1965 and the sustained bombing campaigns against North Vietnam. By 1968, over 500,000 American troops were deployed in Vietnam.[^1]
The resolution became the legal basis for the Johnson and [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] administrations' escalation of the Vietnam War, including the introduction of ground combat troops in 1965 and the sustained bombing campaigns against North Vietnam. By 1968, over 500,000 American troops were deployed in Vietnam.[^1]
### Subsequent Disclosure
@ -51,9 +66,13 @@ In 2005, the NSA released previously classified documents including a 2001 inter
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is significant both as a historical event - the manufactured pretext for the most costly American military engagement of the Cold War - and as a paradigm case in discussions of false-flag operations and government deception. Read alongside the declassified [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] document proposing staged incidents to justify Cuba intervention (1962), Tonkin demonstrated that American officials were not only willing to plan such fabrications but to execute them.
The incident also illustrated the institutional dynamics of intelligence assessment under political pressure: the NSA analysis that confirmed the August 4 attack reflected what policymakers wanted to hear rather than what the evidence showed - a pattern subsequently analyzed in discussions of intelligence and policy.[^2]
The incident also illustrated the institutional dynamics of intelligence assessment under political pressure: the NSA analysis that confirmed the August 4 attack reflected what policymakers wanted to hear rather than what the evidence showed - a pattern subsequently analyzed in discussions of intelligence and policy.[^6]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hanyok, Robert J. "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964." *Cryptologic Quarterly.* NSA. Declassified 2005; available at nsarchive.gwu.edu. Moise, Edwin E. *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.* University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
[^2]: The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel edition). Beacon Press, 1971. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam.* Basic Books, 2001.
[^2]: Peter Solbert, memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, August 3, 1964 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 268. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d268
[^3]: Telephone conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara, August 3, 1964, 10:30 a.m., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 132. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/tapes.htm
[^4]: Notes of the Leadership Meeting, White House, August 4, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 280. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d280
[^5]: John Prados, "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later," National Security Archive, August 4, 2004 (telephone conversation of August 4, 1964, 9:43 a.m.). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm
[^6]: The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel edition). Beacon Press, 1971. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam.* Basic Books, 2001.