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10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Ari Ben-Menashe.md
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ relations:
role: "civilian, External Relations Department (per his 1992 account)"
fn: 5
created: 2024-04-25
updated: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-14
---
Ari Ben-Menashe is an Iranian-born Israeli-Canadian businessman, author, and lobbyist who describes himself as a former official of Israel's military intelligence, and who became a recurring source for claims about covert United States and Israeli arms dealing, the [[October Surprise]] theory, [[PROMIS]] software, [[Robert Maxwell]], and, in later years, [[Jeffrey Epstein]].[^1] He was born on December 4, 1951, in Tehran, [[Iran]], to an affluent Iraqi Jewish family; his father Gourdji was involved with [[LEHI]] (the Stern Gang) and knew [[Yitzhak Shamir]].[^2][^3] His allegations have been influential in conspiracy literature while being repeatedly assessed as unreliable by courts, congressional investigators, and journalists.[^4]
@ -39,51 +39,55 @@ Ben-Menashe's 1992 book dates his entry into the External Relations Department t
The 1992 book reproduces letters of reference dated September 1987 on Israel Defence Forces External Relations Department letterhead. They are signed by Col. [[Pesah Melowany]] (September 4, 1987), Col. Yoav (September 6, 1987), a Dr. A. (September 14, 1987) and Col. [[Arieh Shur]], whose signature block reads "Colonel / Chief of External Relations" (September 14, 1987). Ben-Menashe presents the letters as evidence of his service in the department.[^7]
Critics dispute the seniority he claims. Israel has generally characterized him as a low-level translator rather than a policy insider, and the journalist [[Steven Emerson]], writing in 1991, argued that Ben-Menashe had inflated a minor translating job into a record of "key positions."[^2] The Israeli government acknowledged that he had worked for military intelligence in a translation capacity but denied that he had held the senior operational role he described.[^8] The disagreement over his rank has shaped the reception of all his later claims, because his accounts of arms deals, the October Surprise, and Israeli operations rest on his asserted firsthand access rather than on corroborating documents or witnesses.[^2][^4]
The October Surprise Task Force reported that the personnel file maintained by Israeli Military Intelligence records that Ben-Menashe worked in the External Relations Department from 1977 to 1987; that seven of his ten annual efficiency reports list him as a translator and the other three as a staff officer in an armaments unit; that he failed the preparatory training portion of the officer's course and omitted this from his testimony to the task force; and that on July 23, 1987 his superior Arieh Shur warned him about excessive personal leave, on the same day he wrote to his superiors that he wished to leave the Army, on September 9, 1987 he complained before the union of civilian employees of the Israel Defense Forces that he had served ten years as a translator without a significant promotion, and on September 15, 1987 he resigned from the Israel Defense Forces.[^8] The task force added that Israeli authorities interviewed David Kimche, Yehoshua Saguy, Rafi Eitan, a Samuel Moriah, Meir Meir and General Yitzhak Segev, each of whom said he had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until he began making allegations in the American media in 1991, and that Yitzhak Hofi, head of Mossad from 1980 to 1982, told Israeli authorities that Ben-Menashe was never assigned to any mission by Mossad.[^9]
Critics dispute the seniority he claims. Israel has generally characterized him as a low-level translator rather than a policy insider, and the journalist [[Steven Emerson]], writing in 1991, argued that Ben-Menashe had inflated a minor translating job into a record of "key positions."[^2] The Israeli government acknowledged that he had worked for military intelligence in a translation capacity but denied that he had held the senior operational role he described.[^10] The disagreement over his rank has shaped the reception of all his later claims, because his accounts of arms deals, the October Surprise, and Israeli operations rest on his asserted firsthand access rather than on corroborating documents or witnesses.[^2][^4]
### Arms Case and Acquittal
Ben-Menashe first drew wide public attention when he was arrested in the United States in November 1989 and charged under the Arms Export Control Act with attempting to broker the sale of three Israeli-owned Lockheed [[C-130 Hercules]] transport aircraft to Iran, a deal valued at about 36 million dollars, using false end-user certificates.[^9] The prosecution was brought in the United States District Court for the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]], where the related rulings carried the caption United States v. Menashe.[^10] He spent nearly a year in custody before a jury acquitted him and a co-defendant on November 28, 1990, after his defense argued, and the jury accepted, that he had been acting under the authority of the Israeli government in a transaction tied to Israel's arms dealings with Iran.[^9]
Ben-Menashe first drew wide public attention when he was arrested in the United States in November 1989 and charged under the Arms Export Control Act with attempting to broker the sale of three Israeli-owned Lockheed [[C-130 Hercules]] transport aircraft to Iran, a deal valued at about 36 million dollars, using false end-user certificates.[^11] The prosecution was brought in the United States District Court for the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]], where the related rulings carried the caption United States v. Menashe.[^12] He spent nearly a year in custody before a jury acquitted him and a co-defendant on November 28, 1990, after his defense argued, and the jury accepted, that he had been acting under the authority of the Israeli government in a transaction tied to Israel's arms dealings with Iran.[^11]
Israel denied that he had been authorized to act for it in the transaction, repeating the position that he had been only a translator.[^9] The acquittal nonetheless rested on the jury's willingness to credit his Israeli-agent defense, and he afterward cited the verdict as vindication of his broader account, even though the bodies that later examined his substantive claims rejected them.[^4][^11] The acquittal gave him a platform from which he expanded a series of claims about secret United States and Israeli arms networks, set out in his 1992 book [[Profits of War]].[^3]
The first count of the indictment charged all three defendants with conspiring to sell American-made C-130 military cargo planes located in Israel to Iran, in violation of the [[Arms Export Control Act]]; a second count charged co-defendant [[Joseph O'Toole]] with conspiring to sell American-made anti-aircraft missiles located in Israel. In an opinion of August 1, 1990, Judge [[Louis L. Stanton]] denied co-defendant [[Richard St. Francis]]'s motion to dismiss on due process grounds, granted severance of the second count and of O'Toole from the first count, and noted that Ben-Menashe joined St. Francis's motions.[^13] The indictment said the scheme was revealed by an undercover Customs Service agent posing as an Iranian buyer.[^14] At the six-week trial, his attorney [[Thomas F.X. Dunn|Thomas Dunn]] contended that Ben-Menashe was a former intelligence operative who represented Yitzhak Shamir in an attempted arms-for-hostages deal in 1988 that was to include the release of four U.S. hostages and fell through when Shamir insisted that three Israeli soldiers also be freed. Prosecutors disputed his allegations of government-sanctioned arms deals with Iran, and Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Baruch Weiss]] said that Ben-Menashe was merely a translator for Israeli military intelligence from 1977 to 1987. After the verdict Dunn said that his client claimed Israel had brokered arms deals with Iran between 1980 and 1988 that the U.S. government had covertly approved, among them the transaction that became the Iran-Contra scandal.[^14]
Israel denied that he had been authorized to act for it in the transaction. At trial, Assistant U.S. Attorney Baruch Weiss said that he had been merely a translator for Israeli military intelligence from 1977 to 1987.[^14] The acquittal nonetheless rested on the jury's willingness to credit his Israeli-agent defense, and he afterward cited the verdict as vindication of his broader account, even though the bodies that later examined his substantive claims rejected them.[^4][^15] The acquittal gave him a platform from which he expanded a series of claims about secret United States and Israeli arms networks, set out in his 1992 book [[Profits of War]].[^3]
### October Surprise and Iran-Contra Claims
In Profits of War and in congressional testimony, Ben-Menashe alleged that Israeli officials, working with figures around the 1980 [[Ronald Reagan]] presidential campaign, arranged arms sales to Iran in exchange for delaying the release of American hostages until after the November 1980 election, the scenario known as the October Surprise.[^3] He claimed to have witnessed a Paris meeting in October 1980 attended by [[George H.W. Bush]], the campaign manager [[William J. Casey|William Casey]], and Iranian representatives.[^11]
In Profits of War and in congressional testimony, Ben-Menashe alleged that Israeli officials, working with figures around the 1980 [[Ronald Reagan]] presidential campaign, arranged arms sales to Iran in exchange for delaying the release of American hostages until after the November 1980 election, the scenario known as the October Surprise.[^3] He claimed to have witnessed a Paris meeting in October 1980 attended by [[George H.W. Bush]], the campaign manager [[William J. Casey|William Casey]], and Iranian representatives.[^15]
His detailed account named a sequence of secret meetings. He described [[Miles Copeland]]'s group of CIA-connected officers, Casey, [[Robert McFarlane]], and [[Earl Brian]] entering negotiations with the Iranians, and [[David Kimche]] of Mossad initiating an arms supply to Iran via [[South Africa]] in 1979. He placed first and second Madrid meetings in March and May 1980 involving [[Mehdi Karrubi]], Casey, McFarlane, [[Donald Gregg]], [[Robert Gates]], and Brian; an Amsterdam meeting in August 1980; and the October 1980 Paris meeting at which he says the hostage-release deal was sealed and after which he received 56 million dollars in [[Guatemala]] in December 1980, with 4 million for Brian and 52 million for the Iranian intermediary Kashani. The hostages were released on Reagan's inauguration day, January 20, 1981.[^3] He further alleged a 1980 to 1981 [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] arms pipeline, a role in the June 7, 1981 [[Israel Air Force]] strike on Iraq's Tammuz nuclear reactor, the recruitment of [[Daily Mirror]] foreign editor [[Nicholas Davies]] by Mossad, and the use of a slush fund (the [[Ora Group]]) to finance the [[Likud Party]] and "black" operations including, in his telling, the 1985 [[Achille Lauro]] hijacking.[^3]
No official body endorsed this account. The [[House October Surprise Task Force]], chaired by Representative [[Lee Hamilton]], published its joint report on January 3, 1993, and rejected it, saying it had conclusive evidence from travel and passport records that Ben-Menashe was not in Paris when he claimed to have witnessed the meeting, and describing his testimony as "totally lacking in credibility," "demonstrably false from beginning to end," and "a total fabrication."[^11] A separate review of the Iran-Contra-related allegations conducted under Attorney General [[William Barr]] likewise found no credible basis for his key claims, and an earlier Senate examination reached similar conclusions.[^8][^11] The Senate Foreign Relations special counsel, Reid H. Weingarten, reporting to Senators [[Terry Sanford]] and [[James Jeffords]] on November 19, 1992, found that Ben-Menashe "undoubtedly had real connections with Israeli intelligence and had access to some highly classified information," but that his "insistence upon placing himself in the middle of numerous scandals and adventures" and his contradiction of credible witnesses and documents made him "a wholly unreliable witness," and did not rely on his testimony without independent corroboration.[^12]
No official body endorsed this account. The [[House October Surprise Task Force]], chaired by Representative [[Lee Hamilton]], published its joint report on January 3, 1993, and rejected it, saying it had conclusive evidence from travel and passport records that Ben-Menashe was not in Paris when he claimed to have witnessed the meeting, and describing his testimony as "totally lacking in credibility," "demonstrably false from beginning to end," and "a total fabrication."[^15] The task force pinpoints the passport and personnel evidence: records the Government of Israel supplied, with Ben-Menashe's contemporaneous handwritten answers to the questions he was required to answer for the External Relations Department when traveling abroad, showed that he did not travel outside Israel in October 1980, and exit stamps on his civilian passport indicated the same; the task force wrote that his account of the October meetings, "like his other October Surprise allegations, is a total fabrication."[^16] A separate review of the Iran-Contra-related allegations conducted under Attorney General [[William Barr]] likewise found no credible basis for his key claims, and an earlier Senate examination reached similar conclusions.[^10][^15] The Senate Foreign Relations special counsel, Reid H. Weingarten, reporting to Senators [[Terry Sanford]] and [[James Jeffords]] on November 19, 1992, found that Ben-Menashe "undoubtedly had real connections with Israeli intelligence and had access to some highly classified information," but that his "insistence upon placing himself in the middle of numerous scandals and adventures" and his contradiction of credible witnesses and documents made him "a wholly unreliable witness," and did not rely on his testimony without independent corroboration.[^17]
### PROMIS Affidavits and INSLAW
After the journalist [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death in August 1991, Ben-Menashe called [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW|Inslaw]], and claimed that two FBI agents from Lexington, Kentucky, had been en route to Martinsburg to give Casolaro evidence that the FBI was illegally using PROMIS software, one of them disaffected because his superiors had refused to indict senior Reagan officials over the October Surprise.[^13] In affidavits submitted to the bankruptcy court in February and March 1991, he claimed personal knowledge of Earl Brian's involvement in international PROMIS distribution, alleging that Brian made a 1987 presentation to Israeli Military Intelligence claiming ownership of PROMIS rights, that [[Rafael Eitan]] received PROMIS from Brian and McFarlane in 1982 for Israeli signals intelligence, and that enhanced PROMIS was sold to the Israeli intelligence community, the Singapore Armed Forces, the Soviet Union, and Canada.[^14] These PROMIS-distribution claims were later amplified by [[Seymour Hersh]] in [[The Samson Option]] and [[Gordon Thomas]] in [[Gideon's Spies]].[^15][^16]
After the journalist [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death in August 1991, Ben-Menashe called [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW|Inslaw]], and claimed that two FBI agents from Lexington, Kentucky, had been en route to Martinsburg to give Casolaro evidence that the FBI was illegally using PROMIS software, one of them disaffected because his superiors had refused to indict senior Reagan officials over the October Surprise.[^18] In affidavits submitted to the bankruptcy court in February and March 1991, he claimed personal knowledge of Earl Brian's involvement in international PROMIS distribution, alleging that Brian made a 1987 presentation to Israeli Military Intelligence claiming ownership of PROMIS rights, that [[Rafael Eitan]] received PROMIS from Brian and McFarlane in 1982 for Israeli signals intelligence, and that enhanced PROMIS was sold to the Israeli intelligence community, the Singapore Armed Forces, the Soviet Union, and Canada.[^19] These PROMIS-distribution claims were later amplified by [[Seymour Hersh]] in [[The Samson Option]] and [[Gordon Thomas]] in [[Gideon's Spies]].[^20][^21]
In the first of two affidavits he submitted to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia in the INSLAW case, dated February 17, 1991, Ben-Menashe said that in January 1989, while serving as a special consultant for intelligence affairs in the Israeli prime minister's office, he was told by [[Carlos Cardoen]], the Chilean arms maker, that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and a representative of Iraqi military intelligence for the use of PROMIS.[^17] A *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991, preserved in the Danny Casolaro papers, says the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile, where [[Industrias Cardoen]] had its headquarters, and that Brian called the allegations "nonsense."[^18] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] states that Ben-Menashe "makes a number of extraordinary claims, most of which are not subject to corroboration."[^17] The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] recorded in 1991 that Robert Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing and that the FBI and the CIA inspector general, reviewing Gates's calendar and travel records, found no credible evidence to confirm them.[^19]
In the first of two affidavits he submitted to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia in the INSLAW case, dated February 17, 1991, Ben-Menashe said that in January 1989, while serving as a special consultant for intelligence affairs in the Israeli prime minister's office, he was told by [[Carlos Cardoen]], the Chilean arms maker, that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and a representative of Iraqi military intelligence for the use of PROMIS.[^22] A *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991, preserved in the Danny Casolaro papers, says the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile, where [[Industrias Cardoen]] had its headquarters, and that Brian called the allegations "nonsense."[^23] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] states that Ben-Menashe "makes a number of extraordinary claims, most of which are not subject to corroboration."[^22] The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] recorded in 1991 that Robert Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing and that the FBI and the CIA inspector general, reviewing Gates's calendar and travel records, found no credible evidence to confirm them.[^24]
The special counsel Nicholas Bua, in his 1993 report on the Inslaw affair, rejected these claims. When interviewed, Ben-Menashe gave a substantially different account, stating that he had no knowledge of the transfer of Inslaw's proprietary software, and that the "PROMIS" in his affidavits referred not to Inslaw's product but to an NSA program he called "Milon," a dictionary-compilation tool developed independently before Inslaw existed; he admitted he had allowed the Hamiltons and others to assume he meant Inslaw's PROMIS "to promote his book."[^14] The NSA confirmed that its own internal Product Related On-line Management Information System, also called PROMIS, was written in M204 rather than COBOL and was wholly unrelated to Inslaw's software. The House October Surprise Task Force, the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]], and the special counsel all found his testimony fabricated and unsupported.[^14][^20]
The special counsel Nicholas Bua, in his 1993 report on the Inslaw affair, rejected these claims. When interviewed, Ben-Menashe gave a substantially different account, stating that he had no knowledge of the transfer of Inslaw's proprietary software, and that the "PROMIS" in his affidavits referred not to Inslaw's product but to an NSA program he called "Milon," a dictionary-compilation tool developed independently before Inslaw existed; he admitted he had allowed the Hamiltons and others to assume he meant Inslaw's PROMIS "to promote his book."[^19] The NSA confirmed that its own internal Product Related On-line Management Information System, also called PROMIS, was written in M204 rather than COBOL and was wholly unrelated to Inslaw's software. The House October Surprise Task Force, the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]], and the special counsel all found his testimony fabricated and unsupported.[^19][^25]
### Claims about Robert Maxwell
Ben-Menashe alleged that the publisher Robert Maxwell and Nicholas Davies were long-time assets of Israeli intelligence and that Maxwell had close ties to the prime minister's office.[^3] One specific claim concerned the 1986 case of the nuclear technician [[Mordechai Vanunu]], whose account of [[Dimona]] reached the Maxwell-owned [[Sunday Mirror]]; Ben-Menashe said Davies alerted Israeli intelligence to the approach and introduced him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]], and that a Vanunu photograph published by the Sunday Mirror had been flown in from Israel, although the photograph in question had in fact been taken by the [[Sunday Times]] journalist [[Peter Hounam]], undercutting that detail.[^21] Hersh's 1991 book and the parliamentary statements that followed brought the Maxwell allegations into the open shortly before Maxwell's death, and Maxwell sued Hersh for libel.[^15] No declassified material has confirmed the allegations.[^4]
Ben-Menashe alleged that the publisher Robert Maxwell and Nicholas Davies were long-time assets of Israeli intelligence and that Maxwell had close ties to the prime minister's office.[^3] One specific claim concerned the 1986 case of the nuclear technician [[Mordechai Vanunu]], whose account of [[Dimona]] reached the Maxwell-owned [[Sunday Mirror]]; Ben-Menashe said Davies alerted Israeli intelligence to the approach and introduced him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]], and that a Vanunu photograph published by the Sunday Mirror had been flown in from Israel, although the photograph in question had in fact been taken by the [[Sunday Times]] journalist [[Peter Hounam]], undercutting that detail.[^26] Hersh's 1991 book and the parliamentary statements that followed brought the Maxwell allegations into the open shortly before Maxwell's death, and Maxwell sued Hersh for libel.[^20] No declassified material has confirmed the allegations.[^4]
Seymour Hersh's 1991 book *The Samson Option* states that Ben-Menashe first contacted the author in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed "as no other Israeli would" to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. The author's note adds that Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991, and that his allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.[^22] The book's account of the Davies arms firm, Ora Limited, and of Vanunu's 1986 compromise is attributed in the text to Ben-Menashe's account.[^23]
Seymour Hersh's 1991 book *The Samson Option* states that Ben-Menashe first contacted the author in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed "as no other Israeli would" to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. The author's note adds that Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991, and that his allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.[^27] The book's account of the Davies arms firm, Ora Limited, and of Vanunu's 1986 compromise is attributed in the text to Ben-Menashe's account.[^28]
### Epstein and Maxwell Allegations
Beginning in 2019, Ben-Menashe gave interviews, including to the journalist [[Whitney Webb]] of MintPress News and to the outlet Narativ, in which he claimed that he had met Jeffrey Epstein and [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] in the 1980s, that he had seen Epstein in Robert Maxwell's offices, and that Maxwell had recruited Epstein for Israeli intelligence and introduced him as pre-approved by figures in Aman.[^24] He characterized the later Epstein operation as a "honeytrap" that gathered sexual blackmail material on powerful figures for Israeli intelligence.[^24]
Beginning in 2019, Ben-Menashe gave interviews, including to the journalist [[Whitney Webb]] of MintPress News and to the outlet Narativ, in which he claimed that he had met Jeffrey Epstein and [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] in the 1980s, that he had seen Epstein in Robert Maxwell's offices, and that Maxwell had recruited Epstein for Israeli intelligence and introduced him as pre-approved by figures in Aman.[^29] He characterized the later Epstein operation as a "honeytrap" that gathered sexual blackmail material on powerful figures for Israeli intelligence.[^29]
No corroborating witness, document, or official admission has been produced to support these specific claims, and reviewers have noted that they rest solely on his own assertions against a documented record of unreliability.[^4][^25] His account also conflicts with the established chronology of Epstein's career, since Epstein's documented entry into Ghislaine Maxwell's circle is generally dated to the period after Robert Maxwell's 1991 death rather than to the 1980s meetings Ben-Menashe described.[^25] He has continued to make related claims, including a 2025 assertion that [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] held Epstein-related files, that likewise remain unverified.[^25]
No corroborating witness, document, or official admission has been produced to support these specific claims, and reviewers have noted that they rest solely on his own assertions against a documented record of unreliability.[^4][^30] His account also conflicts with the established chronology of Epstein's career, since Epstein's documented entry into Ghislaine Maxwell's circle is generally dated to the period after Robert Maxwell's 1991 death rather than to the 1980s meetings Ben-Menashe described.[^30] He has continued to make related claims, including a 2025 assertion that [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] held Epstein-related files, that likewise remain unverified.[^30]
### Lobbying and Consulting
After his intelligence-related notoriety, Ben-Menashe built a lobbying and consulting practice through the [[Montreal]]-based firm [[Dickens & Madson]], representing controversial governments and figures.[^26] His involvement with the government of [[Robert Mugabe]] in [[Zimbabwe]] featured in the treason prosecution of the opposition leader [[Morgan Tsvangirai]], built on a videotape in which prosecutors said Tsvangirai discussed the "elimination" of Mugabe with Ben-Menashe; Tsvangirai was acquitted of high treason on October 14, 2004, by Judge [[Paddington Garwe]] of the Harare High Court, who found no proof of the alleged request, ruled that Ben-Menashe's testimony had to be treated with caution, and called some of it clearly false.[^27]
After his intelligence-related notoriety, Ben-Menashe built a lobbying and consulting practice through the [[Montreal]]-based firm [[Dickens & Madson]], representing controversial governments and figures.[^31] His involvement with the government of [[Robert Mugabe]] in [[Zimbabwe]] featured in the treason prosecution of the opposition leader [[Morgan Tsvangirai]], built on a videotape in which prosecutors said Tsvangirai discussed the "elimination" of Mugabe with Ben-Menashe; Tsvangirai was acquitted of high treason on October 14, 2004, by Judge [[Paddington Garwe]] of the Harare High Court, who found no proof of the alleged request, ruled that Ben-Menashe's testimony had to be treated with caution, and called some of it clearly false.[^32]
He later registered a 2 million dollar contract in March 2021 to lobby for the [[Myanmar]] military junta after its coup, agreeing to advise on evading United States sanctions, and took on engagements connected to [[Sudan]] and its militia leader [[Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo]], a roughly 12 million dollar Zimbabwe land transaction funded by the criminal financier [[Paul Le Roux]] in 2007 and 2008 in which the promised farmland was never delivered, a reported 1 million dollar arrangement with [[Kyrgyzstan]], and work tied to [[Libya]], the [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Venezuela]], and the [[Tigray]] conflict in [[Ethiopia]].[^26][^28] Washington figures quoted in profiles of his career described his reputation as "poisonous."[^26]
He later registered a 2 million dollar contract in March 2021 to lobby for the [[Myanmar]] military junta after its coup, agreeing to advise on evading United States sanctions, and took on engagements connected to [[Sudan]] and its militia leader [[Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo]], a roughly 12 million dollar Zimbabwe land transaction funded by the criminal financier [[Paul Le Roux]] in 2007 and 2008 in which the promised farmland was never delivered, a reported 1 million dollar arrangement with [[Kyrgyzstan]], and work tied to [[Libya]], the [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Venezuela]], and the [[Tigray]] conflict in [[Ethiopia]].[^31][^33] Washington figures quoted in profiles of his career described his reputation as "poisonous."[^31]
### The McFarlane Libel Suit
The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the publisher of Profits of War, Sheridan Square Press, for libel over passages that linked McFarlane to the covert dealings Ben-Menashe described.[^29] The case, McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, reached the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled in 1996. Applying the [[actual malice]] standard required for a public figure, the court held that McFarlane could not show the publisher had acted with reckless disregard for the truth merely because Ben-Menashe was a doubtful source, and it affirmed dismissal of the suit. The outcome turned on the high bar a public-figure plaintiff must clear rather than on any finding that Ben-Menashe's account was true.[^29]
The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the publisher of Profits of War, Sheridan Square Press, for libel over passages that linked McFarlane to the covert dealings Ben-Menashe described.[^34] The case, McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, reached the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled in 1996. Applying the [[actual malice]] standard required for a public figure, the court held that McFarlane could not show the publisher had acted with reckless disregard for the truth merely because Ben-Menashe was a doubtful source, and it affirmed dismissal of the suit. The outcome turned on the high bar a public-figure plaintiff must clear rather than on any finding that Ben-Menashe's account was true.[^34]
### Footnotes
@ -94,25 +98,30 @@ The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the p
[^5]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, chapter 3, "Love in the Time of Revolution" ("August 15, 1977. How could I ever forget my first day in the External Relations Department"; four branches at p. 26; "Starting in late September 1977, I became a Middle East commuter"). New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015. Lending copy: https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
[^6]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War*, TrineDay reprint, 2015, pp. 209-210 (index "Lavee, Shimon, 210").
[^7]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War*, TrineDay reprint, 2015, text of the 1989 trial chapter ("Mr. Ari Ben-Menashe has served in the Israel Defense Forces External Relations Department in key positions") and appendix, letters of reference dated September 4, 6 and 14, 1987.
[^8]: "Espionage: Con Man or Key to a Mystery?," *Time,* 1991. https://time.com/archive/6718038/espionage-con-man-or-key-to-a-mystery/
[^9]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post,* 1990. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
[^10]: United States v. Menashe, 741 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
[^11]: "Probe by House finds no 'October surprise,'" *The Baltimore Sun,* 1993. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-01-13-1993013111-story.html
[^12]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *The "October Surprise" Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran: Report of the Special Counsel to Senator Terry Sanford and Senator James M. Jeffords,* S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, p. 113. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000021071829
[^13]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, on Ben-Menashe's call to Bill Hamilton after Casolaro's death.
[^14]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, on the PROMIS affidavits, the "Milon" recantation, and the finding that Ben-Menashe's account offered no evidentiary support for the Inslaw allegations.
[^15]: "Fact or fiction? The claims of Ari Ben-Menashe," *Green Left,* 1992. https://www.greenleft.org.au/1992/42/fact-or-fiction-claims-ari-ben-menashe
[^16]: Pipes, Daniel. "Gideon's Spies by Gordon Thomas," *Commentary,* 1999. https://www.commentary.org/articles/daniel-pipes/gideons-spies-by-gordon-thomas/
[^17]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
[^18]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder of the Casolaro papers, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
[^19]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19 (October 24, 1991), sections 4 and 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 185 to 187).
[^20]: "No wrong-doing in Inslaw affair, report says," *UPI,* 1993. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/06/17/No-wrong-doing-in-Inslaw-affair-report-says/5482740289600/
[^21]: "The Vanunu affair and the Sunday Mirror photograph," contemporaneous press reporting noting the photograph was taken by Sunday Times journalist Peter Hounam, undercutting Ben-Menashe's account.
[^22]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Author's Note, pp. ix-x, and the note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260.
[^23]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 309-310.
[^24]: "Former Israeli Spy Ari Ben-Menashe on Israel's Relationship with Epstein," *MintPress News,* 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/ari-ben-menashe-israel-relationship-jeffrey-epstein/263465/
[^25]: "What did Ari Ben-Menashe claim about Jeffrey Epstein," *Factually,* 2025. https://factually.co/fact-checks/media/ari-ben-menashe-claims-jeffrey-epstein-mossad-d56c30
[^26]: "The Man of Mystery Hustling Myanmar," *Washington Monthly,* 2021. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/13/the-man-of-mystery-hustling-myanmar/
[^27]: "Tsvangirai acquitted of treason in Zimbabwe," *The Globe and Mail,* 2004. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tsvangirai-acquitted-of-treason-in-zimbabwe/article18275151/
[^28]: "The Curious Case of Bishkek's $1 Million Deal With Ex-Israeli Intelligence Worker," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/the-curious-case-of-bishkek-s-1-million-deal-with-ex-israeli-intelligence-worker-/31033365.html
[^29]: McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
[^8]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, pp. 97-98. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
[^9]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98.
[^10]: "Espionage: Con Man or Key to a Mystery?," *Time,* 1991. https://time.com/archive/6718038/espionage-con-man-or-key-to-a-mystery/
[^11]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post,* 1990. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
[^12]: United States v. Menashe, 741 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
[^13]: *United States v. Menashe*, 741 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), No. 90 Cr. 010 (LLS), memorandum and order of Judge Louis L. Stanton, August 1, 1990. https://static.case.law/f-supp/741/cases/1135-01.json
[^14]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 1990 (dateline New York, November 28; statements of Thomas Dunn and Assistant U.S. Attorney Baruch Weiss; the undercover Customs Service agent). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
[^15]: "Probe by House finds no 'October surprise,'" *The Baltimore Sun,* 1993. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-01-13-1993013111-story.html
[^16]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 148.
[^17]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *The "October Surprise" Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran: Report of the Special Counsel to Senator Terry Sanford and Senator James M. Jeffords,* S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, p. 114. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000021071829
[^18]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, on Ben-Menashe's call to Bill Hamilton after Casolaro's death.
[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, on the PROMIS affidavits, the "Milon" recantation, and the finding that Ben-Menashe's account offered no evidentiary support for the Inslaw allegations.
[^20]: "Fact or fiction? The claims of Ari Ben-Menashe," *Green Left,* 1992. https://www.greenleft.org.au/1992/42/fact-or-fiction-claims-ari-ben-menashe
[^21]: Pipes, Daniel. "Gideon's Spies by Gordon Thomas," *Commentary,* 1999. https://www.commentary.org/articles/daniel-pipes/gideons-spies-by-gordon-thomas/
[^22]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
[^23]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder of the Casolaro papers, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
[^24]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19 (October 24, 1991), sections 4 and 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 185 to 187).
[^25]: "No wrong-doing in Inslaw affair, report says," *UPI,* 1993. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/06/17/No-wrong-doing-in-Inslaw-affair-report-says/5482740289600/
[^26]: "The Vanunu affair and the Sunday Mirror photograph," contemporaneous press reporting noting the photograph was taken by Sunday Times journalist Peter Hounam, undercutting Ben-Menashe's account.
[^27]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Author's Note, pp. ix-x, and the note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260.
[^28]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 309-310.
[^29]: "Former Israeli Spy Ari Ben-Menashe on Israel's Relationship with Epstein," *MintPress News,* 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/ari-ben-menashe-israel-relationship-jeffrey-epstein/263465/
[^30]: "What did Ari Ben-Menashe claim about Jeffrey Epstein," *Factually,* 2025. https://factually.co/fact-checks/media/ari-ben-menashe-claims-jeffrey-epstein-mossad-d56c30
[^31]: "The Man of Mystery Hustling Myanmar," *Washington Monthly,* 2021. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/13/the-man-of-mystery-hustling-myanmar/
[^32]: "Tsvangirai acquitted of treason in Zimbabwe," *The Globe and Mail,* 2004. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tsvangirai-acquitted-of-treason-in-zimbabwe/article18275151/
[^33]: "The Curious Case of Bishkek's $1 Million Deal With Ex-Israeli Intelligence Worker," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/the-curious-case-of-bishkek-s-1-million-deal-with-ex-israeli-intelligence-worker-/31033365.html
[^34]: McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

21
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Dick Cheney.md
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@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ relations:
with: "[[Halliburton]]"
role: "chief executive"
end: 2000
fn: 4
fn: 5
created: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-10-14
---
Richard Bruce Cheney was born in Lincoln, Nebraska, on January 30, 1941, and grew up in Casper, Wyoming. He was a congressional fellow in 1968, worked at the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Cost of Living Council, was deputy assistant to President [[Gerald R. Ford]] in 1974 and 1975 and his chief of staff from 1975 to 1977, represented Wyoming in the House from 1979 until March 17, 1989, was Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993, and was Vice President under [[George W. Bush]] from 2001 to 2009.[^1]
@ -42,21 +42,24 @@ In June 1975, as deputy to the chief of staff, [[Donald Rumsfeld]], Cheney led t
### Iran-Contra
As a House Republican on the Iran-Contra investigating committees, Cheney signed the minority report of November 1987, drafted principally by the committee staffer Michael Malbin. It held that "energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government" and that "to whatever extent the [[Boland Amendment|Boland Amendments]] tried to prohibit such activity they were clearly unconstitutional."[^3]
As a House Republican on the Iran-Contra investigating committees, Cheney signed the minority report of November 1987, drafted principally by the committee staffer Michael Malbin. The report quoted Federalist No. 70, "energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government," and stated that the Constitution protects the President's ability "to persuade U.S. citizens to engage voluntarily in otherwise legal activity to serve what they consider to be the national interest. That includes trying to persuade other countries to contribute their own funds for causes both countries support. To whatever extent the [[Boland Amendment|Boland Amendments]] tried to prohibit such activity, they were clearly unconstitutional."[^3]
On December 10, 1986, Cheney questioned [[Robert McFarlane]] before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] about the Boland Amendment. McFarlane testified that in the summer of 1985 he "went to considerable length to determine whether" [[Oliver North]] had violated it, and that a document search "turned up two or three inches of paper, that reported on contacts that did occur between Colonel North and myself, indeed the President and Contra leaders." The committees wrote that in this testimony McFarlane withheld his concerns about the documents and asserted that they proved North had fully complied with the Boland Amendment.[^4]
### Halliburton
Cheney was chief executive of [[Halliburton]] in the late 1990s. [[Ray Hunt]] of [[Hunt Oil Company|Hunt Oil]] joined its board in 1998 and went at once onto its compensation committee, which that year gave Cheney a bonus of 1.1 million dollars and restricted stock worth 1.5 million on a salary of 1.18 million.[^4] As Vice President, he said on August 26, 2002, that the case of the Iraqi defector [[Hussein Kamel]] "should serve as a reminder to all that we often learned more as the result of defections than we learned from the inspection regime itself"; Kamel had told UN inspectors in August 1995 that Iraq's chemical, biological and missile stocks had been destroyed.[^5]
Cheney was chief executive of [[Halliburton]] in the late 1990s. [[Ray Hunt]] of [[Hunt Oil Company|Hunt Oil]] joined its board in 1998 and went at once onto its compensation committee, which that year gave Cheney a bonus of 1.1 million dollars and restricted stock worth 1.5 million on a salary of 1.18 million.[^5] As Vice President, he said on August 26, 2002, that the case of the Iraqi defector [[Hussein Kamel]] "should serve as a reminder to all that we often learned more as the result of defections than we learned from the inspection regime itself"; Kamel had told UN inspectors in August 1995 that Iraq's chemical, biological and missile stocks had been destroyed.[^6]
### Allegations
[[Cathy O'Brien]], who describes herself as a survivor of [[Project Monarch]] mind control, named Cheney among officials she said abused her, in *Trance Formation of America* (1995, with Mark Phillips). Her claims about named officials are uncorroborated.[^6]
[[Cathy O'Brien]], who describes herself as a survivor of [[Project Monarch]] mind control, named Cheney among officials she said abused her, in *Trance Formation of America* (1995, with Mark Phillips). Her claims about named officials are uncorroborated.[^7]
### Footnotes
[^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art and Archives, "CHENEY, Richard Bruce." https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/10884
[^2]: Prados, John, and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, eds. "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975; Removed Section on CIA Assassination Plots." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, February 29, 2016, document 15. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
[^3]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,* H. Rept. 100-433, S. Rept. 100-216, November 1987, minority report. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18221
[^4]: Halliburton Company, Schedule 14A proxy statement, 2004, Securities and Exchange Commission.
[^5]: Rangwala, Glen. "The interview with Hussein Kamel," February 2003, quoting the UNSCOM and IAEA note of the meeting of August 22, 1995; Barry, John. *Newsweek,* March 3, 2003.
[^6]: O'Brien, Cathy, and Mark Phillips. *Trance Formation of America.* 1995.
[^3]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,* H. Rept. 100-433, S. Rept. 100-216, November 1987, minority report, minority views, ch. 1, p. 451, and ch. 2, p. 460. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18221
[^4]: Iran-Contra report, majority views, ch. 6, p. 132 and nn. 193-194 (McFarlane before the House Intelligence Committee, Dec. 10, 1986). https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
[^5]: Halliburton Company, Schedule 14A proxy statement, 2004, Securities and Exchange Commission.
[^6]: Rangwala, Glen. "The interview with Hussein Kamel," February 2003, quoting the UNSCOM and IAEA note of the meeting of August 22, 1995; Barry, John. *Newsweek,* March 3, 2003.
[^7]: O'Brien, Cathy, and Mark Phillips. *Trance Formation of America.* 1995.

12
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Edward P. Boland.md
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@ -9,13 +9,19 @@ born: 1911-10-01
died: 2001-11-04
location: "Springfield, Massachusetts"
---
Edward P. Boland was the Massachusetts Democratic congressman who sponsored the [[Boland Amendment|Boland Amendments]], the series of congressional provisions that prohibited the use of taxpayer funds for covert military operations against [[Nicaragua]]. The amendments, passed between 1982 and 1984, were named after Boland as chairman of the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]].[^1]
Edward P. Boland was the Massachusetts Democratic congressman who sponsored the [[Boland Amendment|Boland Amendments]], the series of congressional provisions that prohibited the use of taxpayer funds for covert military operations against [[Nicaragua]]. The amendments, passed between 1982 and 1986, were named after Boland as chairman of the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]].[^1]
### The Boland Amendments
The amendments sought to rein in the Reagan administration's covert war by prohibiting the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], [[National Security Council]], or any other U.S. government agency from providing military aid to the [[Contras]]. The legislation directly led to [[Oliver North]]'s illegal efforts to fund the Contras through alternative sources, including [[Iran]] arms sales proceeds, Saudi contributions, and [[Cocaine]] trafficking profits. The Boland Amendments exposed the tension between congressional oversight and executive branch determination to pursue the Contra war by any means necessary.[^2]
The amendments sought to rein in the Reagan administration's covert war by restricting military aid to the [[Contras]]. The 1982 provision applied to the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the [[Department of Defense]]; the provisions of 1983 to 1986 extended to "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities," language the Iran-Contra committees' majority read to cover the [[National Security Council]] staff and the minority read not to.[^2] The legislation directly led to [[Oliver North]]'s illegal efforts to fund the Contras through alternative sources, including [[Iran]] arms sales proceeds, Saudi contributions, and [[Cocaine]] trafficking profits. The Boland Amendments exposed the tension between congressional oversight and executive branch determination to pursue the Contra war by any means necessary.[^3]
On December 8, 1982, Boland offered a substitute to [[Tom Harkin]]'s amendment to the fiscal 1983 defense appropriations bill, telling the House that it was substantively identical to the restriction in the classified annex to the earlier intelligence authorization act and that the Administration had accepted it: "They do not like it, but it is agreeable to them." The House adopted his substitute 411 to 0 after rejecting Harkin's substitute, and the provision took effect on December 21, 1982.[^4] The House Intelligence Committee, of which he was chairman, reported the Boland-Zablocki bill in May 1983; the House passed it 228 to 195 on July 28, 1983, and the Senate never considered it.[^5] After the conference of December 1983 Boland described the fiscal 1984 compromise as "a $24 million cap on funding from whatever source." On October 10, 1984, he told the House that the provision then before it "clearly ends United States support for the war in Nicaragua," that "there are no exceptions to the prohibition," and that it "clearly prohibits any expenditure, including those from accounts for salaries and all support costs."[^6]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Glossary.
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 16.
[^2]: Public Law 97-377, sec. 793; Public Law 98-215, sec. 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475; Public Law 98-473, sec. 101 (sec. 8066(a)), 98 Stat. 1935; Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 399, and minority views, ch. 6, pp. 491-497.
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 16.
[^4]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 396; Public Law 97-377, sec. 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (Dec. 21, 1982). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-96/pdf/STATUTE-96-Pg1830.pdf
[^5]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, p. 34 and nn. 34-36.
[^6]: Iran-Contra report, majority views, ch. 26, pp. 397-398 (citing 130 Cong. Rec. H11974 and H11980, daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984); Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, part III, n. 47. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm

165
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Elliott Abrams.md
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@ -51,55 +51,55 @@ relations:
with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
reverse: true
start: 1991-10-07
fn: 34
fn: 37
- type: employed_by
with: "[[National Security Council]]"
start: 2001-06
end: 2009-01
role: "Senior director for democracy, human rights and international organizations; senior director for Near East and North African affairs; deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy"
fn: 39
fn: 42
- type: head_of
with: "[[Ethics and Public Policy Center]]"
start: 1996
end: 2001
fn: 39
fn: 42
- type: member_of
with: "[[U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom]]"
start: 1999
end: 2001
role: "Member, chairman in 2001; reappointed 2012"
fn: 39
fn: 42
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Council on Foreign Relations]]"
role: "Senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies"
fn: 39
fn: 42
- type: employed_by
with: "[[State Department]]"
start: 2019-01-25
end: 2021-01
role: "Special Representative for Venezuela"
fn: 44
fn: 47
- type: employed_by
with: "[[State Department]]"
start: 2020-08
end: 2021-01
role: "Special Representative for Iran"
fn: 46
fn: 49
- type: relative_of
with: "[[Midge Decter]]"
role: "Mother-in-law"
start: 1980
fn: 48
fn: 51
- type: relative_of
with: "[[Norman Podhoretz]]"
role: "Stepfather-in-law"
start: 1980
fn: 48
fn: 51
- type: spouse_of
with: "[[Rachel Abrams]]"
start: 1980
end: 2013-06-07
fn: 48
fn: 51
---
Elliott Abrams (born January 24, 1948, New York City) was an Assistant Secretary of State in the Reagan administration who chaired the [[Restricted Interagency Group]] on Central America and served as the administration's chief advocate on Capitol Hill for aid to the [[Contras]].[^1] With [[Oliver North]] he persuaded the director of the [[NHAO]] to add North's courier to the office staff. He pleaded guilty in 1991 to withholding information from Congress and was pardoned by [[George H.W. Bush]] in December 1992.
@ -107,79 +107,81 @@ Elliott Abrams (born January 24, 1948, New York City) was an Assistant Secretary
Abrams joined the Reagan administration in January 1981 as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs and later became assistant secretary for human rights.[^2] On April 19, 1985 [[George P. Shultz]] offered him the post of assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, and a note by [[Charles Hill]] recorded Shultz's promise to "manage the emergence of E[lliott] A[brams] as King of L[atin] A[merica]."[^3] Abrams assumed the post in July 1985 and became responsible for Central America. The [[Boland Amendment]] had cut off aid to the Contras in October 1984, and Abrams became the administration's chief advocate on Capitol Hill for aid to the rebels.[^2]
Abrams's notes of a September 4, 1985 meeting with Shultz record the instruction to "monitor Ollie," meaning North.[^4] Abrams later testified that his "working assumption" was that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC staff.[^5] He chaired the Restricted Interagency Group, the interagency body that coordinated policy on the region, with [[Alan Fiers]] of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]'s Central American Task Force and North as its principal members.[^6]
Abrams's notes of a September 4, 1985 meeting with Shultz record the instruction to "monitor Ollie," meaning North.[^4] Abrams later testified that his "working assumption" was that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC staff.[^5] He chaired the Restricted Interagency Group, the interagency body that coordinated policy on the region, with [[Alan Fiers]] of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]'s Central American Task Force and North as its principal members.[^6] In March 1985 Abrams's predecessor, [[A. Langhorne Motley]], told the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]]: "even if today we wanted to go to third countries to encourage or solicit, we could not because there is a prohibition."[^7]
### Guatemala, 1983
As assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, Abrams said in January 1983 that the administration was "quite encouraged" by the initial steps of Guatemala's President [[Efrain Rios Montt]], who had come to power in March 1982. He said that under Ríos Montt "There are many fewer abuses than there used to be," that the army's behavior had improved, and that the resumption of military sales should be viewed as "encouragement" to the new government. Asked about accounts by Guatemalan refugees in Mexico of massacres by the army, he said: "There are certainly refugees in Mexico whose towns suffered massacres by the military, but our sense is that this kind of gross behavior by the military is very substantially reduced under Rios Montt."[^7]
As assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, Abrams said in January 1983 that the administration was "quite encouraged" by the initial steps of Guatemala's President [[Efrain Rios Montt]], who had come to power in March 1982. He said that under Ríos Montt "There are many fewer abuses than there used to be," that the army's behavior had improved, and that the resumption of military sales should be viewed as "encouragement" to the new government. Asked about accounts by Guatemalan refugees in Mexico of massacres by the army, he said: "There are certainly refugees in Mexico whose towns suffered massacres by the military, but our sense is that this kind of gross behavior by the military is very substantially reduced under Rios Montt."[^8]
### El Mozote and the 1982 certification
The [[Atlacatl Battalion]] detained the inhabitants of [[El Mozote]] in Morazán on December 10, 1981 and executed them on December 11, according to the [[United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador]]. The Commission identified more than 200 victims at El Mozote, and more than 500 identified victims across El Mozote and the other villages hit in the same operation.[^8] The massacre became public knowledge on January 27, 1982, when [[New York Times|The New York Times]] and [[Washington Post|The Washington Post]] published reports by [[Raymond Bonner]] and [[Alma Guillermoprieto]]. The Salvadoran authorities "categorically denied that a massacre had taken place."[^9]
The [[Atlacatl Battalion]] detained the inhabitants of [[El Mozote]] in Morazán on December 10, 1981 and executed them on December 11, according to the [[United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador]]. The Commission identified more than 200 victims at El Mozote, and more than 500 identified victims across El Mozote and the other villages hit in the same operation.[^9] The massacre became public knowledge on January 27, 1982, when [[New York Times|The New York Times]] and [[Washington Post|The Washington Post]] published reports by [[Raymond Bonner]] and [[Alma Guillermoprieto]]. The Salvadoran authorities "categorically denied that a massacre had taken place."[^10]
On February 8, 1982 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony on the President's January 28, 1982 certification of military aid to El Salvador. [[Thomas O. Enders]] read a summary of an embassy report on the village. The two officers who wrote it had approached El Mozote and interviewed refugees, and they concluded that it was "certain that the guerrilla forces who established defensive positions in El Mozote did nothing to remove them from the path of battle."[^10] Enders's prepared statement said that the embassy found no evidence that government forces systematically massacred civilians, and that the number killed did not approach the 733 or 926 victims cited in press reports. The statement also said that insurgents had repeatedly fabricated or inflated mass-murder allegations.[^10]
On February 8, 1982 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony on the President's January 28, 1982 certification of military aid to El Salvador. [[Thomas O. Enders]] read a summary of an embassy report on the village. The two officers who wrote it had approached El Mozote and interviewed refugees, and they concluded that it was "certain that the guerrilla forces who established defensive positions in El Mozote did nothing to remove them from the path of battle."[^11] Enders's prepared statement said that the embassy found no evidence that government forces systematically massacred civilians, and that the number killed did not approach the 733 or 926 victims cited in press reports. The statement also said that insurgents had repeatedly fabricated or inflated mass-murder allegations.[^11]
Abrams told the committee that the affair "appears to be an incident which is at least being significantly misused, at the very best, by the guerrillas." He added: "Where the truth lies we are still attempting to find out."[^11] The Truth Commission later reported that the 1992 exhumation at El Mozote recovered 245 cartridge cases studied by ballistics analysts, 184 with headstamps identifying ammunition manufactured for the United States Government at Lake City, Missouri, and that all projectiles but one appeared to have been fired from United States-manufactured M-16 rifles.[^12]
Abrams told the committee that the affair "appears to be an incident which is at least being significantly misused, at the very best, by the guerrillas." He added: "Where the truth lies we are still attempting to find out."[^12] The Truth Commission later reported that the 1992 exhumation at El Mozote recovered 245 cartridge cases studied by ballistics analysts, 184 with headstamps identifying ammunition manufactured for the United States Government at Lake City, Missouri, and that all projectiles but one appeared to have been fired from United States-manufactured M-16 rifles.[^13]
### The NHAO and North's network
Congress appropriated $27 million in humanitarian assistance for the Contras in August 1985. On August 29, 1985 President [[Ronald Reagan]] created the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) inside the [[State Department]] to administer the money, and [[Robert W. Duemling]] set up the office.[^13] [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that North intruded in the office in two ways: he insisted that [[Richard Gadd]], who was assisting [[Richard Secord]] and North in lethal resupply, be the contractor for NHAO flights, and, with Abrams, he persuaded Duemling to add North's Central American courier, [[Robert Owen]], to the NHAO staff.[^13] Owen, in addition to handling traveler's checks for contra leaders, picked up and delivered $16,500 in cash.[^14]
Congress appropriated $27 million in humanitarian assistance for the Contras in August 1985. On August 29, 1985 President [[Ronald Reagan]] created the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) inside the [[State Department]] to administer the money, and [[Robert W. Duemling]] set up the office.[^14] [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that North intruded in the office in two ways: he insisted that [[Richard Gadd]], who was assisting [[Richard Secord]] and North in lethal resupply, be the contractor for NHAO flights, and, with Abrams, he persuaded Duemling to add North's Central American courier, [[Robert Owen]], to the NHAO staff.[^14] Owen, in addition to handling traveler's checks for contra leaders, picked up and delivered $16,500 in cash.[^15]
The congressional committees' 1987 report records that Owen applied to Duemling for an NHAO position in mid-September 1985 and that North recommended him as a "can do" person "who knows the scene." Duemling declined, and declined again after the three directors of the United Nicaraguan Opposition wrote asking for Owen's help. At a Restricted Interagency Group meeting on October 11, 1985, North complained about the NHAO flight impounded on October 10, saying it would not have happened had Owen been working for the NHAO. Duemling then agreed to fund a UNO contract with Owen's company, the Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance, Inc.[^15]
The congressional committees' 1987 report records that Owen applied to Duemling for an NHAO position in mid-September 1985 and that North recommended him as a "can do" person "who knows the scene." Duemling declined, and declined again after the three directors of the United Nicaraguan Opposition wrote asking for Owen's help. At a Restricted Interagency Group meeting on October 11, 1985, North complained about the NHAO flight impounded on October 10, saying it would not have happened had Owen been working for the NHAO. Duemling then agreed to fund a UNO contract with Owen's company, the Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance, Inc.[^16]
[[Gary Webb]] wrote in [[Dark Alliance]] that Duemling testified in a deposition to the Iran-Contra committees that he saw no necessity for a middleman, that North had Contra leaders write letters demanding Owen's hiring and lobbied Duemling's superior at the State Department, Assistant Secretary Abrams, and that after one stormy meeting with North and Abrams, Abrams turned to Duemling and said: "Well, Bob, I suppose you probably ought to hire Owen." Webb wrote that Owen was given a $50,000 contract as a "facilitator" and that the minutes of the November 1985 meeting record Abrams and North agreeing that Owen "will be expendable if he becomes a political or diplomatic liability."[^16] A second version attributed to Webb gives the facilitator's pay as $6,000 a month and has Abrams telling Duemling, when Duemling opposed the hiring: "Well, he works for me." In that version the facilitator position was created to channel funds through North's network while maintaining the appearance of humanitarian aid.[^17]
[[Gary Webb]] wrote in [[Dark Alliance]] that Duemling testified in a deposition to the Iran-Contra committees that he saw no necessity for a middleman, that North had Contra leaders write letters demanding Owen's hiring and lobbied Duemling's superior at the State Department, Assistant Secretary Abrams, and that after one stormy meeting with North and Abrams, Abrams turned to Duemling and said: "Well, Bob, I suppose you probably ought to hire Owen." Webb wrote that Owen was given a $50,000 contract as a "facilitator" and that the minutes of the November 1985 meeting record Abrams and North agreeing that Owen "will be expendable if he becomes a political or diplomatic liability."[^17] A second version attributed to Webb gives the facilitator's pay as $6,000 a month and has Abrams telling Duemling, when Duemling opposed the hiring: "Well, he works for me." In that version the facilitator position was created to channel funds through North's network while maintaining the appearance of humanitarian aid.[^18]
On October 10, 1985 an NHAO aircraft flew directly from the United States to Honduras with a television crew on board. The Honduran government then rescinded its permission for NHAO planes to fly directly there from the United States. North proposed the [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango air base]] in El Salvador as a transshipment point, and the NHAO planes were routed there.[^13]
On October 10, 1985 an NHAO aircraft flew directly from the United States to Honduras with a television crew on board. The Honduran government then rescinded its permission for NHAO planes to fly directly there from the United States. North proposed the [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango air base]] in El Salvador as a transshipment point, and the NHAO planes were routed there.[^14]
### Costa Rican airstrip and the RIG
Within days after Shultz's "monitor Ollie" instruction, Abrams, North and Fiers met in Abrams's office, and Fiers briefed Abrams on a secret airfield in Costa Rica that the contra supply network was building.[^18] After the Costa Rican announcement of the airstrip, Abrams drafted a harshly worded cable to the Costa Rican government. Walsh recorded that a cable containing his message was stopped by Shultz aide Hill.[^19]
Within days after Shultz's "monitor Ollie" instruction, Abrams, North and Fiers met in Abrams's office, and Fiers briefed Abrams on a secret airfield in Costa Rica that the contra supply network was building.[^19] After the Costa Rican announcement of the airstrip, Abrams drafted a harshly worded cable to the Costa Rican government. Walsh recorded that a cable containing his message was stopped by Shultz aide Hill.[^20]
In September 1986 North proposed that Panamanian leader [[Manuel Noriega]] pay for sabotage inside Nicaragua, at a RIG meeting in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense [[Richard Armitage]] on September 19. Walsh wrote that the decision was ultimately made not to have North cause the $1 million to be paid to Noriega. On September 20 Abrams met [[Nicholas Platt]] and Hill, and Hill's notes recorded the Noriega offer and "Wants our go-ahead."[^20]
In September 1986 North proposed that Panamanian leader [[Manuel Noriega]] pay for sabotage inside Nicaragua, at a RIG meeting in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense [[Richard Armitage]] on September 19. Walsh wrote that the decision was ultimately made not to have North cause the $1 million to be paid to Noriega. On September 20 Abrams met [[Nicholas Platt]] and Hill, and Hill's notes recorded the Noriega offer and "Wants our go-ahead."[^21]
### Brunei solicitation
After a May 16, 1986 National Security Planning Group meeting, Abrams raised with Shultz the solicitation of third countries. Shultz instructed him not to approach a large recipient of U.S. aid or a right-wing dictatorship such as Taiwan or South Korea.[^21] Abrams suggested the Sultan of [[Brunei]], and North told him to send no papers and say nothing further until North had talked with [[John Poindexter]]. Abrams lunched with Poindexter on June 11, 1986 and they discussed Brunei as a possible donor.[^21]
After a May 16, 1986 National Security Planning Group meeting, Abrams raised with Shultz the solicitation of third countries. Shultz instructed him not to approach a large recipient of U.S. aid or a right-wing dictatorship such as Taiwan or South Korea.[^22] Abrams suggested the Sultan of [[Brunei]], and North told him to send no papers and say nothing further until North had talked with [[John Poindexter]]. Abrams lunched with Poindexter on June 11, 1986 and they discussed Brunei as a possible donor.[^22]
In June 1986 Abrams obtained bank account information from North on a card typed by his secretary, [[Fawn Hall]]. Two account numbers were transposed, and the money went into the wrong account.[^21] Abrams solicited $10 million from the Sultan's defense minister, General Ibnu, in London on August 9, 1986, calling him under the name "Kenilworth." The Sultan ordered the transfer on August 19 from a Citibank account to [[Credit Suisse]] in Geneva, account 368430-22-1. A North notebook entry of September 15 refers to a deposit made about a week earlier and to a meeting with the Sultan the next day. On September 26 Ibnu told the U.S. ambassador that the Sultan had handled the transfer personally and that the recipient was "quite clear."[^22]
In June 1986 Abrams obtained bank account information from North on a card typed by his secretary, [[Fawn Hall]]. Two account numbers were transposed, and the money went into the wrong account.[^22] Abrams solicited $10 million from the Sultan's defense minister, General Ibnu, in London on August 9, 1986, calling him under the name "Kenilworth." The congressional committees dated the meeting August 8, 1986.[^23] The Sultan ordered the transfer on August 19 from a Citibank account to [[Credit Suisse]] in Geneva, account 368430-22-1. A North notebook entry of September 15 refers to a deposit made about a week earlier and to a meeting with the Sultan the next day. On September 26 Ibnu told the U.S. ambassador that the Sultan had handled the transfer personally and that the recipient was "quite clear."[^24]
The account North had supplied was for the Enterprise's Lake Resources account at Credit Suisse, 386.430.22.1. The number Abrams passed on was 368.430.22.1, and the deposit went there. Swiss authorities reported that the money was returned to Brunei.[^23] Walsh recorded that the Brunei contribution passed through accounts "controlled by or on behalf of" [[Bruce Rappaport]], a Swiss businessman, and that Credit Suisse disclaimed him as the recipient in 1989. Questioned under an immunity agreement in October 1990, Rappaport said the account was not his and that he did not know whose account received the deposit. He also said he did not know North or Abrams.[^24]
Shultz had been expected to make the approach to the Sultan on his Asia trip of June 23 and 24, 1986, carrying the index card with the account number; on the advice of U.S. Ambassador Barrington King he did not make a solicitation, and the card was not used on that trip.[^25] The committees wrote that North told Abrams the account was controlled by the Contras and that Abrams so informed Shultz; Walsh wrote that North told Abrams the use of the account North provided would permit more control by the U.S. Government.[^23][^25] The committees wrote that Abrams traveled to London under an alias and requested $10 million in "bridge financing"; asked what Brunei would receive in return, he answered: "Well, ... the President will know of this, and you will have the gratitude of the Secretary and of the President for helping us out in this jam." The official asked, "What concrete do we get out of this?" and Abrams answered: "You don't get anything concrete out of it."[^23] The majority described the giving of the Lake Resources number as "a deliberate effort to divert funds solicited for humanitarian purposes to lethal ends, and was foiled only because of an error in the account number."[^7]
The congressional committees' 1987 report recorded that Abrams described his late 1986 answers on third-country funding as "misleading." It also recorded his explanation that he had been promised confidentiality for Brunei and that "I did not believe I was authorized to" reveal the solicitation.[^25]
The account North had supplied was for the Enterprise's Lake Resources account at Credit Suisse, 386.430.22.1. The number Abrams passed on was 368.430.22.1, and the deposit went there. Swiss authorities reported that the money was returned to Brunei.[^26] Walsh recorded that the Brunei contribution passed through accounts "controlled by or on behalf of" [[Bruce Rappaport]], a Swiss businessman, and that Credit Suisse disclaimed him as the recipient in 1989. Questioned under an immunity agreement in October 1990, Rappaport said the account was not his and that he did not know whose account received the deposit. He also said he did not know North or Abrams.[^27]
The congressional committees' 1987 report recorded that Abrams described his late 1986 answers on third-country funding as "misleading." It also recorded his explanation that he had been promised confidentiality for Brunei and that "I did not believe I was authorized to" reveal the solicitation.[^28]
### Hasenfus and the October 1986 testimony
A C-123 aircraft carrying supplies to the contras was shot down over Nicaragua on October 5, 1986, and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Abrams chaired a RIG meeting on the downed aircraft on October 8. The group discussed demands for access to Hasenfus, Salvadoran denials of contra support, press guidance, and [[Southern Air Transport]], which had been used for NHAO deliveries. Walsh recorded that Abrams phoned North about the incident and asked about the retrieval of the bodies of the two American crew members killed in the crash, but did not explicitly ask North whether he was connected with the aircraft.[^26]
A C-123 aircraft carrying supplies to the contras was shot down over Nicaragua on October 5, 1986, and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Abrams chaired a RIG meeting on the downed aircraft on October 8. The group discussed demands for access to Hasenfus, Salvadoran denials of contra support, press guidance, and [[Southern Air Transport]], which had been used for NHAO deliveries. Walsh recorded that Abrams phoned North about the incident and asked about the retrieval of the bodies of the two American crew members killed in the crash, but did not explicitly ask North whether he was connected with the aircraft.[^29]
On October 10, 1986 Abrams testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Walsh's report calls a closed session and the congressional committees' 1987 report calls an open hearing. He said that "there clearly is an elaborate supply system," and added: "It is not our supply system." He said that the administration's attitude was that the people supplying the contras were doing "a very good thing," and that "we do generally approve of what they are doing."[^27] Asked by [[John Kerry]] about foreign government assistance, Abrams said that "we have not received a dime from a foreign government, not a dime, from any foreign government."[^28] He told the committee that his "injunction from the Secretary of State is never to lie."[^28]
On October 10, 1986 Abrams testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Walsh's report calls a closed session and the congressional committees' 1987 report calls an open hearing. He said that "there clearly is an elaborate supply system," and added: "It is not our supply system." He said that the administration's attitude was that the people supplying the contras were doing "a very good thing," and that "we do generally approve of what they are doing."[^30] Asked by [[John Kerry]] about foreign government assistance, Abrams said that "we have not received a dime from a foreign government, not a dime, from any foreign government."[^31] He told the committee that his "injunction from the Secretary of State is never to lie."[^31]
On October 14 Abrams told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that "that story about the Saudis to my knowledge is false," and that the claim of foreign government support was false as to 1985 and 1986.[^29] On October 15 he told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the U.S. government did not know who organized and paid for the flight. Asked whether anyone in the government did know, he said: "I wouldn't separate myself from the Government. We don't know."[^30]
On October 14 Abrams told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that "that story about the Saudis to my knowledge is false," and that the claim of foreign government support was false as to 1985 and 1986.[^32] On October 15 he told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the U.S. government did not know who organized and paid for the flight. Asked whether anyone in the government did know, he said: "I wouldn't separate myself from the Government. We don't know."[^33]
Walsh's report concluded: "Abrams was not truthful with the congressional committees."[^31] On October 14 Abrams told HPSCI that it was his understanding that [[Donald Gregg]] knew [[Felix Rodriguez]] and had introduced him to the Salvadorans in 1984 to work with the Salvadoran Air Force. He added that the Vice President was aware of Rodriguez's involvement with the Salvadoran Air Force, but that there was no knowledge that Rodriguez had moved on to activities on behalf of the contras.[^32] After his plea, Abrams told the grand jury that he was concerned that Rodriguez "talked too much about the Vice President."[^33]
Walsh's report concluded: "Abrams was not truthful with the congressional committees."[^34] On October 14 Abrams told HPSCI that it was his understanding that [[Donald Gregg]] knew [[Felix Rodriguez]] and had introduced him to the Salvadorans in 1984 to work with the Salvadoran Air Force. He added that the Vice President was aware of Rodriguez's involvement with the Salvadoran Air Force, but that there was no knowledge that Rodriguez had moved on to activities on behalf of the contras.[^35] After his plea, Abrams told the grand jury that he was concerned that Rodriguez "talked too much about the Vice President."[^36]
### Guilty plea and pardon
On October 7, 1991 Abrams pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress. The counts concerned his October 10, 1986 Senate testimony and his October 14, 1986 testimony to HPSCI about the Brunei solicitation.[^34] Abrams admitted that it was his belief "that disclosure of Lt. Col. North's activities in the resupply of the Contras would jeopardize final enactment" of a $100 million appropriation then pending.[^34] U.S. District Chief Judge [[Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr.]] sentenced him on November 15, 1991 to two years' probation and 100 hours of community service.[^35]
On October 7, 1991 Abrams pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress. The counts concerned his October 10, 1986 Senate testimony and his October 14, 1986 testimony to HPSCI about the Brunei solicitation.[^37] Abrams admitted that it was his belief "that disclosure of Lt. Col. North's activities in the resupply of the Contras would jeopardize final enactment" of a $100 million appropriation then pending.[^37] U.S. District Chief Judge [[Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr.]] sentenced him on November 15, 1991 to two years' probation and 100 hours of community service.[^38]
Walsh's report described Abrams as the leading official of the denials, who "steadfastly denied before Congress and the public that the United States was involved in the resupply effort."[^36] On December 24, 1992 President Bush granted clemency to Abrams, [[Caspar Weinberger]], [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Clair George]], Fiers and [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]]. Bush described the prosecutions as the "criminalization of policy differences."[^37] [[William Barr]] later said of Abrams that he was "very unjustly treated."[^38]
Walsh's report described Abrams as the leading official of the denials, who "steadfastly denied before Congress and the public that the United States was involved in the resupply effort."[^39] On December 24, 1992 President Bush granted clemency to Abrams, [[Caspar Weinberger]], [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Clair George]], Fiers and [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]]. Bush described the prosecutions as the "criminalization of policy differences."[^40] [[William Barr]] later said of Abrams that he was "very unjustly treated."[^41]
### Later posts, 2001 to 2009
Abrams joined the George W. Bush administration in June 2001 as senior director of the [[National Security Council]] for democracy, human rights and international organizations. From December 2002 to February 2005 he was senior director for Near East and North African affairs. From February 2005 to January 2009 he was deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy and supervised both the Near East and North African directorate and the democracy directorate.[^39]
Abrams joined the George W. Bush administration in June 2001 as senior director of the [[National Security Council]] for democracy, human rights and international organizations. From December 2002 to February 2005 he was senior director for Near East and North African affairs. From February 2005 to January 2009 he was deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy and supervised both the Near East and North African directorate and the democracy directorate.[^42]
Abrams had led the [[Ethics and Public Policy Center]] from 1996 until he joined the White House staff. He served on the [[U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom]] from 1999 to 2001, chairing it in 2001, and was reappointed in 2012. He was also a member of the [[U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council]].[^39] Abrams was one of the signers of the [[Project for the New American Century]] Statement of Principles of June 3, 1997, whose other signers included [[Dick Cheney]], [[Donald Rumsfeld]], [[Paul Wolfowitz]], [[I. Lewis Libby]], [[Zalmay Khalilzad]], [[Jeb Bush]], [[Midge Decter]] and [[Norman Podhoretz]].[^40] He also signed the Project's letter of January 26, 1998 to President [[Bill Clinton]], which stated that American strategy toward Iraq "should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power." Its other signers included Armitage, [[John Bolton]], Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, [[Richard Perle]], [[Robert Kagan]], [[William Kristol]], [[R. James Woolsey]] and [[Robert Zoellick]].[^41]
Abrams had led the [[Ethics and Public Policy Center]] from 1996 until he joined the White House staff. He served on the [[U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom]] from 1999 to 2001, chairing it in 2001, and was reappointed in 2012. He was also a member of the [[U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council]].[^42] Abrams was one of the signers of the [[Project for the New American Century]] Statement of Principles of June 3, 1997, whose other signers included [[Dick Cheney]], [[Donald Rumsfeld]], [[Paul Wolfowitz]], [[I. Lewis Libby]], [[Zalmay Khalilzad]], [[Jeb Bush]], [[Midge Decter]] and [[Norman Podhoretz]].[^43] He also signed the Project's letter of January 26, 1998 to President [[Bill Clinton]], which stated that American strategy toward Iraq "should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power." Its other signers included Armitage, [[John Bolton]], Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, [[Richard Perle]], [[Robert Kagan]], [[William Kristol]], [[R. James Woolsey]] and [[Robert Zoellick]].[^44]
In April 2002 the Venezuelan government of [[Hugo Chavez|Hugo Chávez]] was briefly removed while Abrams was on the NSC staff. Democracy Now's 2020 summary stated that Abrams "was also linked to the 2002 attempted coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez."[^42] The State Department's [[Office of Inspector General]], reviewing U.S. policy toward Venezuela from November 2001 to April 2002 at the request of Senator [[Christopher Dodd]], reported in July 2002 that "the embassy's and Department's contacts were heavily weighted toward individuals and groups known to be opponents of the Chávez government," and that "The opposition's willingness to talk to Embassy Caracas in detail about their plans against President Chávez and the embassy's willingness to listen may have left doubts about the sincerity of our professed opposition to undemocratic and unconstitutional means of removing President Chávez." The report limited the identities of those met to a classified annex, and concluded that the Inspector General "finds nothing to indicate that the Department or Embassy Caracas planned, participated in, aided, or encouraged the brief ouster of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in April."[^43]
In April 2002 the Venezuelan government of [[Hugo Chavez|Hugo Chávez]] was briefly removed while Abrams was on the NSC staff. Democracy Now's 2020 summary stated that Abrams "was also linked to the 2002 attempted coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez."[^45] The State Department's [[Office of Inspector General]], reviewing U.S. policy toward Venezuela from November 2001 to April 2002 at the request of Senator [[Christopher Dodd]], reported in July 2002 that "the embassy's and Department's contacts were heavily weighted toward individuals and groups known to be opponents of the Chávez government," and that "The opposition's willingness to talk to Embassy Caracas in detail about their plans against President Chávez and the embassy's willingness to listen may have left doubts about the sincerity of our professed opposition to undemocratic and unconstitutional means of removing President Chávez." The report limited the identities of those met to a classified annex, and concluded that the Inspector General "finds nothing to indicate that the Department or Embassy Caracas planned, participated in, aided, or encouraged the brief ouster of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in April."[^46]
### Venezuela and Iran appointments, 2019 to 2021
Secretary of State [[Mike Pompeo]] announced on January 25, 2019 that Abrams would be the United States envoy for Venezuela, with the task of helping "restore democracy," two days after the United States recognized [[Juan Guaido]] as interim president.[^44] He served as special representative for Venezuela.[^45] On August 6, 2020 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named him special representative for Iran, replacing [[Brian Hook]], and he kept the Venezuela post.[^46]
Secretary of State [[Mike Pompeo]] announced on January 25, 2019 that Abrams would be the United States envoy for Venezuela, with the task of helping "restore democracy," two days after the United States recognized [[Juan Guaido]] as interim president.[^47] He served as special representative for Venezuela.[^48] On August 6, 2020 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named him special representative for Iran, replacing [[Brian Hook]], and he kept the Venezuela post.[^49]
### Commission and family
In July 2023 President [[Joe Biden]] nominated Abrams to the [[U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy]].[^47]
In July 2023 President [[Joe Biden]] nominated Abrams to the [[U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy]].[^50]
Abrams married Rachel Decter in 1980. She was the daughter of Midge Decter by her first marriage, and Midge Decter married Norman Podhoretz in 1956, making Rachel his stepdaughter.[^48] A Times of Israel obituary of Rachel Abrams describes Podhoretz as Abrams's father.[^49] Rachel Abrams died on June 7, 2013.[^49]
Abrams married Rachel Decter in 1980. She was the daughter of Midge Decter by her first marriage, and Midge Decter married Norman Podhoretz in 1956, making Rachel his stepdaughter.[^51] A Times of Israel obituary of Rachel Abrams describes Podhoretz as Abrams's father.[^52] Rachel Abrams died on June 7, 2013.[^52]
### Footnotes
@ -189,46 +191,49 @@ Abrams married Rachel Decter in 1980. She was the daughter of Midge Decter by he
[^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams' Knowledge of North's Activities," nn. 4 to 5, quoting Abrams note of September 4, 1985 (ALW 0041285). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^5]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, n. 2, quoting Abrams, Select Committees testimony, June 2, 1987, p. 8. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^6]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, opening section and "Abrams, North and the RIG." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^7]: Christian Science Monitor, "Administration defends plans to aid Guatemalan military," January 10, 1983 (interview with Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams). https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0110/011050.html
[^8]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, *From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador*, S/25500 (1993), "Illustrative case: El Mozote," pp. 114 to 115. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
[^9]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500 (1993), El Mozote, "Subsequent events," pp. 116 to 117. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
[^10]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Certification Concerning Military Aid to El Salvador: Hearings*, 97th Cong., 2d sess., February 8 and March 11, 1982, testimony of Ambassador Thomas O. Enders and prepared statement. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0062
[^11]: Same hearing, February 8, 1982, testimony of Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0062
[^12]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500 (1993), El Mozote, forensic report on the November 1992 exhumation, p. 119. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
[^13]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams, North and NHAO." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, description of the Enterprise couriers (Owen). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
[^15]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), chapter on the NHAO program, discussion of Robert Owen. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 12, citing the Duemling deposition (Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, August 30, 1987) and the Arcos deposition.
[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
[^18]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams' Knowledge of the Costa Rican Airstrip and the Southern Front." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^19]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Costa Rican airstrip section (announcement and cable). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^20]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, meetings of September 19 and 20, 1986, citing Hill notes of September 20, 1986 (ANS). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" (instructions of May 1986, June 11 lunch, account card). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" (August 9 London meeting, August 19 transfer, North notebook of September 15, Bandar cables of September 15 to 26, 1986). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^23]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, Brunei account and Swiss response. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
[^24]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, Rappaport passages and n. 42. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
[^25]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (1987), section "Abrams' Brunei Testimony" and the Brunei solicitation section. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
[^26]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Hasenfus Shootdown" and RIG meeting of October 8, 1986. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^27]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony of October 10, 1986, nn. 70 to 74 (Abrams transcript, pp. 3 to 11, 48). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), describing "an October 10 open hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
[^28]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Brunei section and nn. 107, 112 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, October 10, 1986, pp. 49, 75 to 76). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^29]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, n. 108 (HPSCI testimony, October 14, 1986, p. 21). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, nn. 75 to 76 (House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, October 15, 1986, pp. 31 to 33). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, closing section on the October 1986 testimony. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 29, "Donald P. Gregg," text and n. 137 (Abrams, HPSCI testimony, October 14, 1986, pp. 23 to 24). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_29.htm
[^33]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 29, "Abrams and North's General Recollections of Discussions with Gregg," n. 113 (Abrams grand jury testimony, November 6, 1991, p. 45). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_29.htm
[^34]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, plea section and n. 3 (Government's Statement of the Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea, October 7, 1991, p. 4). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^35]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Summary of Prosecutions, entry for Elliott Abrams (sentence by U.S. District Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., November 15, 1991). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^36]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 27, "President Reagan," text and n. 66. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_27.htm
[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 28, "George Bush," pardon section and n. 1. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_28.htm
[^38]: Miller Center, University of Virginia, "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H.W. Bush Oral History Project. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history
[^39]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, biography of Ambassador Elliott Abrams, hearing of November 19, 2014. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20141119/102753/HHRG-113-FA13-Bio-AbramsE-20141119.pdf
[^40]: Project for the New American Century, "Statement of Principles," June 3, 1997, Wayback Machine capture of April 7, 2002. https://web.archive.org/web/20020407145529/http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm
[^41]: Project for the New American Century, letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998, Wayback Machine capture. https://web.archive.org/web/2003/http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
[^42]: Democracy Now, headline and summary of August 7, 2020, "State Department Taps Elliott Abrams as Special Representative to Iran." https://democracynow.org/2020/8/7/headlines/state_department_taps_elliott_abrams_as_special_representative_to_iran
[^43]: U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, *A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela, November 2001 - April 2002*, Report No. 02-OIG-003 (July 2002), pp. 15 to 16 and Conclusion. https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/13682.pdf
[^44]: Voice of America, "US Appoints New Venezuela Envoy to Help 'Restore Democracy,'" January 25, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2019/01/mil-190125-voa05.htm
[^45]: CBS News, "Elliott Abrams, convicted of lying about Iran-Contra, named special representative for Iran," August 6, 2020 (Abrams "has been serving as the special representative for Venezuela"). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elliott-abrams-iran-contra-named-special-representative-iran
[^46]: Democracy Now, August 7, 2020 (announcement that Abrams becomes special representative for Iran and "will also continue as special representative for Venezuela"). https://democracynow.org/2020/8/7/headlines/state_department_taps_elliott_abrams_as_special_representative_to_iran
[^47]: Democracy Now, headline of July 6, 2023, "Biden Nominates Elliott Abrams, Death Squad Backer Convicted of Lying to Congress, to Gov't Commission" (President Biden "has nominated Elliott Abrams to the bipartisan U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy"). https://democracynow.org/2023/7/6/headlines/biden_nominates_elliott_abrams_death_squad_backer_convicted_of_lying_to_congress_to_govt_commission
[^48]: Jewish Chronicle, obituary of Midge Decter (marriage to Moshe Decter in 1947, daughters Rachel and Naomi; marriage to Norman Podhoretz in 1956; Rachel Decter's marriage to Elliott Abrams in 1980). https://thejc.com/news/obituary-leading-commentator-thinker-and-writer-midge-decter-uzeijpmg
[^49]: Times of Israel, obituary of Rachel Abrams, June 10, 2013 ("Abrams died June 7 after battling stomach cancer for three years. She was 62."). https://www.timesofisrael.com/artist-and-writer-rachel-abrams-succumbs-to-cancer/
[^7]: Iran-Contra report, majority views, ch. 26, pp. 403 and 405-406.
[^8]: Christian Science Monitor, "Administration defends plans to aid Guatemalan military," January 10, 1983 (interview with Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams). https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0110/011050.html
[^9]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, *From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador*, S/25500 (1993), "Illustrative case: El Mozote," pp. 114 to 115. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
[^10]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500 (1993), El Mozote, "Subsequent events," pp. 116 to 117. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
[^11]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Certification Concerning Military Aid to El Salvador: Hearings*, 97th Cong., 2d sess., February 8 and March 11, 1982, testimony of Ambassador Thomas O. Enders and prepared statement. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0062
[^12]: Same hearing, February 8, 1982, testimony of Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0062
[^13]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500 (1993), El Mozote, forensic report on the November 1992 exhumation, p. 119. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams, North and NHAO." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^15]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, description of the Enterprise couriers (Owen). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
[^16]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), chapter on the NHAO program, discussion of Robert Owen. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 12, citing the Duemling deposition (Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, August 30, 1987) and the Arcos deposition.
[^18]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
[^19]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams' Knowledge of the Costa Rican Airstrip and the Southern Front." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^20]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Costa Rican airstrip section (announcement and cable). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, meetings of September 19 and 20, 1986, citing Hill notes of September 20, 1986 (ANS). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" (instructions of May 1986, June 11 lunch, account card). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^23]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 3, p. 71 and nn. 134-142. https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
[^24]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" (August 9 London meeting, August 19 transfer, North notebook of September 15, Bandar cables of September 15 to 26, 1986). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^25]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^26]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, Brunei account and Swiss response. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
[^27]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, Rappaport passages and n. 42. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
[^28]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (1987), section "Abrams' Brunei Testimony" and the Brunei solicitation section. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
[^29]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Hasenfus Shootdown" and RIG meeting of October 8, 1986. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony of October 10, 1986, nn. 70 to 74 (Abrams transcript, pp. 3 to 11, 48). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), describing "an October 10 open hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Brunei section and nn. 107, 112 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, October 10, 1986, pp. 49, 75 to 76). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, n. 108 (HPSCI testimony, October 14, 1986, p. 21). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^33]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, nn. 75 to 76 (House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, October 15, 1986, pp. 31 to 33). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^34]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, closing section on the October 1986 testimony. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^35]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 29, "Donald P. Gregg," text and n. 137 (Abrams, HPSCI testimony, October 14, 1986, pp. 23 to 24). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_29.htm
[^36]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 29, "Abrams and North's General Recollections of Discussions with Gregg," n. 113 (Abrams grand jury testimony, November 6, 1991, p. 45). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_29.htm
[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, plea section and n. 3 (Government's Statement of the Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea, October 7, 1991, p. 4). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Summary of Prosecutions, entry for Elliott Abrams (sentence by U.S. District Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., November 15, 1991). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^39]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 27, "President Reagan," text and n. 66. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_27.htm
[^40]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 28, "George Bush," pardon section and n. 1. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_28.htm
[^41]: Miller Center, University of Virginia, "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H.W. Bush Oral History Project. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history
[^42]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, biography of Ambassador Elliott Abrams, hearing of November 19, 2014. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20141119/102753/HHRG-113-FA13-Bio-AbramsE-20141119.pdf
[^43]: Project for the New American Century, "Statement of Principles," June 3, 1997, Wayback Machine capture of April 7, 2002. https://web.archive.org/web/20020407145529/http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm
[^44]: Project for the New American Century, letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998, Wayback Machine capture. https://web.archive.org/web/2003/http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
[^45]: Democracy Now, headline and summary of August 7, 2020, "State Department Taps Elliott Abrams as Special Representative to Iran." https://democracynow.org/2020/8/7/headlines/state_department_taps_elliott_abrams_as_special_representative_to_iran
[^46]: U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, *A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela, November 2001 - April 2002*, Report No. 02-OIG-003 (July 2002), pp. 15 to 16 and Conclusion. https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/13682.pdf
[^47]: Voice of America, "US Appoints New Venezuela Envoy to Help 'Restore Democracy,'" January 25, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2019/01/mil-190125-voa05.htm
[^48]: CBS News, "Elliott Abrams, convicted of lying about Iran-Contra, named special representative for Iran," August 6, 2020 (Abrams "has been serving as the special representative for Venezuela"). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elliott-abrams-iran-contra-named-special-representative-iran
[^49]: Democracy Now, August 7, 2020 (announcement that Abrams becomes special representative for Iran and "will also continue as special representative for Venezuela"). https://democracynow.org/2020/8/7/headlines/state_department_taps_elliott_abrams_as_special_representative_to_iran
[^50]: Democracy Now, headline of July 6, 2023, "Biden Nominates Elliott Abrams, Death Squad Backer Convicted of Lying to Congress, to Gov't Commission" (President Biden "has nominated Elliott Abrams to the bipartisan U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy"). https://democracynow.org/2023/7/6/headlines/biden_nominates_elliott_abrams_death_squad_backer_convicted_of_lying_to_congress_to_govt_commission
[^51]: Jewish Chronicle, obituary of Midge Decter (marriage to Moshe Decter in 1947, daughters Rachel and Naomi; marriage to Norman Podhoretz in 1956; Rachel Decter's marriage to Elliott Abrams in 1980). https://thejc.com/news/obituary-leading-commentator-thinker-and-writer-midge-decter-uzeijpmg
[^52]: Times of Israel, obituary of Rachel Abrams, June 10, 2013 ("Abrams died June 7 after battling stomach cancer for three years. She was 62."). https://www.timesofisrael.com/artist-and-writer-rachel-abrams-succumbs-to-cancer/

6
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Jack Blum.md
View file

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Jack Blum
aliases:
- Jack Blum
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-09-23
updated: 2026-10-14
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
tags:
- Person
@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ tags:
- DarkAllianceInvestigation
- ContraWar
- Lawyer
summary: "Former Senate investigator and chief counsel to Senator John Kerry's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, widely recognized for exposing the BCCI scandal and investigating Contra-connected drug trafficking."
summary: "Former Senate investigator and special counsel to Senator John Kerry's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, widely recognized for exposing the BCCI scandal and investigating Contra-connected drug trafficking."
relations:
- type: investigated
with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
start: 1988
fn: 4
---
Jack Blum is a former Senate investigator and chief counsel to [[Senator John Kerry]]'s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, widely recognized for his pivotal role in exposing the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] scandal. Described as a crusader and a moralist, Blum was known for his unwavering pursuit of truth, even when it meant challenging powerful institutions and individuals.[^1]
Jack Blum is a former Senate investigator and special counsel to [[Senator John Kerry]]'s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, widely recognized for his pivotal role in exposing the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] scandal. Described as a crusader and a moralist, Blum was known for his unwavering pursuit of truth, even when it meant challenging powerful institutions and individuals.[^1]
### Early Career and Senate Investigations

106
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/James A. Baker III.md
View file

@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
role: "received the Carter briefing book from Casey and passed it to the debate team"
start: 1980
end: 1980
fn: 7
fn: 9
- type: head_of
with: "[[United States Department of the Treasury]]"
role: "Secretary of the Treasury"
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ relations:
- type: participant_in
with: "[[BNL Scandal]]"
role: "Secretary of State briefed on the case; interviewed by Independent Counsel Frederick Lacey"
fn: 13
fn: 15
- type: employed_by
with: "[[White House]]"
role: "chief of staff and senior counselor to President Bush"
@ -90,29 +90,29 @@ relations:
with: "[[Baker Botts]]"
role: "senior partner"
start: 1993-03
fn: 15
fn: 17
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Carlyle Group]]"
role: "senior counselor"
start: 1993
fn: 15
fn: 17
- type: member_of
with: "[[Carlyle Group]]"
role: "executive officer and member of TCG Holdings; managing director of TCG Ventures"
fn: 16
fn: 18
- type: director_of
with: "[[Electronic Data Systems]]"
role: "director; chairman of the governance committee"
start: 1996
fn: 15
fn: 17
- type: director_of
with: "[[Reliant Energy]]"
role: "director"
fn: 15
fn: 17
- type: director_of
with: "[[Rice University]]"
role: "director"
fn: 15
fn: 17
- type: director_of
with: "[[Howard Hughes Medical Institute]]"
role: "board member"
@ -125,20 +125,20 @@ relations:
with: "[[George W. Bush]]"
role: "campaign representative in the Florida recount"
start: 2000-11-09
fn: 17
fn: 19
- type: appointed
with: "[[George W. Bush]]"
reverse: true
role: "personal envoy on Iraqi debt"
start: 2003-12-05
fn: 22
fn: 24
- type: head_of
with: "[[Iraq Study Group]]"
role: "co-chair"
start: 2006-03-15
fn: 24
fn: 26
created: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-14
---
James Addison Baker III was born in [[Houston]] on April 28, 1930, graduated from [[Princeton University]] in 1952, served two years on active duty as a lieutenant in the [[United States Marine Corps]], took his law degree with honors from the [[University of Texas School of Law]] in 1957, and practiced with the Houston firm of [[Andrews & Kurth]] from 1957 to 1975.[^1] Through the influence of his first wife he entered Republican politics, chaired [[George H.W. Bush]]'s unsuccessful 1970 Senate campaign in [[Texas]], and in 1971 became finance chairman of the Republican Party, with a regional role in the 1972 reelection of [[Richard Nixon]].[^2] He served as the Chief of Staff under President [[Ronald Reagan]]. He was present at a meeting of Reagan's high command following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing|Osirak]] in June 1981, where he agreed that some sanctions against [[Israel]] were essential.[^3]
@ -151,61 +151,63 @@ His public service began in 1975, when President [[Gerald R. Ford]] appointed hi
From 1981 to 1985 Baker was White House Chief of Staff.[^1] According to the national security adviser [[Richard V. Allen]], as recounted by [[Seymour Hersh]], at the meeting of Reagan's senior officials the morning after the Israeli raid on Osirak, Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] proposed canceling the sale of F-16 aircraft to Israel, and Vice President Bush and Baker agreed that some sanctions were essential; Reagan, Allen said, "rolled his eyes at me" and made clear he would take no such step. A scheduled delivery of four F-16s was suspended a few days later and quietly resumed two months after that.[^3]
At the [[National Security Planning Group]] meeting of June 25, 1984, which Baker did not attend, Secretary of State [[George P. Shultz]] said: "another lawyer, Jim Baker, said that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense." [[William J. Casey]] answered: "Jim Baker said that if we tried to get money from third countries without notifying the oversight committees, it could be a problem and he was informed that the finding does provide for the participation and cooperation of third countries. Once he learned that the funding does encourage cooperation from third countries, Jim Baker immediately dropped his view that this could be an 'impeachable offense', and you heard him say that, George." Later in the meeting Casey said: "Jim Baker changed his mind as soon as he saw the finding and saw the language."[^5] In a deposition of June 22, 1987 Baker denied any knowledge of the contribution from the country the report calls "Country 2" (Saudi Arabia in Walsh's account), which McFarlane testified it was "likely" he had told Baker of in the spring of 1984, and said he did not recall "using that language or having a specific opinion such as that, although I do, as I have stated, recall feeling that we should take a very close look at the question of legality and feeling that we could not do indirectly what we couldn't do directly."[^6]
### The Carter Briefing Papers
In 1983 the [[Time (magazine)|Time]] correspondent [[Laurence Barrett]] wrote in *Gambling with History* that a Reagan campaign "mole" in the camp of President [[Jimmy Carter]] had "filched papers containing the main points the President planned to make" in the Cleveland debate of October 28, 1980, and that Baker, then a senior campaign adviser, "looked the other way when a dirty trick was perpetrated on Carter. He was grateful not to know the mechanics of it." Baker said through an aide that he did not know how the papers were obtained. Representative [[Donald Albosta]], chairman of the Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, wrote to Baker, to the budget director [[David Stockman]], to the communications director [[David Gergen]] and to the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[William J. Casey]], who had managed Reagan's 1980 campaign; Albosta said the matter "appears on the surface to be more serious than Watergate."[^5]
In 1983 the [[Time (magazine)|Time]] correspondent [[Laurence Barrett]] wrote in *Gambling with History* that a Reagan campaign "mole" in the camp of President [[Jimmy Carter]] had "filched papers containing the main points the President planned to make" in the Cleveland debate of October 28, 1980, and that Baker, then a senior campaign adviser, "looked the other way when a dirty trick was perpetrated on Carter. He was grateful not to know the mechanics of it." Baker said through an aide that he did not know how the papers were obtained. Representative [[Donald Albosta]], chairman of the Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, wrote to Baker, to the budget director [[David Stockman]], to the communications director [[David Gergen]] and to the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] William J. Casey, who had managed Reagan's 1980 campaign; Albosta said the matter "appears on the surface to be more serious than Watergate."[^7]
Casey replied on June 22, 1983: "I have no recollection that I ever received, heard of or learned in any other way of a set of papers which laid out the Carter debate plan or the points which President Carter had planned to make."[^6] Baker's letter, as reported in the [[Washington Post]], stated that "it is my best recollection" that Casey was the senior campaign official who gave him a large loose-leaf book in a black binder "that was thought to have been given to the Reagan camp by someone with the Carter campaign," "with the suggestion that it might be of use to the [Reagan] Debate Briefing Team" headed by Gergen and [[Frank Hodsoll]], and that after thumbing through it he "passed it on." He called it a "compendium" of Carter administration policy positions, wrote that he had "no recollection that I ever received or saw any debate strategy or sensitive debating points prepared by the Carter campaign or Carter White House," and said he had "never, directly or indirectly" asked anyone to get it. Stockman said the material had been "useful" in preparing Reagan. The campaign consultant [[Myles Martel]] said he had urged Hodsoll to return it: "My impression was we had something we shouldn't have had." Casey then said he did not remember "any black book" but that he had sent Baker all papers that crossed his desk about the debate.[^7]
Casey replied on June 22, 1983: "I have no recollection that I ever received, heard of or learned in any other way of a set of papers which laid out the Carter debate plan or the points which President Carter had planned to make."[^8] Baker's letter, as reported in the [[Washington Post]], stated that "it is my best recollection" that Casey was the senior campaign official who gave him a large loose-leaf book in a black binder "that was thought to have been given to the Reagan camp by someone with the Carter campaign," "with the suggestion that it might be of use to the [Reagan] Debate Briefing Team" headed by Gergen and [[Frank Hodsoll]], and that after thumbing through it he "passed it on." He called it a "compendium" of Carter administration policy positions, wrote that he had "no recollection that I ever received or saw any debate strategy or sensitive debating points prepared by the Carter campaign or Carter White House," and said he had "never, directly or indirectly" asked anyone to get it. Stockman said the material had been "useful" in preparing Reagan. The campaign consultant [[Myles Martel]] said he had urged Hodsoll to return it: "My impression was we had something we shouldn't have had." Casey then said he did not remember "any black book" but that he had sent Baker all papers that crossed his desk about the debate.[^9]
On June 27, 1983, Carter's former pollster [[Patrick Caddell]] delivered to the White House a copy of what he said was the complete Carter briefing book. After Baker, Stockman and Gergen reviewed it, the White House said it appeared "a more finished, more sensitive briefing book than they recall," and that papers retrieved from Reagan campaign officials' files had been forwarded to the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Baker had discussed the matter with Casey at a meeting the day before.[^8] In June 1984 the Democratic majority of the Albosta subcommittee reported that "the persons using these papers were aware that they were using Carter debate briefing materials" and that the foreign policy papers were "most likely" taken from the Carter [[National Security Council]] front office or the White House Situation Room. At a news conference on June 14, 1984, Reagan said that "no one" in his campaign had seen the briefing book and called the differing recollections of Baker and Casey "easily understandable."[^9]
On June 27, 1983, Carter's former pollster [[Patrick Caddell]] delivered to the White House a copy of what he said was the complete Carter briefing book. After Baker, Stockman and Gergen reviewed it, the White House said it appeared "a more finished, more sensitive briefing book than they recall," and that papers retrieved from Reagan campaign officials' files had been forwarded to the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Baker had discussed the matter with Casey at a meeting the day before.[^10] In June 1984 the Democratic majority of the Albosta subcommittee reported that "the persons using these papers were aware that they were using Carter debate briefing materials" and that the foreign policy papers were "most likely" taken from the Carter [[National Security Council]] front office or the White House Situation Room. At a news conference on June 14, 1984, Reagan said that "no one" in his campaign had seen the briefing book and called the differing recollections of Baker and Casey "easily understandable."[^11]
### Treasury and BCCI
Baker became the sixty-seventh Secretary of the Treasury on February 3, 1985, exchanging jobs with [[Donald Regan]], and also chaired the President's Economic Policy Council. The Treasury Department credits him with guiding the 1986 tax reform bill through Congress and with "encouraging international economic cooperation by lowering the value of the dollar"; the State Department's historians describe him as "instrumental in passing the Plaza Accord of September 1985."[^1][^2][^4] He resigned on August 17, 1988, to chair the Bush campaign.[^4]
Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin wrote in their 1992 history of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] that a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] report dated September 30, 1986, alleging BCCI's involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering and its secret control of [[First American Bankshares]], was distributed to the State, Treasury and Commerce departments but not to the [[Federal Reserve]], and that Regan, asked about it, said he did not recall seeing it and suggested it may have gone to Baker, his successor, who at the time was traveling in Morocco. They also wrote that in 1987 the Iranian businessman [[Mohammed Rahim Motaghi Irvani]], whom they describe as having multiple ties to BCCI, wrote to Baker, whom they identify as Bush's campaign manager, offering to help, and that the letter was forwarded to Baker by the former CIA director [[Richard Helms]] with a note describing Irvani as "a man of substance and decency"; the letter and Helms's cover note were released by the Senate subcommittee chaired by [[John Kerry]]. They recorded that [[Jackson Stephens]], whose firm had gathered First American stock for BCCI's clients, was a member of Bush's "Team 100" and that his wife ran Bush's 1988 campaign in Arkansas.[^10]
Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin wrote in their 1992 history of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] that a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] report dated September 30, 1986, alleging BCCI's involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering and its secret control of [[First American Bankshares]], was distributed to the State, Treasury and Commerce departments but not to the [[Federal Reserve]], and that Regan, asked about it, said he did not recall seeing it and suggested it may have gone to Baker, his successor, who at the time was traveling in Morocco. They also wrote that in 1987 the Iranian businessman [[Mohammed Rahim Motaghi Irvani]], whom they describe as having multiple ties to BCCI, wrote to Baker, whom they identify as Bush's campaign manager, offering to help, and that the letter was forwarded to Baker by the former CIA director [[Richard Helms]] with a note describing Irvani as "a man of substance and decency"; the letter and Helms's cover note were released by the Senate subcommittee chaired by [[John Kerry]]. They recorded that [[Jackson Stephens]], whose firm had gathered First American stock for BCCI's clients, was a member of Bush's "Team 100" and that his wife ran Bush's 1988 campaign in Arkansas.[^12]
### Secretary of State
Baker was appointed Secretary of State on January 25, 1989, and served until August 23, 1992, the sixty-first holder of the office; he traveled to 90 countries.[^1][^2] On February 9, 1990, in Moscow, he told [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], according to the American memorandum of conversation released under the [[Freedom of Information Act]], that "if we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of [[NATO]], there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east." The Soviet record of the same meeting has him saying that "not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction." The same day [[Robert Gates]], deputy to the national security adviser [[Brent Scowcroft]], told the [[KGB]] chairman [[Vladimir Kryuchkov]] at the Lubyanka the same thing. On February 10 Baker wrote to Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] that he had asked Gorbachev whether he would prefer a unified Germany "tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position."[^11]
Baker was appointed Secretary of State on January 25, 1989, and served until August 23, 1992, the sixty-first holder of the office; he traveled to 90 countries.[^1][^2] On February 9, 1990, in Moscow, he told [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], according to the American memorandum of conversation released under the [[Freedom of Information Act]], that "if we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of [[NATO]], there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east." The Soviet record of the same meeting has him saying that "not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction." The same day [[Robert Gates]], deputy to the national security adviser [[Brent Scowcroft]], told the [[KGB]] chairman [[Vladimir Kryuchkov]] at the Lubyanka the same thing. On February 10 Baker wrote to Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] that he had asked Gorbachev whether he would prefer a unified Germany "tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position."[^13]
### Matrix Churchill and the BNL Prosecution
An authentication certificate numbered 89/3648-2, dated March 14, 1989, attests the seal of the Ohio Secretary of State, [[Sherrod Brown]], on papers of the Cleveland firm [[Matrix Churchill]]. It reads: "In testimony whereof, I, James A. Baker III, Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Authentication Officer of the said Department," and is subscribed "James A. Baker III, Secretary of State. By Annie R. Maddux, Authentication Officer, Department of State." Representative [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs]], placed it in the Congressional Record on August 10, 1992, with a similar document of May 10, 1989, issued over the name of Acting Secretary [[Lawrence Eagleburger]]. Gonzalez said that Iraqis had taken control of Matrix Churchill in late 1988, that Iraqi law required American firms to be certified before opening a branch, that "unwittingly, in 1989 both James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburge[r] helped Matrix-Churchill establish its Baghdad branch," and that the State Department then held intelligence identifying the firm as an Iraqi front company.[^12][^13]
An authentication certificate numbered 89/3648-2, dated March 14, 1989, attests the seal of the Ohio Secretary of State, [[Sherrod Brown]], on papers of the Cleveland firm [[Matrix Churchill]]. It reads: "In testimony whereof, I, James A. Baker III, Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Authentication Officer of the said Department," and is subscribed "James A. Baker III, Secretary of State. By Annie R. Maddux, Authentication Officer, Department of State." Representative [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs]], placed it in the Congressional Record on August 10, 1992, with a similar document of May 10, 1989, issued over the name of Acting Secretary [[Lawrence Eagleburger]]. Gonzalez said that Iraqis had taken control of Matrix Churchill in late 1988, that Iraqi law required American firms to be certified before opening a branch, that "unwittingly, in 1989 both James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburge[r] helped Matrix-Churchill establish its Baghdad branch," and that the State Department then held intelligence identifying the firm as an Iraqi front company.[^14][^15]
Independent Counsel [[Frederick Lacey]], appointed by Attorney General [[William Barr]] on October 16, 1992, to investigate the handling of the prosecution of [[Christopher Drogoul]] and others in the [[BNL Scandal]], listed Baker among the people he and his staff had "spoken to, interviewed or deposed under oath." Lacey classified the second part of his report "Top Secret Codeword."[^13] He recorded that, according to the daily log of the Atlanta prosecutor [[Gale McKenzie]] in the fall of 1989, "then Secretary of State Baker was most interested in the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro|BNL]] case and was receiving frequent briefings," and that the Justice Department first contacted her office on October 26, 1989, when [[Robert Mueller]] called for information on the case; by the time of Lacey's inquiry Mueller was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division.[^13]
Independent Counsel [[Frederick Lacey]], appointed by Attorney General [[William Barr]] on October 16, 1992, to investigate the handling of the prosecution of [[Christopher Drogoul]] and others in the [[BNL Scandal]], listed Baker among the people he and his staff had "spoken to, interviewed or deposed under oath." Lacey classified the second part of his report "Top Secret Codeword."[^15] He recorded that, according to the daily log of the Atlanta prosecutor [[Gale McKenzie]] in the fall of 1989, "then Secretary of State Baker was most interested in the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro|BNL]] case and was receiving frequent briefings," and that the Justice Department first contacted her office on October 26, 1989, when [[Robert Mueller]] called for information on the case; by the time of Lacey's inquiry Mueller was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division.[^15]
Lacey quoted an October 26, 1989, State Department memorandum to Baker from Kelly and Sofaer, sent through Kimmitt and McCormack, warning that "our ability to influence Iraqi policies in areas important to us, from Lebanon to the [[Middle East]] peace process, will be heavily influenced by the outcome of the [[Commodity Credit Corporation|CCC]] negotiations." On November 8, 1989, the Agriculture and State Departments overcame the resistance of the National Advisory Council and obtained approval of 1 billion dollars in [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|Commodity Credit Corporation]] guarantees for Iraq for fiscal 1990, of which one 500 million dollar tranche was released before the Gulf War. The two departments asserted at each stage that there was "no evidence to date that would lead us to recommend that the Department should not extend the guarantees," a claim Lacey called "inconsistent with McKenzie's statements to the contrary." He wrote that it was "not within my responsibility to address the wisdom of the decision." Citing a memorandum of April 17, 1990, from Kimmitt to Baker, he wrote that "as with the CCC program, political considerations have been brought to bear upon Eximbank decisions," while the [[Export-Import Bank of the United States|Export-Import Bank]] had found Iraq "not creditworthy by any reasonable standard" in April 1989.[^13]
Lacey quoted an October 26, 1989, State Department memorandum to Baker from Kelly and Sofaer, sent through Kimmitt and McCormack, warning that "our ability to influence Iraqi policies in areas important to us, from Lebanon to the [[Middle East]] peace process, will be heavily influenced by the outcome of the [[Commodity Credit Corporation|CCC]] negotiations." On November 8, 1989, the Agriculture and State Departments overcame the resistance of the National Advisory Council and obtained approval of 1 billion dollars in [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|Commodity Credit Corporation]] guarantees for Iraq for fiscal 1990, of which one 500 million dollar tranche was released before the Gulf War. The two departments asserted at each stage that there was "no evidence to date that would lead us to recommend that the Department should not extend the guarantees," a claim Lacey called "inconsistent with McKenzie's statements to the contrary." He wrote that it was "not within my responsibility to address the wisdom of the decision." Citing a memorandum of April 17, 1990, from Kimmitt to Baker, he wrote that "as with the CCC program, political considerations have been brought to bear upon Eximbank decisions," while the [[Export-Import Bank of the United States|Export-Import Bank]] had found Iraq "not creditworthy by any reasonable standard" in April 1989.[^15]
In the days before the February 1991 indictment, during the war with Iraq, the list of defendants grew to include the Jordanian businessman [[Wafai Dajani]], whose company handled grain for Iraq at [[Aqaba]] and whom Drogoul called "the brother of the Prince of Jordan," but Dajani and others "were removed as defendants a few days later at a February 13 meeting" of the Atlanta prosecutors and Justice Department officials, Mueller among them. At that meeting the State Department did not want the [[Central Bank of Iraq]] indicted while the Atlanta office still did, and the Treasury, Defense and State Departments, the Export-Import Bank and the Federal Reserve then answered Mueller with a joint memorandum supporting indictment of [[Rafidain Bank]] but opposing indictment of the Central Bank. The prosecutors denied any State Department interference and said the decision not to indict Dajani was their own, for want of evidence. Lacey recorded that Dajani had paid Drogoul 100,000 dollars through a consulting position in 1990 and 1991 and was named as an unindicted co-conspirator. He found "absolutely no support" for reports that the Justice Department, "perhaps influenced by others in the Executive Branch," had imposed the theory of BNL as a victim on the Atlanta office.[^13]
In the days before the February 1991 indictment, during the war with Iraq, the list of defendants grew to include the Jordanian businessman [[Wafai Dajani]], whose company handled grain for Iraq at [[Aqaba]] and whom Drogoul called "the brother of the Prince of Jordan," but Dajani and others "were removed as defendants a few days later at a February 13 meeting" of the Atlanta prosecutors and Justice Department officials, Mueller among them. At that meeting the State Department did not want the [[Central Bank of Iraq]] indicted while the Atlanta office still did, and the Treasury, Defense and State Departments, the Export-Import Bank and the Federal Reserve then answered Mueller with a joint memorandum supporting indictment of [[Rafidain Bank]] but opposing indictment of the Central Bank. The prosecutors denied any State Department interference and said the decision not to indict Dajani was their own, for want of evidence. Lacey recorded that Dajani had paid Drogoul 100,000 dollars through a consulting position in 1990 and 1991 and was named as an unindicted co-conspirator. He found "absolutely no support" for reports that the Justice Department, "perhaps influenced by others in the Executive Branch," had imposed the theory of BNL as a victim on the Atlanta office.[^15]
### Baker Botts and Foreign Principals
Baker served as White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush from August 1992 to January 1993.[^1] The Houston firm of [[Baker Botts]] was registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] as Baker & Botts, L.L.P., registration 4293, from September 15, 1989, to September 30, 2003. Its foreign principals were the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, September 15, 1989, to April 30, 1993), the French chemical company [[Rhône-Poulenc]] (May 1, 1991, to February 13, 1996), Middle East Airlines Airliban of [[Lebanon]] (May 23, 1991, to November 1, 1993), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of [[Yemen]] (April 22, 1992, to July 21, 2000), the Government of [[Abu Dhabi]] (July 29, 1992, to March 31, 1995) and the Japan External Trade Organization office in Houston (November 9, 1992, to September 30, 2003). In 1977 the firm had registered for the Indonesian state oil company [[Pertamina]], and from September 15, 2017, to October 12, 2018, it was registered for the Ministry of Financial Services and Home Affairs of the [[Cayman Islands]].[^14]
Baker served as White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush from August 1992 to January 1993.[^1] The Houston firm of [[Baker Botts]] was registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] as Baker & Botts, L.L.P., registration 4293, from September 15, 1989, to September 30, 2003. Its foreign principals were the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, September 15, 1989, to April 30, 1993), the French chemical company [[Rhône-Poulenc]] (May 1, 1991, to February 13, 1996), Middle East Airlines Airliban of [[Lebanon]] (May 23, 1991, to November 1, 1993), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of [[Yemen]] (April 22, 1992, to July 21, 2000), the Government of [[Abu Dhabi]] (July 29, 1992, to March 31, 1995) and the Japan External Trade Organization office in Houston (November 9, 1992, to September 30, 2003). In 1977 the firm had registered for the Indonesian state oil company [[Pertamina]], and from September 15, 2017, to October 12, 2018, it was registered for the Ministry of Financial Services and Home Affairs of the [[Cayman Islands]].[^16]
### Carlyle and Corporate Boards
Baker has been a senior partner of Baker Botts since March 1993 and was a senior counselor of the [[Carlyle Group]] from 1993. The 2002 proxy statement of [[Electronic Data Systems]], which had been split off from [[General Motors]] in June 1996, lists him as a director since 1996 and chairman of its governance committee, and as a director of [[Reliant Energy]], Reliant Resources, [[Rice University]] and the [[Howard Hughes Medical Institute]]; it discloses that EDS retained Baker Botts for legal services during 2001.[^15]
Baker has been a senior partner of Baker Botts since March 1993 and was a senior counselor of the [[Carlyle Group]] from 1993. The 2002 proxy statement of [[Electronic Data Systems]], which had been split off from [[General Motors]] in June 1996, lists him as a director since 1996 and chairman of its governance committee, and as a director of [[Reliant Energy]], Reliant Resources, [[Rice University]] and the [[Howard Hughes Medical Institute]]; it discloses that EDS retained Baker Botts for legal services during 2001.[^17]
Carlyle's Schedule 13D filings with the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] list him among the executive officers of its holding entities. The filing of May 21, 2001, on [[Net2000 Communications]] names him among the executive officers of TC Group, L.L.C. and TCG Holdings, L.L.C. and members of TCG Holdings, with [[Frank Carlucci]], [[Richard Darman]], [[William Conway]], [[Daniel D'Aniello]], [[David Rubenstein]], [[Jerome Powell]], [[Glenn Youngkin]] and [[Afsaneh Beshloss]], and as one of nine managing directors of TCG Ventures, L.L.C.; the reporting entities included Cayman Islands partnerships, and the directors of TCG Ventures, Ltd. were Rubenstein and a British Virgin Islands company in care of [[Julius Baer]] Bank & Trust. The amendment of January 13, 2005, on [[Magellan Midstream Partners]] again lists him among the executive officers of TC Group and members of TCG Holdings, with [[Louis Gerstner]] and [[William Kennard]].[^16]
Carlyle's Schedule 13D filings with the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] list him among the executive officers of its holding entities. The filing of May 21, 2001, on [[Net2000 Communications]] names him among the executive officers of TC Group, L.L.C. and TCG Holdings, L.L.C. and members of TCG Holdings, with [[Frank Carlucci]], [[Richard Darman]], [[William Conway]], [[Daniel D'Aniello]], [[David Rubenstein]], [[Jerome Powell]], [[Glenn Youngkin]] and [[Afsaneh Beshloss]], and as one of nine managing directors of TCG Ventures, L.L.C.; the reporting entities included Cayman Islands partnerships, and the directors of TCG Ventures, Ltd. were Rubenstein and a British Virgin Islands company in care of [[Julius Baer]] Bank & Trust. The amendment of January 13, 2005, on [[Magellan Midstream Partners]] again lists him among the executive officers of TC Group and members of TCG Holdings, with [[Louis Gerstner]] and [[William Kennard]].[^18]
### Florida, 2000
On November 9, 2000, Baker was in [[Tallahassee, Florida|Tallahassee]], identified by CNN as an observer for the Bush campaign "there to supervise a recount of the state vote in Florida on behalf of George W. Bush." He said he would meet the Florida secretary of state later that day and hoped to meet [[Warren Christopher]], whom the Gore campaign had sent "to do the exact same thing."[^17] On November 28 he introduced the senior litigation team for the contest of the result: [[Barry Richard]] of [[Greenberg Traurig]], [[Fred Bartlit]] and [[Philip Beck]] of Bartlit Beck in Chicago, and "two law partners of mine at Baker Botts in Houston, Texas," [[Irvin Terrell]] and [[Daryl Bristow]].[^18]
On November 9, 2000, Baker was in [[Tallahassee, Florida|Tallahassee]], identified by CNN as an observer for the Bush campaign "there to supervise a recount of the state vote in Florida on behalf of George W. Bush." He said he would meet the Florida secretary of state later that day and hoped to meet [[Warren Christopher]], whom the Gore campaign had sent "to do the exact same thing."[^19] On November 28 he introduced the senior litigation team for the contest of the result: [[Barry Richard]] of [[Greenberg Traurig]], [[Fred Bartlit]] and [[Philip Beck]] of Bartlit Beck in Chicago, and "two law partners of mine at Baker Botts in Houston, Texas," [[Irvin Terrell]] and [[Daryl Bristow]].[^20]
### The Saudi Defense in the September 11 Litigation
[[Michael Isikoff]] of [[Newsweek]] reported on April 15, 2003, that "a trio of lawyers from Baker Botts" had filed a motion for Prince [[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]], the Saudi defense minister, in the September 11 families' suit, arguing that he was immune and acknowledging that he had approved payments of about 266,000 dollars a year for 16 years to the [[International Islamic Relief Organization]] and grants of 52,000 dollars to the [[World Assembly of Muslim Youth]] as official acts. Isikoff wrote that Baker Botts "still boasts former secretary of State James Baker as one of its senior partners" and that its recent alumni included [[Robert Jordan]], President Bush's former personal lawyer and then ambassador to [[Saudi Arabia]]. The plaintiffs' lead lawyer, [[Ron Motley]], said: "We smoked out the prince."[^19] On November 14, 2003, Judge [[James Robertson]] of the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Sultan for his official acts for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and those for his personal acts for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed the claims against Prince [[Turki bin Faisal Al Saud|Turki]], the former head of Saudi general intelligence, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.[^20] William H. Jeffress Jr. of Baker Botts appears among defense counsel in that opinion, and Jeffress, Christopher R. Cooper, Sara E. Kropf and Jamie S. Kilberg of Baker Botts in the consolidated opinion of January 18, 2005, in the [[U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]].[^20][^21]
[[Michael Isikoff]] of [[Newsweek]] reported on April 15, 2003, that "a trio of lawyers from Baker Botts" had filed a motion for Prince [[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]], the Saudi defense minister, in the September 11 families' suit, arguing that he was immune and acknowledging that he had approved payments of about 266,000 dollars a year for 16 years to the [[International Islamic Relief Organization]] and grants of 52,000 dollars to the [[World Assembly of Muslim Youth]] as official acts. Isikoff wrote that Baker Botts "still boasts former secretary of State James Baker as one of its senior partners" and that its recent alumni included [[Robert Jordan]], President Bush's former personal lawyer and then ambassador to [[Saudi Arabia]]. The plaintiffs' lead lawyer, [[Ron Motley]], said: "We smoked out the prince."[^21] On November 14, 2003, Judge [[James Robertson]] of the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Sultan for his official acts for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and those for his personal acts for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed the claims against Prince [[Turki bin Faisal Al Saud|Turki]], the former head of Saudi general intelligence, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.[^22] William H. Jeffress Jr. of Baker Botts appears among defense counsel in that opinion, and Jeffress, Christopher R. Cooper, Sara E. Kropf and Jamie S. Kilberg of Baker Botts in the consolidated opinion of January 18, 2005, in the [[U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]].[^22][^23]
### The Iraqi Debt Envoy
On December 5, 2003, President [[George W. Bush]] announced that "in response to a request from the Iraqi Governing Council" he had appointed Baker "to be my personal envoy on the issue of Iraqi debt," reporting directly to the President.[^22] [[Naomi Klein]] wrote in *[[The Nation]]* on November 1, 2004, that Baker was then senior counselor and an equity partner of Carlyle "with an estimated $180 million stake," that Saudi Arabia was among Iraq's largest creditors, that Carlyle and Baker Botts did extensive business with the Saudi royal family, and that on December 12, 2003, the [[New York Times]] had called editorially for him to resign from both. She wrote that documents obtained by The Nation showed a consortium including Carlyle and the [[Albright Group]] of the former Secretary of State [[Madeleine Albright]] proposing to [[Kuwait]] that its claims on Iraq, as much as 57 billion dollars, be transferred to a foundation the consortium would control, with Kuwait investing 2 billion dollars in a private equity fund, half of it through Carlyle. The proposal, she reported, said the role of Carlyle figures including former President Bush, [[John Major]] and Baker was "now more limited" because of his appointment but that after his "retirement from his temporary position" they would "once again be free to play a more decisive role." On January 21, 2004, the day Baker met Kuwait's foreign minister as envoy, the consortium hand-delivered the proposal to the same minister.[^23]
On December 5, 2003, President [[George W. Bush]] announced that "in response to a request from the Iraqi Governing Council" he had appointed Baker "to be my personal envoy on the issue of Iraqi debt," reporting directly to the President.[^24] [[Naomi Klein]] wrote in *[[The Nation]]* on November 1, 2004, that Baker was then senior counselor and an equity partner of Carlyle "with an estimated $180 million stake," that Saudi Arabia was among Iraq's largest creditors, that Carlyle and Baker Botts did extensive business with the Saudi royal family, and that on December 12, 2003, the [[New York Times]] had called editorially for him to resign from both. She wrote that documents obtained by The Nation showed a consortium including Carlyle and the [[Albright Group]] of the former Secretary of State [[Madeleine Albright]] proposing to [[Kuwait]] that its claims on Iraq, as much as 57 billion dollars, be transferred to a foundation the consortium would control, with Kuwait investing 2 billion dollars in a private equity fund, half of it through Carlyle. The proposal, she reported, said the role of Carlyle figures including former President Bush, [[John Major]] and Baker was "now more limited" because of his appointment but that after his "retirement from his temporary position" they would "once again be free to play a more decisive role." On January 21, 2004, the day Baker met Kuwait's foreign minister as envoy, the consortium hand-delivered the proposal to the same minister.[^25]
Carlyle's spokesman [[Chris Ullman]] told Klein that "neither the Carlyle Group nor James Baker wrote, edited or authorized this proposal to the Kuwait government," that Carlyle knew of the proposal and stood to receive a 1 billion dollar investment but "played no role in procuring that investment," and that after Baker's appointment Carlyle "explicitly restricted its role to only investing assets on behalf of Kuwait." The consortium's chief executive, Shahameen Sheikh, said the timing "had nothing to do with Mr. Baker's visit." Klein wrote that the White House and Baker's office did not respond to repeated requests for comment.[^23]
Carlyle's spokesman [[Chris Ullman]] told Klein that "neither the Carlyle Group nor James Baker wrote, edited or authorized this proposal to the Kuwait government," that Carlyle knew of the proposal and stood to receive a 1 billion dollar investment but "played no role in procuring that investment," and that after Baker's appointment Carlyle "explicitly restricted its role to only investing assets on behalf of Kuwait." The consortium's chief executive, Shahameen Sheikh, said the timing "had nothing to do with Mr. Baker's visit." Klein wrote that the White House and Baker's office did not respond to repeated requests for comment.[^25]
### The Iraq Study Group
In late 2005 Representative [[Frank Wolf]] asked the [[United States Institute of Peace]] to facilitate an assessment of Iraq with the [[James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy]] at Rice University, the [[Center for the Study of the Presidency]] and the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]. Baker and the former Representative [[Lee Hamilton]] co-chaired the [[Iraq Study Group]], launched on March 15, 2006, at a Capitol Hill meeting hosted by Senator [[John Warner]]. Its members were Eagleburger, [[Vernon Jordan]], [[Edwin Meese]], [[Sandra Day O'Connor]], [[Leon Panetta]], [[William Perry]], [[Charles Robb]] and [[Alan Simpson]]; the former CIA director Robert Gates was an active member until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. Recommendation 62 of its December 2006 report urged technical assistance to the Iraqi government "to prepare a draft oil law" creating "a fiscal and legal framework for investment," and Recommendation 63 urged that the [[United States]] "encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies" and help reorganize the national oil industry "as a commercial enterprise."[^24]
In late 2005 Representative [[Frank Wolf]] asked the [[United States Institute of Peace]] to facilitate an assessment of Iraq with the [[James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy]] at Rice University, the [[Center for the Study of the Presidency]] and the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]. Baker and the former Representative [[Lee Hamilton]] co-chaired the [[Iraq Study Group]], launched on March 15, 2006, at a Capitol Hill meeting hosted by Senator [[John Warner]]. Its members were Eagleburger, [[Vernon Jordan]], [[Edwin Meese]], [[Sandra Day O'Connor]], [[Leon Panetta]], [[William Perry]], [[Charles Robb]] and [[Alan Simpson]]; the former CIA director Robert Gates was an active member until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. Recommendation 62 of its December 2006 report urged technical assistance to the Iraqi government "to prepare a draft oil law" creating "a fiscal and legal framework for investment," and Recommendation 63 urged that the [[United States]] "encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies" and help reorganize the national oil industry "as a commercial enterprise."[^26]
### Envoys and Commissions
@ -213,7 +215,7 @@ From 1997 to 2004 Baker was the personal envoy of [[United Nations]] Secretary-G
### Political Contributions
[[Federal Election Commission]] records itemize contributions from James A. Baker III of Houston: 1,000 dollars to George Bush for President on June 6, 1980, and 1,000 dollars on June 11, 1980, to the Connally for President Committee, with his employer given as Andrews Kurth Campbell & Jones; 1,000 dollars to Bush for President Inc. on March 16, 1999; 2,000 dollars to Bush-Cheney '04 Inc. on December 3, 2003, two days before his appointment as envoy; 15,000 dollars to the National Republican Senatorial Committee on April 11, 2006; 2,500 dollars to Romney for President Inc. on July 26, 2011, and July 5, 2012; 2,500 dollars to RickPerry.org on September 16, 2011, with his employer given as the Baker Institute; 2,700 dollars to Jeb 2016 Inc. on January 18, 2016; and 2,800 dollars to Team Graham on September 23, 2020, with Baker Botts as employer in the other filings.[^25]
[[Federal Election Commission]] records itemize contributions from James A. Baker III of Houston: 1,000 dollars to George Bush for President on June 6, 1980, and 1,000 dollars on June 11, 1980, to the Connally for President Committee, with his employer given as Andrews Kurth Campbell & Jones; 1,000 dollars to Bush for President Inc. on March 16, 1999; 2,000 dollars to Bush-Cheney '04 Inc. on December 3, 2003, two days before his appointment as envoy; 15,000 dollars to the National Republican Senatorial Committee on April 11, 2006; 2,500 dollars to Romney for President Inc. on July 26, 2011, and July 5, 2012; 2,500 dollars to RickPerry.org on September 16, 2011, with his employer given as the Baker Institute; 2,700 dollars to Jeb 2016 Inc. on January 18, 2016; and 2,800 dollars to Team Graham on September 23, 2020, with Baker Botts as employer in the other filings.[^27]
### Footnotes
@ -221,24 +223,26 @@ From 1997 to 2004 Baker was the personal envoy of [[United Nations]] Secretary-G
[^2]: "James Addison Baker III," Biographies of the Secretaries of State and Principal Officers and Chiefs of Mission, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State (appointed January 25, 1989; termination of appointment August 23, 1992). https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/baker-james-addison
[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Random House, 1991, p. 9 (account of Richard V. Allen). https://archive.org/details/seymour-hersch-the-samson-option
[^4]: "James A. Baker, III (1985 - 1988)," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Prior Secretaries. https://home.treasury.gov/about/history/prior-secretaries/james-a-baker-iii-1985-1988
[^5]: "Casey fourth Reagan aide asked about '80 campaign incident," *Baltimore Sun*, Washington Bureau, June 22, 1983, reproduced in CIA Reading Room document C05560156. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-05560156
[^6]: Casey, William J., Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Representative Don Albosta, June 22, 1983, CIA-RDP85M00364R001703320052-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp85m00364r001703320052-2
[^7]: Hoffman, David. "Casey Is Cited as Source of Briefing Book," *Washington Post*, June 24, 1983, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400039-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505400039-7
[^8]: Schram, Martin, and Lou Cannon. "1980 Debate 'Papers' Go To Justice," *Washington Post*, June 28, 1983, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020034-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201020034-3
[^9]: Hoffman, David. "Reagan Says 'No One' Saw '80 Briefing Book," *Washington Post*, June 15, 1984, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390080-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505390080-3
[^10]: Truell, Peter, and Larry Gurwin. *False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992, pp. 365 and 382, with source notes. https://archive.org/details/bypetertruellauthorlarrygurwinauthorfalseprofitstheinsidestoryofbccitheworldsmos
[^11]: Savranskaya, Svetlana, and Tom Blanton. "NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard," National Security Archive Briefing Book, December 12, 2017, Documents 05 (memorandum of conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, February 9, 1990, U.S. Department of State FOIA 199504567), 06 (Gorbachev Foundation record of the same conversation), 07 (memorandum of conversation between Robert Gates and Vladimir Kryuchkov, February 9, 1990) and 08 (letter from Baker to Helmut Kohl, February 10, 1990). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
[^12]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Special order, "US Armed Iraq Through BNL," section "Baker and Eagleburger Approve MCC Baghdad Branch," *Congressional Record*, House, August 10, 1992, reproducing Department of State authentication no. 89/3648-2 of March 14, 1989. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920810g.htm
[^13]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," Part I, pp. 1, 12, 37 n., 43, 68-74 and 102-104, reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, hearing, 103d Cong., 1st sess., November 9, 1993, Serial No. 103-95, pp. 343-347, 355, 380, 386, 411-417 and 445-447. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^14]: U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act unit, registrant and foreign principal records for registration 4293 (Baker Botts L.L.P., September 15, 1989, to September 30, 2003), registration 2833 (Baker & Botts, 1977) and registration 6464 (Baker Botts, LLP, 2017 to 2018), via the FARA eFile API. https://efile.fara.gov/api/v1/ForeignPrincipals/json/Terminated/4293
[^15]: Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Schedule 14A definitive proxy statement, filed March 6, 2002 ("Directors Standing for Election" and "Certain Transactions"), Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR accession 0000950109-02-001187. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1007456/000095010902001187/ddef14a.htm
[^16]: Carlyle Venture Partners, L.P., et al., Schedule 13D, Net2000 Communications, Inc., filed May 21, 2001, Item 2 (accession 0000950133-01-501284); TC Group, L.L.C., et al., Schedule 13D/A, Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P., filed January 13, 2005, Schedule A-1 (accession 0001193125-05-006004), Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099363/000095013301501284/w49431sc13d.txt ; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1126975/000119312505006004/0001193125-05-006004.txt
[^17]: "Election 2000: James Baker Holds News Briefing on Progress of Florida Recount," CNN transcript, November 9, 2000. http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0011/09/se.03.html
[^18]: "Bush Legal Team Remarks," Tuesday, November 28, 2000, American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/documents-related-the-2000-election-dispute-40
[^19]: Isikoff, Michael. "Terror Watch: A Legal Counterattack," *Newsweek*, April 15, 2003. https://www.newsweek.com/terror-watch-legal-counterattack-133991
[^20]: Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment & Development Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. November 14, 2003), list of counsel; described in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 781 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/burnett-v-baraka-inv-893111164
[^21]: In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. January 18, 2005), list of counsel. http://uniset.ca/other/cs5/349FSupp2d765.html
[^22]: "Statement on James A. Baker III," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 5, 2003. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031205-3.html
[^23]: Klein, Naomi. "James Baker's Double Life," *The Nation*, November 1, 2004, republished by Type Investigations. https://www.typeinvestigations.org/investigation/2004/11/01/james-bakers-double-life/
[^24]: *The Iraq Study Group Report*, December 2006, Recommendations 62 and 63, pp. 55-56, and "Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations," p. 64. https://web.archive.org/web/2id_/http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf
[^25]: Federal Election Commission, Schedule A itemized receipts for contributor "Baker, James A. III," Houston, Texas, 1980 to 2020, via the FEC API. https://api.open.fec.gov/v1/schedules/schedule_a/
[^5]: National Security Planning Group minutes, June 25, 1984, National Security Archive, The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On, EBB 210, document 2 (IC 00463), pp. 1, 9 and 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/2-NSPG%20minutes%206-25-84%20(IC%2000463).pdf
[^6]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, pp. 38-39 and nn. 145-151 (Baker Dep., June 22, 1987, at 8-9, 12; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, May 11, 1987, at 53). https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
[^7]: "Casey fourth Reagan aide asked about '80 campaign incident," *Baltimore Sun*, Washington Bureau, June 22, 1983, reproduced in CIA Reading Room document C05560156. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-05560156
[^8]: Casey, William J., Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Representative Don Albosta, June 22, 1983, CIA-RDP85M00364R001703320052-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp85m00364r001703320052-2
[^9]: Hoffman, David. "Casey Is Cited as Source of Briefing Book," *Washington Post*, June 24, 1983, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400039-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505400039-7
[^10]: Schram, Martin, and Lou Cannon. "1980 Debate 'Papers' Go To Justice," *Washington Post*, June 28, 1983, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020034-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201020034-3
[^11]: Hoffman, David. "Reagan Says 'No One' Saw '80 Briefing Book," *Washington Post*, June 15, 1984, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390080-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505390080-3
[^12]: Truell, Peter, and Larry Gurwin. *False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992, pp. 365 and 382, with source notes. https://archive.org/details/bypetertruellauthorlarrygurwinauthorfalseprofitstheinsidestoryofbccitheworldsmos
[^13]: Savranskaya, Svetlana, and Tom Blanton. "NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard," National Security Archive Briefing Book, December 12, 2017, Documents 05 (memorandum of conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, February 9, 1990, U.S. Department of State FOIA 199504567), 06 (Gorbachev Foundation record of the same conversation), 07 (memorandum of conversation between Robert Gates and Vladimir Kryuchkov, February 9, 1990) and 08 (letter from Baker to Helmut Kohl, February 10, 1990). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
[^14]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Special order, "US Armed Iraq Through BNL," section "Baker and Eagleburger Approve MCC Baghdad Branch," *Congressional Record*, House, August 10, 1992, reproducing Department of State authentication no. 89/3648-2 of March 14, 1989. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920810g.htm
[^15]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," Part I, pp. 1, 12, 37 n., 43, 68-74 and 102-104, reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, hearing, 103d Cong., 1st sess., November 9, 1993, Serial No. 103-95, pp. 343-347, 355, 380, 386, 411-417 and 445-447. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
[^16]: U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act unit, registrant and foreign principal records for registration 4293 (Baker Botts L.L.P., September 15, 1989, to September 30, 2003), registration 2833 (Baker & Botts, 1977) and registration 6464 (Baker Botts, LLP, 2017 to 2018), via the FARA eFile API. https://efile.fara.gov/api/v1/ForeignPrincipals/json/Terminated/4293
[^17]: Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Schedule 14A definitive proxy statement, filed March 6, 2002 ("Directors Standing for Election" and "Certain Transactions"), Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR accession 0000950109-02-001187. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1007456/000095010902001187/ddef14a.htm
[^18]: Carlyle Venture Partners, L.P., et al., Schedule 13D, Net2000 Communications, Inc., filed May 21, 2001, Item 2 (accession 0000950133-01-501284); TC Group, L.L.C., et al., Schedule 13D/A, Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P., filed January 13, 2005, Schedule A-1 (accession 0001193125-05-006004), Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099363/000095013301501284/w49431sc13d.txt ; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1126975/000119312505006004/0001193125-05-006004.txt
[^19]: "Election 2000: James Baker Holds News Briefing on Progress of Florida Recount," CNN transcript, November 9, 2000. http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0011/09/se.03.html
[^20]: "Bush Legal Team Remarks," Tuesday, November 28, 2000, American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/documents-related-the-2000-election-dispute-40
[^21]: Isikoff, Michael. "Terror Watch: A Legal Counterattack," *Newsweek*, April 15, 2003. https://www.newsweek.com/terror-watch-legal-counterattack-133991
[^22]: Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment & Development Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. November 14, 2003), list of counsel; described in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 781 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/burnett-v-baraka-inv-893111164
[^23]: In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. January 18, 2005), list of counsel. http://uniset.ca/other/cs5/349FSupp2d765.html
[^24]: "Statement on James A. Baker III," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 5, 2003. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031205-3.html
[^25]: Klein, Naomi. "James Baker's Double Life," *The Nation*, November 1, 2004, republished by Type Investigations. https://www.typeinvestigations.org/investigation/2004/11/01/james-bakers-double-life/
[^26]: *The Iraq Study Group Report*, December 2006, Recommendations 62 and 63, pp. 55-56, and "Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations," p. 64. https://web.archive.org/web/2id_/http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf
[^27]: Federal Election Commission, Schedule A itemized receipts for contributor "Baker, James A. III," Houston, Texas, 1980 to 2020, via the FEC API. https://api.open.fec.gov/v1/schedules/schedule_a/

14
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Nachum Admoni.md
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@ -6,20 +6,22 @@ tags:
- Politician
- Israel
- Military
summary: "Acting and later full Director of Mossad who served on the Iran-Israel Joint Committee for supplying arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War."
summary: "Acting and later full Director of Mossad who, according to Ari Ben-Menashe, served on the Iran-Israel Joint Committee for supplying arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War."
born: 1929-11-21
location: "Jerusalem, Mandatory Palestine"
---
[[Nachum Admoni]] was the acting Director of [[Mossad]] and later its full Director. He was the first [[Mossad]] chief to be appointed from the bureaucracy rather than the military. He was appointed after [[Yekutiel Adam]], who was in line for the position, was assassinated.[^1]
[[Nachum Admoni]] was the acting Director of [[Mossad]] and later its full Director. He was the first Mossad chief to be appointed from the bureaucracy rather than the military. He was appointed after [[Yekutiel Adam]], who was in line for the position, was assassinated.[^1]
[[Nachum Admoni|Admoni]] was involved in the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], which was assigned the task of supplying [[Iran]] with arms in its war with [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein's]] [[Iraq]]. He had equal power with the Director of [[Mossad]] on the subject of arms to [[Iran]].[^1]
According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], Admoni was involved in the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], which was assigned the task of supplying [[Iran]] with arms in its war with [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein's]] [[Iraq]], and he had equal power with the Director of Mossad on the subject of arms to Iran.[^1] The Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force identifies [[Yitzhak Hofi]] as head of Mossad during 1980 to 1982.[^2]
[[Nachum Admoni|Admoni]] was briefed by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] on the [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence network's arms sales to [[Iran]] for [[George H.W. Bush|Vice President George Bush]] in July 1986. He also received a phone call from [[Robert Gates]] in early February 1989, expressing [[United States|U.S.]] unhappiness about [[Israel|Israeli]] activities in [[Chile]].[^1]
Admoni was briefed by Ari Ben-Menashe on the [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence network's arms sales to Iran for [[George H.W. Bush|Vice President George Bush]] in July 1986. He also received a phone call from [[Robert Gates]] in early February 1989, expressing [[United States|U.S.]] unhappiness about Israeli activities in [[Chile]].[^1]
[[Nachum Admoni|Admoni]] was involved in the decision to move [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] money, which was under [[Israel|Israeli]] control, to the [[East Bloc]] in 1989. He was one of the three signatories to the slush-fund accounts, along with [[Ari Ben-Menashe]].[^1]
Admoni was involved in the decision to move [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] money, which was under Israeli control, to the [[East Bloc]] in 1989. He was one of the three signatories to the slush-fund accounts, along with Ari Ben-Menashe.[^1]
[[Nachum Admoni|Admoni]] left [[Mossad]] in 1989, but continued to advise [[Yitzhak Shamir]] on intelligence matters. He later became the chair of a public utility in [[Israel]].[^1]
Admoni left Mossad in 1989, but continued to advise [[Yitzhak Shamir]] on intelligence matters. He later became the chair of a public utility in Israel.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce

17
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Rafael Eitan.md
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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
- Rafi Eitan
- Rafi the Stinker
created: 2024-04-25
updated: 2026-10-12
updated: 2026-10-14
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- Person
@ -62,13 +62,17 @@ Eitan stated regarding PROMIS: "We can use that program to stamp out terrorism b
Distribution of the backdoored software was handled in part through British media mogul [[Robert Maxwell]], who used his Israeli computer company [[Degem]] and a network of international holdings as vehicles for sales to intelligence and law enforcement agencies worldwide.[^8] Eitan's involvement in what became known as the [[PROMIS Software Scandal]] was never formally adjudicated; U.S. government investigations, including the [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua Report]] (1993), found no credible evidence that enhanced PROMIS was distributed internationally.[^10]
### Ben-Menashe's Claims
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that Eitan was an initial member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] in 1980 and that, after [[Yitzhak Shamir]] became prime minister, Eitan ran it.[^11] The October Surprise Task Force reported that Ben-Menashe said Eitan confirmed to him reports of 1980 meetings in Spain between [[William J. Casey]] and [[Mehdi Karrubi]], in the presence of [[Yehoshua Sagi|Yehoshua Saguy]]; that Eitan told the Government of Israel that he did not know Ben-Menashe and had never met him; and that Saguy told the Government of Israel that he had never met Ben-Menashe. The task force wrote that credible testimonial and documentary evidence show Ben-Menashe "to be totally lacking in credibility regarding his allegations about meetings in Spain in 1980."[^12] Israeli authorities also reported to the task force that Eitan, with Kimche, Saguy and others, had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until 1991.[^13]
### Dr. Ben Orr
The documentary trace of an Israeli visitor to the Department of Justice is two memoranda of [[Jack Rugh]], the department's deputy project manager on the INSLAW contract. On May 6, 1983, Rugh wrote that "Brick Brewer recently instructed me to make a copy of an LEAA version of PROMIS available to Dr. Ben Orr, a representative of the Government of Israel. Dr. Orr called me to discuss that request... I have made a copy of the LEM DEC version of PROMIS and will provide it, along with the corresponding documentation, to Dr. Orr before he leaves the United States for Israel on May 16," and on May 12 he recorded delivery of the materials to [[C. Madison Brewer]] for transmittal. The version so recorded was the public-domain [[LEAA]] one. Eitan, in the account he gave Thomas and Dillon, was Dr. Orr, travelling on a forged passport in the identity of a real retired prosecutor, "Dr Benjamin Orr, an assistant public prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice in Tel Aviv," who first flew to the United States on December 19, 1982, met Brewer, and returned in February 1983 to be shown the enhanced PROMIS at INSLAW's own offices by Bill Hamilton and [[Nancy Hamilton]], after which Brewer handed him a tape from an office cupboard; Hamilton is quoted recalling eyes "like a computer, tracking everything."[^11]
The documentary trace of an Israeli visitor to the Department of Justice is two memoranda of [[Jack Rugh]], the department's deputy project manager on the INSLAW contract. On May 6, 1983, Rugh wrote that "Brick Brewer recently instructed me to make a copy of an LEAA version of PROMIS available to Dr. Ben Orr, a representative of the Government of Israel. Dr. Orr called me to discuss that request... I have made a copy of the LEM DEC version of PROMIS and will provide it, along with the corresponding documentation, to Dr. Orr before he leaves the United States for Israel on May 16," and on May 12 he recorded delivery of the materials to [[C. Madison Brewer]] for transmittal. The version so recorded was the public-domain [[LEAA]] one. Eitan, in the account he gave Thomas and Dillon, was Dr. Orr, travelling on a forged passport in the identity of a real retired prosecutor, "Dr Benjamin Orr, an assistant public prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice in Tel Aviv," who first flew to the United States on December 19, 1982, met Brewer, and returned in February 1983 to be shown the enhanced PROMIS at INSLAW's own offices by Bill Hamilton and [[Nancy Hamilton]], after which Brewer handed him a tape from an office cupboard; Hamilton is quoted recalling eyes "like a computer, tracking everything."[^14]
### Later Career
Eitan founded the Pensioners' Party, Gil, which won seven Knesset seats in March 2006 and joined [[Ehud Olmert]]'s coalition, in which he served as minister for pensioner affairs; in October 2008 he told a German magazine that Iran's president should be kidnapped and tried at The Hague. Of the Eichmann capture he told Gordon Thomas that "almost every published fact about the capture of Eichmann is pure bullshit. I know because I personally am the man who captured him."[^12]
Eitan founded the Pensioners' Party, Gil, which won seven Knesset seats in March 2006 and joined [[Ehud Olmert]]'s coalition, in which he served as minister for pensioner affairs; in October 2008 he told a German magazine that Iran's president should be kidnapped and tried at The Hague. Of the Eichmann capture he told Gordon Thomas that "almost every published fact about the capture of Eichmann is pure bullshit. I know because I personally am the man who captured him."[^15]
### Footnotes
@ -82,5 +86,8 @@ Eitan founded the Pensioners' Party, Gil, which won seven Knesset seats in March
[^8]: Thomas, Gordon. *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad.* St. Martin's Press, 1999.
[^9]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
[^11]: House Report 102-857, September 10, 1992, reproducing Rugh's memoranda of May 6 and 12, 1983, which do not identify Dr. Orr; Thomas, Gordon, and Martin Dillon, *Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy,* Carroll and Graf, 2002. https://archive.org/details/robert-maxwell-israels-superspy-2002 The February 1983 visit in the book and the May 1983 transfer in the memoranda are not the same transaction, and no record reconciles them.
[^12]: Thomas, Gordon. *Gideon's Spies,* 2009 edition. https://archive.org/details/gideons-spies
[^11]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
[^12]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 97. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
[^13]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98.
[^14]: House Report 102-857, September 10, 1992, reproducing Rugh's memoranda of May 6 and 12, 1983, which do not identify Dr. Orr; Thomas, Gordon, and Martin Dillon, *Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy,* Carroll and Graf, 2002. https://archive.org/details/robert-maxwell-israels-superspy-2002 The February 1983 visit in the book and the May 1983 transfer in the memoranda are not the same transaction, and no record reconciles them.
[^15]: Thomas, Gordon. *Gideon's Spies,* 2009 edition. https://archive.org/details/gideons-spies

9
10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Robert Gates.md
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-14
aliases:
- Robert Gates
- Bob Gates
@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ In its October 24, 1991 report on Gates's nomination, the [[Senate Select Commit
The committee also reported that, while investigating relationships between Gates and Cardoen, it received information about a relationship between [[Industrias Cardoen|Cardoen Industries]] and a former part-time senior CIA employee, [[James D. Theberge]]. The report states that "There is no evidence that the nominee, Mr. Gates, participated in either his recruitment or selection" to the Senior Review Panel. In written answers printed in the report, Gates said that he had moved the panel's organization from the Directorate of Intelligence to the Director's area when he became deputy director for intelligence in January 1982, that decisions on panel members were made by the Director, and that "I do not recall meeting Ambassador Theberge prior to his joining the SRP." He wrote that he was "unaware of his [Theberge's] relationships, his connection to the SWISSCO Management Group, or any connection to the Carlos Cardoen Group."[^4]
### Ben-Menashe's allegations, 1991
During Gates's 1991 confirmation hearings to be director of Central Intelligence, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] alleged to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Gates conspired with the Reagan-Bush campaign to delay the release of the American hostages and was present at various meetings, including those in Paris. Gates, under oath, denied the allegations. The committee reported that investigations by the FBI and the CIA inspector general, including analyses of Gates's calendar and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm Ben-Menashe's allegations; the October Surprise Task Force wrote that it was aware of no evidence to the contrary.[^5][^6] In Ben-Menashe's 1992 book, Gates dealt directly with [[David Kimche]] on Israeli arms sales to Iran, and approved the sale of unsophisticated weapons to Iran in early 1981; the book also places Gates at meetings with [[Mehdi Karrubi]] in Madrid in 1980. In July 1987, according to Ben-Menashe, [[Mohammed Jalali]] met Gates in [[Kansas City]] to seek assurances that arms supplies to Iran would continue.[^7]
### Publications
* *From the Shadows* (1997)
@ -42,3 +46,6 @@ The committee also reported that, while investigating relationships between Gate
[^2]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
[^3]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
[^4]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^5]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19 (October 24, 1991), sections 4 and 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 185 to 187).
[^6]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 172. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
[^7]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm

247
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Edward Lansdale.md
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@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-14
title: Edward Lansdale
aliases:
- Edward Geary Lansdale
- Edward G. Lansdale
- Edward Lansdale
- Ed Lansdale
- E. G. Lansdale
- Lansdale
tags:
- Person
- CIA
@ -11,51 +16,249 @@ tags:
- Philippines
- Vietnam
- AntiCastro
- OSS
- Counterinsurgency
- OperationMongoose
- SaigonMilitaryMission
- Huk
- ChurchCommittee
- Assassination
category: "Intelligence & Government"
summary: "Major General Edward Lansdale was the U.S. Air Force's preeminent counterinsurgency theorist, credited with suppressing the Huk insurgency in the Philippines by backing Ramon Magsaysay (1950-1953), advising Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam (1954-1956), and directing Operation Mongoose against Castro (1961-1962) under Robert Kennedy's oversight, becoming the partial model for the protagonists in both The Quiet American and The Ugly American."
summary: "Edward Lansdale was an Air Force officer whose Philippine counterinsurgency work, Saigon mission and Operation Mongoose role made him a central figure in covert action against Vietnam and Cuba."
born: 1908-02-06
died: 1987-02-23
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Office of Strategic Services]]"
role: "intelligence officer"
start: 1942
end: 1945
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[United States Air Force]]"
role: "officer"
start: 1947
end: 1963-10-31
fn: 2
- type: partner_of
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role: "U.S. adviser to the Philippine defense secretary and later president"
start: 1950
end: 1953
fn: 4
- type: head_of
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role: "chief"
start: 1954-06-01
end: 1956
fn: 7
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Ngo Dinh Diem]]"
role: "U.S. adviser to Diem"
start: 1954
end: 1956
fn: 15
- type: reported_to
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role: "wrote to the Attorney General on the Cuba project"
start: 1961-11-30
fn: 27
- type: head_of
with: "[[Operation Mongoose]]"
role: "chief of operations"
start: 1961-11-30
end: 1962-11
fn: 28
- type: reported_to
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role: "Special Group (Augmented) chairman"
start: 1961-11-30
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fn: 29
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reverse: true
role: "CIA project officer for Operation Mongoose"
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fn: 30
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation NORTHWOODS]]"
role: "requested pretexts for military intervention through the Mongoose interagency group"
start: 1962-03-06
end: 1962-03-13
fn: 44
- type: investigated
with: "[[Church Committee]]"
reverse: true
fn: 29
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Ellsworth Bunker]]"
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end: 1968
fn: 2
- type: appointed
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reverse: true
role: "special assistant to the ambassador, later senior liaison officer"
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end: 1968
fn: 55
---
Edward Geary Lansdale (February 6, 1908 - February 23, 1987) was a [[United States Air Force]] officer and intelligence operative who shaped American counterinsurgency doctrine through practical success in the [[Philippines]] and controversial engagement in [[Vietnam|South Vietnam]], and who directed [[Operation Mongoose]] - the Kennedy administration's post-[[Bay of Pigs]] program to overthrow [[Fidel Castro]] - until its suspension following the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].[^1]
Edward Geary Lansdale (1908-1987) was an [[United States Air Force]] officer and intelligence operative whose counterinsurgency work in the [[Philippines]] and [[Vietnam]] shaped American counterinsurgency doctrine, and who served as chief of operations of [[Operation Mongoose]], the Kennedy administration's covert program against [[Fidel Castro]], from November 1961 until the program was suspended after the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].[^1]
### Philippines and Counterinsurgency Doctrine
### Early career
Lansdale arrived in the Philippines in 1950 as an Air Force officer attached to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] during the Huk insurgency - an armed communist-led peasant rebellion (Hukbalahap) that threatened the Manila government. Working closely with [[Ramon Magsaysay]], first as Defense Secretary and then as President, Lansdale developed an approach to counterinsurgency that emphasized political reform over military force: redressing peasant grievances, creating a professional and non-corrupt military, civic action programs, and psychological operations rather than indiscriminate repression.
Lansdale was born in Detroit on February 6, 1908. He served with the [[Office of Strategic Services]] from 1942 to 1945, was promoted to lieutenant in the U.S. Army in 1943, and served in military intelligence for the duration of the war.[^2] From 1945 to 1948 he was chief of an intelligence division and extended his stay in the Philippines at AFWESPAC and PHILRYCOM, where he helped the Philippine Army rebuild its intelligence services. He was commissioned a captain in the Air Force in 1947 with the temporary rank of major, taught at the Strategic Intelligence School at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, in 1948, and received a temporary promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1949.[^2]
The Huk insurgency was effectively ended by 1953. American policy circles attributed this success to Lansdale's methods, and Magsaysay's election as President in 1953 (which Lansdale helped engineer) was seen as validating the approach: a popular anti-communist leader defeating both insurgency and corruption simultaneously.
[[Fletcher Prouty|L. Fletcher Prouty]] wrote in 1992 that Lansdale entered the OSS soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor and later said that he had left it to serve in army intelligence, and that in November 1949 Lansdale was brought into the [[Office of Policy Coordination]], the covert action office directed by [[Frank Wisner]], who had headed the OSS section in Romania during the war. Prouty wrote that Lansdale worked there under Col. [[Richard G. Stilwell]] in the planning staff of the Far East division.[^3]
This Philippine model - counterinsurgency as political as much as military work - became the basis for American counterinsurgency doctrine and for Lansdale's subsequent assignments.[^1]
### Philippines, 1950 to 1953
### Vietnam: Saigon Military Mission
Lansdale arrived in the Philippines in 1950 as an Air Force officer attached to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] during the [[Hukbalahap|Huk]] insurgency, an armed communist-led peasant rebellion that threatened the Manila government.[^1] His transfer to the [[Joint United States Military Advisory Group]] came at the request of President [[Elpidio Quirino]], to advise the Philippine Army's intelligence services in the campaign against the Huks, and he received a temporary promotion to colonel in 1951.[^2] The Army's history of the campaign places Lansdale's first meeting with [[Ramon Magsaysay]] at a reception at Fort Myer, where Magsaysay had just been named Philippine defense secretary. The study says that Magsaysay then asked President Quirino to request Lansdale's assignment to JUSMAG, and that Lansdale arrived with his assistant, Maj. [[Charles T. R. Bohannan]].[^4]
Lansdale arrived in Saigon in June 1954, days before the Geneva Accords ended the First Indochina War. He headed the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), a covert operation tasked with building support for the anti-communist government of [[Ngo Dinh Diem]] and undermining the communist North Vietnamese government.
Working with Magsaysay, Lansdale developed an approach to counterinsurgency that emphasized political reform over military force: redressing peasant grievances, creating a professional and less corrupt military, civic action programs, and psychological operations rather than indiscriminate repression.[^1] The Huk insurgency was effectively ended by 1953. Magsaysay's election as president in 1953, which Lansdale helped engineer, was seen at the time as validating the approach: a popular anti-communist leader defeating insurgency and corruption at once.[^1] The approach became the basis for American counterinsurgency doctrine and for Lansdale's later assignments.[^1]
The SMM conducted psychological operations and sabotage in North Vietnam, helped orchestrate the movement of approximately 900,000 Catholic Vietnamese from North to South following partition, and worked to stabilize Diem's government against internal challenges from the Binh Xuyen criminal organization and dissident military factions. Lansdale developed a personal relationship with Diem and provided the political counsel that helped Diem survive the turbulent 1954-1956 period.
The Army's study describes the psychological warfare that ran alongside the patrols. Scout-Ranger units distributed propaganda leaflets covertly in areas the guerrillas considered secure, and the most successful was called "The Eye," which left each finder uncertain how far his territory had been penetrated. The study also describes altered cartridges, with dynamite in place of powder, planted in Huk weapon caches, so that a guerrilla could not tell whether his supply had been tampered with by a government agent.[^5] In his memoir Lansdale wrote that one combat psywar squad planted stories among the residents of a town of an asuang, a vampire, living on the hill where the Huks were based, then ambushed a Huk patrol, snatched its last man and "punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-fashion." He described a second technique, the "eye of God," which he had heard of from the siege of Caen and from spotter-aircraft and loudspeaker-tank teams in Europe during World War II: exact intelligence on individual enemy soldiers was broadcast by loudspeaker so that each "couldn't hide from an all-seeing eye."[^6]
Graham Greene's novel *The Quiet American* (1955) drew partially on Lansdale's activities and persona in Vietnam, though Greene's portrayal was decidedly unflattering. William Lederer and Eugene Burdick's *The Ugly American* (1958) featured Colonel Edwin Hillandale, a more sympathetic character clearly modeled on Lansdale.[^1]
### Saigon Military Mission, 1954 to 1956
Lansdale returned to Vietnam for a second tour in 1965-1968 in a senior advisory capacity under Ambassador [[Henry Cabot Lodge]], but with far less operational authority than his earlier mission. He was recalled in 1968 without having achieved the political reform he believed essential to South Vietnam's survival.
In 1953 Lansdale was a member of Lt. Gen. [[John W. O'Daniel]]'s mission to the French forces in Indochina, as an adviser on special counter-guerrilla operations.[^2] He arrived in Saigon on June 1, 1954, about seven weeks before the Geneva Agreements of July 21, 1954 ended the [[First Indochina War]]. He headed the [[Saigon Military Mission]] (SMM), an American team that the mission's own report says was born at a Washington policy meeting early in 1954.[^7] The report gives the team's broad mission as paramilitary operations against the enemy and political-psychological warfare.[^8] O'Daniel and the embassy chargé [[Robert McClintock]] had arranged Lansdale's appointment as assistant air attaché, and secret communications with Washington ran through the Saigon station of the CIA.[^9]
### Operation Mongoose
The report, which the [[Pentagon Papers]] reprinted as Document 95, describes a black propaganda strike that the team engineered in Hanoi before the [[Viet Minh]] took the city: leaflets signed by the Viet Minh gave residents instructions for the takeover, including items on property and money. A later leaflet, attributed to the Viet Minh Resistance Committee, was prepared for the transport of southern Viet Minh to the North under the Geneva agreement. The report also records that the idea for [[Operation Brotherhood]], a program of volunteer medical teams for South Vietnam, was born at an SMM conference in 1954, and that the chief suggested [[Donald R. Heath|Ambassador Heath]] call a U.S. meeting to plan a single Vietnamese refugee agency under a commissioner appointed by Diem.[^10]
After the Bay of Pigs disaster in April 1961, the Kennedy administration created Operation Mongoose to renew efforts against Castro through covert means. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] chaired the [[Special Group]] (Augmented) overseeing the program; Lansdale was appointed its operational director in November 1961.
The report records that [[Ngo Dinh Diem|Diem]] arrived in Saigon on July 7, 1954, and that Diem made an agreement with General [[Trinh Minh The]], leader of some 3,000 [[Cao Dai]] dissidents near Tay Ninh, to give him financial support in return for armed support to the government if needed.[^10] Some 900,000 civilians exercised their option under Article 14(d) of the armistice to move from the North to the South, among them more than 600,000 Catholics, an estimated 65 percent of North Vietnam's Catholics.[^11] The northern team under Maj. [[Lucien Conein]] supervised the refugee flow for the Hanoi airlift organized by the French as part of its cover duties.[^12] In September 1954 the team attempted to destroy the modern presses of the largest printing establishment in the north, which intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with the Viet Minh; Viet Minh security agents had already moved into the plant.[^13] In its last days in Hanoi, before the city was evacuated on October 9, 1954, the team contaminated the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual wreckage of engines and took the first actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad, working with a CIA special technical team in Japan.[^14] Lansdale developed a personal relationship with Diem and provided the political counsel that helped Diem survive the turbulent 1954 to 1956 period.[^1] The team also worked to stabilize Diem's government against challenges from the Binh Xuyen criminal organization and dissident military factions. The Pentagon's study says that in 1955 and 1956 Lansdale "was a key figure in installing and establishing Diem as President of South Vietnam."[^15]
Mongoose was the largest CIA covert action program since the Korean War. At its peak, the CIA's [[JM-WAVE|JM/WAVE]] station in Miami employed over 400 officers and had more than 3,000 Cuban exile agents on its payroll. Operations targeted Cuban economic infrastructure (sabotage), developed internal resistance networks, and maintained assassination planning tracks through [[William Harvey]]'s [[ZR RIFLE|ZR/RIFLE]] program.
The report describes the mission's part in the dispute between Diem and the army chief of staff, General [[Nguyen Van Hinh]], who had selected October 26, 1954 for an attack on the presidential palace. The mission invited two of Hinh's officers to the Philippines on the pretext of an official trip, and the report states that the attack did not take place. Ambassador [[J. Lawton Collins]], who arrived on November 8, applied pressure on Hinh, and Hinh left for Paris on November 29.[^16] In the Philippines the mission built up Freedom Company, a non-profit Philippine corporation backed by President Magsaysay to supply Filipinos experienced in fighting the Huks, and the United States backed a small Freedom Company training camp in a hidden valley on the Clark Air Base reservation.[^17] In January 1955 the mission borrowed Magsaysay's senior aide, Col. [[Napoleon Valeriano]], to reorganize the Presidential Guard Battalion for Diem.[^18]
Lansdale's relationship with Harvey was persistently antagonistic. Harvey believed Mongoose's operational security was compromised by Robert Kennedy's direct involvement; Lansdale regarded Harvey's insubordination and alcoholism as operational liabilities. Harvey unilaterally dispatched teams into Cuba during the October 1962 missile crisis, directly violating administration policy, leading to his transfer to Rome. Mongoose was effectively suspended during the missile crisis and formally reduced in scope thereafter.[^2]
The report also describes an almanac for popular sale in the northern cities, for which Vietnamese astrologers were hired to write predictions of disasters for certain Viet Minh leaders and undertakings and of unity in the south, work the report says was "based on our concept of the use of astrology for psywar in Southeast Asia." Copies were shipped by air to Haiphong and smuggled into Viet Minh territory.[^18] On January 11, 1955 Collins announced Lansdale's transfer from the ambassador's staff to the Training Relations and Instruction Mission under O'Daniel, to head its National Security division, with authority to coordinate all U.S. agencies in Vietnam in that work.[^18]
### Legacy
[[Graham Greene]]'s novel [[The Quiet American]] (1955) drew partly on Lansdale's activities and persona in Vietnam, and Greene's portrayal is decidedly unflattering.[^19] [[William Lederer]] and [[Eugene Burdick]]'s [[The Ugly American]] (1958) featured Colonel Edwin Hillandale, a more sympathetic character. [[Mary McGrory]] wrote in a [[Washington Star]] article on Lodge's second Saigon mission that Lansdale was widely regarded as the prototype of the harmonica-playing Colonel Hillandale of that novel.[^20]
Lansdale represented a specific strand of Cold War American engagement with the Third World: the belief that communist insurgencies could be countered by winning popular support rather than by military force alone, and that American counterinsurgency advisors could translate this theory into practice in specific contexts. His Philippine success was real; his Vietnam engagement contributed to a trajectory that ended in American defeat.
### Diem and the Pentagon, 1955 to 1961
His operational career raised questions that remained relevant through later U.S. counterinsurgency experiences: whether the Philippine model was transferable to different political cultures, whether American advisors could substitute for indigenous political leadership, and whether covert operations could produce durable political outcomes.
Lansdale went to the office of the Secretary of Defense in Washington in 1957 as deputy assistant secretary for special operations, served on the staff of the President's Committee on Military Assistance (the Draper Committee) in 1959, and received a temporary promotion to brigadier general in 1960.[^2] In 1961 he held special operations posts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A letter of January 30, 1961 styles him the deputy assistant for special operations, and a memorandum of June 26, 1961 styles him the assistant for special operations.[^21][^22] The Defense Department's Vietnam study identifies him as Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale of the [[Office of Special Operations]] in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, abbreviated OSO/OSD.[^23]
Lansdale died in Washington on February 23, 1987.[^1]
Lansdale's January 1961 report on Vietnam, submitted after a visit to Saigon, argued that the United States had to keep supporting Diem, and the Defense Department study notes that memoirs by [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr.|Arthur Schlesinger]] and [[Roger Hilsman]] describe the report as shocking the president about conditions in Vietnam.[^23] A letter Lansdale wrote to Diem on January 30, 1961 is in the Lansdale Papers at the [[Hoover Institution]].[^21]
The Defense study says Lansdale served as executive officer of the task force that [[Roswell Gilpatric]] organized to review Vietnam, and that he proposed the task force be given a continuing, dominant role in managing the Vietnamese enterprise.[^23] In October 1961 he met [[Ngo Dinh Nhu]] in Saigon and reported the conversation to [[Maxwell Taylor]], the president's military representative.[^24]
### Operation Mongoose, 1961 to 1962
After the [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion of April 1961, the Kennedy administration renewed covert efforts against Castro. At a White House meeting on November 3, 1961 President [[John F. Kennedy]] authorized a new program. [[Robert Kennedy]]'s handwritten notes of the meeting list "Lansdale (the Ugly American)" among those present, record that Robert Kennedy assigned Lansdale to survey the situation in Cuba, and describe the aim of stirring things up on the island with espionage, sabotage and general disorder, run by Cubans themselves.[^25]
On November 28, 1961 Lansdale wrote to Gen. [[Samuel T. Williams]] that a "crash project" from his superior had taken him away from the follow-through on the Taylor group's reports. The published volume identifies the project as a Cuba effort that Attorney General Kennedy had asked him to take up.[^26] On November 30, 1961 he sent Robert Kennedy a memorandum on the "day of decision" for the project, arguing that the intelligence estimate circulated against it was inadequate on the internal situation.[^27] A later program review states that the November 30 directive set the goal of the program and named Lansdale as chief of operations, with operational lieutenants from [[Department of State|State]], Defense and the CIA.[^28]
The [[Church Committee]] records that Kennedy appointed General Maxwell Taylor chairman of the [[Special Group (Augmented)]], and that Robert Kennedy played an active role in the program, a role unrelated to his position as attorney general.[^29] Lansdale was designated chief of operations. The committee also records that [[William Harvey]] was put in charge of the CIA's [[Task Force W]] in late 1961 or early 1962, a unit that employed approximately 400 people at CIA headquarters and its Miami station.[^29] Harvey's memorandum to Lansdale of July 24, 1962 stated that as of July 23, 477 CIA staff personnel were devoting full time to the effort.[^30]
Lansdale's review of the first phase, dated July 25, 1962, reported that recruitment of third-country nationals and the start of Cuban collection nets had made Operation Mongoose "numerically the largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist state."[^31] Taylor's memorandum to the president of August 17, 1962 described the program as generating the largest intelligence effort directed at any Soviet Bloc country.[^32] Sabotage was part of the plan. On October 8, 1962 Harvey asked Lansdale to put before the Special Group a request for policy approval to sabotage Cuban-owned vessels "wherever and whenever secure access to them can be attained," normally in non-Bloc ports.[^33] Operations targeted Cuban economic infrastructure through sabotage, developed internal resistance networks, and maintained assassination planning tracks through Harvey's [[ZR RIFLE|ZR/RIFLE]] program.[^34] At its peak the [[JM-WAVE]] station in Miami had more than 3,000 Cuban exile agents on its payroll. Lansdale's relationship with Harvey was persistently antagonistic. Harvey believed that Robert Kennedy's direct involvement compromised the operation's security, and Lansdale regarded Harvey's insubordination and alcoholism as operational liabilities.[^34] Mongoose was the largest CIA covert action program since the Korean War.
Planning tasks were set in January 1962. On January 18 Lansdale assigned 32 tasks to the participating agencies.[^35] In a memorandum of January 20 to the members of the Caribbean Survey Group he wrote that "we are in a combat situation" in which "we have been given full command."[^36] On January 19 he added Task 33, a plan to incapacitate Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by chemical means. Lansdale testified that the agents were nonlethal and meant to keep workers away from the fields for 24 to 48 hours. The task was approved for planning with a notation that it required a policy determination, and after a study showed it unfeasible it was cancelled without reaching the Special Group.[^37] A January 26 memorandum asked State and Defense for an early determination of when the United States might use military force in the Cuba project.[^38]
The committee describes Lansdale's six-phase schedule as one that the Special Group did not approve for implementation, and reports that only its first, intelligence-collection phase was approved for January through August 1962. The March 14, 1962 guidelines stated that "During this period, General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks."[^39]
Parrott, an assistant to the president's military representative, testified before the Church Committee in 1975 about a plan for removing Castro that he attributed to Lansdale. In Parrott's account, the plan consisted of spreading word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro, with an American submarine to surface off Cuba and send up starshells as the sign. Parrott said that somebody dubbed the plan "Elimination by Illumination."[^40][^41]
Lansdale testified in 1975 that "touchdown play," a phrase in his memoranda, was a breezy way of referring to a Cuban revolt to overthrow the regime, and the committee reports that the examples in his January 1962 memorandum contained no indication of assassination.[^37]
On February 20, 1962 Lansdale detailed a six-phase schedule designed to culminate in October 1962 with "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." For its "Resistance" phase he listed "attacks on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders," with the notation that "Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police G-2 officials" and that chemical warfare agents should be fully considered. Lansdale testified that the "actions" and "attack" in that component meant killing. He testified that early in the program he had suggested to working-level representatives of the participating agencies that they contact "criminal elements" for intelligence and for "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba, and he conceded that his proposal to recruit gangster elements for attacks on "key leaders" contemplated the targeted killing of individuals.[^42] On January 30, 1962 Craig forwarded to Lansdale a concept called Operation Bounty, a system of financial rewards for killing or delivering alive known Communists, with leaflets listing rewards from $5,000 for an informer to $100,000 for government officials and a reward of 2 cents for Castro. Lansdale testified that the figure was designed to denigrate Castro and that he tabled the concept, which he never brought before the Special Group (Augmented).[^43]
### Operation NORTHWOODS and the pretexts question
At a March 5, 1962 meeting chaired by Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], Rusk spoke of "other tracks" which might be opened for the United States to achieve its objective, and there was joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a notional clandestine action for which "they" could be blamed. On March 6, 1962 Lansdale wrote to [[Richard Goodwin]], the deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, that General Taylor had asked him to report on these alternate "tracks" to the Special Group he chaired. He was asking the Defense representative, [[William H. Craig]], for "a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention," and he asked State for a companion statement.[^44] A [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] memorandum of March 13, 1962, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba," answered with a set of pretexts for military action. That plan is known as [[Operation NORTHWOODS]].[^45]
### Castro assassination questions, 1975
Lansdale's own account of assassination planning appeared in an [[Associated Press]] interview published by [[The Washington Post]] on May 1, 1975. He said that, acting on orders delivered through an intermediary, he developed plans for removing Castro by any means, including assassination, and that he was assigned to the project in 1962, when the United States first received intelligence that Castro was prepared to install Soviet-made missiles in Cuba.[^46] He declined to name the intermediary and said it was not [[McGeorge Bundy]] but someone "much more intimate."[^46] Of the project he said, "I just wanted to see if the United States had any such capabilities," and he said he was "working for the highest authority in the land." [[Robert McNamara]] objected to the description of Lansdale as his assistant in August 1962, saying "I had no personal knowledge of what he was doing."[^46]
The Associated Press identified Lansdale as the author of an August 1962 memorandum, then in the possession of the [[Rockefeller Commission 1975|Rockefeller Commission]], which authoritative sources said gave the CIA authority to develop contingency plans for the assassination of Castro. Lansdale said he did not remember the memorandum but acknowledged that it would not have been incompatible with his assigned task. He confirmed that the phrase "something like that," used in describing the project, included the possibility of assassination.[^46]
The August 13, 1962 memorandum that the Church Committee quotes directed Harvey to include an option for the "liquidation of leaders" in a proposed Phase II plan. Harvey's memorandum of August 14 to [[Richard Helms]] attached Lansdale's memorandum with the words excised.[^47] On August 6, 1962 Lansdale had reviewed Harvey's draft operational plan.[^48] The Special Group met on August 16, 1962 and approved Lansdale's paper subject to detailed actions, and [[John McCone]]'s record of the meeting notes a difference between Lansdale and the CIA over the position McCone had taken on the plan.[^49]
### The missile crisis and the end of the program
Harvey testified before the committee that during the October 1962 crisis he ordered agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation, that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that McCone ordered the agent operations stopped. On October 30, 1962 the Special Group ordered a halt to all sabotage operations, citing Lansdale's memorandum for the record.[^50] The committee's chronology records that Operation Mongoose ended in November 1962.[^51] The program was formally reduced in scope after the crisis.
Harvey was appointed chief of the CIA station in Rome, effective on or about June 30, 1963.[^52] [[Evan Thomas|Thomas]] wrote that Robert Kennedy had exiled Harvey to Rome.[^53] Lansdale retired from the Air Force on October 31, 1963, was awarded a second Distinguished Service Medal for his counterinsurgency work, and became a consultant to the director of Food for Peace at the White House.[^2]
### Return to Vietnam, 1965 to 1968
Lansdale returned to Vietnam in 1965. A CIA memorandum for the record, of August 1965, summarizes a Washington meeting on his mission, attended by officials from State, including [[Walt Rostow]], from the White House, from [[United States Agency for International Development|AID]] and [[United States Information Agency|USIA]], and from the CIA, including [[William Colby]]. At that meeting Lansdale described his concept of the mission as finding out what the Vietnamese thought, what they wanted and what they would do, and as unifying the efforts of the American mission.[^54]
Congressional remarks by Representative [[Claude Pepper]], reprinting a Washington Post item of August 20, 1965, described Lansdale as being sent to South Vietnam as a special assistant to Ambassador [[Henry Cabot Lodge]].[^55] The Pentagon Papers state that Lansdale "never got to Vietnam until Cabot Lodge brought him out later in 1965," despite four requests from Diem and recommendations from Cottrell, the Taylor report and William Bundy that he be sent.[^56] In late August 1965 Lodge announced Lansdale's appointment as chairman of the U.S. Mission liaison group to the South Vietnamese government's CRCC.[^57]
His 1965 post carried less operational authority than his earlier mission. A New York World Journal Tribune article of March 26, 1967 reported that Lansdale had returned to Vietnam in September 1965 with Lodge, under the unusual and rather vague title of senior liaison officer, with ministerial rank, as a member of a ten-man mission council.[^58] The senior liaison office staff worked on winning support in the Vietnamese countryside, and President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] also appointed Lansdale a minister. From 1967 to 1968 he was an assistant to Ambassador [[Ellsworth Bunker]] at the U.S. Mission in South Vietnam.[^2] Lansdale was recalled in 1968 without the political reform he believed essential to South Vietnam's survival.[^1]
Lansdale died in McLean, Virginia, on February 23, 1987.[^2]
### Fletcher Prouty's claims
Col. L. Fletcher Prouty wrote about Lansdale in two publications, one placing him in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other connecting him to the story of President Kennedy's assassination. In a 1986 article in [[Freedom (magazine)|Freedom]], Prouty wrote that he and Lansdale flew to [[Fort Gordon]], Georgia, on November 1, 1960 to collect elements of a Civil Affairs and Military Government curriculum, and that both were then assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Prouty described Lansdale as a principal proponent of what he called the "Mao doctrine" of counterinsurgency, which he wrote was introduced into the White House under the guise of a mutual security program.[^59]
In his 1992 book on the assassination and Vietnam, Prouty asked where the Joint Chiefs, Lansdale and [[Allen Dulles]] were when the guns sounded in the streets of Dallas. He wrote that Cuban exile groups from Louisiana and their instructors became suspects in the investigation, that many of them were later recruited into the larger program Operation Mongoose under Lansdale, and that the identification of [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] as the scapegoat served as a cover story.[^60]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Currey, Cecil B. *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American.* Houghton Mifflin, 1988. Lansdale, Edward Geary. *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia.* Harper & Row, 1972.
[^2]: Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
[^1]: Currey, Cecil B. *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American*. Houghton Mifflin, 1988.
[^2]: Hoover Institution Library & Archives, *Register of the Edward Geary Lansdale papers, 1910-1987*, Online Archive of California, biographical chronology (born Detroit, February 6, 1908; O.S.S. 1942-1945; JUSMAG 1950; O'Daniel mission 1953; Saigon 1954-1956; Office of the Secretary of Defense 1957, 1959, 1960 and 1961; retirement October 31, 1963; senior liaison officer 1965-1967; assistant to Ambassador Bunker 1967-1968; death at McLean, Virginia, February 23, 1987). https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf6v19n8cp/
[^3]: Prouty, L. Fletcher. *JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy*. Carol Publishing Group, 1992, on Lansdale's OSS service and his assignment to the Office of Policy Coordination in November 1949. https://archive.org/details/jfkciavietnamplo0000prou_r5p5
[^4]: Greenberg, Lawrence M. *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1986, section on Lansdale's JUSMAG assignment and the Magsaysay request. https://archive.org/details/hukbalahapinsurr00lawr
[^5]: Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, section on psychological warfare operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, describing the Scout-Ranger leaflets, "The Eye," and the altered-cartridge tactic. https://archive.org/details/hukbalahapinsurr00lawr
[^6]: Edward Geary Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; reprint, New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), pp. 72-75. https://archive.org/details/inmidstofwarsame0000lans
[^7]: Saigon Military Mission report, excerpted as Document 95 in *The Pentagon Papers, The Senator Gravel Edition*, vol. I, pp. 573-574, on the mission's origin in a Washington policy meeting and the arrival of Lansdale in Saigon on June 1, 1954. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^8]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 573-574, on the mission's broad statement of purpose. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^9]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, p. 574, on the assistant air attache cover arranged by O'Daniel and McClintock and the communications through the CIA station. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^10]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 574-579, covering the Diem arrival of July 7, 1954 (p. 575), the refugee commission proposal and Operation Brotherhood (p. 576), the black propaganda strike in Hanoi (pp. 578-579) and the Viet Minh leaflet for the southern transport (p. 579), and the Diem agreement with Trinh Minh The (p. 578). https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^11]: *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 289-291, on the some 900,000 civilians who exercised their option under Article 14(d) of the armistice (pp. 289-290) and the estimated 65 percent of North Vietnam's Catholics, more than 600,000 in all, who moved south (p. 291). https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^12]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, p. 577, on the northern team's cover duties supervising the Hanoi refugee airlift. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^13]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, p. 578, on the attempt to destroy the Hanoi printing presses in September 1954. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^14]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, p. 579, on the evacuation of Hanoi on October 9, 1954, the contamination of the bus company oil supply and the delayed sabotage of the railroad. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^15]: *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 2, Part IV.B.1, sections on the Lansdale report of January 1961 and the Taylor mission, quoting the Defense Department's statement that Lansdale "was a key figure in installing and establishing Diem as President of South Vietnam." DTIC ADA542557. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA542557
[^16]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 577-580, on the dispute between Diem and General Hinh, the invitation to the Philippines on October 26, 1954, the arrival of Collins on November 8 and Hinh's departure on November 29. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^17]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 580-581, on Freedom Company and the training camp on the Clark Air Base reservation. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^18]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 581-582, on the almanac, the transfer to the Training Relations and Instruction Mission and the loan of Colonel Valeriano. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
[^19]: Greene, Graham. *The Quiet American*. Heinemann, 1955.
[^20]: McGrory, Mary. "'Old Asia Hand' Going Back But Highly Effective," *Washington Star*, undated clipping on Lodge's second mission to Vietnam. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000300430064-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000300430064-8
[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. I, doc. 6, Letter From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to President Diem, Washington, January 30, 1961. Source line: Hoover Institution, Lansdale Papers. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d6
[^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. I, doc. 73, Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric), Washington, June 26, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d73
[^23]: *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Department of Defense study, Book 2, Part IV.B.1, "Evolution of the War: The Kennedy Program and Commitments, 1961," sections on the Lansdale report of January 1961, the Gilpatric task force, and Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, OSO/OSD. DTIC ADA542557. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA542557
[^24]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. I, doc. 182, Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor), Saigon, October 21, 1961, on Lansdale's talk with Ngo Dinh Nhu on October 19. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d182
[^25]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 270, Editorial Note on the November 3, 1961 meeting, quoting Robert Kennedy's handwritten notes, which list "Lansdale (the Ugly American)." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d270
[^26]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. I, doc. 293, Letter From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to General Samuel T. Williams, Washington, November 28, 1961. Source line: Hoover Institution Archives, Williams Papers. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d293
[^27]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 277, Memorandum From General Edward Lansdale to Attorney General Kennedy, Washington, November 30, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d277
[^28]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 309, Program Review, Washington, March 2, 1962, entry for November 30, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d309
[^29]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 140-141, on Taylor's chairmanship of the Special Group (Augmented), Lansdale's appointment as chief of operations, Robert Kennedy's role, and Task Force W. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^30]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 359, Memorandum From the CIA Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations (Lansdale), Washington, July 24, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d359
[^31]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 360, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Special Group (Augmented), Washington, July 25, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d360
[^32]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 380, Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, Washington, August 17, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d380
[^33]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 10, Memorandum From the CIA Project Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations (Lansdale), Washington, October 8, 1962, "Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Ship." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d10
[^34]: Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995.
[^35]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 142-143, on the January 18, 1962 assignment of 32 tasks. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^36]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 293, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Members of the Caribbean Survey Group, Washington, January 20, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d293
[^37]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 143, on Task 33, Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975 (p. 29), and Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975 (p. 45) on the "touchdown play." https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 297, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), Washington, January 26, 1962, "Tasks 29 and 33, Cuba Project." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d297
[^39]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 143-145, on the six-phase schedule, the approval of the first phase, and the Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE of March 14, 1962. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^40]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 142 n. 2, quoting the testimony of Parrott, July 10, 1975, pp. 49-50. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^41]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 414, Memorandum From the Assistant to the President's Military Representative (Parrott) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, September 6, 1962, identifying Parrott's office. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d414
[^42]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 143-144, on the February 20, 1962 six-phase schedule and Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975, pp. 104-107. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^43]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 144, on Operation Bounty, citing Craig's memorandum to Lansdale of January 30, 1962 and Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975, p. 26. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^44]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 310, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin), Washington, March 6, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
[^45]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba," memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, March 13, 1962, National Security Archive, Operation Northwoods documents. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/index.htm
[^46]: Martin, David C., Associated Press, "Plan to Slay Castro Tied to JFK Orders," *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1975. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP90-01208R000100160011-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-01208r000100160011-4
[^47]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 161-163, on Lansdale's memorandum of August 13, 1962, Harvey's memorandum to Helms of August 14, and the August 10, 1962 meeting. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^48]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 366, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the CIA Operations Officer (Harvey), Washington, August 6, 1962, "CIA Draft Operational Plan B+." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d366
[^49]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 378, Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, August 16, 1962, prepared by McCone. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d378
[^50]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 148, citing Harvey's testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81, on the agent teams and McCone's order, and citing Lansdale's memorandum for the record of October 30, 1962 on the halt. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^51]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, chronology, p. 293, "November: Operation MONGOOSE ends." https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^52]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. CIA reading room document 01228805. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
[^53]: Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA*. Simon & Schuster, 1995.
[^54]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Lansdale Mission to Vietnam," August 1965, participants including Unger, Lansdale, Rostow, Colby and Bohannan. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420030-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01580r001603420030-5
[^55]: Congressional Record, 89th Congress, August 1965, remarks of Rep. Claude Pepper extending remarks with a Washington Post item of August 20, 1965, on Lansdale's appointment as special assistant to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000300430053-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000300430053-0
[^56]: *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. II, pp. 126-130, on Lansdale's arrival in Vietnam in 1965 and the four requests from Diem. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapers025197
[^57]: *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. II, pp. 364-366, on Lodge's announcement in late August 1965 of Lansdale as chairman of the U.S. Mission liaison group to the GVN CRCC. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapers025197
[^58]: *New York World Journal Tribune*, March 26, 1967, on Lansdale's title and position in the U.S. Embassy. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000300430002-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000300430002-6
[^59]: Prouty, L. Fletcher. "Building to the Final Confrontation: John F. Kennedy vs. the CIA," *Freedom*, July 1986, on the Fort Gordon trip of November 1, 1960 and the "Mao doctrine." https://archive.org/details/building-to-the-final-confrontation-john-f.-kennedy-vs.-the-cia-by-l.-fletcher-p
[^60]: Prouty, L. Fletcher. *JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy*. Carol Publishing Group, 1992, chapters on the Kennedy-era covert programs and on the assassination. https://archive.org/details/jfkciavietnamplo0000prou_r5p5

3
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Henry A. Kissinger.md
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@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ relations:
start: 1986-07-01
end: 1988-06-30
fn: 65
---
Henry Alfred Kissinger (1923 to 2023) was a German-born American political scientist and diplomat who served as [[United States Secretary of State]] and as National Security Advisor under Presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Gerald R. Ford]]. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that in the fall of 1967, while a [[Harvard University]] professor and consultant on [[Vietnam]] to the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration, Kissinger visited [[Tel Aviv]] to teach for a week at the Israeli Defense College, and that at the end of that course he went to [[William N. Dale]]'s office in the embassy and sent an urgent, top-secret message to the [[White House]] warning about [[Dimona]] and concluding that [[Israel]] was making nuclear warheads.[^1]
@ -281,7 +280,7 @@ Gonzalez also reported that Eagleburger was at a meeting between the bank's mana
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's December 1992 report on [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] by [[John Kerry]] and [[Hank Brown]] devotes its chapter 20 to Kissinger Associates. It states that from the fall of 1986 through early 1989 BCCI initiated contacts with the firm, which then had five partners (Kissinger, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Alan Stoga and T. Jefferson Cunningham III); that Stoga and a retired Brazilian ambassador working as a Kissinger Associates consultant, Sergio Correa da Costa, explored ways to link BCCI's banks with the firm's services; and that the discussions "ended in early 1989 at Henry Kissinger's personal insistence," after which Kissinger Associates referred BCCI to its director William D. Rogers and the law firm [[Arnold & Porter]]. Letters of November 3, 1986 set da Costa's terms at $40,000 a year plus 10 to 20 percent of fees on transactions he arranged, and da Costa told Kissinger in them that he would also work for BCCI. In the summer of 1987 da Costa wrote to the firm about "that amusing luncheon with the BNL crowd." On September 20, 1987 da Costa invited Kissinger to a dinner at the plantation of the BCCI shareholder [[Ghaith Pharaon]], suggesting Pharaon as a client; the report states that Kissinger declined the invitation.[^66]
In a letter of January 30, 1992 to Kerry, the firm's attorney [[Lloyd Cutler]] wrote that Kissinger Associates "have never represented or provided any services for BCCI, ICIC, or any BCCI shareholder." The committee wrote that the account "is not untrue" but "does fail to characterize the full extent of the contacts," and that the firm refused to provide its client list to the subcommittee.[^66] A note by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists on the copy of the report published by that organization states that Hank Brown, "reportedly acting at the behest of Henry Kissinger," pressed after its release for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in chapter 20, so that the Government Printing Office edition differs slightly from the committee's softcopy.[^66]
In a letter of January 30, 1992 to Kerry, the firm's attorney [[Lloyd Cutler]] wrote that Kissinger Associates "have never represented or provided any services for BCCI, ICIC, or any BCCI shareholder." The committee's electronic text, published by the Federation of American Scientists, adds the comment that the account "is not untrue" but "does fail to characterize the full extent of the contacts"; the Government Printing Office print omits that comment, and both editions record that the firm declined to provide its client list to the subcommittee. The printed chapter says the contacts "extended over a period of 2 years" and adds a paragraph stating that "in each case reviewed by the Subcommittee, Kissinger declined the overtures."[^66] A note by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists on the copy of the report published by that organization states that Hank Brown, "reportedly acting at the behest of Henry Kissinger," pressed after its release for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in chapter 20, so that the Government Printing Office edition differs slightly from the committee's softcopy.[^66]
### Telephone Transcripts

9
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Michael Milken.md
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@ -5,16 +5,17 @@ tags:
- IranContra
- CIA
- Israel
summary: "Large amounts of money from the arms sales to Iran were funneled through American banks and held at Drexel Burnham, contributing to Milken's firm's stature and its ability to underwrite huge quantities of junk bonds."
summary: "According to Ari Ben-Menashe, money from the arms sales to Iran was held at Drexel Burnham, adding to Milken's firm's ability to underwrite junk bonds."
born: 1946-07-04
location: "Encino, California, USA"
---
[[Michael Milken]] was a prominent stockbroker known for building his junk-bond fortune at the brokerage house [[Drexel Burnham]]. His activities intersected with the financial operations of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]'s slush fund.
[[Michael Milken]] was a prominent stockbroker known for building his junk-bond fortune at the brokerage house [[Drexel Burnham]]. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], his activities intersected with the financial operations of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]'s slush fund.
Large amounts of money from the arms sales to [[Iran]] were funneled through [[United States|American]] banks and held at [[Drexel Burnham]], contributing to Milken's firm's stature and its ability to underwrite huge quantities of junk bonds. These deposits were managed on behalf of [[Israel|Israeli]] front companies.[^1]
Ben-Menashe wrote that large amounts of money from the arms sales to [[Iran]] were funneled through [[United States|American]] banks and held at Drexel Burnham, contributing to Milken's firm's stature and its ability to underwrite huge quantities of junk bonds, and that these deposits were managed on behalf of [[Israel|Israeli]] front companies.[^1]
In 1987, the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] decided to withdraw its funds from Drexel, a decision that contributed to Milken's growing troubles and ultimately to the fall of Drexel Burnham.[^1]
He wrote that in 1987 the Iran-Israel Joint Committee decided to withdraw its funds from Drexel, a decision that contributed to Milken's growing troubles and ultimately to the fall of Drexel Burnham.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

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@ -8,15 +8,16 @@ tags:
summary: "Colonel Mohammed Jalali was the Defense Minister of Iran."
---
Colonel [[Mohammed Jalali]] was the Defense Minister of [[Iran]]. He was a key figure in the [[Iran|Iranian]] government's arms procurement during the [[Iran-Iraq War]] and had direct dealings with [[Israel|Israeli]] and [[United States|U.S.]] officials.[^1]
Colonel [[Mohammed Jalali]] was the Defense Minister of [[Iran]]. He was a key figure in the Iranian government's arms procurement during the [[Iran-Iraq War]] and had direct dealings with [[Israel|Israeli]] and [[United States|U.S.]] officials.[^1]
[[Mohammed Jalali|Jalali]] worked with the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Israeli Joint Committee]] and was involved in negotiations for arms sales to [[Iran]]. In July 1987, he met with [[Robert Gates]] in [[Kansas City]] to seek assurances that arms supplies to [[Iran]] would continue despite the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] scandal. He also expressed concern about the [[United States|U.S.]] supporting the supply of chemical weapons to [[Iraq]].[^1]
According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], Jalali worked with the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Israeli Joint Committee]] and was involved in negotiations for arms sales to Iran, and in July 1987 he met with [[Robert Gates]] in [[Kansas City]] to seek assurances that arms supplies to Iran would continue despite the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] scandal. He also expressed concern about the U.S. supporting the supply of chemical weapons to [[Iraq]].[^1]
In late 1985, [[Mohammed Jalali|Jalali]] was part of a faction within the [[Iran|Iranian]] Supreme Council that was loyal to [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani|Hojjat El-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani]]. He opposed the [[Oliver North|North]]-[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] second channel for arms sales to [[Iran]], and [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani|Rafsanjani]] assured [[Israel|Israel]] that there would be no sales through these new people.[^1]
In late 1985, Jalali was part of a faction within the Iranian Supreme Council that was loyal to [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani|Hojjat El-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani]]. He opposed the [[Oliver North|North]]-[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] second channel for arms sales to Iran, and Rafsanjani assured Israel that there would be no sales through these new people.[^1]
[[Mohammed Jalali|Jalali]] was involved in the deal concerning the three [[C-130]] aircraft. He requested these planes in exchange for the release of three [[Israel|Israeli]] soldiers held in [[Lebanon]]. He also pushed for the payment to [[Chile]] for [[F-5E Tiger-2|F-5E]] aircraft and was in favor of leaking to the press that [[Iran]] was in business with [[Santiago]].[^1]
Jalali was involved in the deal concerning the three [[C-130]] aircraft. He requested these planes in exchange for the release of three Israeli soldiers held in [[Lebanon]]. He also pushed for the payment to [[Chile]] for [[F-5E Tiger-2|F-5E]] aircraft and was in favor of leaking to the press that Iran was in business with [[Santiago]].[^1]
[[Mohammed Jalali|Jalali]] is mentioned as being retired and living in [[Iran]] with a second home in [[London]] as of 1992.[^1]
Jalali is mentioned as being retired and living in Iran with a second home in [[London]] as of 1992.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

9
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Moshe Hebroni.md
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@ -5,13 +5,14 @@ tags:
summary: "Major Moshe Hebroni was the chief of staff for the director of Israeli Military Intelligence, Yehoshua Sagi."
---
Major [[Moshe Hebroni]] was the chief of staff for the director of [[Mossad]], [[Yehoshua Sagi]]. He was a member of the initial [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].[^1]
Major [[Moshe Hebroni]] was the chief of staff for the director of Israeli Military Intelligence, [[Yehoshua Sagi]]. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], he was a member of the initial [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].[^1]
[[Moshe Hebroni|Hebroni]] was involved in expediting the export license for tires sold to [[Iran]] in April 1980. He also received a call from [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] regarding [[Sayeed Mehdi Kashani|Kashani's]] request for military aid from [[Israel]], and instructed [[Ari Ben-Menashe|Ben-Menashe]] to bring [[Sayeed Mehdi Kashani|Kashani]] directly to the general headquarters of [[Israel|IDF]]/MI.[^1]
Hebroni was involved in expediting the export license for tires sold to [[Iran]] in April 1980. He also received a call from Ari Ben-Menashe regarding [[Sayeed Mehdi Kashani|Kashani's]] request for military aid from [[Israel]], and instructed Ben-Menashe to bring Kashani directly to the general headquarters of IDF/MI.[^1]
[[Moshe Hebroni|Hebroni]] was the duty officer who received the letter from [[Pierre Gemayel]] to [[Ariel Sharon]] warning of the impending [[Sabra and Shatila massacres]]. He made copies of the letter and informed [[Yehoshua Sagi|Sagi]]. After the massacres, [[Moshe Hebroni|Hebroni]] was allowed to spend three months as head of branch in the External Relations Department, a period during which he could remove any documentation that might implicate him and [[Yehoshua Sagi|Sagi]] in the massacres.[^1]
Hebroni was the duty officer who received the letter from [[Pierre Gemayel]] to [[Ariel Sharon]] warning of the impending [[Sabra and Shatila massacres]]. He made copies of the letter and informed Sagi. After the massacres, Hebroni was allowed to spend three months as head of branch in the External Relations Department, a period during which he could remove any documentation that might implicate him and Sagi in the massacres.[^1]
[[Moshe Hebroni|Hebroni]] later worked for the [[Jewish Agency]] and was an unofficial adviser to [[Yitzhak Shamir]] after leaving [[Mossad]] in 1989. He confirmed [[Ari Ben-Menashe|Ben-Menashe's]] access to highly sensitive intelligence material.[^1]
Hebroni later worked for the [[Jewish Agency]] and was an unofficial adviser to [[Yitzhak Shamir]] after leaving [[Mossad]] in 1989. He confirmed Ben-Menashe's access to highly sensitive intelligence material.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Central Intelligence Agency]]"
role: "acting director"
fn: 7
fn: 8
---
Richard J. Kerr served as Acting [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Director. In 1991, he confirmed that the agency had used [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] to move money around the world.[^1]
@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ Richard J. Kerr served as Acting [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Director. In 19
Kerr appeared before Senator [[John Kerry]]'s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations on October 25, 1991, to discuss the CIA's knowledge of BCCI's activities.[^2] He stated that the CIA had not been involved with a BCCI "black network" of thugs and assassins, nor had it used BCCI for arms sales to [[Iran]] or diversion of funds for the [[Nicaraguan Contras]].[^3] He also denied that the CIA had a relationship with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] or had placed him on a watch list.[^4]
Despite these denials, Kerr admitted that the CIA did maintain accounts with BCCI, describing them as normal operational accounts.[^5] The [[Kerry Committee|Kerry subcommittee]]'s report suggested that [[William J. Casey]]'s actions, including any role in the [[Iran-Contra Affair]], were undertaken in his position as an adviser to the President, rather than as Director of the CIA, allowing them to be undocumented and deniable.[^6]
Despite these denials, Kerr admitted that the CIA did maintain accounts with BCCI, describing them as normal operational accounts.[^5] The Kerry-Brown report states that he acknowledged the agency's extensive use of First American as a repository for "normal banking" and savings accounts.[^6] The [[Kerry Committee|Kerry subcommittee]]'s report suggested that [[William J. Casey]]'s actions, including any role in the [[Iran-Contra Affair]], were undertaken in his position as an adviser to the President, rather than as Director of the CIA, allowing them to be undocumented and deniable.[^7]
### Testimony
Kerr first spoke publicly on BCCI on August 2, 1991. In open testimony on October 25, 1991, he told the subcommittee: "As an intelligence officer for 30 years, I find myself a little reluctant in an open hearing to talk about intelligence, intelligence sources, and intelligence methods." The subcommittee learned from him that the agency had produced not two memoranda on BCCI but hundreds, disseminated to other agencies, and that it had told the [[United States Department of the Treasury|Treasury]] of BCCI's secret ownership of [[First American Bank]] in 1985. In closed session the following week he acknowledged that several questions he had refused to answer in public did not concern classified information, but that he had been "uncomfortable discussing information in public that might embarrass the [[United States]], or any U.S. agency or official."[^7]
Kerr first spoke publicly on BCCI on August 2, 1991. In open testimony on October 25, 1991, he told the subcommittee: "As an intelligence officer for 30 years, I find myself a little reluctant in an open hearing to talk about intelligence, intelligence sources, and intelligence methods." The subcommittee learned from him that the agency had produced not two memoranda on BCCI but hundreds, disseminated to other agencies, and that it had told the [[United States Department of the Treasury|Treasury]] of BCCI's secret ownership of [[First American Bank]] in 1985. In closed session the following week he acknowledged that several questions he had refused to answer in public did not concern classified information, but that he had been "uncomfortable discussing information in public that might embarrass the [[United States]], or any U.S. agency or official."[^8]
He described the agency's use of BCCI for intelligence gathering as "limited and routine, and undertaken without the knowledge of any person at BCCI," a characterization a [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|Senate Intelligence Committee]] audit confirmed according to a briefing given to subcommittee staff, and acknowledged that the agency had made "extensive use of First American" for "normal banking" and savings accounts, which neither [[Clark Clifford]] nor [[Robert Altman]] had known of before the summer of 1991. He testified that "allegations that the Agency had any direct or indirect relationship with Abedi or recruited him for CIA activities are absolutely baseless." The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] found that the official record he presented was "by and large, accurately represented," but contained gaps concerning [[Kamal Adham]], [[A. R. (Abdul Raouf) Khalil|Abdul Raouf Khalil]] and [[Adnan Khashoggi]] "which strain belief."[^7]
He described the agency's use of BCCI for intelligence gathering as "limited and routine, and undertaken without the knowledge of any person at BCCI," a characterization a [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|Senate Intelligence Committee]] audit confirmed according to a briefing given to subcommittee staff, and acknowledged that the agency had made "extensive use of First American" for "normal banking" and savings accounts, which neither [[Clark Clifford]] nor [[Robert Altman]] had known of before the summer of 1991. He testified that "allegations that the Agency had any direct or indirect relationship with Abedi or recruited him for CIA activities are absolutely baseless." The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] found that the official record he presented was "by and large, accurately represented," but contained gaps concerning [[Kamal Adham]], [[A. R. (Abdul Raouf) Khalil|Abdul Raouf Khalil]] and [[Adnan Khashoggi]] "which strain belief."[^8]
### Footnotes
@ -34,5 +34,6 @@ He described the agency's use of BCCI for intelligence gathering as "limited and
[^3]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 348.
[^4]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 348.
[^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
[^6]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 348.
[^7]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
[^6]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 11, p. 292. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
[^7]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 348.
[^8]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm

2
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Robert Kennedy.md
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@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ On March 16, 1964, Branch 4 of the Covert Action Staff requested covert security
A [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] deportation sent [[Carlos Marcello]] to [[Guatemala]] on April 4, 1961. A May 24, 1961 [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] memorandum from R. O. Lallier to A. H. Belmont, reporting a May 12 interview in Guatemala City, records the account of [[Paul Loeb]], chief of the CIA station there. Loeb said it was his understanding that Attorney General Kennedy had conferred with [[Allen Dulles]] and asked for the CIA director's help in making certain Guatemala accepted Marcello as a citizen, and that he received instructions from headquarters to give the matter special handling. Loeb said he then approached President [[Miguel Ydigoras]], who insisted that the matter be handled quietly, and that he was at the airport when Marcello arrived on a U.S. Border Patrol plane to find 15 to 20 reporters waiting. According to the memorandum, Marcello was to be returned to the United States on or about May 10 but did not appear at the airport, and Loeb was convinced he was living on a farm in the interior of Guatemala.[^10]
On November 1, 1961, the White House aide [[Richard Goodwin]] wrote to President Kennedy that "the Attorney General would be the most effective commander" of a "command operation" for Cuba. After a White House meeting on November 3, 1961 on a new program against [[Fidel Castro]], Kennedy's handwritten notes read: "My idea is to stir things up on island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run & operated by Cubans themselves with every group but Batistaites & Communists." A presidential memorandum of November 22 assigned the direction of the program to the Attorney General, with [[Edward Lansdale]] as his chief of operations; the version issued on November 30 placed the program "under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations," and assigned the Attorney General no direction role.[^11]
On November 1, 1961, the White House aide [[Richard Goodwin]] wrote to President Kennedy that "the Attorney General would be the most effective commander" of a "command operation" for Cuba. After a White House meeting on November 3, 1961 on a new program against [[Fidel Castro]], Kennedy's handwritten notes read: "My idea is to stir things up on island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run & operated by Cubans themselves with every group but Batistaites & Communists." The notes list [[Edward Lansdale]] among those present as "Lansdale (the Ugly American)," record McNamara saying that he would make Lansdale available, and record Robert Kennedy assigning him "to make survey of situation in Cuba."[^11] A presidential memorandum of November 22 assigned the direction of the program to the Attorney General, with Edward Lansdale as his chief of operations; the version issued on November 30 placed the program "under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations," and assigned the Attorney General no direction role.[^11]
The program, [[Operation Mongoose]], was overseen by a group called the Special Group (Augmented) ([[NSC Special Group|Special Group (Augmented)]]), consisting of the regular Special Group members ([[McGeorge Bundy]], [[U. Alexis Johnson]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], [[John McCone]] and [[Lyman Lemnitzer]]) augmented by Robert Kennedy and General [[Maxwell Taylor]]. President Kennedy appointed Taylor chairman of the group. The State Department editors of the Foreign Relations series wrote that Robert Kennedy "was the principal motive force within the group and the informal link between the group and the President," and the [[Church Committee]] wrote that Kennedy "played an active role in the MONGOOSE Operation, a role unrelated to his position as Attorney General."[^11][^12] The Church Committee also records Goodwin's proposal that Kennedy head Mongoose and the President's decision to give Lansdale the coordinating task instead.[^12]

38
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Robert McFarlane.md
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
- Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane
- Robert Carl McFarlane
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-12
updated: 2026-10-14
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- KeyFigure
@ -47,14 +47,14 @@ relations:
start: 1984
end: 1986-11
role: "organized third-country Contra funding, an early advocate of the Iran arms sales, and led the May 1986 mission to Tehran"
fn: 8
fn: 12
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
reverse: true
start: 1988-03-11
end: 1992-12-24
role: "pleaded guilty March 11, 1988 to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress; sentenced March 3, 1989; pardoned December 24, 1992"
fn: 10
fn: 14
---
Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a [[United States Naval Academy|Naval Academy]] graduate and Marine Corps officer who served as President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s national security adviser from October 1983 to December 1985. Before that he had been deputy to his predecessor [[William Clark]], counselor to Secretary of State [[Alexander Haig]], a staff member of the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]], and military aide to [[Henry Kissinger]] when Kissinger was national security adviser to [[Richard Nixon]]. He commanded the first U.S. Marine battery to land in the Republic of [[Vietnam]], completed two tours, received a Bronze Star, and resigned from the [[United States Marine Corps]] as a lieutenant colonel.[^1] [[Lawrence Walsh]]'s Final Report records that under Reagan the [[National Security Council]] staff "at times became operational, taking on primary responsibility for the execution of the [[Iran]] and contra covert operations," and that McFarlane "did not shrink from the operational tasks that were of high personal interest to the President," delegating some of them to his deputy director of political-military affairs, [[Oliver North]].[^1]
@ -72,11 +72,13 @@ The writer [[Gary Webb]] reported that in January 1985, as the [[FDN]] spent its
McFarlane received North's written reports throughout 1985. Walsh lists six "problem documents" that the NSC general counsel [[Paul Thompson]] pulled from the NSC's System IV file in August 1985 after Representatives [[Michael Barnes]] and [[Lee Hamilton]] asked about press reports of North's activity: a December 4, 1984 memorandum on Chinese SA-7 missiles shipped under false [[Guatemala|Guatemalan]] end-user certificates and on a British security expert for Calero; a February 6, 1985 memorandum proposing that the Nicaraguan merchant ship Monimbo be seized or sunk; a March 5, 1985 memorandum on compensating Guatemala; a March 16, 1985 "Fallback Plan" in which McFarlane marked an additional $25 to $30 million from the Saudis "doubtful"; an April 11, 1985 memorandum reporting that Contra strength had grown from 9,500 to more than 16,000; and a May 31, 1985 memorandum on the delivery of lethal supplies.[^1] On October 30, 1985 North's "Reconnaissance Overflights" memorandum, which told McFarlane that the intelligence would be air-dropped with two Honduran recoilless rifles to sink arms carriers, was marked by [[John Poindexter]] "President approved."[^1]
On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote Hamilton that "at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law" and that "we did not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary activities either from Americans or third parties"; his September 12 letter to Barnes and an October 7 reply to Hamilton's questions said North had not "used his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies." On October 17, 1985 he showed Barnes a stack of NSC documents that could not leave the White House; Barnes did not take up the offer, and McFarlane did not answer his request of October 29 for the documents.[^1] North's secretary [[Fawn Hall]] later altered five of the six documents in November 1986.[^1] Asked at North's 1989 trial whether he lied to Congress, McFarlane said: "At the time I didn't believe it but at the time I was wrong and I admit that," and explained that "you don't lie. You put your own interpretation on what the truth is."[^1]
On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote Hamilton that "at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law" and that "we did not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary activities either from Americans or third parties"; his September 12 letter to Barnes and an October 7 reply to Hamilton's questions said North had not "used his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies."[^7] On October 17, 1985 he showed Barnes a stack of NSC documents that could not leave the White House; Barnes did not take up the offer, and McFarlane did not answer his request of October 29 for the documents.[^1] North's secretary [[Fawn Hall]] later altered five of the six documents in November 1986.[^1] Asked at North's 1989 trial whether he lied to Congress, McFarlane said: "At the time I didn't believe it but at the time I was wrong and I admit that," and explained that "you don't lie. You put your own interpretation on what the truth is."[^1]
Walsh wrote that McFarlane "decided to lie about North's activities in a series of letters to Barnes and Hamilton in September-October 1985."[^8] McFarlane told the Iran-Contra committees that he interpreted the Boland Amendment "that the NSC was not to itself get involved in military or paramilitary activities or replicating the CIA function in those domains," and at the public hearings said: "If we felt that we were not covered, what was I doing?"[^9] On December 10, 1986, answering questions from Representative [[Dick Cheney]] before the House Intelligence Committee, McFarlane testified that in the summer of 1985 he "went to considerable length to determine whether" North had violated the Boland Amendment; the committees wrote that he withheld his concerns about the documents he had reviewed.[^10]
### The Iran initiative, 1985 to 1986
McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^7] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^6][^8]
McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^11] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^6][^12]
On July 3, 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.[^1][^6] Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of [[Charles Hill]], Weinberger and Chief of Staff [[Donald Regan]] obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.[^1] Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.[^1]
@ -84,19 +86,19 @@ McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calli
### Exposure, plea and pardon
After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^9]
After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^13]
On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^10] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^11] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^10]
On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^14] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^15] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^14]
### Esquire article and lawsuit
In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^12] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^12]
In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^16] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^16]
McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^12] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^12]
McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^16] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^16]
### Death
McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^9]
McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^13]
### Footnotes
@ -106,9 +108,13 @@ McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his
[^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it."
[^6]: Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., *Report of the Congressional Committees*, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
[^8]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
[^9]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
[^10]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^11]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
[^12]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json
[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 1, nn. 60-62 (letters of Sept. 5, Sept. 12 and Oct. 7, 1985); ch. 2; ch. 4, nn. 57-58; part III. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
[^8]: Walsh, vol. I, part I, nn. 17-18. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
[^9]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 400 and nn. 48, 66.
[^10]: Iran-Contra report, majority views, ch. 6, p. 132 and nn. 193-194.
[^11]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
[^12]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
[^13]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^15]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
[^16]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json

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10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/William Harvey.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-14
title: William Harvey
aliases:
- Bill Harvey
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ relations:
with: "[[CIA Rome Station]]"
role: "chief of station"
start: 1963
fn: 36
fn: 38
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation Gold]]"
role: "Berlin base chief running the tunnel with MI6"
@ -140,57 +140,59 @@ Martin wrote that Lansdale told the Senate committee that [[John F. Kennedy]] ha
On August 13, 1962 Lansdale directed Harvey to include an option for the "liquidation of leaders" in a proposed Phase II plan for Mongoose.[^24] Harvey's memorandum of August 14 to Richard Helms attached Lansdale's memorandum with the words excised, and stated that the Special Group (Augmented) "is not expecting any written comments or study on this point."[^24] McCone said that McNamara agreed Lansdale's memorandum should be withdrawn.[^24] Harvey's August 14 memorandum to Helms recorded: "It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record." McCone's April 14, 1967 memorandum to Helms states that McCone took immediate exception to a suggestion to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro.[^26] [[Walter Elder]], McCone's executive assistant, testified that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposition to assassination after the August 10 meeting.[^27]
On August 6, 1962 Lansdale, as chief of operations, replied to Harvey's draft operational plan. He wrote that, "As requested by you in our meeting Monday afternoon, I have read your draft operational plan," and that he "found little basis to say that these were either additional or possible within the context of contributing to the mission as stated." He questioned three items, among them the suggestion that the CIA could generate strikes inside Cuba ("If we have no assets inside Cuba, then why is this now called a possibility?"), and asked Harvey to initial each item he believed was really possible.[^28] On August 16, after that day's meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), Lansdale sent Harvey a memorandum headed "Actions by Cuban Refugees." It said that the Phase II program should give full attention to the desirability of the Cubans liberating Cuba with United States help, and that Bundy had requested that this field of effort be made part of the Phase II guidelines; it proposed that Harvey designate his deputy, Bruce Cheever, to be responsible for the CIA's action. A typed note attached to the copy states that General Taylor asked that action be withheld on the memorandum until further word from him.[^29]
### Roselli and the Poison Pills
On November 16, 1961, Bissell asked Harvey to take over the gambling-syndicate operation from [[Sheffield Edwards]], and they discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE program to Cuba."[^28] Bissell testified that the operation was not reactivated until after he left the agency in February 1962.[^28]
On November 16, 1961, Bissell asked Harvey to take over the gambling-syndicate operation from [[Sheffield Edwards]], and they discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE program to Cuba."[^30] Bissell testified that the operation was not reactivated until after he left the agency in February 1962.[^30]
In early April 1962 Harvey, who testified that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms, asked Edwards to put him in touch with [[Johnny Roselli]]. A 1976 CIA memorandum dates Harvey's taking over as case officer to May 1962.[^29] Harvey told Roselli to stop dealing with [[Robert Maheu]] and [[Sam Giancana]], whom Harvey had decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus."[^28]
In early April 1962 Harvey, who testified that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms, asked Edwards to put him in touch with [[Johnny Roselli]]. A 1976 CIA memorandum dates Harvey's taking over as case officer to May 1962.[^31] Harvey told Roselli to stop dealing with [[Robert Maheu]] and [[Sam Giancana]], whom Harvey had decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus."[^30]
Four poison pills were given to the support chief on April 18, 1962. Harvey arrived in [[Miami]] on April 21 and gave them to Roselli, who was already in touch with the same Cuban who had been involved in the pill passage before the [[Bay of Pigs invasion|Bay of Pigs]].[^28] Harvey procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar costing about $5,000. Harvey and the chief of the JM/WAVE station rented a truck under an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot, where the keys were given to Roselli.[^28]
Four poison pills were given to the support chief on April 18, 1962. Harvey arrived in [[Miami]] on April 21 and gave them to Roselli, who was already in touch with the same Cuban who had been involved in the pill passage before the [[Bay of Pigs invasion|Bay of Pigs]].[^30] Harvey procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar costing about $5,000. Harvey and the chief of the JM/WAVE station rented a truck under an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot, where the keys were given to Roselli.[^30]
Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. Harvey testified that by then he had grave doubts that the operation would take place. In early January 1963 he paid Roselli $2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses. The second three-man team never left for Cuba, the reason given being that "conditions" in Cuba were not right.[^28] Harvey ended the operation in mid-February 1963 at a meeting with Roselli in [[Los Angeles]].[^28]
Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. Harvey testified that by then he had grave doubts that the operation would take place. In early January 1963 he paid Roselli $2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses. The second three-man team never left for Cuba, the reason given being that "conditions" in Cuba were not right.[^30] Harvey ended the operation in mid-February 1963 at a meeting with Roselli in [[Los Angeles]].[^30]
In early 1963 Harvey told his underworld contacts that the CIA was no longer interested in assassinating Castro. The FBI learned of this in June 1963.[^30]
In early 1963 Harvey told his underworld contacts that the CIA was no longer interested in assassinating Castro. The FBI learned of this in June 1963.[^32]
Harvey's operations involving Roselli began in early 1962 and ended in February 1963. Harvey, and to a lesser extent [[James O'Connell]], remained in contact with Roselli from 1964 to about 1970.[^29]
Harvey's operations involving Roselli began in early 1962 and ended in February 1963. Harvey, and to a lesser extent [[James O'Connell]], remained in contact with Roselli from 1964 to about 1970.[^31]
In June 1963, before Harvey went on another assignment, he and Roselli had a farewell dinner. The FBI observed the meeting, and [[Sam Papich]], the FBI liaison with the CIA, told Harvey that Hoover would be informed. Harvey told Helms of the incident, and Helms agreed that McCone need not be briefed unless a call from Hoover was expected.[^31]
In June 1963, before Harvey went on another assignment, he and Roselli had a farewell dinner. The FBI observed the meeting, and [[Sam Papich]], the FBI liaison with the CIA, told Harvey that Hoover would be informed. Harvey told Helms of the incident, and Helms agreed that McCone need not be briefed unless a call from Hoover was expected.[^33]
The [[House Select Committee on Assassinations]], which described Harvey in June 1963 as "chief of the CIA's Cuban Task Force," found it "unable to accept" the conclusion that the CIA-Mafia plots were irrelevant because they ended in February 1963, and reported that CIA files show Roselli continued to maintain direct contact with Harvey at least until 1967.[^32]
The [[House Select Committee on Assassinations]], which described Harvey in June 1963 as "chief of the CIA's Cuban Task Force," found it "unable to accept" the conclusion that the CIA-Mafia plots were irrelevant because they ended in February 1963, and reported that CIA files show Roselli continued to maintain direct contact with Harvey at least until 1967.[^34]
In 1967 Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling at the [[Friars Club]] in [[Beverly Hills, California|Beverly Hills]]. He asked Harvey, who had left the agency, to represent him. Harvey contacted the agency and suggested that it prevent the prosecution, according to a December 11, 1967 memorandum by [[Howard Osborn]].[^33]
In 1967 Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling at the [[Friars Club]] in [[Beverly Hills, California|Beverly Hills]]. He asked Harvey, who had left the agency, to represent him. Harvey contacted the agency and suggested that it prevent the prosecution, according to a December 11, 1967 memorandum by [[Howard Osborn]].[^35]
### The Clash with Robert Kennedy and the Missile Crisis
Harvey and [[Robert Kennedy]] were openly at odds over Mongoose. Thomas wrote that Harvey regarded Kennedy's micromanagement of the operations as incompetent and dangerous, and that Kennedy regarded Harvey as insubordinate and unreliable.[^1] Harvey testified that during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] he gave an order sending agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. He said that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that McCone then ordered the agent operations stopped.[^34] Walter Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, described the episode as Harvey having "earned another black mark as not being fully under control," and said that Harvey had attempted to get guidance from top officials during the crisis.[^34]
Harvey and [[Robert Kennedy]] were openly at odds over Mongoose. Thomas wrote that Harvey regarded Kennedy's micromanagement of the operations as incompetent and dangerous, and that Kennedy regarded Harvey as insubordinate and unreliable.[^1] Harvey testified that during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] he gave an order sending agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. He said that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that McCone then ordered the agent operations stopped.[^36] Walter Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, described the episode as Harvey having "earned another black mark as not being fully under control," and said that Harvey had attempted to get guidance from top officials during the crisis.[^36]
Martin wrote that Kennedy tied off a series of questions to Harvey with "and I've got 10 minutes to hear the answer," and that when Harvey exceeded his time limit Kennedy walked out and Harvey kept talking.[^5] Martin quoted McCone: "When you take a plant supervisor and make him president of the company, it doesn't always work out," and wrote that Dulles is said to have remarked, "That fellow Harvey is a conspiratorial cop."[^5] Thomas wrote that Robert Kennedy demanded Harvey's removal.[^1]
### Rome and the End of Task Force W
[[Desmond FitzGerald]] replaced Harvey as chief of Task Force W in January 1963.[^35] It is unclear whether Harvey or FitzGerald conceived the plan to present Fidel Castro with a contaminated diving suit.[^35]
[[Desmond FitzGerald]] replaced Harvey as chief of Task Force W in January 1963.[^37] It is unclear whether Harvey or FitzGerald conceived the plan to present Fidel Castro with a contaminated diving suit.[^37]
Harvey was appointed chief of station at Rome, effective on or about June 30, 1963, to replace [[Francis I. G. Coleman]], who was scheduled to attend the [[National War College]].[^36] He took up the Rome post before the November 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy. Thomas wrote that Robert Kennedy had exiled Harvey to Rome.[^1] Martin wrote in The Washington Post that some attributed the appointment to a wish to keep Harvey out of the country and others to the Rome station's need of a shakeup, that Harvey was hospitalized, that Desmond FitzGerald cabled a report to Helms, that Helms ordered Harvey relieved, that an aide sent to carry out the order sat seven hours across from Harvey, who held a loaded revolver in his lap, and that Harvey was then placed in a unit studying countermeasures against electronic surveillance.[^5]
Harvey was appointed chief of station at Rome, effective on or about June 30, 1963, to replace [[Francis I. G. Coleman]], who was scheduled to attend the [[National War College]].[^38] He took up the Rome post before the November 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy. Thomas wrote that Robert Kennedy had exiled Harvey to Rome.[^1] Martin wrote in The Washington Post that some attributed the appointment to a wish to keep Harvey out of the country and others to the Rome station's need of a shakeup, that Harvey was hospitalized, that Desmond FitzGerald cabled a report to Helms, that Helms ordered Harvey relieved, that an aide sent to carry out the order sat seven hours across from Harvey, who held a loaded revolver in his lap, and that Harvey was then placed in a unit studying countermeasures against electronic surveillance.[^5]
### Testimony Before the Senate
Harvey testified before the Church Committee in executive session on June 25, 1975 and again on July 11, 1975. He signed an affidavit dated September 14, 1975.[^28] He told the committee that he had acted on explicit orders from Helms, and that he believed the 1962 assassination activity carried over from the period when Allen Dulles was Director, a belief he based on what Bissell had told him.[^18]
Harvey testified before the Church Committee in executive session on June 25, 1975 and again on July 11, 1975. He signed an affidavit dated September 14, 1975.[^30] He told the committee that he had acted on explicit orders from Helms, and that he believed the 1962 assassination activity carried over from the period when Allen Dulles was Director, a belief he based on what Bissell had told him.[^18]
Harvey said he had not informed the Special Group, or anyone outside the agency, that he had given the poison pills to Roselli. He said he did not brief McCone on the pills because he did not believe it was necessary.[^18]
### Retirement, Death and Aftermath
In April 1967 Harvey was to be transferred from the [[European Division]] to the Office of Personnel, where he would be carried in casual status until his final retirement, and his sick leave required a physician's monthly certification.[^37] By October 30, 1967 he had not yet set a retirement date, and retirement was expected on November 30.[^38] He retired from the agency in 1967.[^29]
In April 1967 Harvey was to be transferred from the [[European Division]] to the Office of Personnel, where he would be carried in casual status until his final retirement, and his sick leave required a physician's monthly certification.[^39] By October 30, 1967 he had not yet set a retirement date, and retirement was expected on November 30.[^40] He retired from the agency in 1967.[^31]
In November 1967, while leaving the agency to practice law, Harvey asked Sam Papich for reputable private investigators. Papich suggested [[Wackenhut Corporation]] or the [[Fidelifax]] Company, as Howard Osborn recorded in a memorandum of November 8, 1967.[^39]
In November 1967, while leaving the agency to practice law, Harvey asked Sam Papich for reputable private investigators. Papich suggested [[Wackenhut Corporation]] or the [[Fidelifax]] Company, as Howard Osborn recorded in a memorandum of November 8, 1967.[^41]
Roselli died in August 1976. On August 11, 1976 [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush]], then Director of Central Intelligence, wrote that calls to Senators had suggested that the CIA was involved in the murder, and that he had asked [[Edward Levi]] to bring the FBI into the case.[^40]
Roselli died in August 1976. On August 11, 1976 [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush]], then Director of Central Intelligence, wrote that calls to Senators had suggested that the CIA was involved in the murder, and that he had asked [[Edward Levi]] to bring the FBI into the case.[^42]
According to the 1976 obituary, Harvey moved to [[Indianapolis, Indiana|Indianapolis]] in 1969 after leaving the agency, and was law editor for [[Bobbs-Merrill]] at the time of his death.[^3]
Harvey died of a heart attack at an Indianapolis hospital on June 9, 1976, at the age of 60. He was buried at South Cemetery in Danville, Indiana, and was survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter and a son.[^3] A CIA memorandum of August 9, 1976 gives the same date, "9 June 1976."[^29] Martin wrote that surgeons had worked four hours to implant an artificial valve and that Harvey died, holding his wife's hand, at ten minutes past two in the afternoon of June 9.[^2] A June 1976 press report named Harvey among ten agents whose identities the Senate committee had disclosed, and said that [[William Colby]] had argued that disclosure endangered agents.[^3] A CIA routing memorandum of June 16, 1976 records that the agency's information on his death came from the press reports.[^41] Martin wrote that Harvey's wife told him reporters were trying to link his death to Roselli's murder, that there had been two attempted break-ins, and that people were "after his papers," to which she said she had "burned everything."[^5]
Harvey died of a heart attack at an Indianapolis hospital on June 9, 1976, at the age of 60. He was buried at South Cemetery in Danville, Indiana, and was survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter and a son.[^3] A CIA memorandum of August 9, 1976 gives the same date, "9 June 1976."[^31] Martin wrote that surgeons had worked four hours to implant an artificial valve and that Harvey died, holding his wife's hand, at ten minutes past two in the afternoon of June 9.[^2] A June 1976 press report named Harvey among ten agents whose identities the Senate committee had disclosed, and said that [[William Colby]] had argued that disclosure endangered agents.[^3] A CIA routing memorandum of June 16, 1976 records that the agency's information on his death came from the press reports.[^43] Martin wrote that Harvey's wife told him reporters were trying to link his death to Roselli's murder, that there had been two attempted break-ins, and that people were "after his papers," to which she said she had "burned everything."[^5]
In June 1977 Martin, an [[Associated Press]] correspondent, asked a retired agency employee for cooperation with a book about Harvey. The employee was irritated and believed that a retired CIA officer had given Martin his name.[^42]
In June 1977 Martin, an [[Associated Press]] correspondent, asked a retired agency employee for cooperation with a book about Harvey. The employee was irritated and believed that a retired CIA officer had given Martin his name.[^44]
### Footnotes
@ -221,18 +223,20 @@ In June 1977 Martin, an [[Associated Press]] correspondent, asked a retired agen
[^25]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 164, and Additional Views of Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., p. 321, quoting Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 29-30 and 86. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
[^26]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 371, Editorial Note on the August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), quoting Harvey's memorandum of August 14, 1962 and McCone's memorandum of April 14, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d371
[^27]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 107 (Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, on telling Helms of McCone's opposition after the August 10 meeting). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^28]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 83-85 (the 1961 assignment and the November 16, 1961 notes; the April 1962 reactivation and "explicit orders"; the poison pills of April 18 and 21, 1962; the $5,000 equipment and the rented truck; the September 1962 meetings; the $2,700 payment; the second team; the February 1963 termination), citing Harvey testimony of June 25 and July 11, 1975, and the affidavit of September 14, 1975. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Johnny Roselli," August 9, 1976. Reading room document 00508811, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00508811 (Harvey's operations from early 1962 to February 1963; Harvey as case officer from May 1962; Harvey and O'Connell in contact from 1964 to about 1970; Harvey retired in 1967).
[^30]: Church Committee, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Final Report Book V, S. Rept. 94-755, April 23, 1976, pp. 69, 72. https://archive.org/details/ChurchCommittee
[^31]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 105, citing Inspector General's report p. 54 (the June 1963 farewell dinner; FBI observation; Papich's notice to Harvey; Harvey's report to Helms). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^32]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, H. Rept. 95-1828, 1979, p. 117 (the committee's finding that the plots were not shown to be irrelevant; CIA files on contact with Harvey until 1967). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^33]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 86-87 (Osborn memorandum for the record, December 11, 1967). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^34]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 149 n. 1, citing Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81, and Walter Elder testimony of August 13, 1975, pp. 34-35. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^35]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 86-87 (FitzGerald replacing Harvey in January 1963; the diving-suit plan), citing Inspector General's report p. 75. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^36]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
[^37]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record "William K. Harvey," April 5, 1967. Reading room document 0001228917, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001228917
[^38]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record "William K. Harvey," October 30, 1967. Reading room document 0001228965, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001228965
[^39]: Osborn, Howard J. Memorandum for the record, November 8, 1967, JFK record 104-10133-10076. National Archives, JFK Assassination Records Collection.
[^40]: Bush, George, memorandum "The Death of Roselli," August 11, 1976. Reading room document 00508811, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00508811
[^41]: Central Intelligence Agency, routing and record memorandum, June 16, 1976, filed with the reading room copy of the June 1976 press report, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-00498a000600020001-2
[^42]: Central Intelligence Agency, routing and record sheet, "Mr. David Martin, Associated Press Correspondent's Interest in Writing a Book About Mr. William King Harvey," June 27, 1977. Reading room document 0001229025, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001229025
[^28]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 366, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey), Washington, August 6, 1962, subject "CIA Draft Operational Plan B+." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d366
[^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 377, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey), Washington, August 16, 1962, subject "Actions by Cuban Refugees." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d377
[^30]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 83-85 (the 1961 assignment and the November 16, 1961 notes; the April 1962 reactivation and "explicit orders"; the poison pills of April 18 and 21, 1962; the $5,000 equipment and the rented truck; the September 1962 meetings; the $2,700 payment; the second team; the February 1963 termination), citing Harvey testimony of June 25 and July 11, 1975, and the affidavit of September 14, 1975. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^31]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Johnny Roselli," August 9, 1976. Reading room document 00508811, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00508811 (Harvey's operations from early 1962 to February 1963; Harvey as case officer from May 1962; Harvey and O'Connell in contact from 1964 to about 1970; Harvey retired in 1967).
[^32]: Church Committee, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Final Report Book V, S. Rept. 94-755, April 23, 1976, pp. 69, 72. https://archive.org/details/ChurchCommittee
[^33]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 105, citing Inspector General's report p. 54 (the June 1963 farewell dinner; FBI observation; Papich's notice to Harvey; Harvey's report to Helms). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^34]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, H. Rept. 95-1828, 1979, p. 117 (the committee's finding that the plots were not shown to be irrelevant; CIA files on contact with Harvey until 1967). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^35]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 86-87 (Osborn memorandum for the record, December 11, 1967). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^36]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 149 n. 1, citing Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81, and Walter Elder testimony of August 13, 1975, pp. 34-35. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^37]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 86-87 (FitzGerald replacing Harvey in January 1963; the diving-suit plan), citing Inspector General's report p. 75. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^38]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
[^39]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record "William K. Harvey," April 5, 1967. Reading room document 0001228917, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001228917
[^40]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record "William K. Harvey," October 30, 1967. Reading room document 0001228965, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001228965
[^41]: Osborn, Howard J. Memorandum for the record, November 8, 1967, JFK record 104-10133-10076. National Archives, JFK Assassination Records Collection.
[^42]: Bush, George, memorandum "The Death of Roselli," August 11, 1976. Reading room document 00508811, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00508811
[^43]: Central Intelligence Agency, routing and record memorandum, June 16, 1976, filed with the reading room copy of the June 1976 press report, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-00498a000600020001-2
[^44]: Central Intelligence Agency, routing and record sheet, "Mr. David Martin, Associated Press Correspondent's Interest in Writing a Book About Mr. William King Harvey," June 27, 1977. Reading room document 0001229025, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001229025

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10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Amiram Nir.md
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@ -11,21 +11,31 @@ born: 1950-12-08
died: 1988-11-30
location: "Israel"
---
[[Amiram Nir]] was a former [[Israel|Israeli]] TV newsman and a counterterrorism adviser to [[Shimon Peres]]. He was originally a military officer in the tank corps and lost an eye in a training accident. He married [[Judy Moses]], the daughter of the owner of [[Yediot Ahronot]], a major [[Israel|Israeli]] newspaper chain.[^1]
[[Amiram Nir]] was a former [[Israel|Israeli]] TV newsman and a counterterrorism adviser to [[Shimon Peres]]. He was originally a military officer in the tank corps and lost an eye in a training accident. He married [[Judy Moses]], the daughter of the owner of [[Yediot Ahronot]], a major Israeli newspaper chain.[^1]
Nir resigned from his TV job to work as a public relations adviser for [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] during the 1981 elections. After [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] became prime minister in 1984, he appointed Nir as his counterterrorism adviser. Nir found documents related to [[Rafael Eitan|Eitan's]] [[United States|U.S.]] spy network and the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
Nir resigned from his TV job to work as a public relations adviser for Peres during the 1981 elections. After Peres became prime minister in 1984, he appointed Nir as his counterterrorism adviser. Nir found documents related to [[Rafael Eitan|Eitan's]] [[United States|U.S.]] spy network and the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
[[Shimon Peres|Peres]] and Nir faced challenges from the [[Likud Party]]-controlled intelligence community and the lack of financial power within the [[Labor Party]]. [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] decided to open a competing arms channel, run by Nir, to gain control over the profitable [[Iran]] arms sales and to undermine the existing intelligence-community channel. Nir, despite his lack of experience in intelligence or business, sought support from individuals like [[Al Schwimmer]] and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1]
A note of January 4, 1986 by [[Charles Hill]], a [[George P. Shultz|Shultz]] aide, records [[John Poindexter]] saying that Nir had come to see him to revive the hostage idea.[^2] The 1987 congressional report describes Nir as Peres's adviser on counterterrorism and lists, among the occasions on which Israel acted to keep the Iran initiative moving, "Nir's January 1986 proposal to keep the initiative moving forward at a time when U.S. interest appeared to be flagging."[^3]
Nir met with [[Robert McFarlane]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] and threatened him with exposure if he did not cooperate with the new channel. This led to [[Robert McFarlane|McFarlane]] connecting Nir with [[Oliver North]] and [[John Poindexter]] of the [[National Security Council]]. Nir, [[Oliver North|North]], and [[John Poindexter|Poindexter]] gained the support of [[William J. Casey]], then head of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], and [[George H.W. Bush]] tacitly ignored the operation.[^1]
Peres and Nir faced challenges from the [[Likud Party]]-controlled intelligence community and the lack of financial power within the [[Labor Party]]. Peres decided to open a competing arms channel, run by Nir, to gain control over the profitable Iran arms sales and to undermine the existing intelligence-community channel. Nir, despite his lack of experience in intelligence or business, sought support from individuals like [[Al Schwimmer]] and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1]
Nir's operation, however, struggled to make significant inroads into the arms trade. In April 1986, [[Oliver North|North]] initiated a sting operation, the [[Hashemi sting]], to discredit the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|original channel]] and its members. Nir was also involved in the leaking of the [[Jonathan Pollard]] story to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] to further undermine the [[Likud Party]]'s credibility.[^1]
Nir met with [[Robert McFarlane]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] and threatened him with exposure if he did not cooperate with the new channel. This led to McFarlane connecting Nir with [[Oliver North]] and John Poindexter of the [[National Security Council]]. Nir, North, and Poindexter gained the support of [[William J. Casey]], then head of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], and [[George H.W. Bush]] tacitly ignored the operation.[^1]
In May 1986, [[Oliver North|North]], [[Robert McFarlane|McFarlane]], and Nir traveled to [[Tehran]] disguised as Irish technicians, carrying [[TOW missile]]s and [[Hawk missile]] spare parts. They were detained, and the military equipment was confiscated. This incident, along with the delivery of outdated [[Hawk missile]]s with [[Israel|Israeli]] markings, effectively killed off the [[Iran]] end of the second channel.[^1]
Nir's operation, however, struggled to make significant inroads into the arms trade. In April 1986, North initiated a sting operation, the [[Hashemi sting]], to discredit the original channel and its members. Nir was also involved in the leaking of the [[Jonathan Pollard]] story to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] to further undermine the Likud Party's credibility.[^1]
[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] also faced problems with his plans for supplying the [[Contras]], as [[Yitzhak Rabin]] refused to cooperate. A mysterious $10 million contribution from the [[Sultan of Brunei]] to [[Oliver North|North's]] group, wired through [[Bruce Rappaport]], was leaked by the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee]], further exposing the second channel.[^1]
According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in May 1986 North, McFarlane, and Nir traveled to [[Tehran]] disguised as Irish technicians, carrying [[TOW missile]]s and [[Hawk missile]] spare parts, were detained, and had the military equipment confiscated. He wrote that this incident, along with the delivery of outdated Hawk missiles with Israeli markings, effectively killed off the Iran end of the second channel.[^1]
[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] was due to be a major witness in [[Oliver North|North's]] trial and knew a great deal about [[Ihsan Barbouti|Barbouti's]] chemical operation in [[Miami]]. He was killed in a plane crash in [[Mexico]] in November 1988, an event that [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence believed was a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] operation to prevent his testimony from embarrassing [[Shimon Peres|Peres]], [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]], or [[George H.W. Bush|Bush]].[^1]
The independent counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that by May 1986 Nir had replaced [[David Kimche]] as the Israeli official in the arms dealings. When the McFarlane party left Washington on May 23, 1986, by way of Frankfurt and Israel, [[Richard Secord]] and Nir joined the group in Israel, and only a portion of the HAWK spare parts the Iranians expected was loaded onto the aircraft that took the party to Tehran. The party arrived in Tehran on May 25, 1986; according to North's notes of a secure message, "We have been treated politely, though heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." On the evening of May 26, North, [[Howard Teicher]], [[George Cave]] and Nir met without McFarlane with an Iranian foreign affairs adviser to the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, a meeting Teicher described as "our most serious meeting." On the evening of May 27 the Americans discovered that all day the plane "was not refueled," and the party left Tehran at about 9 a.m. on May 28, while the plane carrying the remainder of the HAWK parts turned back in mid-flight.[^4]
According to Ben-Menashe, Nir also faced problems with his plans for supplying the [[Contras]], as [[Yitzhak Rabin]] refused to cooperate. The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in May 1986 Rabin offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that in September 1986 he and North discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras, which Poindexter sanctioned as "a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless."[^5] On the night of February 4, 1987, Rabin said that he had personally categorically rejected an appeal by a ranking White House aide for Israel to become involved with the Contras in any way.[^6] According to Ben-Menashe, a mysterious $10 million contribution from the [[Sultan of Brunei]] to North's group, wired through [[Bruce Rappaport]], was leaked by the Joint Committee, further exposing the second channel.[^1]
Nir was due to be a major witness in North's trial and knew a great deal about [[Ihsan Barbouti|Barbouti's]] chemical operation in [[Miami]]. He was killed in a plane crash in [[Mexico]] in November 1988, an event that Israeli intelligence believed was a CIA operation to prevent his testimony from embarrassing Peres, [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]], or Bush.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I, ch. 24 ("The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt"), n. 206 (Hill Note, January 4, 1986, ANS 0001255-56). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm
[^3]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), pp. 526-27, "The Israeli Connection." https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport
[^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1 ("United States v. Robert C. McFarlane"), on the May 23 to 28, 1986 trip (North Note, May 25, 1986, AMX 001128; Teicher Note, May 26, 1986, AKW 005421; Teicher Note, May 27, 1986, AKW 005452; Teicher Note, May 28, 1986, AKW 005452-53). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
[^5]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
[^6]: "Rabin Rejects Senate Report," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 6, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-rejects-senate-report

17
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Harry H. Schwartz.md
View file

@ -4,11 +4,22 @@ tags:
- Person
- Nuclear
- Israel
summary: "Aide to Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke who witnessed Warnke directly confronting Israeli Ambassador Rabin about Israel's nuclear weapons program."
summary: "Deputy assistant secretary of defense in the office of Paul Warnke, present at the November 1968 meetings with Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin on the F-4 sale and the draft memorandum of understanding on nuclear assurances."
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Office of the Secretary of Defense]]"
role: "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)"
start: 1968
fn: 2
---
Harry H. Schwartz was an aide to [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He was present at a meeting where Warnke directly questioned [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then [[Israel]]'s ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], about [[Israel]]'s nuclear capabilities. Schwartz recalled Warnke stating, "Mr. Ambassador, we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in [[Israel]] behind our back."[^1]
[[Harry H. Schwartz]] was a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the office of [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.[^1][^2] He attended the November 22, 1968 meeting at which [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then [[Israel]]'s ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding on Israeli nuclear assurances implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy," and Warnke answered that he had discussed the paragraph with [[Clark Clifford]] and Clifford with [[Dean Rusk]], and that the government did not put that construction on it.[^1] In a conversation with Warnke on November 26, 1968, Rabin said that General [[Mordecai Hod]] had met Schwartz the day before and presented a list of the items desired so that a letter of offer could be prepared.[^3] On December 20, 1968, in Warnke's office, Rabin said that the negotiations with Schwartz were finished.[^2]
[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that Schwartz was present at a meeting where Warnke directly questioned Rabin about Israel's nuclear capabilities, and that Schwartz recalled Warnke stating, "Mr. Ambassador, we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in Israel behind our back."[^4]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 14.
[^1]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330
[^2]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 355, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 20, 1968 (lists "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NESA)"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d355
[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 332, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 26, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d332
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 14.

39
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/John Poindexter.md
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-13
updated: 2026-10-14
title: John Poindexter
aliases:
- John Poindexter
@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ relations:
start: 2002-01
end: 2003-08-29
role: "director, Information Awareness Office"
fn: 3
fn: 4
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Policy Analysis Market]]"
start: 2002
end: 2003-08-29
role: "director of the Information Awareness Office, under which FutureMAP sat; approved the program per Nextgov"
fn: 8
fn: 9
---
John Marlan Poindexter was born August 12, 1936. He graduated first in his class from the [[U.S. Naval Academy]] in 1958 and earned a PhD in nuclear physics from the [[California Institute of Technology]] in 1964. He pursued a naval career that included service in the Pentagon's [[National Security Council]] staff, rising to military assistant to President Reagan's National Security Advisers before assuming the position himself.[^1]
@ -42,33 +42,36 @@ Poindexter succeeded Robert McFarlane as National Security Adviser in December 1
Poindexter resigned on November 25, 1986, the same day North was fired, after Attorney General Meese's announcement that the Iran arms sale profits had been diverted to the Contras. His resignation and North's termination were the first public accountability actions in the Iran-Contra affair.[^1]
After the September 1986 discussion between Oliver North and Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] of an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras, Poindexter sanctioned the offer: "It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless." He later cautioned that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." When North's memorandum briefing the President for a visit by Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] recommended that the President thank Peres for the Israeli bloc arms, Poindexter penciled next to the sentence: "Rabin. Very tightly held."[^2]
### Congressional Testimony and Criminal Proceedings
Poindexter testified before the joint congressional [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] committees under a grant of immunity in July 1987. He stated that he had authorized the diversion of funds and had not told [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] about it. He said he made the decision himself because he did not want to place the President in the position of having approved an operation that violated the [[Boland Amendment]]'s prohibition on Contra assistance. This testimony was the central account of executive branch knowledge and authorization in the entire Iran-Contra affair.[^1]
Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] indicted Poindexter in March 1988 on charges of conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, making false statements, and destroying documents. The case was tried in 1990 after North's conviction. Poindexter was convicted on five counts in April 1990 and sentenced to six months in prison.[^2]
Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] indicted Poindexter in March 1988 on charges of conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, making false statements, and destroying documents. The case was tried in 1990 after North's conviction. Poindexter was convicted on five counts in April 1990 and sentenced to six months in prison.[^3]
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Poindexter's conviction in November 1991, on the same grounds that had reversed North's: that witnesses against him had been exposed to his immunized congressional testimony, potentially tainting their accounts in ways the government could not demonstrate had not occurred. Walsh declined to retry the case.[^2]
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Poindexter's conviction in November 1991, on the same grounds that had reversed North's: that witnesses against him had been exposed to his immunized congressional testimony, potentially tainting their accounts in ways the government could not demonstrate had not occurred. Walsh declined to retry the case.[^3]
### Total Information Awareness
[[DARPA]] created the [[Information Awareness Office]] in mid-January 2002, under the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] administration, and Poindexter directed it.[^3] The office, a research program focused on mining large-scale databases for intelligence indicators, developed the Total Information Awareness (TIA) system, which proposed aggregating commercial, government, and intelligence databases to identify patterns predictive of terrorist activity.
[[DARPA]] created the [[Information Awareness Office]] in mid-January 2002, under the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] administration, and Poindexter directed it.[^4] The office, a research program focused on mining large-scale databases for intelligence indicators, developed the Total Information Awareness (TIA) system, which proposed aggregating commercial, government, and intelligence databases to identify patterns predictive of terrorist activity.
When TIA became publicly known in late 2002, it generated intense opposition from civil liberties organizations and members of Congress, who argued that the system constituted a mass domestic surveillance infrastructure. Poindexter's own Iran-Contra history (including his conviction and its reversal) was cited repeatedly in the congressional debate over TIA. On August 12, 2003 Poindexter submitted a five-page letter of resignation to DARPA director [[Anthony Tether]], effective August 29.[^3] The conference report on the fiscal 2004 defense appropriations act provided in Section 8131 that none of the funds may be obligated "for the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," excepting processing, analysis and collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and its joint explanatory statement states that the conferees "direct that the Office be terminated immediately."[^4]
When TIA became publicly known in late 2002, it generated intense opposition from civil liberties organizations and members of Congress, who argued that the system constituted a mass domestic surveillance infrastructure. Poindexter's own Iran-Contra history (including his conviction and its reversal) was cited repeatedly in the congressional debate over TIA. On August 12, 2003 Poindexter submitted a five-page letter of resignation to DARPA director [[Anthony Tether]], effective August 29.[^4] The conference report on the fiscal 2004 defense appropriations act provided in Section 8131 that none of the funds may be obligated "for the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," excepting processing, analysis and collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and its joint explanatory statement states that the conferees "direct that the Office be terminated immediately."[^5]
The joint explanatory statement lists four projects previously under the office that may continue under DARPA: Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology, Rapid Analytic Wargaming, Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment, and Automated Speech and Text Exploitation in Multiple Languages, including Babylon and Symphony.[^4]
The joint explanatory statement lists four projects previously under the office that may continue under DARPA: Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology, Rapid Analytic Wargaming, Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment, and Automated Speech and Text Exploitation in Multiple Languages, including Babylon and Symphony.[^5]
DARPA's May 20, 2003 report to Congress on Terrorism Information Awareness lists FutureMAP, the Information Awareness Office's prediction-market program, among TIA's decision-support projects.[^5] On July 28, 2003 Senator [[Ron Wyden]] told reporters that the program's [[Policy Analysis Market]] was under Poindexter's supervision, and Senator [[John Warner]] said the next day that Poindexter and DARPA director Anthony Tether had personally reviewed it.[^6][^7] Nextgov reported that Poindexter approved FutureMAP and that he was not leading the office when the original solicitation was answered; [[Robin Hanson]], who designed the market, wrote that he had never met him.[^8][^9] The Pentagon abandoned the market on July 29, 2003, and Poindexter's resignation letter to Tether is dated August 12, 2003.[^7][^10]
DARPA's May 20, 2003 report to Congress on Terrorism Information Awareness lists FutureMAP, the Information Awareness Office's prediction-market program, among TIA's decision-support projects.[^6] On July 28, 2003 Senator [[Ron Wyden]] told reporters that the program's [[Policy Analysis Market]] was under Poindexter's supervision, and Senator [[John Warner]] said the next day that Poindexter and DARPA director Anthony Tether had personally reviewed it.[^7][^8] Nextgov reported that Poindexter approved FutureMAP and that he was not leading the office when the original solicitation was answered; [[Robin Hanson]], who designed the market, wrote that he had never met him.[^9][^10] The Pentagon abandoned the market on July 29, 2003, and Poindexter's resignation letter to Tether is dated August 12, 2003.[^8][^11]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Tower Commission Report (President's Special Review Board). *The Tower Commission Report*. Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987. U.S. Congress, Joint Committees on Iran-Contra. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.
[^2]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994.
[^3]: Dan Caterinicchia, "Poindexter leaving DARPA," *Nextgov/FCW*, August 13, 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/poindexter-leaving-darpa/201670/
[^4]: Congressional Record, House, September 24, 2003, Conference Report on H.R. 2658, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (House Report 108-283), Sec. 8131 and Joint Explanatory Statement. https://sgp.fas.org/congress/2003/tia.html
[^5]: DARPA, "Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," May 20, 2003, Annex B. https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/TIA-report.html
[^6]: "Pentagon plan to bet on terrorism is blasted," Associated Press, as published by the Deseret News, July 29, 2003. https://www.deseret.com/2003/7/29/19738241/pentagon-plan-to-bet-on-terrorism-is-blasted/
[^7]: "Pentagon Abandons Terrorism Betting Plan," Associated Press, July 29, 2003, as published by KSL. https://www.ksl.com/article/103317
[^8]: "DOD's misguided bet on the future," Nextgov, August 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/dods-misguided-bet-on-the-future/201748/
[^9]: Robin Hanson, "The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive," George Mason University. https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/policyanalysismarket.html
[^10]: Dawn S. Onley, "In his resignation, Poindexter defends projects," Government Computer News, August 13, 2003. https://www.route-fifty.com/digital-government/2003/08/in-his-resignation-poindexter-defends-projects/295109/
[^2]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
[^3]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994.
[^4]: Dan Caterinicchia, "Poindexter leaving DARPA," *Nextgov/FCW*, August 13, 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/poindexter-leaving-darpa/201670/
[^5]: Congressional Record, House, September 24, 2003, Conference Report on H.R. 2658, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (House Report 108-283), Sec. 8131 and Joint Explanatory Statement. https://sgp.fas.org/congress/2003/tia.html
[^6]: DARPA, "Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," May 20, 2003, Annex B. https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/TIA-report.html
[^7]: "Pentagon plan to bet on terrorism is blasted," Associated Press, as published by the Deseret News, July 29, 2003. https://www.deseret.com/2003/7/29/19738241/pentagon-plan-to-bet-on-terrorism-is-blasted/
[^8]: "Pentagon Abandons Terrorism Betting Plan," Associated Press, July 29, 2003, as published by KSL. https://www.ksl.com/article/103317
[^9]: "DOD's misguided bet on the future," Nextgov, August 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/dods-misguided-bet-on-the-future/201748/
[^10]: Robin Hanson, "The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive," George Mason University. https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/policyanalysismarket.html
[^11]: Dawn S. Onley, "In his resignation, Poindexter defends projects," Government Computer News, August 13, 2003. https://www.route-fifty.com/digital-government/2003/08/in-his-resignation-poindexter-defends-projects/295109/

9
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Menachem Schneerson.md
View file

@ -5,17 +5,18 @@ tags:
- IranContra
- CIA
- Israel
summary: "Large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to Drexel Burnham, a brokerage house where Michael Milken built his junk-bond fortune."
summary: "According to Ari Ben-Menashe, large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to Drexel Burnham, a brokerage house where Michael Milken built his junk-bond fortune."
born: 1902-04-18
died: 1994-06-12
location: "Nikolaev, Russian Empire (now Mykolaiv, Ukraine)"
---
[[Menachem Schneerson]], also known as the Lubavitcher Rebbe, was a prominent orthodox Jewish leader based in Brooklyn, [[New York City]]. His financial institutions were enlisted by the [[Likud Party]]-controlled [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] to funnel money for housing projects in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]] for Jewish settlers, drawing from the slush fund generated by arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
[[Menachem Schneerson]], also known as the Lubavitcher Rebbe, was a prominent orthodox Jewish leader based in Brooklyn, [[New York City]]. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], his financial institutions were enlisted by the [[Likud Party]]-controlled [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] to funnel money for housing projects in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]] for Jewish settlers, drawing from the slush fund generated by arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
Large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to [[Drexel Burnham]], a brokerage house where [[Michael Milken]] built his junk-bond fortune. Until 1987, some of the profits from the slush fund were used to finance the Lubavitcher yeshivahs (colleges).[^1]
Ben-Menashe wrote that large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to [[Drexel Burnham]], a brokerage house where [[Michael Milken]] built his junk-bond fortune, and that until 1987 some of the profits from the slush fund were used to finance the Lubavitcher yeshivahs (colleges).[^1]
In 1987, the committee and Schneerson parted ways. This was partly due to questions regarding his allegiance to the [[Likud Party]] and the emergence of the orthodox [[Shas Party]], which was at odds with the Rebbe. Funds previously directed to the Lubavitcher yeshivahs were redirected to the Shas yeshivahs. The committee also decided to withdraw funds from Drexel and from Schneerson's control due to concerns that the funds might be frozen if relations between [[Israel]] and the [[United States|U.S.]] deteriorated, contributing to Drexel's eventual downfall.[^1]
He wrote that in 1987 the committee and Schneerson parted ways, partly due to questions regarding his allegiance to the Likud Party and the emergence of the orthodox [[Shas Party]], which was at odds with the Rebbe; that funds previously directed to the Lubavitcher yeshivahs were redirected to the Shas yeshivahs; and that the committee also decided to withdraw funds from Drexel and from Schneerson's control due to concerns that the funds might be frozen if relations between [[Israel]] and the [[United States|U.S.]] deteriorated, contributing to Drexel's eventual downfall.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

174
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.md
View file

@ -2,19 +2,181 @@
category: "Political Figure"
tags:
- Person
summary: "Under the Shah, Iran maintained good relations with 'moderate pro-American Arab countries' such as Egypt, Jordan, and the Emirates."
- Iran
- OperationAjax
- SAVAK
- KurdishOperation
- ArmsSales
- HostageCrisis
- SafariClub
- Trident
- ProjectFlower
aliases:
- "Mohammad Reza Pahlavi"
- "Mohammad Reza Shah"
- "Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi"
- "Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi"
- "Shah of Iran"
- "the Shah"
summary: "Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979, returned to power by the 1953 coup, partner of Nixon and Kissinger in the Kurdish program, and admitted to New York Hospital on October 22, 1979."
born: 1919-10-26
died: 1980-07-27
location: "Tehran, Iran"
created: 2025-08-05
updated: 2026-10-14
relations:
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation AJAX]]"
start: 1953-08-13
role: "signed firmans dismissing Mohammed Mossadegh and naming Fazlollah Zahedi prime minister"
fn: 6
- type: appointed
with: "[[Fazlollah Zahedi]]"
start: 1953-08-13
role: "prime minister by royal firman"
fn: 6
- type: relative_of
with: "[[Princess Ashraf Pahlavi]]"
role: "twin sister, who with Schwarzkopf pressed him to sign the 1953 firmans"
fn: 5
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Safari Club]]"
start: 1976
role: "Iran listed among the member states by Prince Turki al-Faisal"
fn: 32
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Project Flower]]"
start: 1977-04
role: "signed the Israeli-Iranian oil-for-arms contracts with Shimon Peres, including the missile project, per documents published by Iranian students"
fn: 31
- type: subject_of
with: "[[Pike Committee]]"
start: 1976-02-16
role: "the Kurdish covert aid program examined in the committee report"
fn: 23
---
[[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], also known as the Shah of [[Iran]], ruled for nearly 40 years. His departure from [[Iran]] on January 16, 1979, marked a tumultuous upheaval in the [[Middle East]] and led to a new threat to [[Israel|Israel's]] existence.[^1]
[[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], also known as the Shah of [[Iran]], ruled Iran for nearly 40 years, from his accession during the Second World War until his departure on January 16, 1979.[^1] His throne was restored in 1953 by a coup that removed [[Mohammed Mossadegh]], and his government relied on the [[SAVAK]] security service. By November 1979 he was in the [[United States]] for medical treatment, and the decision to admit him became a subject of dispute involving the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration, [[Henry A. Kissinger]] and [[David Rockefeller]].
Under the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]], [[Iran]] maintained good relations with "moderate pro-[[United States|American]] Arab countries" such as [[Egypt]], [[Jordan]], and the [[Emirates]]. However, by 1978, his rule was threatened by widespread discontent due to extreme corruption, skyrocketing prices, and the failure of his White Revolution to address food production issues. The infrastructure of [[Tehran]] was also unable to handle the traffic, leading to public frustration.[^1]
### Return to power, 1951 to 1953
[[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence, particularly [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], warned of an impending revolution and the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah's]] imminent overthrow as early as 1978. These warnings were dismissed by [[United States|U.S.]] analysts, who misread the threat to his rule. In December 1978, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and [[SAVAK]] (Iranian secret police) enlisted [[Israel|Israeli]] aid in a plan to assassinate [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini]], but the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]] rejected it, fearing further bloodshed.[^1]
By 1952 the American embassy in [[Tehran]] had concluded that a government to replace Mossadegh could be installed only by a military coup. On July 31, 1952, [[Loy Henderson]] reported that any alternative to Mossadegh could be brought to power "except perhaps by military coup," and that the officers best placed to lead one were [[Fazlollah Zahedi]] and General Hedjazi.[^2]
After his departure, the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]]'s Regency and Supreme Military Councils were unable to function, and [[Shahpour Bakhtiar]], his last prime minister, proved helpless. [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]] arrived in [[Iran]] on February 1, 1979, and declared [[Iran]] an Islamic republic on April 1. The [[Israel|Israeli]] Embassy in [[Tehran]] was subsequently handed over to the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]].[^1]
In March 1953 Henderson assessed the Shah's own part in such a move. He wrote that the Shah would "undoubtedly be frightened at thought of military coup being attempted in his name" and would probably try to discourage it, and that a failed attempt would be likely to complete the ruin of the Shah and the dynasty.[^3] On April 15, 1953, the embassy reported that the Shah had been postponing a meeting with Zahedi from day to day.[^4]
The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s history of the operation, known as TPAJAX and later as [[Operation AJAX]], was written by [[Donald Wilber]] in March 1954 and released in 2000. The [[National Security Archive]] posted it as part of its Iran coup briefing book. Wilber describes a plan in four steps. [[Princess Ashraf Pahlavi]], the Shah's twin sister, was to urge him to dismiss Mossadegh and to tell him she was in contact with American and British officials. General [[H. Norman Schwarzkopf]], formerly head of the American gendarmerie mission in Iran, was to bring the Shah two royal decrees (firmans), one dismissing Mossadegh and one appointing Zahedi, and to get the army's commitment to the crown. A British agent whose credentials the Shah accepted would reinforce the message. [[Kermit Roosevelt]], representing the President of the United States, would then urge the Shah to sign.[^5]
Wilber records that the Shah refused at first. On August 10 he said that while he approved of the plan for action he would sign no papers. After pressure from Princess Ashraf and General Schwarzkopf and several meetings with Roosevelt, the Wilber history records, the Shah signed the required firmans, and action was set for August 16.[^5] A security leak in the Iranian army then caused the chief of the Shah's bodyguard, who had been assigned to seize Mossadegh, to be overwhelmed by loyal units. Wilber describes the Shah's flight to [[Baghdad]] as "an act of prudence" that had been at least partly foreseen in the plan.[^5]
A British memorandum in the Foreign Relations volume dates the firman dismissing Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi to August 13, 1953, and says it was conveyed secretly. The opposition press later published photographs of it. The same memorandum says the firman was carried from Ramsar to Tehran by Colonel Nasiri, commander of the Imperial Guard, who delivered a copy late on August 15 to the officer in charge of the troops at Mossadegh's house and was arrested as he left; it records the belief that junior Guards officers with Tudeh sympathies disrupted the plan.[^6] On August 18 Henderson reported that Mossadegh had asked him whether the Shah had issued a firman removing him as prime minister.[^7] The same day Under Secretary of State [[Walter Bedell Smith]] wrote to the President that "it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his constitutional power in signing the firman replacing Mosadeq." He added that "the old boy wouldn't accept this and arrested the messenger and everybody else involved that he could get his hands on."[^8] The Shah arrived in [[Rome]] from Baghdad in the early afternoon of August 18.[^9] On August 20 the embassy in Rome reported that he was to leave Rome for Baghdad around midnight, arriving about noon on August 21.[^10] An airgram from the Tehran embassy in January 1973 described the episode as the time "when the Shah was forced to flee the country only to return two weeks later when Mossadeq was ousted."[^1]
On October 9, 1953, Henderson reported that the Shah had expressed willingness to sign the necessary firmans if Zahedi requested them.[^11] The oil arrangements that followed were recorded in the State Department files of late October 1954, when the Shah signed the oil bill.[^12]
### SAVAK
SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar) served as the Shah's internal security and intelligence service. A February 1971 airgram from the Tehran embassy recorded that Iranian young people widely assumed the CIA had aided SAVAK when the Shah first organized it, and that the "invisible hand of the CIA still wields considerable influence on, if not outright control of, SAVAK." The airgram also reported that SAVAK "is feared by most Iranians."[^13] The November 23, 1979 summary of [[Special Coordination Committee]] (Intelligence) conclusions lists, among its points, publicizing links between some present Iranian leaders and SAVAK.[^14]
### The Kurdish operation, 1972 to 1975
On May 30, 1972, in Tehran, [[Richard Nixon]] and Kissinger met the Shah. The memorandum of conversation records the Shah saying he feared the Soviets would establish "a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists." When Kissinger asked what could be done, the Shah replied: "Turkey needs strengthening. Iran can help with the Kurds."[^15] The aid went to the Kurdish insurgency of [[Mulla Mustafa Barzani]] in [[Iraq]].
In June 1972 the NSC staff, the CIA and the State Department worked through the question. On June 7 [[Harold Saunders]] wrote to Kissinger that "the balance is fairly fine on the question of whether we should support the Kurds," and advised that Kissinger should not meet Barzani's representatives personally, since that "comes so close to involving the President at least by implication."[^16] A CIA memorandum of June 12 to [[Richard Helms]] said that the policy of non-interference had been confirmed "not only by the State Department but by Dr. Kissinger's office as well."[^17] On July 28 [[Alexander Haig]] forwarded to Kissinger Helms's proposal: about $3 million from the United States over one year and about $2 million in supplies, with Iran also contributing. Haig recommended informing only the 40 Committee principals and to "avoid any paper and tell them that the President wants this done."[^18]
Kissinger later described the origin of the program in a memorandum to Nixon of September 6, 1973: "You will recall that you initiated financial and military support to the Kurds in August 1972 in response to an appeal from the Shah."[^19] His memorandum of April 11, 1974 said that since then the United States had provided, "through the Iranians," a monthly subsidy, and that "the underlying purpose was to keep the Iraqi Government tied down and to limit its capacity for adventures abroad."[^20] On June 24, 1974, the CIA proposed $8.06 million for fiscal 1975, and Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve it.[^21] On March 16, 1975, after the Iran-Iraq agreement, [[Brent Scowcroft]] sent Helms, then ambassador to Iran, a message instructing him to tell the Shah that the United States was prepared to provide the March subvention, and to answer Barzani's message with the words "our prayers are with them."[^22]
The [[Pike Committee]], the House Select Committee on Intelligence under Representative [[Otis Pike]], examined the Kurdish operation as one of three covert cases. Its report, printed in [[The Village Voice]] on February 16, 1976, states that the program ultimately involved some $16 million and was apparently endorsed by the President after a private meeting with the Shah and Kissinger. [[John B. Connally]], then about to take a major role in the President's re-election campaign, personally advised the Shah that the United States would cooperate. The report states that there was no [[Forty Committee]] meeting at which a formal proposal could be discussed and voted on. It says Kissinger "personally restrained the insurgents from an all-out offensive on the one occasion when such an attack might have been successful." After the Iran-Iraq border agreement the United States dropped the Kurds. The report charges: "The President, Dr. Kissinger and the foreign head of state [the Shah] hoped our clients would not prevail," and concludes: "Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise." A high American official later explained to the committee staff that "covert action should not be confused with missionary work."[^23]
### Arms purchases and aircraft
In May 1972 the Tehran embassy recommended that the United States make available at least three squadrons of F-15s, with possibly two to four F-14s equipped with Phoenix missiles per squadron.[^24] A memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Kenneth Rush]] to Kissinger of May 18, 1972 attached a talking paper noting that since 1969 the Shah had focused on follow-on aircraft to replace his American-supplied F-4s, and that "these aircraft are barely out of the research and development stage."[^25] On April 27, 1973, Deputy Secretary of State Rush reported from [[Geneva]] on a ninety-minute audience with the Shah, in which he outlined plans to go ahead on the Trident and B-1 weapons programs of the United States.[^26]
On July 20, 1973, the [[Senior Review Group]] discussed the Shah's visit. [[William Clements]] of the Department of Defense said that the Shah wanted to ride in an F-14 while he was in the country, and that "he has indicated he wants to buy a squadron of F-14s and F-15s at some point."[^27] Four days later the memorandum of a conversation records the Shah's belief that he needed sufficient air power, including F-14s, F-15s and possibly A-10s, to deter his enemies.[^28]
A briefing memorandum from [[Alfred L. Atherton Jr.]] to Kissinger of November 10, 1975 listed friction points with Iran. It described [[Project IBEX]] as "a large electronic system which will give the Iranians an ELINT capability." The Department of Defense had suggested that IBEX be placed under foreign military sales, because it was responsible for overseeing the integration of Iranian communications under the Seek Switch program. The memorandum records that the Iranians said how IBEX was managed was "our bureaucratic problem to resolve," and that they would not accept delays or added costs.[^29]
### Israel and Iran, 1958 to 1979
[[Reuven Shiloah]], the founder of the Israeli intelligence services, pursued a "peripheral" alliance policy from 1957. The Turkish scholar Yusuf Suha Sonucu wrote that in the autumn of 1957 the Iranian embassy in Paris sent the Israeli embassy a note asking for a secret meeting at deputy prime minister level, that in January 1958 Shiloah carried a letter from [[David Ben-Gurion]] to Tehran, and that in April 1958 an Iranian delegation headed by a deputy of Prime Minister [[Manouchehr Eghbal]] was received in Tel Aviv by Ben-Gurion and [[Golda Meir]]. Following a meeting of prime ministers in [[Ankara]] on August 29, 1958, the heads of the three intelligence services met in Ankara in late September or early October 1958, and the tripartite arrangement known as Trident was set up among [[Mossad]], Turkey's National Security Service (MAH, later the [[Turkish National Intelligence Organization|MIT]]) and SAVAK. Sonucu reports that the services divided tasks against [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] and Soviet influence, with Iran contributing on the Persian Gulf and Iraq and Turkey on Syria, and that the service chiefs met twice a year. He also reports that after Ben-Gurion's approach to Washington the Central Intelligence Agency financed a two-story building in Israel as the Trident center, with Iranian officers on the "blue" floor, Turkish officers on the "yellow" floor and Israelis on the ground floor.[^30]
Sonucu cites Haggai Eshed's biography of Shiloah for a CIA report on Israel's security, found in the American embassy in Tehran and published by Iranian revolutionaries in March 1979, that described Trident as an arrangement among Mossad, the Turkish service and SAVAK whose ministers met twice a year. He writes that after the Iran-Iraq agreement of March 5, 1975, the Shah told the Egyptian journalist [[Mohamed Hassanein Heikal]] that the Nasser threat had gone and that Iranian intelligence and the army had been in contact with Israel, and that in the first months of the new regime Mossad director [[Yitzhak Hofi]] said Israel had wanted to keep Iran in the arrangement and had offered it free tires for its F-4 Phantoms.[^30]
According to documents published by the Iranian students who held the American embassy after November 1979, the Shah and [[Shimon Peres]], then Israel's defense minister, signed one of six oil-for-arms contracts in Tehran in April 1977. The contract code-named Flower covered a surface-to-surface missile project. The Israeli papers, in English, were published in paperback in Iran, and the volume on the missile project was supplied to The New York Times in 1986. The documents state that the aim was to extend the range of an Israeli missile developed in the early 1970s and to replace American-supplied parts so that Israel could export it without American approval. The missile carried a warhead of 750 kilograms and a range of up to 300 miles; shipments were to go through a Swiss company to central Iran, with an assembly plant near Sirjan and a test range near Rafsanjan. In the record of General [[Hassan Toufanian]]'s July 1977 visit to Israel, [[Ezer Weizman]] tells him that Iran must have a missile, and [[Moshe Dayan]] raises the sensitivity of the Americans to missiles of that kind, which with a 750-kilogram head could also be regarded as nuclear-capable. Toufanian, the Shah's arms procurer, told the Times that the Israelis never said explicitly that they had a nuclear capability but that it was implied, and that Iran made a down payment in oil in 1978. A July 1978 summary of a conversation between Admiral Kamal Habibollahi and the Israeli navy commander Michael Barkai mentions enhancing Flower so that the missiles could be launched from submarines.[^31]
Toufanian and Habibollahi told the Times that the recorded conversations were genuine, and Weizman did not deny that the documents were authentic. The spokesman for Israel's Foreign Ministry called them falsified documents spread by the Tehran government. [[Gary Sick]] and Harold Saunders told the Times that they had not known of the project. Israel halted the cooperation when [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]] came to power in February 1979.[^31]
### The Safari Club
[[Turki al-Faisal|Prince Turki al-Faisal]], the former head of Saudi intelligence, said in a speech at [[Georgetown University]] on February 3, 2002, that in 1976, after Watergate, the American intelligence community was "literally tied up by Congress," and that a group of countries got together and established what was called the Safari Club. He stated that the Safari Club included France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Iran, with the aim of sharing information and countering Soviet influence, especially in Africa.[^32] Heikal wrote in 1982 that the club was the idea of Count [[Alexandre de Marenches]], head of the French [[SDECE]], and that an agreement among the five governments was signed by Sheikh [[Kamal Adham]], director of intelligence, for Saudi Arabia, General [[Nematollah Nassiri]], head of [[SAVAK]], for Iran, the director of intelligence for Egypt, Ahmed Duleimi, director of intelligence, for Morocco, and de Marenches himself for France. He wrote that a copy of the agreement was found in SAVAK's archives after the revolution, and that the proposal to make Algeria a founding member came to him in an interview with President [[Houari Boumediene]].[^33]
### The 1978 warnings and the revolution
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]], who worked for Israeli intelligence, wrote in his memoir that under the Shah Iran maintained good relations with "moderate pro-American Arab countries" such as [[Egypt]], [[Jordan]] and the [[Emirates]], and that by 1978 the Shah's rule was threatened by widespread discontent over corruption, rising prices and the failure of his White Revolution to address food production. He added that the infrastructure of Tehran could not handle its traffic.[^34]
Ben-Menashe also wrote that Israeli intelligence warned of an impending revolution and the Shah's overthrow as early as 1978, that American analysts dismissed the warnings, and that in December 1978 the CIA and SAVAK enlisted Israeli aid in a plan to assassinate Khomeini, which the Shah rejected, fearing further bloodshed.[^34]
The Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979, which Ben-Menashe describes as a tumultuous upheaval in the [[Middle East]] and a new threat to Israel's existence. He wrote that the regency and supreme military councils were unable to function and that [[Shahpour Bakhtiar]], the last prime minister, proved helpless; that Khomeini arrived in Iran on February 1, 1979, and declared an Islamic republic on April 1; and that the Israeli embassy in Tehran was then handed over to the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]].[^34]
### Medical treatment and the admission to the United States, 1979
The Shah entered the United States on October 22, 1979, for diagnosis and evaluation of his medical condition at the Cornell medical facility in New York; the statement read by White House press secretary [[Jody Powell]] on December 15, 1979, gives that date, adds that he entered Wilford Hall Air Force Hospital at Lackland Air Force Base on December 2, and announces his departure for residence in [[Panama]].[^35]
The Special Coordination Committee recorded on November 5, 1979 that "the Rockefeller group, which is managing the Shah's affairs, has increased the security around the Shah." The [[New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center]] released a medical update on him the same day.[^36] A [[National Security Council]] meeting record of November 6 states that he "has a tube implanted in him and also has cancer of the neck and could not easily be moved."[^37] The editorial note in the Foreign Relations volume on Iranian withdrawals from [[Chase Manhattan Bank]] records that David Rockefeller, "a friend of the Shah, had lobbied for the Shah's acceptance into the United States for medical treatment."[^38]
A memorandum from Ambassador [[Hermann Eilts]] to Carter of November 21 recorded questions about the Shah's health, including whether he had cancer and how serious it was.[^39] At a National Security Council meeting on November 23, the minutes record the question whether [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] should talk to David Rockefeller.[^40] A November 24 memorandum from Under Secretary of State [[David D. Newsom]] to [[Cyrus Vance]] records that the Rockefeller organization would arrange transportation for the Shah's planned trips to [[Mexico]].[^41]
On November 26 Vance sent Carter a memorandum noting that a television interview by [[George Ball]] "inspired a number of inquiries on Henry Kissinger's advice." Ball had said on NBC's Meet the Press on November 25 that the Shah might not have been admitted to the United States were it not for the "enormously obnoxious" pressure exerted by Kissinger. The [[Chicago Tribune]] reported the same day under the headline "Report Kissinger Tells Shah to Stay." Carter wrote in the margin that the press reported he had met "to soothe an angry Kissinger."[^42] On December 1 Vance's memorandum recorded plans for moving the Shah to Wilford Hall Hospital at [[Lackland Air Force Base]] in [[San Antonio]].[^43] A January 15, 1980 memorandum from [[Steven Oxman]] recorded the prognosis that the Shah's cancer could metastasize at any time and lead quickly to death.[^44]
An undated memorandum from [[Hamilton Jordan]] to Carter, Vance and Brzezinski, written in January 1980, summarized the account given by Panamanian emissaries of their meetings with Iranian Foreign Minister [[Sadegh Ghotbzadeh]] on January 7 about the Shah's presence in Panama. According to that summary, Ghotbzadeh described the seizure of the American embassy as an "American conspiracy" involving "Rockefeller, Kissinger and others," who intended to create a crisis for Carter that would lead to the election of a Republican "controlled by Kissinger and Rockefeller."[^45]
On March 30, 1980, a message from the Swiss ambassador to Iran reported that the Shah had been transferred to [[Cairo]], and that, according to the ambassador's information, Kissinger had organized the move.[^46] On April 1, 1980, the record of an Oval Office meeting noted that [[Abolhassan Bani-Sadr]] had said in a March 31 speech that Kissinger was responsible for the Shah's move to Egypt.[^47] The Shah died in Cairo on July 27, 1980.[^48]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^1]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, document 1, Airgram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, January 9, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d1.
[^2]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, document 192, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, July 31, 1952. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d192.
[^3]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 313, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, March 6, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d313.
[^4]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 324, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, April 15, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d324.
[^5]: [[Donald Wilber]], *Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953*, written March 1954, released by the CIA in 2000. Posted by the [[National Security Archive]] as Iran Coup Briefing Book 28 (November 29, 2000), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/; text copy at https://archive.org/details/CIA-Mossadeq-Iran-1953. First disclosed by James Risen in *The New York Times* on April 16 and June 18, 2000. The CIA's mid-1970s internal history *The Battle for Iran*, released in 1981 with references to TPAJAX blacked out, was posted by the National Security Archive with those references restored on August 19, 2013 (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/).
[^6]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 362, British Memorandum (undated), recording that the firman dismissing Mosadeq and appointing Zahedi was issued on August 13, 1953, and that the opposition press published photographs of the royal firman. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d362.
[^7]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 347, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d347.
[^8]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 346, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the President, Washington, August 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d346.
[^9]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 348, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 20, 1953, reporting telegram 571 from Rome of August 18. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d348.
[^10]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 350, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 21, 1953, editorial note citing telegram 613 from Rome, August 20. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d350.
[^11]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 374, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, October 9, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d374.
[^12]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 502, Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran, Washington, October 28, 1954, reporting that the Shah signed the oil bill on the day the Tehran embassy informed the Department. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d502.
[^13]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, document 116, Airgram A-56 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, February 22, 1971. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d116.
[^14]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979-September 1980, document 54, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting, November 23, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d54.
[^15]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 200, Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 30, 1972, 5:35 to 6:35 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d200.
[^16]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 313, Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Staff to Kissinger, Washington, June 7, 1972, "Message from Shah on Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d313.
[^17]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 315, Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, CIA (Waller) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, June 12, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d315.
[^18]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 321, Memorandum From Haig to Kissinger, Washington, July 28, 1972, "Kurdish Problem," attaching Helms's memorandum of July 18, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d321.
[^19]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 233, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1973, "Increased Assistance to the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d233.
[^20]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 246, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, April 11, 1974, "Further Support for the Kurds in Iraq." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d246.
[^21]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 254, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, June 24, 1974, "Fiscal Year 1975 Support for the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d254.
[^22]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 281, Backchannel Message From Scowcroft to the Ambassador to Iran (Helms), Washington, March 16, 1975, with the oral message to Barzani. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d281.
[^23]: Pike Committee, *Report on the Central Intelligence Agency*, as printed in "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," *The Village Voice*, February 16, 1976, Case 2 (Arms Support). Released through the CIA CREST database as document CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5; text at https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5. The Kissinger restraint passage, the Iran-Iraq border passage and the "missionary work" remark appear in the printed introduction by Aaron Latham, which quotes the report.
[^24]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 187, Telegram 2642 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, May 6, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d187.
[^25]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 195, Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to Kissinger, Washington, May 18, 1972, with attached talking paper "Sale of F-15/F-14 Aircraft." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d195.
[^26]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 14, Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush) to the Department of State, Geneva, April 27, 1973, "Conversation with Shah." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d14.
[^27]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 23, Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, July 20, 1973 (participants include William Clements for the Department of Defense). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d23.
[^28]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 26, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 24, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d26.
[^29]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 147, Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Kissinger, Washington, November 10, 1975, "Issues Between the U.S. Government and Iran." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d147.
[^30]: Yusuf Suha Sonucu, "Periferi Doktrini Bağlamında Türkiye-İsrail İstihbarat İşbirliği," *İsrailiyat: İsrail ve Yahudi Çalışmaları Dergisi*, no. 3 (Winter 2018), pp. 12-60, citing Haggai Eshed, *Reuven Shiloah: The Man Behind the Mossad* (Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 308-310; Yossi Alpher, *Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), pp. 11-15; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion* (Tel Aviv, 1987), pp. 1322-1333; and Ofra Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 44-46. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/672649.
[^31]: Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal With the Shah," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1986, as reprinted in the CIA reading room, CIA-RDP90-00965R000705970013-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000705970013-3.
[^32]: Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, special address, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, February 3, 2002 (transcription by Paul Dyer). https://web.archive.org/web/20030402032839/http://www.ccasonline.org/publicaffairs/turki_02032002.html.
[^33]: Mohamed Heikal, *Iran: The Untold Story* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 113 and author's note. https://archive.org/details/iranuntoldstoryi00hayk
[^34]: [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^35]: Jimmy Carter, "Shah of Iran: Statement by the White House Press Secretary on the Shah's Departure From the United States," December 15, 1979. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/248279.
[^36]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 2, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting, Washington, November 5, 1979, including the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center update of November 5. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d2.
[^37]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 8, Record of a National Security Council Meeting, November 6, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d8.
[^38]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 30, Editorial Note (Bani-Sadr announcement of November 14, 1979; John Kifner, "Iran Defends Move To Withdraw Funds," *New York Times*, November 15, 1979). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d30.
[^39]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 43, Memorandum From Ambassador Eilts to President Carter, Washington, November 21, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d43.
[^40]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 51, Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, November 23, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d51.
[^41]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 57, Memorandum From Under Secretary of State Newsom to Secretary of State Vance, Washington, November 24, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d57.
[^42]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 60, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, November 26, 1979, citing "Report Kissinger Tells Shah to Stay," *Chicago Tribune*, November 26, 1979, p. 2, and Robert G. Kaiser, "Vance Briefing Aimed at Soothing Angry Kissinger," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d60.
[^43]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 76, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, December 1, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d76.
[^44]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 149, Memorandum by the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Oxman), January 15, 1980. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d149.
[^45]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 144, Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and Brzezinski, undated, with Jordan's summary of notes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d144.
[^46]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 228, Message From the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State, Tehran, March 30, 1980. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d228.
[^47]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 233, Record of an Oval Office Meeting, April 1, 1980, recording Bani-Sadr's March 31 speech. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d233.
[^48]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 326, Editorial Note: "On July 27, 1980, the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, died in Cairo." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d326.

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10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Oliver North.md
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
- Oliver L. North
- Lt. Col. Oliver North
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-14
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- KeyFigure
@ -89,31 +89,33 @@ The writer [[Cheri Seymour]] wrote that North received drug profits from Al-Kass
The Enterprise's air operation used the [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango]] base in [[El Salvador]]. North wrote to [[Felix Rodriguez]] in September 1985 asking him to use his influence with Salvadoran Air Force commander [[Juan Rafael Bustillo]] to secure hangar space; the CIA's records, as the writer [[Gary Webb]] reported, show Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango was used by the CIA for covert Contra operations until it was turned over to the NSC and North's Enterprise in 1985, while the adjoining Hangar No. 5 remained CIA-run.[^12] Walsh's Enterprise chapter records that the Salvadoran chief at Ilopango, General Bustillo, ordered the operation's warehouse of parts and supplies there, and that the downing of [[Eugene Hasenfus]] on October 5, 1986 "settled irrevocably the question of CIA assumption" of the Enterprise's operation.[^3]
The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in May 1986 Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that North and Rabin met again in September 1986 and discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras. The report quotes North's notes that Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for Sov Bloc weaps and ammo he could make avail," and asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. When North answered that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested that it dock at [[Haifa]] and "have it filled w/ whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." On September 15, 1986, North told John Poindexter that orders had been passed to the ship to proceed to Haifa, where loading would be accomplished by Israeli military personnel. North's later briefing memorandum for a visit by Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] recommended that the President thank him for the Israeli bloc arms "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance."[^13]
### Panama and Noriega
According to testimony before the [[Kerry Committee]] by the Panamanian official José Blandón, [[Manuel Noriega]] met North in June 1985 on a boat anchored off Panama City to discuss Panamanian cooperation in the war against Nicaragua while the Boland Amendment barred direct or indirect CIA support. Blandón testified that this meeting produced Noriega's agreement to help train Contra troops and to let Contra leaders enter and leave Panama freely, and that at a second meeting Noriega suggested Panamanian units could be used in operations on Nicaraguan territory; Blandón had no information that Noriega acted on North's request. Noriega met Casey in November 1985; a memorandum Casey wrote suggested Noriega left "reassured" and the narcotics issue was not mentioned, and other U.S. officials concluded that Casey had "let Noriega off the hook."[^13]
According to testimony before the [[Kerry Committee]] by the Panamanian official José Blandón, [[Manuel Noriega]] met North in June 1985 on a boat anchored off Panama City to discuss Panamanian cooperation in the war against Nicaragua while the Boland Amendment barred direct or indirect CIA support. Blandón testified that this meeting produced Noriega's agreement to help train Contra troops and to let Contra leaders enter and leave Panama freely, and that at a second meeting Noriega suggested Panamanian units could be used in operations on Nicaraguan territory; Blandón had no information that Noriega acted on North's request. Noriega met Casey in November 1985; a memorandum Casey wrote suggested Noriega left "reassured" and the narcotics issue was not mentioned, and other U.S. officials concluded that Casey had "let Noriega off the hook."[^14]
The Independent Counsel's summary of North's "Quid Pro Quo" admission describes discussions with Noriega about acts of sabotage against the Sandinista government in exchange for U.S. help in rehabilitating Noriega's public image.[^14] Webb wrote, citing government documents filed in North's trial, that Noriega also offered to have the entire Sandinista leadership assassinated in exchange for a promise to "clean up Noriega's image"; that North raised the proposal at a top-level meeting but was told to say the administration was not keen on murdering Nicaraguan officials though Panamanian help with sabotage would be acceptable; that North returned to Panama a month after the torture-murder of [[Hugo Spadafora]] to assure Noriega of increased U.S. aid; and that within a year $200 million in additional U.S. funds and bank loans went to Noriega.[^15]
The Independent Counsel's summary of North's "Quid Pro Quo" admission describes discussions with Noriega about acts of sabotage against the Sandinista government in exchange for U.S. help in rehabilitating Noriega's public image.[^15] Webb wrote, citing government documents filed in North's trial, that Noriega also offered to have the entire Sandinista leadership assassinated in exchange for a promise to "clean up Noriega's image"; that North raised the proposal at a top-level meeting but was told to say the administration was not keen on murdering Nicaraguan officials though Panamanian help with sabotage would be acceptable; that North returned to Panama a month after the torture-murder of [[Hugo Spadafora]] to assure Noriega of increased U.S. aid; and that within a year $200 million in additional U.S. funds and bank loans went to Noriega.[^16]
### NHAO and the contractors
North used the State Department's [[NHAO|Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] to move Contra supplies. The Kerry Committee report found that the State Department selected four companies owned or operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras: SETCO Air, established by the Honduran trafficker [[Juan Matta Ballesteros]]; DIACSA, a Miami air company that served as headquarters of a trafficking enterprise run by the convicted traffickers Floyd Carlton and Alfredo Caballero; Frigorificos de Puntarenas, owned and operated by Cuban-American traffickers; and Vortex, partly owned by the admitted trafficker [[Michael Palmer]]. The State Department paid the four a total of $806,401.20 between January and August 1986, and the report states that in each case federal law enforcement had received information about the individuals controlling the company before the contracts were signed.[^16] One of the pilots who flew Contra missions for SETCO was Frank Moss, who had been under investigation as an alleged trafficker since 1979 by ten different law enforcement agencies, without indictment.[^16]
North used the State Department's [[NHAO|Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] to move Contra supplies. The Kerry Committee report found that the State Department selected four companies owned or operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras: SETCO Air, established by the Honduran trafficker [[Juan Matta Ballesteros]]; DIACSA, a Miami air company that served as headquarters of a trafficking enterprise run by the convicted traffickers Floyd Carlton and Alfredo Caballero; Frigorificos de Puntarenas, owned and operated by Cuban-American traffickers; and Vortex, partly owned by the admitted trafficker [[Michael Palmer]]. The State Department paid the four a total of $806,401.20 between January and August 1986, and the report states that in each case federal law enforcement had received information about the individuals controlling the company before the contracts were signed.[^17] One of the pilots who flew Contra missions for SETCO was Frank Moss, who had been under investigation as an alleged trafficker since 1979 by ten different law enforcement agencies, without indictment.[^17]
Webb wrote that North installed his courier [[Robert Owen]] as a $50,000 "facilitator" at NHAO, that North instructed NHAO director Robert Duemling not to "dislodge or replace their existing arrangements," and that Fiers said: "I believe we guided them toward the carriers they ultimately used." Webb also wrote that Frigorificos was created by the [[Medellin Cartel]].[^15]
Webb wrote that North installed his courier [[Robert Owen]] as a $50,000 "facilitator" at NHAO, that North instructed NHAO director Robert Duemling not to "dislodge or replace their existing arrangements," and that Fiers said: "I believe we guided them toward the carriers they ultimately used." Webb also wrote that Frigorificos was created by the [[Medellin Cartel]].[^16]
### Barry Seal and Federico Vaughn
The Kerry Committee report states that the DEA informant [[Barry Seal]] photographed a man identified as Federico Vaughn, a Nicaraguan government official, and [[Pablo Escobar]] loading Seal's plane with drugs; that the Seal operation "was disclosed prematurely by an administration official who leaked to the press evidence supposedly collected" in an effort to influence a pending congressional vote on Contra aid; and that "one individual in the U.S. government, Lt. Col. Oliver North, decided to play politics with the issue."[^13] The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime found that the phone number Vaughn used in calls from Seal was controlled by the U.S. Embassy; the State Department later reported no evidence of Nicaraguan use for drug shipments to the United States "since the allegations made in 1984 in connection with the Seal case."[^13]
The Kerry Committee report states that the DEA informant [[Barry Seal]] photographed a man identified as Federico Vaughn, a Nicaraguan government official, and [[Pablo Escobar]] loading Seal's plane with drugs; that the Seal operation "was disclosed prematurely by an administration official who leaked to the press evidence supposedly collected" in an effort to influence a pending congressional vote on Contra aid; and that "one individual in the U.S. government, Lt. Col. Oliver North, decided to play politics with the issue."[^14] The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime found that the phone number Vaughn used in calls from Seal was controlled by the U.S. Embassy; the State Department later reported no evidence of Nicaraguan use for drug shipments to the United States "since the allegations made in 1984 in connection with the Seal case."[^14]
Webb wrote that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on the Seal sting and supplied with evidence; that North said his only involvement was as an observer; that North's diary contained a July 6, 1984 entry, "Freddy coming in late July," and an October 15, 1986 entry, "46 boxes of transcripts of SF Frogman case. Justice never provided"; that four DEA officials testified they were pressed by North and the CIA to leak Vaughn's involvement; and that after Seal was murdered North told the FBI of an "active measures program" by the Sandinistas against him and said he might be targeted by organized crime.[^12][^15] Seal was shot on February 19, 1986, as he parked at the Salvation Army Community Treatment Center in Baton Rouge, and three men were convicted of first-degree murder in 1987.[^17]
Webb wrote that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on the Seal sting and supplied with evidence; that North said his only involvement was as an observer; that North's diary contained a July 6, 1984 entry, "Freddy coming in late July," and an October 15, 1986 entry, "46 boxes of transcripts of SF Frogman case. Justice never provided"; that four DEA officials testified they were pressed by North and the CIA to leak Vaughn's involvement; and that after Seal was murdered North told the FBI of an "active measures program" by the Sandinistas against him and said he might be targeted by organized crime.[^12][^16] Seal was shot on February 19, 1986, as he parked at the Salvation Army Community Treatment Center in Baton Rouge, and three men were convicted of first-degree murder in 1987.[^18]
### Drug-related contacts
Webb wrote that North's courier Robert Owen reported to North in 1985 that a DC-6 owned by Mario Calero, brother of Adolfo Calero, "which is being used for runs out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; that Owen's phone number was found aboard a DC-4 seized by the DEA in March 1987 off Florida; and that a CIA cable said Frank Moss's notes aboard that plane contained "the names of two CIA officers and their telephone numbers."[^12] The Kerry report separately states that Honduran General José Bueso-Rosa, convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova in a plot to be financed by the sale of $40 million of cocaine, received a sentence cut to five years through intervention by senior U.S. officials, and that according to the United States's admissions in the North trial North suggested efforts be made concerning Bueso-Rosa to keep him from disclosing details.[^13]
Webb wrote that North's courier Robert Owen reported to North in 1985 that a DC-6 owned by Mario Calero, brother of Adolfo Calero, "which is being used for runs out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; that Owen's phone number was found aboard a DC-4 seized by the DEA in March 1987 off Florida; and that a CIA cable said Frank Moss's notes aboard that plane contained "the names of two CIA officers and their telephone numbers."[^12] The Kerry report separately states that Honduran General José Bueso-Rosa, convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova in a plot to be financed by the sale of $40 million of cocaine, received a sentence cut to five years through intervention by senior U.S. officials, and that according to the United States's admissions in the North trial North suggested efforts be made concerning Bueso-Rosa to keep him from disclosing details.[^14]
Webb wrote that at a 1984 meeting with DEA officials North suggested that $1.5 million in cocaine cash the DEA planned to seize from the Medellín cartel be turned over to the Contras, which the DEA declined; that a White House leak then blew the DEA operation; and that North wrote that Casey did not want the Contras' "unofficial funds" entering U.S. banks for fear Treasury agents would grow suspicious.[^18] Webb also wrote that North relied on fraudulent end-user certificates from Guatemala and Honduras after Boland, quoting Fiers: "an arms broker will get an intermediary country to issue false end-user certificates."[^19]
Webb wrote that at a 1984 meeting with DEA officials North suggested that $1.5 million in cocaine cash the DEA planned to seize from the Medellín cartel be turned over to the Contras, which the DEA declined; that a White House leak then blew the DEA operation; and that North wrote that Casey did not want the Contras' "unofficial funds" entering U.S. banks for fear Treasury agents would grow suspicious.[^19] Webb also wrote that North relied on fraudulent end-user certificates from Guatemala and Honduras after Boland, quoting Fiers: "an arms broker will get an intermediary country to issue false end-user certificates."[^20]
Webb further wrote that Dagoberto Núñez, a Costa Rican trafficker working for North and the CIA, signed a contract with the Sandinista agency Heroes and Martyrs Trading Corporation, and quoted a 1986 Owen memo to North: "He believes this will provide an opportunity to use his boats for cover operations, or to implicate the Ortegas and Borge in taking money on the side." In Webb's account, in November 1986 the FBI's "Operation Front Door" interviewed the realtor of [[Ronald Lister]], who said Lister claimed to run a "CIA-approved" security business and had told a neighbor he worked for North and Secord and had sent arms shipments to the Contras; the lead was not pursued.[^12][^20] The former Air Force intelligence officer [[Terry Reed]] claimed North was his CIA contact for a pilot-training program and a machine-tool front in [[Arkansas]], and described an Arkansas State Police "shredding party" to purge the state's [[Mena, Arkansas]] files of nearly a thousand documents including those naming North and Reed; North has denied knowing anything about Reed or Mena.[^12]
Webb further wrote that Dagoberto Núñez, a Costa Rican trafficker working for North and the CIA, signed a contract with the Sandinista agency Heroes and Martyrs Trading Corporation, and quoted a 1986 Owen memo to North: "He believes this will provide an opportunity to use his boats for cover operations, or to implicate the Ortegas and Borge in taking money on the side." In Webb's account, in November 1986 the FBI's "Operation Front Door" interviewed the realtor of [[Ronald Lister]], who said Lister claimed to run a "CIA-approved" security business and had told a neighbor he worked for North and Secord and had sent arms shipments to the Contras; the lead was not pursued.[^12][^21] The former Air Force intelligence officer [[Terry Reed]] claimed North was his CIA contact for a pilot-training program and a machine-tool front in [[Arkansas]], and described an Arkansas State Police "shredding party" to purge the state's [[Mena, Arkansas]] files of nearly a thousand documents including those naming North and Reed; North has denied knowing anything about Reed or Mena.[^12]
Webb quoted North's 1991 memoir, *Under Fire*, as saying that the death squads in El Salvador, "under the guise of anti-Communism," terrorized the entire country and murdered nuns, teachers, labor organizers, political opponents and thousands of other civilians, and that most of the activity was the responsibility of the ARENA party and its leader [[Roberto D'Aubuisson]].[^12]
@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ Webb quoted North's 1991 memoir, *Under Fire*, as saying that the death squads i
When the Iran arms sales and the Contra supply operation became public in October and November 1986, North told investigators little; the Independent Counsel wrote that his "wide destruction of records" eliminated possible documentary proof, and that he called the diversion the "secret within the secret."[^2] At the Select Committees' hearing on July 7, 1987, North testified under a grant of immunity that he believed the President had authorized the diversion.[^2] On November 25, 1986, Reagan telephoned North at a Sheraton hotel in Tysons Corner for two minutes; Reagan's sworn interrogatory answer says he told North he had no personal animus and "may have referred to LtCol North as a national hero."[^2]
North was indicted in March 1988 on 16 counts with Poindexter, Secord and Hakim. After the conspiracy count was dropped because of classified-information problems he stood trial before Judge Gerhard Gesell on 12 counts and on May 4, 1989 was found guilty on three: aiding and abetting the obstruction of Congress, shredding and altering official documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity from Secord in the form of a home-security system. The Court of Appeals vacated the convictions on July 20, 1990 because trial witnesses might have been affected by his immunized congressional testimony; the Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 28, 1991; and on remand, after Robert McFarlane testified that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to dismissal of the remaining counts with prejudice on September 16, 1991.[^1] President [[George H.W. Bush]] did not pardon North. On December 24, 1992 Bush pardoned [[Caspar Weinberger]], McFarlane, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], Clair George and Fiers.[^21]
North was indicted in March 1988 on 16 counts with Poindexter, Secord and Hakim. After the conspiracy count was dropped because of classified-information problems he stood trial before Judge Gerhard Gesell on 12 counts and on May 4, 1989 was found guilty on three: aiding and abetting the obstruction of Congress, shredding and altering official documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity from Secord in the form of a home-security system. The Court of Appeals vacated the convictions on July 20, 1990 because trial witnesses might have been affected by his immunized congressional testimony; the Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 28, 1991; and on remand, after Robert McFarlane testified that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to dismissal of the remaining counts with prejudice on September 16, 1991.[^1] President [[George H.W. Bush]] did not pardon North. On December 24, 1992 Bush pardoned [[Caspar Weinberger]], McFarlane, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], Clair George and Fiers.[^22]
Seymour wrote that North reportedly attended a White House prayer group that [[Nita Scoggan]], wife of a [[Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship International]] member, was invited to form by a Reagan aide who later worked for [[Pat Robertson]]'s presidential campaign.[^11]
@ -139,12 +141,13 @@ Seymour wrote that North reportedly attended a White House prayer group that [[N
[^10]: Graham Exhibit 1, Deposition of Daniel O. Graham, Appendix B, vol. 12 (Internet Archive item micro_IA41152840_0234).
[^11]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
[^12]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, chapters 6, 13 and 20.
[^13]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988 (Panama chapter; "Barry Seal and the Cartel"; "Bueso-Rosa and the Contras"; Nicaragua chapter). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, section on the "Quid Pro Quo" admission and the "Heads of State" documents.
[^15]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapters 11 and 12.
[^16]: Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, section "U.S. Government Funds and Companies with Drug Connections."
[^17]: Lau, Maya, and Amy Wold. "Man who gunned down drug informant Barry Seal in Baton Rouge street dies at Angola." *The Advocate* (Baton Rouge), September 2, 2015, citing court documents. https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_f09fb38d-4bb9-59ea-bda3-557497d84561.html
[^18]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 11.
[^19]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 10.
[^20]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 20.
[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary and ch. 27, notes on pardons of December 24, 1992. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
[^13]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
[^14]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988 (Panama chapter; "Barry Seal and the Cartel"; "Bueso-Rosa and the Contras"; Nicaragua chapter). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^15]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, section on the "Quid Pro Quo" admission and the "Heads of State" documents.
[^16]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapters 11 and 12.
[^17]: Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, section "U.S. Government Funds and Companies with Drug Connections."
[^18]: Lau, Maya, and Amy Wold. "Man who gunned down drug informant Barry Seal in Baton Rouge street dies at Angola." *The Advocate* (Baton Rouge), September 2, 2015, citing court documents. https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_f09fb38d-4bb9-59ea-bda3-557497d84561.html
[^19]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 11.
[^20]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 10.
[^21]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 20.
[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary and ch. 27, notes on pardons of December 24, 1992. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm

77
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Richard Secord.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
- Dick Secord
- General Secord
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-14
category: "Military"
tags:
- Person
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ relations:
with: "[[Oliver North]]"
role: "paid for a home security system for North and set up a 200,000 dollar Swiss account for North's family; both were charged as illegal gratuities"
start: 1986
fn: 53
fn: 54
- type: investigated
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
reverse: true
@ -178,50 +178,54 @@ The resupply operation that flew arms to the contras from [[Ilopango Airbase]] i
On October 5, 1986, a resupply aircraft was shot down over [[Nicaragua]] and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Walsh wrote that the Enterprise had effectively ceased its Central American activities after the shootdown.[^4] Before it, Secord and Hakim at North's request had three checks issued to pay outstanding contra grocery bills. Afterward Secord told Quintero to set aside a second check for 75,000 dollars and a third for 50,000 dollars to establish a defense fund for Hasenfus.[^31]
In September 1986 Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] discussed with North an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras and suggested that North's ship, the Erria, dock at [[Haifa]] to be filled from a recently seized PLO shipment. [[John Poindexter]] sanctioned the offer: "It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless.... Keep the pressure on Bill [Casey] to make things right for Secord."[^34]
### The Enterprise: The HAWK Shipment of November 1985
A letter dated November 19, 1985, which North signed with his own name for the national security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]], asked Secord, described as a retired U.S. Air Force general officer, to proceed to a third-country transit point and arrange the transfer of "sensitive materiel" being shipped from Israel.[^34] The Tower Commission recorded that [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]] of the CIA told the U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to be in touch with a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge was told was an alias for Secord, and that a CIA field officer attributed the failure of the arrangements to the amateurish way in which Secord and his associates approached officials in the government from which landing clearance was needed.[^35][^36] The Israelis transferred 1 million dollars on November 20, 1985 to the Enterprise's Lake Resources account to pay for airlifting the missiles; after 18 HAWKs were delivered and the Iranians rejected them, about 870,000 dollars remained in Lake Resources, commingled with other funds and used for the contras and other purposes.[^37] Clines accompanied Secord to Europe in late November 1985 to facilitate the shipment.[^38] Secord testified that the Israelis did not ask for the money back, and that North told him "we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^39] Secord quickly chartered a jet to fly the 18 HAWKs to Iran under cover of a humanitarian mission, according to the Los Angeles Times.[^1]
A letter dated November 19, 1985, which North signed with his own name for the national security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]], asked Secord, described as a retired U.S. Air Force general officer, to proceed to a third-country transit point and arrange the transfer of "sensitive materiel" being shipped from Israel.[^35] The Tower Commission recorded that [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]] of the CIA told the U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to be in touch with a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge was told was an alias for Secord, and that a CIA field officer attributed the failure of the arrangements to the amateurish way in which Secord and his associates approached officials in the government from which landing clearance was needed.[^36][^37] The Israelis transferred 1 million dollars on November 20, 1985 to the Enterprise's Lake Resources account to pay for airlifting the missiles; after 18 HAWKs were delivered and the Iranians rejected them, about 870,000 dollars remained in Lake Resources, commingled with other funds and used for the contras and other purposes.[^38] Clines accompanied Secord to Europe in late November 1985 to facilitate the shipment.[^39] Secord testified that the Israelis did not ask for the money back, and that North told him "we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^40] Secord quickly chartered a jet to fly the 18 HAWKs to Iran under cover of a humanitarian mission, according to the Los Angeles Times.[^1]
### The Enterprise: Iran Arms Sales and Swiss Accounts
More than 47.6 million dollars from the Iran and contra operations flowed into the Enterprise's Swiss accounts. The largest share went to Lake Resources Inc. (31.5 million), with Energy Resources International (11.3 million) and Hyde Park Square Corporation (4.8 million) receiving the rest.[^29] Lake Resources was controlled by Hakim and later pleaded guilty to the corporate felony of theft of government property for diverting the proceeds of the arms sales.[^30] The Enterprise transferred 12.2 million dollars to a CIA Swiss account for weapons sold to Iran.[^29]
[[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], an Iranian exile and former CIA informant whom the agency had discredited as a fabricator, was a driving force behind the proposals to sell arms to Iran.[^40] On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a covert-action Finding that authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran, with Secord acting as an agent of the CIA. Under the Finding, Secord was to collect payment in advance and deposit the Defense Department's cost in a CIA account.[^40] In January 1986 North and Secord negotiated on behalf of the United States the sale of 4,000 TOW missiles to Iran, at 10,000 dollars per missile for an initial 1,000. In February 1986 [[Adnan Khashoggi]] deposited 10 million dollars into Lake Resources to finance the first sale; on February 10 and 11, 3.7 million dollars went from Lake to a CIA account, and the surplus on the sale was 5.6 million dollars.[^40] In February 1986 Secord, using the alias Major General Adams, requested alias documentation from North, and on February 20 he met Ghorbanifar in [[Frankfurt]] with North, [[Amiram Nir]] and a CIA officer.[^41] In May 1986 about 16.7 million dollars in Iranian and Israeli payments for HAWK parts and TOW replenishment went into Lake Resources, leaving a surplus of 9.2 million dollars.[^40] When Robert McFarlane flew to Tehran on May 25, 1986, Secord and one communicator remained in [[Tel Aviv]].[^42] A further 500 TOW missiles were sold in October 1986, and the Enterprise cleared 1.463 million dollars on that sale.[^40]
[[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], an Iranian exile and former CIA informant whom the agency had discredited as a fabricator, was a driving force behind the proposals to sell arms to Iran.[^41] On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a covert-action Finding that authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran, with Secord acting as an agent of the CIA. Under the Finding, Secord was to collect payment in advance and deposit the Defense Department's cost in a CIA account.[^41] In January 1986 North and Secord negotiated on behalf of the United States the sale of 4,000 TOW missiles to Iran, at 10,000 dollars per missile for an initial 1,000. In February 1986 [[Adnan Khashoggi]] deposited 10 million dollars into Lake Resources to finance the first sale; on February 10 and 11, 3.7 million dollars went from Lake to a CIA account, and the surplus on the sale was 5.6 million dollars.[^41] In February 1986 Secord, using the alias Major General Adams, requested alias documentation from North, and on February 20 he met Ghorbanifar in [[Frankfurt]] with North, [[Amiram Nir]] and a CIA officer.[^42] In May 1986 about 16.7 million dollars in Iranian and Israeli payments for HAWK parts and TOW replenishment went into Lake Resources, leaving a surplus of 9.2 million dollars.[^41] When Robert McFarlane flew to Tehran on May 25, 1986, Secord and one communicator remained in [[Tel Aviv]].[^43] A further 500 TOW missiles were sold in October 1986, and the Enterprise cleared 1.463 million dollars on that sale.[^41]
Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion of arms-sale proceeds to the contras was 3.6 million dollars, and he judged the figure to be at least 1.1 million dollars low. Walsh wrote that North pressed Secord to send money from the Iran operation to the contra operation, and that Secord "claimed he did not view this as a diversion."[^43] In July 1986 the Enterprise paid Defex Portugal 2.6 million dollars and paid the Syrian arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; Walsh left the Al-Kassar payment out of his diversion estimate because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^44]
Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion of arms-sale proceeds to the contras was 3.6 million dollars, and he judged the figure to be at least 1.1 million dollars low. Walsh wrote that North pressed Secord to send money from the Iran operation to the contra operation, and that Secord "claimed he did not view this as a diversion."[^44] In July 1986 the Enterprise paid Defex Portugal 2.6 million dollars and paid the Syrian arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; Walsh left the Al-Kassar payment out of his diversion estimate because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^45]
### Secord's Personal Receipts
Walsh found that Secord personally received 1.037 million dollars in cash from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986, of which about 34,000 dollars was accounted for as legitimate expenses or withdrawals from his profits. Three payments totaling 796,000 dollars were unaccounted for. Secord said he gave two cash payments, of 225,000 and 260,000 dollars received on May 15 and 21, 1986, to the Israeli official Amiram Nir, and a further 311,000 dollars in July 1986 to the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar. He produced no documentation for any of them, and Ghorbanifar denied receiving the 311,000 dollars. The Independent Counsel stated that Nir had died and that the Israelis denied their government ever received the funds.[^45]
Walsh found that Secord personally received 1.037 million dollars in cash from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986, of which about 34,000 dollars was accounted for as legitimate expenses or withdrawals from his profits. Three payments totaling 796,000 dollars were unaccounted for. Secord said he gave two cash payments, of 225,000 and 260,000 dollars received on May 15 and 21, 1986, to the Israeli official Amiram Nir, and a further 311,000 dollars in July 1986 to the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar. He produced no documentation for any of them, and Ghorbanifar denied receiving the 311,000 dollars. The Independent Counsel stated that Nir had died and that the Israelis denied their government ever received the funds.[^46]
Walsh found that in July 1985 Secord had CSF delete his name from the Enterprise profit accounts, and that his profit distributions, totaling 1,457,568 dollars, were credited to a shell company, Korel Assets, whose documents he signed on September 20, 1985. Withdrawals from the Korel account paid for a small private airplane, a Porsche and a stay at a German weight-reduction spa. Walsh concluded that Secord personally received at least 2 million dollars from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986. His 1985 return reported adjusted gross income of 147,000 dollars and answered "no" when asked about foreign financial accounts, and Walsh did not charge him with a tax offense because the Swiss records could not be used in a tax case.[^46] Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise in the same years.[^47]
Walsh found that in July 1985 Secord had CSF delete his name from the Enterprise profit accounts, and that his profit distributions, totaling 1,457,568 dollars, were credited to a shell company, Korel Assets, whose documents he signed on September 20, 1985. Withdrawals from the Korel account paid for a small private airplane, a Porsche and a stay at a German weight-reduction spa. Walsh concluded that Secord personally received at least 2 million dollars from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986. His 1985 return reported adjusted gross income of 147,000 dollars and answered "no" when asked about foreign financial accounts, and Walsh did not charge him with a tax offense because the Swiss records could not be used in a tax case.[^47] Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise in the same years.[^48]
### Congressional Testimony, May 1987
In December 1986 Secord was subpoenaed by the intelligence committees and refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. In February 1987 he refused to testify before the grand jury, and in March 1987 he appeared before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. in response to a corporate subpoena and denied having custody of Enterprise records. In late April 1987 he agreed to testify voluntarily.[^48] He was the first witness before the joint House and Senate committees, testifying from May 5 to May 8, 1987, without immunity. He was recalled and deposed in June 1987.[^2][^48] Newsweek wrote on May 5, 1987 that committee chairman Senator [[Daniel Inouye]] said Secord "feels sincerely that he has nothing to hide."[^6] Walsh's assessment was that Secord "provided an enormous amount of largely truthful information regarding the Enterprise's operational workings," but that his "responses to questions about its financial activities were much less candid."[^48]
In December 1986 Secord was subpoenaed by the intelligence committees and refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. In February 1987 he refused to testify before the grand jury, and in March 1987 he appeared before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. in response to a corporate subpoena and denied having custody of Enterprise records. In late April 1987 he agreed to testify voluntarily.[^49] He was the first witness before the joint House and Senate committees, testifying from May 5 to May 8, 1987, without immunity. He was recalled and deposed in June 1987.[^2][^49] Newsweek wrote on May 5, 1987 that committee chairman Senator [[Daniel Inouye]] said Secord "feels sincerely that he has nothing to hide."[^6] Walsh's assessment was that Secord "provided an enormous amount of largely truthful information regarding the Enterprise's operational workings," but that his "responses to questions about its financial activities were much less candid."[^49]
On the first day Secord testified, according to the New York Times, that about 3.5 million dollars of 12 million dollars in profits from the sale of arms to Iran was spent on behalf of the contras, that more than half of the money was kept by his partner Hakim, and that part of the rest was used for a secret project unrelated to Iran or Nicaragua that he did not identify; he said: "We believed our conduct was in the furtherance of the President's policies," and "I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it."[^49] In his testimony Secord said that North told him several times that he had mentioned to President Reagan that it was "very ironic" that "some of the ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras"; Secord said, "Whether he actually said this to the president, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure," and that it was "not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke."[^50] He said he had no direct knowledge of what the president knew, and that he had spoken to officials including Casey, McFarlane and [[John Poindexter]], some of whom told him the president was aware of what he was doing with the contras. He said that a White House aide told him on November 25, 1986 that "they'd already built a wall around the president," and that [[Edwin Meese]]'s remarks that day "betrayed all of us, and it's unforgivable."[^50] On the third day he acknowledged that the Enterprise had amassed 12 million dollars in cash and assets in about two years, said the money was intended for future operations, and agreed that it had been set up at the request of Poindexter and North.[^51]
On the first day Secord testified, according to the New York Times, that about 3.5 million dollars of 12 million dollars in profits from the sale of arms to Iran was spent on behalf of the contras, that more than half of the money was kept by his partner Hakim, and that part of the rest was used for a secret project unrelated to Iran or Nicaragua that he did not identify; he said: "We believed our conduct was in the furtherance of the President's policies," and "I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it."[^50] In his testimony Secord said that North told him several times that he had mentioned to President Reagan that it was "very ironic" that "some of the ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras"; Secord said, "Whether he actually said this to the president, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure," and that it was "not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke."[^51] He said he had no direct knowledge of what the president knew, and that he had spoken to officials including Casey, McFarlane and John Poindexter, some of whom told him the president was aware of what he was doing with the contras. He said that a White House aide told him on November 25, 1986 that "they'd already built a wall around the president," and that [[Edwin Meese]]'s remarks that day "betrayed all of us, and it's unforgivable."[^51] On the third day he acknowledged that the Enterprise had amassed 12 million dollars in cash and assets in about two years, said the money was intended for future operations, and agreed that it had been set up at the request of Poindexter and North.[^52]
Walsh listed the statements on which the 1989 charges were based. Secord testified that he had waived all interest in Enterprise profits after July 1985, that Korel was not his company, that he had received no money from the Iran sales beyond his salary, that Defex was set up to hide the source of Enterprise funds from arms dealers, and that he held no beneficial interest in foreign accounts other than a British checking account. Walsh found each of these statements false. Walsh also found that the 500,000 dollars STTGI received from CSF was not a loan, as Secord had testified, and that STTGI in fact received at least 700,000 dollars. Walsh described Hakim, who had received limited use immunity from Congress, as the committees' chief source for Enterprise financial information.[^48]
Walsh listed the statements on which the 1989 charges were based. Secord testified that he had waived all interest in Enterprise profits after July 1985, that Korel was not his company, that he had received no money from the Iran sales beyond his salary, that Defex was set up to hide the source of Enterprise funds from arms dealers, and that he held no beneficial interest in foreign accounts other than a British checking account. Walsh found each of these statements false. Walsh also found that the 500,000 dollars STTGI received from CSF was not a loan, as Secord had testified, and that STTGI in fact received at least 700,000 dollars. Walsh described Hakim, who had received limited use immunity from Congress, as the committees' chief source for Enterprise financial information.[^49]
### Indictment, Plea and Sentence
The Independent Counsel indicted Secord on March 16, 1988, together with Poindexter, North and Hakim, in a 23-count indictment whose first count charged conspiracy to defraud the United States; Secord was named in six felony counts that included conspiracy and theft and three counts of illegal gratuities paid to North.[^5][^30] The conspiracy and theft charges were dismissed because of problems with classified information, and the trials of the four defendants were severed. On May 11, 1989 a second indictment charged Secord with nine counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements.[^5][^48]
The Independent Counsel indicted Secord on March 16, 1988, together with Poindexter, North and Hakim, in a 23-count indictment whose first count charged conspiracy to defraud the United States; Secord was named in six felony counts that included conspiracy and theft and three counts of illegal gratuities paid to North.[^5][^30] The conspiracy and theft charges were dismissed because of problems with classified information, and the trials of the four defendants were severed. On May 11, 1989 a second indictment charged Secord with nine counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements.[^5][^49]
On November 8, 1989, five days before he was to stand trial on twelve felony charges, Secord pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, admitting that he lied when he denied that North had received personal benefits from the Enterprise.[^48] The Deseret News reported that the plea was taken before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.; that Secord told the judge he had answered "no" "in a misguided effort to prevent further criticism" of North and himself; that the offense carried up to five years in prison; and that Walsh's chief prosecutor in the Secord case, [[Reid Weingarten]] told the judge the government was prepared to prove that Secord provided North with a home security system costing almost 14,000 dollars and a Swiss bank account containing 200,000 dollars funded by arms profits.[^52] Under the plea Secord agreed to cooperate in the pending trials and the Independent Counsel's investigation.[^48]
On November 8, 1989, five days before he was to stand trial on twelve felony charges, Secord pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, admitting that he lied when he denied that North had received personal benefits from the Enterprise.[^49] The Deseret News reported that the plea was taken before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.; that Secord told the judge he had answered "no" "in a misguided effort to prevent further criticism" of North and himself; that the offense carried up to five years in prison; and that Walsh's chief prosecutor in the Secord case, [[Reid Weingarten]] told the judge the government was prepared to prove that Secord provided North with a home security system costing almost 14,000 dollars and a Swiss bank account containing 200,000 dollars funded by arms profits.[^53] Under the plea Secord agreed to cooperate in the pending trials and the Independent Counsel's investigation.[^49]
The gratuities concerned a 16,000 dollar security system installed at North's home in Great Falls, Virginia, after Secord introduced North to Glenn A. Robinette in the spring of 1986, and a 200,000 dollar Swiss account, the "B. Button" account, set up in 1986 to help educate North's children; Walsh wrote that the Independent Counsel could not prove that North accepted or received any of the money in that account.[^53] A 1989 conviction of North on the gratuity charge was later overturned on appeal.[^53]
The gratuities concerned a 16,000 dollar security system installed at North's home in Great Falls, Virginia, after Secord introduced North to Glenn A. Robinette in the spring of 1986, and a 200,000 dollar Swiss account, the "B. Button" account, set up in 1986 to help educate North's children; Walsh wrote that the Independent Counsel could not prove that North accepted or received any of the money in that account.[^54] A 1989 conviction of North on the gratuity charge was later overturned on appeal.[^54]
Robinson sentenced Secord on January 24, 1990, to two years' probation.[^5]
Thomas Clines was indicted in February 1990 following the cooperation of Secord and Hakim, and was convicted in September 1990 of four tax felonies after a two-week jury trial in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Secord, compelled to testify under a cooperation agreement, was a central prosecution witness; he admitted there that the Korel account was his own investment account, a fact he had denied before his plea.[^38][^46]
Thomas Clines was indicted in February 1990 following the cooperation of Secord and Hakim, and was convicted in September 1990 of four tax felonies after a two-week jury trial in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Secord, compelled to testify under a cooperation agreement, was a central prosecution witness; he admitted there that the Korel account was his own investment account, a fact he had denied before his plea.[^39][^47]
### Later Activity and the Memoir
Secord published the memoir *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, written with [[Jay Wurts]] and published by John Wiley & Sons in 1992.[^54] The Washington Post obituary says that in the memoir he maintained he joined the operation out of what he saw as patriotic duty, and that later disclosures suggested financial motives "played no small role."[^2] In a 1987 interview with [[Playboy]] he said: "I feel I was betrayed."[^2]
Secord published the memoir *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, written with [[Jay Wurts]] and published by John Wiley & Sons in 1992.[^55] The Washington Post obituary says that in the memoir he maintained he joined the operation out of what he saw as patriotic duty, and that later disclosures suggested financial motives "played no small role."[^2] In a 1987 interview with [[Playboy]] he said: "I feel I was betrayed."[^2]
After leaving the Air Force, Secord was a top executive at Computerized Thermal Imaging, a computer imaging firm, and was president of the Air Commando Association.[^2] He and his wife had formed Secord Associates in 1983 and bought three houses near their McLean, Virginia, home.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1987, "Secord: A Specialist in Covert Deals" ("Skilled Secret Soldier"), CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000201700001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201700001-4.
[^2]: Bill Hewitt, "Richard V. Secord, general embroiled in Iran-contra affair, dies at 92," *Washington Post*, Oct. 16, 2024, text reprinted by the National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/media/32473/ocr.
[^3]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, *Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., May 5-8, 1987 (Hearings 100-1), p. 46, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
@ -255,24 +259,25 @@ After leaving the Air Force, Secord was a top executive at Computerized Thermal
[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Southern Air Transport, Jetstar and Hasenfus defense-fund passages).
[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Dutton outline of the resupply operation, dated July 21, 1986).
[^33]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 3, pp. 66-67.
[^34]: *The Tower Commission Report* (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), p. 32, https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit.
[^35]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 162.
[^36]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 73.
[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Phase IV and November 1985 HAWK shipment), citing the Israeli Financial Chronology, Apr. 26, 1987.
[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
[^39]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 95; cited in Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 32.
[^40]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Direct U.S. Arms Sales to Iran; February 1986, May-August 1986 and October-November 1986 sections).
[^41]: *The Tower Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.
[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 296.
[^43]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (The Iran/Contra Diversion), citing Secord, FBI 302, Mar. 12, 1988, p. 4.
[^44]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, and n. 51.
[^45]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances), citing Secord, OIC Interview, Mar. 9, 1988, pp. 106-07, Secord, Grand Jury, Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 150-51, and Ghorbanifar, OIC Deposition, Dec. 10, 1987, p. 94.
[^46]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances; Korel perjury charge; Secord, Clines Trial Testimony, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 193).
[^47]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
[^48]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Testimony to Congress and Independent Counsel; Secord Indicted; Obstruction, Perjury and False Statements).
[^49]: David E. Rosenbaum, "Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on U.S. Arms Aid," *New York Times*, dateline May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605580005-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605580005-6.
[^50]: "North Said He Mentioned Diversion to Reagan, Secord Says," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550012-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550012-3.
[^51]: Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, "Secord Testifies Unspent Money Was for Future Operations, Not His Use," *Washington Post*, May 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550011-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550011-4.
[^52]: "Secord guilty of lying to Congress," *Deseret News*, Nov. 8, 1989, https://www.deseret.com/1989/11/8/18831419/secord-guilty-of-lying-to-congress/.
[^53]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Gratuities to North: The Basis for the Guilty Plea; The North Security Fence; The "B. Button" Account; n. 13).
[^54]: Richard V. Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (John Wiley & Sons, 1992), ISBN 0471573280, https://archive.org/details/honoredbetrayedi0000seco.
[^34]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
[^35]: *The Tower Commission Report* (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), p. 32, https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit.
[^36]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 162.
[^37]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 73.
[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Phase IV and November 1985 HAWK shipment), citing the Israeli Financial Chronology, Apr. 26, 1987.
[^39]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
[^40]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 95; cited in Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 32.
[^41]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Direct U.S. Arms Sales to Iran; February 1986, May-August 1986 and October-November 1986 sections).
[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.
[^43]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 296.
[^44]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (The Iran/Contra Diversion), citing Secord, FBI 302, Mar. 12, 1988, p. 4.
[^45]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, and n. 51.
[^46]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances), citing Secord, OIC Interview, Mar. 9, 1988, pp. 106-07, Secord, Grand Jury, Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 150-51, and Ghorbanifar, OIC Deposition, Dec. 10, 1987, p. 94.
[^47]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances; Korel perjury charge; Secord, Clines Trial Testimony, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 193).
[^48]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
[^49]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Testimony to Congress and Independent Counsel; Secord Indicted; Obstruction, Perjury and False Statements).
[^50]: David E. Rosenbaum, "Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on U.S. Arms Aid," *New York Times*, dateline May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605580005-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605580005-6.
[^51]: "North Said He Mentioned Diversion to Reagan, Secord Says," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550012-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550012-3.
[^52]: Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, "Secord Testifies Unspent Money Was for Future Operations, Not His Use," *Washington Post*, May 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550011-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550011-4.
[^53]: "Secord guilty of lying to Congress," *Deseret News*, Nov. 8, 1989, https://www.deseret.com/1989/11/8/18831419/secord-guilty-of-lying-to-congress/.
[^54]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Gratuities to North: The Basis for the Guilty Plea; The North Security Fence; The "B. Button" Account; n. 13).
[^55]: Richard V. Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (John Wiley & Sons, 1992), ISBN 0471573280, https://archive.org/details/honoredbetrayedi0000seco.

7
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Uri Simchoni.md
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@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ tags:
- IranContra
- Israel
- Military
summary: "Brigadier General Uri Simchoni was a member of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee."
summary: "Brigadier General Uri Simchoni was, according to Ari Ben-Menashe, a member of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee."
---
Brigadier General [[Uri Simchoni]] was a member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]. He served at various times as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations for the [[Israel]] and as a military attaché in [[Washington, D.C.]]. He had also been the chief of the elite [[Golani infantry brigade|Golani infantry brigade]].[^1]
Brigadier General [[Uri Simchoni]] was, according to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], a member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]. He served at various times as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations for the [[Israel]] and as a military attaché in [[Washington, D.C.]]. He had also been the chief of the elite [[Golani infantry brigade|Golani infantry brigade]].[^1]
[[Uri Simchoni|Simchoni]] was part of the [[Israel|Israeli]] delegation at the October 1980 [[Paris Summit Meeting]], which included [[George H.W. Bush]], [[William J. Casey]], and [[Mehdi Karrubi]].[^1]
Simchoni was part of the Israeli delegation at the October 1980 [[Paris Summit Meeting]], which included [[George H.W. Bush]], [[William J. Casey]], and [[Mehdi Karrubi]].[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

61
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Walt Rostow.md
View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ tags: [OSS, EnemyObjectivesUnit, AirTargeting, MITCenterForInternationalStudies,
aliases: [Walt Rostow, Walt Whitman Rostow, Walter W. Rostow, W. W. Rostow, W.W. Rostow, Walter Rostow]
summary: "American economist who served in the OSS Enemy Objectives Unit in London, chaired the State Department Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966, and was Johnson's national security adviser from 1966 to 1969."
created: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-14
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]]"
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
role: "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
start: "1966"
end: "1969"
fn: 29
fn: 30
- type: employed_by
with: "[[University of Texas at Austin]]"
role: "professor of economics"
@ -123,43 +123,45 @@ The State Department record lists Rostow as chairman of the Policy Planning Coun
On February 15, 1965, Rostow sent Assistant Secretary [[William Bundy]] three points on a possible negotiation. He thought [[Hanoi]] might be driving for a settlement, that a "land grab" was likely, perhaps in the [[Laos]] corridor, and that the United States should consider a preemptive ground force move in that area and inside [[South Vietnam]], because air and naval power would be hard to use during a negotiation.[^27] Eight days earlier McGeorge Bundy's memorandum from Saigon had set out a "policy of sustained reprisal", described in Annex A as "graduated and continuing reprisal" against [[North Vietnam]].[^28]
In August 1965 Rostow attended a Washington meeting on the mission to Vietnam of Edward Lansdale. Attendees included officials from State, the White House, AID, USIA and the CIA, among them [[William Colby]]. Lansdale described his aim as finding out what the Vietnamese thought, what they wanted and what they would do. Rostow suggested that Lansdale have a liaison officer who would keep other agencies and Washington advised of his efforts and thinking.[^29]
### National Security Adviser, 1966 to 1969
By April 1966 Rostow was the President's special assistant, as the headings of his memoranda show.[^29]
By April 1966 Rostow was the President's special assistant, as the headings of his memoranda show.[^30]
#### POL strikes, June 1966
On June 14, 1966, Johnson wrote [[Harold Wilson]] that Rusk had discussed "the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi" with him. POL is the standard abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.[^30] At the National Security Council meeting of June 17, Rostow argued: "Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy." He added that "our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges." [[Arthur Goldberg]] argued that the risk of widening the bombing to POL targets was too great. Rostow's memorandum to Johnson of the previous day said he had "marched carefully through all the considerations" with Goldberg.[^31] On June 28 [[Robert McNamara]] telephoned Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening.[^32] On July 5 a telegram from the acting secretary of state reported that "Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow." On July 7 Rostow wrote Johnson that the speech at Omaha on June 30 had been "a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL."[^32][^33]
On June 14, 1966, Johnson wrote [[Harold Wilson]] that Rusk had discussed "the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi" with him. POL is the standard abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.[^31] At the National Security Council meeting of June 17, Rostow argued: "Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy." He added that "our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges." [[Arthur Goldberg]] argued that the risk of widening the bombing to POL targets was too great. Rostow's memorandum to Johnson of the previous day said he had "marched carefully through all the considerations" with Goldberg.[^32] On June 28 [[Robert McNamara]] telephoned Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening.[^33] On July 5 a telegram from the acting secretary of state reported that "Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow." On July 7 Rostow wrote Johnson that the speech at Omaha on June 30 had been "a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL."[^33][^34]
#### The Rostow thesis
In a memorandum of September 15, 1966, Rostow set out the case that bombing imposed a cumulative burden on Hanoi, and that without it Hanoi had no incentive to stop. He wrote that bombing "has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese." He listed its effects: it engaged a large amount of civilian manpower for repair and air defense, caused economic stagnation or decline, imposed "a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time," limited shipping, and left most foreign aid shoring up the North rather than the South. "Put another way," he wrote, "without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off." He cited a 1962 interview with Hanoi leaders published in the [[Saturday Evening Post]], whose "punch line" was: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."[^34]
In a memorandum of September 15, 1966, Rostow set out the case that bombing imposed a cumulative burden on Hanoi, and that without it Hanoi had no incentive to stop. He wrote that bombing "has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese." He listed its effects: it engaged a large amount of civilian manpower for repair and air defense, caused economic stagnation or decline, imposed "a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time," limited shipping, and left most foreign aid shoring up the North rather than the South. "Put another way," he wrote, "without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off." He cited a 1962 interview with Hanoi leaders published in the [[Saturday Evening Post]], whose "punch line" was: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."[^35]
#### Tet, 1968
On January 31, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk an outline of headings for a presidential speech on Asia. A marginal note in an unknown hand reads "This is WWR not LBJ."[^35] On February 5 he gave Johnson a written account of the fighting, which he said was in answer to a question from [[Elspeth Davies Rostow]], his wife. He described the attacks on the cities and at [[Khe Sanh]] as the enemy committing a large part of its "capital," its pools of military forces and firepower, on the believed vulnerability of the South Vietnamese government and of American public opinion.[^36] On February 6 he reported the findings from captured prisoners and documents. One prisoner captured on January 31 said that the attack "was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace."[^36]
On January 31, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk an outline of headings for a presidential speech on Asia. A marginal note in an unknown hand reads "This is WWR not LBJ."[^36] On February 5 he gave Johnson a written account of the fighting, which he said was in answer to a question from [[Elspeth Davies Rostow]], his wife. He described the attacks on the cities and at [[Khe Sanh]] as the enemy committing a large part of its "capital," its pools of military forces and firepower, on the believed vulnerability of the South Vietnamese government and of American public opinion.[^37] On February 6 he reported the findings from captured prisoners and documents. One prisoner captured on January 31 said that the attack "was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace."[^37]
#### Israel, 1967
On May 25, 1967, Rostow sent Johnson an Israeli intelligence estimate with a CIA appraisal attached. The appraisal, he noted, "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^37] On June 5 Rostow telephoned Johnson to read him a draft statement on the outbreak of fighting.[^38] His covering memorandum on a meeting among [[Meir Amit]], [[Walworth Barbour]] and [[Harry C. McPherson Jr.]] said that Amit's account was consistent with [[Levi Eshkol]]'s, and added: "At least that's his story."[^39]
On May 25, 1967, Rostow sent Johnson an Israeli intelligence estimate with a CIA appraisal attached. The appraisal, he noted, "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^38] On June 5 Rostow telephoned Johnson to read him a draft statement on the outbreak of fighting.[^39] His covering memorandum on a meeting among [[Meir Amit]], [[Walworth Barbour]] and [[Harry C. McPherson Jr.]] said that Amit's account was consistent with [[Levi Eshkol]]'s, and added: "At least that's his story."[^40]
### Security clearance
A CIA Office of Security memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence dated April 11, 1958, furnished in case Mr. Dillon should seek the agency's opinion of "Rostow's record and security standing," states that Rostow "has twice been denied clearance for OCB employment by the NSC Security Office," that he "was also disapproved for employment by Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover," and that he "has been denied a security clearance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense." The memorandum adds that in 1953 a CIA employee, since resigned, had threatened to take Rostow's case to the McCarran Committee.[^7]
In October 1967 Senator [[Strom Thurmond]] reported in his column in *The Clinton Chronicle* on a brief filed for [[Otto Otepka]], a State Department security officer, before a departmental hearing officer. The column stated that under the Eisenhower administration Rostow had twice been denied a State Department clearance "to handle" sensitive data, that Otepka had expressed reservations in 1960 about a proposed clearance for Rostow and had indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate [[Robert F. Kennedy]] that he would probably still evaluate the file in the same manner, and that Rostow was then given immediate clearance as a White House aide.[^40] *Human Events* of October 23, 1967 reported the brief's account that the Air Force "had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow" and that Under Secretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]], as chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, decided that Rostow would not be used as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with a psychological warfare project.[^41]
In October 1967 Senator [[Strom Thurmond]] reported in his column in *The Clinton Chronicle* on a brief filed for [[Otto Otepka]], a State Department security officer, before a departmental hearing officer. The column stated that under the Eisenhower administration Rostow had twice been denied a State Department clearance "to handle" sensitive data, that Otepka had expressed reservations in 1960 about a proposed clearance for Rostow and had indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate [[Robert F. Kennedy]] that he would probably still evaluate the file in the same manner, and that Rostow was then given immediate clearance as a White House aide.[^41] *Human Events* of October 23, 1967 reported the brief's account that the Air Force "had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow" and that Under Secretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]], as chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, decided that Rostow would not be used as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with a psychological warfare project.[^42]
The Associated Press reported that Rostow denied the account. "From 1951 onward," he told a reporter, "I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the federal government." The Associated Press noted that he did not say what assignment in 1951 had required clearance, and that his Who's Who entry listed him as a staff member of the Center for International Studies from 1951 to 1960.[^42]
The Associated Press reported that Rostow denied the account. "From 1951 onward," he told a reporter, "I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the federal government." The Associated Press noted that he did not say what assignment in 1951 had required clearance, and that his Who's Who entry listed him as a staff member of the Center for International Studies from 1951 to 1960.[^43]
On December 19, 1967 the CIA Director of Security, replying to an inquiry of December 15, wrote that Rostow "was granted a Special Intelligence Clearance by this Agency on 3 February 1961 based on a favorable investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1960."[^43]
On December 19, 1967 the CIA Director of Security, replying to an inquiry of December 15, wrote that Rostow "was granted a Special Intelligence Clearance by this Agency on 3 February 1961 based on a favorable investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1960."[^44]
### Later career and death
Rostow taught economics at the [[University of Texas at Austin]] from 1969 until his death in Austin on February 13, 2003.[^1] His official files are in the National Security File, "Memos to the President," at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library]], which the Foreign Relations volumes cite as "Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow."[^30][^36] Drafts and correspondence by and about Rostow, including drafts of his historical manuscripts, are in the Bissell papers at the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library]].[^6]
Rostow taught economics at the [[University of Texas at Austin]] from 1969 until his death in Austin on February 13, 2003.[^1] His official files are in the National Security File, "Memos to the President," at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library]], which the Foreign Relations volumes cite as "Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow."[^31][^37] Drafts and correspondence by and about Rostow, including drafts of his historical manuscripts, are in the Bissell papers at the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library]].[^6]
### Family
His brother Eugene V. Rostow (1913-2002) became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A 1967 letter from the Under Secretary to the Israeli ambassador was drafted by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow.[^44] In January 1983, as director of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Eugene was told by [[George Shultz]] that the President wanted his resignation. Spokesmen for the State Department and the White House, as reported by Joseph C. Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, said that he "had not been a team player."[^45] Another brother, [[Ralph Waldo Emerson Rostow]] (1920-2006), is listed in the same family memorial record.[^1]
His brother Eugene V. Rostow (1913-2002) became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A 1967 letter from the Under Secretary to the Israeli ambassador was drafted by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow.[^45] In January 1983, as director of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Eugene was told by [[George Shultz]] that the President wanted his resignation. Spokesmen for the State Department and the White House, as reported by Joseph C. Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, said that he "had not been a team player."[^46] Another brother, [[Ralph Waldo Emerson Rostow]] (1920-2006), is listed in the same family memorial record.[^1]
His wife, Elspeth Davies Rostow (1917-2007), is listed as his spouse in the same memorial record.[^1]
@ -193,20 +195,21 @@ His wife, Elspeth Davies Rostow (1917-2007), is listed as his spouse in the same
[^26]: *FRUS 1961-1963*, Volume I, document 335 ("Chairman of the Policy Planning Council," December 22, 1961), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d335 ; Volume II, document 140 ("Director of the Policy Planning Staff," April 3, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d140, and document 275 ("Counselor of the Department of State," September 5, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d275; Volume III, document 206 ("Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council," July 4, 1963), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d206
[^27]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965*, document 121, memorandum from Rostow to Bundy, February 15, 1965, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d121
[^28]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume II*, document 84, memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, "The Situation in Vietnam," February 7, 1965, with Annex A, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d84
[^29]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966*, document 115, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Johnson, April 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d115
[^30]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 156, message from Johnson to Wilson, June 14, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d156 (source line: "Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow").
[^31]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 159, summary notes of the 559th National Security Council meeting, June 17, 1966, with footnote on Rostow's memorandum of June 16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d159
[^32]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 164, editorial note on McNamara's telephone call to Johnson, June 28, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d164 ; document 173, telegram from the Department of State to Rusk, July 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d173
[^33]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 176, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, "Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles," July 7, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d176
[^34]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 232, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 15, 1966, "A reflection on bombing the North," quoting Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," *Saturday Evening Post* 235 (November 24, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d232
[^35]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968*, document 42, memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, January 31, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d42
[^36]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI*, document 55, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 5, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d55 ; document 57, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 6, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d57
[^37]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, document 61, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 25, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
[^38]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, editorial note on Rostow's telephone call to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d152
[^39]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 158, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, with Rostow's covering memorandum to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
[^40]: Senator Strom Thurmond, column in *The Clinton Chronicle*, October 19, 1967, p. 19, "Otepka and Rostow," https://historicnewspapers.sc.edu/lccn/sn86063780/1967-10-19/ed-1/seq-19/ (the column reports the brief's claims, and describes Rostow as "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs").
[^41]: "The Rostow Story," *Human Events*, October 23, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000600040001-4
[^42]: Associated Press, "Rostow Denies Report on Security Clearance," as printed in newspaper clippings of October 1967, CIA reading room documents CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080008-2 and CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080006-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700080008-2
[^43]: Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, letter of December 19, 1967 replying to an inquiry of December 15, 1967, regarding "Mr. Walter Whitman Rostow," CIA reading room document 0001475810, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001475810
[^44]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 36, letter from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eugene Rostow) to the Israeli ambassador (Harman), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 (drafted by Eugene Rostow, Meeker and Robert T. Grey; cleared by Rusk, Walt Rostow and others).
[^45]: Joseph C. Harsch, "The Rostow affair," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0120/012025.html (Eugene Rostow summoned to the office of Secretary of State Shultz and told the President wanted his resignation; "had not been a team player").
[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Lansdale Mission to Vietnam," August 1965. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420030-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01580r001603420030-5
[^30]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966*, document 115, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Johnson, April 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d115
[^31]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 156, message from Johnson to Wilson, June 14, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d156 (source line: "Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow").
[^32]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 159, summary notes of the 559th National Security Council meeting, June 17, 1966, with footnote on Rostow's memorandum of June 16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d159
[^33]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 164, editorial note on McNamara's telephone call to Johnson, June 28, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d164 ; document 173, telegram from the Department of State to Rusk, July 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d173
[^34]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 176, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, "Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles," July 7, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d176
[^35]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 232, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 15, 1966, "A reflection on bombing the North," quoting Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," *Saturday Evening Post* 235 (November 24, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d232
[^36]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968*, document 42, memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, January 31, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d42
[^37]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI*, document 55, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 5, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d55 ; document 57, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 6, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d57
[^38]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, document 61, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 25, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
[^39]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, editorial note on Rostow's telephone call to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d152
[^40]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 158, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, with Rostow's covering memorandum to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
[^41]: Senator Strom Thurmond, column in *The Clinton Chronicle*, October 19, 1967, p. 19, "Otepka and Rostow," https://historicnewspapers.sc.edu/lccn/sn86063780/1967-10-19/ed-1/seq-19/ (the column reports the brief's claims, and describes Rostow as "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs").
[^42]: "The Rostow Story," *Human Events*, October 23, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000600040001-4
[^43]: Associated Press, "Rostow Denies Report on Security Clearance," as printed in newspaper clippings of October 1967, CIA reading room documents CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080008-2 and CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080006-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700080008-2
[^44]: Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, letter of December 19, 1967 replying to an inquiry of December 15, 1967, regarding "Mr. Walter Whitman Rostow," CIA reading room document 0001475810, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001475810
[^45]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 36, letter from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eugene Rostow) to the Israeli ambassador (Harman), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 (drafted by Eugene Rostow, Meeker and Robert T. Grey; cleared by Rusk, Walt Rostow and others).
[^46]: Joseph C. Harsch, "The Rostow affair," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0120/012025.html (Eugene Rostow summoned to the office of Secretary of State Shultz and told the President wanted his resignation; "had not been a team player").

9
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/William French Smith.md
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
created: 2024-04-25
updated: 2026-10-12
updated: 2026-10-14
tags:
- Person
- DoJ
@ -19,9 +19,16 @@ William French Smith was the U.S. Attorney General under [[Ronald Reagan]] who s
In early 1982, Smith and Casey signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding under which narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of crimes the CIA was required to report to the Justice Department.[^2] Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported either. Gary Webb, after quoting Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]]'s March 1998 testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, wrote that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^3] In an interview for the PBS series Frontline, Hitz said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^4] The agreement was signed just as the CIA was launching both the [[Contras|Contra]] project and operations in Afghanistan, timing that [[Robert Parry]] argued proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold." Civil rights lawyers later filed suit charging the agreement was illegal and led to policies protecting rather than stopping drug trafficking.[^3]
### Third-Country Funding for the Contras, June 1984
The day after the [[National Security Planning Group]] meeting of June 25, 1984, Casey and CIA General Counsel [[Stanley Sporkin]] met Attorney General Smith. [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that Smith determined that third-country funding of the Contras was legally permissible as long as no U.S. funds were used for the purpose and the third country did not expect the United States to repay the aid.[^5] The Iran-Contra committees wrote that Smith orally expressed his opinion to Casey that solicitation was lawful as long as there was no quid pro quo.[^6] At the NSPG meeting [[George P. Shultz]] had said: "I think we need to get an opinion from the Attorney General on whether we can help the Contras obtain money from third sources."[^7]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
[^2]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story.* https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
[^4]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
[^5]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 1, n. 14 (Sporkin Memorandum for the Record, June 26, 1984, ALV 035917) and ch. 15. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
[^6]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 403.
[^7]: National Security Planning Group minutes, June 25, 1984, National Security Archive, EBB 210, document 2 (IC 00463), p. 9. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/2-NSPG%20minutes%206-25-84%20(IC%2000463).pdf

11
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yehoshua Sagi.md
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@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ tags:
- Israel
- Aman
- MilitaryIntelligence
summary: "Yehoshua Sagi (also rendered Saguy) served as director of Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) from 1979 to 1983 and was found by the Kahan Commission to bear personal responsibility for indifference regarding the Sabra and Shatila massacres."
summary: "Yehoshua Sagi (also Saguy) directed Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate from 1979 to 1983 and was faulted by the Kahan Commission over Sabra and Shatila."
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-10-14
born: 1933
location: "Jerusalem, Mandatory Palestine"
---
@ -25,7 +25,14 @@ Following the September 1982 [[Sabra and Shatila massacres|massacres at the Sabr
Sagi subsequently entered electoral politics, serving as a member of the Knesset on the [[Likud Party|Likud]] list from 1988 to 1992. He then served as mayor of Bat Yam.
### Ben-Menashe's Claims
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that, on [[Menachem Begin]]'s order in the fall of 1980, Sagi and [[Nachum Admoni]] were to appoint the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], a joint group of military intelligence and [[Mossad]] officers supplying arms to [[Iran]].[^3] The October Surprise Task Force reported that Saguy, in whose presence Ben-Menashe says [[Rafael Eitan]] confirmed reports of 1980 meetings in Spain between [[William J. Casey]] and [[Mehdi Karrubi]], told the Government of Israel that he had never met Ben-Menashe and that he had no knowledge of such meetings.[^4] In the task force's account, Israeli authorities interviewed Saguy together with [[David Kimche]], Eitan and others, and each said he had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until Ben-Menashe began making allegations in the American media in 1991.[^5]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Rodger W. Claire, *Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign That Denied Saddam the Bomb* (Broadway Books, 2004).
[^2]: Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, Final Report, February 8, 1983, section on "The Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy," in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents*, vol. 8, 1982-1984, doc. 104. https://syriaaccountability.org/content/images/wordpress/ISRAELMFA_Commission-Inquiry-Beirut_1983_EN.pdf
[^3]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015), p. 78. https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
[^4]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 97. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
[^5]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98.

193
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yitzhak Rabin.md
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@ -4,20 +4,201 @@ tags:
- Person
- Nuclear
- Israel
summary: "As army chief of operations, Yitzhak Rabin was among the old-fashioned military men, including Yigal Allon and Ariel Sharon, who believed that Israel's essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel."
- IranContra
- PollardAffair
- Oslo
- Assassination
summary: "Yitzhak Rabin was Israel's chief of staff, ambassador in Washington, defense minister during the Iran-Contra shipments and Prime Minister when Oslo was signed, before Yigal Amir shot him in 1995."
aliases:
- Yitzhak Rabin
- Rabin
born: 1922-03-01
died: 1995-11-04
location: "Jerusalem"
created: 2025-08-05
updated: 2026-10-14
relations:
- type: member_of
with: "[[Palmach]]"
role: "Operations officer; commander of the Harel Brigade"
start: 1948
fn: 2
- type: head_of
with: "[[Israel Defense Forces]]"
role: "Chief of Staff"
start: 1964
end: 1968
fn: 6
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Israel]]"
role: "Ambassador to the United States"
start: 1968
end: 1973
fn: 8
- type: head_of
with: "[[Israel]]"
role: "Prime Minister"
start: 1974
end: 1977
fn: 19
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Israel]]"
role: "Minister of Defense"
start: 1984
end: 1990
fn: 24
- type: head_of
with: "[[Israel]]"
role: "Prime Minister"
start: 1992
end: 1995
fn: 40
- type: member_of
with: "[[Labor Party]]"
fn: 40
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
role: "Defense minister whose ministry handled Israeli HAWK and TOW missile shipments to Iran and who offered Soviet-bloc arms to Oliver North"
start: 1985
end: 1986
fn: 29
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Jonathan Pollard]]"
role: "Defense minister during the Pollard operation"
start: 1985
end: 1986
fn: 39
- type: subject_of
with: "[[Shamgar Commission]]"
role: "Inquiry into the assassination of Rabin"
start: 1995
end: 1996
fn: 44
---
[[Yitzhak Rabin]] was an [[Israel|Israeli]] politician and military leader who served as Prime Minister of [[Israel]] and Defense Minister. He was a rival of [[Shimon Peres]] within the [[Labor Party]].[^1]
[[Yitzhak Rabin]] was an [[Israel|Israeli]] soldier and politician who served as chief of staff of the [[Israel Defense Forces]], ambassador to the United States, Prime Minister twice, and Defense Minister. He was a rival of [[Shimon Peres]] within the [[Labor Party]].[^1] He was shot at a peace rally in [[Tel Aviv]] on November 4, 1995, and died of his wounds.
As army chief of operations, [[Yitzhak Rabin]] was among the old-fashioned military men, including [[Yigal Allon]] and [[Ariel Sharon]], who believed that [[Israel]]'s essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel. To these men, nuclear weapons were nothing more than a great equalizer, and they argued that an [[Egypt]] equipped with the bomb would be far more dangerous to [[Israel]] than an [[Egypt]] limited to conventional arms.[^2]
### Palmach and the 1948 war
As Defense Minister, [[Yitzhak Rabin|Rabin]] did not try to impede the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms operations, as he had no interest in helping [[Shimon Peres|Peres]]. However, he unceremoniously and disrespectfully threw [[Oliver North]] out of his office when the [[Contras]] were mentioned, thwarting [[Oliver North|North's]] attempts to set up his second channel.[^1]
Rabin served in the [[Palmach]], the strike force of the [[Haganah]]. In the early months of the 1948 war he was the Palmach's operations officer and liaison to the general staff, in April 1948 he took command of the Harel Brigade, and in July he served as operations officer and deputy to [[Yigal Allon]] in Operation Danny, the offensive that captured [[Lydda]] and [[Ramle]].[^2]
[[Yitzhak Rabin|Rabin]] replaced [[Shimon Peres]] as leader of the [[Labor Party]] and became Prime Minister of [[Israel]] in 1992 after the national elections, replacing [[Yitzhak Shamir]].[^1]
[[David K. Shipler]] wrote in 2015 that in 1979 an Israeli censorship committee chaired by the justice minister deleted five paragraphs from Rabin's memoir, his first-person account of the expulsion of Arab residents from Lydda and Ramle. Shipler quoted the suppressed section: "Great suffering was inflicted upon the men taking part in the eviction action," Rabin wrote. "There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action to remove the bitterness of these youth movement groups, and explain why we were obliged to undertake such a harsh and cruel action." Shipler added that when he learned of the deletion at the time, Rabin told him that he had intentionally given the censors something else to do by writing about Israel's nuclear weapons.[^3] [[Alix Wall]] wrote in 2001 that the memoir's translator, [[Peretz Kidron]], gave the excised passage to the [[New York Times]].[^4]
[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that Rabin, Allon and [[Ariel Sharon]] were among the old-fashioned military men who held, as Rabin did as army chief of operations, that Israel's essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel. Hersh wrote that these men regarded nuclear weapons as nothing more than a great equalizer, and argued that an [[Egypt]] equipped with the bomb would be far more dangerous to Israel than an Egypt limited to conventional arms.[^5]
### Chief of staff and the 1967 war
Rabin was chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 1964. At the end of a three-year term in late 1966 the Prime Minister extended his tenure by a year, and he left the army at the beginning of 1968 after 27 years of service.[^6] A telegram from the Defense Attaché Office in Israel to the White House dated June 18, 1967 records that on the evening of June 17 Lieutenant Colonel Efrat, "Aide to General Rabin, IDF COS," told the naval attaché: "Gen Rabin extends his personal regrets to the CNO USN for the sad mistake of the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] incident." The telegram records that Rabin had decided to provide a synopsis of the findings of the IDF court of inquiry into the attack, although the findings had not yet received final review.[^7]
### Washington, 1968 to 1973
Rabin became Israel's ambassador to the United States at the beginning of 1968 and held the post until March 1973.[^8] At the fifth session of the F-4 negotiations, on November 22, 1968, held in the office of [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Rabin said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding, allowing the United States to recover aircraft if Israel acted contrary to its undertakings, looked "quite awkward," had no precedent, and implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy." Warnke answered that he had discussed the paragraph with [[Clark Clifford]] and Clifford with [[Dean Rusk]], and that the government did not put that construction on it. Rabin said that Israel had agreed only to reaffirm its earlier understandings, that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry them on United States aircraft. Warnke asked: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?" The embassy's minister, [[Shlomo Argov]], said: "We feel we are on parole." Warnke's deputy [[Harry H. Schwartz]], the NESA deputy director [[Robert J. Murray]], and the Israeli air force commander [[Mordecai Hod]] attended.[^9]
On November 27, 1968, Warnke wrote to Rabin that the United States agreed to sell Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft. The letter recorded the Israeli government's reaffirmation of its policy "that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons" and its agreement not to use the aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier, and stated the United States position that "the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons." A note to the letter records that Rabin objected by telephone that the proposed last paragraph implied Israeli agreement with that interpretation, and that Warnke substituted a bland concluding paragraph.[^10]
On June 20, 1969, Rabin spoke with [[Harold H. Saunders]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff. Saunders recorded that Rabin had labeled the conversation strictly personal, and that because of the "extremely personal nature of Rabin's talk" the memorandum would not be distributed through the system.[^11]
On July 29, 1969, Rabin met the acting secretary of state, [[Elliot L. Richardson]], and the deputy secretary of defense, [[David Packard]], on Israel's nuclear weapon and missile policy. Rabin cited the exchange of letters with Warnke the previous November and observed that there were two problems, nuclear weapons in the Middle East and the [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]]. He asked which of the two was the subject of the talk.[^12]
The record of a September 25, 1969 meeting in Washington between [[William P. Rogers]], [[Henry Kissinger]], and the Israeli party, with Rabin present, describes the channel the two governments had agreed on with [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Golda Meir]]. Rabin's memoir, as quoted in that record, says that Kissinger would reach Rabin and Rabin would transmit the messages directly to [[Simcha Dinitz]] in Jerusalem.[^13]
On March 12, 1970, Kissinger showed Rabin the points he had covered with [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] about a Soviet message on the Middle East, and let Rabin read the portion of the message Dobrynin had read to him.[^14] On August 17, 1970, Nixon met Rabin in the Map Room with General [[Alexander Haig]] present. Rabin later described the meeting in his memoir.[^15] On September 21, 1970, during the crisis over Syrian intervention in [[Jordan]], Assistant Secretary of State [[Joseph Sisco]] met Rabin and read him the King's answer to Allon.[^16]
On December 29, 1971, Sisco met Rabin at the ambassador's residence. Sisco said that Nixon had directed that discussions begin with Rabin as a follow-up to the December 2 conversation between Nixon and Meir, with the aim of working out an agreement.[^17] In a November 14, 1972 meeting held during the visit of the defense minister, [[Moshe Dayan]], Rabin said of [[King Hussein]] that he was "moderate to the Western world, but this was not necessarily the case in his relations with Israel."[^18]
### First premiership, 1974 to 1977
Rabin took office as Prime Minister on June 3, 1974, and negotiated the interim agreement with Egypt through Kissinger, signed on September 1, 1975.[^19] On February 11, 1975, Kissinger's report on his talks in Jerusalem, relayed to [[Gerald Ford]] by [[Brent Scowcroft]], said that he had met Rabin alone at breakfast and then with the Prime Minister and his negotiating team, which included Allon and Peres.[^20] On March 22, 1975, Kissinger met Rabin and Israeli ministers in Jerusalem, where the discussion focused on the suspension of the negotiations with Egypt.[^21]
In the 1976 hijacking of an airliner to [[Entebbe Airport]], the cabinet protocols released by the [[Israel State Archives]] record Rabin telling ministers that the Israeli intention was to hold the French government responsible for the fate of the passengers, and telling the cabinet on the fourth day: "We have no way of acting without the agreement of the countries concerned. What are we supposed to do, attack Uganda?" At a Saturday cabinet meeting, after the chief of staff, [[Mordechai Gur]], presented the plan, Rabin said: "Additional time, intelligence and study make a military option possible." The ministers unanimously approved the operation, and Rabin told them that if journalists called, "you deny it. In a case like this, it is justified not to tell the truth."[^22]
In March 1977 [[Dan Margalit]] of [[Haaretz]] reported that [[Leah Rabin]] held a dollar account at a bank in Washington. [[Maariv]] reported that the account had been opened while Rabin was ambassador and should have been closed when the family left Washington in March 1973, and that at one point the balance was $20,000. Foreign currency accounts of that kind were illegal under Israeli law. On April 8, 1977, a Finance Ministry administrative penalty committee fined Rabin and his wife IL150,000. In a radio announcement Rabin said he accepted full responsibility for the joint offense. The [[Jewish Telegraphic Agency]] reported that the step meant he would not lead the party in the next elections, and that Defense Minister Peres was expected to take the party's reins.[^23]
### Defense minister, 1984 to 1990
Rabin was defense minister from the 1984 national unity government until the Labor Party left the government in 1990.[^24] [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], who says he sat on the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], wrote that Rabin did not try to impede the committee's arms operations, as he had no interest in helping Peres, and that Rabin threw [[Oliver North]] out of his office when the [[Contras]] were mentioned, thwarting North's attempts to set up his second channel.[^1]
The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in the summer of 1985 Rabin would not proceed with the TOW sale to Iran unless he received assurances that the Secretary of State knew of the plan and that the President unequivocally approved it, and that Peres and Rabin approved the second shipment, of 400 TOW missiles, on September 9, 1985.[^25] [[Michael Ledeen]] told North and [[Robert McFarlane]] that Rabin was "complaining about" the failure of the United States to replace the TOWs sent to Iran.[^26] The report of the Independent Counsel, [[Lawrence Walsh]], records that on November 14, 1985, McFarlane told [[William Casey]] and the deputy director of central intelligence that Israel planned to ship weapons to Iranian military elements. The following day Rabin had breakfast with Casey and then met McFarlane at the [[White House]]. Rabin asked whether the United States still approved of Israeli arms sales to Iran. McFarlane replied that [[Ronald Reagan]] continued to approve. McFarlane later said that the purpose of Rabin's visit "was simply to reconfirm that the President's authority for the original concept was still valid."[^27][^28] The congressional report adds that Rabin also sought reassurance that the matter was a joint project of the two governments, and raised the unresolved replacement of 504 TOW missiles.[^29]
Rabin called McFarlane in Geneva to report a problem with an arms shipment through a European country, and McFarlane directed North to help the Israelis with flight clearances.[^30] On November 17, 1985, Rabin telephoned North to say that Israel was ready to ship 80 HAWK missiles once replenishment problems were resolved, and North flew to New York to meet him.[^29][^31] The Walsh report states that 18 HAWK missiles were delivered from Israeli stocks on November 24, 1985, while Casey was on a trip to Asia.[^28] Walsh also records that North told Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]] in an interview that Rabin had described the November shipment as containing "oil related equipment," and that North later learned from [[Richard V. Secord]] that it contained HAWK missiles. This is North's account, recorded in the report as his own statement.[^32]
The congressional report records that in May 1986 Rabin offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that North and Rabin met again in September 1986 and discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras. The report quotes North's notes that Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for Sov Bloc weaps and ammo he could make avail," and asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. When North answered that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested that it dock at [[Haifa]] and "have it filled w/ whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." [[John Poindexter]] sanctioned the offer ("It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless") and cautioned that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." On September 15, 1986, North told Poindexter that orders had been passed to the ship to proceed to Haifa, where loading would be accomplished by Israeli military personnel. North's later briefing memorandum for a visit by Peres recommended that the President thank him for the Israeli bloc arms "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance," and Poindexter penciled beside it: "Rabin. Very tightly held."[^33]
On the night of February 4, 1987, Rabin called the report of the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] on the Iran arms sales "highly inaccurate" and said that it "reached the wrong conclusions regarding Israel's role." He said he had personally categorically rejected an appeal by a ranking White House aide for Israel to become involved with the Contras in any way.[^34]
### The first intifada and the "break their bones" charge
In a February 1988 interview with the [[Christian Science Monitor]], Rabin insisted that "there is no policy of beatings" by the government. He said beatings were permissible for soldiers during demonstrations or in "hot pursuit" of demonstrators, and acknowledged "exceptions" in reports of Palestinians beaten in their homes. Two weeks earlier, he had advocated replacing "live ammunition" with "punches and blows," and had labeled the policy "might, power, and beatings." He said of the change in policy: "I brought about a change in policy to use force on a large scale, including hitting to replace the use of firearms. I'm not denying this is what I've said. But to call it a policy of beating is not a correct statement."[^35]
The "break their bones" charge came from the case of [[Yehuda Meir]], an Israel Defense Forces colonel who was a lieutenant colonel at the time of the events. A Jewish Telegraphic Agency report of November 7, 1989 says that the state prosecutor charged that Meir ordered soldiers to break the arms and legs of 20 residents of Beita and Huwara.[^36] A report of March 30, 1990 says that the charge sheet alleged that in Huwara Meir ordered a platoon to arrest 12 Palestinians and break their bones, that they were bound, blindfolded and beaten with clubs although they had not resisted, and that Meir said he acted on orders from his superiors in "the military and political echelon."[^37] In July 1990 the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Rabin, by then out of office, told the Foreign Press Association that he had not given orders to break bones and that there was no evidence to back such charges before a court or commission of inquiry. It reported that several senior officers facing disciplinary action contended they had acted on explicit instructions from Defense Minister Rabin, and that Rabin said troops were ordered to storm rioters "beating them with fists and batons, not to punish them but to hurt them and force them to cease their assault," and also to handcuff and detain them.[^38]
### Jonathan Pollard
The [[Knesset]] intelligence subcommittee chaired by [[Abba Eban]] reported on May 26, 1987 on the [[Jonathan Pollard]] affair. It faulted Rabin for failing "to follow up or increase supervision as he should have done" during the period of the operation, when he was defense minister.[^39] A cabinet panel chaired by [[Yehoshua Rotenstreich]] held that Peres, [[Yitzhak Shamir]] and Rabin did not follow up after Pollard's arrest to ensure full Israeli cooperation with the United States. On the promotions of [[Aviem Sella]] and [[Rafael Eitan]] the panel wrote: "All three of them share responsibility for these decisions." Rabin and Peres both attacked the Eban panel as politically tainted.[^39]
### Second premiership and Oslo, 1992 to 1995
Rabin defeated Peres in the Labor Party primaries, replacing him as leader of the Labor Party, and became prime minister in 1992 after the national elections, replacing Shamir. He presented his new government to the Knesset on July 13, 1992.[^40] According to the Yitzhak Rabin Center, he approved the continuation of the secret negotiations in [[Oslo]] between Israeli and [[Palestine Liberation Organization|Palestinian]] representatives, and approved the PLO as a party to the agreement after a letter from [[Yasser Arafat]] affirming PLO recognition of Israel. The Declaration of Principles was signed on the lawn of the White House on September 13, 1993, with President [[Bill Clinton]] present.[^40][^41]
The [[Nobel Committee]] awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Arafat, Peres and Rabin "for their efforts to create peace in the Middle East."[^42]
### Assassination, November 4, 1995
On the evening of November 4, 1995, Rabin addressed a rally under the slogan "Yes to Peace, No to Violence" in the square in Tel Aviv, and was shot on his way to his car. According to the Yitzhak Rabin Center he died at Ichilov Hospital at 11:14 p.m.[^43] A summary of the [[Shamgar Commission]] report of March 28, 1996 states that [[Yigal Amir]] came to the event by bus from his home in [[Herzliya]] and situated himself in the parking area where Rabin's car was parked. At 9:45 p.m., as Rabin walked to the car with five bodyguards, Amir fired three shots. Rabin reached the hospital with no pulse and no blood pressure and died of his wounds.[^44]
The summary states that the commission concluded that the murder was made possible by a lack of cooperation between the security agencies responsible for protection at the event. It criticized the head of the [[Shin Bet]], [[Carmi Gillon]], who resigned before the commission completed its work, and the head of the agency's VIP protection division, who had failed to assess the intelligence data and the threat from a Jewish assailant. It recommended that the procedures for cooperation between the police and the General Security Service be reevaluated and that the VIP protection unit double its personnel. The summary lists among the commission's conclusions: "There was no basis for the conspiracy arguments that were raised regarding the event."[^44]
Amir was sentenced to life imprisonment plus six years for wounding Rabin's bodyguard. In a second trial he received eight more years, together with his brother [[Haguay Amir]], who received 12 years for conspiracy to murder the prime minister and weapons possession, and his friend [[Dror Adani]], who received seven years.[^45]
[[Avishai Raviv]], identified as an agent of the General Security Service, was tried for not preventing the crime, on the basis that he knew Amir's intentions and did not report them to the service. He was found not guilty.[^45] In November 2022 the [[Times of Israel]] reported that recordings of Amir's interrogation and testimony to the Shamgar Commission, aired by Channel 12, had Amir saying that the Shin Bet "didn't know anything" about his plans, and giving as his motives the election results and the 1994 massacre in [[Hebron]] by Baruch Goldstein. In the same recordings Amir said he knew Raviv, that Raviv had discussed killing Rabin, and that Raviv was not trusted in [[Kiryat Arba]], where after Goldstein's massacre people told Amir that Raviv worked for the Shin Bet. Raviv has said that he heard Amir make the din rodef vow declaring Rabin worthy of killing but did not believe Amir was serious. A confidential section of the 1996 Shamgar report dealt with the Shin Bet and Raviv.[^46]
The Times of Israel reported that [[Bezalel Smotrich]] told the Knesset on November 6, 2022 that the security services had used "irresponsible manipulations, which haven't been fully exposed to this day, to encourage the murderer to carry out his plan." Raviv's lawyer, [[Eitan Peleg]], called the allegations libel against his client and the state. The journalist Amichai Ataeli, who interviewed Amir in prison over several years, said that Amir and those around him suspected Raviv was being operated by the Shin Bet and that he did not see Raviv as having caused Amir to act. The former Shin Bet agent [[Lior Akerman]], who first interviewed Amir after the assassination, acknowledged intelligence failures and rejected the claim of Shin Bet encouragement as false.[^46]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 9.
[^2]: "1948 - A Commander during the War of Independence," Yitzhak Rabin Center, Tel Aviv. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1948/
[^3]: Shipler, David K., review of S. Yizhar, *Khirbet Khizeh*, *Moment* magazine, May 5, 2015 (May-June 2015 issue). https://momentmag.com/book-review-khirbet-khizeh/
[^4]: Wall, Alix, article on Rabin's memoir and the excised passage, *J. The Jewish News of Northern California*, January 26, 2001. https://jweekly.com/?p=27908
[^5]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 9.
[^6]: "1964 - Chief of Staff" and "1968 - Ambassador of Israel to the United States," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1964/ and https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1968/
[^7]: Telegram from the Defense Attaché Office in Israel to the White House, "Israeli Court of Inquiry in USS Liberty incident," June 18, 1967, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XIX, *Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, Document 307. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d307
[^8]: "1968 - Ambassador of Israel to the United States," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1968/
[^9]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968*, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968, 5:40-6:15 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330
[^10]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 333, Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke to Ambassador Rabin, Washington, November 27, 1968, and editorial note. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d333
[^11]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972*, Document 36, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 20, 1969. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d36
[^12]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 41, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 29, 1969. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d41
[^13]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 52, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 25, 1969, quoting Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Little, Brown, 1979), p. 154. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d52
[^14]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 99, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 12, 1970. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d99
[^15]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 151, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 17, 1970, citing Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, pp. 184-185. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d151
[^16]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIV, *Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970*, Document 306, Telegram, Washington, September 22, 1970 (Sisco's meeting with Rabin on September 21). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d306
[^17]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 271, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 29, 1971. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d271
[^18]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 319, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 14, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d319
[^19]: "1974 - Prime Minister of Israel, first term," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1974/
[^20]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXVI, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976*, Document 131, Memorandum from Scowcroft to President Ford reporting Kissinger's initial discussions, February 11, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d131
[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXVI, Document 158, Memorandum of Conversation, Jerusalem, March 22, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d158
[^22]: Crissy, Ron, "'No concessions': Entebbe files reveal drama behind one of Israel's most daring rescue operations," *Ynetnews*, 2026, on the Israel State Archives release of the Cabinet, Security Cabinet and special ministerial team protocols. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sjzfgnszme
[^23]: "Rabin Resigns Following Probe into Illegal Bank Accounts Held by Him and His Wife in Washington," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, April 8, 1977. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-resigns-following-probe-into-illegal-bank-accounts-held-by-him-and-his-wife-in-washington
[^24]: "1984 - Minister of Defense," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1984/
[^25]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 9, pp. 167 and 169, on Rabin's conditions for the 1985 TOW sale and the September 9, 1985 approval of the second shipment.
[^26]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 10, p. 174, on Ledeen's account of Rabin's complaint about replacement of the TOW missiles.
[^27]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. 1, *Investigations and Prosecutions* (1993), p. 110 and n. 110, on the November 15, 1985 meeting of McFarlane and Rabin. https://archive.org/details/WalshReport
[^28]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 15, on the Casey breakfast with Rabin, McFarlane's assurance of continuing approval, and the November 24, 1985 delivery of 18 HAWK missiles.
[^29]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 10, pp. 176-177, on the McFarlane-Rabin meeting of November 15, 1985 and Rabin's call to North on November 17.
[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 4, on Rabin's call to McFarlane in Geneva about the shipment through a European country and McFarlane's direction to North. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_04.htm
[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 18, on Rabin's request for help with flight clearances and the planned shipment of 80 HAWK missiles. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm
[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 31 and n. 163, on North's account of the November shipment in his interview with Attorney General Edwin Meese. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_31.htm
[^33]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
[^34]: "Rabin Rejects Senate Report," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 6, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-rejects-senate-report
[^35]: Moffett, George D., III, "Israeli foresees more unrest," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 9, 1988, interview with Defense Minister Rabin. https://www.csmonitor.com/1988/0209/orab.html
[^36]: "IDF Furloughs Officer for Beatings," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, November 7, 1989. https://jta.org/archive/idf-furloughs-officer-for-beatings
[^37]: "Israeli Colonel Pleads Not Guilty to Brutality Toward Palestinians," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, March 30, 1990. https://jta.org/archive/idf-colonel-pleads-not-guilty-to-brutality-toward-palestinians
[^38]: "Rabin Denies Giving Orders to Break Bones of Palestinians," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, July 6, 1990. https://jta.org/archive/rabin-denies-giving-orders-to-break-bones-of-palestinians
[^39]: Frankel, Glenn, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0
[^40]: "Israel's Rabin Leaves Door Ajar For Ultra-Orthodox in Cabinet," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1992. https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0714/14013.html
[^41]: "1992 - Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, Second Term," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1992/
[^42]: The Nobel Prize, "The Nobel Peace Prize 1994," Nobel Foundation. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1994/summary/
[^43]: "1995 - Assassination of the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1995/
[^44]: Israel Electronic Library (CIE 2014), English summary of the Shamgar Commission, *Report on the Assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin*, March 28, 1996. https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1996-3-28-Shamgar-Commission-Report-on-the-Assassination-of-Prime-Minister-Yitzhak-Rabin.pdf
[^45]: Israel Electronic Library (CIE 2014), afterword to the summary of the Shamgar Commission report, on the sentences and on the trial of Avishai Raviv. https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1996-3-28-Shamgar-Commission-Report-on-the-Assassination-of-Prime-Minister-Yitzhak-Rabin.pdf
[^46]: "Rabin's killer said Shin Bet 'didn't know anything' about plot, refuting Smotrich," *Times of Israel*, November 8, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/rabins-killer-said-shin-bet-didnt-know-anything-about-plot-refuting-smotrich/

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location: "Webster, Massachusetts"
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Paul C. Warnke served as the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He was involved in intense pressure on [[Israel]] to sign the [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty|NPT]] in exchange for F-4 fighter jets. Warnke directly questioned [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then [[Israel]]'s ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], about [[Israel]]'s nuclear capabilities, stating, "we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in [[Israel]] behind our back."[^1]
Paul C. Warnke served as the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He was involved in intense pressure on [[Israel]] to sign the [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty|NPT]] in exchange for F-4 fighter jets. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that Warnke directly questioned [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then Israel's ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], about Israel's nuclear capabilities, stating, "we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in Israel behind our back."[^1]
### Israeli F-4 negotiations, 1968
In the fall of 1968, Warnke conducted the negotiations with Rabin over the sale of F-4 Phantom aircraft. On November 22, 1968, in Warnke's office, Rabin said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding made it appear that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy." Warnke took issue with the reading and said that he had discussed the paragraph with [[Clark Clifford]] and Clifford with [[Dean Rusk]], and that the government did not put that construction on it. Warnke asked Rabin: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?"[^2] On November 27, 1968, Warnke wrote to Rabin that the United States agreed to sell Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft, and the letter recorded the Israeli government's reaffirmation of its policy "that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons."[^3]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 14.
[^2]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968*, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330
[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 333, Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke to Ambassador Rabin, Washington, November 27, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d333