vault backup: 2026-10-14 17:47:52

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Amiram Nir.md

@@ -11,21 +11,31 @@ born: 1950-12-08
 died: 1988-11-30
 location: "Israel"
 ---
-[[Amiram Nir]] was a former [[Israel|Israeli]] TV newsman and a counterterrorism adviser to [[Shimon Peres]]. He was originally a military officer in the tank corps and lost an eye in a training accident. He married [[Judy Moses]], the daughter of the owner of [[Yediot Ahronot]], a major [[Israel|Israeli]] newspaper chain.[^1]
+[[Amiram Nir]] was a former [[Israel|Israeli]] TV newsman and a counterterrorism adviser to [[Shimon Peres]]. He was originally a military officer in the tank corps and lost an eye in a training accident. He married [[Judy Moses]], the daughter of the owner of [[Yediot Ahronot]], a major Israeli newspaper chain.[^1]
 
-Nir resigned from his TV job to work as a public relations adviser for [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] during the 1981 elections. After [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] became prime minister in 1984, he appointed Nir as his counterterrorism adviser. Nir found documents related to [[Rafael Eitan|Eitan's]] [[United States|U.S.]] spy network and the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
+Nir resigned from his TV job to work as a public relations adviser for Peres during the 1981 elections. After Peres became prime minister in 1984, he appointed Nir as his counterterrorism adviser. Nir found documents related to [[Rafael Eitan|Eitan's]] [[United States|U.S.]] spy network and the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
 
-[[Shimon Peres|Peres]] and Nir faced challenges from the [[Likud Party]]-controlled intelligence community and the lack of financial power within the [[Labor Party]]. [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] decided to open a competing arms channel, run by Nir, to gain control over the profitable [[Iran]] arms sales and to undermine the existing intelligence-community channel. Nir, despite his lack of experience in intelligence or business, sought support from individuals like [[Al Schwimmer]] and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1]
+A note of January 4, 1986 by [[Charles Hill]], a [[George P. Shultz|Shultz]] aide, records [[John Poindexter]] saying that Nir had come to see him to revive the hostage idea.[^2] The 1987 congressional report describes Nir as Peres's adviser on counterterrorism and lists, among the occasions on which Israel acted to keep the Iran initiative moving, "Nir's January 1986 proposal to keep the initiative moving forward at a time when U.S. interest appeared to be flagging."[^3]
 
-Nir met with [[Robert McFarlane]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] and threatened him with exposure if he did not cooperate with the new channel. This led to [[Robert McFarlane|McFarlane]] connecting Nir with [[Oliver North]] and [[John Poindexter]] of the [[National Security Council]]. Nir, [[Oliver North|North]], and [[John Poindexter|Poindexter]] gained the support of [[William J. Casey]], then head of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], and [[George H.W. Bush]] tacitly ignored the operation.[^1]
+Peres and Nir faced challenges from the [[Likud Party]]-controlled intelligence community and the lack of financial power within the [[Labor Party]]. Peres decided to open a competing arms channel, run by Nir, to gain control over the profitable Iran arms sales and to undermine the existing intelligence-community channel. Nir, despite his lack of experience in intelligence or business, sought support from individuals like [[Al Schwimmer]] and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1]
 
-Nir's operation, however, struggled to make significant inroads into the arms trade. In April 1986, [[Oliver North|North]] initiated a sting operation, the [[Hashemi sting]], to discredit the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|original channel]] and its members. Nir was also involved in the leaking of the [[Jonathan Pollard]] story to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] to further undermine the [[Likud Party]]'s credibility.[^1]
+Nir met with [[Robert McFarlane]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] and threatened him with exposure if he did not cooperate with the new channel. This led to McFarlane connecting Nir with [[Oliver North]] and John Poindexter of the [[National Security Council]]. Nir, North, and Poindexter gained the support of [[William J. Casey]], then head of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], and [[George H.W. Bush]] tacitly ignored the operation.[^1]
 
-In May 1986, [[Oliver North|North]], [[Robert McFarlane|McFarlane]], and Nir traveled to [[Tehran]] disguised as Irish technicians, carrying [[TOW missile]]s and [[Hawk missile]] spare parts. They were detained, and the military equipment was confiscated. This incident, along with the delivery of outdated [[Hawk missile]]s with [[Israel|Israeli]] markings, effectively killed off the [[Iran]] end of the second channel.[^1]
+Nir's operation, however, struggled to make significant inroads into the arms trade. In April 1986, North initiated a sting operation, the [[Hashemi sting]], to discredit the original channel and its members. Nir was also involved in the leaking of the [[Jonathan Pollard]] story to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] to further undermine the Likud Party's credibility.[^1]
 
-[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] also faced problems with his plans for supplying the [[Contras]], as [[Yitzhak Rabin]] refused to cooperate. A mysterious $10 million contribution from the [[Sultan of Brunei]] to [[Oliver North|North's]] group, wired through [[Bruce Rappaport]], was leaked by the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee]], further exposing the second channel.[^1]
+According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in May 1986 North, McFarlane, and Nir traveled to [[Tehran]] disguised as Irish technicians, carrying [[TOW missile]]s and [[Hawk missile]] spare parts, were detained, and had the military equipment confiscated. He wrote that this incident, along with the delivery of outdated Hawk missiles with Israeli markings, effectively killed off the Iran end of the second channel.[^1]
 
-[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] was due to be a major witness in [[Oliver North|North's]] trial and knew a great deal about [[Ihsan Barbouti|Barbouti's]] chemical operation in [[Miami]]. He was killed in a plane crash in [[Mexico]] in November 1988, an event that [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence believed was a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] operation to prevent his testimony from embarrassing [[Shimon Peres|Peres]], [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]], or [[George H.W. Bush|Bush]].[^1]
+The independent counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that by May 1986 Nir had replaced [[David Kimche]] as the Israeli official in the arms dealings. When the McFarlane party left Washington on May 23, 1986, by way of Frankfurt and Israel, [[Richard Secord]] and Nir joined the group in Israel, and only a portion of the HAWK spare parts the Iranians expected was loaded onto the aircraft that took the party to Tehran. The party arrived in Tehran on May 25, 1986; according to North's notes of a secure message, "We have been treated politely, though heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." On the evening of May 26, North, [[Howard Teicher]], [[George Cave]] and Nir met without McFarlane with an Iranian foreign affairs adviser to the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, a meeting Teicher described as "our most serious meeting." On the evening of May 27 the Americans discovered that all day the plane "was not refueled," and the party left Tehran at about 9 a.m. on May 28, while the plane carrying the remainder of the HAWK parts turned back in mid-flight.[^4]
+
+According to Ben-Menashe, Nir also faced problems with his plans for supplying the [[Contras]], as [[Yitzhak Rabin]] refused to cooperate. The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in May 1986 Rabin offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that in September 1986 he and North discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras, which Poindexter sanctioned as "a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless."[^5] On the night of February 4, 1987, Rabin said that he had personally categorically rejected an appeal by a ranking White House aide for Israel to become involved with the Contras in any way.[^6] According to Ben-Menashe, a mysterious $10 million contribution from the [[Sultan of Brunei]] to North's group, wired through [[Bruce Rappaport]], was leaked by the Joint Committee, further exposing the second channel.[^1]
+
+Nir was due to be a major witness in North's trial and knew a great deal about [[Ihsan Barbouti|Barbouti's]] chemical operation in [[Miami]]. He was killed in a plane crash in [[Mexico]] in November 1988, an event that Israeli intelligence believed was a CIA operation to prevent his testimony from embarrassing Peres, [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]], or Bush.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+[^2]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I, ch. 24 ("The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt"), n. 206 (Hill Note, January 4, 1986, ANS 0001255-56). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm
+[^3]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), pp. 526-27, "The Israeli Connection." https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport
+[^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1 ("United States v. Robert C. McFarlane"), on the May 23 to 28, 1986 trip (North Note, May 25, 1986, AMX 001128; Teicher Note, May 26, 1986, AKW 005421; Teicher Note, May 27, 1986, AKW 005452; Teicher Note, May 28, 1986, AKW 005452-53). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^5]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
+[^6]: "Rabin Rejects Senate Report," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 6, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-rejects-senate-report

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Harry H. Schwartz.md

@@ -4,11 +4,22 @@ tags:
   - Person
   - Nuclear
   - Israel
-summary: "Aide to Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke who witnessed Warnke directly confronting Israeli Ambassador Rabin about Israel's nuclear weapons program."
+summary: "Deputy assistant secretary of defense in the office of Paul Warnke, present at the November 1968 meetings with Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin on the F-4 sale and the draft memorandum of understanding on nuclear assurances."
+relations:
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Office of the Secretary of Defense]]"
+    role: "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)"
+    start: 1968
+    fn: 2
 ---
 
-Harry H. Schwartz was an aide to [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He was present at a meeting where Warnke directly questioned [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then [[Israel]]'s ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], about [[Israel]]'s nuclear capabilities. Schwartz recalled Warnke stating, "Mr. Ambassador, we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in [[Israel]] behind our back."[^1]
+[[Harry H. Schwartz]] was a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the office of [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.[^1][^2] He attended the November 22, 1968 meeting at which [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then [[Israel]]'s ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding on Israeli nuclear assurances implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy," and Warnke answered that he had discussed the paragraph with [[Clark Clifford]] and Clifford with [[Dean Rusk]], and that the government did not put that construction on it.[^1] In a conversation with Warnke on November 26, 1968, Rabin said that General [[Mordecai Hod]] had met Schwartz the day before and presented a list of the items desired so that a letter of offer could be prepared.[^3] On December 20, 1968, in Warnke's office, Rabin said that the negotiations with Schwartz were finished.[^2]
+
+[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that Schwartz was present at a meeting where Warnke directly questioned Rabin about Israel's nuclear capabilities, and that Schwartz recalled Warnke stating, "Mr. Ambassador, we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in Israel behind our back."[^4]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 14.
+[^1]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330
+[^2]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 355, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 20, 1968 (lists "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NESA)"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d355
+[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 332, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 26, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d332
+[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 14.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/John Poindexter.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-10-13
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: John Poindexter
 aliases:
   - John Poindexter
@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ relations:
     start: 2002-01
     end: 2003-08-29
     role: "director, Information Awareness Office"
-    fn: 3
+    fn: 4
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Policy Analysis Market]]"
     start: 2002
     end: 2003-08-29
     role: "director of the Information Awareness Office, under which FutureMAP sat; approved the program per Nextgov"
-    fn: 8
+    fn: 9
 ---
 
 John Marlan Poindexter was born August 12, 1936. He graduated first in his class from the [[U.S. Naval Academy]] in 1958 and earned a PhD in nuclear physics from the [[California Institute of Technology]] in 1964. He pursued a naval career that included service in the Pentagon's [[National Security Council]] staff, rising to military assistant to President Reagan's National Security Advisers before assuming the position himself.[^1]
@@ -42,33 +42,36 @@ Poindexter succeeded Robert McFarlane as National Security Adviser in December 1
 
 Poindexter resigned on November 25, 1986, the same day North was fired, after Attorney General Meese's announcement that the Iran arms sale profits had been diverted to the Contras. His resignation and North's termination were the first public accountability actions in the Iran-Contra affair.[^1]
 
+After the September 1986 discussion between Oliver North and Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] of an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras, Poindexter sanctioned the offer: "It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless." He later cautioned that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." When North's memorandum briefing the President for a visit by Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] recommended that the President thank Peres for the Israeli bloc arms, Poindexter penciled next to the sentence: "Rabin. Very tightly held."[^2]
+
 ### Congressional Testimony and Criminal Proceedings
 
 Poindexter testified before the joint congressional [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] committees under a grant of immunity in July 1987. He stated that he had authorized the diversion of funds and had not told [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] about it. He said he made the decision himself because he did not want to place the President in the position of having approved an operation that violated the [[Boland Amendment]]'s prohibition on Contra assistance. This testimony was the central account of executive branch knowledge and authorization in the entire Iran-Contra affair.[^1]
 
-Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] indicted Poindexter in March 1988 on charges of conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, making false statements, and destroying documents. The case was tried in 1990 after North's conviction. Poindexter was convicted on five counts in April 1990 and sentenced to six months in prison.[^2]
+Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] indicted Poindexter in March 1988 on charges of conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, making false statements, and destroying documents. The case was tried in 1990 after North's conviction. Poindexter was convicted on five counts in April 1990 and sentenced to six months in prison.[^3]
 
-The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Poindexter's conviction in November 1991, on the same grounds that had reversed North's: that witnesses against him had been exposed to his immunized congressional testimony, potentially tainting their accounts in ways the government could not demonstrate had not occurred. Walsh declined to retry the case.[^2]
+The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Poindexter's conviction in November 1991, on the same grounds that had reversed North's: that witnesses against him had been exposed to his immunized congressional testimony, potentially tainting their accounts in ways the government could not demonstrate had not occurred. Walsh declined to retry the case.[^3]
 
 ### Total Information Awareness
 
-[[DARPA]] created the [[Information Awareness Office]] in mid-January 2002, under the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] administration, and Poindexter directed it.[^3] The office, a research program focused on mining large-scale databases for intelligence indicators, developed the Total Information Awareness (TIA) system, which proposed aggregating commercial, government, and intelligence databases to identify patterns predictive of terrorist activity.
+[[DARPA]] created the [[Information Awareness Office]] in mid-January 2002, under the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] administration, and Poindexter directed it.[^4] The office, a research program focused on mining large-scale databases for intelligence indicators, developed the Total Information Awareness (TIA) system, which proposed aggregating commercial, government, and intelligence databases to identify patterns predictive of terrorist activity.
 
-When TIA became publicly known in late 2002, it generated intense opposition from civil liberties organizations and members of Congress, who argued that the system constituted a mass domestic surveillance infrastructure. Poindexter's own Iran-Contra history (including his conviction and its reversal) was cited repeatedly in the congressional debate over TIA. On August 12, 2003 Poindexter submitted a five-page letter of resignation to DARPA director [[Anthony Tether]], effective August 29.[^3] The conference report on the fiscal 2004 defense appropriations act provided in Section 8131 that none of the funds may be obligated "for the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," excepting processing, analysis and collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and its joint explanatory statement states that the conferees "direct that the Office be terminated immediately."[^4]
+When TIA became publicly known in late 2002, it generated intense opposition from civil liberties organizations and members of Congress, who argued that the system constituted a mass domestic surveillance infrastructure. Poindexter's own Iran-Contra history (including his conviction and its reversal) was cited repeatedly in the congressional debate over TIA. On August 12, 2003 Poindexter submitted a five-page letter of resignation to DARPA director [[Anthony Tether]], effective August 29.[^4] The conference report on the fiscal 2004 defense appropriations act provided in Section 8131 that none of the funds may be obligated "for the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," excepting processing, analysis and collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and its joint explanatory statement states that the conferees "direct that the Office be terminated immediately."[^5]
 
-The joint explanatory statement lists four projects previously under the office that may continue under DARPA: Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology, Rapid Analytic Wargaming, Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment, and Automated Speech and Text Exploitation in Multiple Languages, including Babylon and Symphony.[^4]
+The joint explanatory statement lists four projects previously under the office that may continue under DARPA: Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology, Rapid Analytic Wargaming, Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment, and Automated Speech and Text Exploitation in Multiple Languages, including Babylon and Symphony.[^5]
 
-DARPA's May 20, 2003 report to Congress on Terrorism Information Awareness lists FutureMAP, the Information Awareness Office's prediction-market program, among TIA's decision-support projects.[^5] On July 28, 2003 Senator [[Ron Wyden]] told reporters that the program's [[Policy Analysis Market]] was under Poindexter's supervision, and Senator [[John Warner]] said the next day that Poindexter and DARPA director Anthony Tether had personally reviewed it.[^6][^7] Nextgov reported that Poindexter approved FutureMAP and that he was not leading the office when the original solicitation was answered; [[Robin Hanson]], who designed the market, wrote that he had never met him.[^8][^9] The Pentagon abandoned the market on July 29, 2003, and Poindexter's resignation letter to Tether is dated August 12, 2003.[^7][^10]
+DARPA's May 20, 2003 report to Congress on Terrorism Information Awareness lists FutureMAP, the Information Awareness Office's prediction-market program, among TIA's decision-support projects.[^6] On July 28, 2003 Senator [[Ron Wyden]] told reporters that the program's [[Policy Analysis Market]] was under Poindexter's supervision, and Senator [[John Warner]] said the next day that Poindexter and DARPA director Anthony Tether had personally reviewed it.[^7][^8] Nextgov reported that Poindexter approved FutureMAP and that he was not leading the office when the original solicitation was answered; [[Robin Hanson]], who designed the market, wrote that he had never met him.[^9][^10] The Pentagon abandoned the market on July 29, 2003, and Poindexter's resignation letter to Tether is dated August 12, 2003.[^8][^11]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Tower Commission Report (President's Special Review Board). *The Tower Commission Report*. Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987. U.S. Congress, Joint Committees on Iran-Contra. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.
-[^2]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994.
-[^3]: Dan Caterinicchia, "Poindexter leaving DARPA," *Nextgov/FCW*, August 13, 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/poindexter-leaving-darpa/201670/
-[^4]: Congressional Record, House, September 24, 2003, Conference Report on H.R. 2658, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (House Report 108-283), Sec. 8131 and Joint Explanatory Statement. https://sgp.fas.org/congress/2003/tia.html
-[^5]: DARPA, "Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," May 20, 2003, Annex B. https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/TIA-report.html
-[^6]: "Pentagon plan to bet on terrorism is blasted," Associated Press, as published by the Deseret News, July 29, 2003. https://www.deseret.com/2003/7/29/19738241/pentagon-plan-to-bet-on-terrorism-is-blasted/
-[^7]: "Pentagon Abandons Terrorism Betting Plan," Associated Press, July 29, 2003, as published by KSL. https://www.ksl.com/article/103317
-[^8]: "DOD's misguided bet on the future," Nextgov, August 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/dods-misguided-bet-on-the-future/201748/
-[^9]: Robin Hanson, "The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive," George Mason University. https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/policyanalysismarket.html
-[^10]: Dawn S. Onley, "In his resignation, Poindexter defends projects," Government Computer News, August 13, 2003. https://www.route-fifty.com/digital-government/2003/08/in-his-resignation-poindexter-defends-projects/295109/
+[^2]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
+[^3]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994.
+[^4]: Dan Caterinicchia, "Poindexter leaving DARPA," *Nextgov/FCW*, August 13, 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/poindexter-leaving-darpa/201670/
+[^5]: Congressional Record, House, September 24, 2003, Conference Report on H.R. 2658, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (House Report 108-283), Sec. 8131 and Joint Explanatory Statement. https://sgp.fas.org/congress/2003/tia.html
+[^6]: DARPA, "Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," May 20, 2003, Annex B. https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/TIA-report.html
+[^7]: "Pentagon plan to bet on terrorism is blasted," Associated Press, as published by the Deseret News, July 29, 2003. https://www.deseret.com/2003/7/29/19738241/pentagon-plan-to-bet-on-terrorism-is-blasted/
+[^8]: "Pentagon Abandons Terrorism Betting Plan," Associated Press, July 29, 2003, as published by KSL. https://www.ksl.com/article/103317
+[^9]: "DOD's misguided bet on the future," Nextgov, August 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/dods-misguided-bet-on-the-future/201748/
+[^10]: Robin Hanson, "The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive," George Mason University. https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/policyanalysismarket.html
+[^11]: Dawn S. Onley, "In his resignation, Poindexter defends projects," Government Computer News, August 13, 2003. https://www.route-fifty.com/digital-government/2003/08/in-his-resignation-poindexter-defends-projects/295109/

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Menachem Schneerson.md

@@ -5,17 +5,18 @@ tags:
   - IranContra
   - CIA
   - Israel
-summary: "Large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to Drexel Burnham, a brokerage house where Michael Milken built his junk-bond fortune."
+summary: "According to Ari Ben-Menashe, large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to Drexel Burnham, a brokerage house where Michael Milken built his junk-bond fortune."
 born: 1902-04-18
 died: 1994-06-12
 location: "Nikolaev, Russian Empire (now Mykolaiv, Ukraine)"
 ---
 
-[[Menachem Schneerson]], also known as the Lubavitcher Rebbe, was a prominent orthodox Jewish leader based in Brooklyn, [[New York City]]. His financial institutions were enlisted by the [[Likud Party]]-controlled [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] to funnel money for housing projects in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]] for Jewish settlers, drawing from the slush fund generated by arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
+[[Menachem Schneerson]], also known as the Lubavitcher Rebbe, was a prominent orthodox Jewish leader based in Brooklyn, [[New York City]]. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], his financial institutions were enlisted by the [[Likud Party]]-controlled [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] to funnel money for housing projects in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]] for Jewish settlers, drawing from the slush fund generated by arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
 
-Large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to [[Drexel Burnham]], a brokerage house where [[Michael Milken]] built his junk-bond fortune. Until 1987, some of the profits from the slush fund were used to finance the Lubavitcher yeshivahs (colleges).[^1]
+Ben-Menashe wrote that large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to [[Drexel Burnham]], a brokerage house where [[Michael Milken]] built his junk-bond fortune, and that until 1987 some of the profits from the slush fund were used to finance the Lubavitcher yeshivahs (colleges).[^1]
 
-In 1987, the committee and Schneerson parted ways. This was partly due to questions regarding his allegiance to the [[Likud Party]] and the emergence of the orthodox [[Shas Party]], which was at odds with the Rebbe. Funds previously directed to the Lubavitcher yeshivahs were redirected to the Shas yeshivahs. The committee also decided to withdraw funds from Drexel and from Schneerson's control due to concerns that the funds might be frozen if relations between [[Israel]] and the [[United States|U.S.]] deteriorated, contributing to Drexel's eventual downfall.[^1]
+He wrote that in 1987 the committee and Schneerson parted ways, partly due to questions regarding his allegiance to the Likud Party and the emergence of the orthodox [[Shas Party]], which was at odds with the Rebbe; that funds previously directed to the Lubavitcher yeshivahs were redirected to the Shas yeshivahs; and that the committee also decided to withdraw funds from Drexel and from Schneerson's control due to concerns that the funds might be frozen if relations between [[Israel]] and the [[United States|U.S.]] deteriorated, contributing to Drexel's eventual downfall.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.md

@@ -2,19 +2,181 @@
 category: "Political Figure"
 tags:
   - Person
-summary: "Under the Shah, Iran maintained good relations with 'moderate pro-American Arab countries' such as Egypt, Jordan, and the Emirates."
+  - Iran
+  - OperationAjax
+  - SAVAK
+  - KurdishOperation
+  - ArmsSales
+  - HostageCrisis
+  - SafariClub
+  - Trident
+  - ProjectFlower
+aliases:
+  - "Mohammad Reza Pahlavi"
+  - "Mohammad Reza Shah"
+  - "Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi"
+  - "Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi"
+  - "Shah of Iran"
+  - "the Shah"
+summary: "Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979, returned to power by the 1953 coup, partner of Nixon and Kissinger in the Kurdish program, and admitted to New York Hospital on October 22, 1979."
 born: 1919-10-26
 died: 1980-07-27
 location: "Tehran, Iran"
+created: 2025-08-05
+updated: 2026-10-14
+relations:
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Operation AJAX]]"
+    start: 1953-08-13
+    role: "signed firmans dismissing Mohammed Mossadegh and naming Fazlollah Zahedi prime minister"
+    fn: 6
+  - type: appointed
+    with: "[[Fazlollah Zahedi]]"
+    start: 1953-08-13
+    role: "prime minister by royal firman"
+    fn: 6
+  - type: relative_of
+    with: "[[Princess Ashraf Pahlavi]]"
+    role: "twin sister, who with Schwarzkopf pressed him to sign the 1953 firmans"
+    fn: 5
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Safari Club]]"
+    start: 1976
+    role: "Iran listed among the member states by Prince Turki al-Faisal"
+    fn: 32
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Project Flower]]"
+    start: 1977-04
+    role: "signed the Israeli-Iranian oil-for-arms contracts with Shimon Peres, including the missile project, per documents published by Iranian students"
+    fn: 31
+  - type: subject_of
+    with: "[[Pike Committee]]"
+    start: 1976-02-16
+    role: "the Kurdish covert aid program examined in the committee report"
+    fn: 23
 ---
 
-[[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], also known as the Shah of [[Iran]], ruled for nearly 40 years. His departure from [[Iran]] on January 16, 1979, marked a tumultuous upheaval in the [[Middle East]] and led to a new threat to [[Israel|Israel's]] existence.[^1]
+[[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], also known as the Shah of [[Iran]], ruled Iran for nearly 40 years, from his accession during the Second World War until his departure on January 16, 1979.[^1] His throne was restored in 1953 by a coup that removed [[Mohammed Mossadegh]], and his government relied on the [[SAVAK]] security service. By November 1979 he was in the [[United States]] for medical treatment, and the decision to admit him became a subject of dispute involving the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration, [[Henry A. Kissinger]] and [[David Rockefeller]].
 
-Under the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]], [[Iran]] maintained good relations with "moderate pro-[[United States|American]] Arab countries" such as [[Egypt]], [[Jordan]], and the [[Emirates]]. However, by 1978, his rule was threatened by widespread discontent due to extreme corruption, skyrocketing prices, and the failure of his White Revolution to address food production issues. The infrastructure of [[Tehran]] was also unable to handle the traffic, leading to public frustration.[^1]
+### Return to power, 1951 to 1953
 
-[[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence, particularly [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], warned of an impending revolution and the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah's]] imminent overthrow as early as 1978. These warnings were dismissed by [[United States|U.S.]] analysts, who misread the threat to his rule. In December 1978, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and [[SAVAK]] (Iranian secret police) enlisted [[Israel|Israeli]] aid in a plan to assassinate [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini]], but the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]] rejected it, fearing further bloodshed.[^1]
+By 1952 the American embassy in [[Tehran]] had concluded that a government to replace Mossadegh could be installed only by a military coup. On July 31, 1952, [[Loy Henderson]] reported that any alternative to Mossadegh could be brought to power "except perhaps by military coup," and that the officers best placed to lead one were [[Fazlollah Zahedi]] and General Hedjazi.[^2]
 
-After his departure, the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]]'s Regency and Supreme Military Councils were unable to function, and [[Shahpour Bakhtiar]], his last prime minister, proved helpless. [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]] arrived in [[Iran]] on February 1, 1979, and declared [[Iran]] an Islamic republic on April 1. The [[Israel|Israeli]] Embassy in [[Tehran]] was subsequently handed over to the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]].[^1]
+In March 1953 Henderson assessed the Shah's own part in such a move. He wrote that the Shah would "undoubtedly be frightened at thought of military coup being attempted in his name" and would probably try to discourage it, and that a failed attempt would be likely to complete the ruin of the Shah and the dynasty.[^3] On April 15, 1953, the embassy reported that the Shah had been postponing a meeting with Zahedi from day to day.[^4]
+
+The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s history of the operation, known as TPAJAX and later as [[Operation AJAX]], was written by [[Donald Wilber]] in March 1954 and released in 2000. The [[National Security Archive]] posted it as part of its Iran coup briefing book. Wilber describes a plan in four steps. [[Princess Ashraf Pahlavi]], the Shah's twin sister, was to urge him to dismiss Mossadegh and to tell him she was in contact with American and British officials. General [[H. Norman Schwarzkopf]], formerly head of the American gendarmerie mission in Iran, was to bring the Shah two royal decrees (firmans), one dismissing Mossadegh and one appointing Zahedi, and to get the army's commitment to the crown. A British agent whose credentials the Shah accepted would reinforce the message. [[Kermit Roosevelt]], representing the President of the United States, would then urge the Shah to sign.[^5]
+
+Wilber records that the Shah refused at first. On August 10 he said that while he approved of the plan for action he would sign no papers. After pressure from Princess Ashraf and General Schwarzkopf and several meetings with Roosevelt, the Wilber history records, the Shah signed the required firmans, and action was set for August 16.[^5] A security leak in the Iranian army then caused the chief of the Shah's bodyguard, who had been assigned to seize Mossadegh, to be overwhelmed by loyal units. Wilber describes the Shah's flight to [[Baghdad]] as "an act of prudence" that had been at least partly foreseen in the plan.[^5]
+
+A British memorandum in the Foreign Relations volume dates the firman dismissing Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi to August 13, 1953, and says it was conveyed secretly. The opposition press later published photographs of it. The same memorandum says the firman was carried from Ramsar to Tehran by Colonel Nasiri, commander of the Imperial Guard, who delivered a copy late on August 15 to the officer in charge of the troops at Mossadegh's house and was arrested as he left; it records the belief that junior Guards officers with Tudeh sympathies disrupted the plan.[^6] On August 18 Henderson reported that Mossadegh had asked him whether the Shah had issued a firman removing him as prime minister.[^7] The same day Under Secretary of State [[Walter Bedell Smith]] wrote to the President that "it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his constitutional power in signing the firman replacing Mosadeq." He added that "the old boy wouldn't accept this and arrested the messenger and everybody else involved that he could get his hands on."[^8] The Shah arrived in [[Rome]] from Baghdad in the early afternoon of August 18.[^9] On August 20 the embassy in Rome reported that he was to leave Rome for Baghdad around midnight, arriving about noon on August 21.[^10] An airgram from the Tehran embassy in January 1973 described the episode as the time "when the Shah was forced to flee the country only to return two weeks later when Mossadeq was ousted."[^1]
+
+On October 9, 1953, Henderson reported that the Shah had expressed willingness to sign the necessary firmans if Zahedi requested them.[^11] The oil arrangements that followed were recorded in the State Department files of late October 1954, when the Shah signed the oil bill.[^12]
+
+### SAVAK
+
+SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar) served as the Shah's internal security and intelligence service. A February 1971 airgram from the Tehran embassy recorded that Iranian young people widely assumed the CIA had aided SAVAK when the Shah first organized it, and that the "invisible hand of the CIA still wields considerable influence on, if not outright control of, SAVAK." The airgram also reported that SAVAK "is feared by most Iranians."[^13] The November 23, 1979 summary of [[Special Coordination Committee]] (Intelligence) conclusions lists, among its points, publicizing links between some present Iranian leaders and SAVAK.[^14]
+
+### The Kurdish operation, 1972 to 1975
+
+On May 30, 1972, in Tehran, [[Richard Nixon]] and Kissinger met the Shah. The memorandum of conversation records the Shah saying he feared the Soviets would establish "a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists." When Kissinger asked what could be done, the Shah replied: "Turkey needs strengthening. Iran can help with the Kurds."[^15] The aid went to the Kurdish insurgency of [[Mulla Mustafa Barzani]] in [[Iraq]].
+
+In June 1972 the NSC staff, the CIA and the State Department worked through the question. On June 7 [[Harold Saunders]] wrote to Kissinger that "the balance is fairly fine on the question of whether we should support the Kurds," and advised that Kissinger should not meet Barzani's representatives personally, since that "comes so close to involving the President at least by implication."[^16] A CIA memorandum of June 12 to [[Richard Helms]] said that the policy of non-interference had been confirmed "not only by the State Department but by Dr. Kissinger's office as well."[^17] On July 28 [[Alexander Haig]] forwarded to Kissinger Helms's proposal: about $3 million from the United States over one year and about $2 million in supplies, with Iran also contributing. Haig recommended informing only the 40 Committee principals and to "avoid any paper and tell them that the President wants this done."[^18]
+
+Kissinger later described the origin of the program in a memorandum to Nixon of September 6, 1973: "You will recall that you initiated financial and military support to the Kurds in August 1972 in response to an appeal from the Shah."[^19] His memorandum of April 11, 1974 said that since then the United States had provided, "through the Iranians," a monthly subsidy, and that "the underlying purpose was to keep the Iraqi Government tied down and to limit its capacity for adventures abroad."[^20] On June 24, 1974, the CIA proposed $8.06 million for fiscal 1975, and Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve it.[^21] On March 16, 1975, after the Iran-Iraq agreement, [[Brent Scowcroft]] sent Helms, then ambassador to Iran, a message instructing him to tell the Shah that the United States was prepared to provide the March subvention, and to answer Barzani's message with the words "our prayers are with them."[^22]
+
+The [[Pike Committee]], the House Select Committee on Intelligence under Representative [[Otis Pike]], examined the Kurdish operation as one of three covert cases. Its report, printed in [[The Village Voice]] on February 16, 1976, states that the program ultimately involved some $16 million and was apparently endorsed by the President after a private meeting with the Shah and Kissinger. [[John B. Connally]], then about to take a major role in the President's re-election campaign, personally advised the Shah that the United States would cooperate. The report states that there was no [[Forty Committee]] meeting at which a formal proposal could be discussed and voted on. It says Kissinger "personally restrained the insurgents from an all-out offensive on the one occasion when such an attack might have been successful." After the Iran-Iraq border agreement the United States dropped the Kurds. The report charges: "The President, Dr. Kissinger and the foreign head of state [the Shah] hoped our clients would not prevail," and concludes: "Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise." A high American official later explained to the committee staff that "covert action should not be confused with missionary work."[^23]
+
+### Arms purchases and aircraft
+
+In May 1972 the Tehran embassy recommended that the United States make available at least three squadrons of F-15s, with possibly two to four F-14s equipped with Phoenix missiles per squadron.[^24] A memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Kenneth Rush]] to Kissinger of May 18, 1972 attached a talking paper noting that since 1969 the Shah had focused on follow-on aircraft to replace his American-supplied F-4s, and that "these aircraft are barely out of the research and development stage."[^25] On April 27, 1973, Deputy Secretary of State Rush reported from [[Geneva]] on a ninety-minute audience with the Shah, in which he outlined plans to go ahead on the Trident and B-1 weapons programs of the United States.[^26]
+
+On July 20, 1973, the [[Senior Review Group]] discussed the Shah's visit. [[William Clements]] of the Department of Defense said that the Shah wanted to ride in an F-14 while he was in the country, and that "he has indicated he wants to buy a squadron of F-14s and F-15s at some point."[^27] Four days later the memorandum of a conversation records the Shah's belief that he needed sufficient air power, including F-14s, F-15s and possibly A-10s, to deter his enemies.[^28]
+
+A briefing memorandum from [[Alfred L. Atherton Jr.]] to Kissinger of November 10, 1975 listed friction points with Iran. It described [[Project IBEX]] as "a large electronic system which will give the Iranians an ELINT capability." The Department of Defense had suggested that IBEX be placed under foreign military sales, because it was responsible for overseeing the integration of Iranian communications under the Seek Switch program. The memorandum records that the Iranians said how IBEX was managed was "our bureaucratic problem to resolve," and that they would not accept delays or added costs.[^29]
+
+### Israel and Iran, 1958 to 1979
+
+[[Reuven Shiloah]], the founder of the Israeli intelligence services, pursued a "peripheral" alliance policy from 1957. The Turkish scholar Yusuf Suha Sonucu wrote that in the autumn of 1957 the Iranian embassy in Paris sent the Israeli embassy a note asking for a secret meeting at deputy prime minister level, that in January 1958 Shiloah carried a letter from [[David Ben-Gurion]] to Tehran, and that in April 1958 an Iranian delegation headed by a deputy of Prime Minister [[Manouchehr Eghbal]] was received in Tel Aviv by Ben-Gurion and [[Golda Meir]]. Following a meeting of prime ministers in [[Ankara]] on August 29, 1958, the heads of the three intelligence services met in Ankara in late September or early October 1958, and the tripartite arrangement known as Trident was set up among [[Mossad]], Turkey's National Security Service (MAH, later the [[Turkish National Intelligence Organization|MIT]]) and SAVAK. Sonucu reports that the services divided tasks against [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] and Soviet influence, with Iran contributing on the Persian Gulf and Iraq and Turkey on Syria, and that the service chiefs met twice a year. He also reports that after Ben-Gurion's approach to Washington the Central Intelligence Agency financed a two-story building in Israel as the Trident center, with Iranian officers on the "blue" floor, Turkish officers on the "yellow" floor and Israelis on the ground floor.[^30]
+
+Sonucu cites Haggai Eshed's biography of Shiloah for a CIA report on Israel's security, found in the American embassy in Tehran and published by Iranian revolutionaries in March 1979, that described Trident as an arrangement among Mossad, the Turkish service and SAVAK whose ministers met twice a year. He writes that after the Iran-Iraq agreement of March 5, 1975, the Shah told the Egyptian journalist [[Mohamed Hassanein Heikal]] that the Nasser threat had gone and that Iranian intelligence and the army had been in contact with Israel, and that in the first months of the new regime Mossad director [[Yitzhak Hofi]] said Israel had wanted to keep Iran in the arrangement and had offered it free tires for its F-4 Phantoms.[^30]
+
+According to documents published by the Iranian students who held the American embassy after November 1979, the Shah and [[Shimon Peres]], then Israel's defense minister, signed one of six oil-for-arms contracts in Tehran in April 1977. The contract code-named Flower covered a surface-to-surface missile project. The Israeli papers, in English, were published in paperback in Iran, and the volume on the missile project was supplied to The New York Times in 1986. The documents state that the aim was to extend the range of an Israeli missile developed in the early 1970s and to replace American-supplied parts so that Israel could export it without American approval. The missile carried a warhead of 750 kilograms and a range of up to 300 miles; shipments were to go through a Swiss company to central Iran, with an assembly plant near Sirjan and a test range near Rafsanjan. In the record of General [[Hassan Toufanian]]'s July 1977 visit to Israel, [[Ezer Weizman]] tells him that Iran must have a missile, and [[Moshe Dayan]] raises the sensitivity of the Americans to missiles of that kind, which with a 750-kilogram head could also be regarded as nuclear-capable. Toufanian, the Shah's arms procurer, told the Times that the Israelis never said explicitly that they had a nuclear capability but that it was implied, and that Iran made a down payment in oil in 1978. A July 1978 summary of a conversation between Admiral Kamal Habibollahi and the Israeli navy commander Michael Barkai mentions enhancing Flower so that the missiles could be launched from submarines.[^31]
+
+Toufanian and Habibollahi told the Times that the recorded conversations were genuine, and Weizman did not deny that the documents were authentic. The spokesman for Israel's Foreign Ministry called them falsified documents spread by the Tehran government. [[Gary Sick]] and Harold Saunders told the Times that they had not known of the project. Israel halted the cooperation when [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]] came to power in February 1979.[^31]
+
+### The Safari Club
+
+[[Turki al-Faisal|Prince Turki al-Faisal]], the former head of Saudi intelligence, said in a speech at [[Georgetown University]] on February 3, 2002, that in 1976, after Watergate, the American intelligence community was "literally tied up by Congress," and that a group of countries got together and established what was called the Safari Club. He stated that the Safari Club included France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Iran, with the aim of sharing information and countering Soviet influence, especially in Africa.[^32] Heikal wrote in 1982 that the club was the idea of Count [[Alexandre de Marenches]], head of the French [[SDECE]], and that an agreement among the five governments was signed by Sheikh [[Kamal Adham]], director of intelligence, for Saudi Arabia, General [[Nematollah Nassiri]], head of [[SAVAK]], for Iran, the director of intelligence for Egypt, Ahmed Duleimi, director of intelligence, for Morocco, and de Marenches himself for France. He wrote that a copy of the agreement was found in SAVAK's archives after the revolution, and that the proposal to make Algeria a founding member came to him in an interview with President [[Houari Boumediene]].[^33]
+
+### The 1978 warnings and the revolution
+
+[[Ari Ben-Menashe]], who worked for Israeli intelligence, wrote in his memoir that under the Shah Iran maintained good relations with "moderate pro-American Arab countries" such as [[Egypt]], [[Jordan]] and the [[Emirates]], and that by 1978 the Shah's rule was threatened by widespread discontent over corruption, rising prices and the failure of his White Revolution to address food production. He added that the infrastructure of Tehran could not handle its traffic.[^34]
+
+Ben-Menashe also wrote that Israeli intelligence warned of an impending revolution and the Shah's overthrow as early as 1978, that American analysts dismissed the warnings, and that in December 1978 the CIA and SAVAK enlisted Israeli aid in a plan to assassinate Khomeini, which the Shah rejected, fearing further bloodshed.[^34]
+
+The Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979, which Ben-Menashe describes as a tumultuous upheaval in the [[Middle East]] and a new threat to Israel's existence. He wrote that the regency and supreme military councils were unable to function and that [[Shahpour Bakhtiar]], the last prime minister, proved helpless; that Khomeini arrived in Iran on February 1, 1979, and declared an Islamic republic on April 1; and that the Israeli embassy in Tehran was then handed over to the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]].[^34]
+
+### Medical treatment and the admission to the United States, 1979
+
+The Shah entered the United States on October 22, 1979, for diagnosis and evaluation of his medical condition at the Cornell medical facility in New York; the statement read by White House press secretary [[Jody Powell]] on December 15, 1979, gives that date, adds that he entered Wilford Hall Air Force Hospital at Lackland Air Force Base on December 2, and announces his departure for residence in [[Panama]].[^35]
+
+The Special Coordination Committee recorded on November 5, 1979 that "the Rockefeller group, which is managing the Shah's affairs, has increased the security around the Shah." The [[New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center]] released a medical update on him the same day.[^36] A [[National Security Council]] meeting record of November 6 states that he "has a tube implanted in him and also has cancer of the neck and could not easily be moved."[^37] The editorial note in the Foreign Relations volume on Iranian withdrawals from [[Chase Manhattan Bank]] records that David Rockefeller, "a friend of the Shah, had lobbied for the Shah's acceptance into the United States for medical treatment."[^38]
+
+A memorandum from Ambassador [[Hermann Eilts]] to Carter of November 21 recorded questions about the Shah's health, including whether he had cancer and how serious it was.[^39] At a National Security Council meeting on November 23, the minutes record the question whether [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] should talk to David Rockefeller.[^40] A November 24 memorandum from Under Secretary of State [[David D. Newsom]] to [[Cyrus Vance]] records that the Rockefeller organization would arrange transportation for the Shah's planned trips to [[Mexico]].[^41]
+
+On November 26 Vance sent Carter a memorandum noting that a television interview by [[George Ball]] "inspired a number of inquiries on Henry Kissinger's advice." Ball had said on NBC's Meet the Press on November 25 that the Shah might not have been admitted to the United States were it not for the "enormously obnoxious" pressure exerted by Kissinger. The [[Chicago Tribune]] reported the same day under the headline "Report Kissinger Tells Shah to Stay." Carter wrote in the margin that the press reported he had met "to soothe an angry Kissinger."[^42] On December 1 Vance's memorandum recorded plans for moving the Shah to Wilford Hall Hospital at [[Lackland Air Force Base]] in [[San Antonio]].[^43] A January 15, 1980 memorandum from [[Steven Oxman]] recorded the prognosis that the Shah's cancer could metastasize at any time and lead quickly to death.[^44]
+
+An undated memorandum from [[Hamilton Jordan]] to Carter, Vance and Brzezinski, written in January 1980, summarized the account given by Panamanian emissaries of their meetings with Iranian Foreign Minister [[Sadegh Ghotbzadeh]] on January 7 about the Shah's presence in Panama. According to that summary, Ghotbzadeh described the seizure of the American embassy as an "American conspiracy" involving "Rockefeller, Kissinger and others," who intended to create a crisis for Carter that would lead to the election of a Republican "controlled by Kissinger and Rockefeller."[^45]
+
+On March 30, 1980, a message from the Swiss ambassador to Iran reported that the Shah had been transferred to [[Cairo]], and that, according to the ambassador's information, Kissinger had organized the move.[^46] On April 1, 1980, the record of an Oval Office meeting noted that [[Abolhassan Bani-Sadr]] had said in a March 31 speech that Kissinger was responsible for the Shah's move to Egypt.[^47] The Shah died in Cairo on July 27, 1980.[^48]
 
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+
+[^1]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, document 1, Airgram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, January 9, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d1.
+[^2]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, document 192, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, July 31, 1952. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d192.
+[^3]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 313, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, March 6, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d313.
+[^4]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 324, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, April 15, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d324.
+[^5]: [[Donald Wilber]], *Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953*, written March 1954, released by the CIA in 2000. Posted by the [[National Security Archive]] as Iran Coup Briefing Book 28 (November 29, 2000), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/; text copy at https://archive.org/details/CIA-Mossadeq-Iran-1953. First disclosed by James Risen in *The New York Times* on April 16 and June 18, 2000. The CIA's mid-1970s internal history *The Battle for Iran*, released in 1981 with references to TPAJAX blacked out, was posted by the National Security Archive with those references restored on August 19, 2013 (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/).
+[^6]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 362, British Memorandum (undated), recording that the firman dismissing Mosadeq and appointing Zahedi was issued on August 13, 1953, and that the opposition press published photographs of the royal firman. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d362.
+[^7]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 347, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d347.
+[^8]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 346, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the President, Washington, August 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d346.
+[^9]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 348, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 20, 1953, reporting telegram 571 from Rome of August 18. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d348.
+[^10]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 350, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 21, 1953, editorial note citing telegram 613 from Rome, August 20. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d350.
+[^11]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 374, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, October 9, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d374.
+[^12]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 502, Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran, Washington, October 28, 1954, reporting that the Shah signed the oil bill on the day the Tehran embassy informed the Department. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d502.
+[^13]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, document 116, Airgram A-56 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, February 22, 1971. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d116.
+[^14]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979-September 1980, document 54, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting, November 23, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d54.
+[^15]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 200, Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 30, 1972, 5:35 to 6:35 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d200.
+[^16]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 313, Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Staff to Kissinger, Washington, June 7, 1972, "Message from Shah on Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d313.
+[^17]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 315, Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, CIA (Waller) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, June 12, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d315.
+[^18]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 321, Memorandum From Haig to Kissinger, Washington, July 28, 1972, "Kurdish Problem," attaching Helms's memorandum of July 18, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d321.
+[^19]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 233, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1973, "Increased Assistance to the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d233.
+[^20]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 246, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, April 11, 1974, "Further Support for the Kurds in Iraq." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d246.
+[^21]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 254, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, June 24, 1974, "Fiscal Year 1975 Support for the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d254.
+[^22]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 281, Backchannel Message From Scowcroft to the Ambassador to Iran (Helms), Washington, March 16, 1975, with the oral message to Barzani. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d281.
+[^23]: Pike Committee, *Report on the Central Intelligence Agency*, as printed in "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," *The Village Voice*, February 16, 1976, Case 2 (Arms Support). Released through the CIA CREST database as document CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5; text at https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5. The Kissinger restraint passage, the Iran-Iraq border passage and the "missionary work" remark appear in the printed introduction by Aaron Latham, which quotes the report.
+[^24]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 187, Telegram 2642 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, May 6, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d187.
+[^25]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 195, Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to Kissinger, Washington, May 18, 1972, with attached talking paper "Sale of F-15/F-14 Aircraft." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d195.
+[^26]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 14, Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush) to the Department of State, Geneva, April 27, 1973, "Conversation with Shah." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d14.
+[^27]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 23, Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, July 20, 1973 (participants include William Clements for the Department of Defense). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d23.
+[^28]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 26, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 24, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d26.
+[^29]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 147, Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Kissinger, Washington, November 10, 1975, "Issues Between the U.S. Government and Iran." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d147.
+[^30]: Yusuf Suha Sonucu, "Periferi Doktrini Bağlamında Türkiye-İsrail İstihbarat İşbirliği," *İsrailiyat: İsrail ve Yahudi Çalışmaları Dergisi*, no. 3 (Winter 2018), pp. 12-60, citing Haggai Eshed, *Reuven Shiloah: The Man Behind the Mossad* (Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 308-310; Yossi Alpher, *Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), pp. 11-15; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion* (Tel Aviv, 1987), pp. 1322-1333; and Ofra Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 44-46. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/672649.
+[^31]: Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal With the Shah," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1986, as reprinted in the CIA reading room, CIA-RDP90-00965R000705970013-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000705970013-3.
+[^32]: Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, special address, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, February 3, 2002 (transcription by Paul Dyer). https://web.archive.org/web/20030402032839/http://www.ccasonline.org/publicaffairs/turki_02032002.html.
+[^33]: Mohamed Heikal, *Iran: The Untold Story* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 113 and author's note. https://archive.org/details/iranuntoldstoryi00hayk
+[^34]: [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+[^35]: Jimmy Carter, "Shah of Iran: Statement by the White House Press Secretary on the Shah's Departure From the United States," December 15, 1979. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/248279.
+[^36]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 2, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting, Washington, November 5, 1979, including the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center update of November 5. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d2.
+[^37]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 8, Record of a National Security Council Meeting, November 6, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d8.
+[^38]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 30, Editorial Note (Bani-Sadr announcement of November 14, 1979; John Kifner, "Iran Defends Move To Withdraw Funds," *New York Times*, November 15, 1979). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d30.
+[^39]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 43, Memorandum From Ambassador Eilts to President Carter, Washington, November 21, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d43.
+[^40]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 51, Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, November 23, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d51.
+[^41]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 57, Memorandum From Under Secretary of State Newsom to Secretary of State Vance, Washington, November 24, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d57.
+[^42]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 60, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, November 26, 1979, citing "Report Kissinger Tells Shah to Stay," *Chicago Tribune*, November 26, 1979, p. 2, and Robert G. Kaiser, "Vance Briefing Aimed at Soothing Angry Kissinger," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d60.
+[^43]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 76, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, December 1, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d76.
+[^44]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 149, Memorandum by the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Oxman), January 15, 1980. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d149.
+[^45]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 144, Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and Brzezinski, undated, with Jordan's summary of notes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d144.
+[^46]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 228, Message From the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State, Tehran, March 30, 1980. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d228.
+[^47]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 233, Record of an Oval Office Meeting, April 1, 1980, recording Bani-Sadr's March 31 speech. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d233.
+[^48]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 326, Editorial Note: "On July 27, 1980, the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, died in Cairo." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d326.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Oliver North.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
   - Oliver L. North
   - Lt. Col. Oliver North
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-10-08
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 tags:
   - KeyFigure
@@ -89,31 +89,33 @@ The writer [[Cheri Seymour]] wrote that North received drug profits from Al-Kass
 
 The Enterprise's air operation used the [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango]] base in [[El Salvador]]. North wrote to [[Felix Rodriguez]] in September 1985 asking him to use his influence with Salvadoran Air Force commander [[Juan Rafael Bustillo]] to secure hangar space; the CIA's records, as the writer [[Gary Webb]] reported, show Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango was used by the CIA for covert Contra operations until it was turned over to the NSC and North's Enterprise in 1985, while the adjoining Hangar No. 5 remained CIA-run.[^12] Walsh's Enterprise chapter records that the Salvadoran chief at Ilopango, General Bustillo, ordered the operation's warehouse of parts and supplies there, and that the downing of [[Eugene Hasenfus]] on October 5, 1986 "settled irrevocably the question of CIA assumption" of the Enterprise's operation.[^3]
 
+The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in May 1986 Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that North and Rabin met again in September 1986 and discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras. The report quotes North's notes that Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for Sov Bloc weaps and ammo he could make avail," and asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. When North answered that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested that it dock at [[Haifa]] and "have it filled w/ whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." On September 15, 1986, North told John Poindexter that orders had been passed to the ship to proceed to Haifa, where loading would be accomplished by Israeli military personnel. North's later briefing memorandum for a visit by Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] recommended that the President thank him for the Israeli bloc arms "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance."[^13]
+
 ### Panama and Noriega
 
-According to testimony before the [[Kerry Committee]] by the Panamanian official José Blandón, [[Manuel Noriega]] met North in June 1985 on a boat anchored off Panama City to discuss Panamanian cooperation in the war against Nicaragua while the Boland Amendment barred direct or indirect CIA support. Blandón testified that this meeting produced Noriega's agreement to help train Contra troops and to let Contra leaders enter and leave Panama freely, and that at a second meeting Noriega suggested Panamanian units could be used in operations on Nicaraguan territory; Blandón had no information that Noriega acted on North's request. Noriega met Casey in November 1985; a memorandum Casey wrote suggested Noriega left "reassured" and the narcotics issue was not mentioned, and other U.S. officials concluded that Casey had "let Noriega off the hook."[^13]
+According to testimony before the [[Kerry Committee]] by the Panamanian official José Blandón, [[Manuel Noriega]] met North in June 1985 on a boat anchored off Panama City to discuss Panamanian cooperation in the war against Nicaragua while the Boland Amendment barred direct or indirect CIA support. Blandón testified that this meeting produced Noriega's agreement to help train Contra troops and to let Contra leaders enter and leave Panama freely, and that at a second meeting Noriega suggested Panamanian units could be used in operations on Nicaraguan territory; Blandón had no information that Noriega acted on North's request. Noriega met Casey in November 1985; a memorandum Casey wrote suggested Noriega left "reassured" and the narcotics issue was not mentioned, and other U.S. officials concluded that Casey had "let Noriega off the hook."[^14]
 
-The Independent Counsel's summary of North's "Quid Pro Quo" admission describes discussions with Noriega about acts of sabotage against the Sandinista government in exchange for U.S. help in rehabilitating Noriega's public image.[^14] Webb wrote, citing government documents filed in North's trial, that Noriega also offered to have the entire Sandinista leadership assassinated in exchange for a promise to "clean up Noriega's image"; that North raised the proposal at a top-level meeting but was told to say the administration was not keen on murdering Nicaraguan officials though Panamanian help with sabotage would be acceptable; that North returned to Panama a month after the torture-murder of [[Hugo Spadafora]] to assure Noriega of increased U.S. aid; and that within a year $200 million in additional U.S. funds and bank loans went to Noriega.[^15]
+The Independent Counsel's summary of North's "Quid Pro Quo" admission describes discussions with Noriega about acts of sabotage against the Sandinista government in exchange for U.S. help in rehabilitating Noriega's public image.[^15] Webb wrote, citing government documents filed in North's trial, that Noriega also offered to have the entire Sandinista leadership assassinated in exchange for a promise to "clean up Noriega's image"; that North raised the proposal at a top-level meeting but was told to say the administration was not keen on murdering Nicaraguan officials though Panamanian help with sabotage would be acceptable; that North returned to Panama a month after the torture-murder of [[Hugo Spadafora]] to assure Noriega of increased U.S. aid; and that within a year $200 million in additional U.S. funds and bank loans went to Noriega.[^16]
 
 ### NHAO and the contractors
 
-North used the State Department's [[NHAO|Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] to move Contra supplies. The Kerry Committee report found that the State Department selected four companies owned or operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras: SETCO Air, established by the Honduran trafficker [[Juan Matta Ballesteros]]; DIACSA, a Miami air company that served as headquarters of a trafficking enterprise run by the convicted traffickers Floyd Carlton and Alfredo Caballero; Frigorificos de Puntarenas, owned and operated by Cuban-American traffickers; and Vortex, partly owned by the admitted trafficker [[Michael Palmer]]. The State Department paid the four a total of $806,401.20 between January and August 1986, and the report states that in each case federal law enforcement had received information about the individuals controlling the company before the contracts were signed.[^16] One of the pilots who flew Contra missions for SETCO was Frank Moss, who had been under investigation as an alleged trafficker since 1979 by ten different law enforcement agencies, without indictment.[^16]
+North used the State Department's [[NHAO|Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] to move Contra supplies. The Kerry Committee report found that the State Department selected four companies owned or operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras: SETCO Air, established by the Honduran trafficker [[Juan Matta Ballesteros]]; DIACSA, a Miami air company that served as headquarters of a trafficking enterprise run by the convicted traffickers Floyd Carlton and Alfredo Caballero; Frigorificos de Puntarenas, owned and operated by Cuban-American traffickers; and Vortex, partly owned by the admitted trafficker [[Michael Palmer]]. The State Department paid the four a total of $806,401.20 between January and August 1986, and the report states that in each case federal law enforcement had received information about the individuals controlling the company before the contracts were signed.[^17] One of the pilots who flew Contra missions for SETCO was Frank Moss, who had been under investigation as an alleged trafficker since 1979 by ten different law enforcement agencies, without indictment.[^17]
 
-Webb wrote that North installed his courier [[Robert Owen]] as a $50,000 "facilitator" at NHAO, that North instructed NHAO director Robert Duemling not to "dislodge or replace their existing arrangements," and that Fiers said: "I believe we guided them toward the carriers they ultimately used." Webb also wrote that Frigorificos was created by the [[Medellin Cartel]].[^15]
+Webb wrote that North installed his courier [[Robert Owen]] as a $50,000 "facilitator" at NHAO, that North instructed NHAO director Robert Duemling not to "dislodge or replace their existing arrangements," and that Fiers said: "I believe we guided them toward the carriers they ultimately used." Webb also wrote that Frigorificos was created by the [[Medellin Cartel]].[^16]
 
 ### Barry Seal and Federico Vaughn
 
-The Kerry Committee report states that the DEA informant [[Barry Seal]] photographed a man identified as Federico Vaughn, a Nicaraguan government official, and [[Pablo Escobar]] loading Seal's plane with drugs; that the Seal operation "was disclosed prematurely by an administration official who leaked to the press evidence supposedly collected" in an effort to influence a pending congressional vote on Contra aid; and that "one individual in the U.S. government, Lt. Col. Oliver North, decided to play politics with the issue."[^13] The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime found that the phone number Vaughn used in calls from Seal was controlled by the U.S. Embassy; the State Department later reported no evidence of Nicaraguan use for drug shipments to the United States "since the allegations made in 1984 in connection with the Seal case."[^13]
+The Kerry Committee report states that the DEA informant [[Barry Seal]] photographed a man identified as Federico Vaughn, a Nicaraguan government official, and [[Pablo Escobar]] loading Seal's plane with drugs; that the Seal operation "was disclosed prematurely by an administration official who leaked to the press evidence supposedly collected" in an effort to influence a pending congressional vote on Contra aid; and that "one individual in the U.S. government, Lt. Col. Oliver North, decided to play politics with the issue."[^14] The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime found that the phone number Vaughn used in calls from Seal was controlled by the U.S. Embassy; the State Department later reported no evidence of Nicaraguan use for drug shipments to the United States "since the allegations made in 1984 in connection with the Seal case."[^14]
 
-Webb wrote that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on the Seal sting and supplied with evidence; that North said his only involvement was as an observer; that North's diary contained a July 6, 1984 entry, "Freddy coming in late July," and an October 15, 1986 entry, "46 boxes of transcripts of SF Frogman case. Justice never provided"; that four DEA officials testified they were pressed by North and the CIA to leak Vaughn's involvement; and that after Seal was murdered North told the FBI of an "active measures program" by the Sandinistas against him and said he might be targeted by organized crime.[^12][^15] Seal was shot on February 19, 1986, as he parked at the Salvation Army Community Treatment Center in Baton Rouge, and three men were convicted of first-degree murder in 1987.[^17]
+Webb wrote that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on the Seal sting and supplied with evidence; that North said his only involvement was as an observer; that North's diary contained a July 6, 1984 entry, "Freddy coming in late July," and an October 15, 1986 entry, "46 boxes of transcripts of SF Frogman case. Justice never provided"; that four DEA officials testified they were pressed by North and the CIA to leak Vaughn's involvement; and that after Seal was murdered North told the FBI of an "active measures program" by the Sandinistas against him and said he might be targeted by organized crime.[^12][^16] Seal was shot on February 19, 1986, as he parked at the Salvation Army Community Treatment Center in Baton Rouge, and three men were convicted of first-degree murder in 1987.[^18]
 
 ### Drug-related contacts
 
-Webb wrote that North's courier Robert Owen reported to North in 1985 that a DC-6 owned by Mario Calero, brother of Adolfo Calero, "which is being used for runs out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; that Owen's phone number was found aboard a DC-4 seized by the DEA in March 1987 off Florida; and that a CIA cable said Frank Moss's notes aboard that plane contained "the names of two CIA officers and their telephone numbers."[^12] The Kerry report separately states that Honduran General José Bueso-Rosa, convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova in a plot to be financed by the sale of $40 million of cocaine, received a sentence cut to five years through intervention by senior U.S. officials, and that according to the United States's admissions in the North trial North suggested efforts be made concerning Bueso-Rosa to keep him from disclosing details.[^13]
+Webb wrote that North's courier Robert Owen reported to North in 1985 that a DC-6 owned by Mario Calero, brother of Adolfo Calero, "which is being used for runs out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; that Owen's phone number was found aboard a DC-4 seized by the DEA in March 1987 off Florida; and that a CIA cable said Frank Moss's notes aboard that plane contained "the names of two CIA officers and their telephone numbers."[^12] The Kerry report separately states that Honduran General José Bueso-Rosa, convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova in a plot to be financed by the sale of $40 million of cocaine, received a sentence cut to five years through intervention by senior U.S. officials, and that according to the United States's admissions in the North trial North suggested efforts be made concerning Bueso-Rosa to keep him from disclosing details.[^14]
 
-Webb wrote that at a 1984 meeting with DEA officials North suggested that $1.5 million in cocaine cash the DEA planned to seize from the Medellín cartel be turned over to the Contras, which the DEA declined; that a White House leak then blew the DEA operation; and that North wrote that Casey did not want the Contras' "unofficial funds" entering U.S. banks for fear Treasury agents would grow suspicious.[^18] Webb also wrote that North relied on fraudulent end-user certificates from Guatemala and Honduras after Boland, quoting Fiers: "an arms broker will get an intermediary country to issue false end-user certificates."[^19]
+Webb wrote that at a 1984 meeting with DEA officials North suggested that $1.5 million in cocaine cash the DEA planned to seize from the Medellín cartel be turned over to the Contras, which the DEA declined; that a White House leak then blew the DEA operation; and that North wrote that Casey did not want the Contras' "unofficial funds" entering U.S. banks for fear Treasury agents would grow suspicious.[^19] Webb also wrote that North relied on fraudulent end-user certificates from Guatemala and Honduras after Boland, quoting Fiers: "an arms broker will get an intermediary country to issue false end-user certificates."[^20]
 
-Webb further wrote that Dagoberto Núñez, a Costa Rican trafficker working for North and the CIA, signed a contract with the Sandinista agency Heroes and Martyrs Trading Corporation, and quoted a 1986 Owen memo to North: "He believes this will provide an opportunity to use his boats for cover operations, or to implicate the Ortegas and Borge in taking money on the side." In Webb's account, in November 1986 the FBI's "Operation Front Door" interviewed the realtor of [[Ronald Lister]], who said Lister claimed to run a "CIA-approved" security business and had told a neighbor he worked for North and Secord and had sent arms shipments to the Contras; the lead was not pursued.[^12][^20] The former Air Force intelligence officer [[Terry Reed]] claimed North was his CIA contact for a pilot-training program and a machine-tool front in [[Arkansas]], and described an Arkansas State Police "shredding party" to purge the state's [[Mena, Arkansas]] files of nearly a thousand documents including those naming North and Reed; North has denied knowing anything about Reed or Mena.[^12]
+Webb further wrote that Dagoberto Núñez, a Costa Rican trafficker working for North and the CIA, signed a contract with the Sandinista agency Heroes and Martyrs Trading Corporation, and quoted a 1986 Owen memo to North: "He believes this will provide an opportunity to use his boats for cover operations, or to implicate the Ortegas and Borge in taking money on the side." In Webb's account, in November 1986 the FBI's "Operation Front Door" interviewed the realtor of [[Ronald Lister]], who said Lister claimed to run a "CIA-approved" security business and had told a neighbor he worked for North and Secord and had sent arms shipments to the Contras; the lead was not pursued.[^12][^21] The former Air Force intelligence officer [[Terry Reed]] claimed North was his CIA contact for a pilot-training program and a machine-tool front in [[Arkansas]], and described an Arkansas State Police "shredding party" to purge the state's [[Mena, Arkansas]] files of nearly a thousand documents including those naming North and Reed; North has denied knowing anything about Reed or Mena.[^12]
 
 Webb quoted North's 1991 memoir, *Under Fire*, as saying that the death squads in El Salvador, "under the guise of anti-Communism," terrorized the entire country and murdered nuns, teachers, labor organizers, political opponents and thousands of other civilians, and that most of the activity was the responsibility of the ARENA party and its leader [[Roberto D'Aubuisson]].[^12]
 
@@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ Webb quoted North's 1991 memoir, *Under Fire*, as saying that the death squads i
 
 When the Iran arms sales and the Contra supply operation became public in October and November 1986, North told investigators little; the Independent Counsel wrote that his "wide destruction of records" eliminated possible documentary proof, and that he called the diversion the "secret within the secret."[^2] At the Select Committees' hearing on July 7, 1987, North testified under a grant of immunity that he believed the President had authorized the diversion.[^2] On November 25, 1986, Reagan telephoned North at a Sheraton hotel in Tysons Corner for two minutes; Reagan's sworn interrogatory answer says he told North he had no personal animus and "may have referred to LtCol North as a national hero."[^2]
 
-North was indicted in March 1988 on 16 counts with Poindexter, Secord and Hakim. After the conspiracy count was dropped because of classified-information problems he stood trial before Judge Gerhard Gesell on 12 counts and on May 4, 1989 was found guilty on three: aiding and abetting the obstruction of Congress, shredding and altering official documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity from Secord in the form of a home-security system. The Court of Appeals vacated the convictions on July 20, 1990 because trial witnesses might have been affected by his immunized congressional testimony; the Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 28, 1991; and on remand, after Robert McFarlane testified that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to dismissal of the remaining counts with prejudice on September 16, 1991.[^1] President [[George H.W. Bush]] did not pardon North. On December 24, 1992 Bush pardoned [[Caspar Weinberger]], McFarlane, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], Clair George and Fiers.[^21]
+North was indicted in March 1988 on 16 counts with Poindexter, Secord and Hakim. After the conspiracy count was dropped because of classified-information problems he stood trial before Judge Gerhard Gesell on 12 counts and on May 4, 1989 was found guilty on three: aiding and abetting the obstruction of Congress, shredding and altering official documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity from Secord in the form of a home-security system. The Court of Appeals vacated the convictions on July 20, 1990 because trial witnesses might have been affected by his immunized congressional testimony; the Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 28, 1991; and on remand, after Robert McFarlane testified that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to dismissal of the remaining counts with prejudice on September 16, 1991.[^1] President [[George H.W. Bush]] did not pardon North. On December 24, 1992 Bush pardoned [[Caspar Weinberger]], McFarlane, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], Clair George and Fiers.[^22]
 
 Seymour wrote that North reportedly attended a White House prayer group that [[Nita Scoggan]], wife of a [[Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship International]] member, was invited to form by a Reagan aide who later worked for [[Pat Robertson]]'s presidential campaign.[^11]
 
@@ -139,12 +141,13 @@ Seymour wrote that North reportedly attended a White House prayer group that [[N
 [^10]: Graham Exhibit 1, Deposition of Daniel O. Graham, Appendix B, vol. 12 (Internet Archive item micro_IA41152840_0234).
 [^11]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
 [^12]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, chapters 6, 13 and 20.
-[^13]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988 (Panama chapter; "Barry Seal and the Cartel"; "Bueso-Rosa and the Contras"; Nicaragua chapter). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
-[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, section on the "Quid Pro Quo" admission and the "Heads of State" documents.
-[^15]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapters 11 and 12.
-[^16]: Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, section "U.S. Government Funds and Companies with Drug Connections."
-[^17]: Lau, Maya, and Amy Wold. "Man who gunned down drug informant Barry Seal in Baton Rouge street dies at Angola." *The Advocate* (Baton Rouge), September 2, 2015, citing court documents. https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_f09fb38d-4bb9-59ea-bda3-557497d84561.html
-[^18]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 11.
-[^19]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 10.
-[^20]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 20.
-[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary and ch. 27, notes on pardons of December 24, 1992. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
+[^13]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
+[^14]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988 (Panama chapter; "Barry Seal and the Cartel"; "Bueso-Rosa and the Contras"; Nicaragua chapter). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^15]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, section on the "Quid Pro Quo" admission and the "Heads of State" documents.
+[^16]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapters 11 and 12.
+[^17]: Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, section "U.S. Government Funds and Companies with Drug Connections."
+[^18]: Lau, Maya, and Amy Wold. "Man who gunned down drug informant Barry Seal in Baton Rouge street dies at Angola." *The Advocate* (Baton Rouge), September 2, 2015, citing court documents. https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_f09fb38d-4bb9-59ea-bda3-557497d84561.html
+[^19]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 11.
+[^20]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 10.
+[^21]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 20.
+[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary and ch. 27, notes on pardons of December 24, 1992. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Richard Secord.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
   - Dick Secord
   - General Secord
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Military"
 tags:
   - Person
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ relations:
     with: "[[Oliver North]]"
     role: "paid for a home security system for North and set up a 200,000 dollar Swiss account for North's family; both were charged as illegal gratuities"
     start: 1986
-    fn: 53
+    fn: 54
   - type: investigated
     with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
     reverse: true
@@ -178,50 +178,54 @@ The resupply operation that flew arms to the contras from [[Ilopango Airbase]] i
 
 On October 5, 1986, a resupply aircraft was shot down over [[Nicaragua]] and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Walsh wrote that the Enterprise had effectively ceased its Central American activities after the shootdown.[^4] Before it, Secord and Hakim at North's request had three checks issued to pay outstanding contra grocery bills. Afterward Secord told Quintero to set aside a second check for 75,000 dollars and a third for 50,000 dollars to establish a defense fund for Hasenfus.[^31]
 
+In September 1986 Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] discussed with North an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras and suggested that North's ship, the Erria, dock at [[Haifa]] to be filled from a recently seized PLO shipment. [[John Poindexter]] sanctioned the offer: "It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless.... Keep the pressure on Bill [Casey] to make things right for Secord."[^34]
+
 ### The Enterprise: The HAWK Shipment of November 1985
 
-A letter dated November 19, 1985, which North signed with his own name for the national security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]], asked Secord, described as a retired U.S. Air Force general officer, to proceed to a third-country transit point and arrange the transfer of "sensitive materiel" being shipped from Israel.[^34] The Tower Commission recorded that [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]] of the CIA told the U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to be in touch with a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge was told was an alias for Secord, and that a CIA field officer attributed the failure of the arrangements to the amateurish way in which Secord and his associates approached officials in the government from which landing clearance was needed.[^35][^36] The Israelis transferred 1 million dollars on November 20, 1985 to the Enterprise's Lake Resources account to pay for airlifting the missiles; after 18 HAWKs were delivered and the Iranians rejected them, about 870,000 dollars remained in Lake Resources, commingled with other funds and used for the contras and other purposes.[^37] Clines accompanied Secord to Europe in late November 1985 to facilitate the shipment.[^38] Secord testified that the Israelis did not ask for the money back, and that North told him "we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^39] Secord quickly chartered a jet to fly the 18 HAWKs to Iran under cover of a humanitarian mission, according to the Los Angeles Times.[^1]
+A letter dated November 19, 1985, which North signed with his own name for the national security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]], asked Secord, described as a retired U.S. Air Force general officer, to proceed to a third-country transit point and arrange the transfer of "sensitive materiel" being shipped from Israel.[^35] The Tower Commission recorded that [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]] of the CIA told the U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to be in touch with a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge was told was an alias for Secord, and that a CIA field officer attributed the failure of the arrangements to the amateurish way in which Secord and his associates approached officials in the government from which landing clearance was needed.[^36][^37] The Israelis transferred 1 million dollars on November 20, 1985 to the Enterprise's Lake Resources account to pay for airlifting the missiles; after 18 HAWKs were delivered and the Iranians rejected them, about 870,000 dollars remained in Lake Resources, commingled with other funds and used for the contras and other purposes.[^38] Clines accompanied Secord to Europe in late November 1985 to facilitate the shipment.[^39] Secord testified that the Israelis did not ask for the money back, and that North told him "we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^40] Secord quickly chartered a jet to fly the 18 HAWKs to Iran under cover of a humanitarian mission, according to the Los Angeles Times.[^1]
 
 ### The Enterprise: Iran Arms Sales and Swiss Accounts
 
 More than 47.6 million dollars from the Iran and contra operations flowed into the Enterprise's Swiss accounts. The largest share went to Lake Resources Inc. (31.5 million), with Energy Resources International (11.3 million) and Hyde Park Square Corporation (4.8 million) receiving the rest.[^29] Lake Resources was controlled by Hakim and later pleaded guilty to the corporate felony of theft of government property for diverting the proceeds of the arms sales.[^30] The Enterprise transferred 12.2 million dollars to a CIA Swiss account for weapons sold to Iran.[^29]
 
-[[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], an Iranian exile and former CIA informant whom the agency had discredited as a fabricator, was a driving force behind the proposals to sell arms to Iran.[^40] On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a covert-action Finding that authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran, with Secord acting as an agent of the CIA. Under the Finding, Secord was to collect payment in advance and deposit the Defense Department's cost in a CIA account.[^40] In January 1986 North and Secord negotiated on behalf of the United States the sale of 4,000 TOW missiles to Iran, at 10,000 dollars per missile for an initial 1,000. In February 1986 [[Adnan Khashoggi]] deposited 10 million dollars into Lake Resources to finance the first sale; on February 10 and 11, 3.7 million dollars went from Lake to a CIA account, and the surplus on the sale was 5.6 million dollars.[^40] In February 1986 Secord, using the alias Major General Adams, requested alias documentation from North, and on February 20 he met Ghorbanifar in [[Frankfurt]] with North, [[Amiram Nir]] and a CIA officer.[^41] In May 1986 about 16.7 million dollars in Iranian and Israeli payments for HAWK parts and TOW replenishment went into Lake Resources, leaving a surplus of 9.2 million dollars.[^40] When Robert McFarlane flew to Tehran on May 25, 1986, Secord and one communicator remained in [[Tel Aviv]].[^42] A further 500 TOW missiles were sold in October 1986, and the Enterprise cleared 1.463 million dollars on that sale.[^40]
+[[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], an Iranian exile and former CIA informant whom the agency had discredited as a fabricator, was a driving force behind the proposals to sell arms to Iran.[^41] On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a covert-action Finding that authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran, with Secord acting as an agent of the CIA. Under the Finding, Secord was to collect payment in advance and deposit the Defense Department's cost in a CIA account.[^41] In January 1986 North and Secord negotiated on behalf of the United States the sale of 4,000 TOW missiles to Iran, at 10,000 dollars per missile for an initial 1,000. In February 1986 [[Adnan Khashoggi]] deposited 10 million dollars into Lake Resources to finance the first sale; on February 10 and 11, 3.7 million dollars went from Lake to a CIA account, and the surplus on the sale was 5.6 million dollars.[^41] In February 1986 Secord, using the alias Major General Adams, requested alias documentation from North, and on February 20 he met Ghorbanifar in [[Frankfurt]] with North, [[Amiram Nir]] and a CIA officer.[^42] In May 1986 about 16.7 million dollars in Iranian and Israeli payments for HAWK parts and TOW replenishment went into Lake Resources, leaving a surplus of 9.2 million dollars.[^41] When Robert McFarlane flew to Tehran on May 25, 1986, Secord and one communicator remained in [[Tel Aviv]].[^43] A further 500 TOW missiles were sold in October 1986, and the Enterprise cleared 1.463 million dollars on that sale.[^41]
 
-Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion of arms-sale proceeds to the contras was 3.6 million dollars, and he judged the figure to be at least 1.1 million dollars low. Walsh wrote that North pressed Secord to send money from the Iran operation to the contra operation, and that Secord "claimed he did not view this as a diversion."[^43] In July 1986 the Enterprise paid Defex Portugal 2.6 million dollars and paid the Syrian arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; Walsh left the Al-Kassar payment out of his diversion estimate because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^44]
+Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion of arms-sale proceeds to the contras was 3.6 million dollars, and he judged the figure to be at least 1.1 million dollars low. Walsh wrote that North pressed Secord to send money from the Iran operation to the contra operation, and that Secord "claimed he did not view this as a diversion."[^44] In July 1986 the Enterprise paid Defex Portugal 2.6 million dollars and paid the Syrian arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; Walsh left the Al-Kassar payment out of his diversion estimate because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^45]
 
 ### Secord's Personal Receipts
 
-Walsh found that Secord personally received 1.037 million dollars in cash from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986, of which about 34,000 dollars was accounted for as legitimate expenses or withdrawals from his profits. Three payments totaling 796,000 dollars were unaccounted for. Secord said he gave two cash payments, of 225,000 and 260,000 dollars received on May 15 and 21, 1986, to the Israeli official Amiram Nir, and a further 311,000 dollars in July 1986 to the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar. He produced no documentation for any of them, and Ghorbanifar denied receiving the 311,000 dollars. The Independent Counsel stated that Nir had died and that the Israelis denied their government ever received the funds.[^45]
+Walsh found that Secord personally received 1.037 million dollars in cash from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986, of which about 34,000 dollars was accounted for as legitimate expenses or withdrawals from his profits. Three payments totaling 796,000 dollars were unaccounted for. Secord said he gave two cash payments, of 225,000 and 260,000 dollars received on May 15 and 21, 1986, to the Israeli official Amiram Nir, and a further 311,000 dollars in July 1986 to the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar. He produced no documentation for any of them, and Ghorbanifar denied receiving the 311,000 dollars. The Independent Counsel stated that Nir had died and that the Israelis denied their government ever received the funds.[^46]
 
-Walsh found that in July 1985 Secord had CSF delete his name from the Enterprise profit accounts, and that his profit distributions, totaling 1,457,568 dollars, were credited to a shell company, Korel Assets, whose documents he signed on September 20, 1985. Withdrawals from the Korel account paid for a small private airplane, a Porsche and a stay at a German weight-reduction spa. Walsh concluded that Secord personally received at least 2 million dollars from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986. His 1985 return reported adjusted gross income of 147,000 dollars and answered "no" when asked about foreign financial accounts, and Walsh did not charge him with a tax offense because the Swiss records could not be used in a tax case.[^46] Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise in the same years.[^47]
+Walsh found that in July 1985 Secord had CSF delete his name from the Enterprise profit accounts, and that his profit distributions, totaling 1,457,568 dollars, were credited to a shell company, Korel Assets, whose documents he signed on September 20, 1985. Withdrawals from the Korel account paid for a small private airplane, a Porsche and a stay at a German weight-reduction spa. Walsh concluded that Secord personally received at least 2 million dollars from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986. His 1985 return reported adjusted gross income of 147,000 dollars and answered "no" when asked about foreign financial accounts, and Walsh did not charge him with a tax offense because the Swiss records could not be used in a tax case.[^47] Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise in the same years.[^48]
 
 ### Congressional Testimony, May 1987
 
-In December 1986 Secord was subpoenaed by the intelligence committees and refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. In February 1987 he refused to testify before the grand jury, and in March 1987 he appeared before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. in response to a corporate subpoena and denied having custody of Enterprise records. In late April 1987 he agreed to testify voluntarily.[^48] He was the first witness before the joint House and Senate committees, testifying from May 5 to May 8, 1987, without immunity. He was recalled and deposed in June 1987.[^2][^48] Newsweek wrote on May 5, 1987 that committee chairman Senator [[Daniel Inouye]] said Secord "feels sincerely that he has nothing to hide."[^6] Walsh's assessment was that Secord "provided an enormous amount of largely truthful information regarding the Enterprise's operational workings," but that his "responses to questions about its financial activities were much less candid."[^48]
+In December 1986 Secord was subpoenaed by the intelligence committees and refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. In February 1987 he refused to testify before the grand jury, and in March 1987 he appeared before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. in response to a corporate subpoena and denied having custody of Enterprise records. In late April 1987 he agreed to testify voluntarily.[^49] He was the first witness before the joint House and Senate committees, testifying from May 5 to May 8, 1987, without immunity. He was recalled and deposed in June 1987.[^2][^49] Newsweek wrote on May 5, 1987 that committee chairman Senator [[Daniel Inouye]] said Secord "feels sincerely that he has nothing to hide."[^6] Walsh's assessment was that Secord "provided an enormous amount of largely truthful information regarding the Enterprise's operational workings," but that his "responses to questions about its financial activities were much less candid."[^49]
 
-On the first day Secord testified, according to the New York Times, that about 3.5 million dollars of 12 million dollars in profits from the sale of arms to Iran was spent on behalf of the contras, that more than half of the money was kept by his partner Hakim, and that part of the rest was used for a secret project unrelated to Iran or Nicaragua that he did not identify; he said: "We believed our conduct was in the furtherance of the President's policies," and "I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it."[^49] In his testimony Secord said that North told him several times that he had mentioned to President Reagan that it was "very ironic" that "some of the ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras"; Secord said, "Whether he actually said this to the president, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure," and that it was "not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke."[^50] He said he had no direct knowledge of what the president knew, and that he had spoken to officials including Casey, McFarlane and [[John Poindexter]], some of whom told him the president was aware of what he was doing with the contras. He said that a White House aide told him on November 25, 1986 that "they'd already built a wall around the president," and that [[Edwin Meese]]'s remarks that day "betrayed all of us, and it's unforgivable."[^50] On the third day he acknowledged that the Enterprise had amassed 12 million dollars in cash and assets in about two years, said the money was intended for future operations, and agreed that it had been set up at the request of Poindexter and North.[^51]
+On the first day Secord testified, according to the New York Times, that about 3.5 million dollars of 12 million dollars in profits from the sale of arms to Iran was spent on behalf of the contras, that more than half of the money was kept by his partner Hakim, and that part of the rest was used for a secret project unrelated to Iran or Nicaragua that he did not identify; he said: "We believed our conduct was in the furtherance of the President's policies," and "I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it."[^50] In his testimony Secord said that North told him several times that he had mentioned to President Reagan that it was "very ironic" that "some of the ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras"; Secord said, "Whether he actually said this to the president, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure," and that it was "not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke."[^51] He said he had no direct knowledge of what the president knew, and that he had spoken to officials including Casey, McFarlane and John Poindexter, some of whom told him the president was aware of what he was doing with the contras. He said that a White House aide told him on November 25, 1986 that "they'd already built a wall around the president," and that [[Edwin Meese]]'s remarks that day "betrayed all of us, and it's unforgivable."[^51] On the third day he acknowledged that the Enterprise had amassed 12 million dollars in cash and assets in about two years, said the money was intended for future operations, and agreed that it had been set up at the request of Poindexter and North.[^52]
 
-Walsh listed the statements on which the 1989 charges were based. Secord testified that he had waived all interest in Enterprise profits after July 1985, that Korel was not his company, that he had received no money from the Iran sales beyond his salary, that Defex was set up to hide the source of Enterprise funds from arms dealers, and that he held no beneficial interest in foreign accounts other than a British checking account. Walsh found each of these statements false. Walsh also found that the 500,000 dollars STTGI received from CSF was not a loan, as Secord had testified, and that STTGI in fact received at least 700,000 dollars. Walsh described Hakim, who had received limited use immunity from Congress, as the committees' chief source for Enterprise financial information.[^48]
+Walsh listed the statements on which the 1989 charges were based. Secord testified that he had waived all interest in Enterprise profits after July 1985, that Korel was not his company, that he had received no money from the Iran sales beyond his salary, that Defex was set up to hide the source of Enterprise funds from arms dealers, and that he held no beneficial interest in foreign accounts other than a British checking account. Walsh found each of these statements false. Walsh also found that the 500,000 dollars STTGI received from CSF was not a loan, as Secord had testified, and that STTGI in fact received at least 700,000 dollars. Walsh described Hakim, who had received limited use immunity from Congress, as the committees' chief source for Enterprise financial information.[^49]
 
 ### Indictment, Plea and Sentence
 
-The Independent Counsel indicted Secord on March 16, 1988, together with Poindexter, North and Hakim, in a 23-count indictment whose first count charged conspiracy to defraud the United States; Secord was named in six felony counts that included conspiracy and theft and three counts of illegal gratuities paid to North.[^5][^30] The conspiracy and theft charges were dismissed because of problems with classified information, and the trials of the four defendants were severed. On May 11, 1989 a second indictment charged Secord with nine counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements.[^5][^48]
+The Independent Counsel indicted Secord on March 16, 1988, together with Poindexter, North and Hakim, in a 23-count indictment whose first count charged conspiracy to defraud the United States; Secord was named in six felony counts that included conspiracy and theft and three counts of illegal gratuities paid to North.[^5][^30] The conspiracy and theft charges were dismissed because of problems with classified information, and the trials of the four defendants were severed. On May 11, 1989 a second indictment charged Secord with nine counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements.[^5][^49]
 
-On November 8, 1989, five days before he was to stand trial on twelve felony charges, Secord pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, admitting that he lied when he denied that North had received personal benefits from the Enterprise.[^48] The Deseret News reported that the plea was taken before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.; that Secord told the judge he had answered "no" "in a misguided effort to prevent further criticism" of North and himself; that the offense carried up to five years in prison; and that Walsh's chief prosecutor in the Secord case, [[Reid Weingarten]] told the judge the government was prepared to prove that Secord provided North with a home security system costing almost 14,000 dollars and a Swiss bank account containing 200,000 dollars funded by arms profits.[^52] Under the plea Secord agreed to cooperate in the pending trials and the Independent Counsel's investigation.[^48]
+On November 8, 1989, five days before he was to stand trial on twelve felony charges, Secord pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, admitting that he lied when he denied that North had received personal benefits from the Enterprise.[^49] The Deseret News reported that the plea was taken before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.; that Secord told the judge he had answered "no" "in a misguided effort to prevent further criticism" of North and himself; that the offense carried up to five years in prison; and that Walsh's chief prosecutor in the Secord case, [[Reid Weingarten]] told the judge the government was prepared to prove that Secord provided North with a home security system costing almost 14,000 dollars and a Swiss bank account containing 200,000 dollars funded by arms profits.[^53] Under the plea Secord agreed to cooperate in the pending trials and the Independent Counsel's investigation.[^49]
 
-The gratuities concerned a 16,000 dollar security system installed at North's home in Great Falls, Virginia, after Secord introduced North to Glenn A. Robinette in the spring of 1986, and a 200,000 dollar Swiss account, the "B. Button" account, set up in 1986 to help educate North's children; Walsh wrote that the Independent Counsel could not prove that North accepted or received any of the money in that account.[^53] A 1989 conviction of North on the gratuity charge was later overturned on appeal.[^53]
+The gratuities concerned a 16,000 dollar security system installed at North's home in Great Falls, Virginia, after Secord introduced North to Glenn A. Robinette in the spring of 1986, and a 200,000 dollar Swiss account, the "B. Button" account, set up in 1986 to help educate North's children; Walsh wrote that the Independent Counsel could not prove that North accepted or received any of the money in that account.[^54] A 1989 conviction of North on the gratuity charge was later overturned on appeal.[^54]
 
 Robinson sentenced Secord on January 24, 1990, to two years' probation.[^5]
 
-Thomas Clines was indicted in February 1990 following the cooperation of Secord and Hakim, and was convicted in September 1990 of four tax felonies after a two-week jury trial in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Secord, compelled to testify under a cooperation agreement, was a central prosecution witness; he admitted there that the Korel account was his own investment account, a fact he had denied before his plea.[^38][^46]
+Thomas Clines was indicted in February 1990 following the cooperation of Secord and Hakim, and was convicted in September 1990 of four tax felonies after a two-week jury trial in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Secord, compelled to testify under a cooperation agreement, was a central prosecution witness; he admitted there that the Korel account was his own investment account, a fact he had denied before his plea.[^39][^47]
 
 ### Later Activity and the Memoir
 
-Secord published the memoir *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, written with [[Jay Wurts]] and published by John Wiley & Sons in 1992.[^54] The Washington Post obituary says that in the memoir he maintained he joined the operation out of what he saw as patriotic duty, and that later disclosures suggested financial motives "played no small role."[^2] In a 1987 interview with [[Playboy]] he said: "I feel I was betrayed."[^2]
+Secord published the memoir *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, written with [[Jay Wurts]] and published by John Wiley & Sons in 1992.[^55] The Washington Post obituary says that in the memoir he maintained he joined the operation out of what he saw as patriotic duty, and that later disclosures suggested financial motives "played no small role."[^2] In a 1987 interview with [[Playboy]] he said: "I feel I was betrayed."[^2]
 
 After leaving the Air Force, Secord was a top executive at Computerized Thermal Imaging, a computer imaging firm, and was president of the Air Commando Association.[^2] He and his wife had formed Secord Associates in 1983 and bought three houses near their McLean, Virginia, home.[^1]
 
+### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1987, "Secord: A Specialist in Covert Deals" ("Skilled Secret Soldier"), CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000201700001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201700001-4.
 [^2]: Bill Hewitt, "Richard V. Secord, general embroiled in Iran-contra affair, dies at 92," *Washington Post*, Oct. 16, 2024, text reprinted by the National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/media/32473/ocr.
 [^3]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, *Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., May 5-8, 1987 (Hearings 100-1), p. 46, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
@@ -255,24 +259,25 @@ After leaving the Air Force, Secord was a top executive at Computerized Thermal
 [^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Southern Air Transport, Jetstar and Hasenfus defense-fund passages).
 [^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Dutton outline of the resupply operation, dated July 21, 1986).
 [^33]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 3, pp. 66-67.
-[^34]: *The Tower Commission Report* (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), p. 32, https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit.
-[^35]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 162.
-[^36]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 73.
-[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Phase IV and November 1985 HAWK shipment), citing the Israeli Financial Chronology, Apr. 26, 1987.
-[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
-[^39]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 95; cited in Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 32.
-[^40]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Direct U.S. Arms Sales to Iran; February 1986, May-August 1986 and October-November 1986 sections).
-[^41]: *The Tower Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.
-[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 296.
-[^43]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (The Iran/Contra Diversion), citing Secord, FBI 302, Mar. 12, 1988, p. 4.
-[^44]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, and n. 51.
-[^45]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances), citing Secord, OIC Interview, Mar. 9, 1988, pp. 106-07, Secord, Grand Jury, Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 150-51, and Ghorbanifar, OIC Deposition, Dec. 10, 1987, p. 94.
-[^46]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances; Korel perjury charge; Secord, Clines Trial Testimony, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 193).
-[^47]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
-[^48]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Testimony to Congress and Independent Counsel; Secord Indicted; Obstruction, Perjury and False Statements).
-[^49]: David E. Rosenbaum, "Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on U.S. Arms Aid," *New York Times*, dateline May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605580005-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605580005-6.
-[^50]: "North Said He Mentioned Diversion to Reagan, Secord Says," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550012-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550012-3.
-[^51]: Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, "Secord Testifies Unspent Money Was for Future Operations, Not His Use," *Washington Post*, May 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550011-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550011-4.
-[^52]: "Secord guilty of lying to Congress," *Deseret News*, Nov. 8, 1989, https://www.deseret.com/1989/11/8/18831419/secord-guilty-of-lying-to-congress/.
-[^53]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Gratuities to North: The Basis for the Guilty Plea; The North Security Fence; The "B. Button" Account; n. 13).
-[^54]: Richard V. Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (John Wiley & Sons, 1992), ISBN 0471573280, https://archive.org/details/honoredbetrayedi0000seco.
+[^34]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
+[^35]: *The Tower Commission Report* (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), p. 32, https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit.
+[^36]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 162.
+[^37]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 73.
+[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Phase IV and November 1985 HAWK shipment), citing the Israeli Financial Chronology, Apr. 26, 1987.
+[^39]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
+[^40]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 95; cited in Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 32.
+[^41]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Direct U.S. Arms Sales to Iran; February 1986, May-August 1986 and October-November 1986 sections).
+[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.
+[^43]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 296.
+[^44]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (The Iran/Contra Diversion), citing Secord, FBI 302, Mar. 12, 1988, p. 4.
+[^45]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, and n. 51.
+[^46]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances), citing Secord, OIC Interview, Mar. 9, 1988, pp. 106-07, Secord, Grand Jury, Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 150-51, and Ghorbanifar, OIC Deposition, Dec. 10, 1987, p. 94.
+[^47]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances; Korel perjury charge; Secord, Clines Trial Testimony, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 193).
+[^48]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
+[^49]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Testimony to Congress and Independent Counsel; Secord Indicted; Obstruction, Perjury and False Statements).
+[^50]: David E. Rosenbaum, "Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on U.S. Arms Aid," *New York Times*, dateline May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605580005-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605580005-6.
+[^51]: "North Said He Mentioned Diversion to Reagan, Secord Says," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550012-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550012-3.
+[^52]: Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, "Secord Testifies Unspent Money Was for Future Operations, Not His Use," *Washington Post*, May 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550011-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550011-4.
+[^53]: "Secord guilty of lying to Congress," *Deseret News*, Nov. 8, 1989, https://www.deseret.com/1989/11/8/18831419/secord-guilty-of-lying-to-congress/.
+[^54]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Gratuities to North: The Basis for the Guilty Plea; The North Security Fence; The "B. Button" Account; n. 13).
+[^55]: Richard V. Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (John Wiley & Sons, 1992), ISBN 0471573280, https://archive.org/details/honoredbetrayedi0000seco.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Uri Simchoni.md

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ tags:
   - IranContra
   - Israel
   - Military
-summary: "Brigadier General Uri Simchoni was a member of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee."
+summary: "Brigadier General Uri Simchoni was, according to Ari Ben-Menashe, a member of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee."
 ---
 
-Brigadier General [[Uri Simchoni]] was a member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]. He served at various times as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations for the [[Israel]] and as a military attaché in [[Washington, D.C.]]. He had also been the chief of the elite [[Golani infantry brigade|Golani infantry brigade]].[^1]
+Brigadier General [[Uri Simchoni]] was, according to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], a member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]. He served at various times as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations for the [[Israel]] and as a military attaché in [[Washington, D.C.]]. He had also been the chief of the elite [[Golani infantry brigade|Golani infantry brigade]].[^1]
 
-[[Uri Simchoni|Simchoni]] was part of the [[Israel|Israeli]] delegation at the October 1980 [[Paris Summit Meeting]], which included [[George H.W. Bush]], [[William J. Casey]], and [[Mehdi Karrubi]].[^1]
+Simchoni was part of the Israeli delegation at the October 1980 [[Paris Summit Meeting]], which included [[George H.W. Bush]], [[William J. Casey]], and [[Mehdi Karrubi]].[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Walt Rostow.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ tags: [OSS, EnemyObjectivesUnit, AirTargeting, MITCenterForInternationalStudies,
 aliases: [Walt Rostow, Walt Whitman Rostow, Walter W. Rostow, W. W. Rostow, W.W. Rostow, Walter Rostow]
 summary: "American economist who served in the OSS Enemy Objectives Unit in London, chaired the State Department Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966, and was Johnson's national security adviser from 1966 to 1969."
 created: 2026-10-09
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-14
 relations:
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]]"
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
     role: "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
     start: "1966"
     end: "1969"
-    fn: 29
+    fn: 30
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[University of Texas at Austin]]"
     role: "professor of economics"
@@ -123,43 +123,45 @@ The State Department record lists Rostow as chairman of the Policy Planning Coun
 
 On February 15, 1965, Rostow sent Assistant Secretary [[William Bundy]] three points on a possible negotiation. He thought [[Hanoi]] might be driving for a settlement, that a "land grab" was likely, perhaps in the [[Laos]] corridor, and that the United States should consider a preemptive ground force move in that area and inside [[South Vietnam]], because air and naval power would be hard to use during a negotiation.[^27] Eight days earlier McGeorge Bundy's memorandum from Saigon had set out a "policy of sustained reprisal", described in Annex A as "graduated and continuing reprisal" against [[North Vietnam]].[^28]
 
+In August 1965 Rostow attended a Washington meeting on the mission to Vietnam of Edward Lansdale. Attendees included officials from State, the White House, AID, USIA and the CIA, among them [[William Colby]]. Lansdale described his aim as finding out what the Vietnamese thought, what they wanted and what they would do. Rostow suggested that Lansdale have a liaison officer who would keep other agencies and Washington advised of his efforts and thinking.[^29]
+
 ### National Security Adviser, 1966 to 1969
 
-By April 1966 Rostow was the President's special assistant, as the headings of his memoranda show.[^29]
+By April 1966 Rostow was the President's special assistant, as the headings of his memoranda show.[^30]
 
 #### POL strikes, June 1966
 
-On June 14, 1966, Johnson wrote [[Harold Wilson]] that Rusk had discussed "the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi" with him. POL is the standard abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.[^30] At the National Security Council meeting of June 17, Rostow argued: "Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy." He added that "our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges." [[Arthur Goldberg]] argued that the risk of widening the bombing to POL targets was too great. Rostow's memorandum to Johnson of the previous day said he had "marched carefully through all the considerations" with Goldberg.[^31] On June 28 [[Robert McNamara]] telephoned Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening.[^32] On July 5 a telegram from the acting secretary of state reported that "Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow." On July 7 Rostow wrote Johnson that the speech at Omaha on June 30 had been "a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL."[^32][^33]
+On June 14, 1966, Johnson wrote [[Harold Wilson]] that Rusk had discussed "the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi" with him. POL is the standard abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.[^31] At the National Security Council meeting of June 17, Rostow argued: "Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy." He added that "our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges." [[Arthur Goldberg]] argued that the risk of widening the bombing to POL targets was too great. Rostow's memorandum to Johnson of the previous day said he had "marched carefully through all the considerations" with Goldberg.[^32] On June 28 [[Robert McNamara]] telephoned Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening.[^33] On July 5 a telegram from the acting secretary of state reported that "Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow." On July 7 Rostow wrote Johnson that the speech at Omaha on June 30 had been "a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL."[^33][^34]
 
 #### The Rostow thesis
 
-In a memorandum of September 15, 1966, Rostow set out the case that bombing imposed a cumulative burden on Hanoi, and that without it Hanoi had no incentive to stop. He wrote that bombing "has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese." He listed its effects: it engaged a large amount of civilian manpower for repair and air defense, caused economic stagnation or decline, imposed "a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time," limited shipping, and left most foreign aid shoring up the North rather than the South. "Put another way," he wrote, "without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off." He cited a 1962 interview with Hanoi leaders published in the [[Saturday Evening Post]], whose "punch line" was: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."[^34]
+In a memorandum of September 15, 1966, Rostow set out the case that bombing imposed a cumulative burden on Hanoi, and that without it Hanoi had no incentive to stop. He wrote that bombing "has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese." He listed its effects: it engaged a large amount of civilian manpower for repair and air defense, caused economic stagnation or decline, imposed "a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time," limited shipping, and left most foreign aid shoring up the North rather than the South. "Put another way," he wrote, "without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off." He cited a 1962 interview with Hanoi leaders published in the [[Saturday Evening Post]], whose "punch line" was: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."[^35]
 
 #### Tet, 1968
 
-On January 31, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk an outline of headings for a presidential speech on Asia. A marginal note in an unknown hand reads "This is WWR not LBJ."[^35] On February 5 he gave Johnson a written account of the fighting, which he said was in answer to a question from [[Elspeth Davies Rostow]], his wife. He described the attacks on the cities and at [[Khe Sanh]] as the enemy committing a large part of its "capital," its pools of military forces and firepower, on the believed vulnerability of the South Vietnamese government and of American public opinion.[^36] On February 6 he reported the findings from captured prisoners and documents. One prisoner captured on January 31 said that the attack "was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace."[^36]
+On January 31, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk an outline of headings for a presidential speech on Asia. A marginal note in an unknown hand reads "This is WWR not LBJ."[^36] On February 5 he gave Johnson a written account of the fighting, which he said was in answer to a question from [[Elspeth Davies Rostow]], his wife. He described the attacks on the cities and at [[Khe Sanh]] as the enemy committing a large part of its "capital," its pools of military forces and firepower, on the believed vulnerability of the South Vietnamese government and of American public opinion.[^37] On February 6 he reported the findings from captured prisoners and documents. One prisoner captured on January 31 said that the attack "was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace."[^37]
 
 #### Israel, 1967
 
-On May 25, 1967, Rostow sent Johnson an Israeli intelligence estimate with a CIA appraisal attached. The appraisal, he noted, "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^37] On June 5 Rostow telephoned Johnson to read him a draft statement on the outbreak of fighting.[^38] His covering memorandum on a meeting among [[Meir Amit]], [[Walworth Barbour]] and [[Harry C. McPherson Jr.]] said that Amit's account was consistent with [[Levi Eshkol]]'s, and added: "At least that's his story."[^39]
+On May 25, 1967, Rostow sent Johnson an Israeli intelligence estimate with a CIA appraisal attached. The appraisal, he noted, "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^38] On June 5 Rostow telephoned Johnson to read him a draft statement on the outbreak of fighting.[^39] His covering memorandum on a meeting among [[Meir Amit]], [[Walworth Barbour]] and [[Harry C. McPherson Jr.]] said that Amit's account was consistent with [[Levi Eshkol]]'s, and added: "At least that's his story."[^40]
 
 ### Security clearance
 
 A CIA Office of Security memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence dated April 11, 1958, furnished in case Mr. Dillon should seek the agency's opinion of "Rostow's record and security standing," states that Rostow "has twice been denied clearance for OCB employment by the NSC Security Office," that he "was also disapproved for employment by Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover," and that he "has been denied a security clearance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense." The memorandum adds that in 1953 a CIA employee, since resigned, had threatened to take Rostow's case to the McCarran Committee.[^7]
 
-In October 1967 Senator [[Strom Thurmond]] reported in his column in *The Clinton Chronicle* on a brief filed for [[Otto Otepka]], a State Department security officer, before a departmental hearing officer. The column stated that under the Eisenhower administration Rostow had twice been denied a State Department clearance "to handle" sensitive data, that Otepka had expressed reservations in 1960 about a proposed clearance for Rostow and had indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate [[Robert F. Kennedy]] that he would probably still evaluate the file in the same manner, and that Rostow was then given immediate clearance as a White House aide.[^40] *Human Events* of October 23, 1967 reported the brief's account that the Air Force "had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow" and that Under Secretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]], as chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, decided that Rostow would not be used as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with a psychological warfare project.[^41]
+In October 1967 Senator [[Strom Thurmond]] reported in his column in *The Clinton Chronicle* on a brief filed for [[Otto Otepka]], a State Department security officer, before a departmental hearing officer. The column stated that under the Eisenhower administration Rostow had twice been denied a State Department clearance "to handle" sensitive data, that Otepka had expressed reservations in 1960 about a proposed clearance for Rostow and had indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate [[Robert F. Kennedy]] that he would probably still evaluate the file in the same manner, and that Rostow was then given immediate clearance as a White House aide.[^41] *Human Events* of October 23, 1967 reported the brief's account that the Air Force "had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow" and that Under Secretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]], as chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, decided that Rostow would not be used as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with a psychological warfare project.[^42]
 
-The Associated Press reported that Rostow denied the account. "From 1951 onward," he told a reporter, "I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the federal government." The Associated Press noted that he did not say what assignment in 1951 had required clearance, and that his Who's Who entry listed him as a staff member of the Center for International Studies from 1951 to 1960.[^42]
+The Associated Press reported that Rostow denied the account. "From 1951 onward," he told a reporter, "I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the federal government." The Associated Press noted that he did not say what assignment in 1951 had required clearance, and that his Who's Who entry listed him as a staff member of the Center for International Studies from 1951 to 1960.[^43]
 
-On December 19, 1967 the CIA Director of Security, replying to an inquiry of December 15, wrote that Rostow "was granted a Special Intelligence Clearance by this Agency on 3 February 1961 based on a favorable investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1960."[^43]
+On December 19, 1967 the CIA Director of Security, replying to an inquiry of December 15, wrote that Rostow "was granted a Special Intelligence Clearance by this Agency on 3 February 1961 based on a favorable investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1960."[^44]
 
 ### Later career and death
 
-Rostow taught economics at the [[University of Texas at Austin]] from 1969 until his death in Austin on February 13, 2003.[^1] His official files are in the National Security File, "Memos to the President," at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library]], which the Foreign Relations volumes cite as "Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow."[^30][^36] Drafts and correspondence by and about Rostow, including drafts of his historical manuscripts, are in the Bissell papers at the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library]].[^6]
+Rostow taught economics at the [[University of Texas at Austin]] from 1969 until his death in Austin on February 13, 2003.[^1] His official files are in the National Security File, "Memos to the President," at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library]], which the Foreign Relations volumes cite as "Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow."[^31][^37] Drafts and correspondence by and about Rostow, including drafts of his historical manuscripts, are in the Bissell papers at the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library]].[^6]
 
 ### Family
 
-His brother Eugene V. Rostow (1913-2002) became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A 1967 letter from the Under Secretary to the Israeli ambassador was drafted by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow.[^44] In January 1983, as director of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Eugene was told by [[George Shultz]] that the President wanted his resignation. Spokesmen for the State Department and the White House, as reported by Joseph C. Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, said that he "had not been a team player."[^45] Another brother, [[Ralph Waldo Emerson Rostow]] (1920-2006), is listed in the same family memorial record.[^1]
+His brother Eugene V. Rostow (1913-2002) became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A 1967 letter from the Under Secretary to the Israeli ambassador was drafted by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow.[^45] In January 1983, as director of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Eugene was told by [[George Shultz]] that the President wanted his resignation. Spokesmen for the State Department and the White House, as reported by Joseph C. Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, said that he "had not been a team player."[^46] Another brother, [[Ralph Waldo Emerson Rostow]] (1920-2006), is listed in the same family memorial record.[^1]
 
 His wife, Elspeth Davies Rostow (1917-2007), is listed as his spouse in the same memorial record.[^1]
 
@@ -193,20 +195,21 @@ His wife, Elspeth Davies Rostow (1917-2007), is listed as his spouse in the same
 [^26]: *FRUS 1961-1963*, Volume I, document 335 ("Chairman of the Policy Planning Council," December 22, 1961), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d335 ; Volume II, document 140 ("Director of the Policy Planning Staff," April 3, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d140, and document 275 ("Counselor of the Department of State," September 5, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d275; Volume III, document 206 ("Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council," July 4, 1963), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d206
 [^27]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965*, document 121, memorandum from Rostow to Bundy, February 15, 1965, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d121
 [^28]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume II*, document 84, memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, "The Situation in Vietnam," February 7, 1965, with Annex A, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d84
-[^29]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966*, document 115, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Johnson, April 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d115
-[^30]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 156, message from Johnson to Wilson, June 14, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d156 (source line: "Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow").
-[^31]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 159, summary notes of the 559th National Security Council meeting, June 17, 1966, with footnote on Rostow's memorandum of June 16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d159
-[^32]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 164, editorial note on McNamara's telephone call to Johnson, June 28, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d164 ; document 173, telegram from the Department of State to Rusk, July 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d173
-[^33]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 176, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, "Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles," July 7, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d176
-[^34]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 232, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 15, 1966, "A reflection on bombing the North," quoting Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," *Saturday Evening Post* 235 (November 24, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d232
-[^35]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968*, document 42, memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, January 31, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d42
-[^36]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI*, document 55, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 5, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d55 ; document 57, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 6, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d57
-[^37]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, document 61, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 25, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
-[^38]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, editorial note on Rostow's telephone call to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d152
-[^39]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 158, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, with Rostow's covering memorandum to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
-[^40]: Senator Strom Thurmond, column in *The Clinton Chronicle*, October 19, 1967, p. 19, "Otepka and Rostow," https://historicnewspapers.sc.edu/lccn/sn86063780/1967-10-19/ed-1/seq-19/ (the column reports the brief's claims, and describes Rostow as "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs").
-[^41]: "The Rostow Story," *Human Events*, October 23, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000600040001-4
-[^42]: Associated Press, "Rostow Denies Report on Security Clearance," as printed in newspaper clippings of October 1967, CIA reading room documents CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080008-2 and CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080006-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700080008-2
-[^43]: Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, letter of December 19, 1967 replying to an inquiry of December 15, 1967, regarding "Mr. Walter Whitman Rostow," CIA reading room document 0001475810, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001475810
-[^44]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 36, letter from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eugene Rostow) to the Israeli ambassador (Harman), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 (drafted by Eugene Rostow, Meeker and Robert T. Grey; cleared by Rusk, Walt Rostow and others).
-[^45]: Joseph C. Harsch, "The Rostow affair," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0120/012025.html (Eugene Rostow summoned to the office of Secretary of State Shultz and told the President wanted his resignation; "had not been a team player").
+[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Lansdale Mission to Vietnam," August 1965. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420030-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01580r001603420030-5
+[^30]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966*, document 115, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Johnson, April 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d115
+[^31]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 156, message from Johnson to Wilson, June 14, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d156 (source line: "Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow").
+[^32]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 159, summary notes of the 559th National Security Council meeting, June 17, 1966, with footnote on Rostow's memorandum of June 16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d159
+[^33]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 164, editorial note on McNamara's telephone call to Johnson, June 28, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d164 ; document 173, telegram from the Department of State to Rusk, July 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d173
+[^34]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 176, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, "Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles," July 7, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d176
+[^35]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 232, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 15, 1966, "A reflection on bombing the North," quoting Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," *Saturday Evening Post* 235 (November 24, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d232
+[^36]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968*, document 42, memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, January 31, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d42
+[^37]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI*, document 55, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 5, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d55 ; document 57, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 6, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d57
+[^38]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, document 61, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 25, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
+[^39]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, editorial note on Rostow's telephone call to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d152
+[^40]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 158, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, with Rostow's covering memorandum to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
+[^41]: Senator Strom Thurmond, column in *The Clinton Chronicle*, October 19, 1967, p. 19, "Otepka and Rostow," https://historicnewspapers.sc.edu/lccn/sn86063780/1967-10-19/ed-1/seq-19/ (the column reports the brief's claims, and describes Rostow as "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs").
+[^42]: "The Rostow Story," *Human Events*, October 23, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000600040001-4
+[^43]: Associated Press, "Rostow Denies Report on Security Clearance," as printed in newspaper clippings of October 1967, CIA reading room documents CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080008-2 and CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080006-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700080008-2
+[^44]: Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, letter of December 19, 1967 replying to an inquiry of December 15, 1967, regarding "Mr. Walter Whitman Rostow," CIA reading room document 0001475810, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001475810
+[^45]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 36, letter from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eugene Rostow) to the Israeli ambassador (Harman), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 (drafted by Eugene Rostow, Meeker and Robert T. Grey; cleared by Rusk, Walt Rostow and others).
+[^46]: Joseph C. Harsch, "The Rostow affair," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0120/012025.html (Eugene Rostow summoned to the office of Secretary of State Shultz and told the President wanted his resignation; "had not been a team player").

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/William French Smith.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - DoJ
@@ -19,9 +19,16 @@ William French Smith was the U.S. Attorney General under [[Ronald Reagan]] who s
 
 In early 1982, Smith and Casey signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding under which narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of crimes the CIA was required to report to the Justice Department.[^2] Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported either. Gary Webb, after quoting Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]]'s March 1998 testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, wrote that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^3] In an interview for the PBS series Frontline, Hitz said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^4] The agreement was signed just as the CIA was launching both the [[Contras|Contra]] project and operations in Afghanistan, timing that [[Robert Parry]] argued proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold." Civil rights lawyers later filed suit charging the agreement was illegal and led to policies protecting rather than stopping drug trafficking.[^3]
 
+### Third-Country Funding for the Contras, June 1984
+
+The day after the [[National Security Planning Group]] meeting of June 25, 1984, Casey and CIA General Counsel [[Stanley Sporkin]] met Attorney General Smith. [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that Smith determined that third-country funding of the Contras was legally permissible as long as no U.S. funds were used for the purpose and the third country did not expect the United States to repay the aid.[^5] The Iran-Contra committees wrote that Smith orally expressed his opinion to Casey that solicitation was lawful as long as there was no quid pro quo.[^6] At the NSPG meeting [[George P. Shultz]] had said: "I think we need to get an opinion from the Attorney General on whether we can help the Contras obtain money from third sources."[^7]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
 [^2]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story.* https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
 [^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
 [^4]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
+[^5]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 1, n. 14 (Sporkin Memorandum for the Record, June 26, 1984, ALV 035917) and ch. 15. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^6]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 403.
+[^7]: National Security Planning Group minutes, June 25, 1984, National Security Archive, EBB 210, document 2 (IC 00463), p. 9. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/2-NSPG%20minutes%206-25-84%20(IC%2000463).pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yehoshua Sagi.md

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ tags:
   - Israel
   - Aman
   - MilitaryIntelligence
-summary: "Yehoshua Sagi (also rendered Saguy) served as director of Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) from 1979 to 1983 and was found by the Kahan Commission to bear personal responsibility for indifference regarding the Sabra and Shatila massacres."
+summary: "Yehoshua Sagi (also Saguy) directed Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate from 1979 to 1983 and was faulted by the Kahan Commission over Sabra and Shatila."
 created: 2026-05-14
-updated: 2026-05-14
+updated: 2026-10-14
 born: 1933
 location: "Jerusalem, Mandatory Palestine"
 ---
@@ -25,7 +25,14 @@ Following the September 1982 [[Sabra and Shatila massacres|massacres at the Sabr
 
 Sagi subsequently entered electoral politics, serving as a member of the Knesset on the [[Likud Party|Likud]] list from 1988 to 1992. He then served as mayor of Bat Yam.
 
+### Ben-Menashe's Claims
+
+[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that, on [[Menachem Begin]]'s order in the fall of 1980, Sagi and [[Nachum Admoni]] were to appoint the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], a joint group of military intelligence and [[Mossad]] officers supplying arms to [[Iran]].[^3] The October Surprise Task Force reported that Saguy, in whose presence Ben-Menashe says [[Rafael Eitan]] confirmed reports of 1980 meetings in Spain between [[William J. Casey]] and [[Mehdi Karrubi]], told the Government of Israel that he had never met Ben-Menashe and that he had no knowledge of such meetings.[^4] In the task force's account, Israeli authorities interviewed Saguy together with [[David Kimche]], Eitan and others, and each said he had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until Ben-Menashe began making allegations in the American media in 1991.[^5]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Rodger W. Claire, *Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign That Denied Saddam the Bomb* (Broadway Books, 2004).
 [^2]: Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, Final Report, February 8, 1983, section on "The Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy," in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents*, vol. 8, 1982-1984, doc. 104. https://syriaaccountability.org/content/images/wordpress/ISRAELMFA_Commission-Inquiry-Beirut_1983_EN.pdf
+[^3]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015), p. 78. https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
+[^4]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 97. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
+[^5]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yitzhak Rabin.md

@@ -4,20 +4,201 @@ tags:
   - Person
   - Nuclear
   - Israel
-summary: "As army chief of operations, Yitzhak Rabin was among the old-fashioned military men, including Yigal Allon and Ariel Sharon, who believed that Israel's essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel."
+  - IranContra
+  - PollardAffair
+  - Oslo
+  - Assassination
+summary: "Yitzhak Rabin was Israel's chief of staff, ambassador in Washington, defense minister during the Iran-Contra shipments and Prime Minister when Oslo was signed, before Yigal Amir shot him in 1995."
+aliases:
+  - Yitzhak Rabin
+  - Rabin
 born: 1922-03-01
 died: 1995-11-04
 location: "Jerusalem"
+created: 2025-08-05
+updated: 2026-10-14
+relations:
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Palmach]]"
+    role: "Operations officer; commander of the Harel Brigade"
+    start: 1948
+    fn: 2
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Israel Defense Forces]]"
+    role: "Chief of Staff"
+    start: 1964
+    end: 1968
+    fn: 6
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    role: "Ambassador to the United States"
+    start: 1968
+    end: 1973
+    fn: 8
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    role: "Prime Minister"
+    start: 1974
+    end: 1977
+    fn: 19
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    role: "Minister of Defense"
+    start: 1984
+    end: 1990
+    fn: 24
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    role: "Prime Minister"
+    start: 1992
+    end: 1995
+    fn: 40
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Labor Party]]"
+    fn: 40
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
+    role: "Defense minister whose ministry handled Israeli HAWK and TOW missile shipments to Iran and who offered Soviet-bloc arms to Oliver North"
+    start: 1985
+    end: 1986
+    fn: 29
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Jonathan Pollard]]"
+    role: "Defense minister during the Pollard operation"
+    start: 1985
+    end: 1986
+    fn: 39
+  - type: subject_of
+    with: "[[Shamgar Commission]]"
+    role: "Inquiry into the assassination of Rabin"
+    start: 1995
+    end: 1996
+    fn: 44
 ---
 
-[[Yitzhak Rabin]] was an [[Israel|Israeli]] politician and military leader who served as Prime Minister of [[Israel]] and Defense Minister. He was a rival of [[Shimon Peres]] within the [[Labor Party]].[^1]
+[[Yitzhak Rabin]] was an [[Israel|Israeli]] soldier and politician who served as chief of staff of the [[Israel Defense Forces]], ambassador to the United States, Prime Minister twice, and Defense Minister. He was a rival of [[Shimon Peres]] within the [[Labor Party]].[^1] He was shot at a peace rally in [[Tel Aviv]] on November 4, 1995, and died of his wounds.
 
-As army chief of operations, [[Yitzhak Rabin]] was among the old-fashioned military men, including [[Yigal Allon]] and [[Ariel Sharon]], who believed that [[Israel]]'s essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel. To these men, nuclear weapons were nothing more than a great equalizer, and they argued that an [[Egypt]] equipped with the bomb would be far more dangerous to [[Israel]] than an [[Egypt]] limited to conventional arms.[^2]
+### Palmach and the 1948 war
 
-As Defense Minister, [[Yitzhak Rabin|Rabin]] did not try to impede the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms operations, as he had no interest in helping [[Shimon Peres|Peres]]. However, he unceremoniously and disrespectfully threw [[Oliver North]] out of his office when the [[Contras]] were mentioned, thwarting [[Oliver North|North's]] attempts to set up his second channel.[^1]
+Rabin served in the [[Palmach]], the strike force of the [[Haganah]]. In the early months of the 1948 war he was the Palmach's operations officer and liaison to the general staff, in April 1948 he took command of the Harel Brigade, and in July he served as operations officer and deputy to [[Yigal Allon]] in Operation Danny, the offensive that captured [[Lydda]] and [[Ramle]].[^2]
 
-[[Yitzhak Rabin|Rabin]] replaced [[Shimon Peres]] as leader of the [[Labor Party]] and became Prime Minister of [[Israel]] in 1992 after the national elections, replacing [[Yitzhak Shamir]].[^1]
+[[David K. Shipler]] wrote in 2015 that in 1979 an Israeli censorship committee chaired by the justice minister deleted five paragraphs from Rabin's memoir, his first-person account of the expulsion of Arab residents from Lydda and Ramle. Shipler quoted the suppressed section: "Great suffering was inflicted upon the men taking part in the eviction action," Rabin wrote. "There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action to remove the bitterness of these youth movement groups, and explain why we were obliged to undertake such a harsh and cruel action." Shipler added that when he learned of the deletion at the time, Rabin told him that he had intentionally given the censors something else to do by writing about Israel's nuclear weapons.[^3] [[Alix Wall]] wrote in 2001 that the memoir's translator, [[Peretz Kidron]], gave the excised passage to the [[New York Times]].[^4]
+
+[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that Rabin, Allon and [[Ariel Sharon]] were among the old-fashioned military men who held, as Rabin did as army chief of operations, that Israel's essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel. Hersh wrote that these men regarded nuclear weapons as nothing more than a great equalizer, and argued that an [[Egypt]] equipped with the bomb would be far more dangerous to Israel than an Egypt limited to conventional arms.[^5]
+
+### Chief of staff and the 1967 war
+
+Rabin was chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 1964. At the end of a three-year term in late 1966 the Prime Minister extended his tenure by a year, and he left the army at the beginning of 1968 after 27 years of service.[^6] A telegram from the Defense Attaché Office in Israel to the White House dated June 18, 1967 records that on the evening of June 17 Lieutenant Colonel Efrat, "Aide to General Rabin, IDF COS," told the naval attaché: "Gen Rabin extends his personal regrets to the CNO USN for the sad mistake of the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] incident." The telegram records that Rabin had decided to provide a synopsis of the findings of the IDF court of inquiry into the attack, although the findings had not yet received final review.[^7]
+
+### Washington, 1968 to 1973
+
+Rabin became Israel's ambassador to the United States at the beginning of 1968 and held the post until March 1973.[^8] At the fifth session of the F-4 negotiations, on November 22, 1968, held in the office of [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Rabin said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding, allowing the United States to recover aircraft if Israel acted contrary to its undertakings, looked "quite awkward," had no precedent, and implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy." Warnke answered that he had discussed the paragraph with [[Clark Clifford]] and Clifford with [[Dean Rusk]], and that the government did not put that construction on it. Rabin said that Israel had agreed only to reaffirm its earlier understandings, that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry them on United States aircraft. Warnke asked: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?" The embassy's minister, [[Shlomo Argov]], said: "We feel we are on parole." Warnke's deputy [[Harry H. Schwartz]], the NESA deputy director [[Robert J. Murray]], and the Israeli air force commander [[Mordecai Hod]] attended.[^9]
+
+On November 27, 1968, Warnke wrote to Rabin that the United States agreed to sell Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft. The letter recorded the Israeli government's reaffirmation of its policy "that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons" and its agreement not to use the aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier, and stated the United States position that "the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons." A note to the letter records that Rabin objected by telephone that the proposed last paragraph implied Israeli agreement with that interpretation, and that Warnke substituted a bland concluding paragraph.[^10]
+
+On June 20, 1969, Rabin spoke with [[Harold H. Saunders]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff. Saunders recorded that Rabin had labeled the conversation strictly personal, and that because of the "extremely personal nature of Rabin's talk" the memorandum would not be distributed through the system.[^11]
+
+On July 29, 1969, Rabin met the acting secretary of state, [[Elliot L. Richardson]], and the deputy secretary of defense, [[David Packard]], on Israel's nuclear weapon and missile policy. Rabin cited the exchange of letters with Warnke the previous November and observed that there were two problems, nuclear weapons in the Middle East and the [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]]. He asked which of the two was the subject of the talk.[^12]
+
+The record of a September 25, 1969 meeting in Washington between [[William P. Rogers]], [[Henry Kissinger]], and the Israeli party, with Rabin present, describes the channel the two governments had agreed on with [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Golda Meir]]. Rabin's memoir, as quoted in that record, says that Kissinger would reach Rabin and Rabin would transmit the messages directly to [[Simcha Dinitz]] in Jerusalem.[^13]
+
+On March 12, 1970, Kissinger showed Rabin the points he had covered with [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] about a Soviet message on the Middle East, and let Rabin read the portion of the message Dobrynin had read to him.[^14] On August 17, 1970, Nixon met Rabin in the Map Room with General [[Alexander Haig]] present. Rabin later described the meeting in his memoir.[^15] On September 21, 1970, during the crisis over Syrian intervention in [[Jordan]], Assistant Secretary of State [[Joseph Sisco]] met Rabin and read him the King's answer to Allon.[^16]
+
+On December 29, 1971, Sisco met Rabin at the ambassador's residence. Sisco said that Nixon had directed that discussions begin with Rabin as a follow-up to the December 2 conversation between Nixon and Meir, with the aim of working out an agreement.[^17] In a November 14, 1972 meeting held during the visit of the defense minister, [[Moshe Dayan]], Rabin said of [[King Hussein]] that he was "moderate to the Western world, but this was not necessarily the case in his relations with Israel."[^18]
+
+### First premiership, 1974 to 1977
+
+Rabin took office as Prime Minister on June 3, 1974, and negotiated the interim agreement with Egypt through Kissinger, signed on September 1, 1975.[^19] On February 11, 1975, Kissinger's report on his talks in Jerusalem, relayed to [[Gerald Ford]] by [[Brent Scowcroft]], said that he had met Rabin alone at breakfast and then with the Prime Minister and his negotiating team, which included Allon and Peres.[^20] On March 22, 1975, Kissinger met Rabin and Israeli ministers in Jerusalem, where the discussion focused on the suspension of the negotiations with Egypt.[^21]
+
+In the 1976 hijacking of an airliner to [[Entebbe Airport]], the cabinet protocols released by the [[Israel State Archives]] record Rabin telling ministers that the Israeli intention was to hold the French government responsible for the fate of the passengers, and telling the cabinet on the fourth day: "We have no way of acting without the agreement of the countries concerned. What are we supposed to do, attack Uganda?" At a Saturday cabinet meeting, after the chief of staff, [[Mordechai Gur]], presented the plan, Rabin said: "Additional time, intelligence and study make a military option possible." The ministers unanimously approved the operation, and Rabin told them that if journalists called, "you deny it. In a case like this, it is justified not to tell the truth."[^22]
+
+In March 1977 [[Dan Margalit]] of [[Haaretz]] reported that [[Leah Rabin]] held a dollar account at a bank in Washington. [[Maariv]] reported that the account had been opened while Rabin was ambassador and should have been closed when the family left Washington in March 1973, and that at one point the balance was $20,000. Foreign currency accounts of that kind were illegal under Israeli law. On April 8, 1977, a Finance Ministry administrative penalty committee fined Rabin and his wife IL150,000. In a radio announcement Rabin said he accepted full responsibility for the joint offense. The [[Jewish Telegraphic Agency]] reported that the step meant he would not lead the party in the next elections, and that Defense Minister Peres was expected to take the party's reins.[^23]
+
+### Defense minister, 1984 to 1990
+
+Rabin was defense minister from the 1984 national unity government until the Labor Party left the government in 1990.[^24] [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], who says he sat on the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], wrote that Rabin did not try to impede the committee's arms operations, as he had no interest in helping Peres, and that Rabin threw [[Oliver North]] out of his office when the [[Contras]] were mentioned, thwarting North's attempts to set up his second channel.[^1]
+
+The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in the summer of 1985 Rabin would not proceed with the TOW sale to Iran unless he received assurances that the Secretary of State knew of the plan and that the President unequivocally approved it, and that Peres and Rabin approved the second shipment, of 400 TOW missiles, on September 9, 1985.[^25] [[Michael Ledeen]] told North and [[Robert McFarlane]] that Rabin was "complaining about" the failure of the United States to replace the TOWs sent to Iran.[^26] The report of the Independent Counsel, [[Lawrence Walsh]], records that on November 14, 1985, McFarlane told [[William Casey]] and the deputy director of central intelligence that Israel planned to ship weapons to Iranian military elements. The following day Rabin had breakfast with Casey and then met McFarlane at the [[White House]]. Rabin asked whether the United States still approved of Israeli arms sales to Iran. McFarlane replied that [[Ronald Reagan]] continued to approve. McFarlane later said that the purpose of Rabin's visit "was simply to reconfirm that the President's authority for the original concept was still valid."[^27][^28] The congressional report adds that Rabin also sought reassurance that the matter was a joint project of the two governments, and raised the unresolved replacement of 504 TOW missiles.[^29]
+
+Rabin called McFarlane in Geneva to report a problem with an arms shipment through a European country, and McFarlane directed North to help the Israelis with flight clearances.[^30] On November 17, 1985, Rabin telephoned North to say that Israel was ready to ship 80 HAWK missiles once replenishment problems were resolved, and North flew to New York to meet him.[^29][^31] The Walsh report states that 18 HAWK missiles were delivered from Israeli stocks on November 24, 1985, while Casey was on a trip to Asia.[^28] Walsh also records that North told Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]] in an interview that Rabin had described the November shipment as containing "oil related equipment," and that North later learned from [[Richard V. Secord]] that it contained HAWK missiles. This is North's account, recorded in the report as his own statement.[^32]
+
+The congressional report records that in May 1986 Rabin offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that North and Rabin met again in September 1986 and discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras. The report quotes North's notes that Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for Sov Bloc weaps and ammo he could make avail," and asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. When North answered that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested that it dock at [[Haifa]] and "have it filled w/ whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." [[John Poindexter]] sanctioned the offer ("It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless") and cautioned that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." On September 15, 1986, North told Poindexter that orders had been passed to the ship to proceed to Haifa, where loading would be accomplished by Israeli military personnel. North's later briefing memorandum for a visit by Peres recommended that the President thank him for the Israeli bloc arms "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance," and Poindexter penciled beside it: "Rabin. Very tightly held."[^33]
+
+On the night of February 4, 1987, Rabin called the report of the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] on the Iran arms sales "highly inaccurate" and said that it "reached the wrong conclusions regarding Israel's role." He said he had personally categorically rejected an appeal by a ranking White House aide for Israel to become involved with the Contras in any way.[^34]
+
+### The first intifada and the "break their bones" charge
+
+In a February 1988 interview with the [[Christian Science Monitor]], Rabin insisted that "there is no policy of beatings" by the government. He said beatings were permissible for soldiers during demonstrations or in "hot pursuit" of demonstrators, and acknowledged "exceptions" in reports of Palestinians beaten in their homes. Two weeks earlier, he had advocated replacing "live ammunition" with "punches and blows," and had labeled the policy "might, power, and beatings." He said of the change in policy: "I brought about a change in policy to use force on a large scale, including hitting to replace the use of firearms. I'm not denying this is what I've said. But to call it a policy of beating is not a correct statement."[^35]
+
+The "break their bones" charge came from the case of [[Yehuda Meir]], an Israel Defense Forces colonel who was a lieutenant colonel at the time of the events. A Jewish Telegraphic Agency report of November 7, 1989 says that the state prosecutor charged that Meir ordered soldiers to break the arms and legs of 20 residents of Beita and Huwara.[^36] A report of March 30, 1990 says that the charge sheet alleged that in Huwara Meir ordered a platoon to arrest 12 Palestinians and break their bones, that they were bound, blindfolded and beaten with clubs although they had not resisted, and that Meir said he acted on orders from his superiors in "the military and political echelon."[^37] In July 1990 the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Rabin, by then out of office, told the Foreign Press Association that he had not given orders to break bones and that there was no evidence to back such charges before a court or commission of inquiry. It reported that several senior officers facing disciplinary action contended they had acted on explicit instructions from Defense Minister Rabin, and that Rabin said troops were ordered to storm rioters "beating them with fists and batons, not to punish them but to hurt them and force them to cease their assault," and also to handcuff and detain them.[^38]
+
+### Jonathan Pollard
+
+The [[Knesset]] intelligence subcommittee chaired by [[Abba Eban]] reported on May 26, 1987 on the [[Jonathan Pollard]] affair. It faulted Rabin for failing "to follow up or increase supervision as he should have done" during the period of the operation, when he was defense minister.[^39] A cabinet panel chaired by [[Yehoshua Rotenstreich]] held that Peres, [[Yitzhak Shamir]] and Rabin did not follow up after Pollard's arrest to ensure full Israeli cooperation with the United States. On the promotions of [[Aviem Sella]] and [[Rafael Eitan]] the panel wrote: "All three of them share responsibility for these decisions." Rabin and Peres both attacked the Eban panel as politically tainted.[^39]
+
+### Second premiership and Oslo, 1992 to 1995
+
+Rabin defeated Peres in the Labor Party primaries, replacing him as leader of the Labor Party, and became prime minister in 1992 after the national elections, replacing Shamir. He presented his new government to the Knesset on July 13, 1992.[^40] According to the Yitzhak Rabin Center, he approved the continuation of the secret negotiations in [[Oslo]] between Israeli and [[Palestine Liberation Organization|Palestinian]] representatives, and approved the PLO as a party to the agreement after a letter from [[Yasser Arafat]] affirming PLO recognition of Israel. The Declaration of Principles was signed on the lawn of the White House on September 13, 1993, with President [[Bill Clinton]] present.[^40][^41]
+
+The [[Nobel Committee]] awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Arafat, Peres and Rabin "for their efforts to create peace in the Middle East."[^42]
+
+### Assassination, November 4, 1995
+
+On the evening of November 4, 1995, Rabin addressed a rally under the slogan "Yes to Peace, No to Violence" in the square in Tel Aviv, and was shot on his way to his car. According to the Yitzhak Rabin Center he died at Ichilov Hospital at 11:14 p.m.[^43] A summary of the [[Shamgar Commission]] report of March 28, 1996 states that [[Yigal Amir]] came to the event by bus from his home in [[Herzliya]] and situated himself in the parking area where Rabin's car was parked. At 9:45 p.m., as Rabin walked to the car with five bodyguards, Amir fired three shots. Rabin reached the hospital with no pulse and no blood pressure and died of his wounds.[^44]
+
+The summary states that the commission concluded that the murder was made possible by a lack of cooperation between the security agencies responsible for protection at the event. It criticized the head of the [[Shin Bet]], [[Carmi Gillon]], who resigned before the commission completed its work, and the head of the agency's VIP protection division, who had failed to assess the intelligence data and the threat from a Jewish assailant. It recommended that the procedures for cooperation between the police and the General Security Service be reevaluated and that the VIP protection unit double its personnel. The summary lists among the commission's conclusions: "There was no basis for the conspiracy arguments that were raised regarding the event."[^44]
+
+Amir was sentenced to life imprisonment plus six years for wounding Rabin's bodyguard. In a second trial he received eight more years, together with his brother [[Haguay Amir]], who received 12 years for conspiracy to murder the prime minister and weapons possession, and his friend [[Dror Adani]], who received seven years.[^45]
+
+[[Avishai Raviv]], identified as an agent of the General Security Service, was tried for not preventing the crime, on the basis that he knew Amir's intentions and did not report them to the service. He was found not guilty.[^45] In November 2022 the [[Times of Israel]] reported that recordings of Amir's interrogation and testimony to the Shamgar Commission, aired by Channel 12, had Amir saying that the Shin Bet "didn't know anything" about his plans, and giving as his motives the election results and the 1994 massacre in [[Hebron]] by Baruch Goldstein. In the same recordings Amir said he knew Raviv, that Raviv had discussed killing Rabin, and that Raviv was not trusted in [[Kiryat Arba]], where after Goldstein's massacre people told Amir that Raviv worked for the Shin Bet. Raviv has said that he heard Amir make the din rodef vow declaring Rabin worthy of killing but did not believe Amir was serious. A confidential section of the 1996 Shamgar report dealt with the Shin Bet and Raviv.[^46]
+
+The Times of Israel reported that [[Bezalel Smotrich]] told the Knesset on November 6, 2022 that the security services had used "irresponsible manipulations, which haven't been fully exposed to this day, to encourage the murderer to carry out his plan." Raviv's lawyer, [[Eitan Peleg]], called the allegations libel against his client and the state. The journalist Amichai Ataeli, who interviewed Amir in prison over several years, said that Amir and those around him suspected Raviv was being operated by the Shin Bet and that he did not see Raviv as having caused Amir to act. The former Shin Bet agent [[Lior Akerman]], who first interviewed Amir after the assassination, acknowledged intelligence failures and rejected the claim of Shin Bet encouragement as false.[^46]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
-[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 9.
+[^2]: "1948 - A Commander during the War of Independence," Yitzhak Rabin Center, Tel Aviv. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1948/
+[^3]: Shipler, David K., review of S. Yizhar, *Khirbet Khizeh*, *Moment* magazine, May 5, 2015 (May-June 2015 issue). https://momentmag.com/book-review-khirbet-khizeh/
+[^4]: Wall, Alix, article on Rabin's memoir and the excised passage, *J. The Jewish News of Northern California*, January 26, 2001. https://jweekly.com/?p=27908
+[^5]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 9.
+[^6]: "1964 - Chief of Staff" and "1968 - Ambassador of Israel to the United States," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1964/ and https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1968/
+[^7]: Telegram from the Defense Attaché Office in Israel to the White House, "Israeli Court of Inquiry in USS Liberty incident," June 18, 1967, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XIX, *Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, Document 307. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d307
+[^8]: "1968 - Ambassador of Israel to the United States," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1968/
+[^9]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968*, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968, 5:40-6:15 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330
+[^10]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 333, Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke to Ambassador Rabin, Washington, November 27, 1968, and editorial note. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d333
+[^11]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972*, Document 36, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 20, 1969. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d36
+[^12]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 41, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 29, 1969. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d41
+[^13]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 52, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 25, 1969, quoting Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Little, Brown, 1979), p. 154. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d52
+[^14]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 99, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 12, 1970. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d99
+[^15]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 151, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 17, 1970, citing Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, pp. 184-185. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d151
+[^16]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIV, *Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970*, Document 306, Telegram, Washington, September 22, 1970 (Sisco's meeting with Rabin on September 21). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d306
+[^17]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 271, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 29, 1971. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d271
+[^18]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 319, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 14, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d319
+[^19]: "1974 - Prime Minister of Israel, first term," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1974/
+[^20]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXVI, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976*, Document 131, Memorandum from Scowcroft to President Ford reporting Kissinger's initial discussions, February 11, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d131
+[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXVI, Document 158, Memorandum of Conversation, Jerusalem, March 22, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d158
+[^22]: Crissy, Ron, "'No concessions': Entebbe files reveal drama behind one of Israel's most daring rescue operations," *Ynetnews*, 2026, on the Israel State Archives release of the Cabinet, Security Cabinet and special ministerial team protocols. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sjzfgnszme
+[^23]: "Rabin Resigns Following Probe into Illegal Bank Accounts Held by Him and His Wife in Washington," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, April 8, 1977. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-resigns-following-probe-into-illegal-bank-accounts-held-by-him-and-his-wife-in-washington
+[^24]: "1984 - Minister of Defense," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1984/
+[^25]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 9, pp. 167 and 169, on Rabin's conditions for the 1985 TOW sale and the September 9, 1985 approval of the second shipment.
+[^26]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 10, p. 174, on Ledeen's account of Rabin's complaint about replacement of the TOW missiles.
+[^27]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. 1, *Investigations and Prosecutions* (1993), p. 110 and n. 110, on the November 15, 1985 meeting of McFarlane and Rabin. https://archive.org/details/WalshReport
+[^28]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 15, on the Casey breakfast with Rabin, McFarlane's assurance of continuing approval, and the November 24, 1985 delivery of 18 HAWK missiles.
+[^29]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 10, pp. 176-177, on the McFarlane-Rabin meeting of November 15, 1985 and Rabin's call to North on November 17.
+[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 4, on Rabin's call to McFarlane in Geneva about the shipment through a European country and McFarlane's direction to North. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_04.htm
+[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 18, on Rabin's request for help with flight clearances and the planned shipment of 80 HAWK missiles. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm
+[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 31 and n. 163, on North's account of the November shipment in his interview with Attorney General Edwin Meese. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_31.htm
+[^33]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
+[^34]: "Rabin Rejects Senate Report," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 6, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-rejects-senate-report
+[^35]: Moffett, George D., III, "Israeli foresees more unrest," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 9, 1988, interview with Defense Minister Rabin. https://www.csmonitor.com/1988/0209/orab.html
+[^36]: "IDF Furloughs Officer for Beatings," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, November 7, 1989. https://jta.org/archive/idf-furloughs-officer-for-beatings
+[^37]: "Israeli Colonel Pleads Not Guilty to Brutality Toward Palestinians," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, March 30, 1990. https://jta.org/archive/idf-colonel-pleads-not-guilty-to-brutality-toward-palestinians
+[^38]: "Rabin Denies Giving Orders to Break Bones of Palestinians," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, July 6, 1990. https://jta.org/archive/rabin-denies-giving-orders-to-break-bones-of-palestinians
+[^39]: Frankel, Glenn, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0
+[^40]: "Israel's Rabin Leaves Door Ajar For Ultra-Orthodox in Cabinet," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1992. https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0714/14013.html
+[^41]: "1992 - Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, Second Term," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1992/
+[^42]: The Nobel Prize, "The Nobel Peace Prize 1994," Nobel Foundation. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1994/summary/
+[^43]: "1995 - Assassination of the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1995/
+[^44]: Israel Electronic Library (CIE 2014), English summary of the Shamgar Commission, *Report on the Assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin*, March 28, 1996. https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1996-3-28-Shamgar-Commission-Report-on-the-Assassination-of-Prime-Minister-Yitzhak-Rabin.pdf
+[^45]: Israel Electronic Library (CIE 2014), afterword to the summary of the Shamgar Commission report, on the sentences and on the trial of Avishai Raviv. https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1996-3-28-Shamgar-Commission-Report-on-the-Assassination-of-Prime-Minister-Yitzhak-Rabin.pdf
+[^46]: "Rabin's killer said Shin Bet 'didn't know anything' about plot, refuting Smotrich," *Times of Israel*, November 8, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/rabins-killer-said-shin-bet-didnt-know-anything-about-plot-refuting-smotrich/