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10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Walt Rostow.md
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ tags: [OSS, EnemyObjectivesUnit, AirTargeting, MITCenterForInternationalStudies,
aliases: [Walt Rostow, Walt Whitman Rostow, Walter W. Rostow, W. W. Rostow, W.W. Rostow, Walter Rostow]
summary: "American economist who served in the OSS Enemy Objectives Unit in London, chaired the State Department Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966, and was Johnson's national security adviser from 1966 to 1969."
created: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-14
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]]"
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
role: "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
start: "1966"
end: "1969"
fn: 29
fn: 30
- type: employed_by
with: "[[University of Texas at Austin]]"
role: "professor of economics"
@ -123,43 +123,45 @@ The State Department record lists Rostow as chairman of the Policy Planning Coun
On February 15, 1965, Rostow sent Assistant Secretary [[William Bundy]] three points on a possible negotiation. He thought [[Hanoi]] might be driving for a settlement, that a "land grab" was likely, perhaps in the [[Laos]] corridor, and that the United States should consider a preemptive ground force move in that area and inside [[South Vietnam]], because air and naval power would be hard to use during a negotiation.[^27] Eight days earlier McGeorge Bundy's memorandum from Saigon had set out a "policy of sustained reprisal", described in Annex A as "graduated and continuing reprisal" against [[North Vietnam]].[^28]
In August 1965 Rostow attended a Washington meeting on the mission to Vietnam of Edward Lansdale. Attendees included officials from State, the White House, AID, USIA and the CIA, among them [[William Colby]]. Lansdale described his aim as finding out what the Vietnamese thought, what they wanted and what they would do. Rostow suggested that Lansdale have a liaison officer who would keep other agencies and Washington advised of his efforts and thinking.[^29]
### National Security Adviser, 1966 to 1969
By April 1966 Rostow was the President's special assistant, as the headings of his memoranda show.[^29]
By April 1966 Rostow was the President's special assistant, as the headings of his memoranda show.[^30]
#### POL strikes, June 1966
On June 14, 1966, Johnson wrote [[Harold Wilson]] that Rusk had discussed "the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi" with him. POL is the standard abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.[^30] At the National Security Council meeting of June 17, Rostow argued: "Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy." He added that "our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges." [[Arthur Goldberg]] argued that the risk of widening the bombing to POL targets was too great. Rostow's memorandum to Johnson of the previous day said he had "marched carefully through all the considerations" with Goldberg.[^31] On June 28 [[Robert McNamara]] telephoned Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening.[^32] On July 5 a telegram from the acting secretary of state reported that "Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow." On July 7 Rostow wrote Johnson that the speech at Omaha on June 30 had been "a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL."[^32][^33]
On June 14, 1966, Johnson wrote [[Harold Wilson]] that Rusk had discussed "the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi" with him. POL is the standard abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.[^31] At the National Security Council meeting of June 17, Rostow argued: "Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy." He added that "our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges." [[Arthur Goldberg]] argued that the risk of widening the bombing to POL targets was too great. Rostow's memorandum to Johnson of the previous day said he had "marched carefully through all the considerations" with Goldberg.[^32] On June 28 [[Robert McNamara]] telephoned Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening.[^33] On July 5 a telegram from the acting secretary of state reported that "Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow." On July 7 Rostow wrote Johnson that the speech at Omaha on June 30 had been "a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL."[^33][^34]
#### The Rostow thesis
In a memorandum of September 15, 1966, Rostow set out the case that bombing imposed a cumulative burden on Hanoi, and that without it Hanoi had no incentive to stop. He wrote that bombing "has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese." He listed its effects: it engaged a large amount of civilian manpower for repair and air defense, caused economic stagnation or decline, imposed "a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time," limited shipping, and left most foreign aid shoring up the North rather than the South. "Put another way," he wrote, "without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off." He cited a 1962 interview with Hanoi leaders published in the [[Saturday Evening Post]], whose "punch line" was: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."[^34]
In a memorandum of September 15, 1966, Rostow set out the case that bombing imposed a cumulative burden on Hanoi, and that without it Hanoi had no incentive to stop. He wrote that bombing "has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese." He listed its effects: it engaged a large amount of civilian manpower for repair and air defense, caused economic stagnation or decline, imposed "a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time," limited shipping, and left most foreign aid shoring up the North rather than the South. "Put another way," he wrote, "without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off." He cited a 1962 interview with Hanoi leaders published in the [[Saturday Evening Post]], whose "punch line" was: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."[^35]
#### Tet, 1968
On January 31, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk an outline of headings for a presidential speech on Asia. A marginal note in an unknown hand reads "This is WWR not LBJ."[^35] On February 5 he gave Johnson a written account of the fighting, which he said was in answer to a question from [[Elspeth Davies Rostow]], his wife. He described the attacks on the cities and at [[Khe Sanh]] as the enemy committing a large part of its "capital," its pools of military forces and firepower, on the believed vulnerability of the South Vietnamese government and of American public opinion.[^36] On February 6 he reported the findings from captured prisoners and documents. One prisoner captured on January 31 said that the attack "was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace."[^36]
On January 31, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk an outline of headings for a presidential speech on Asia. A marginal note in an unknown hand reads "This is WWR not LBJ."[^36] On February 5 he gave Johnson a written account of the fighting, which he said was in answer to a question from [[Elspeth Davies Rostow]], his wife. He described the attacks on the cities and at [[Khe Sanh]] as the enemy committing a large part of its "capital," its pools of military forces and firepower, on the believed vulnerability of the South Vietnamese government and of American public opinion.[^37] On February 6 he reported the findings from captured prisoners and documents. One prisoner captured on January 31 said that the attack "was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace."[^37]
#### Israel, 1967
On May 25, 1967, Rostow sent Johnson an Israeli intelligence estimate with a CIA appraisal attached. The appraisal, he noted, "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^37] On June 5 Rostow telephoned Johnson to read him a draft statement on the outbreak of fighting.[^38] His covering memorandum on a meeting among [[Meir Amit]], [[Walworth Barbour]] and [[Harry C. McPherson Jr.]] said that Amit's account was consistent with [[Levi Eshkol]]'s, and added: "At least that's his story."[^39]
On May 25, 1967, Rostow sent Johnson an Israeli intelligence estimate with a CIA appraisal attached. The appraisal, he noted, "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^38] On June 5 Rostow telephoned Johnson to read him a draft statement on the outbreak of fighting.[^39] His covering memorandum on a meeting among [[Meir Amit]], [[Walworth Barbour]] and [[Harry C. McPherson Jr.]] said that Amit's account was consistent with [[Levi Eshkol]]'s, and added: "At least that's his story."[^40]
### Security clearance
A CIA Office of Security memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence dated April 11, 1958, furnished in case Mr. Dillon should seek the agency's opinion of "Rostow's record and security standing," states that Rostow "has twice been denied clearance for OCB employment by the NSC Security Office," that he "was also disapproved for employment by Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover," and that he "has been denied a security clearance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense." The memorandum adds that in 1953 a CIA employee, since resigned, had threatened to take Rostow's case to the McCarran Committee.[^7]
In October 1967 Senator [[Strom Thurmond]] reported in his column in *The Clinton Chronicle* on a brief filed for [[Otto Otepka]], a State Department security officer, before a departmental hearing officer. The column stated that under the Eisenhower administration Rostow had twice been denied a State Department clearance "to handle" sensitive data, that Otepka had expressed reservations in 1960 about a proposed clearance for Rostow and had indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate [[Robert F. Kennedy]] that he would probably still evaluate the file in the same manner, and that Rostow was then given immediate clearance as a White House aide.[^40] *Human Events* of October 23, 1967 reported the brief's account that the Air Force "had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow" and that Under Secretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]], as chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, decided that Rostow would not be used as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with a psychological warfare project.[^41]
In October 1967 Senator [[Strom Thurmond]] reported in his column in *The Clinton Chronicle* on a brief filed for [[Otto Otepka]], a State Department security officer, before a departmental hearing officer. The column stated that under the Eisenhower administration Rostow had twice been denied a State Department clearance "to handle" sensitive data, that Otepka had expressed reservations in 1960 about a proposed clearance for Rostow and had indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate [[Robert F. Kennedy]] that he would probably still evaluate the file in the same manner, and that Rostow was then given immediate clearance as a White House aide.[^41] *Human Events* of October 23, 1967 reported the brief's account that the Air Force "had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow" and that Under Secretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]], as chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, decided that Rostow would not be used as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with a psychological warfare project.[^42]
The Associated Press reported that Rostow denied the account. "From 1951 onward," he told a reporter, "I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the federal government." The Associated Press noted that he did not say what assignment in 1951 had required clearance, and that his Who's Who entry listed him as a staff member of the Center for International Studies from 1951 to 1960.[^42]
The Associated Press reported that Rostow denied the account. "From 1951 onward," he told a reporter, "I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the federal government." The Associated Press noted that he did not say what assignment in 1951 had required clearance, and that his Who's Who entry listed him as a staff member of the Center for International Studies from 1951 to 1960.[^43]
On December 19, 1967 the CIA Director of Security, replying to an inquiry of December 15, wrote that Rostow "was granted a Special Intelligence Clearance by this Agency on 3 February 1961 based on a favorable investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1960."[^43]
On December 19, 1967 the CIA Director of Security, replying to an inquiry of December 15, wrote that Rostow "was granted a Special Intelligence Clearance by this Agency on 3 February 1961 based on a favorable investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1960."[^44]
### Later career and death
Rostow taught economics at the [[University of Texas at Austin]] from 1969 until his death in Austin on February 13, 2003.[^1] His official files are in the National Security File, "Memos to the President," at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library]], which the Foreign Relations volumes cite as "Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow."[^30][^36] Drafts and correspondence by and about Rostow, including drafts of his historical manuscripts, are in the Bissell papers at the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library]].[^6]
Rostow taught economics at the [[University of Texas at Austin]] from 1969 until his death in Austin on February 13, 2003.[^1] His official files are in the National Security File, "Memos to the President," at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library]], which the Foreign Relations volumes cite as "Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow."[^31][^37] Drafts and correspondence by and about Rostow, including drafts of his historical manuscripts, are in the Bissell papers at the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library]].[^6]
### Family
His brother Eugene V. Rostow (1913-2002) became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A 1967 letter from the Under Secretary to the Israeli ambassador was drafted by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow.[^44] In January 1983, as director of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Eugene was told by [[George Shultz]] that the President wanted his resignation. Spokesmen for the State Department and the White House, as reported by Joseph C. Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, said that he "had not been a team player."[^45] Another brother, [[Ralph Waldo Emerson Rostow]] (1920-2006), is listed in the same family memorial record.[^1]
His brother Eugene V. Rostow (1913-2002) became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A 1967 letter from the Under Secretary to the Israeli ambassador was drafted by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow.[^45] In January 1983, as director of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Eugene was told by [[George Shultz]] that the President wanted his resignation. Spokesmen for the State Department and the White House, as reported by Joseph C. Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, said that he "had not been a team player."[^46] Another brother, [[Ralph Waldo Emerson Rostow]] (1920-2006), is listed in the same family memorial record.[^1]
His wife, Elspeth Davies Rostow (1917-2007), is listed as his spouse in the same memorial record.[^1]
@ -193,20 +195,21 @@ His wife, Elspeth Davies Rostow (1917-2007), is listed as his spouse in the same
[^26]: *FRUS 1961-1963*, Volume I, document 335 ("Chairman of the Policy Planning Council," December 22, 1961), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d335 ; Volume II, document 140 ("Director of the Policy Planning Staff," April 3, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d140, and document 275 ("Counselor of the Department of State," September 5, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d275; Volume III, document 206 ("Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council," July 4, 1963), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d206
[^27]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965*, document 121, memorandum from Rostow to Bundy, February 15, 1965, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d121
[^28]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume II*, document 84, memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, "The Situation in Vietnam," February 7, 1965, with Annex A, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d84
[^29]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966*, document 115, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Johnson, April 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d115
[^30]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 156, message from Johnson to Wilson, June 14, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d156 (source line: "Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow").
[^31]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 159, summary notes of the 559th National Security Council meeting, June 17, 1966, with footnote on Rostow's memorandum of June 16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d159
[^32]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 164, editorial note on McNamara's telephone call to Johnson, June 28, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d164 ; document 173, telegram from the Department of State to Rusk, July 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d173
[^33]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 176, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, "Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles," July 7, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d176
[^34]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 232, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 15, 1966, "A reflection on bombing the North," quoting Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," *Saturday Evening Post* 235 (November 24, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d232
[^35]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968*, document 42, memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, January 31, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d42
[^36]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI*, document 55, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 5, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d55 ; document 57, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 6, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d57
[^37]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, document 61, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 25, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
[^38]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, editorial note on Rostow's telephone call to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d152
[^39]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 158, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, with Rostow's covering memorandum to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
[^40]: Senator Strom Thurmond, column in *The Clinton Chronicle*, October 19, 1967, p. 19, "Otepka and Rostow," https://historicnewspapers.sc.edu/lccn/sn86063780/1967-10-19/ed-1/seq-19/ (the column reports the brief's claims, and describes Rostow as "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs").
[^41]: "The Rostow Story," *Human Events*, October 23, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000600040001-4
[^42]: Associated Press, "Rostow Denies Report on Security Clearance," as printed in newspaper clippings of October 1967, CIA reading room documents CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080008-2 and CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080006-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700080008-2
[^43]: Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, letter of December 19, 1967 replying to an inquiry of December 15, 1967, regarding "Mr. Walter Whitman Rostow," CIA reading room document 0001475810, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001475810
[^44]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 36, letter from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eugene Rostow) to the Israeli ambassador (Harman), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 (drafted by Eugene Rostow, Meeker and Robert T. Grey; cleared by Rusk, Walt Rostow and others).
[^45]: Joseph C. Harsch, "The Rostow affair," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0120/012025.html (Eugene Rostow summoned to the office of Secretary of State Shultz and told the President wanted his resignation; "had not been a team player").
[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Lansdale Mission to Vietnam," August 1965. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420030-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01580r001603420030-5
[^30]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966*, document 115, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Johnson, April 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d115
[^31]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 156, message from Johnson to Wilson, June 14, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d156 (source line: "Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow").
[^32]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 159, summary notes of the 559th National Security Council meeting, June 17, 1966, with footnote on Rostow's memorandum of June 16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d159
[^33]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 164, editorial note on McNamara's telephone call to Johnson, June 28, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d164 ; document 173, telegram from the Department of State to Rusk, July 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d173
[^34]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 176, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, "Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles," July 7, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d176
[^35]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 232, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 15, 1966, "A reflection on bombing the North," quoting Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," *Saturday Evening Post* 235 (November 24, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d232
[^36]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968*, document 42, memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, January 31, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d42
[^37]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI*, document 55, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 5, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d55 ; document 57, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 6, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d57
[^38]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, document 61, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 25, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
[^39]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, editorial note on Rostow's telephone call to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d152
[^40]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 158, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, with Rostow's covering memorandum to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
[^41]: Senator Strom Thurmond, column in *The Clinton Chronicle*, October 19, 1967, p. 19, "Otepka and Rostow," https://historicnewspapers.sc.edu/lccn/sn86063780/1967-10-19/ed-1/seq-19/ (the column reports the brief's claims, and describes Rostow as "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs").
[^42]: "The Rostow Story," *Human Events*, October 23, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000600040001-4
[^43]: Associated Press, "Rostow Denies Report on Security Clearance," as printed in newspaper clippings of October 1967, CIA reading room documents CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080008-2 and CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080006-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700080008-2
[^44]: Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, letter of December 19, 1967 replying to an inquiry of December 15, 1967, regarding "Mr. Walter Whitman Rostow," CIA reading room document 0001475810, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001475810
[^45]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 36, letter from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eugene Rostow) to the Israeli ambassador (Harman), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 (drafted by Eugene Rostow, Meeker and Robert T. Grey; cleared by Rusk, Walt Rostow and others).
[^46]: Joseph C. Harsch, "The Rostow affair," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0120/012025.html (Eugene Rostow summoned to the office of Secretary of State Shultz and told the President wanted his resignation; "had not been a team player").