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40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Operation NORTHWOODS.md
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---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-12
updated: 2026-10-14
title: Operation NORTHWOODS
aliases:
- Northwoods
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Killing of Americans: The document explicitly contemplated staging incidents in
### Rejection
On March 6, 1962 Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wrote that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^6]On March 5, 1962 the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, wrote to General Craig with the request, under the subject "Operation MONGOOSE." The Joint Chiefs' memorandum takes "cognizance of a suggested course of action proposed by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area," citing a March 8, 1962 memorandum from the chief of naval operations to the Joint Chiefs titled "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)."[^7] The Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 13 recommended that the paper be forwarded "as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes." The paper (JCS 1969/321) rested on the premise that intervention "will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances," and a draft memorandum appended to it stated that a plan built from the suggestions "would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale."[^8]
On March 6, 1962 Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wrote to [[Richard Goodwin]], deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, that Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] had spoken at the March 5 meeting of "other tracks" which might be opened for the United States to achieve its objective, and that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention." He asked State for a companion statement of the pretexts State believed desirable. According to the letter, Rusk's remarks at the meeting included a joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a notional clandestine action for which "they" could be blamed, and General Taylor had asked Lansdale to report on the alternate "tracks," among other things, to the Special Group Taylor chaired; Lansdale wrote that he intended to complete the report on Friday, March 9, and that he was acting "in response to direction."[^6] On March 5, 1962 the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, wrote to General Craig with the request, under the subject "Operation MONGOOSE." The Joint Chiefs' memorandum takes "cognizance of a suggested course of action proposed by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area," citing a March 8, 1962 memorandum from the chief of naval operations to the Joint Chiefs titled "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)."[^7] The Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 13 recommended that the paper be forwarded "as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes." The paper (JCS 1969/321) rested on the premise that intervention "will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances," and a draft memorandum appended to it stated that a plan built from the suggestions "would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale."[^8]
On March 16, 1962 President Kennedy met with [[John A. McCone]], General [[Maxwell Taylor]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Lemnitzer to discuss the Mongoose guidelines. [[U. Alexis Johnson]]'s handwritten note records that "The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action," and that "no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^9] On April 5, 1962 the Special Group concluded that Mongoose should re-examine its basic philosophy "with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention," and five days later (April 10) the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both questions put by General Maxwell Taylor, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so.[^10] At the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), according to McCone's notes, the "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^11]