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---
created: 2024-08-21
updated: 2025-01-03
updated: 2026-10-15
title: United States Army Intelligence Support Activity
aliases:
- United States Army Intelligence Support Activity
- Intelligence Support Activity
- Army Intelligence Support Activity
- USAISA
- GRAY FOX
- CENTRA SPIKE
- GRANTOR SHADOW
- ROYAL CAPE
- OPTIMIZE TALENT
tags:
- U.S. Army
- Covert Operations
- Intelligence Gathering
description: The Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) is a covert U.S. Army unit specializing in HUMINT and SIGINT for JSOC operations. It conducts clandestine intelligence gathering, operational support, and direct action missions globally. ISA operates under classified programs, collaborates with NSA and CIA, and has a history of involvement in high-profile missions.
- Organization
- SpecialAccessProgram
- CentraSpike
- GrayFox
- RoyalCape
- CongressionalOversight
category: "U.S. Government"
summary: "The United States Army Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) is a classified special operations intelligence unit providing direct support to special operations forces, with covert operational roles in hostage rescue and counterterrorism that overlap with CIA clandestine activities."
summary: "The United States Army Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) was a covert Army unit authorized in January 1981, whose designation was discontinued in March 1989 after congressional and inspector general criticism."
start: 1981
location: "Fort Belvoir, Virginia"
relations:
- type: member_of
with: "[[U.S. Army]]"
start: 1981-01-29
role: "authorized by the Army chief of staff as a unit of the Army"
fn: 1
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Central Intelligence Agency]]"
start: 1981-03
role: "direct liaison channel and coordination of operations, per a CIA memorandum"
fn: 17
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Defense Intelligence Agency]]"
start: 1983-03-14
role: "resource management memorandum of agreement with the General Defense Intelligence Program"
fn: 20
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Bo Gritz]]"
start: 1982-11
role: "unit contacted Gritz to aid his 1982 Laos POW mission, per the Washington Post (1985) and a CIA memorandum"
fn: 16
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Special Operations Division]]"
start: 1981
role: "the division oversaw some of the unit's needs, per Emerson (1988)"
fn: 7
- type: head_of
with: "[[Jerry King]]"
reverse: true
start: 1980-07
role: "headed the Foreign Operating Group that became the unit, per Emerson (1988)"
fn: 7
- type: head_of
with: "[[John G. Lackey III]]"
reverse: true
start: 1985-10
end: 1987-09
role: "commander listed in the fiscal year 1986 and 1987 key personnel reports"
fn: 4
- type: member_of
with: "[[William V. Cowan]]"
reverse: true
start: 1983
role: "Marine lieutenant colonel, deputy director of operations, per Emerson (1988)"
fn: 28
- type: member_of
with: "[[David Morehouse]]"
reverse: true
start: 1987-10
end: 1988
role: "briefly a member, joined late 1987 according to Jim Schnabel"
fn: 44
- type: investigated
with: "[[Pablo Escobar]]"
role: "signals intelligence support to the manhunt, a claim attributed to Mark Bowden and carried by the National Security Archive"
fn: 32
---
The following borrows or copies heavily from [greydynamics.com](https://greydynamics.com/isa-soldier-spies-of-the-intelligence-support-activity/) and their explainer of the ISA.
The Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) is a covert [[U.S. Army]] unit providing intelligence for [[Joint Special Operations Command]] (JSOC) operations. Its current official name is classified. All records are classified under a [[Special Access Programs]] originally named OPTIMIZE TALENT.
### Known Designations
- 1st Capabilities Integration Group (Airborne)
- Task Force Orange
- [[GRAY FOX]]
- Army of Northern Virginia
- Office of Military Support
- CENTRA SPIKE
- Torn Victor
- INTREPID SPEAR
### Function and Doctrine
ISA specializes in clandestine intelligence gathering and operational support, focusing on HUMINT and SIGINT. Unlike combat-focused JSOC units, ISA conducts intelligence and espionage operations at a tactical level. It prepares the battlespace for military operations globally, primarily enabling JSOC special mission units.
### Key Activities
- HUMINT collection through coercion and interrogation
- SIGINT gathering via communication interception and physical bugging
- Direct action missions when necessary
### Organizational Structure
- Comprises 5 primary elements: administration, training, SIGINT, HUMINT, and direct action
- Four primary battalions with over 300 operators
- Includes cyber ops teams, technology ops teams, and mission support teams
### Known Squadrons
1. Operations Squadron (HUMINT/Ground Squadron)
- Four troops: A, B, C, D
- A and C troops use official cover
- B and D troops use non-official cover
2. SIGINT Squadron
3. Mission Support Squadron
The United States Army Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) was a covert [[U.S. Army]] unit authorized on January 29, 1981, to collect human and signals intelligence and to run covert operations.[^1] A 1986 unit history described it as the only unit in the [[Department of Defense]] designed to address unique military intelligence and special operations needs.[^1] The designation was discontinued on March 31, 1989. [[Jeffrey T. Richelson]] wrote that, according to several reports, responsibility for the unit then passed to the [[United States Special Operations Command]].[^2] The unit's [[Special Access Programs|special access program]] was marked OPTIMIZE TALENT on its 1983 charter, ROYAL CAPE on its 1986 and 1987 histories, and GRANTOR SHADOW in 1989.[^3][^4][^5]
Headquarters located at [[Fort Belvoir]], VA; squadrons scattered across Maryland/D.C./Virginia area.
### Connections to Other Organizations
- Operates as a tactical arm of the [[NSA|National Security Agency]] (NSA)
- Works closely with JSOC, SOCOM, and other intelligence agencies
- Collaborates with [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], including cross-training of personnel
### Selection and Training
- Recruits primarily from Green Berets and other military branches
- Emphasizes language skills and ability to blend with locals
- Training includes:
- Infiltration techniques
- Advanced air operations
- Offensive and off-road driving
- Personal defensive measures
- Communications
- Espionage methods
- Cross-trains with CIA at "The Farm" in Virginia
### Notable Operations
1. Operation Winter Harvest (Italy, 1980s)
- Rescue of U.S. Brigadier General James Dozier from Red Brigades
2. Operation Queens Hunter (El Salvador)
- Extended SIGINT operations against guerrillas
3. Afghanistan: Operation Anaconda
- Provided critical SIGINT support during Battle of Takur Ghar
- Called [[GRAY FOX]] during this period
4. Iraq: Operation Red Dawn
- Contributed to the capture of Saddam Hussein
5. Colombia: Centra Spike
- SIGINT operations in hunt for Pablo Escobar
6. Raid on Osama bin Laden
- SIGINT prior to and during the bin Laden raid
### Equipment and Tactics
- Weapons vary based on mission, often using local arms for cover
- Utilizes advanced SIGINT and surveillance technology
- "Confederate Air Force": Fleet of 40 ISR aircraft across 15 types
- Mastery of tradecraft, including disguises and covert entry
### History
- 1965: Department of Defense outlines need for military intelligence operations
- 1979: Field Operations Group (FOG) conducts covert survey in Nicaragua
- 1981: Officially established as ISA
- Expanded role following Operation Eagle Claw (attempt to rescue hostages in Tehran) failure
- 2003: Organization was transferred to [[Joint Special Operations Command]]
### Unusual Information
- Members are on the [[Department of the Army's Special Roster]] (DASR), effectively making them "non-existent"
- Can remotely activate turned-off cell phones for surveillance
- Operatives sometimes work in male-female teams, posing as married couples for deep cover operations
### Establishment
The unit grew out of the failed April 1980 attempt to rescue the hostages held in [[Iran]]. On December 10, 1980, the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] Director for Operations, [[Philip C. Gast]], wrote to the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] that a review of the past year's intelligence had revealed "a serious and persistent information deficiency" for Iranian contingency planning, and recommended that the Defense Department consider developing a human intelligence capability within its own structure.[^6] The [[Field Operations Group]], an ad hoc joint organization formed to support a second rescue attempt, was redesignated the Intelligence Support Activity in March 1981.[^1]
[[Steven Emerson]] wrote that [[Jerry King]], a colonel, headed the Field Operations Group when it was created in July 1980 with about fifty members drawn from Special Forces and military intelligence, and that in the summer and fall of 1980 a handful of its agents went to [[Tehran]] under false passports. Emerson wrote that a classified February 1981 memorandum from [[Caspar Weinberger]] told each service to continue to develop its own counterterrorist capabilities, and that in its early years the military had a classified cover name for the unit, Tactical Concept Activity.[^7]
The [[Los Angeles Times]] reported in May 1983 that a former Carter administration official had said such a unit "had been discussed at the Pentagon for a long time" before a decision was made under the Reagan administration. [[Robert C. Toth]] wrote that [[Richard G. Stilwell]], a retired four-star Army general, "apparently picked up the issue in 1981."[^8]
The [[Washington Post]] gave a different account of the origin in 1985, describing the unit as formed from a "Foreign Operating Group," or FOG, which had infiltrated soldiers posing as civilians into Tehran before the April 1980 mission.[^9] [[Samuel Longstreth]] wrote for [[Grey Dynamics]] that a 1965 Defense Department memorandum outlined the need for military intelligence operations, and that the Field Operations Group conducted a covert survey of [[Nicaragua]] after the 1979 fall of [[Anastasio Somoza Debayle]], photographing the [[United States Embassy]] and recording the types of locks on its doors.[^10]
### Charter and approvals
On May 26, 1982, Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Frank C. Carlucci]] wrote to the deputy under secretary for policy that he found an attached inspection report on ISA "disturbing in the extreme." His memorandum said "We seem to have created our own CIA, but like Topsy, uncoordinated and uncontrolled," that the unit contained much talent "and probably even more dedication," and that "Action will be taken to terminate all ISA operations within 30 days; or effect transfer thereof to other competent organizations" unless a plan to continue the unit reached him by June 15. The plan was to include a concept plan, a command structure showing to whom the unit was accountable, a fiscal management plan, a program for working with the appropriate committees of [[United States Congress]], and the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the General Counsel. He wrote that the arrangement had created "an organization that is unaccountable." The memorandum was copied to the General Counsel, the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff.[^11]
Emerson wrote that the inspector general's spring 1982 report criticized oversight and spending, including the acquisition of a hot-air balloon, a Rolls-Royce obtained from the [[Drug Enforcement Administration]] after it was confiscated from drug smugglers, and a dune buggy. He wrote that Caspar Weinberger signed a one-page top secret memorandum ordering Secretary of the Army [[John O. Marsh Jr.]] to dismantle the unit within thirty days, and that Army lobbying, particularly by Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Lieutenant General [[William E. Odom]], got the order rescinded.[^12]
On June 16, 1982, [[William J. Casey]], the Director of Central Intelligence, told the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]] in a prepared statement that he welcomed the opportunity to "discuss coordination of the Army's Intelligence Support Activity (ISA)."[^13] On July 22, 1982, Casey replied to Odom on the draft charter that he did not believe it was in the national interest to have peacetime special activities "conducted by agencies other than the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]," but he supported an Army clandestine organization subject to changes reflecting congressional concern about coordination.[^14]
The charter as issued, which the 1986 history dates to July 1983 and attributes to approval by the [[National Security Planning Group]], the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Adjutant General, described the unit as a Field Operating Agency of Army headquarters under the operational control of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.[^1][^3] Every page carries the marking SECRET OPTIMIZE TALENT with "special access required." It directed that the unit undertake activities "only when other intelligence or operational support elements and resources are unavailable or inappropriate to accomplish the tasking." The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff were to review personally any request that carried a substantial risk of embarrassment, a substantial risk of physical harm to Army personnel, a question of policy or propriety, the use of a prominent or notorious person, or a U.S. person as a target.[^3]
The charter's later pages set out the administrative terms. Intelligence information reports were to be processed through the Army's Intelligence Support Activity staff office at headquarters, aircraft support requests were to go through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and all liaison with foreign governments required approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The unit was not to "establish or maintain any corporate proprietaries, unless authorized by law." Military records of its personnel were to be secured through the [[Department of the Army's Special Roster|Department of the Army Special Roster]] procedures run by the Army Administrative Survey Detachment of the [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command]], and selection and recruitment were to follow an approved cover plan. Security, counterintelligence support and cover support came from the Intelligence and Security Command. The commander could approve expenditures under $10,000, with larger sums approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff; disbursements were subject to quarterly audit by the Comptroller of the Army; the unit was funded from Program 3 funds; and no funds were to be made available for any activity not previously justified to Congress unless the Director of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense had notified the House and Senate intelligence and appropriations committees. The Army Inspector General was to inspect all aspects of the unit annually, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff were to receive a monthly report, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence was to ensure that congressional committees were "kept fully and currently informed."[^3]
### The Gritz mission
[[Bo Gritz]], a retired Special Forces lieutenant colonel, led an unofficial mission into [[Laos]] in November 1982 to search for American prisoners of war. [[Time (magazine)|Time]] reported that the raid began on November 27, 1982, that a band of guerrillas ambushed the party after three days, killing two Laotians and capturing an American, and that Gritz paid $17,000 to ransom the captured colleague before he surrendered at a police station in northeastern [[Thailand]].[^15]
Emerson wrote that Gritz later told Congress that in June 1981 he was advised that "the 'Activity' shortly hoped to obtain the charter for the rescue of American POWs and was invited to participate in its operation," which was code-named Grand Eagle.[^7] [[Caryle Murphy]] and [[Charles R. Babcock]] wrote in the Washington Post in 1985 that the Defense Department had planned its own secret operation in Laos to verify reports of living American prisoners, and that at the same time, without the knowledge of Army leadership, ISA had made contact with Gritz to aid his unofficial mission, according to [[Edward C. Meyer]] and others. The same article reported that after Gritz publicly disclosed the help he had received from "the activity," the Army investigated ISA.[^9]
An undated CIA memorandum recorded that the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had learned of ISA largely from Gritz's public statements, since Gritz had identified ISA as his point of contact within the Army. The committee had summoned Army intelligence to appear on February 12 to explain the unit. The memorandum stated that ISA supported the Gritz collection operation in Southeast Asia without informing DIA or the committee until months afterward, and that a direct CIA liaison channel to the unit had been agreed in March 1981.[^16][^17]
A 1993 report of the [[Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs]] stated that Army intelligence documentation confirmed that a component of Army intelligence provided a long range camera, polygraph and other equipment and financial support to Gritz for a separate private effort called "Grand Eagle," in advance of full approval, and that the request was ultimately denied.[^18]
### Congressional and executive review
[[Jay Peterzell]] wrote in the Washington Post on April 24, 1983 that, according to a number of well-informed sources, the unit had carried out illegal clandestine intelligence activities without a presidential finding or a report to the intelligence committees. He wrote that the congressional committees had learned of its actions early in 1982, had conducted an investigation, and had referred the matter to the [[Intelligence Oversight Board]].[^19]
Toth wrote in May 1983 that the Army's inspector general had said the unit was monitored "insufficiently closely" for the first year of its life, that it had worked for almost a year without a legally required presidential finding, and that the White House was preparing operating guidelines for it.[^8]
On March 14, 1983, the [[General Defense Intelligence Program]] staff circulated a memorandum of agreement between the managers of the General Defense Intelligence Program and the [[Consolidated Cryptologic Program]] that assigned resource responsibilities for ISA under the general guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence.[^20]
On January 23, 1984, the Director of the Program and Budget Staff at the [[Intelligence Community Staff]] asked [[James A. Williams]], director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to prepare a briefing for the first week of February. The request sought a detailed accounting of ISA spending for fiscal years 1983 through 1985 and outyears, a full presentation of its operational activities to date, and the approval mechanism for sensitive operations, for use in "the upcoming congressional review."[^21]
Emerson wrote that the Army's Special Operations Division was tasked with overseeing some of the needs of the unit, that a cell under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence handled its financial requirements, and that after the Yellow Fruit investigations the Army Inspector General and the Criminal Investigation Command conducted a worldwide review of Delta, ISA, Sea Spray, military intelligence units and Task Force 160.[^7][^22]
### Operations in the record
A July 30, 1985 after action report by the [[902nd Military Intelligence Group]], written by Major David V. Owen, chief of the Intelligence and Security Command Support Element, described a security assessment of GRAZING LAWN, a deployed collection operation based at the [[Tegucigalpa]] airfield in [[Honduras]]. From July 2 to 11, 1985 a special agent of the support element evaluated the operation's security posture and a second evaluated it from outside as a "red team," reading the four Honduran dailies and monitoring broadcasts for any mention of the operation and visiting hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners. Three Special Forces qualified personnel, one organic to CAYMAN JAW and two from the 1st Special Forces Group at Fort Lewis, provided the operation's on-site security. The report was copied to the commanders of CAYMAN JAW and ROYAL CAPE, and its questions concerned QUIET FALCON, a related collection program.[^23] The unit's 1986 history described GRAZING LAWN as a deployed collection operation involving joint ROYAL CAPE and CAYMAN JAWS personnel and assets, started in spring 1985 and terminated in January 1986 for security reasons, with four counterintelligence agents deployed to provide operations security assistance.[^4]
The 1986 history described three exercises. POWERFUL GAZE, in March 1986 in the Jacksonville and New Bern area of [[North Carolina]], was a joint exercise in which eight participants were surveilled and apprehended by State Bureau of Investigation personnel who believed they were involved in drug smuggling; two counterintelligence agents were sent from headquarters, and the Director of Operations decided that counterintelligence personnel would be on site during future exercises. QUIZ ICING, in June 1986, was a hostage rescue exercise. POPULAR FOREST, in August and September 1986 at Savannah, Georgia with follow-on support in eastern Tennessee, was the counterterrorism portion of a larger exercise and included an escape and evasion phase. In each, the unit's mission was to provide HUMINT and SIGINT intelligence and to receive, sustain and exfiltrate the counterterrorist team. The history also records 29 airborne operations in fiscal year 1986, a visit by two operations security personnel to the Miami area in January and February 1986 to ask the U.S. Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration about concealment devices, with the Secretary of the Army advised of the results, and trips by an operations representative to Japan and South Korea for discussions with the 500th and 501st Military Intelligence Groups. The intelligence directorate listed 10 country intelligence estimates, 35 operational data files in each of two series, 22 landing zone and drop zone graphics, 260 information service requests and an area map library of 90,000 maps.[^24]
The 1987 history listed project code names in the approval and coordination process. For Latin America they included GRAPE GODDESS, WHET STING, CAVORT BELLOWS, CAESAR HOME, ROOSTER COURT, ROOT PAIN, GOTHIC JAGUAR and GOAL CARD, with GOTHIC JAGUAR not coordinated in September 1987 "based on risk:gain assessment" and four ISA personnel supporting a Pacific Command and Special Operations Command Pacific survey in March 1987. For the Middle East they included ROUND BOTTLE, which was "terminated without evaluation of information" even though the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence personally requested it, QUIVER STRAP, CAVERN TOLL and LEAVE CATCH. The directorate wrote that the year was marked by "continued and increased oversight of the organization," that the list "in no way" reflected "the energy generated and expended by the organization with regard to inquiries from the Congress and all layers of the intelligence community and Department of Defense," and that route reconnaissance training named ROUTE RETREAT was canceled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1987.[^25]
The 1987 command group log lists visits to the unit that year, among them a lunch on October 1, 1986 with a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to discuss ROYAL CAPE, the escort of William E. Odom, by then Director of the [[National Security Agency]], on October 8, 1986, visits by Secretary of the Army Marsh on November 6, 1986 and September 21, 1987, a visit by Secretary of Defense Weinberger on February 5, 1987, the Director of the DIA on three occasions, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff on February 25, 1987, House and Senate intelligence committee staff on May 18, 1987, and the committee chairman, Senator [[David Boren]], on September 24, 1987.[^26]
The 1986 key personnel report lists Colonel John G. Lackey III as commander and Colonel Robert R. Glass III as deputy commander, with Lieutenant Colonel Jesse R. Timmerman Jr. as executive officer; the 1987 report lists Lackey, Glass and Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Lurey as executive officer.[^4][^26] The 1986 organizational chart shows a command group, personnel and administration, intelligence and operations directorates, an operations squadron with Troops A through D, a communications squadron with a forward communications troop, and a signals intelligence squadron with an exploitation troop and a direct support troop. The fiscal year 1988 chart in the 1987 report lists a command group of 12, an operations directorate of 54, an intelligence directorate of 26, a signals intelligence squadron of 72, a communications squadron of 50 and an operations squadron of 102.[^4][^26]
On July 18, 1985, [[CBS News|CBS]] reported that sources close to the unit said it had still not sent any agents into [[Lebanon]], although it had been created after the Iranian crisis to infiltrate native-speaking agents into countries where Americans could not move freely.[^27] Emerson wrote that a five-person ISA team returned to Beirut after the October 23, 1983 bombing, that in 1983 a survey team led by Lieutenant Colonel William V. Cowan, the unit's deputy director of operations, had recommended a fusion cell and warned that the Marine headquarters was a tempting target, that a 1985 message from [[Oliver North]] to [[John Poindexter]] said "We already have one ISA officer in Beirut," and that in mid-September 1985 the CIA ordered the unit to cease and desist from contact with Lebanese Christian forces, after which ISA agents were told they had "bumped up against Ollie North."[^28] He wrote that the unit worked in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Jordan; that in late 1981 it ran Operation Great Falcon, an attempt to obtain a Soviet T-72 tank from Iraq; that in 1982 it protected President Nimeiry in [[Khartoum]]; and that from December 1982 it and [[Delta Force]] set up a Special Purpose Detachment for the Saudi Arabian National Guard under Crown Prince Abdullah.[^28]
[[James L. Dozier]], a U.S. Army brigadier general, was kidnapped by the [[Red Brigades]] in December 1981 and rescued by Italian police in January 1982. The [[Christian Science Monitor]] credited the raid to Italian anti-terrorist commandos and called it a major blow to the Red Brigades.[^29] Emerson wrote that a signals intelligence team from the unit was dispatched to [[Italy]].[^30] A compilation of press reports from May 1983 named Italy among the places where the unit operated, including its part in the rescue of Dozier.[^31] Grey Dynamics named the search Operation Winter Harvest and credited the unit with a role in the rescue.[^10]
Emerson wrote that in Central America the unit was active in [[Panama]], Nicaragua, [[El Salvador]], Honduras and [[Guatemala]], that it set up "scores of business fronts," and that before 1984 its agents entered Nicaragua on false embassy credentials and from 1985 on third-country passports. He wrote that in October 1983 the Joint Special Operations Command commander, Major General Richard Scholtes, did not use the unit in [[Grenada]], and that a 1983 HUMINT study led to a program named Monarch Eagle.[^12]
Jeffrey T. Richelson wrote that the former ISA, known by the codename CENTRA SPIKE in 1993, played an important role in the hunt for [[Colombia|Colombian]] drug lord [[Pablo Escobar]], as detailed in [[Mark Bowden]]'s [[Killing Pablo]].[^2][^32]
Longstreth wrote that the unit supplied signals intelligence support in Operation Anaconda in [[Afghanistan]], including the Battle of Takur Ghar, where it operated under the name [[GRAY FOX]], in Operation Red Dawn, which he credited with contributing to the capture of [[Saddam Hussein]], and before the raid on [[Osama bin Laden]].[^10]
### Yellow Fruit and Sea Spray
Emerson listed the units together in 1988: "Delta, Yellow Fruit, Seaspray, Quick Reaction Team, Task Force 160, Intelligence Support Activity and Special Operations Division." He wrote that the Special Operations Division was tasked with overseeing some of the needs of ISA, and that Richard Gadd's air contract for the division served "Seaspray, ISA, Yellow Fruit and Delta."[^7][^33]
Emerson described Yellow Fruit as Dale Duncan's operational security operation for the Special Operations Division, with a staff of nine and a cover company, Business Security International (BSI), opened in July 1983 in Annandale, Virginia, with a first-year budget of $2.7 million. He wrote that a plan to entrap the ISA commander with a prostitute, devised in the Yellow Fruit period, was never used.[^22]
The [[New York Times]] reported on April 22, 1987 that the Pentagon had found a Swiss bank account set up by a secret Army unit called [[Yellow Fruit]], which had been disbanded in 1983. The unit was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Duncan, and it had worked through a front company in Annandale, Virginia, called Business Security International. The Army investigated the unit's finances for two years and still could not account for all of its money. A senior Pentagon official said the evidence suggested that Oliver North and [[Richard Secord]] had access to the account, and it was not known whether U.S. government funds had been deposited in it.[^34]
The [[Boston Globe]] reported on April 23, 1987 that Duncan had been convicted in 1986 of submitting fraudulent expense accounts relating to Yellow Fruit activities, apparently unconnected to the contras, and was serving a ten year sentence at [[Fort Leavenworth]], Kansas. Sworn statements by one witness attributed to Duncan the claim that he carried CIA credentials and had conducted operations for the Agency. The Globe reported that court documents placed a meeting about the case in the office of Colonel [[James Longhofer]], who ran the Army division responsible for secret operations, at CIA headquarters.[^35] CBS reported that bank records showed $2.5 million withdrawn from the account in one day in 1985, and that $75,000 of it had been used to charter a freighter that carried arms to the contras.[^34]
The [[Chicago Tribune]] reported on May 4, 1987 that North "also used an account set up by the Pentagon under the heading Project Yellow Fruit to fund secret military operations."[^36]
The Washington Post reported in 1985 that the Army's [[Special Operations Division]], created at about the same time as ISA with a staff of about 20 and a budget of about $100 million a year according to sources, had a financial investigation begin after subordinates of Lieutenant Colonel Dale Duncan alleged in September 1983 that he was diverting secret funds through Business Security International, a front code-named Yellow Fruit. The Post also reported that the Army had created a special aviation unit at [[Fort Eustis]], Virginia, in the summer of 1981, officially called the First Rotary Wing Test Activity, which bought Hughes helicopters and commercial aircraft outside the usual procurement channels.[^9]
On November 22, 1985, CBS reported on a secret Army unit called [[Sea Spray]], based at Fort Eustis, which flew helicopters on missions ordered by President Reagan and was the target of an investigation into the mishandling of a $300 million intelligence contingency fund. CBS said that Sea Spray ran an operation called Queen's Hunter, which began during the 1982 elections in El Salvador and was still underway, using aircraft disguised as a civilian mapping team to eavesdrop on guerrilla communications. CBS also reported that a Sea Spray helicopter had flown a representative of Lebanese Christian leader [[Camille Chamoun]] out of Beirut to Israel in 1981, and that in 1983 Sea Spray helicopters had been sent to [[Barbados]] with $100,000 in cash to infiltrate a CIA agent into Grenada, an operation cancelled before U.S. forces invaded the island.[^37]
Emerson wrote that Queen's Hunter, run by Sea Spray out of La Ceiba, Honduras at $140,000 a month, was crewed on its Beechcraft by ISA signals intelligence operators, "knob-turners," taken from an operation called Graphic Book; that the NSA and CIA estimated that 70 percent of all signals intelligence collected in Central America from 1982 through 1984 came from it; that the Special Operations Division used a cutout, Armairco, headquartered in La Jolla, California; and that the follow-on program was Quiet Falcon. He wrote that Sea Spray was later renamed Quasar Talent.[^12][^33][^38]
### The Duncan prosecutions
The court record on Duncan runs through three tribunals. In the summer of 1983 the Army audited the Business Security International accounts, and Duncan was required to account for about $157,000 advanced to him for operational expenses. On September 12, 1983 a warrant officer assigned to the activity alleged mismanagement of funds; the Army Inspector General opened an investigation, and the General Counsel of the Army referred the matter to the Department of Justice in December 1983. A Justice Department attorney and an Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Theodore Greenberg, were assigned, and the Justice Department investigation extended to other special operations not described in the court's record.[^39][^40]
Duncan was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on November 19, 1985, tried from February 10, 1986, and convicted on February 12, 1986 of three counts; he was sentenced on March 14, 1986 to a year of imprisonment. The vouchers at issue were an $8,400 claim for the charter of a DC-3, on which the jury acquitted him, a $56,230 claim for electronic equipment, which the trial court dismissed, and a $796 airline ticket obtained with a frequent flyer certificate. On April 14, 1987 the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit]] reversed the false statement and false claim convictions for an erroneous jury instruction and, on the government's concession, vacated the theft conviction. Duncan was not retried in civilian court.[^39][^40][^41] Duncan and his wife also sued the Army and three individuals under the Right to Financial Privacy Act over the examination of their American Express records during the 1983 audit, and on March 23, 1987 the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of that suit and remanded it.[^42]
The Army court-martial charges were preferred on May 9, 1985, with further charges on September 4, 1985 and May 9, 1986. The Department of Justice asked the Army to defer them until the federal case ended. An Article 32 investigation began on April 7, 1986, the charges were referred to a general court-martial by the Commander, Military District of Washington, on July 10, 1986, and the trial began on October 27 or 28, 1986 and concluded on November 10, 1986. The members convicted Duncan of conspiracy to obstruct justice, violation of a lawful general regulation, thirteen specifications of larceny, forgery, two specifications of making a false claim, conduct unbecoming an officer, obstruction of justice and failure to account for public funds. The sentence was dismissal, ten years' confinement, forfeiture of $3,350 per month and a $50,000 fine, and the convening authority reduced the confinement and forfeitures to seven years. On June 9, 1992 the Army Court of Military Review set the findings and sentence aside and dismissed the charges, holding that the 120 day speedy trial rule required dismissal of the original and first additional charges and that the evidence did not prove the second set of additional charges, which included a larceny charge. The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the dismissal on October 28, 1993. The appellate record in the case ran to fifty-five volumes and the oral argument was heard in a sensitive compartmented information facility.[^40][^41]
The Court of Military Appeals recorded that the case was the last residue of charges brought against several Army members assigned to BSI: Sergeant Major Barone was acquitted at trial, most of Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Byard's charges were dismissed by the Court of Military Review, and the charges against Colonel James Longhofer were dismissed by the Court of Military Review, a ruling the Court of Military Appeals affirmed in 1989 on the speedy trial rule.[^40][^43]
### Termination of the designation
On March 31, 1989, the unit's commander sent a message titled "Termination of USAISA and 'Grantor Shadow.'" It stated that effective 2400 hours that day the term "United States Army Intelligence Support Activity (USAISA)" would be discontinued, that "USAISA" or "ISA" should not be used in any communications after that date, and that the special access program known as GRANTOR SHADOW would be terminated.[^5]
Richelson wrote that GRANTOR SHADOW was the current designation of the special access program that had protected information about ISA, previously known as ROYAL CAPE, and that the message did not abolish the unit. He wrote that, according to several reports, responsibility passed to the Special Operations Command, which changed its name every two years and its special access program designation every six months. The commander had requested disestablishment on several occasions after 1985, at least once out of frustration with the approval process for ISA operations.[^2]
Longstreth wrote that the unit was transferred to the [[Joint Special Operations Command]] in 2003.[^10]
### Organization and training
The 1986 unit history described carefully screened personnel, operational personnel selected from volunteers, and training among the most intensive in the Army. Its training included an Assessment and Selection course designed to place candidates under repeated stressful situations and a Core Training Course for newly assigned personnel before deployment to operational units.[^1] The 1986 and 1987 histories describe headquarters directorates, including intelligence and operations, and a number of operational squadrons.[^4][^25] Emerson wrote that the unit's personnel were carried on the Department of the Army Special Roster, with cover credentials issued by the Administrative Survey Detachment at [[Fort Meade]].[^7]
Longstreth wrote that the unit's current official name is classified; that it specializes in clandestine human and signals intelligence collection and operational support, including intelligence collection through coercion and interrogation, signals collection through communication interception and physical bugging, and direct action missions when necessary; that it prepares the battlespace for operations by Joint Special Operations Command special mission units and works closely with JSOC, the Special Operations Command and other intelligence agencies; that it includes cyber operations, technology operations and mission support teams; that its role expanded after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran; and that among its operations were Operation Queens Hunter, in El Salvador, which extended signals intelligence operations against guerrillas. He wrote that its members are carried on the Department of the Army Special Roster (DASR), which he said effectively makes them non-existent.[^10]
Longstreth wrote that the unit had four primary battalions with more than 300 operators, five primary elements (administration, training, SIGINT, HUMINT and direct action), and an operations squadron with four troops, two of which used official cover and two of which used non-official cover. He listed three squadrons, an operations squadron (the human intelligence or ground squadron), a signals intelligence squadron and a mission support squadron, scattered across the Maryland, Washington, D.C. and Virginia area. He placed its headquarters at [[Fort Belvoir]], Virginia, and wrote that it recruits primarily from the Green Berets and other military branches, emphasizing language skills and the ability to blend with locals; that its training includes infiltration techniques, advanced air operations, offensive and off-road driving, personal defensive measures, communications and espionage methods; and that its case officers cross-trained with the CIA at The Farm and that originally the unit operated as a tactical arm of the National Security Agency.[^10]
[[Jim Schnabel]] wrote that [[David Morehouse]] joined the unit in late 1987, before he began remote viewing work at Fort Meade in 1988.[^44]
### Designations and names
The unit operated under several names in the record. The 1989 message ended the use of USAISA and GRANTOR SHADOW, Richelson places the CENTRA SPIKE codename in 1993, and Emerson records the cover name Tactical Concept Activity.[^2][^5][^7] Longstreth lists GRAY FOX, Task Force Orange, Army of Northern Virginia, Office of Military Support, Torn Victor, INTREPID SPEAR and the 1st Capabilities Integration Group (Airborne).[^10]
[[Luis Elizondo]] wrote in *Imminent* (2024) that [[Eugene Lessman]] said the [[Great Skill Program]] was also called Grey Fox.[^45]
### Aircraft and tradecraft
Longstreth described the unit's fleet, which he called the "Confederate Air Force," as 40 intelligence and surveillance aircraft across 15 types, built up with a component of the Air Force and Delta, and its operatives as masters of tradecraft, including disguises and covert entry, using local arms for cover, able to remotely activate turned-off cellular telephones for surveillance, and working in male and female teams posing as married couples in deep cover.[^10]
### Footnotes
[^1]: U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity, "Brief History of Unit," 1986, Secret, 2 pp., in Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Histories of Once Secret Spy Units," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 46, May 23, 2001, document 11, https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document11.pdf.
[^2]: Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Histories of Once Secret Spy Units," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 46, May 23, 2001, introduction, https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/index2.html.
[^3]: "Charter of U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity (U)," circa 1983, 9 pp., document 8, pp. 1 to 9 (sections 8 to 10 on pp. 5 to 9), https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document8.pdf.
[^4]: United States Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1986 Historical Report, document 12a, key personnel report and organizational chart (pp. 4 and 6) and GRAZING LAWN entry (p. 10).
[^5]: Commander, USAISA, message, "Termination of USAISA and 'Grantor Shadow,'" 311500Z MAR 89, effective 2400 hours March 31, 1989, 2 pp., document 14, https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document14.pdf.
[^6]: Philip C. Gast, Lieutenant General, Director for Operations, Joint Staff, memorandum for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Subject: Intelligence Capability," December 10, 1980, 2 pp., document 6, https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document6.pdf.
[^7]: Steven Emerson, *Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1988), pp. 7, 22, 38, 50 to 51, 73, 76, 79.
[^8]: Robert C. Toth, "White House to Put Limits on Army's Secret Spy Unit," Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1983, CIA reading room copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000201610001-2.
[^9]: Caryle Murphy and Charles R. Babcock, "Army's Covert Role Scrutinized," Washington Post, 1985, CIA reading room copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504650029-4.
[^10]: Samuel Longstreth, "ISA: Soldier Spies of the Intelligence Support Activity," Grey Dynamics, written July 9, 2025 and republished March 25, 2026, https://greydynamics.com/isa-soldier-spies-of-the-intelligence-support-activity/.
[^11]: Frank C. Carlucci, memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, May 26, 1982, 1 p., document 7, https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document7.pdf.
[^12]: Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, pp. 81 to 84, 91 to 92, 235.
[^13]: William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, statement before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, June 16, 1982, CIA-RDP84B00049R000902210008-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84b00049r000902210008-5.
[^14]: William J. Casey to William E. Odom, "Comments on Proposed United States Army Intelligence Support Activity (USAISA) Charter," July 22, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R002100140010-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83m00914r002100140010-7.
[^15]: "Colonel Gritz's Dubious Mission," Time, April 4, 1983, https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,923455-1,00.html.
[^16]: Undated CIA memorandum, "HPSCI 'Discovery' of the Army's Intelligence Support Activity (ISA)," CIA-RDP83M00914R000700040105-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83m00914r000700040105-9.
[^17]: Same undated CIA memorandum, CIA-RDP83M00914R000700040105-9, on the March 1981 liaison channel.
[^18]: Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, report, January 13, 1993, section "Private Operations with Official Support," https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_rpt/15_intel.htm.
[^19]: Jay Peterzell, "What Is the Army's ISA Up To?", Washington Post, April 24, 1983, CIA reading room copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000605570002-8.
[^20]: Martin Hurwitz, Director, GDIP Staff, memorandum, March 14, 1983, "ISA Memorandum of Agreement," SI-433583/83, CIA-RDP85M00158R000800020048-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp85m00158r000800020048-2.
[^21]: Director, Program and Budget Staff, Intelligence Community Staff, memorandum to Lieutenant General James A. Williams, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Joint Review of Army Intelligence Support Activity (ISA)," January 23, 1984, DCI/ICS 84-3509, CIA-RDP86M00886R001800030023-8, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp86m00886r001800030023-8.
[^22]: Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, pp. 96 to 97, 105 to 106, 159, 168.
[^23]: 902nd Military Intelligence Group, "After Action Report for Operation CANVAS SHIELD," July 30, 1985, signed by David V. Owen, Major, MI, Chief, ISE, 10 pp., document 10, https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document10.pdf.
[^24]: United States Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1986 Historical Report, annexes A to D, document 12a, pp. 4 to 23, https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document12a.pdf.
[^25]: United States Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1987 Historical Report, annex C, Directorate of Operations (pp. 16 to 20), document 12b, https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/document12b.pdf.
[^26]: United States Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1987 Historical Report, document 12b, key personnel report (p. 8), FY88 command chart (p. 10) and Command Group Historical Report, fiscal year 1987 (pp. 12 to 15).
[^27]: CBS Evening News, "CIA Activities," July 18, 1985, CIA reading room copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504260013-4.
[^28]: Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, pp. 185 to 193, 231 to 233.
[^29]: "Italy saves the general," editorial, Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 1982, https://features.csmonitor.com/1982/0201/020113.html.
[^30]: Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, p. 67.
[^31]: "Spooks: U.S.," item 12, Lobster magazine, compiled press reports of 1983, https://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/article/issue/1/spooks-us/.
[^32]: Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw* (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), as cited in the National Security Archive briefing book at https://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/index2.html.
[^33]: Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, pp. 90 to 93, 144.
[^34]: Jeff Gerth, "Pentagon Linking Secret Army Unit to Contra Money," New York Times, April 22, 1987, CIA reading room copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302300001-6.
[^35]: Adam Pertman, "Records show CIA may have aided Army unit," Boston Globe, April 23, 1987, CIA reading room copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000604980001-7.
[^36]: Michael Tackett and James O'Shea, "Contra aid network: not so secret," Chicago Tribune, May 4, 1987, CIA reading room copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504880003-7.
[^37]: David Martin, "Secret Army Units," CBS Evening News, November 22, 1985, CIA reading room copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504260010-7.
[^38]: Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, pp. 89 to 93.
[^39]: United States v. Duncan, 816 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1987), No. 86-5036, decided April 14, 1987.
[^40]: United States v. Duncan, 38 M.J. 476 (C.M.A. 1993), No. 68,272, decided October 28, 1993.
[^41]: United States v. Duncan, 34 M.J. 1232 (A.C.M.R. 1992), ACMR 8601129, decided June 9, 1992.
[^42]: Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1987), No. 86-2033, decided March 23, 1987.
[^43]: United States v. Longhofer, 29 M.J. 22 (C.M.A. 1989), decided September 26, 1989; United States v. Byard, 29 M.J. 803 (A.C.M.R. 1989), as cited in the Court of Military Appeals opinion in Duncan.
[^44]: Jim Schnabel, "The Truth About Dave Morehouse and *Psychic Warrior*," November 7, 1996.
[^45]: Luis Elizondo, *Imminent* (William Morrow, 2024).