--- aliases: - Yom Kippur War - 1973 Yom Kippur War - 1973 Arab-Israeli War - Arab-Israeli War of 1973 - October War - Ramadan War - Yom Kippur category: "Major Conflict" tags: - Event - Conflict - MiddleEast - IntelligenceFailure - NuclearAlert - Airlift - OilEmbargo summary: "The 1973 war in which coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attacks produced an intelligence failure, an Israeli nuclear alert, an American airlift, an oil embargo and a United States DEFCON III alert." start: 1973-10-06 end: 1973-10-25 location: ["Sinai Peninsula", "Golan Heights"] updated: 2026-10-08 relations: - type: participant_in with: "[[Israel]]" reverse: true start: 1973-10-06 end: 1973-10-25 role: "belligerent; recipient of the American airlift" fn: 2 - type: participant_in with: "[[Egypt]]" reverse: true start: 1973-10-06 end: 1973-10-25 role: "belligerent; attacked across the Suez Canal on October 6" fn: 2 - type: participant_in with: "[[Syria]]" reverse: true start: 1973-10-06 end: 1973-10-25 role: "belligerent; attacked the Golan Heights on October 6" fn: 2 - type: participant_in with: "[[Soviet Union]]" reverse: true start: 1973-10-24 end: 1973-10-25 role: "sender of the Brezhnev letter of October 24, 1973 that preceded the American DEFCON III alert" fn: 25 - type: participant_in with: "[[Henry A. Kissinger]]" reverse: true start: 1973-10-16 end: 1973-10-25 role: "Secretary of State; participant in the Washington Special Actions Group meetings" fn: 27 - type: participant_in with: "[[Richard Nixon]]" reverse: true start: 1973-10-06 end: 1973-10-25 role: "President; authorized the airlift on October 12, 1973" fn: 16 - type: investigated with: "[[Agranat Commission]]" reverse: true start: 1974-04-01 role: "commission of inquiry into the surprise at the outset of the war; interim report April 1, 1974" fn: 2 --- The Yom Kippur War, also called the October War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Ramadan War, began on Saturday, October 6, 1973, when [[Egypt]] attacked across the [[Suez Canal]] into the [[Sinai Peninsula]] and [[Syria]] attacked the [[Golan Heights]], both striking [[Israel]] on the Jewish holy day. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that the first days were "a stunning rout" for Israel, with 500 tanks and 49 aircraft (14 of them F-4 Phantoms) lost in the first three days, that Egyptian forces equipped with missiles and electronic defenses "blasted through the Bar-Lev defense line" along the canal, and that Syrian forces rolled through the Israeli defenses on the Golan and "moved to the edge of Galilee."[^1] The [[Agranat Commission]] recorded that the Egyptians crossed the canal despite the line of Israeli outposts, and that the Syrians attacked with 1,400 tanks against 177 Israeli tanks and advanced almost to the edge of the heights overlooking the [[Sea of Galilee]].[^2] ### Israeli nuclear arsenal at the outbreak Hersh writes, citing Israeli officials, that [[Dimona]] was ordered into full-scale production early in 1968, turning out four or five warheads a year, and that there were more than twenty-five bombs in the arsenal by the Yom Kippur War.[^3] A Control Group paper of June 1967 had stated that the reactor at Dimona was capable of producing enough plutonium for about one weapon per year and that before the 1967 crisis the Israelis had "probably not made a decision to develop nuclear weapons, but probably had decided to keep that option open."[^4] ### The warning On October 5, 1973, [[Zvi Zamir]], the head of the [[Mossad]], sent a five-page Hebrew cable to the military secretary of Prime Minister [[Golda Meir]]. The Israel State Archives released it on September 17, 2018. Its first line read, "The Egyptian army and the Syrian army are poised to launch an attack on Israel on Saturday 6.10.73 at dusk." The cable gave the source's assessment as a "99 percent chance" that the attack would be launched on October 6, and suggested that "it may be possible to prevent the outbreak of war by publishing information about it on the radio and in newspapers."[^5] The source was [[Ashraf Marwan]], a son-in-law of [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] and an aide to [[Anwar Sadat]].[^2][^5] A telegram from London reached the Mossad on the night of October 4 and 5, 1973. [[Alfred Eini]], an aide to Zamir, testified to the Agranat Commission that he understood it "to be a warning that there would be a war," and that he telephoned Zamir that night.[^6] At the meeting of the Prime Minister's advisers that opened at 8:05 a.m. on October 6, the Chief of Staff, [[David Elazar]], said that he had read the telegram sent by Marwan to Zamir and that it was "an authentic message, though it is a very short notice for us." Defense Minister [[Moshe Dayan]] opposed a preemptive strike and proposed a smaller call-up of reserves than the 200,000 that Elazar asked for; Golda Meir decided for the larger mobilization.[^2] The Agranat Commission, which the Israeli government established on November 21, 1973, held 156 sessions and heard 90 witnesses. Its interim report, presented on April 1, 1974, dealt mainly with the circumstances that produced the surprise and examined the functionality of the prime minister, the defense minister and the heads of the military. A second report followed on July 10, 1974, and a final report of a more general character came after it.[^2] The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] conducted its own review. A preliminary post-mortem dated December 20, 1973, titled "The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973," concluded that "there was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October."[^7] The same report stated that the information gathered by the collection elements "was sufficient to prompt such a warning" and was "not conclusive but was plentiful, ominous, and often accurate."[^7] Shortly before the war, the Director of Central Intelligence, [[William Colby]], had initiated a reorganization of the Agency's estimative process.[^7] ### Opening days and the nuclear question In his 1991 book on the [[Samson Option]], Hersh wrote that Dayan had told the censored press at his daily briefing on Monday, October 8 that "the situation is desperate. Everything is lost. We must withdraw," and had said that "this is the end of the Third Temple."[^1] Hersh wrote that Dayan's pessimism led to an all-night meeting that day in Golda Meir's office in [[Tel Aviv]], attended by Dayan, Meir, Elazar, deputy prime minister [[Yigal Allon]], Meir's military aide [[Yisrael Leor]] and the minister without portfolio [[Israel Galili]]. Hersh wrote that the leadership resolved to rally its collapsing forces, to arm and target its nuclear arsenal in case of total collapse, and to inform [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] of the step and demand an emergency airlift.[^8] He wrote that the launchers at [[Hirbat Zachariah]] would be made operational, along with eight specially marked F-4 aircraft on twenty-four-hour alert at [[Tel Nof]], and that the initial target list included the Egyptian and Syrian military headquarters near [[Cairo]] and [[Damascus]].[^8] Hersh wrote that no weapons were targeted on the [[Soviet Union]] but that "there was little doubt that the Soviets would quickly learn what was going on," because Israeli intelligence was intercepting encoded signals from presumed Soviet operatives inside the country that morning.[^9] He added that Elazar's published diary recorded the night of October 8 only as "Crucial meeting," that a source said some senior officials of the nuclear establishment, though not [[Shalheveth Freier]], accused the senior officials of panicking, and that a separate preliminary briefing by technical experts from Dimona, led by Freier, described the weapons and targets available for immediate assembly.[^9] Hersh quoted [[Mohammed Heikal]], the editor of [[Al-Ahram]], as saying that the Soviet Union told the Egyptian leadership early in the war that the "Israelis had three warheads assembled and ready," through a Soviet intelligence officer who passed the message to the Egyptian chief of staff, [[Mohammed Abdel Ghany el-Gamasy]].[^9] Hersh wrote, citing former Israeli government officials, that arming the weapons had a second purpose, to force the [[United States]] into an immediate resupply of the Israeli military, and that "there was widespread rage inside the Israeli cabinet at the Nixon White House," aimed especially at [[Henry A. Kissinger]], "over what was correctly perceived in Israel as an American strategy of delaying the resupply" so that the Arabs would win some territory and open the way to land-for-peace bargaining. He quoted Kissinger telling Defense Secretary [[James R. Schlesinger]] that his goal was to "let Israel come out ahead, but bleed."[^9] Hersh described a series of urgent telephone calls from the Israeli ambassador to Washington, [[Simcha Dinitz]], beginning at 1:45 a.m. on Tuesday, October 9, and a meeting at 8:20 a.m. in the White House Map Room, at which, in Kissinger's memoir, Dinitz asked to speak with him alone and said that Meir "was prepared to come to the United States personally for an hour to plead with President Nixon for urgent arms aid." Kissinger wrote that he rejected the proposal "out of hand" and that it "could reflect only either hysteria or blackmail," and that by the evening of October 9 Israel "had been assured that its war losses would be made up." Hersh wrote that "a more complete account of the Dinitz message would undoubtedly show that it was closer to blackmail." He wrote that, according to a former Israeli intelligence official, the Israeli signals intelligence unit [[Unit 8200]] intercepted on the morning of October 9 a Soviet warning to Washington about the Israeli nuclear arming.[^10] Hersh cited the recollection of [[Hermann F. Eilts]], the American ambassador to Egypt, that Kissinger spoke to him in November 1973 about Israeli panic on the fourth day of the war with "never a word about nuclear arming," and that in late 1976 Kissinger "threw in that there was concern that the Israelis might go nuclear." Schlesinger told Hersh that "Kissinger just turned around totally" on resupply and that "from where we sat, there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes"; Colby told him, "We were afraid Israel might go for broke." Hersh wrote that Heikal reported that Anwar Sadat had relayed a remark by an "American," whom Hersh took to be Kissinger, that the airlift was decided to avoid a nuclear escalation, and that "sometime in this period" the American intelligence community got its first look, via the KH-11, at the completed missile launchers at Hirbat Zachariah.[^11] The Israel State Archives released protocols of Meir's consultations with her advisers in 2010. In the protocol of the session of October 9, 1973 at 7:30 a.m., Golda Meir raises a "crazy thought" of flying to Washington in secrecy for 24 hours to put the severity of the situation to Nixon directly, and asks that Dinitz bring the idea to Kissinger; Dayan answers, "It is. But it needs to be done." In the same session Elazar asks for permission to target inside Damascus.[^2] A 2013 [[CNA]] study by [[Elbridge Colby]], [[Avner Cohen]], William McCants, Bradley Morris and William Rosenau. It concluded that Israel "likely did take some steps associated with the readying of its nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons delivery forces" in the early stages of the war, that these steps were "defensive or precautionary in nature," and that the United States very likely observed the activity.[^12] The study judged that Dayan likely proposed a "demonstration" use of nuclear forces on or about October 7, that Meir and the other participants rebuffed the proposal, and that no action followed from it.[^12] The study assessed Hersh's account of a coordinated "blackmail" attempt as "without foundation" and found that the account has "evident inaccuracies."[^12] It located the "blackmail" that Kissinger described in his memoirs in a proposal by Dinitz that Meir visit Washington during the war.[^12] A 2002 [[United Press International]] report by [[Richard Sale]] repeated several of Hersh's claims and attributed them to unidentified "knowledgeable" American government sources. It added that the alert lasted three full days and that the Jericho missiles were deployed inside caves at air bases with "huge blast doors."[^13] [[Alistair Horne]] wrote in his Kissinger biography that Kissinger "always hotly denied, and several times to the author, that Israel had ever mentioned this possibility [the use, in extremis, of Israel's nuclear weapon]" to the United States.[^14] A [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] paper on Israeli security, "Long-Range Outlook for Israeli Security," was attached to an October 24 memorandum from Vice Admiral V.P. de Poix, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to [[Thomas H. Moorer]]. One option it listed was "a public declaration of Israeli determination to employ nuclear weapons." The paper described an Israeli nuclear threat against "such targets as Arab forces, cities, ports, holy places, and the Aswan High Dam," and stated that the Arabs "might be willing to attack, despite the deterrent threat."[^15] ### The airlift On October 12, 1973, President [[Richard Nixon]] authorized the emergency airlift known as [[Operation Nickel Grass]]. [[Military Airlift Command]] aircraft were ready to depart less than nine hours after the decision. The fleet consisted of 268 C-141s and 77 C-5As, and [[Paul K. Carlton]] knew that it could sustain a flow of three C-141s every two hours and four C-5s every four hours.[^16] With a single exception, the United States' allies denied landing and overflight rights, and [[Portugal]] allowed flights through [[Lajes Field]].[^16] Military Airlift Command aircraft carried 22,325 tons over 32 days, between October 14 and November 14, 1973,, and the airlift slowed after the third cease-fire resolution was implemented on October 24.[^17] The Israeli national airline, [[El Al]], flew eight of its own airliners carrying 5,500 tons.[^16] The Washington Special Actions Group minutes of October 19 record that the airlift was being stepped up to "5 C5As and 18 C141s a day."[^18] ### The oil embargo On October 17, 1973, the eleven members of the [[Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries]] announced an immediate cut of 5 percent in oil production, with monthly cuts of 5 percent to follow until Israel withdrew to the 1967 frontiers. On the same day the six Persian Gulf members of [[OPEC]] raised the price of oil by 70 percent, from $3.01 to $5.12 a barrel. The Kuwaiti minister of oil and finance told the American ambassador that the cumulative effect of the cuts was intended to produce a "complete embargo on oil to the United States."[^19] A CIA paper of October 19 judged that the effect on the United States "would be relatively small" and that the brunt of the cutback would fall on [[Europe]] and [[Japan]].[^19] On October 23, Prince [[Fahd]] of [[Saudi Arabia]] informed Kissinger that the kingdom would maintain a total embargo on oil exports to the United States until Israel withdrew to its pre-June 1967 borders. At the Secretary of State's staff meeting that day, Kissinger said, "We will break it."[^19] Kissinger later wrote that "the true impact of the embargo was psychological."[^19] The financial side of the price rise appears in the State Department and CIA papers of the period. A telegram from the embassy at [[Jeddah]] of September 4, 1973, reported that Saudi petrodollars "continue to grow" and that more than 50 percent of current Saudi income was being re-positioned into European or other currencies.[^20] A CIA Office of Economic Research paper of March 5, 1974, stated that OPEC members were "considering many and implementing some schemes to recycle a portion of their burgeoning revenues to the Third World."[^21] A March 29, 1974 paper by an ad hoc group of the [[International Energy Review Group]] addressed "the LDC payments problems related to higher oil prices."[^22] Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" between Israel and the Arab states followed the fighting.[^23] On October 16, at a Washington Special Actions Group meeting, Kissinger said, "I expect that plane is carrying Kosygin to Cairo," a reference to [[Alexei N. Kosygin]], the Soviet premier.[^24] ### The October 24 alert On October 24, 1973, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] sent Nixon a letter threatening unilateral Soviet action in the Middle East. The letter prompted the American DEFCON III alert.[^25] Kissinger described it in his memoirs as "one of the most serious challenges to an American President by a Soviet leader."[^26] The Washington Special Actions Group principals met in the night of October 24 and 25 and decided to set DEFCON III. Admiral Moorer's record of the meeting lists the actions taken: the carrier [[USS John F. Kennedy]] was moved from west of [[Gibraltar]] into the Mediterranean, the Roosevelt was moved from the vicinity of [[Sicily]], the [[82nd Airborne Division]] was alerted, and 75 B-52s were recalled from [[Guam]].[^27] Kissinger recalled that the group decided DEFCON III would not be noted quickly enough by Soviet decisionmakers, so at 12:20 a.m. the 82nd Airborne was alerted for possible movement and at 12:25 a.m. the carriers were ordered to the Mediterranean.[^28] The alert was leaked at about 3 a.m. on October 25.[^27] At 1:03 a.m. Kissinger told the British ambassador, [[Cromer]], "Well, don't say the Americans have gone crazy."[^27] According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, the participants in the rump session on the night of October 24 to 25, 1973 were Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, [[Alexander Haig]], [[Brent Scowcroft]], Colby and [[Jonathan Howe]].[^29] Kissinger later noted that the White House described the meeting as an NSC meeting while State Department records called it a WSAG "meeting of principals," and [[Ray Cline]] called it a "curious little rump NSC meeting."[^29] Nixon remained upstairs in the White House, and Kissinger conferred with him by telephone before the decision.[^7] The CIA's 2013 history of the episode states that "many questioned, then and later, whether the decision for DEFCON III was based on legitimate alarms or whether it was an overreaction," and that "there has also been speculation that the decision may have been politically motivated" by the needs of a [[Watergate]]-beleaguered White House.[^7] It records the view of Ray Cline that Kissinger "knew what he wanted to do all along" and that the meeting was "a kind of shell game, a superficial exercise."[^7] Cline's October 26 memorandum to Kissinger, quoted in a footnote to the minutes, stated that "the technical intelligence evidence available in INR did not support such a Soviet intention."[^27] A CIA document dated October 30, 1973, titled "Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Egypt?," reported Scud-associated equipment at two locations in Egypt and stated that the confirmation "adds seriousness to the evidence that Moscow introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East."[^7] A December 20, 1973 CIA assessment, "The Impact of the 24 October US Alert on the Soviet Leadership," judged that Brezhnev and his colleagues "appear to have reacted with greater concern and annoyance to President Nixon's statements of 26 October than they did to the alert itself."[^7] ### Aftermath Marwan died in June 2007 after falling from the balcony of his apartment in [[London]]. A coroner's inquest was held to determine whether he died by suicide, accident or foul play.[^30] Coroner [[William Dolman]] handed down an open verdict in July 2010, and said there was no evidence to support a verdict of either suicide or unlawful killing.[^30] Dolman described claims about the death as belonging to "the murky and secretive world of espionage."[^30] Marwan's widow, [[Mona Nasser]], told the inquest that her husband had never spoken of suicide but had expressed fears that he might be killed.[^30] Historians and intelligence agents have accused Marwan of being an Israeli spy who passed on vital information before the 1973 war, or of being a double agent loyal to Egypt.[^30] ### Footnotes [^1]: Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), pages 222 to 223 (military losses, Bar-Lev line, the Golan, "the end of the Third Temple," Dayan's October 8 briefing). [^2]: Agranat Commission, "1973 Agranat Commission: Yom Kippur War," translated by Roni Eshel (Center for Israel Education, December 2010), https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/1973-Agranat-Comm-Report-1973-War.pdf. Summary of the Egyptian and Syrian fronts (1,400 Syrian tanks against 177 Israeli tanks); session and witness counts and the interim report of April 1, 1974; the protocol of the meeting of October 6, 1973 at 8:05 a.m. in which the Chief of Staff speaks of the Marwan telegram; the protocol of October 9, 1973 (7:30 a.m.) released by the Israel State Archives. [^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 13, p. 179. [^4]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 305, Paper Submitted by the Control Group, undated (dated June 17, 1967 by the editors), with annex. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d305 [^5]: Judah Ari Gross, "'Odds of war lower than low': Papers highlight intel failures in Yom Kippur War," The Times of Israel, September 17, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/odds-of-war-lower-than-low-papers-highlight-intel-failures-in-yom-kippur-war/, on the cable of Zvi Zamir dated October 5, 1973 released by the Israel State Archives. [^6]: Alfred Eini testimony to the Agranat Commission, as reported by ynetnews (Reuters), September 25, 2012, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4285092,00.html [^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Collections Division, "President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War" (2013), https://cia.gov/static/President-Nixon-and-the-Role-of-Intelligence-in-the-1973-Arab-Israeli-War.pdf. The December 20, 1973 post-mortem, the Cline and Colby passages, the CIA document of October 30, 1973 and the December 20, 1973 assessment appear in the booklet's text and collection list. [^8]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 224 to 226 (chapter 17, "Nuclear Blackmail": the meeting of October 8, attendees, the three decisions, Hirbat Zachariah, Tel Nof, target list). [^9]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 226 to 228 (Soviet interception, Elazar's diary, the objections, the Freier briefing, the Heikal account of the Soviet warning to Cairo, the Israeli cabinet's anger, Kissinger's "let Israel come out ahead, but bleed"). [^10]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 228 to 229 (the Dinitz calls and Map Room meeting, quoting Kissinger, Years of Upheaval; the account of a former Israeli intelligence official on Detachment 8200 and the October 9 Soviet warning). [^11]: Hersh, The Samson Option, pages 229 to 231 (Eilts, Schlesinger and Colby recollections; Heikal on Sadat and Kissinger; the KH-11 imagery of Hirbat Zachariah). [^12]: Elbridge Colby, Avner Cohen, William McCants, Bradley Morris and William Rosenau, "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis," CNA, DRM-2013-U-004480-Final (April 2013), https://www.cna.org/reports/2013/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final.pdf [^13]: Richard Sale, "Yom Kippur: Israel's 1973 Nuclear Alert," UPI, September 16, 2002, as cited in Colby et al., note 10. [^14]: Alistair Horne, biography of Henry Kissinger, as quoted in Colby et al., note 10. [^15]: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Long-Range Outlook for Israeli Security," enclosure to the October 24, 1973 memorandum from Vice Admiral V.P. de Poix to Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 265, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25 [^16]: "Nickel Grass," Air & Space Forces Magazine, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1298nickel/ [^17]: "Yom Kippur War: Nickel Grass," Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/nickelgrass.html [^18]: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 19, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 208, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25 [^19]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 200, editorial note, pages 586 to 587, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25 [^20]: Embassy in Saudi Arabia, telegram 3796 to the Department of State, Jidda, September 4, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974, Document 200, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36 [^21]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research paper, March 5, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Document 333, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36 [^22]: Ad Hoc Group, International Energy Review Group Working Group, "The LDC Payments Problems Related to Higher Oil Prices," March 29, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI, Document 346, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36 [^23]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Preface, identifying Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976, for the "shuttle diplomacy," https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25 [^24]: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 16, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 191, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25 [^25]: National Security Archive, "The October War and U.S. Policy," Electronic Briefing Book No. 98 (2003), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm, including document 71, Brezhnev's letter of October 24, 1973. [^26]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 583 to 584, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 268, note 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25 [^27]: Memorandum for the Record, CJCS Memo M-88-73, NSC/JCS meeting of October 24 and 25, 1973, from the records of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, including notes 11 and 13, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25 [^28]: Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (1982), pages 588 to 589, as quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Document 269, note 10, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25 [^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269, memorandum for the record by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, October 26, 1973, Washington, October 24/25, 1973, 10:30 p.m. to 3:30 a.m., editorial notes (Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 586-587; Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, no. 17, Winter 1974-1975, p. 128). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d269 [^30]: "Inquest: Egyptian spy suspect's death unexplained," report of the British coroner's ruling of July 2010, reprinted at The Herald (heraldnet.com), https://www.heraldnet.com/?p=177620, and ynetnews, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/3919938