The_Info_Web/30 - PROGRAMS & PROJECTS/INTELLIGENCE_OPERATIONS/ZR RIFLE.md

created	updated	title	aliases	tags	category	summary	start	end	location	relations
2026-05-15	2026-10-15	ZR/RIFLE	ZR RIFLE ZRRIFLE Executive Action EXEC ACTION ZR/RIFLE	Program CIA Assassination ColdWar AntiCastro	Intelligence Operation	CIA executive action program established in early 1961 under William Harvey to develop a capability to kill foreign leaders, applied against Fidel Castro through Johnny Roselli and exposed by the Church Committee in 1975.	1961-01-01	1963-12-31	Washington, D.C. / Miami, Florida	type with reverse role start fn head_of William Harvey true supervised the executive action capability 1961 2

ZR/RIFLE was a covert program established within the Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine service in early 1961 to develop what agency documents called an "executive action" capability - the ability to arrange the assassination of foreign leaders. The program was headed by William Harvey and was applied primarily to operations targeting Fidel Castro of Cuba. It was exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, which found that its existence had been deliberately concealed from the Warren Commission investigating President Kennedy's assassination.¹

Origins and Authorization

The concept of an executive action capability had circulated within CIA leadership since at least 1959. Richard Bissell, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, directed Harvey to develop such a capability. The program was given the cryptonym ZR/RIFLE (with the cover name EXEC ACTION used in some communications). The Senate interim report records that in early 1961 Bissell assigned Harvey to establish the capability, and Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" of meetings on January 25 and 26, 1961.²³

Harvey's handwritten notes of the January 25 and 26, 1961 meetings, preserved at the CIA, contain the phrases "last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness," "the magic button," and "never mention word assassination." Harvey confirmed that the notes suggested a discussion of assassination.³ The Inspector General's 1967 report, as quoted by the Senate committee, found "no indication in the file that the Executive Action capability of ZR/RIFLE-QJ/WIN was ever used," and said that "after Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE."³ Harvey testified that during the whole project "no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassination." Bissell described the program as "internal and purely preparatory."³

The single agent placed under Harvey's supervision, cryptonym QJ/WIN, was described by Richard Helms: "If you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you had a man who might be prepared to carry it out."³

Harvey testified that Bissell had told him the White House had urged the capability more than once. Bissell's account changed across his appearances. In July 1975 he said there had been no White House urging for the project, though tacit approval by McGeorge Bundy was probably given after it was established.³ The Inspector General's 1967 report describes Harvey as "Chief of FI/D" when he was briefed in February 1961, by authority of Bissell, on the gambling-syndicate operation, and quotes Harvey's notes as recording Bissell saying, "The White House has twice urged me to create such a capability."⁴ A dispatch of June 8, 1961 from "Chief, KUTUBE/D" to the Chief of Station, Rome, captioned ZRRIFLE, concerns the tracing of potential agents for "this KUTUBE/D purpose."⁵ A memorandum for the record of May 23, 1967 by the Inspector General records that the Director's instructions of May 22, 1967 were to retain the report in eyes-only safekeeping and to destroy all notes and source materials, which were destroyed on May 23, 1967.⁴

Harvey drafted a planning memorandum defining the requirements: the program would develop foreign national assets capable of performing assassinations, maintain plausible deniability through layers of cutout relationships, and be available for use against specific targets as authorized by higher authority. Harvey's memos were deliberately oblique, using phrases like "termination with extreme prejudice" rather than explicit language.¹

CIA-Mafia Connection

The primary operational implementation of ZR/RIFLE targeted Castro. Harvey, building on relationships initiated by CIA officer Robert Maheu in 1960, worked with Johnny Roselli of the Chicago Outfit to develop assassination plots using organized crime assets. The theory was that organized crime figures with pre-revolutionary Cuban casino interests had both motivation and access - through exile Cuban contacts and Cuban underworld connections - that the CIA lacked.

Sam Giancana (Chicago Outfit boss) and Santos Trafficante, Jr. (Tampa boss) were brought in alongside Roselli. The CIA's Technical Services Division developed poison pills intended for Castro's food. Multiple attempts were made through 1960-1963; none succeeded. Castro's G2 security service was highly effective at detecting infiltration, and the exile Cubans who might have been used as operational assets were under intense surveillance.¹

Early in 1962 Harvey was appointed chief of Task Force W, the CIA component of Operation Mongoose, and Evan Thomas wrote that his ZR/RIFLE assets were incorporated into Mongoose planning.⁶⁷ Harvey continued meeting with Roselli, providing operational guidance and CIA resources while maintaining the cutout structure intended to preserve deniability.¹

Harvey's Roselli Operation, 1962 to 1963

Harvey met Roselli in Miami in early April 1962, after requesting an introduction through the support chief. The support chief had run the operation before Harvey took it over. Harvey told Roselli to maintain his Cuban contacts but not to deal with Maheu or Giancana, whom Harvey considered "untrustworthy" and "surplus."⁸ Harvey and Roselli met again in New York on April 8 and 9, 1962.

On April 18, 1962 four poison pills were given to the support chief, who passed them to Harvey. Harvey arrived in Miami on April 21 and gave the pills to Roselli, explaining that "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything." Roselli testified that he told Harvey the Cubans intended to use the pills against Che Guevara as well as Fidel and Raul Castro, and that Harvey approved the targets, saying "everything is all right, what they want to do."⁹

With the help of the JM-WAVE station, Harvey procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar costing about $5,000. Harvey and the chief of JM/WAVE rented a truck under an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot, where the keys were given to Roselli, who watched the delivery from across the street.⁹ Roselli reported in May 1962 that the pills and guns had arrived in Cuba. On June 21 he told Harvey that the Cuban had dispatched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's report described the mission as "vague" and conjectured that the team would kill Castro or recruit others to do the job, using the pills if the opportunity arose.⁹

The Inspector General's 1967 report, in a table comparing published details of the Drew Pearson story with the facts as the Inspector General knew them, stated that Roselli informed Harvey on June 21, 1962, presumably on the basis of information from Varona, that a team of three men was inside Cuba; that the Inspector General did not know their identities or what had happened to them; that there was no proof they were actually dispatched, and that none of the announced captures and executions during the period fitted the team. It also stated that Roselli had told the Inspector General the pills were sent in during Phase One and again in Phase Two.¹⁰

Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. The Cuban was reported to be preparing a second three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard, and Harvey was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine," were still "safe" in Cuba. Harvey testified that by then he had grave doubts that the operation would ever take place, and told Roselli that "there's not much likelihood that this is going anyplace, or that it should be continued." The second team never left for Cuba, claiming that "conditions" were not right. In early January 1963 Harvey paid Roselli $2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses, and Harvey terminated the operation in mid-February 1963.¹¹

Church Committee Disclosure

The Church Committee - the Senate Select Committee investigating intelligence activities - disclosed ZR/RIFLE in its 1975 report Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. The committee found that:

• The CIA had maintained assassination plots against Castro from 1960 through at least 1963
• ZR/RIFLE had also contemplated or discussed targets including Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, and the South Vietnamese Ngo Dinh Diem
• CIA Director Helms had not informed the Warren Commission of ZR/RIFLE's existence or its operational relationship with the Cuban exile and organized crime networks
• This concealment was intentional; Helms and other CIA officials believed the Warren Commission investigation should not know about the assassination programs

The committee found that while it could not definitively prove the CIA-organized crime anti-Castro network had been involved in Kennedy's assassination, the concealment of ZR/RIFLE from the Warren Commission had fundamentally compromised that investigation's ability to examine the possibility.¹

Subsequent Operations

After FitzGerald replaced Harvey as chief of Task Force W in January 1963, ZR/RIFLE operations continued under Desmond FitzGerald, the CIA's Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division. FitzGerald met personally with Rolando Cubela (AM/LASH), a senior Cuban official who claimed willingness to assassinate Castro, in September 1963. This meeting took place on the same day as the JFK Assassination; Cubela was being offered a poison pen when Kennedy was shot in Dallas. The AM/LASH operation ultimately produced no result against Castro and was penetrated by Cuban intelligence.¹²

Footnotes

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1. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. Available at archives.gov. ↩︎

2. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 83-84 (the 1961 assignment and the November 16, 1961 notes). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

3. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 182-185 (the Executive Action definition, QJ/WIN, the Inspector General's findings, the January 25 and 26, 1961 notes, the White House question). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

4. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General, "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, memorandum for the record and p. 37. JFK Assassination Records Collection, National Archives, record 104-10213-10101, https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf ↩︎

5. Central Intelligence Agency, dispatch OIRW 18590, Chief, KUTUBE/D, to Chief of Station, Rome, June 8, 1961. JFK Assassination Records Collection, National Archives, record 104-10185-10046, https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10185-10046.pdf ↩︎

6. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 153-155 (the Task Force W appointment in early 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

7. Thomas, Evan. The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA. Simon & Schuster, 1995. ↩︎

8. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 83 to 84 (Harvey testimony of June 25, 1975, p. 65; Support Chief testimony of May 30, 1975, pp. 50 to 52; Rosselli testimony of June 24, 1975, pp. 27 to 30; Edwards memorandum of May 14, 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

9. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 84 to 85 (Inspector General's Report, pp. 46 to 52, as quoted; Rosselli testimony of June 24, 1975, pp. 31 to 42; Harvey testimony of June 25, 1975, p. 63). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

10. Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General, "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, p. 118, unsanitized copy, National Archives JFK Records 104-10213-10101. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf ↩︎

11. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 85 to 86 (Harvey testimony of June 25, 1975, pp. 103 to 104; Inspector General's Report, pp. 51 to 52). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

12. Thomas, Evan. The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA. Simon & Schuster, 1995. Hersh, Seymour M. The Dark Side of Camelot. Little, Brown, 1997. ↩︎