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33 KiB

Raw Blame History

Partnership history and the 1987 combination

The firm's history dates the origin of the name to 1911, when Peat and Mitchell "had hammered out a plan to join forces" on a transatlantic crossing.¹ In 1978 the firm implemented a new structure and was renamed Peat Marwick International. The Klynveld Main Goerdeler network was formed in 1979 from Klynveld Kraayenhof & Co., DTG and McLintock Main Lafrentz.¹ Peat Marwick International merged with KMG in 1986, and on January 1, 1987 the joint companies took the name Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, from which the initials KPMG derive.¹

The United States partnership kept the Peat Marwick name in the courts for another decade. A 1996 Fifth Circuit opinion names "Peat Marwick Main & Co." and "KPMG Peat Marwick" as co-defendants.⁴ A 2000 SEC initial decision names the respondent as KPMG Peat Marwick L.L.P., and a 2001 Commission order identifies it as KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, now KPMG LLP.⁵⁶

Size and federal clients in 1975

In January 1976 Walter E. Hanson, the firm's senior partner, answered a questionnaire from Senator Lee Metcalf's Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management. The answers reported 100 offices in the United States (in 42 states, Guam, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia), 199 foreign offices, 791 partners, 90 principals and 8,277 other employees. The clients included 220 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 115 on the American Stock Exchange, 745 other publicly held corporations and 22,500 non-public clients. The firm reported a $200,000 annual contribution to the Financial Accounting Standards Board.⁷ The staff study's own count gave the firm the most partners of any "Big Eight" firm in the United States (791, against 348 at Price Waterhouse) and the most non-CPA principals (90).³

The same questionnaire listed the federal departments and agencies for which the firm performed services in 1975, together with about 1,500 state, municipal and other government clients. The list names the Department of the Army, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Home Loan Board, the Federal Railroad Administration, the General Accounting Office, the General Services Administration, Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Alien Property, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Office of Management and Budget and the United States Price Commission.⁷

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the firm held federal contracts developing computerized management systems for multiple government departments including the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation and the Small Business Administration, in addition to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.⁸

PROMIS and the 1969 design team

In 1969 the Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia administered a $60,000 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (70-DF-047) to the firm, to design a computer-based case-management system for the U.S. Attorney's office at the direction of U.S. Attorney Thomas A. Flannery.² The co-directors were Joan E. Jacoby, then director of the Office of Crime Analysis, and Charles R. Work, deputy director of the Superior Court Division.⁹ The project manager was Bill Hamilton, a senior consultant at the firm who had been an analyst at the NSA. Team members named in the record include Sidney H. Brounstein, Robert H. Cain, Joyce H. Deroy, James M. Etheridge, John L. Gizzarelli, Fred L. Lander III, Soo Lee, Dean C. Merrill, John M. Middleton, Stanley H. Turner, Dennis W. Wright, Frederick G. Watts and Robert Whitaker. The system was deployed on January 1, 1971.²

By 1972 the LEAA had paid PM&M $667,400 in aggregate grants related to PROMIS and related criminal justice programs, and the firm received later grants to write training manuals after PROMIS was declared an LEAA "exemplary project."² A February 1977 LEAA publication signed by Hamilton as president of the INSLAW states that the LEAA "had funded the development of PROMIS" and began a program to transfer the software to state and local agencies.¹⁰

Mitchell Pacelle and Robert Safian wrote in a profile of Hamilton in The American Lawyer that he had joined the "management consulting department" of the firm in 1969, that within a few months he started the case-tracking project for the U.S. Attorney's Office, and that in 1971 he "left Peat Marwick to improve the software, which by contract rights belonged to the government." After 18 months as an independent contractor for the U.S. Attorney's Office, they wrote, he created the not-for-profit Institute for Law and Social Research.¹¹

The Department of Justice, the client in the later dispute with INSLAW, appears on the firm's own 1975 list of federal clients.⁷¹¹

Accounting Series Release 173 and the 1975 settlement

On July 2, 1975 the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 173, "In the matter of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.," an opinion and order in a Rule 2(e) proceeding. Between February 1972 and March 1974 the Commission had filed four civil injunctive complaints against the firm over its examinations of the financial statements of National Student Marketing Corporation, Talley Industries, Penn Central Company and Republic National Life Insurance Company; a fifth matter, Stirling Homex Corporation, had been investigated. The firm submitted an offer of settlement, and without admitting or denying the Commission's statements it agreed to the institution of the proceeding and the order.¹²

The release states that in the Penn Central matter the firm "did not place sufficient emphasis on the economic substance of several transactions," and that the inclusion of all of them produced financial statements that did not communicate the company's financial position. It states that in the National Student Marketing matter there was inadequate communication between the predecessor auditor and the firm, which was unaware of the predecessor's doubts about the integrity of management, and that in Stirling Homex a partner's statements to the Commission staff were "unacceptable professional behavior in practice before the Commission."¹²

The settlement terms were a comprehensive examination of the firm's audit practice by a committee whose compensation and expenses the firm bore, two annual reviews in 1976 and 1977 at the firm's expense, and an order prohibiting the firm from accepting audit engagements for new SEC clients from May 1 to October 31, 1975, with listed exceptions.¹² Arthur Young & Co., hired by the firm for a review reported to cost $500,000, wrote to the partners on November 21, 1975 on the firm's quality control procedures for the period from April 1, 1974 to March 31, 1975, covering 18 of its 100 U.S. operating offices.¹³

The Metcalf subcommittee staff study listed the firm as one of three "Big Eight" firms officially disciplined by the SEC, with Arthur Andersen and Touche Ross. It wrote that the firm's materials showed "a relatively minor amount of questionable or improper activities," and, separately, that the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants had taken no action against partners of the firm after Release 173 other than ending the membership of a few individuals who had been convicted in the courts.³¹⁴

National Student Marketing and the 1969 comfort letter

Peat Marwick was the outside accountant of National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC) and, in the period of the merger, of Interstate National Corporation, an insurance holding company. The merger closed in October 1969.¹⁵ In mid-October 1969 the firm began drafting a comfort letter on NSMC's unaudited interim financial statements for the nine months ended May 31, 1969, which had reported a profit of about $700,000. The firm's representatives concluded that a $500,000 adjustment to deferred costs, a $300,000 write-off of unbilled receivables and an $84,000 adjustment to paid-in capital were required, and that with them the period would show a loss.¹⁵

The court found that although the firm discussed the proposed adjustments with NSMC's representatives, neither the accountants nor NSMC told Interstate of them before the closing, which was set for 2 p.m. on October 31, 1969 at the New York offices of White & Case. When the letter had not arrived by about 2:15 p.m., the firm's Washington partner in charge, Anthony M. Natelli, dictated a letter over the telephone to the secretary of the White & Case partner Marion J. Epley III. Max E. Meyer, a director of Interstate and a partner of Lord, Bissell & Brook, which was Interstate's outside counsel, said that Interstate would close if the White & Case partner assured them that the document was the comfort letter and that a signed copy would follow from the firm. Epley gave that assurance, and the closing went ahead on an unsigned letter.¹⁵ The opinion adds that during the afternoon the firm's representatives telephoned Epley about the propriety of proceeding in light of the adjustments, and that Epley did not tell Interstate of an additional paragraph the firm dictated.¹⁵

The SEC's civil action named the NSMC defendants, Peat Marwick and two of its partners, Interstate officers, and two law firms. The court's 1978 memorandum opinion records that NSMC consented to a permanent injunction on July 27, 1972 and that similar judgments were entered against other defendants on dates running to 1977, with Natelli's on January 25, 1977. Entry of a judgment of permanent injunction against Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. is dated July 2, 1975, the date of Release 173. The court wrote that each of the remaining defendants had violated the securities laws in specific instances, and it dismissed the complaint against them, holding that the SEC had not made the "proper showing" that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent further violations.¹⁵

Penn Square Bank

The Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on the failure of Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma City on December 10, 1982. Wendell Sebastian, executive director of the National Credit Union Administration, testified for the agency's chairman. He said that the information a credit union decision-maker had on the bank's financial condition included, as he understood it, "a satisfactory 1981 year-end audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co." as well as other traditional financial information; the agency's 139 federally insured credit unions had $111.5 million in uninsured deposits in the bank.¹⁶

William M. Isaac, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, told the committee that primary responsibility for the failure lay with the shareholders, the directors, the management the directors selected, "the accounting firm which issued an unqualified statement on that bank after an earlier accounting firm had issued a qualified statement," and the correspondent banks, savings and loans and credit unions that funded it. He added that the FDIC had been "pretty aggressive in recent years in terms of pursuing officers and directors, accounting firms and others after a bank fails."¹⁷ The FDIC's statement to the hearing said that its personnel had been examining the bank's records since July 5, 1982, and that it was investigating potential claims against former officers and directors of the bank and the bank's accounting firm.¹⁸

A 1986 federal opinion recites the allegations of a credit union investor: that the firm agreed in the latter part of 1981 to audit the bank as of December 31, 1981, that it issued a report on March 19, 1982, and that the investor's adviser received the firm's opinion and audited statements on or about April 16, 1982 and began recommending the bank's certificates of deposit. The investor placed over $4 million in short-term certificates from May 25, 1982 and lost about $2.5 million when the Comptroller closed the bank on July 5, 1982. It sued the firm and 17 of its partners under civil RICO and state law; the court held that the alleged mailings of the audit opinion and management report were a single scheme and not a pattern of racketeering activity, and dismissed the state claims for want of diversity jurisdiction.¹⁹

In June 1984 the FDIC, as receiver of the bank, sued former officers and directors, and in December 1984 it amended the complaint to add the firm as a defendant on claims of negligence and breach of contract in the audit of the bank's 1981 financial statements.²⁰ In August 1985 Judge Lee R. West of the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the firm's third-party action against the FDIC in its corporate capacity and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in which the firm had alleged that the agencies' examinations and the decision to liquidate the bank caused the losses for which it was sued.²¹ In a separate discovery dispute the Tenth Circuit in November 1984 denied the firm's petition for mandamus against an order compelling production of a "general counsel study" of the Penn Square audit.²² On July 18, 1986 the FDIC settled its claims against the firm, as the Tenth Circuit recorded in 1987.²⁰

On August 9, 1994 the FDIC, the Resolution Trust Corporation and the Office of Thrift Supervision announced that KPMG Peat Marwick would pay $186.5 million in a global settlement of federal claims: $128 million in cash to the RTC, $58.5 million to the FDIC, of which $23.5 million was cash and $35 million a two-year note, and a cease and desist order from the OTS requiring specific changes in accounting policies for audits of insured institutions over the next five years. The settlement resolved five RTC suits, two FDIC suits and all claims for professional work done for institutions that failed on or before April 4, 1994.²³

Capcom and the Peat Marwick report

The Senate subcommittee report on the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) cited a "Peat, Marwick report" for the account of Capcom, the BCCI commodities trading affiliate. The report states that on February 10, 1988 Capcom received a telex from Ahmed Tawfik instructing a payment of $150,000 to Shakarchi Trading of Zurich, a gold and currency dealer.²⁴ The subcommittee added that it was hard to understand why British regulators, "in light of the Peat Marwick report," had allowed Capcom UK to continue operations.²⁵

The report also records that Ian Glendinning Watt, a chartered accountant of Peat Marwick McLintock, was appointed to investigate Capcom's trading. The subcommittee wrote that Watt characterized the profits of the Capital Fund as "artificial," explaining that through "matched" and "back to back" transactions money from at least 17 accounts, an estimated $3,334,480, was transferred into the fund; the source cited is page 25 of his affidavit.²⁶ In the same affidavit, dated January 20, 1989, Watt found the explanations of Capcom's managing director, S. M. Akbar, "unsatisfactory" (at 44), "deficien[t]" (at 45), "most curious," "illogical" and "not capable of corroboration" (at 46).²⁶ The report's notes cite a Peat Marwick McLintock audit of Capcom prepared for the Chicago Board of Trade and dated May 4, 1989.²⁷

The auditor named for BCCI itself in the report is Price Waterhouse, which the report calls "BCCI's own auditors" when it describes the June 22, 1991 Sandstorm report.²⁸ The Peat Marwick passages concern Capcom and its counterparties.

International Signal and Control and Ferranti

In September 1989 the board of Ferranti said that it had come to suspect significant irregularities in overseas contracts of International Signal and Control (ISC) Technologies, and that it had commissioned Coopers & Lybrand to carry out an urgent investigation, "and not Peat Marwick, who are Ferranti's auditors."²⁹ A Prime Minister's private office note of October 2, 1989 records that some of Ferranti's expected write-off of about 215 million pounds "might eventually be recovered from Peat Marwick (who had advised Ferranti on ISC's financial position before the merger) and their insurers."²⁹

The Washington Post reported in 1989 that the firm had been ISC's accountant during the merger and that it and Robert Fleming & Co., the financial adviser, were expected to be asked how they failed to detect the phantom contracts.³⁰ In 1990 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania restrained a Lancaster bank account under the racketeering forfeiture statute on a showing by a task force investigator that ISC's founder James Guerin had engaged in racketeering, including front companies, Swiss and American bank accounts and false status reports that inflated ISC's stock and helped obtain the Ferranti merger.³¹

In June 1992 Ferranti reached "a full litigation settlement with Peat Marwick, which assisted in Ferranti's acquisition of International Signal." The trade press reported that Peat Marwick had paid Ferranti 40 million pounds in compensation.³²

Scottish Heritable Trust and Rangaire

The firm audited the financial statements of Rangaire from 1962 to 1990. The Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC, a British conglomerate, bought a controlling interest in Rangaire between August and December 1988 and sued the firm over unqualified audit reports for the years ended July 31, 1987 and July 31, 1988.⁴ A jury found the firm liable for negligent misrepresentation in those reports. In 1996 the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Texas law did not permit recovery on the facts, and wrote that it would "render a take-nothing judgment in favor of Peat Marwick."⁴

SEC proceedings over the Porta Systems audit

The SEC's administrative proceeding against the firm concerned its audit of the 1995 year-end financial statements of Porta Systems Corp., with an audit report dated March 22, 1996. The Commission instituted proceedings by an order of December 4, 1997 under Section 21C of the Exchange Act and Rule 102(e). The order alleged that the firm lacked independence because it had loaned $100,000 to the president and chief operating officer of its audit client, had capitalized businesses he owned, and was entitled to a percentage of the client's earnings, inventory disposals and debt restructuring.⁵

Administrative Law Judge Robert G. Mahony held a hearing in June 1998. On May 21, 1998 he had ruled that scienter was the standard for the Rule 102(e) charges, and in his initial decision of January 21, 2000 he dismissed the proceeding insofar as it alleged improper professional conduct under Rule 102(e).⁵⁶

On January 19, 2001 the Commission opinion found that the firm was not independent of the registrant when it audited the registrant's statements, with a loan outstanding to an officer of the registrant and a right to a fee contingent on the registrant's financial success, and that it acted negligently. The Commission ordered the firm to cease and desist from causing violations of Section 13(a) and Rule 13a-1 and of Rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S-X, and did not sustain the Rule 102(e) charges because the law judge had applied a scienter standard. A March 8, 2001 order (Release No. 44050, AAER No. 1374) denied reconsideration.⁶

Caracas and the Blandon group

Gary Webb wrote in Dark Alliance that in late 1986 the Frente Democratico Nicaraguense appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine newspaper allegations that the Contras were squandering humanitarian aid money, and that its members included the exiled Nicaraguan judge Jose Macario and an accountant, Rene Gonzalez, of the Peat Marwick & Mitchell office in Caracas, Venezuela. After the commission exonerated the FDN, Webb wrote, both men became business partners of Danilo Blandon in Mex-US Import and Export Inc., whose other directors included Sergio Guerra and the Panamanian banker Jose Fernando Soto, the longtime representative of the Swiss Bank Corporation in Panama.³³

Tax shelter prosecution of KPMG

In August 2005 KPMG LLP, the firm that succeeded the U.S. partnership, admitted criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in fines, restitution and penalties under a deferred prosecution agreement. The Justice Department said that the firm had engaged in a fraud that generated at least $11 billion in phony tax losses, and that nine individuals, including six former KPMG partners and the former deputy chairman of the firm, were being prosecuted in relation to the tax shelters. The investigation and prosecution were supervised by the chief counsel to the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.³⁴³⁵

Footnotes

KPMG, "Our history," kpmg.com/lv/en/about/governance/our-history.html. The page places the 1911 "plan to join forces," the 1978 renaming to Peat Marwick International, the 1979 formation of Klynveld Main Goerdeler, the 1986 merger of PMI with KMG and the January 1, 1987 name change. ↩︎
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations. Intermediate Report, 1972, on the grant number, the January 1, 1971 deployment and the $667,400 total. Google Books, OCLC record. ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, The Accounting Establishment: A Staff Study, Committee Print, 94th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: GPO, December 1976), p. 32 (partners: Peat Marwick 791, Price Waterhouse 348), p. 34 (90 "principals"), p. 62 (the Peat Marwick section), archive.org item accstabl00unit. ↩︎
Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J.). https://static.case.law/f3d/81/cases/0606-01.json. ↩︎
In the Matter of KPMG Peat Marwick L.L.P., Initial Decision Release No. 157, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9500 (SEC, January 21, 2000) (Mahony, ALJ), the order instituting proceedings of December 4, 1997 and the dismissal of the Rule 102(e) allegations. https://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/id157rgm.htm. ↩︎
Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 44050, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1374, In the Matter of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, March 8, 2001, describing the Commission's opinion of January 19, 2001 (File No. 3-9500). https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44050.htm. ↩︎
Letter of Walter E. Hanson to Senator Lee Metcalf, January 23, 1976, and the firm's answers to the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management questionnaire (items 1 to 6, 9 to 11, 13 and 14), in The Accounting Establishment, appendix pp. 324 to 326, archive.org item accstabl00unit. ↩︎
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report. House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992. ↩︎
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf ↩︎
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, PROMIS: An Exemplary Project of LEAA (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, February 1977), foreword by William A. Hamilton, president of the Institute for Law and Social Research. Archive.org item PROMISAnExemplaryProjectOfLEAA. ↩︎
Mitchell Pacelle and Robert Safian, "Vendetta," The American Lawyer, December (year not printed in the reprint), the section "The Rise and Fall of INSLAW," as reprinted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Staff Study of Allegations Pertaining to the Department of Justice's Handling of a Contract with INSLAW, Inc., Committee Print, 101st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1989). Archive.org item micro_IA41152832_0145. The House Judiciary Committee report is H. Rept. 102-857, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992. ↩︎
Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting Series Release No. 173, In the matter of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., July 2, 1975, Rule 2(e) opinion and order, reprinted in The Accounting Establishment, appendix pp. 736 to 787 (introduction and footnote 1 at 736 to 737; Penn Central, National Student Marketing and Stirling Homex discussions; the settlement terms in the conclusion at 785 to 787). ↩︎
Letter of Arthur Young & Company to the partners of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., November 21, 1975, in The Accounting Establishment, appendix p. 788; the staff study reports the $500,000 cost "according to news reports" at p. 62. ↩︎
The Accounting Establishment, p. 62 (the "relatively minor amount" sentence and the three disciplined firms) and pp. 126 to 127 (the AICPA's failure to act after Accounting Series Release 173). ↩︎
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (Parker, J.), memorandum opinion: the October 1969 comfort letter and closing, the footnote listing consent judgments (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., July 2, 1975; Natelli, January 25, 1977) and the dismissal of the complaint against the remaining defendants. https://static.case.law/f-supp/457/cases/0682-01.json. ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Failure of Penn Square Bank: Hearing, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, December 10, 1982, statement of Wendell Sebastian, executive director, National Credit Union Administration, pp. 48 to 50 (the "satisfactory 1981 year-end audit" sentence at p. 50). Archive.org item micro_IA41152659_0922. ↩︎
Same hearing, testimony of William M. Isaac, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, pp. 106 to 107 (the accounting firm sentence) and pp. 97 to 98 (the "pretty aggressive" sentence). ↩︎
Same hearing, FDIC statement, section "Bond Claims and Directors Liability Matters," p. 45. ↩︎
Eastern Corporate Federal Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Mass. July 30, 1986). https://static.case.law/f-supp/639/cases/1532-01.json. ↩︎
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Jennings, 816 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. Apr. 29, 1987) (Logan, J.), reciting the June 1984 suit, the December 1984 amendment adding the firm and the July 18, 1986 settlement. https://static.case.law/f2d/816/cases/1488-01.json. ↩︎
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Jennings, 615 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 1985), No. CIV-84-1612-W (West, J.). https://static.case.law/f-supp/615/cases/0465-01.json. ↩︎
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). https://static.case.law/f2d/748/cases/0540-01.json. ↩︎
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Resolution Trust Corporation and Office of Thrift Supervision, joint release PR-52-94, "Peat Marwick Settles with FDIC, RTC and OTS for $186.5 Million," August 9, 1994. https://archive.fdic.gov/view/fdic/478/fdic_478_DS1.pdf. ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. John Kerry and Hank Brown, The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, December 1992, ch. 21, "Capcom: A Case Study of Money Laundering," the "Capcom and Shakarchi" section. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/21capcom.htm. ↩︎
Kerry and Brown, The BCCI Affair, ch. 21, the closing remarks on Capcom UK and the British regulators. ↩︎
Kerry and Brown, The BCCI Affair, ch. 21, the Capital Fund section and notes 38, 101 and 102 (Watt affidavit, January 20, 1989, at 25, 44, 45 and 46, reprinted in S. Hrg. 102-350). ↩︎
Kerry and Brown, The BCCI Affair, ch. 21, notes 111, 114 and 164, "Peat Marwick McLintock Audit of Capcom for CBOT, May 4, 1989," at p. 21(b). ↩︎
Kerry and Brown, The BCCI Affair, ch. 4, "BCCI's Criminality," the Sandstorm Report section. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/04crime.htm. ↩︎
Ministry of Defence letter of 12 September 1989 to Charles Powell, Downing Street, and the Prime Minister's private office note of 2 October 1989 on the meeting about Ferranti, Prime Minister's papers, file PO-CH-NL 0500 PART A, Margaret Thatcher Foundation archive. https://archive.margaretthatcher.org/HMTPO/PO-CH-NL%200500%20PART%20A.pdf. ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "British Firm Claims It Was Duped by Pa. Arms Maker," Washington Post, September 29, 1989. ↩︎
In re Assets of Parent Industries, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 1990), order restraining Fulton Bank account No. 9902-93316 under 18 U.S.C. § 1963. https://static.case.law/f-supp/739/cases/0248-01.json. ↩︎
"Ferranti gets losses under control but it will be a long, hard climb out of the pit," Computer Business Review (Tech Monitor), June 23, 1992. https://www.techmonitor.ai/?p=184616. ↩︎
Gary Webb, Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998), the passage on the 1986 FDN commission and Mex-US Import and Export Inc. ↩︎
Department of Justice, press release 05-433, "KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case," August 29, 2005. https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html. ↩︎
Internal Revenue Service, news release IR-05-083, August 29, 2005, announcing the same agreement jointly with the Justice Department. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-05-083.pdf. ↩︎

33 KiB Raw Blame History