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@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ relations:
start: 1963-08-24
end: 1963-11-02
role: "target of the generals' coup"
fn: 35
fn: 37
- type: investigated
with: "[[Church Committee]]"
reverse: true
@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ relations:
role: "subject of the interim report on alleged assassination plots"
fn: 2
created: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-01
updated: 2026-10-26
---
Ngo Dinh Diem (died November 2, 1963, [[Saigon]]) was premier of the [[State of Vietnam]] from July 7, 1954, and president of [[South Vietnam]] until he and his brother [[Ngo Dinh Nhu]] were killed during the [[1963 South Vietnamese coup d'état|generals' coup of November 1 and 2, 1963]].[^1][^2] Two [[Central Intelligence Agency]] stations in Saigon worked with his government from its first weeks, and the CIA paid money through him to armed sects in 1954.[^3][^4] A [[Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group|Michigan State University group]] under contract to his government advised his police from 1955 to 1962.[^5] The Senate's [[Church Committee]] found in 1975 that the [[United States]] encouraged the coup against him but neither desired nor was involved in his death.[^2]
@ -132,35 +132,35 @@ In October 1961 President Kennedy sent General [[Maxwell Taylor]] and [[Walt Ros
On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in Hue fired on [[Buddhists in Vietnam|Buddhists]] celebrating Buddha's birthday, killing nine and wounding fourteen. By July 4 Generals [[Duong Van Minh]], [[Tran Van Don]], [[Le Van Kim]] and [[Tran Thien Khiem]] had agreed on the necessity of a coup. Shortly after midnight on August 21 Nhu ordered forces loyal to him to attack pagodas across the country; over thirty monks were injured and 1,400 arrested.[^2]
On August 24 the State Department sent telegram 243 to Ambassador [[Henry Cabot Lodge]]. It stated that the "US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands," authorized Lodge to tell key military leaders that the United States would find it impossible to continue support unless the Nhus were removed, added that "if, in spite of all of your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved," and instructed the country team to "make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary." It was drafted by [[Roger Hilsman]], cleared by Hilsman, [[Michael V. Forrestal|Michael Forrestal]] and [[George Ball]], and approved for transmission by [[Averell Harriman]].[^13] Taylor later said it was sent without the concurrence of the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs or the CIA; Hilsman maintained that the President and representatives of the agencies concerned had cleared it.[^13]
On August 24 the State Department sent telegram 243 to Ambassador [[Henry Cabot Lodge]]. It stated that the "US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands," authorized Lodge to tell key military leaders that the United States would find it impossible to continue support unless the Nhus were removed, added that "if, in spite of all of your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved," and instructed the country team to "make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary." It was drafted by [[Roger Hilsman]], cleared by Hilsman, [[Michael V. Forrestal|Michael Forrestal]] and [[George Ball]], and approved for transmission by [[Averell Harriman]].[^13] The Krulak memorandum of August 24, 1963 records Forrestal's account that he, Roger Hilsman and "Governor Harriman" had converted a proposed course of action into an instruction to Lodge, that the instruction had been sent to the President for approval, and that it was not something on which Defense clearance was desired.[^14] Harriman's title on that date was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.[^15] Taylor later said it was sent without the concurrence of the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs or the CIA; Hilsman maintained that the President and representatives of the agencies concerned had cleared it.[^13]
Lieutenant Colonel [[Lucien Conein]] and another CIA officer were told on August 26 to convey the substance of the telegram to Generals Khiem and [[Nguyen Khanh]], reminding them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state." On August 29 a message from the [[White House]] authorized General [[Paul Harkins]] to confirm that the United States would support a coup with a good chance of success, and Kennedy cabled Lodge the same day: "Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions."[^2] On August 30 Taylor sent the President a CIA-sourced table of the probable loyalties of the units around Saigon in a coup, rating the Presidential Guard most likely to remain loyal and the airborne brigade likely to act against Diem.[^14]
Lieutenant Colonel [[Lucien Conein]] and another CIA officer were told on August 26 to convey the substance of the telegram to Generals Khiem and [[Nguyen Khanh]], reminding them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state." On August 29 a message from the [[White House]] authorized General [[Paul Harkins]] to confirm that the United States would support a coup with a good chance of success, and Kennedy cabled Lodge the same day: "Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions."[^2] On August 30 Taylor sent the President a CIA-sourced table of the probable loyalties of the units around Saigon in a coup, rating the Presidential Guard most likely to remain loyal and the airborne brigade likely to act against Diem.[^16]
On October 2 Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and Taylor reported that there was "no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a possibility." They recommended withholding commodity import funds, which together with [[Public Law 480]] made up 60 to 70 percent of Vietnam's imports, suspending two [[Agency for International Development|AID]] loans, and cutting off MAP and CIA support to the units of Colonel [[Le Quang Tung]] unless they were placed under the [[Joint General Staff (Vietnam)|Joint General Staff]]. They held that "no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in government" and called for "an intensive clandestine effort, under the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts" to appraise coup prospects.[^15] Taylor had written to Diem the day before as "an old friend of South Vietnam," and had met Minh privately on September 29 and October 1.[^16][^17]
On October 2 Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and Taylor reported that there was "no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a possibility." They recommended withholding commodity import funds, which together with [[Public Law 480]] made up 60 to 70 percent of Vietnam's imports, suspending two [[Agency for International Development|AID]] loans, and cutting off MAP and CIA support to the units of Colonel [[Le Quang Tung]] unless they were placed under the [[Joint General Staff (Vietnam)|Joint General Staff]]. They held that "no initiative should be taken to encourage actively a change in government" and called for "an intensive clandestine effort, under the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts" to appraise coup prospects.[^17] Taylor had written to Diem the day before as "an old friend of South Vietnam," and had met Minh privately on September 29 and October 1.[^18][^19]
### The generals and Conein, October 1963
On the night of October 2 Conein, who had known many of the generals since the Second World War, met Don at [[Nha Trang]] with the approval of the deputy chief of mission, [[William Trueheart]], whose guidance was to neither encourage nor discourage coup thinking.[^18] On October 5 Minh told Conein that he needed to know the American position and outlined three plans, the first being the assassination of Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can with Diem kept in office, which he called the easiest; Conein said he could not answer.[^19] The station recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot." [[John McCone]], the Director of Central Intelligence, cabled on October 5 that "we cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination," and on October 6 that the recommendation be withdrawn; William Colby, then chief of the Far East Division, drafted the first cable. Conein testified that Lodge told him of McCone's position around October 20 and that he then told Don the United States opposed assassination.[^2] A CIA cable to Lodge of October 9 stated that Washington did not wish to stimulate a coup but would not thwart a change of government or deny aid to a new regime, and that knowledge was confined to an extremely limited group in the White House, State, Defense and the CIA.[^20]
On the night of October 2 Conein, who had known many of the generals since the Second World War, met Don at [[Nha Trang]] with the approval of the deputy chief of mission, [[William Trueheart]], whose guidance was to neither encourage nor discourage coup thinking.[^20] On October 5 Minh told Conein that he needed to know the American position and outlined three plans, the first being the assassination of Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can with Diem kept in office, which he called the easiest; Conein said he could not answer.[^21] The station recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot." [[John McCone]], the Director of Central Intelligence, cabled on October 5 that "we cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination," and on October 6 that the recommendation be withdrawn; William Colby, then chief of the Far East Division, drafted the first cable. Conein testified that Lodge told him of McCone's position around October 20 and that he then told Don the United States opposed assassination.[^2] A CIA cable to Lodge of October 9 stated that Washington did not wish to stimulate a coup but would not thwart a change of government or deny aid to a new regime, and that knowledge was confined to an extremely limited group in the White House, State, Defense and the CIA.[^22]
Conein's after-action report of November 1 states that the majority of officers wished Diem to have honorable retirement and exile, but that "as to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu would be welcomed."[^2] Conein received 3 million piasters on October 24 and kept them in a safe at his house; on October 29 Lodge cabled that a request for funds should be anticipated.[^2] The station's cable 2023 of October 29 on Conein's meeting with Don the day before, held at a dentist's office, which listed coup units and described two escape tunnels from [[Gia Long Palace]], was sent eyes only to McNamara, [[Roswell Gilpatric|Gilpatric]], Taylor, [[Victor Krulak|Krulak]] and [[William Bundy]] at Defense, among others.[^4][^21]
Conein's after-action report of November 1 states that the majority of officers wished Diem to have honorable retirement and exile, but that "as to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu would be welcomed."[^2] Conein received 3 million piasters on October 24 and kept them in a safe at his house; on October 29 Lodge cabled that a request for funds should be anticipated.[^2] The station's cable 2023 of October 29 on Conein's meeting with Don the day before, held at a dentist's office, which listed coup units and described two escape tunnels from [[Gia Long Palace]], was sent eyes only to McNamara, [[Roswell Gilpatric|Gilpatric]], Taylor, [[Victor Krulak|Krulak]] and [[William Bundy]] at Defense, among others.[^4][^23]
At the White House on October 29 Colby estimated pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces at about 9,800 each, with 18,000 neutral. Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] said that the United States needed 48 hours' notice, not four, of any coup. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] called his opposition to a coup "the minority view," and Taylor and McCone agreed with him; McNamara proposed that the deputy chief of mission, the acting CIA chief and Harkins jointly decide "what our agent Conein would say and do."[^22] Around October 30 Colby wrote to McCone proposing that Nhu be installed in his brother's place as a "strong, reasonably well oriented and efficient potential successor," whose "highly unfavorable public image" the United States should help improve; the proposal drew no support.[^4] Conein later recalled that Lodge had remarked that if nothing happened and Lodge made his scheduled trip to Washington, Conein would never work another day for the government.[^4]
At the White House on October 29 Colby estimated pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces at about 9,800 each, with 18,000 neutral. Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] said that the United States needed 48 hours' notice, not four, of any coup. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] called his opposition to a coup "the minority view," and Taylor and McCone agreed with him; McNamara proposed that the deputy chief of mission, the acting CIA chief and Harkins jointly decide "what our agent Conein would say and do."[^24] Around October 30 Colby wrote to McCone proposing that Nhu be installed in his brother's place as a "strong, reasonably well oriented and efficient potential successor," whose "highly unfavorable public image" the United States should help improve; the proposal drew no support.[^4] Conein later recalled that Lodge had remarked that if nothing happened and Lodge made his scheduled trip to Washington, Conein would never work another day for the government.[^4]
### November 1 and 2, 1963
On the morning of November 1 Diem received Lodge and Admiral [[Harry D. Felt|Harry Felt]] and complained that that junior CIA officers were "poisoning atmosphere by spreading rumors of coups against him," naming one officer, Hodges.[^23] Speaking alone with Lodge afterwards, Diem asked him to consult "Mr. Colby of CIA and former Ambassador Nolting" about Nhu, saying that Colby had told him it was "too bad that brother Nhu was living in an ivory tower," and asked Lodge to tell Kennedy that he was "a good and a frank ally."[^24]
On the morning of November 1 Diem received Lodge and Admiral [[Harry D. Felt|Harry Felt]] and complained that that junior CIA officers were "poisoning atmosphere by spreading rumors of coups against him," naming one officer, Hodges.[^25] Speaking alone with Lodge afterwards, Diem asked him to consult "Mr. Colby of CIA and former Ambassador Nolting" about Nhu, saying that Colby had told him it was "too bad that brother Nhu was living in an ivory tower," and asked Lodge to tell Kennedy that he was "a good and a frank ally."[^26]
The coup began early in the afternoon; Harkins cabled Taylor that instead of four hours' or two days' notice "we got approximately four minutes."[^25] An aide to Don asked Conein to bring all available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters, and Conein brought 3 million piasters, about $42,000, which was given to Don to buy food for the troops and pay death benefits. Don wrote in his memoir, *Our Endless War*, that Conein "offered us money and weapons, but I turned him down."[^2][^21] Conein stayed at the Joint General Staff headquarters through the coup, relaying what Minh and Don told him; CIA officers in the streets supplied, with him, nearly all the authoritative information Washington received over the next twenty-four hours.[^4] At 4:30 p.m. Diem telephoned Lodge and asked, "What is the attitude of the US?" Lodge replied that he lacked information and instructions, said he was concerned for Diem's safety, and asked whether Diem had heard of the offer of safe conduct if he resigned; Diem answered, "I am trying to reestablish order."[^4]
The coup began early in the afternoon; Harkins cabled Taylor that instead of four hours' or two days' notice "we got approximately four minutes."[^27] An aide to Don asked Conein to bring all available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters, and Conein brought 3 million piasters, about $42,000, which was given to Don to buy food for the troops and pay death benefits. Don wrote in his memoir, *Our Endless War*, that Conein "offered us money and weapons, but I turned him down."[^2][^23] Conein stayed at the Joint General Staff headquarters through the coup, relaying what Minh and Don told him; CIA officers in the streets supplied, with him, nearly all the authoritative information Washington received over the next twenty-four hours.[^4] At 4:30 p.m. Diem telephoned Lodge and asked, "What is the attitude of the US?" Lodge replied that he lacked information and instructions, said he was concerned for Diem's safety, and asked whether Diem had heard of the offer of safe conduct if he resigned; Diem answered, "I am trying to reestablish order."[^4]
In Washington, before the outcome was known, Rusk cabled Lodge that "since coup is wholly Vietnamese," premature American recognition would falsely brand it as American-inspired. A second telegram, drafted by Hilsman and [[McGeorge Bundy]], instructed Lodge that acceptance of the coup in the United States would be "greatly increased" if the generals continued to develop "strongly and publicly" their charge that Nhu had been "dickering with Communists"; Lodge replied the next day that he knew "of no hard evidence of such a desire."[^26][^27] Rusk told Senator [[J. William Fulbright]] by telephone at noon that "our own involvement is minimal."[^28]
In Washington, before the outcome was known, Rusk cabled Lodge that "since coup is wholly Vietnamese," premature American recognition would falsely brand it as American-inspired. A second telegram, drafted by Hilsman and [[McGeorge Bundy]], instructed Lodge that acceptance of the coup in the United States would be "greatly increased" if the generals continued to develop "strongly and publicly" their charge that Nhu had been "dickering with Communists"; Lodge replied the next day that he knew "of no hard evidence of such a desire."[^28][^29] Rusk told Senator [[J. William Fulbright]] by telephone at noon that "our own involvement is minimal."[^30]
At 6:20 on the morning of November 2 Diem called Don and offered to surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport. Lodge had cabled on October 30 that key leaders might request evacuation, and Conein was charged with obtaining an aircraft; when Minh and Don asked for one, a station officer told Conein it would take twenty-four hours, because it would have to come from [[Guam]] and could fly Diem only to a country that granted asylum.[^2] The station officer, [[David Smith (CIA)|David Smith]], also named France as the country most likely to grant asylum and put at twenty-four hours the time needed to bring in an aircraft able to reach Paris without intermediate stops.[^4] An escort appeared at the palace at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not there.[^2]
When Conein returned to the Joint General Staff about 10:30 a.m., Minh told him the brothers were dead and had killed themselves in a Catholic church, to which Conein responded that someone had better construct a more plausible story. Minh offered to show him the bodies, and Conein declined.[^2][^4] Conein reported that he believed Minh had ordered the executions.[^4] The embassy reported that day several versions: that the brothers had spent the night at a Cholon clubhouse owned by a Chinese businessman, gone to church in the morning and been picked up by the army and locked in a vehicle; that Minh had told the former finance minister that they had shot themselves with a gun left in the vehicle "due to an inadvertence"; and that an aide to General Khanh, who saw the bodies, said they had been assassinated at least at the direction of General [[Mai Huu Xuan]].[^29] Most station reporting attributed the decision to kill them to Minh, and the various reports agreed that the killing was carried out by an officer named Nhung, described variously as Minh's bodyguard and as a supporter of Mai Huu Xuan.[^4] On November 16 an officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies in which their hands appeared tied behind their backs, and said they had been shot and stabbed in the vehicle taking them to the Joint General Staff.[^2]
When Conein returned to the Joint General Staff about 10:30 a.m., Minh told him the brothers were dead and had killed themselves in a Catholic church, to which Conein responded that someone had better construct a more plausible story. Minh offered to show him the bodies, and Conein declined.[^2][^4] Conein reported that he believed Minh had ordered the executions.[^4] The embassy reported that day several versions: that the brothers had spent the night at a Cholon clubhouse owned by a Chinese businessman, gone to church in the morning and been picked up by the army and locked in a vehicle; that Minh had told the former finance minister that they had shot themselves with a gun left in the vehicle "due to an inadvertence"; and that an aide to General Khanh, who saw the bodies, said they had been assassinated at least at the direction of General [[Mai Huu Xuan]].[^31] Most station reporting attributed the decision to kill them to Minh, and the various reports agreed that the killing was carried out by an officer named Nhung, described variously as Minh's bodyguard and as a supporter of Mai Huu Xuan.[^4] On November 16 an officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies in which their hands appeared tied behind their backs, and said they had been shot and stabbed in the vehicle taking them to the Joint General Staff.[^2]
The news reached Kennedy during a meeting at 9:35 a.m. on November 2, when Forrestal brought in a telegram reporting the deaths.[^30] Rusk instructed Lodge that the generals should establish publicly that the deaths were suicides "if this true," through an impartial group.[^31] McGeorge Bundy cabled Lodge that evening that the generals "should not be left under illusion that political assassination is easily accepted here."[^32] The State Department instructed all diplomatic posts, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, to distinguish the Saigon coup from its opposition to military coups against democratic governments elsewhere.[^33] Lodge recommended resuming commercial import payments "on a periodic and selective basis without public announcement so as to avoid appearance of blank check or of pay-off."[^34]
The news reached Kennedy during a meeting at 9:35 a.m. on November 2, when Forrestal brought in a telegram reporting the deaths.[^32] Rusk instructed Lodge that the generals should establish publicly that the deaths were suicides "if this true," through an impartial group.[^33] McGeorge Bundy cabled Lodge that evening that the generals "should not be left under illusion that political assassination is easily accepted here."[^34] The State Department instructed all diplomatic posts, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, to distinguish the Saigon coup from its opposition to military coups against democratic governments elsewhere.[^35] Lodge recommended resuming commercial import payments "on a periodic and selective basis without public announcement so as to avoid appearance of blank check or of pay-off."[^36]
The Church Committee concluded that the details of the deaths were not known and that there was no available evidence of direct or indirect American involvement in them.[^2] Taylor, asked in 1981 whether the killing had been a covert operation, answered, "Not if you mean a covert operation conducted by the CIA."[^35]
The Church Committee concluded that the details of the deaths were not known and that there was no available evidence of direct or indirect American involvement in them.[^2] Taylor, asked in 1981 whether the killing had been a covert operation, answered, "Not if you mean a covert operation conducted by the CIA."[^37]
### Footnotes
@ -177,25 +177,27 @@ The Church Committee concluded that the details of the deaths were not known and
[^11]: *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 2, Part IV.A.4, "U.S. Training of the Vietnamese National Army, 1954-1959," DTIC ADA542557, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA542557
[^12]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence via the Deputy Director (Plans), "Position Papers for President Ngo Dinh Diem Visit," May 9, 1957, CIA-RDP80R01731R000700500014-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r000700500014-9
[^13]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. III, *Vietnam, January-August 1963*, document 281, telegram 243 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, August 24, 1963, and source note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d281
[^14]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, *Vietnam, August-December 1963*, document 24, Taylor to the President, CM-856-63, August 30, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d24
[^15]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 167, McNamara and Taylor to the President, "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam," October 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d167
[^16]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 163, Taylor to President Diem, October 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d163
[^17]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 162, memorandum for the record by Taylor, October 1, 1963, and source note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d162
[^18]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 171, CIA Saigon station telegram 1385, October 3, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d171
[^19]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 177, CIA Saigon station telegram, October 5, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d177
[^20]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 192, CIA telegram to the Ambassador in Vietnam, October 9, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d192
[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 225, CIA Saigon station telegram 2023, October 29, 1963, and source note quoting Tran Van Don, *Our Endless War*, pp. 98-99, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d225
[^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 234, memorandum of conference with President Kennedy, October 29, 1963, 4:20 p.m., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d234
[^23]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 261, Saigon telegram 854, November 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d261
[^24]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 262, Saigon telegram 841, November 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d262
[^25]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 267, Harkins to Taylor, MAC J00 8512, November 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d267
[^26]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 264, telegram 673 to Saigon, November 1, 1963, and document 266, telegram 674 to Saigon, November 1, 1963, with source notes, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d264 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d266
[^27]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 270, Saigon telegram 875, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d270
[^28]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 265, memorandum of telephone conversation between Rusk and Senator Fulbright, November 1, 1963, 12:01 p.m., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d265
[^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 273, Saigon telegram 888, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d273
[^30]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 274, editorial note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d274
[^31]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 271, telegram 688 to Saigon, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d271
[^32]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 278, Bundy to Lodge, CAP 63602, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d278
[^33]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 277, circular telegram 833, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d277
[^34]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 270, Saigon telegram 875, November 2, 1963, paragraph 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d270
[^35]: Robert S. Gallagher, "Gen. Maxwell Taylor: Memories of Peace and War" (interview), *American Heritage*, vol. 32, no. 3 (April/May 1981), https://www.americanheritage.com/gen-maxwell-taylor-memories-peace-and-war
[^14]: Memorandum for the Record by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak), Washington, August 24, 1963, National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-172-69. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961 to 1963*, vol. III, document 282. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d282
[^15]: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961 to 1963*, vol. III, document 243. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d243
[^16]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, *Vietnam, August-December 1963*, document 24, Taylor to the President, CM-856-63, August 30, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d24
[^17]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 167, McNamara and Taylor to the President, "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam," October 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d167
[^18]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 163, Taylor to President Diem, October 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d163
[^19]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 162, memorandum for the record by Taylor, October 1, 1963, and source note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d162
[^20]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 171, CIA Saigon station telegram 1385, October 3, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d171
[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 177, CIA Saigon station telegram, October 5, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d177
[^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 192, CIA telegram to the Ambassador in Vietnam, October 9, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d192
[^23]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 225, CIA Saigon station telegram 2023, October 29, 1963, and source note quoting Tran Van Don, *Our Endless War*, pp. 98-99, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d225
[^24]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 234, memorandum of conference with President Kennedy, October 29, 1963, 4:20 p.m., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d234
[^25]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 261, Saigon telegram 854, November 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d261
[^26]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 262, Saigon telegram 841, November 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d262
[^27]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 267, Harkins to Taylor, MAC J00 8512, November 1, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d267
[^28]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 264, telegram 673 to Saigon, November 1, 1963, and document 266, telegram 674 to Saigon, November 1, 1963, with source notes, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d264 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d266
[^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 270, Saigon telegram 875, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d270
[^30]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 265, memorandum of telephone conversation between Rusk and Senator Fulbright, November 1, 1963, 12:01 p.m., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d265
[^31]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 273, Saigon telegram 888, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d273
[^32]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 274, editorial note, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d274
[^33]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 271, telegram 688 to Saigon, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d271
[^34]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 278, Bundy to Lodge, CAP 63602, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d278
[^35]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 277, circular telegram 833, November 2, 1963, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d277
[^36]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. IV, document 270, Saigon telegram 875, November 2, 1963, paragraph 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d270
[^37]: Robert S. Gallagher, "Gen. Maxwell Taylor: Memories of Peace and War" (interview), *American Heritage*, vol. 32, no. 3 (April/May 1981), https://www.americanheritage.com/gen-maxwell-taylor-memories-peace-and-war