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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ aliases:
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- Central Intelligence Agency
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- CIA
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created: 2025-07-22
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updated: 2026-10-15
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updated: 2026-10-26
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tags:
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- Organization
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- Intelligence
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@ -22,71 +22,75 @@ relations:
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role: "Office of Security release of police techniques through LEAA"
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start: 1970
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end: 1973
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fn: 5
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fn: 10
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- type: employed_by
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with: "[[Bobby Ray Inman]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "deputy director"
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start: 1981-02
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end: 1982-04
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fn: 32
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fn: 37
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Psychological Strategy Board]]"
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role: "Member agency; the Director of Central Intelligence chaired meeting M-8"
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start: 1952-01-10
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fn: 59
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fn: 64
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- type: employed_by
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with: "[[Max Millikan]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Assistant Director, Research and Reports (1951); Special Consultant (1952)"
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start: 1951-01
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end: 1952-03
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fn: 60
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fn: 65
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- type: funded
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with: "[[Center for International Studies]]"
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role: "agency money reported to have set up the center in 1951; $300,000 reported in 1967"
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start: 1951
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fn: 67
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fn: 72
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- type: employed_by
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with: "[[Ronald Pandolfi]]"
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reverse: true
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start: 1995
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role: "analyst; described as a CIA scientist (Farley, 1995) and CIA analyst (Cox Committee, 1999)"
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fn: 44
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fn: 49
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---
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The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
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The CIA, particularly through its Photographic Intelligence Division, was instrumental in aerial reconnaissance efforts, especially with the U-2 spy plane, to monitor Soviet nuclear programs and later, the Israeli nuclear facility at [[Dimona]].[^2]
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### Personnel posts, 1951 to 1973
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In July 1951 an [[Associated Press]] item reported that [[F. Trubee Davison]], formerly Assistant Secretary of War for Air and president of the [[American Museum of Natural History]], would join the Agency on July 16 as a principal assistant to [[Walter Bedell Smith]], and that he probably would do personnel work.[^3] A memorandum from Davison dated September 11, 1951 appears on a CIA routing slip addressed to the Assistant Director (Personnel).[^4] CIA documents of 1968, 1969 and 1972 name [[Hugh T. Cunningham]] as the Agency's Director of Training.[^5] The Covert Action Information Bulletin reported in 1990 that Cunningham served in the Agency from 1947 to 1973 and that Davison, Cunningham, [[William P. Bundy]] and [[Dino Pionzio]] (deputy chief of station in [[Santiago]] in 1970) were members of the Yale society [[Skull and Bones]].[^6] [[Antony C. Sutton]]'s index of members lists Davison under the class of 1918, Cunningham (Hugh Terry) under 1934, Bundy under 1939 and Pionzio under 1950.[^7]
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### Early Involvement in Psi Research
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The CIA's interest in psi research dates back to the early 1970s, partly in response to rumors of extensive Soviet psi research. Following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying, the CIA came under unprecedented scrutiny from Congress. This led to a preference for "clean" spying methods, making psychic intelligence an appealing, low-profile alternative to traditional human intelligence (HUMINT).[^1]
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In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the [[White House]].[^3]
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In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the [[White House]].[^8]
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### The Search for Behavioral Control
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Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^4]
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Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^9]
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### Police Technique Program Through LEAA
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From 1970 the Office of Security used the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]] as its channel for releasing agency techniques to police. A June 10, 1970 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence recommended LEAA as "the best vehicle to expand dissemination of this technique to all public law enforcement officials in the United States" for the Trace Metal Detection Technique, which the Director had declassified.[^5] The memorandum carried the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Plans, [[Thomas Karamessines]]. It stated that the only stipulation placed on recipients was that there be "no public connection between the technique and this Agency."[^5]
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From 1970 the Office of Security used the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]] as its channel for releasing agency techniques to police. A June 10, 1970 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence recommended LEAA as "the best vehicle to expand dissemination of this technique to all public law enforcement officials in the United States" for the Trace Metal Detection Technique, which the Director had declassified.[^10] The memorandum carried the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Plans, [[Thomas Karamessines]]. It stated that the only stipulation placed on recipients was that there be "no public connection between the technique and this Agency."[^10]
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Between June 1970 and December 1971 Office of Security representatives demonstrated the technique to approximately 35 police departments, three professional police associations and representatives of 83 other state and local departments. Outside the Washington area they appeared as "consultants" to LEAA, and "no mention was made of the Agency."[^6] The office provided six men to LEAA in 1970 for the same briefings.[^7]
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Between June 1970 and December 1971 Office of Security representatives demonstrated the technique to approximately 35 police departments, three professional police associations and representatives of 83 other state and local departments. Outside the Washington area they appeared as "consultants" to LEAA, and "no mention was made of the Agency."[^11] The office provided six men to LEAA in 1970 for the same briefings.[^12]
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The Explosive Residue Detection Technique was declassified in March 1971, and the Security Office recommended dissemination through LEAA or the LEAA-funded National Bomb Data Center.[^6] On November 10, 1971 agency officers demonstrated it to LEAA staff and then met [[Lester Shubin]] and [[Marc Nerenstone]], whom the memorandum describes as "both witting of the Agency's role in the development of the technique."[^8]
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The Explosive Residue Detection Technique was declassified in March 1971, and the Security Office recommended dissemination through LEAA or the LEAA-funded National Bomb Data Center.[^11] On November 10, 1971 agency officers demonstrated it to LEAA staff and then met [[Lester Shubin]] and [[Marc Nerenstone]], whom the memorandum describes as "both witting of the Agency's role in the development of the technique."[^13]
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A February 16, 1972 Office of Security memorandum records that LEAA never reimbursed the agency's travel costs "because of their desire to avoid unclassified (i.e. public) reimbursement of the money to CIA" and that "LEAA indicated it did not wish to be publicly affiliated with CIA."[^9] A May 9, 1973 survey of the Office of Research and Development recorded that an adhesive restraint, a non-lethal incapacitation system, had been made available to LEAA in August 1972. It said that "if they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control."[^10] On June 18, 1973 the House adopted by voice vote the Holtzman amendment to H.R. 8152, which the Office of Legislative Counsel summarized as prohibiting LEAA from using the agency's services, equipment, personnel and facilities.[^11]
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A February 16, 1972 Office of Security memorandum records that LEAA never reimbursed the agency's travel costs "because of their desire to avoid unclassified (i.e. public) reimbursement of the money to CIA" and that "LEAA indicated it did not wish to be publicly affiliated with CIA."[^14] A May 9, 1973 survey of the Office of Research and Development recorded that an adhesive restraint, a non-lethal incapacitation system, had been made available to LEAA in August 1972. It said that "if they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control."[^15] On June 18, 1973 the House adopted by voice vote the Holtzman amendment to H.R. 8152, which the Office of Legislative Counsel summarized as prohibiting LEAA from using the agency's services, equipment, personnel and facilities.[^16]
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Section 508 of the Crime Control Act of 1973 authorized LEAA to use federal agency services "(not including the Central Intelligence Agency)," a restriction absent from the 1968 statute.[^12] An Office of General Counsel memorandum of October 15, 1973 concluded that the agency was not required to reject all LEAA requests and would decide each one case by case.[^13] In July 1978 the Office of Legislative Counsel reviewed reauthorization language that would bar any use of CIA services by LEAA, and reported that the agency did not endorse the provision but had no formal objection to it.[^14] On November 14, 1975 an agency officer briefed two staff members of a House select committee on the LEAA liaison. The memorandum records that the agency discontinued liaison with LEAA in 1973 as a result of the Kennedy-Holtzman amendment, and that one staff member asked where the agency fit into the operation of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, described as "a communications network between police intelligence agencies"; the officer answered that he knew of no such nationwide network in which the agency had taken part.[^15]
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Section 508 of the Crime Control Act of 1973 authorized LEAA to use federal agency services "(not including the Central Intelligence Agency)," a restriction absent from the 1968 statute.[^17] An Office of General Counsel memorandum of October 15, 1973 concluded that the agency was not required to reject all LEAA requests and would decide each one case by case.[^18] In July 1978 the Office of Legislative Counsel reviewed reauthorization language that would bar any use of CIA services by LEAA, and reported that the agency did not endorse the provision but had no formal objection to it.[^19] On November 14, 1975 an agency officer briefed two staff members of a House select committee on the LEAA liaison. The memorandum records that the agency discontinued liaison with LEAA in 1973 as a result of the Kennedy-Holtzman amendment, and that one staff member asked where the agency fit into the operation of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, described as "a communications network between police intelligence agencies"; the officer answered that he knew of no such nationwide network in which the agency had taken part.[^20]
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### The 1977 Notifications to Institutions
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In the summer of 1977 the agency located MKULTRA documents it had believed destroyed in 1973, and notified the institutions named in them. Director of Central Intelligence [[Stansfield Turner]] wrote to Senator [[Daniel K. Inouye]] on August 2, 1977 that the agency now held "the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants" and the names of 80 institutions where the work was done or with which the researchers were affiliated. He listed them as 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, and 3 penal institutions. The names went to the Senate committee on a classified basis, and the Director wrote that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent."[^16]
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In the summer of 1977 the agency located MKULTRA documents it had believed destroyed in 1973, and notified the institutions named in them. Director of Central Intelligence [[Stansfield Turner]] wrote to Senator [[Daniel K. Inouye]] on August 2, 1977 that the agency now held "the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants" and the names of 80 institutions where the work was done or with which the researchers were affiliated. He listed them as 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, and 3 penal institutions. The names went to the Senate committee on a classified basis, and the Director wrote that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent."[^21]
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General Counsel [[Anthony A. Lapham]] wrote to each institution in August 1977. The letter stated that the institution "is included among the institutions at which some portion of this CIA-sponsored research appears to have been performed or with which one or more individuals performing some aspect of this research were affiliated," and that the agency "does not intend to reveal to the public the identities of any institutions that knowingly or unknowingly were involved in MKULTRA activities, or the names of individual researchers."[^17] On September 7, 1977 A. R. Cinquegrana of the Office of General Counsel sent the president of the [[New School for Social Research]], [[John R. Everett]], copies of the two MKULTRA subproject files relating to the school, with a letter stating that "the name of the School has been reinserted wherever it appears in the original documents."[^18] Lapham's letter of November 7, 1977 asked whether each institution had itself made its correspondence public, and wrote that "Where an institution has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts."[^19] On March 17, 1978 Assistant General Counsel Cinquegrana wrote that the agency would presume an institution wished its identity protected if it did not respond by April 15, 1978.[^20]
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General Counsel [[Anthony A. Lapham]] wrote to each institution in August 1977. The letter stated that the institution "is included among the institutions at which some portion of this CIA-sponsored research appears to have been performed or with which one or more individuals performing some aspect of this research were affiliated," and that the agency "does not intend to reveal to the public the identities of any institutions that knowingly or unknowingly were involved in MKULTRA activities, or the names of individual researchers."[^22] On September 7, 1977 A. R. Cinquegrana of the Office of General Counsel sent the president of the [[New School for Social Research]], [[John R. Everett]], copies of the two MKULTRA subproject files relating to the school, with a letter stating that "the name of the School has been reinserted wherever it appears in the original documents."[^23] Lapham's letter of November 7, 1977 asked whether each institution had itself made its correspondence public, and wrote that "Where an institution has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts."[^24] On March 17, 1978 Assistant General Counsel Cinquegrana wrote that the agency would presume an institution wished its identity protected if it did not respond by April 15, 1978.[^25]
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The Senate Health Subcommittee invited the presidents of 20 institutions to testify on September 20 and 21, 1977. Only one accepted, and that president was not scheduled to testify because the others declined.[^21]
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The Senate Health Subcommittee invited the presidents of 20 institutions to testify on September 20 and 21, 1977. Only one accepted, and that president was not scheduled to testify because the others declined.[^26]
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### Notable Operations and Impact
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@ -108,180 +112,185 @@ Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]]
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### Involvement with BCCI
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The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^22] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^22] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^23]
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The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^27] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^27] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^28]
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In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^24] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^25] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^26]
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In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^29] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^30] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^31]
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William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^27] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^27]
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William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^32] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^32]
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The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^28]
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The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^33]
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### Operations and Activities
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The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^29] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^29]
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The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^34] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^34]
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In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^30] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^30]
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In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^35] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^35]
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### Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1981 to 1982
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President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^31] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^32] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^31]
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President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^36] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^37] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^36]
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The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^33] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^34]
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The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^38] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^39]
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### Senior Review Panel
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The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^35] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^35] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^36]
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The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^40] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^40] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^41]
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### UAP Research and Secrecy
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The CIA has a long and complex history with the [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.[^3]
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The CIA has a long and complex history with the [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.[^8]
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The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. [[Dr. William Livingston]], who served as a medical advisor to the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.[^3]
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The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. [[Dr. William Livingston]], who served as a medical advisor to the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.[^8]
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In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the [[UAP Task Force]] and is a member of the current [[All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office]] (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.[^3]
|
||||
In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the [[UAP Task Force]] and is a member of the current [[All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office]] (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Dark Alliance Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^37]
|
||||
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
### Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case
|
||||
|
||||
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^38]
|
||||
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^43]
|
||||
|
||||
Webb wrote that the pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money, and that he was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^38] The CIA Inspector General's 1998 report stated that CIA records show a CIA independent contractor used the alias "Ivan Gomez" in Costa Rica in the 1980s, that CIA records place the contractor in the United States during April and May 1982, and that he denied meeting Carlos Cabezas.[^39]
|
||||
Webb wrote that the pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money, and that he was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^43] The CIA Inspector General's 1998 report stated that CIA records show a CIA independent contractor used the alias "Ivan Gomez" in Costa Rica in the 1980s, that CIA records place the contractor in the United States during April and May 1982, and that he denied meeting Carlos Cabezas.[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department
|
||||
|
||||
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^40]
|
||||
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
### Ilopango Obstruction
|
||||
|
||||
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^41] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^42]
|
||||
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^46] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
### Inspector General Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^40]
|
||||
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hughes Electronics and the Pandolfi Estimate, 1995 to 1998
|
||||
|
||||
On July 19, 1995 an analyst from the agency's Directorate of Intelligence visited the Hughes facility in El Segundo, California, while researching a draft National Intelligence Estimate on the effect of technology transfers on China's military capabilities. The analyst was [[Ronald Pandolfi]].[^43] The analyst alleged that during a visit to the plant he came across information indicating that technical data had been improperly passed by Hughes to the PRC in connection with the 1995 failure investigation of a Long March 2E, and that the agency ignored his request for a formal report to headquarters.[^44] The Congressional Research Service reports that in April 1996 Pandolfi had reportedly prepared an estimate on how Hughes may have helped improve China's missile capabilities, and that the agency did not approve it.[^45] The New York Times reported that agency officials said the estimate was "not 'rigorous' enough" and that it was not distributed to other government officials.[^43]
|
||||
On July 19, 1995 an analyst from the agency's Directorate of Intelligence visited the Hughes facility in El Segundo, California, while researching a draft National Intelligence Estimate on the effect of technology transfers on China's military capabilities. The analyst was [[Ronald Pandolfi]].[^48] The analyst alleged that during a visit to the plant he came across information indicating that technical data had been improperly passed by Hughes to the PRC in connection with the 1995 failure investigation of a Long March 2E, and that the agency ignored his request for a formal report to headquarters.[^49] The Congressional Research Service reports that in April 1996 Pandolfi had reportedly prepared an estimate on how Hughes may have helped improve China's missile capabilities, and that the agency did not approve it.[^50] The New York Times reported that agency officials said the estimate was "not 'rigorous' enough" and that it was not distributed to other government officials.[^48]
|
||||
|
||||
In September 1998 the agency told Hughes about Pandolfi's briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee, according to an internal cable of September 23, 1998. The Cox Committee judged that the agency's notification was "ill-advised and an impediment" to the committee's investigation, and the agency said it had notified Hughes "as a courtesy."[^44] Bill Harlow, an agency spokesman, declined in December 1998 to discuss Pandolfi's experiences or the 1996 estimate "because of the investigations."[^43] The Congressional Research Service reports that Senator Richard Shelby said in September 2000 that the Justice Department had decided not to charge an unnamed CIA official with obstructing a Senate investigation.[^45]
|
||||
In September 1998 the agency told Hughes about Pandolfi's briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee, according to an internal cable of September 23, 1998. The Cox Committee judged that the agency's notification was "ill-advised and an impediment" to the committee's investigation, and the agency said it had notified Hughes "as a courtesy."[^49] Bill Harlow, an agency spokesman, declined in December 1998 to discuss Pandolfi's experiences or the 1996 estimate "because of the investigations."[^48] The Congressional Research Service reports that Senator Richard Shelby said in September 2000 that the Justice Department had decided not to charge an unnamed CIA official with obstructing a Senate investigation.[^50]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iran-Contra Indictments
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^37]
|
||||
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
### Interrogation videotapes and the 2004 to 2006 directorship
|
||||
|
||||
[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^46] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^47] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^48]
|
||||
[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^51] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^52] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^53]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^49] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^49]
|
||||
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^54] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^50] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^51]
|
||||
Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^55] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^56]
|
||||
|
||||
### Foreign Broadcast Information Service
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^52] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^53] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^54]
|
||||
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^57] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^58] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^59]
|
||||
|
||||
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^55]
|
||||
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^60]
|
||||
|
||||
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^56]
|
||||
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^61]
|
||||
|
||||
### Psychological warfare liaison, 1946 to 1952
|
||||
|
||||
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^57]
|
||||
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^62]
|
||||
|
||||
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^58]
|
||||
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^63]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^59]
|
||||
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^64]
|
||||
|
||||
In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^60] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^61] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^62] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^63] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^64] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^65] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^66]
|
||||
In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^65] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^66] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^67] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^68] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^69] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^70] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^71]
|
||||
|
||||
The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^67] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^68] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^69]
|
||||
The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^72] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^73] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^74]
|
||||
|
||||
The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^70] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^71]
|
||||
The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^75] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^76]
|
||||
|
||||
In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^72]
|
||||
In February 1961 [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]] wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^77]
|
||||
|
||||
A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^73] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^74] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^75] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^76] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^77]
|
||||
A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^78] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^79] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^80] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^81] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^82]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
|
||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
|
||||
[^3]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
|
||||
[^4]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
|
||||
[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Release of Trace Metal Detection Technique to Law Enforcement Officials," June 10, 1970, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150029-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150029-5
|
||||
[^6]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum on the relationship with LEAA, CIA CREST document C01435053. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435053
|
||||
[^7]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, "Relationship with Police," CIA CREST document C01435041. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435041
|
||||
[^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security memorandum, "Technology Transfer of ERDT to LEAA," November 10, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150007-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150007-9
|
||||
[^9]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum for the Deputy Director of Security, "LEAA Request for Agency Support, Where's What," February 16, 1972, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200060130-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000200060130-3
|
||||
[^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, "Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 9, 1973, CIA CREST document 01430445, entry on LEAA. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01430445
|
||||
[^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, summary of the Holtzman Amendment, CIA-RDP76M00527R000700190003-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp76m00527r000700190003-1
|
||||
[^12]: Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-83, sec. 508, 87 Stat. 211 (August 6, 1973). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg197.pdf
|
||||
[^13]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, memorandum for the record, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," OGC 73-1954, October 15, 1973, CIA-RDP75-00793R000300160026-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00793r000300160026-2
|
||||
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Reauthorization Legislation," July 12, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050017-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r001800050017-0
|
||||
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Review Staff, "Briefing of House Select Committee Staff re LEAA Relationships," November 14, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110024-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp89b00552r000100110024-1
|
||||
[^16]: Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (figures at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
|
||||
[^17]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, August 1977 (stamped August 15, 1977), in NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 94-95.
|
||||
[^18]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, September 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 7. https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
|
||||
[^19]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, November 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 3.
|
||||
[^20]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, March 17, 1978, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 1.
|
||||
[^21]: Thomas, Jo, "Extent of University Work for C.I.A. Is Hard to Pin Down," New York Times, October 9, 1977, CIA reading room clipping CIA-RDP88-01315R000300390007-3.
|
||||
[^22]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
|
||||
[^23]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
|
||||
[^24]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
|
||||
[^25]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
|
||||
[^26]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
|
||||
[^27]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
|
||||
[^28]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
|
||||
[^29]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
|
||||
[^30]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
|
||||
[^31]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
|
||||
[^32]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
|
||||
[^33]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
|
||||
[^34]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
|
||||
[^35]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
|
||||
[^36]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
|
||||
[^37]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||
[^38]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||
[^39]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation Concerning Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States, Volume I, January 29, 1998, findings on Carlos Cabezas and "Ivan Gomez." https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
|
||||
[^40]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
|
||||
[^41]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||
[^42]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^43]: Gerth, Jeff, "Old Concerns Over Data Transfer to China Get New Attention," *The New York Times,* December 7, 1998, section A, p. 20, archived copy at https://web.archive.org/web/20201101033224/https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/07/us/old-concerns-over-data-transfer-to-china-get-new-attention.html
|
||||
[^44]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Report (Cox Report), H. Rept. 105-851, vol. II, ch. 5, pp. 55-57, and Appendix A, pp. 208-209, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt851/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt851.pdf
|
||||
[^45]: Congressional Research Service, "China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers under U.S. Satellite Export Policy: Actions and Chronology," report 98-485 F, entries for April 1996 and September 1998, with notes 76 and 77, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/98-485F.html
|
||||
[^46]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
|
||||
[^47]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
|
||||
[^48]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
|
||||
[^49]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
|
||||
[^50]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
|
||||
[^51]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
|
||||
[^52]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^53]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
|
||||
[^54]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^55]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^56]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
|
||||
[^57]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
|
||||
[^58]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
|
||||
[^59]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
|
||||
[^60]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
|
||||
[^61]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
|
||||
[^62]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
|
||||
[^63]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
|
||||
[^64]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
|
||||
[^65]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
|
||||
[^66]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
|
||||
[^67]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
|
||||
[^68]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
|
||||
[^69]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
|
||||
[^70]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
|
||||
[^71]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
|
||||
[^72]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
|
||||
[^73]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
|
||||
[^74]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
|
||||
[^75]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
|
||||
[^76]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
|
||||
[^77]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4
|
||||
[^3]: Associated Press item, "F. Trubee Davison to Join CIA in Personnel Post," CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP78-04718A000500180115-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp78-04718a000500180115-2
|
||||
[^4]: Memorandum from F. Trubee Davison, September 11, 1951, on CIA Official Routing Slip, CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP80R01731R003100090067-0. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003100090067-0
|
||||
[^5]: CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP84-00780R003200020017-9 (May 15, 1969), CIA-RDP84-00780R003200020006-1 (1968) and CIA-RDP80-00536A000300070001-5 (Midcareer Course No. 32, 1972). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80-00536a000300070001-5
|
||||
[^6]: "Bush's Boy's Club: Skull and Bones," *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, no. 33 (Winter 1990), pp. 20 to 22. https://archive.org/details/CAIB33
|
||||
[^7]: Antony C. Sutton, *America's Secret Establishment* (1983), index of members by class year. https://archive.org/details/americas_secret_establishment-skull_and_bones
|
||||
[^8]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
|
||||
[^9]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
|
||||
[^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Release of Trace Metal Detection Technique to Law Enforcement Officials," June 10, 1970, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150029-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150029-5
|
||||
[^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum on the relationship with LEAA, CIA CREST document C01435053. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435053
|
||||
[^12]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, "Relationship with Police," CIA CREST document C01435041. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435041
|
||||
[^13]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security memorandum, "Technology Transfer of ERDT to LEAA," November 10, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150007-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150007-9
|
||||
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum for the Deputy Director of Security, "LEAA Request for Agency Support, Where's What," February 16, 1972, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200060130-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000200060130-3
|
||||
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, "Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 9, 1973, CIA CREST document 01430445, entry on LEAA. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01430445
|
||||
[^16]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, summary of the Holtzman Amendment, CIA-RDP76M00527R000700190003-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp76m00527r000700190003-1
|
||||
[^17]: Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-83, sec. 508, 87 Stat. 211 (August 6, 1973). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg197.pdf
|
||||
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, memorandum for the record, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," OGC 73-1954, October 15, 1973, CIA-RDP75-00793R000300160026-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00793r000300160026-2
|
||||
[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Reauthorization Legislation," July 12, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050017-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r001800050017-0
|
||||
[^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Review Staff, "Briefing of House Select Committee Staff re LEAA Relationships," November 14, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110024-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp89b00552r000100110024-1
|
||||
[^21]: Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (figures at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
|
||||
[^22]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, August 1977 (stamped August 15, 1977), in NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 94-95.
|
||||
[^23]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, September 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 7. https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
|
||||
[^24]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, November 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 3.
|
||||
[^25]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, March 17, 1978, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 1.
|
||||
[^26]: Thomas, Jo, "Extent of University Work for C.I.A. Is Hard to Pin Down," New York Times, October 9, 1977, CIA reading room clipping CIA-RDP88-01315R000300390007-3.
|
||||
[^27]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
|
||||
[^28]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
|
||||
[^29]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
|
||||
[^30]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
|
||||
[^31]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
|
||||
[^32]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
|
||||
[^33]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
|
||||
[^34]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
|
||||
[^35]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
|
||||
[^36]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
|
||||
[^37]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
|
||||
[^38]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
|
||||
[^39]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
|
||||
[^40]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
|
||||
[^41]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
|
||||
[^42]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||
[^43]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||
[^44]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation Concerning Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States, Volume I, January 29, 1998, findings on Carlos Cabezas and "Ivan Gomez." https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
|
||||
[^45]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
|
||||
[^46]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||
[^47]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
|
||||
[^48]: Gerth, Jeff, "Old Concerns Over Data Transfer to China Get New Attention," *The New York Times,* December 7, 1998, section A, p. 20, archived copy at https://web.archive.org/web/20201101033224/https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/07/us/old-concerns-over-data-transfer-to-china-get-new-attention.html
|
||||
[^49]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Report (Cox Report), H. Rept. 105-851, vol. II, ch. 5, pp. 55-57, and Appendix A, pp. 208-209, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt851/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt851.pdf
|
||||
[^50]: Congressional Research Service, "China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers under U.S. Satellite Export Policy: Actions and Chronology," report 98-485 F, entries for April 1996 and September 1998, with notes 76 and 77, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/98-485F.html
|
||||
[^51]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
|
||||
[^52]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
|
||||
[^53]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
|
||||
[^54]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
|
||||
[^55]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
|
||||
[^56]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
|
||||
[^57]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^58]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
|
||||
[^59]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^60]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^61]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
|
||||
[^62]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
|
||||
[^63]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
|
||||
[^64]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
|
||||
[^65]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
|
||||
[^66]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
|
||||
[^67]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
|
||||
[^68]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
|
||||
[^69]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
|
||||
[^70]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
|
||||
[^71]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
|
||||
[^72]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
|
||||
[^73]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
|
||||
[^74]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
|
||||
[^75]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
|
||||
[^76]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
|
||||
[^77]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
|
||||
[^78]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
|
||||
[^79]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
|
||||
[^80]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
|
||||
[^81]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
|
||||
[^82]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ summary: "The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service was the United States gover
|
|||
start: 1941-02-26
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
created: 2026-10-09
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-26
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Lloyd Free]]"
|
||||
|
|
@ -37,81 +37,81 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "Director"
|
||||
start: 1941-06-16
|
||||
end: 1942-04
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
fn: 22
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Robert D. Leigh]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Director"
|
||||
start: 1942-07
|
||||
end: 1944-07
|
||||
fn: 23
|
||||
fn: 24
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Charles S. Hyneman]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Director"
|
||||
start: 1944-07-27
|
||||
end: 1945-08-07
|
||||
fn: 69
|
||||
fn: 70
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Russell M. Shepherd]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Director, fourth director of the service"
|
||||
start: 1945-08-07
|
||||
end: 1947-09-29
|
||||
fn: 90
|
||||
fn: 91
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Harold N. Graves Jr.]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Senior Administrative Officer; acting director in 1942"
|
||||
start: 1941-03
|
||||
end: 1943-12
|
||||
fn: 65
|
||||
fn: 66
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Goodwin Watson]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Head of the Analysis Section, later Analysis Division"
|
||||
start: 1941-11-17
|
||||
end: 1943-11
|
||||
fn: 24
|
||||
fn: 25
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Hans Speier]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Senior Political Analyst and head of the Central European Section; acting chief analyst after Watson's departure"
|
||||
start: 1942-03
|
||||
end: 1944-05-22
|
||||
fn: 33
|
||||
fn: 34
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Nathan Leites]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Analyst; sent to London with Watson in September 1942"
|
||||
start: 1942-09
|
||||
fn: 30
|
||||
fn: 31
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Alexander L. George]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Analyst in the Central European Section"
|
||||
fn: 36
|
||||
fn: 37
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[William E. Dodd Jr.]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Editor, hired December 1941"
|
||||
start: 1941-12
|
||||
end: 1943-11
|
||||
fn: 42
|
||||
fn: 43
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[House Un-American Activities Committee]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Named Goodwin Watson, Frederick L. Schuman and William E. Dodd Jr. in 1941 and 1943 attacks"
|
||||
start: 1941-11-18
|
||||
end: 1943-04-21
|
||||
fn: 41
|
||||
fn: 42
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Cox Committee]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Special House committee to investigate the Federal Communications Commission"
|
||||
start: 1943-01
|
||||
end: 1945-01-02
|
||||
fn: 59
|
||||
fn: 60
|
||||
- type: owned
|
||||
with: "[[Federal Communications Commission]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
|
|
@ -125,24 +125,24 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "Sponsoring agency after the War Department"
|
||||
start: 1946-07-31
|
||||
end: 1947-09
|
||||
fn: 80
|
||||
fn: 81
|
||||
- type: owned
|
||||
with: "[[Central Intelligence Agency]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Component of the agency, under the Assistant Director for Operations"
|
||||
start: 1947
|
||||
fn: 81
|
||||
fn: 82
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Theodore Newcomb]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Director of the Analysis Division, succeeding Watson, per the National Archives records description"
|
||||
start: 1943-11
|
||||
fn: 27
|
||||
fn: 28
|
||||
- type: partner_of
|
||||
with: "[[Office of War Information]]"
|
||||
role: "Analysis Division used exclusively for OWI radio reporting under the April 19, 1943 agreement"
|
||||
start: 1943-04-19
|
||||
fn: 32
|
||||
fn: 33
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) was the United States government's service for monitoring, translating and analyzing foreign radio broadcasts. It began as the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service inside the [[Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) in 1941, passed to the [[War Department]] at the end of 1945, came under the [[Central Intelligence Group]] in 1946 and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] in 1947, and in November 2005 was named as the base of expertise for the [[Open Source Center]].[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -151,109 +151,109 @@ The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) was the United States governme
|
|||
|
||||
The proposal for a government monitoring service reached the [[Defense Communications Board]] in January 1941. The [[Princeton Listening Center]] had been running since November 1939, and the [[State Department]] official [[Breckinridge Long]], the Board's State Department representative, introduced the resolution calling on the FCC to establish a monitoring service.[^2] [[Helena Huntington Smith]] wrote in *Collier's* in January 1943 that the service's "godfather was Breckinridge Long of the State Department," who took the idea to FCC chairman [[James L. Fly]]. Stephen C. Mercado, who serves in the Directorate of Science and Technology, uses the same word for Long and quotes his letter of September 10, 1941 congratulating Fly.[^3] The FCC's annual report for fiscal 1941 states that the service was created in cooperation with the Defense Communications Board.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
On February 25, 1941 [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] allotted $150,000 from his emergency fund, and the money was transferred the next day, so that the birth date of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) was February 26, 1941.[^5] Daniel Bessner's dissertation on [[Hans Speier]] dates the origin to a late 1940 meeting between Roosevelt and [[Henry L. Stimson]], then Secretary of War, at which Stimson suggested a unit to monitor foreign propaganda aimed at the United States.[^6] A 1969 CIA history of the service has the idea raised in an informal late 1940 discussion between the Secretary of State and Roosevelt.[^7] The FCC's Radio Intelligence Division had been running the National Defense Activities that recorded foreign broadcasts, and the FCC was "the only group staffed and equipped" for the monitoring work.[^8]
|
||||
On February 25, 1941 [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] allotted $150,000 from his emergency fund, and the money was transferred the next day, so that the birth date of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) was February 26, 1941.[^5] Daniel Bessner's dissertation on [[Hans Speier]] dates the origin to a late 1940 meeting between Roosevelt and [[Henry L. Stimson]], then Secretary of War, at which Stimson suggested a unit to monitor foreign propaganda aimed at the United States.[^6] A 1969 CIA history of the service has the idea raised in an informal late 1940 discussion between the Secretary of State and Roosevelt; the Secretary of State in late 1940 was [[Cordell Hull]].[^7][^8] The FCC's Radio Intelligence Division had been running the National Defense Activities that recorded foreign broadcasts, and the FCC was "the only group staffed and equipped" for the monitoring work.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The service began in an old garage at 316 F Street Northeast in Washington, and in April 1942 moved to 1424 K Street NW, where four floors were assigned to it.[^9]
|
||||
The service began in an old garage at 316 F Street Northeast in Washington, and in April 1942 moved to 1424 K Street NW, where four floors were assigned to it.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Robert D. Leigh]], who took over as director on July 15, 1942, recommended renaming the service the Broadcast Intelligence Service, on the reasoning that the name was "less unwieldy and more accurately reflected the duties of the organization." The FCC insisted on keeping the word "foreign," and on July 26, 1942 the FBMS became the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service.[^10] An FCC order of July 28, 1942 is recorded for the same change.[^11] The name was raised again in 1945. In a memorandum for the FCC of March 2, 1945, [[Charles S. Hyneman]] proposed a change to end confusion with the FBI, which reported trouble from misdirected mail, and suggested International Broadcast Intelligence Service, Broadcast Intelligence Service, Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service and Broadcast Reporting Service, explaining that "intelligence" and "reporting" described its operations better than "monitoring." The service's newsletter, *On the Beam*, reported on April 9, 1945 that the FCC had approved the change to Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service. The next month the newsletter announced that the FCC had reversed itself, and the new name was never formally adopted.[^12]
|
||||
[[Robert D. Leigh]], who took over as director on July 15, 1942, recommended renaming the service the Broadcast Intelligence Service, on the reasoning that the name was "less unwieldy and more accurately reflected the duties of the organization." The FCC insisted on keeping the word "foreign," and on July 26, 1942 the FBMS became the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service.[^11] An FCC order of July 28, 1942 is recorded for the same change.[^12] The name was raised again in 1945. In a memorandum for the FCC of March 2, 1945, [[Charles S. Hyneman]] proposed a change to end confusion with the FBI, which reported trouble from misdirected mail, and suggested International Broadcast Intelligence Service, Broadcast Intelligence Service, Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service and Broadcast Reporting Service, explaining that "intelligence" and "reporting" described its operations better than "monitoring." The service's newsletter, *On the Beam*, reported on April 9, 1945 that the FCC had approved the change to Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service. The next month the newsletter announced that the FCC had reversed itself, and the new name was never formally adopted.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Princeton and the Rockefeller Foundation
|
||||
|
||||
The Princeton Listening Center was the most visible American monitoring effort before the government service existed. [[Harold N. Graves Jr.]], who had directed it, wrote in 1941 that "The Center was established in November 1939 by the School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University, to study international broadcasting in wartime."[^13] The center's finding aid states that the project was financed by the [[Rockefeller Foundation]], was conceived by the Princeton professor [[John B. Whitton]], and was administered by Graves with a committee that included [[Hadley Cantril]], William S. Carpenter, [[Harwood L. Childs]], O. W. Riegel and the engineer Brunson S. McCutchen, with quarters in a house on Alexander Street. It records the center's transcripts from November 1939 through May 1941, "until the operations of the Center were taken over by the Federal Communications Commission," and says the center continued its work until June 1941.[^14] Mercado likewise gives the center's funding as coming from the Rockefeller Foundation and its absorption by the service as occurring in June.[^15] Bessner's dissertation states that the service "had absorbed the Rockefeller-funded Princeton Listening Center, whose director, Harold Graves, became the FBIS's Senior Administrative Officer."[^16] Graves was hired to help organize the service as "the young man who had been acting as director of the Princeton Listening Post since its inception." Staff who had worked at Princeton and joined the new service included [[Jerome S. Bruner]], [[Bennett Ferrell Ellington]], [[Arthur Mathieu]] and [[Arthur Cantor]].[^17]
|
||||
The Princeton Listening Center was the most visible American monitoring effort before the government service existed. [[Harold N. Graves Jr.]], who had directed it, wrote in 1941 that "The Center was established in November 1939 by the School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University, to study international broadcasting in wartime."[^14] The center's finding aid states that the project was financed by the [[Rockefeller Foundation]], was conceived by the Princeton professor [[John B. Whitton]], and was administered by Graves with a committee that included [[Hadley Cantril]], William S. Carpenter, [[Harwood L. Childs]], O. W. Riegel and the engineer Brunson S. McCutchen, with quarters in a house on Alexander Street. It records the center's transcripts from November 1939 through May 1941, "until the operations of the Center were taken over by the Federal Communications Commission," and says the center continued its work until June 1941.[^15] Mercado likewise gives the center's funding as coming from the Rockefeller Foundation and its absorption by the service as occurring in June.[^16] Bessner's dissertation states that the service "had absorbed the Rockefeller-funded Princeton Listening Center, whose director, Harold Graves, became the FBIS's Senior Administrative Officer."[^17] Graves was hired to help organize the service as "the young man who had been acting as director of the Princeton Listening Post since its inception." Staff who had worked at Princeton and joined the new service included [[Jerome S. Bruner]], [[Bennett Ferrell Ellington]], [[Arthur Mathieu]] and [[Arthur Cantor]].[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
The Rockefeller connection was also a public relations problem. A [[Baltimore Sun]] article described the service as a joint project of the FCC, Princeton and the Rockefeller Foundation, and as the "brain child" of Whitton. Graves wrote a memo for [[Lloyd Free]] on July 9, 1941 about his "embarrassment" at inaccuracies in the article, among them the "dragging in" of the Princeton Listening Post and the joint-project claim. On September 8, 1941 a syndicated column by [[Eleanor Ragsdale]] said the service was "inaugurated and pushed through by Chairman Fly of FCC."[^18]
|
||||
The Rockefeller connection was also a public relations problem. A [[Baltimore Sun]] article described the service as a joint project of the FCC, Princeton and the Rockefeller Foundation, and as the "brain child" of Whitton. Graves wrote a memo for [[Lloyd Free]] on July 9, 1941 about his "embarrassment" at inaccuracies in the article, among them the "dragging in" of the Princeton Listening Post and the joint-project claim. On September 8, 1941 a syndicated column by [[Eleanor Ragsdale]] said the service was "inaugurated and pushed through by Chairman Fly of FCC."[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 29, 1942 [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the [[Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs]], wrote to FCC chairman James L. Fly that his office had "been able thus far to make good use of the material provided by teletype from the Kingsville Field Bureau," and asked for a larger volume of verbatim transcripts for hemispheric propaganda work.[^19]
|
||||
On July 29, 1942 [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the [[Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs]], wrote to FCC chairman James L. Fly that his office had "been able thus far to make good use of the material provided by teletype from the Kingsville Field Bureau," and asked for a larger volume of verbatim transcripts for hemispheric propaganda work.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
An administrative memorandum to FBIS officers dated January 22, 1943 recorded an exchange of correspondence with Rockefeller, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, under which FBIS would have with his office the same relationship it had with OWI. Under the same memorandum, FBIS material reached non-government users only through one of two OWI officials, one of them [[Leo Rosten]], deputy director in charge of enemy sources, and requests for Latin American material went to officers of the Coordinator's office.[^20]
|
||||
An administrative memorandum to FBIS officers dated January 22, 1943 recorded an exchange of correspondence with Rockefeller, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, under which FBIS would have with his office the same relationship it had with OWI. Under the same memorandum, FBIS material reached non-government users only through one of two OWI officials, one of them [[Leo Rosten]], deputy director in charge of enemy sources, and requests for Latin American material went to officers of the Coordinator's office.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
### Directors and the Analysis Division
|
||||
|
||||
Free, editor of the [[Public Opinion Quarterly]] and a Princeton man, assumed office as director on June 16, 1941. He established contacts with the [[BBC]] very soon after taking office, with the idea of attaching a staff to the BBC, and in December 1941 he was still in London when the Pearl Harbor attack came.[^21] Harold Graves and Tom Grandin took over the Washington office on December 7, 1941.[^22] Free resigned in April 1942 to accept an Army commission, and he was military attaché at the United States Embassy in Switzerland for most of the war years.[^23]
|
||||
Free, editor of the [[Public Opinion Quarterly]] and a Princeton man, assumed office as director on June 16, 1941. He established contacts with the [[BBC]] very soon after taking office, with the idea of attaching a staff to the BBC, and in December 1941 he was still in London when the Pearl Harbor attack came.[^22] Harold Graves and Tom Grandin took over the Washington office on December 7, 1941.[^23] Free resigned in April 1942 to accept an Army commission, and he was military attaché at the United States Embassy in Switzerland for most of the war years.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
Leigh, for fourteen years president of [[Bennington College]], took over on July 15, 1942, with Graves as acting director in the intervening months. He was paid $1,000 more than the $8,000 Free had received, and the appropriation bill had to be amended to legalize the salary.[^23]
|
||||
Leigh, for fourteen years president of [[Bennington College]], took over on July 15, 1942, with Graves as acting director in the intervening months. He was paid $1,000 more than the $8,000 Free had received, and the appropriation bill had to be amended to legalize the salary.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
The Analysis Division was the service's research core. In November 1941 [[Goodwin Watson]] of [[Columbia University]] entered on duty to head the Analysis Section, which Free and Graves had recruited him to lead.[^24] Watson testified in April 1943 that his connection with the commission dated from November 15, 1941.[^25] The section became the Analysis Division in 1942.[^26] A records description of the service gives November 15, 1941 as the start of Watson's directorship of the division and November 15, 1943 as the day [[Theodore Newcomb]] succeeded him; Newcomb was second only to Watson in the division by February 1943.[^27][^28] In March 1942 the table of organization of the Analysis Division called for 37 analysts, assistants and trainees, with 17 of the positions filled, and the planned table was never reached.[^29] In September 1942 Watson and [[Nathan Leites]] went to London to set up an analysis operation working with the [[Office of War Information]], and a two-man staff remained there through the war.[^30] The division's German Section began the weekly *Central European Radio Analysis* in January 1943, and the *Radio Report on the Far East* first appeared on August 24, 1942.[^31]
|
||||
The Analysis Division was the service's research core. In November 1941 [[Goodwin Watson]] of [[Columbia University]] entered on duty to head the Analysis Section, which Free and Graves had recruited him to lead.[^25] Watson testified in April 1943 that his connection with the commission dated from November 15, 1941.[^26] The section became the Analysis Division in 1942.[^27] A records description of the service gives November 15, 1941 as the start of Watson's directorship of the division and November 15, 1943 as the day [[Theodore Newcomb]] succeeded him; Newcomb was second only to Watson in the division by February 1943.[^28][^29] In March 1942 the table of organization of the Analysis Division called for 37 analysts, assistants and trainees, with 17 of the positions filled, and the planned table was never reached.[^30] In September 1942 Watson and [[Nathan Leites]] went to London to set up an analysis operation working with the [[Office of War Information]], and a two-man staff remained there through the war.[^31] The division's German Section began the weekly *Central European Radio Analysis* in January 1943, and the *Radio Report on the Far East* first appeared on August 24, 1942.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
On April 19, 1943 Robert D. Leigh announced an agreement under which the Bureau of Research and Analysis of the Overseas Operations Branch of the Office of War Information would use the Analysis Division exclusively for reporting and analyzing radio broadcasts, and the division would move to the Social Security Building. On May 13 Harold N. Graves Jr. said that the division would "function as an integral part of OWI" while continuing its other duties. In a letter to Leigh of June 18, 1943, [[Eugene Katz]], identified as the head of the OWI division, wrote that relations with the Analysis Division were "so friendly" that nothing warranted a formal reappraisal of the agreement.[^32]
|
||||
On April 19, 1943 Robert D. Leigh announced an agreement under which the Bureau of Research and Analysis of the Overseas Operations Branch of the Office of War Information would use the Analysis Division exclusively for reporting and analyzing radio broadcasts, and the division would move to the Social Security Building. On May 13 Harold N. Graves Jr. said that the division would "function as an integral part of OWI" while continuing its other duties. In a letter to Leigh of June 18, 1943, [[Eugene Katz]], identified as the head of the OWI division, wrote that relations with the Analysis Division were "so friendly" that nothing warranted a formal reappraisal of the agreement.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hans Speier and the Central European Section
|
||||
|
||||
Hans Speier reached the service through the research project he ran with [[Ernst Kris]] at the [[New School for Social Research]]. Speier sent the project's first report a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and Free and Watson read his work "with the greatest of interest." In February 1942 Watson offered him a post as Senior Political Analyst and head of the Central European Section, and the Analysis Division was the "heart" of the service.[^33] Graves had written to Speier and Kris on December 23, 1941 about their reports and encouraged them to send more, and Free wrote to Speier on January 31, 1942.[^34] The Civil Service Commission informed Speier on May 26, 1942, two months after he entered the division, that he had been rated eligible for the post of Senior Political Analyst.[^35]
|
||||
Hans Speier reached the service through the research project he ran with [[Ernst Kris]] at the [[New School for Social Research]]. Speier sent the project's first report a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and Free and Watson read his work "with the greatest of interest." In February 1942 Watson offered him a post as Senior Political Analyst and head of the Central European Section, and the Analysis Division was the "heart" of the service.[^34] Graves had written to Speier and Kris on December 23, 1941 about their reports and encouraged them to send more, and Free wrote to Speier on January 31, 1942.[^35] The Civil Service Commission informed Speier on May 26, 1942, two months after he entered the division, that he had been rated eligible for the post of Senior Political Analyst.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
Speier brought colleagues into the division, including [[Alexander L. George]], Leites and the psychologist Henry Kellermann.[^36] Watson praised Speier's "extraordinarily good job of analysis," and wrote that he knew "nobody in the United States whom I would willingly trade for him."[^36] Watson left under pressure from opponents of the New Deal, after which Speier became acting chief analyst with thirty people under him.[^37] Bessner cites a letter from Newcomb to Colonel S. A. Greenwell of December 4, 1943 for Speier's replacing Watson as Acting Chief Analyst.[^38] Speier moved from the service to the Office of War Information on May 22, 1944, under [[Wallace Carroll]].[^39]
|
||||
Speier brought colleagues into the division, including [[Alexander L. George]], Leites and the psychologist Henry Kellermann.[^37] Watson praised Speier's "extraordinarily good job of analysis," and wrote that he knew "nobody in the United States whom I would willingly trade for him."[^37] Watson left under pressure from opponents of the New Deal, after which Speier became acting chief analyst with thirty people under him.[^38] Bessner cites a letter from Newcomb to Colonel S. A. Greenwell of December 4, 1943 for Speier's replacing Watson as Acting Chief Analyst.[^39] Speier moved from the service to the Office of War Information on May 22, 1944, under [[Wallace Carroll]].[^40]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 29, 1943 Speier wrote a memorandum predicting much of Hitler's speech for the anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch. Seventeen of twenty-five predictions were correct. Speier gave the memo to an OWI contact, [[Mark Abrams]], who brought it to the attention of Representative [[Joseph Martin]] and Senator [[Alexander Wiley]], and they used most of its content in a radio broadcast.[^40]
|
||||
On October 29, 1943 Speier wrote a memorandum predicting much of Hitler's speech for the anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch. Seventeen of twenty-five predictions were correct. Speier gave the memo to an OWI contact, [[Mark Abrams]], who brought it to the attention of Representative [[Joseph Martin]] and Senator [[Alexander Wiley]], and they used most of its content in a radio broadcast.[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Dies Committee and the 1943 Rider
|
||||
|
||||
The first congressional attack came from [[Martin Dies]], chairman of the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]]. On November 18, 1941, the day after Watson entered on duty, Dies wrote to James L. Fly expressing "deep concern" over the selection of a man who had written in favor of the Soviet Union, and naming thirteen organizations he called communist fronts.[^41] Fly replied that Watson belonged to only one of them, Consumers Union. The House passed an appropriation bill with a rider denying salary to the named employees, including [[Frederick L. Schuman]] and [[William E. Dodd Jr.]], who had been hired as an editor in December 1941. The Senate Appropriations Committee deleted the rider, and Watson testified before that committee on February 4, 1942.[^42]
|
||||
The first congressional attack came from [[Martin Dies]], chairman of the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]]. On November 18, 1941, the day after Watson entered on duty, Dies wrote to James L. Fly expressing "deep concern" over the selection of a man who had written in favor of the Soviet Union, and naming thirteen organizations he called communist fronts.[^42] Fly replied that Watson belonged to only one of them, Consumers Union. The House passed an appropriation bill with a rider denying salary to the named employees, including [[Frederick L. Schuman]] and [[William E. Dodd Jr.]], who had been hired as an editor in December 1941. The Senate Appropriations Committee deleted the rider, and Watson testified before that committee on February 4, 1942.[^43]
|
||||
|
||||
In a House speech on February 1, 1943, Dies listed 39 "communists" holding government posts, with Dodd, Watson and Schuman at the head of the list.[^43] On February 4, 1943 [[Joe Hendricks]] of Florida gave notice of an amendment to the House Post Office and Treasury appropriations bill forbidding payment of the thirty-nine named employees, among them Watson, Schuman and Dodd. On February 5 the House, in the Committee of the Whole, rejected it, 130 to 137 on a division and 146 to 153 on tellers, and then agreed, 163 to 111 on tellers, to a separate amendment naming only [[William Pickens]].[^44] Dies accused the employees of "un-American beliefs."[^45] Mercado writes that Dies may have been provoked by FBIS reports that his statements were being praised in Nazi Germany, and that Vice President [[Henry A. Wallace]] had said Dies's statements "might as well come from Goebbels himself as far as their practical effect is concerned."[^46] [[House Resolution 105]], adopted February 9, 1943, authorized the Committee on Appropriations, "acting through a special subcommittee," to examine charges of unfitness based on association with organizations whose aims were subversive. The subcommittee was Congressman [[John H. Kerr]] (chairman), [[Albert Gore Sr.|Albert Gore]], [[Clinton P. Anderson]], [[D. Lane Powers]] and [[Frank B. Keefe]], with Major Matt H. Allen as counsel, and Watson's testimony opens at its sitting of Friday, April 9, 1943.[^47] On March 31, 1943 Dies told the House that a subcommittee headed by [[Joe Starnes]] of Alabama, whom he called his "distinguished and able colleague," would make a report.[^48] On April 7 Kerr told the House that the committee had been asking for six weeks for the full evidence and had been able to get it for only "3 of the 38 men who are charged in this resolution." Dies replied, "You have evidence on 10."[^49] The subcommittee took testimony in executive session from the three men. Its report of April 21, 1943 found Watson and Dodd unfit for government employment and stated that it "does not find sufficient evidence to support a recommendation of unfitness" as to Schuman; Roop's history names the three men found guilty of "subversive activity" and "unfit" as Dodd, Watson and the Interior Department official [[Robert Morss Lovett]]. The subcommittee's hearings and H. Rept. No. 448 of May 14, 1943 were printed by the Government Printing Office.[^50][^51] The subcommittee was later accused of having prepared its final report before the men were called to testify.[^50]
|
||||
In a House speech on February 1, 1943, Dies listed 39 "communists" holding government posts, with Dodd, Watson and Schuman at the head of the list.[^44] On February 4, 1943 [[Joe Hendricks]] of Florida gave notice of an amendment to the House Post Office and Treasury appropriations bill forbidding payment of the thirty-nine named employees, among them Watson, Schuman and Dodd. On February 5 the House, in the Committee of the Whole, rejected it, 130 to 137 on a division and 146 to 153 on tellers, and then agreed, 163 to 111 on tellers, to a separate amendment naming only [[William Pickens]].[^45] Dies accused the employees of "un-American beliefs."[^46] Mercado writes that Dies may have been provoked by FBIS reports that his statements were being praised in Nazi Germany, and that Vice President [[Henry A. Wallace]] had said Dies's statements "might as well come from Goebbels himself as far as their practical effect is concerned."[^47] [[House Resolution 105]], adopted February 9, 1943, authorized the Committee on Appropriations, "acting through a special subcommittee," to examine charges of unfitness based on association with organizations whose aims were subversive. The subcommittee was Congressman [[John H. Kerr]] (chairman), [[Albert Gore Sr.|Albert Gore]], [[Clinton P. Anderson]], [[D. Lane Powers]] and [[Frank B. Keefe]], with Major Matt H. Allen as counsel, and Watson's testimony opens at its sitting of Friday, April 9, 1943.[^48] On March 31, 1943 Dies told the House that a subcommittee headed by [[Joe Starnes]] of Alabama, whom he called his "distinguished and able colleague," would make a report.[^49] On April 7 Kerr told the House that the committee had been asking for six weeks for the full evidence and had been able to get it for only "3 of the 38 men who are charged in this resolution." Dies replied, "You have evidence on 10."[^50] The subcommittee took testimony in executive session from the three men. Its report of April 21, 1943 found Watson and Dodd unfit for government employment and stated that it "does not find sufficient evidence to support a recommendation of unfitness" as to Schuman; Roop's history names the three men found guilty of "subversive activity" and "unfit" as Dodd, Watson and the Interior Department official [[Robert Morss Lovett]]. The subcommittee's hearings and H. Rept. No. 448 of May 14, 1943 were printed by the Government Printing Office.[^51][^52] The subcommittee was later accused of having prepared its final report before the men were called to testify.[^51]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 17, 1943 Frank B. Keefe of Wisconsin read excerpts of Watson's testimony to the House. Keefe quoted Watson's 1934 article "The Great Choice, Reformation or Transformation," and said that, asked about it, Watson answered "I just do not believe in that any more. That was the effusion of an academic mind written in 1934," and "I disavow myself of that sort of philosophy."[^52] The printed hearings record Watson's answer on the article as that it was an academic idea that had appealed to him at the time and that "I do not now believe it to be true," and record Keefe's question whether he had ever published an article disavowing it, to which Watson answered "That is true" (that he had not).[^53] Kerr told the House on May 18 that the employees "have no property rights in their offices" and that "One Congress can take away their rights given them by another."[^54]
|
||||
On May 17, 1943 Frank B. Keefe of Wisconsin read excerpts of Watson's testimony to the House. Keefe quoted Watson's 1934 article "The Great Choice, Reformation or Transformation," and said that, asked about it, Watson answered "I just do not believe in that any more. That was the effusion of an academic mind written in 1934," and "I disavow myself of that sort of philosophy."[^53] The printed hearings record Watson's answer on the article as that it was an academic idea that had appealed to him at the time and that "I do not now believe it to be true," and record Keefe's question whether he had ever published an article disavowing it, to which Watson answered "That is true" (that he had not).[^54] Kerr told the House on May 18 that the employees "have no property rights in their offices" and that "One Congress can take away their rights given them by another."[^55]
|
||||
|
||||
The House approved the rider a second time. The Senate rejected it four times before accepting it, 48 to 32. The President signed the appropriation bill while denouncing the rider and declaring it unconstitutional.[^55] The rider became Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, which halted pay for the three men after November 15, 1943 unless the President reappointed them with the advice and consent of the Senate.[^56]
|
||||
The House approved the rider a second time. The Senate rejected it four times before accepting it, 48 to 32. The President signed the appropriation bill while denouncing the rider and declaring it unconstitutional.[^56] The rider became Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, which halted pay for the three men after November 15, 1943 unless the President reappointed them with the advice and consent of the Senate.[^57]
|
||||
|
||||
In [[United States v. Lovett]], decided June 3, 1946, the Supreme Court held Section 304 unconstitutional. Justice Black wrote that "legislative trials and punishments were too dangerous to liberty to exist in the nation of free men they envisioned." He continued: "And so they proscribed bills of attainder. Section 304 is one."[^57] The judgment ran for Lovett, Watson and Dodd.
|
||||
In [[United States v. Lovett]], decided June 3, 1946, the Supreme Court held Section 304 unconstitutional. Justice Black wrote that "legislative trials and punishments were too dangerous to liberty to exist in the nation of free men they envisioned." He continued: "And so they proscribed bills of attainder. Section 304 is one."[^58] The judgment ran for Lovett, Watson and Dodd.
|
||||
|
||||
Other staff were drawn into the same attacks. [[Peter Rhodes]], [[Audrey Menefee]] and Speier were attacked on the House floor. Fly wrote to [[J. Edgar Hoover]] on April 28, 1942 that one informant had described the New York school where Speier taught as a "refuge for exiled European communists," and a counter-report called it "a nest of pro-Nazi activities."[^58]
|
||||
Other staff were drawn into the same attacks. [[Peter Rhodes]], [[Audrey Menefee]] and Speier were attacked on the House floor. Fly wrote to [[J. Edgar Hoover]] on April 28, 1942 that one informant had described the New York school where Speier taught as a "refuge for exiled European communists," and a counter-report called it "a nest of pro-Nazi activities."[^59]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Cox Committee
|
||||
|
||||
The most serious confrontation with Congress came from [[Eugene Cox]], a Georgia congressman who had been an enthusiastic supporter of the FCC. The FCC referred a case about an Atlanta radio station's representation to the Justice Department and urged prosecution of Cox, and Cox retaliated by seeking an investigation of the FCC. In early 1943 the House named him chairman of a special committee, and he appointed [[Eugene Garey]], a New York lawyer, as chief investigator.[^59]
|
||||
The most serious confrontation with Congress came from [[Eugene Cox]], a Georgia congressman who had been an enthusiastic supporter of the FCC. The FCC referred a case about an Atlanta radio station's representation to the Justice Department and urged prosecution of Cox, and Cox retaliated by seeking an investigation of the FCC. In early 1943 the House named him chairman of a special committee, and he appointed [[Eugene Garey]], a New York lawyer, as chief investigator.[^60]
|
||||
|
||||
The committee requisitioned the FBIS personnel files. Leigh reported, in his January 1945 article in [[Harper's Magazine]], that the truck took away "three-fourths of FBIS personnel files," which had no duplicates, and held them for more than a year.[^60] Ten FBIS employees were subpoenaed at 8:00 a.m. after working all night, and Leigh called the questioning that followed "Star Chamber testimony."[^60]
|
||||
The committee requisitioned the FBIS personnel files. Leigh reported, in his January 1945 article in [[Harper's Magazine]], that the truck took away "three-fourths of FBIS personnel files," which had no duplicates, and held them for more than a year.[^61] Ten FBIS employees were subpoenaed at 8:00 a.m. after working all night, and Leigh called the questioning that followed "Star Chamber testimony."[^61]
|
||||
|
||||
The committee found one actual irregularity at FBIS, a night clerical shift in which a sick employee drew pay while coworkers marked her present. It publicized that case and also charged that FBIS was "masquerading" as a war agency, that it used "intelligence" in its name to misrepresent its operations, and that it was no more than a "glorified news gathering agency."[^61] Counsel for the committee also charged that Leigh changed the name of the service to "dignify its activities."[^62]
|
||||
The committee found one actual irregularity at FBIS, a night clerical shift in which a sick employee drew pay while coworkers marked her present. It publicized that case and also charged that FBIS was "masquerading" as a war agency, that it used "intelligence" in its name to misrepresent its operations, and that it was no more than a "glorified news gathering agency."[^62] Counsel for the committee also charged that Leigh changed the name of the service to "dignify its activities."[^63]
|
||||
|
||||
The Washington Post ran a series of sixteen editorials critical of the committee. An FCC member who usually opposed Fly's views and was sympathetic to Cox agreed to petition the Speaker to dismiss him as chairman, and Cox resigned after an emotional speech. [[Clarence F. Lea]] of California took over the committee, fired Garey, and promised the FCC a fair hearing.[^63]
|
||||
The Washington Post ran a series of sixteen editorials critical of the committee. An FCC member who usually opposed Fly's views and was sympathetic to Cox agreed to petition the Speaker to dismiss him as chairman, and Cox resigned after an emotional speech. [[Clarence F. Lea]] of California took over the committee, fired Garey, and promised the FCC a fair hearing.[^64]
|
||||
|
||||
FBIS officials testified in May 1944. Leigh made the principal statement, [[Stewart Hensley]] described the wire service, [[Ellis G. Porter]] described the publications, and Harold N. Graves Jr., who had left FBIS and was a naval officer by then, described the Analysis Division. The Lea committee's final report of January 2, 1945 cleared FBIS of wrongdoing and stated that it was rendering an efficient and worthwhile service. Two members, [[Louis E. Miller]] of Missouri and [[Richard B. Wigglesworth]] of Massachusetts, filed a dissenting minority report expressing "grave doubt" as to the value of FBIS materials. In his own minority report Wigglesworth, a member of the Appropriations Committee, charged that Fly and Leigh had violated the law by soliciting aid in congressional appropriations for the FCC, and stated that it was "but fair to assume" that the select committee's inquiry was "largely responsible" for a two-million-dollar cut in the FCC's appropriation for fiscal 1945.[^64] The majority report, quoted in *On the Beam* on February 3, 1945, stated that "Obviously the United States could not conduct an intelligent program for counteracting enemy propaganda without a reasonably accurate knowledge of that propaganda."[^65]
|
||||
FBIS officials testified in May 1944. Leigh made the principal statement, [[Stewart Hensley]] described the wire service, [[Ellis G. Porter]] described the publications, and Harold N. Graves Jr., who had left FBIS and was a naval officer by then, described the Analysis Division. The Lea committee's final report of January 2, 1945 cleared FBIS of wrongdoing and stated that it was rendering an efficient and worthwhile service. Two members, [[Louis E. Miller]] of Missouri and [[Richard B. Wigglesworth]] of Massachusetts, filed a dissenting minority report expressing "grave doubt" as to the value of FBIS materials. In his own minority report Wigglesworth, a member of the Appropriations Committee, charged that Fly and Leigh had violated the law by soliciting aid in congressional appropriations for the FCC, and stated that it was "but fair to assume" that the select committee's inquiry was "largely responsible" for a two-million-dollar cut in the FCC's appropriation for fiscal 1945.[^65] The majority report, quoted in *On the Beam* on February 3, 1945, stated that "Obviously the United States could not conduct an intelligent program for counteracting enemy propaganda without a reasonably accurate knowledge of that propaganda."[^66]
|
||||
|
||||
### Budget Cuts and Leigh's Departure
|
||||
|
||||
The budget was the next weapon. A newsletter by Leigh on February 15, 1944 reported that the House Appropriations Committee would eliminate 30 percent of the service's budget from July onward, and noted that the committee had given no reason. Leigh wrote that "[t]he obvious conclusion is that the proposed cut relates to the opposition on the part of Representative Cox to FCC for reasons well known and [to] the Dodd-Watson case." Leigh resigned that summer.[^66] The House Appropriations Committee recommended a cut of 25 percent for each FCC department. The Senate Appropriations Committee, under Senator [[Kenneth McKellar]], demanded proof of the service's value, and then recommended a cut of $500,000 that both houses approved.[^67]
|
||||
The budget was the next weapon. A newsletter by Leigh on February 15, 1944 reported that the House Appropriations Committee would eliminate 30 percent of the service's budget from July onward, and noted that the committee had given no reason. Leigh wrote that "[t]he obvious conclusion is that the proposed cut relates to the opposition on the part of Representative Cox to FCC for reasons well known and [to] the Dodd-Watson case." Leigh resigned that summer.[^67] The House Appropriations Committee recommended a cut of 25 percent for each FCC department. The Senate Appropriations Committee, under Senator [[Kenneth McKellar]], demanded proof of the service's value, and then recommended a cut of $500,000 that both houses approved.[^68]
|
||||
|
||||
Leigh wrote in *Harper's* that no congressional statement gave the real reason for the cut, and that Fly was ruled out of order when he tried to state it to the Senate Appropriations Committee. He quoted a member of Congress, speaking privately: "Surely it was a punitive cut. Larry Fly has been defiant of Congress for a long time. He has been openly defiant. Now his chickens have come home to roost." The CIA's history of the service describes the cut as made to punish Fly and the FCC for defiance of Congress and for Fly's request that the Department of Justice prosecute Cox.[^68] Hyneman became director on July 27, 1944 and served until August 7, 1945, when [[Russell M. Shepherd]] became the fourth director.[^69]
|
||||
Leigh wrote in *Harper's* that no congressional statement gave the real reason for the cut, and that Fly was ruled out of order when he tried to state it to the Senate Appropriations Committee. He quoted a member of Congress, speaking privately: "Surely it was a punitive cut. Larry Fly has been defiant of Congress for a long time. He has been openly defiant. Now his chickens have come home to roost." The CIA's history of the service describes the cut as made to punish Fly and the FCC for defiance of Congress and for Fly's request that the Department of Justice prosecute Cox.[^69] Hyneman became director on July 27, 1944 and served until August 7, 1945, when [[Russell M. Shepherd]] became the fourth director.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
In the second half of 1944 the service abandoned most of its analytical work. A liaison study of April 1944 found that State, War, the Foreign Economic Administration and the [[Office of Strategic Services]] were reluctant to give up the analytical publications but would drop them and keep the Daily Report if they had to choose, and the Special Reports Section of six analysts in the OWI office was abolished on December 31, 1944. Only the Far East Division under Audrey Menefee kept analytical work. Certain quarters protested in November 1944; Hyneman answered that State should set up a Russian analysis team to use the service's materials and recommended that it obtain the retiring Soviet expert Charles Prince. On January 17, 1945 [[Geroid T. Robinson]] of the OSS wrote to Hyneman to express regret that the analytical work had been discontinued, and added that he hoped the Daily Report would carry more Soviet radio material.[^70] The Soviet Embassy in Washington had asked for copies of the Daily Report as early as November 11, 1942, with State Department approval, and in London the service received the daily Soviet communique directly from TASS.[^71]
|
||||
In the second half of 1944 the service abandoned most of its analytical work. A liaison study of April 1944 found that State, War, the Foreign Economic Administration and the [[Office of Strategic Services]] were reluctant to give up the analytical publications but would drop them and keep the Daily Report if they had to choose, and the Special Reports Section of six analysts in the OWI office was abolished on December 31, 1944. Only the Far East Division under Audrey Menefee kept analytical work. Certain quarters protested in November 1944; Hyneman answered that State should set up a Russian analysis team to use the service's materials and recommended that it obtain the retiring Soviet expert Charles Prince. On January 17, 1945 [[Geroid T. Robinson]] of the OSS wrote to Hyneman to express regret that the analytical work had been discontinued, and added that he hoped the Daily Report would carry more Soviet radio material.[^71] The Soviet Embassy in Washington had asked for copies of the Daily Report as early as November 11, 1942, with State Department approval, and in London the service received the daily Soviet communique directly from TASS.[^72]
|
||||
|
||||
### War Department Custody, 1945 to 1946
|
||||
|
||||
A draft executive order survives among the service's files, undated and bearing the name of [[Harry S. Truman]], to transfer its functions to the State Department and to the Interim Research and Intelligence Service. The draft was apparently prepared by Shepherd and perhaps by State Department representatives, and it was never approved by the Secretary of State.[^72]
|
||||
A draft executive order survives among the service's files, undated and bearing the name of [[Harry S. Truman]], to transfer its functions to the State Department and to the Interim Research and Intelligence Service. The draft was apparently prepared by Shepherd and perhaps by State Department representatives, and it was never approved by the Secretary of State.[^73]
|
||||
|
||||
On September 19, 1945 the House Appropriations Committee voted to rescind part of the National Defense Activities appropriation. On 26 September the FCC announced that FBIS would go out of existence within thirty days, and sent thirty-day notices to employees. On 1 December a conference committee reported a compromise rescinding half the remaining money, $465,000, which both houses approved on 3 December. FBIS operations came to a close on December 10, 1945.[^73]
|
||||
On September 19, 1945 the House Appropriations Committee voted to rescind part of the National Defense Activities appropriation. On 26 September the FCC announced that FBIS would go out of existence within thirty days, and sent thirty-day notices to employees. On 1 December a conference committee reported a compromise rescinding half the remaining money, $465,000, which both houses approved on 3 December. FBIS operations came to a close on December 10, 1945.[^74]
|
||||
|
||||
Mercado writes that the last Daily Report appeared on December 4, 1945, and that the FCC terminated the service the following day.[^74] The FCC's annual report for fiscal 1946 says FBIS was "discontinued as a Commission activity on December 30, 1945."[^75]
|
||||
Mercado writes that the last Daily Report appeared on December 4, 1945, and that the FCC terminated the service the following day.[^75] The FCC's annual report for fiscal 1946 says FBIS was "discontinued as a Commission activity on December 30, 1945."[^76]
|
||||
|
||||
The War Department then stepped in. On December 13, 1945 Shepherd told the FCC that the War Department had requested an executive order transferring FBIS to the Military Intelligence Division effective January 1, 1946. On 21 December Secretary of War [[Robert P. Patterson]] wrote to [[Paul Porter]], chairman of the FCC, asking that FBIS personnel transfer on 31 December. Porter accepted on 27 December, and the service resumed on January 2, 1946 under War Department sponsorship. Shepherd asked that operations continue until the transfer, and only token operations followed, with little monitoring and no publications. No document authorizing continued operations has been found, although "permission may have been given orally."[^76]
|
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The War Department then stepped in. On December 13, 1945 Shepherd told the FCC that the War Department had requested an executive order transferring FBIS to the Military Intelligence Division effective January 1, 1946. On 21 December Secretary of War [[Robert P. Patterson]] wrote to [[Paul Porter]], chairman of the FCC, asking that FBIS personnel transfer on 31 December. Porter accepted on 27 December, and the service resumed on January 2, 1946 under War Department sponsorship. Shepherd asked that operations continue until the transfer, and only token operations followed, with little monitoring and no publications. No document authorizing continued operations has been found, although "permission may have been given orally."[^77]
|
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|
||||
### Central Intelligence Group and the Name
|
||||
|
||||
In January 1946 President Harry S. Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) by executive order. In February [[Hoyt Vandenberg]], then Assistant Chief of Staff for G-2, gave [[Sidney W. Souers]] a memorandum proposing that the CIG choose the agency to direct the service, and a committee of five, drawn from the CIG and the remaining Intelligence Advisory Board members, was formed to study it.[^77][^78]
|
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In January 1946 President Harry S. Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) by executive order. In February [[Hoyt Vandenberg]], then Assistant Chief of Staff for G-2, gave [[Sidney W. Souers]] a memorandum proposing that the CIG choose the agency to direct the service, and a committee of five, drawn from the CIG and the remaining Intelligence Advisory Board members, was formed to study it.[^78][^79]
|
||||
|
||||
The ad hoc committee recommended that FBIS remain with the War Department, but that its operating organization be liquidated and rebuilt, because its publications circulated too widely and its personnel had not been screened for security. The War Department refused, arguing that operating a monitoring service was properly a CIG function, and proposed that the State Department take it over. State declined, and a State memorandum signed by [[William L. Langer]] on May 27, 1946 accepted CIG sponsorship.[^79]
|
||||
The ad hoc committee recommended that FBIS remain with the War Department, but that its operating organization be liquidated and rebuilt, because its publications circulated too widely and its personnel had not been screened for security. The War Department refused, arguing that operating a monitoring service was properly a CIG function, and proposed that the State Department take it over. State declined, and a State memorandum signed by [[William L. Langer]] on May 27, 1946 accepted CIG sponsorship.[^80]
|
||||
|
||||
The Director of Central Intelligence "assumed control" of FBIS on July 31, 1946, and personnel were transferred to the CIG on 3 November.[^80] NARA gives August 5, 1946 as the date of transfer to the CIG, and November 1, 1946 as the date its agency was abolished, with "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CIG, November-December, 1946" as the successor.[^81]
|
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The Director of Central Intelligence "assumed control" of FBIS on July 31, 1946, and personnel were transferred to the CIG on 3 November.[^81] NARA gives August 5, 1946 as the date of transfer to the CIG, and November 1, 1946 as the date its agency was abolished, with "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CIG, November-December, 1946" as the successor.[^82]
|
||||
|
||||
The name shifted during this period. A March 1946 CIG memorandum still uses the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service name.[^82] Shepherd's notice of October 31, 1946 announcing the personnel transfer of 3 November stated that the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service would immediately become the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, with publications and letterheads changed accordingly.[^83] On December 31, 1946 [[Edwin L. Sibert]], in charge of the CIG Office of Operations, informed the staff that the name had been changed to the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, and in a wire of January 2, 1947 designated Shepherd Chief, FBIB.[^84] By May and June 1947 CIG papers refer to the branch by that name. Colonel [[Lawrence K. White]], acting chief of the branch, met with Lloyd Stratton of the Associated Press in May 1947.[^85] A 1970 CIA history places a notice of July 28, 1947 telling field bureaus that they would no longer bear the "confusing name" of the branch, but would retain the name Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and that offices outside Washington were to camouflage their connection with CIG.[^86] A footnote in Mercado's article dates the name Foreign Broadcast Information Service to 1967.[^87]
|
||||
The name shifted during this period. A March 1946 CIG memorandum still uses the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service name.[^83] Shepherd's notice of October 31, 1946 announcing the personnel transfer of 3 November stated that the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service would immediately become the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, with publications and letterheads changed accordingly.[^84] On December 31, 1946 [[Edwin L. Sibert]], in charge of the CIG Office of Operations, informed the staff that the name had been changed to the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, and in a wire of January 2, 1947 designated Shepherd Chief, FBIB.[^85] By May and June 1947 CIG papers refer to the branch by that name. Colonel [[Lawrence K. White]], acting chief of the branch, met with Lloyd Stratton of the Associated Press in May 1947.[^86] A 1970 CIA history places a notice of July 28, 1947 telling field bureaus that they would no longer bear the "confusing name" of the branch, but would retain the name Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and that offices outside Washington were to camouflage their connection with CIG.[^87] A footnote in Mercado's article dates the name Foreign Broadcast Information Service to 1967.[^88]
|
||||
|
||||
### Central Intelligence Agency, 1947 onward
|
||||
|
||||
The [[National Security Act of 1947]] transformed the CIG into the CIA, and the successor is recorded as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^81] The service came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^88]
|
||||
The [[National Security Act of 1947]] transformed the CIG into the CIA, and the successor is recorded as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^82] The service came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^89]
|
||||
|
||||
Within the agency the service sat under the Assistant Director for Operations, Sibert. Shepherd proposed in a memorandum of November 5, 1946 that the service take up propaganda analysis, estimating 35 employees at $150,000 a year. The Assistant Director presented a scaled-down project to the PRC on January 6, 1947, approving Shepherd's program but making clear that FBIS would not take over "interpretative analysis." The reduced request was for a staff of twelve at $61,000 a year. White was announced as deputy chief of FBIS on January 9, 1947. A Special Reports Division was approved on February 13, 1947 on an experimental basis, began work on March 28, 1947 and issued its first Survey of Soviet Radio Broadcasts on April 15, 1947. The early years of analysis under the CIA are described as "stormy."[^89] Shepherd resigned on September 29, 1947, and Colonel White became chief.[^90]
|
||||
Within the agency the service sat under the Assistant Director for Operations, Sibert. Shepherd proposed in a memorandum of November 5, 1946 that the service take up propaganda analysis, estimating 35 employees at $150,000 a year. The Assistant Director presented a scaled-down project to the PRC on January 6, 1947, approving Shepherd's program but making clear that FBIS would not take over "interpretative analysis." The reduced request was for a staff of twelve at $61,000 a year. White was announced as deputy chief of FBIS on January 9, 1947. A Special Reports Division was approved on February 13, 1947 on an experimental basis, began work on March 28, 1947 and issued its first Survey of Soviet Radio Broadcasts on April 15, 1947. The early years of analysis under the CIA are described as "stormy."[^90] Shepherd resigned on September 29, 1947, and Colonel White became chief.[^91]
|
||||
|
||||
The service also had a working relationship with the BBC monitoring service. In June 1946 Shepherd spent three weeks in London with BBC officials, and met [[Malcolm Frost]], then chief of the BBC Monitoring Service, who proposed that the American service begin paying its share of the monitoring cost, perhaps $250,000 a year, or supply the BBC with enough material from its own monitoring to balance the books.[^91] The BBC service then employed 385 persons at a cost of $650,000 a year. After further negotiation, Frost informed the service on October 15, 1947 that the BBC had obtained authority and funds to sign an agreement.[^92]
|
||||
The service also had a working relationship with the BBC monitoring service. In June 1946 Shepherd spent three weeks in London with BBC officials, and met [[Malcolm Frost]], then chief of the BBC Monitoring Service, who proposed that the American service begin paying its share of the monitoring cost, perhaps $250,000 a year, or supply the BBC with enough material from its own monitoring to balance the books.[^92] The BBC service then employed 385 persons at a cost of $650,000 a year. After further negotiation, Frost informed the service on October 15, 1947 that the BBC had obtained authority and funds to sign an agreement.[^93]
|
||||
|
||||
After 1957 the service "had come of age as an established CIA unit." On March 23, 1961 the Directorate of Intelligence and the Assistant Director for Operations instructed FBIS to accept responsibility for propaganda indications, and that FBIS and the BBC together monitored broadcasts from 90 countries in 1961, a figure that rose to 115 by the spring of 1963.[^93]
|
||||
After 1957 the service "had come of age as an established CIA unit." On March 23, 1961 the Directorate of Intelligence and the Assistant Director for Operations instructed FBIS to accept responsibility for propaganda indications, and that FBIS and the BBC together monitored broadcasts from 90 countries in 1961, a figure that rose to 115 by the spring of 1963.[^94]
|
||||
|
||||
### Daily Report and Records
|
||||
|
||||
The Daily Report, the service's translation series, first appeared on November 18, 1941.[^94] Ellis G. Porter, a former newspaper editor, joined the staff in January 1942 to direct its publication.[^95] A Daily Report of the Far Eastern Section dated January 3, 1946 is in Record Group 262, Entry 25, Box 1, and the first issue of the new Daily Report was published that month.[^96]
|
||||
The Daily Report, the service's translation series, first appeared on November 18, 1941.[^95] Ellis G. Porter, a former newspaper editor, joined the staff in January 1942 to direct its publication.[^96] A Daily Report of the Far Eastern Section dated January 3, 1946 is in Record Group 262, Entry 25, Box 1, and the first issue of the new Daily Report was published that month.[^97]
|
||||
|
||||
The wartime records are held in [[Record Group 262]], including the daily reports of foreign radio broadcasts for 1941 to 1945, daily reports of the Far Eastern, Latin American and European sections for 1941 to 1946, the weekly reviews, the *Radio Reports on the Far East* for 1942 to 1945, and program schedules for 1942 to 1947. The Foreign Broadcast Information Branch records for 1947 and 1948 are in Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency.[^97]
|
||||
The wartime records are held in [[Record Group 262]], including the daily reports of foreign radio broadcasts for 1941 to 1945, daily reports of the Far Eastern, Latin American and European sections for 1941 to 1946, the weekly reviews, the *Radio Reports on the Far East* for 1942 to 1945, and program schedules for 1942 to 1947. The Foreign Broadcast Information Branch records for 1947 and 1948 are in Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency.[^98]
|
||||
|
||||
### Open Source Center, 2005
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -266,95 +266,96 @@ On November 8, 2005 [[John D. Negroponte]], the Director of National Intelligenc
|
|||
[^3]: Helena Huntington Smith, "It Pays to Listen," *Collier's*, January 30, 1943, pp. 43-44, which states "Its godfather was Breckinridge Long of the State Department, who foresaw that we might one day be cut off from accustomed sources of news in foreign countries. He took it up with Chairman Fly of the FCC." https://archive.org/details/colliers111janspri_201908. Stephen C. Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis, 1941-1945," Studies in Intelligence 45, no. 5 (2001), on Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, "godfather" of FBIS, and his letter of September 10, 1941 to FCC chairman James L. Fly. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^4]: Federal Communications Commission, Seventh Annual Report, fiscal year 1941, section on the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, "created February 26, 1941, by the Federal Communications Commission in cooperation with the Defense Communications Board." https://archive.org/details/fcc_DOC-308657A1.
|
||||
[^5]: Roop, Part I, p. 9, on the President's allotment of $150,000 on February 25, 1941, its transfer the next day, the "birth date" of the service on February 26, 1941. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^6]: Daniel Morris Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD dissertation, Duke University, 2013), p. 132, which describes "a late 1940 meeting between Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson and FDR" and the allocation of $150,000 on February 25, 1941. Stimson was Secretary of War from July 1940; Roop (note 7) gives the Secretary of State without naming him. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/items/19152946-8fbb-4b9b-9da0-faca0979e718.
|
||||
[^6]: Daniel Morris Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD dissertation, Duke University, 2013), p. 132, which describes "a late 1940 meeting between Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson and FDR" and the allocation of $150,000 on February 25, 1941. Stimson was Secretary of War from July 10, 1940 (National Archives, RG 107 finding aid); his term as Secretary of State ended March 4, 1933, and Cordell Hull held that office from March 4, 1933 to November 20, 1944 (Office of the Historian, Biographies of the Secretaries of State). https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/items/19152946-8fbb-4b9b-9da0-faca0979e718.
|
||||
[^7]: Roop, Part I, pp. 5-6, quoting the account that "Toward the end of 1940 the Secretary of State, in an informal discussion with President Roosevelt, suggested that a government unit should be established to monitor and analyze propaganda beamed to the United States." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^8]: Roop, Part I, p. 9, on the FCC's Radio Intelligence Division and its National Defense Activities, quoting the FCC as "the only group staffed and equipped" for the monitoring work. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^9]: Roop, Part I, p. 9, on the service's beginnings "in an old garage at 316 F Street Northeast," and p. 49, "In April a move was made to 1424 K St., N.W., where four floors were assigned to FBMS." Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," photograph caption, "FBIS headquarters from 1942-1947 at 1424 K Street, NW, in Washington." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^10]: Roop, Part I, pp. 49-50, on Leigh taking over "on 15 July 1942," his recommendation of the name Broadcast Intelligence Service, the phrase "less unwieldy and more accurately reflected the duties of the organization," the FCC's insistence on "foreign," and the change of July 26, 1942. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^11]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, "Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service," Record Group 262, administrative history, which gives "FCC order, July 28, 1942." https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html. The same guide's history line reads "Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service, 1942," which is an apparent typographical error.
|
||||
[^12]: Roop, Part I, p. 259, on Hyneman's memorandum for the FCC of March 2, 1945 proposing alternative names to avoid confusion with the FBI, the preference for Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service, the report in *On the Beam* of April 9, 1945, and, on p. 260, the reversal and the statement that the new name was "never formally adopted." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^13]: Harold N. Graves Jr., *War on the Short Wave* (Foreign Policy Association, Headline Books No. 30, 1941), Acknowledgments.
|
||||
[^14]: Princeton University Library, "Princeton Listening Center Records, 1939-1941" (AC015), finding aid, Scope and Contents and Biographical / Historical notes. https://findingaids.princeton.edu/catalog/AC015 (EAD at https://findingaids.princeton.edu/catalog/AC015.xml). The finding aid states that the project "was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation," that the center "continued its work successfully until June, 1941," and that its published book was *Propaganda by Short Wave*, edited by Harwood L. Childs and John B. Whitton (Princeton University Press, 1942).
|
||||
[^15]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on the Princeton Listening Center's launch in November 1939 with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, and on its absorption by FBIS in June. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^16]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 133, on the absorption of the Princeton Listening Center and Graves's post as Senior Administrative Officer. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/items/19152946-8fbb-4b9b-9da0-faca0979e718.
|
||||
[^17]: Roop, Part I, p. 10, describing Graves as "the young man who had been acting as director of the Princeton Listening Post since its inception" and naming the Princeton staff; Roop, Part I, pp. 93-95, on the Baltimore Sun article, Graves's memo of July 9, 1941 about his "embarrassment," the "dragging in" of the Princeton Listening Post, the "brain child" description, and the Eleanor Ragsdale column of September 8, 1941. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^18]: Roop, Part I, pp. 93-95. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^19]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," note 24: Nelson A. Rockefeller to James L. Fly, July 29, 1942, National Archives, RG 262, Entry 68, Box 22, quoted as "We have been able thus far to make good use of the material provided by teletype from the Kingsville Field Bureau of the Monitoring Service of your Commission." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^20]: FBIS Administrative Memorandum No. 16, "To Officers of the FBIS," January 22, 1943. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP82-00177R000300410017-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00177r000300410017-3
|
||||
[^21]: Roop, Part I, p. 10, on Free's editorship of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and "Mr. Free assumed office as Director on 16 June 1941" (p. 11); p. 35, on Free's contacts with BBC officials "very soon after he assumed office with the idea of attaching a staff to BBC." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^22]: Roop, Part I, pp. 36-37, quoting "With Lloyd Free still in London, Harold Graves and Tom Grandin took over at 316 F St. on 7 December 1941." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^23]: Roop, Part I, pp. 48-50, on Free's resignation in April 1942 "to accept a commission in the Army," his service as military attache in the United States Embassy in Switzerland, the appointment of Leigh of Bennington College, the $1,000 difference from Free's $8,000 salary and the appropriation bill provision, and Graves as Acting Director until Leigh took over on July 15, 1942. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^24]: Roop, Part I, p. 189, on Free and Graves's recruitment of Goodwin Watson of Columbia University, who "entered upon duty 17 November 1941." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^25]: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., acting under H. Res. 105 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 2. https://archive.org/details/1943-watson-dodd-lovett
|
||||
[^26]: Roop, Part I, p. 50, on the Analysis Section becoming the Analysis Division. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^27]: Central Intelligence Agency Reading Room, Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (National Archives records description, compiled by Walter W. Weinstein): "Goodwin Watson was Director of the Division from November 15, 1941, until November 15, 1943, when he was succeeded by Theodore Newcomb." https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp08t00376r000100250001-1
|
||||
[^28]: Roop, Part I, p. 122, on Newcomb, "who was second only to Watson in the Analysis Division," in a note of February 15, 1943. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947
|
||||
[^29]: Roop, Part I, p. 57, "In March 1942 the table of organization of the Analysis Division called for 37 analysts, assistants, and trainees, but with only 17 of the positions filled," and p. 58, "the planned table of organization was never reached." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^30]: Roop, Part I, p. 46, that Watson and Leites "were sent to London in September 1942" to set up analysis, and that "a two-man analysis staff remained" through the war. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^31]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on the Central European Radio Analysis, begun January 1943 by the German Section, and the Radio Report on the Far East, first published August 24, 1942 (RG 262, Entry 34, Box 1). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^32]: Roop, Part I, pp. 121-122 (Leigh's announcement of April 19, 1943; Graves on May 13, 1943; Eugene Katz's letter of June 18, 1943). https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947
|
||||
[^33]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 132-133, on Speier's report sent "a week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor," Free and Watson's reading of his work "with the greatest of interest," the February 1942 offer, and the Analysis Division as the "heart" of the service.
|
||||
[^34]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 132, note 51, citing Harold Graves to Hans Speier and Ernst Kris, December 23, 1941, and Lloyd Free to Hans Speier, January 31, 1942, RG 262, Entry 2, Box 66. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/items/19152946-8fbb-4b9b-9da0-faca0979e718.
|
||||
[^35]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 134, which places the letter of May 26, 1942 two months after Speier entered the Analysis Division and quotes it as stating that, "as a result of investigation," he had "been rated eligible on suitability for the position of Senior Political Analyst" (note 59: United States Civil Service Commission to Hans Speier, May 26, 1942, Speier Papers, Box 2, Folder 5). https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/items/19152946-8fbb-4b9b-9da0-faca0979e718.
|
||||
[^36]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 135, on Speier's colleagues George, Leites and Henry Kellermann and on Watson's praise, with the quoted phrases "extraordinarily good job of analysis" and "nobody in the United States whom I would willingly trade for him" (note 62).
|
||||
[^37]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 138 and p. 143 (note 90), on Watson leaving "under pressure from enemies of the New Deal" and Speier becoming acting chief analyst, overseeing thirty people.
|
||||
[^38]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 143 and note 90 (Theodore Newcomb to Col. S. A. Greenwell, December 4, 1943; Speier's Application for Federal Employment, Speier Papers, Box 2, Folder 5): "Speier replaced Watson as Acting Chief Analyst."
|
||||
[^39]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 145, on Speier's transfer on "May 22, 1944" from the Analysis Division to the Office of War Information, with Wallace Carroll as his immediate superior.
|
||||
[^40]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 136-137, on the memorandum of October 29, 1943, the seventeen of twenty-five predictions, Mark Abrams, Representative Joseph Martin and Senator Alexander Wiley.
|
||||
[^41]: Roop, Part I, p. 189, on Dies's letter to Fly of November 18, 1941, which expressed "deep concern" and named thirteen organizations. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^42]: Roop, Part I, pp. 190-191, on Fly's reply that Watson "belonged to only one of the 13 organizations Dies named," the Senate Appropriations Committee's deletion of the rider, Dodd's hiring as an editor in December 1941, and Watson's testimony of February 4, 1942. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947. Roop and Mercado spell the analyst's surname "Schumann"; Bessner writes "Schuman."
|
||||
[^43]: Roop, Part I, pp. 191-192, on Dies's House speech of February 1, 1943, listing 39 "communists," with Dodd, Watson and Schumann at the head of the list. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^44]: Congressional Record, vol. 89, pp. 623-624 (House, February 4, 1943, notice of the amendment naming thirty-nine employees), and pp. 645, 655 and 656 (House, February 5, 1943). Roop, Part I, pp. 191-192, states that a rider "immediately was attached" to the appropriation bill after Dies's speech. https://archive.org/details/sim_congressional-record-proceedings-and-debates_january-06-march-01-1943_89
|
||||
[^45]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on Congressman Dies accusing three FBIS employees, among dozens of civil servants, of "un-American beliefs." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^46]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," quoting Vice President Henry Wallace on Dies. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^47]: Hearings (as above), pp. iii-v and 1 (the text of H. Res. 105 and the membership; first sitting April 9, 1943, "pursuant to adjournment on Wednesday, April 7, 1943"). https://archive.org/details/1943-watson-dodd-lovett
|
||||
[^48]: Congressional Record, vol. 89, pp. 2788-2789 (House, March 31, 1943). https://archive.org/details/sim_congressional-record-proceedings-and-debates_march-02-april-05-1943_89
|
||||
[^49]: Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 89, p. 3068 (House, April 7, 1943). https://archive.org/details/sim_congressional-record-proceedings-and-debates_april-06-may-13-1943_89
|
||||
[^50]: Roop, Part I, pp. 192-193, on the subcommittee under Congressman Kerr, which started hearings on April 2, 1943 and reported on 21 April, the findings of "subversive activity" and "unfit," the three named men, and the statement that the subcommittee "was later accused of having its final report prepared before the men were called to testify." Roop states that the subcommittee was named by the Un-American Activities Committee. The printed hearings give the authority as House Resolution 105, adopted February 9, 1943, directed to the Committee on Appropriations (Hearings, pp. iii-v), and give the sitting at which Watson's testimony begins as April 9, 1943, against Roop's April 2. *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), likewise describes a special subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, appointed under a House resolution, whose report is H. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. The Monthly Catalog lists H. Rept. 448 (May 14, 1943, pursuant to H. Res. 105, "submitted by Mr. Kerr") on Watson, Dodd and Lovett; a February 1943 newspaper report names Kerr, a North Carolina Democrat, as chairman of the subcommittee. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/328/303.
|
||||
[^51]: Hearings (as above), Appendix D, H. Rept. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 327-334, including the finding that Schuman's case did not support a recommendation of unfitness and the findings on Watson and Dodd.
|
||||
[^52]: Congressional Record, vol. 89, pp. 4554-4555 (House, May 17, 1943). https://archive.org/details/sim_congressional-record-proceedings-and-debates_may-14-june-14-1943_89
|
||||
[^53]: Hearings (as above), pp. 100-105 and 118-119.
|
||||
[^54]: Congressional Record, vol. 89, p. 4583 (House, May 18, 1943), the page cited in *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
|
||||
[^55]: Roop, Part I, p. 193, on the Senate's four rejections, its approval of the rider by 48 to 32, and the President's signature while denouncing the rider and declaring it unconstitutional.
|
||||
[^56]: Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, section 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450, as quoted in *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Roop, Part I, p. 193, note, gives the effective cutoff as November 21, 1943, where the statute as quoted gives 15 November. The enacted text also excepted accrued leave and salary and payment for jury or armed-forces service; the text proposed in the subcommittee's report (Hearings, p. 328) omitted the November 15 date and the reappointment clause. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/328/303.
|
||||
[^57]: *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), argued May 3-6, 1946, decided June 3, 1946, opinion of Justice Black. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/328/303. Mercado's article gives the middle name as "Morse."
|
||||
[^58]: Roop, Part I, pp. 194-195, on the attacks on Rhodes, Menefee and Speier; Fly's letter to J. Edgar Hoover of April 28, 1942, and the two informant reports, one calling the New York school a "refuge for exiled European communists" and the other calling it "a nest of pro-Nazi activities."
|
||||
[^59]: Roop, Part I, p. 196, on Cox, the Atlanta station case, the FCC's referral to the Justice Department, the House's naming of Cox as chairman in early 1943, and the appointment of Eugene Garey as investigator.
|
||||
[^60]: Roop, Part I, p. 197, on the removal of "three-fourths of FBIS personnel files," the subpoena of ten employees at 8:00 a.m., and "Star Chamber testimony," citing Leigh's article "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats" (subtitle "The case of FCC Chairman Fly and Congressman Cox"), *Harper's Magazine*, January 1945. https://harpers.org/archive/1945/01/politicians-vs-bureaucrats. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^61]: Roop, Part I, p. 198, on the single irregularity found at FBIS and the list of charges, including "masquerading," "intelligence" and "glorified news gathering agency." Mercado renders the last phrase as "glorified news agency."
|
||||
[^62]: Roop, Part I, p. 50, on the Cox counsel's charge that Leigh changed the name of the service to "dignify its activities," make it sound more like a war agency, and influence Congress to grant appropriations."
|
||||
[^63]: Roop, Part I, pp. 198-199, on the Washington Post's sixteen editorials, the FCC member who "agreed to petition the Speaker of the House to dismiss Cox as chairman," Cox's resignation after an emotional speech, Lea's succession, and Garey's dismissal. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947. Louis E. Miller (R-Mo.) and Richard B. Wigglesworth (R-Mass.) are the minority members named in *Broadcasting*, January 8, 1945. Full names: Clarence Frederick Lea (D-Calif.), Louis Ebenezer Miller (R-Mo.), Richard Bowditch Wigglesworth (R-Mass.) and Kenneth Douglas McKellar (D-Tenn.), per the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress as reproduced in the unitedstates/congress-legislators dataset.
|
||||
[^64]: "Lea Probe Demands Sweeping Law Change," *Broadcasting*, January 8, 1945, on the Miller and Wigglesworth minority reports and Wigglesworth's statements. https://www.worldradiohistory.com/Archive-BC/BC-1945/1945-01-08-BC.pdf.
|
||||
[^65]: Roop, Part I, pp. 200-201, on the May 1944 testimony of Leigh, Hensley, Porter and Graves; the Lea report of January 2, 1945 ("an efficient and worthwhile service"); the Miller and Wigglesworth minority report ("grave doubt"); and the majority passage quoted in *On the Beam* of February 3, 1945, in the note on p. 201. The hearings are *Hearings of the Special House Committee Investigating the FCC* (GPO, 1944), three volumes, with FBIS testimony beginning in Volume III, page 3439. Roop, Part I, p. 189, records Graves's resignation by the end of 1943.
|
||||
[^66]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on Leigh's newsletter of February 15, 1944: "The obvious conclusion is that the proposed cut relates to the opposition on the part of Representative Cox to FCC," the 30 percent figure, and Leigh's resignation "that summer." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^67]: Roop, Part I, pp. 204-206, on the House Appropriations Committee's recommended cut of 25 percent for each FCC department, Senator McKellar's demand for proof, and the Senate Appropriations Committee's recommended cut of $500,000 that both houses approved. Mercado's figure of 30 percent is given at note 48.
|
||||
[^68]: Roop, Part I, pp. 206-207, on the absence of any stated congressional reason for the cut, Fly's being ruled out of order, the statement that "it was a punitive cut, made to punish Fly and FCC for defiance of Congress and for Fly's effrontery in asking the Department of Justice to prosecute Eugene Cox, a member of Congress," and, in the note on p. 207, Leigh's quotation of a member of Congress speaking privately, from Leigh's *Harper's Magazine* article, January 1945. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^69]: Roop, Part I, pp. 241-244, "Charles S. Hyneman, who succeeded Leigh as FBIS director on 27 July 1944," and p. 260, "from 27 July 1944 to 7 August 1945," and Shepherd's appointment as the fourth FBIS Director. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^70]: Roop, Part I, pp. 256-257 (note on the liaison study of April 29, 1944; abolition of the Special Reports Section on December 31, 1944), p. 259 (Far East Division retained "the only analytical work done in FBIS"), and pp. 267-268 (the protest of November 1944, Hyneman's response, and Robinson's letter of January 17, 1945). https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^71]: Roop, Part I, p. 268, on the Soviet Embassy's request of November 11, 1942 and the TASS arrangement in London in 1943. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^72]: Roop, Part I, p. 275, note, on the undated executive order with the name of President Truman, transferring FBIS functions to the Interim Research and Intelligence Service, "prepared by Shepherd and perhaps some representatives from State," and "never approved by the Secretary of State." Job 54-27, Box 15, CIA Records Center.
|
||||
[^73]: Roop, Part I, pp. 274-277, on the House Appropriations Committee's action of September 19, 1945, the FCC's news release of 26 September, the conference compromise of 1 December ($465,000) approved on 3 December, and the closing of operations on December 10, 1945.
|
||||
[^74]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on the last Daily Report "on 4 December" and the FCC's termination "the following day." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^75]: Federal Communications Commission, Twelfth Annual Report, fiscal year ended June 30, 1946, which states that FBIS "was discontinued as a Commission activity on December 30, 1945." https://archive.org/details/fcc_DOC-308665A1.
|
||||
[^76]: Roop, Part I, pp. 278-280, on Shepherd's letter of December 13, 1945 to the FCC, the token operations that followed, Patterson's letter of 21 December, Porter's reply of 27 December, the resumption on January 2, 1946 under War Department sponsorship, and the note on p. 279 that "No documents authorizing continued operations have been found, but permission may have been given orally." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^77]: Roop, Part I, pp. 299-300, on the creation of the CIG by executive order in January 1946, the Vandenberg memorandum to Souers in February 1946, and the five-member committee. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^78]: Central Intelligence Group, "Survey of the Function of Monitoring Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers," C.I.G. 1, memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, February 25, 1946, which states that FBIS functions were "taken over by the War Department on an interim basis on 30 December 1945." https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110003-4. Ad hoc committee report, March 18, 1946: https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110004-3.
|
||||
[^79]: Roop, Part I, pp. 301-303, on the ad hoc committee's recommendations (March 18, 1946), the War Department's refusal, the State Department's reply, C.I.G. 1/1 (April 26, 1946), C.I.G. 1/2 (May 8, 1946, signed by James S. Lay), and the State memorandum signed by William L. Langer on May 27, 1946, enclosed with C.I.G. 1/3 (June 4, 1946).
|
||||
[^80]: Roop, Part I, pp. 303-304, on the notice, signed for the Director of Central Intelligence by Col. John Dabney, that the Director had "assumed control" of FBIS on July 31, 1946, and on the personnel transfer to CIG on November 3, 1946, announced on 31 October. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^81]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, RG 262, administrative history: transfer to the Central Intelligence Group, "August 5, 1946"; "Abolished: November 1, 1946"; successors "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CIG, November-December, 1946," "Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, CIG, January-September 1947," and "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-." https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
|
||||
[^82]: CIG, "Background on Development of Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service," memorandum for the Chief, Information Branch, March 1946. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110001-6.
|
||||
[^83]: Roop, Part I, pp. 303-304, on the notice of October 31, 1946 that "the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service would immediately become the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), with all publications and letterheads changed accordingly." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^84]: Roop, Part I, p. 305 and note, on Sibert's statement of December 31, 1946 "informing that the name had been changed to the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB)" and his wire of January 2, 1947 designating Russell Shepherd Chief, FBIB. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^85]: CIG, "'A' and 'X' Wire Services Furnished by Foreign Broadcast Information Branch," memorandum, June 10, 1947. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110015-1. Also memorandum on the May 6, 1947 interview of Colonel L. K. White, Acting Chief, FBIB, with Lloyd Stratton of the Associated Press. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110022-3.
|
||||
[^86]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), p. 102, on the notice that field bureaus would no longer bear "the confusing name of Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB)," and on the camouflage of their connection with CIG. The notice is dated July 28, 1947. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^87]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," note 4: "The initial monitoring service was renamed the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service in 1942 and evolved into the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in 1967." Roop, Part I, pp. 303-304 (the notice of October 31, 1946) and the 1947 CIG memoranda already use the later name. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^88]: Roop, Part I, p. 2, "FBIS took form during those six years before its adoption by the Central Intelligence Agency, and came to CIA almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^89]: Roop, Part II, pp. 151-152, on Shepherd's memorandum of November 5, 1946, the Assistant Director for Operations' presentation to the PRC on January 6, 1947, the 35-employee and $150,000 proposal, the reduced request of twelve staff at $61,000, the "stormy" early years, and the Special Reports Division (approved February 13, 1947, begun March 28, 1947, first Survey of Soviet Radio Broadcasts April 15, 1947); p. 2, on the announcement of Col. Lawrence K. White as Deputy Chief on January 9, 1947. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^90]: Roop, Part II, p. 56, "Shepherd resigned from FBIS on 29 September 1947," with Colonel White the new FBIS Chief. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690. Appointment of the fourth director: Roop, Part I, p. 260. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^91]: Roop, Part II, p. 51, on Shepherd's visit to London from June 24, 1946, his meeting with "Malcolm Frost, Chief of the BBC Monitoring Service," the $250,000 figure, and the BBC Monitoring Service's 385 employees and $650,000 cost. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^92]: Roop, Part II, pp. 54-56, on the Shepherd-Frost negotiations and the notice of October 15, 1947. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^93]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service History, Part III: 1957-1967" (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, May 1972), p. 2, "after 1957 FBIS had come of age as an established CIA unit"; p. 19, on the March 23, 1961 instruction to accept responsibility for propaganda indications; and pp. 4-5, "FBIS and the BBC were monitoring broadcasts from 90 countries in 1961. By the spring of 1963 this number had increased to 115." https://archive.org/details/CIADirectorateOfIntelligenceHistoricalSeriesForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart319571967.
|
||||
[^94]: Roop, Part I, p. 25, on the mailing list for the Daily Report issued on November 18, 1941; Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," states that the service "published its first Daily Report of translations on 18 November 1941." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^95]: Roop, Part I, p. 50, that Ellis G. Porter, "former editor of newspapers in Baltimore and Philadelphia," joined the staff in January 1942 "to direct publication of the Daily Report."
|
||||
[^96]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," note 39: "FBIS, Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Far Eastern Section, 3 January 1946, NARA, RG 262, Entry 25, Box 1," and the text that the first issue of the new Daily Report was published in January 1946. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^97]: NARA, Guide to Federal Records, RG 262: "Daily reports of foreign radio broadcasts, 1941-45"; "Daily reports of the Far Eastern, Latin American, and European Sections, 1941-46"; "Weekly reviews of official foreign broadcasts, 1941-44"; "Radio reports on the Far East, 1942-45"; "Program schedules of foreign broadcasts, 1942-47"; and "Related Records: Records of the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, 1947-48, in RG 263." https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
|
||||
[^8]: United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Cordell Hull," Biographies of the Secretaries of State. https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/hull-cordell
|
||||
[^9]: Roop, Part I, p. 9, on the FCC's Radio Intelligence Division and its National Defense Activities, quoting the FCC as "the only group staffed and equipped" for the monitoring work. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^10]: Roop, Part I, p. 9, on the service's beginnings "in an old garage at 316 F Street Northeast," and p. 49, "In April a move was made to 1424 K St., N.W., where four floors were assigned to FBMS." Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," photograph caption, "FBIS headquarters from 1942-1947 at 1424 K Street, NW, in Washington." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^11]: Roop, Part I, pp. 49-50, on Leigh taking over "on 15 July 1942," his recommendation of the name Broadcast Intelligence Service, the phrase "less unwieldy and more accurately reflected the duties of the organization," the FCC's insistence on "foreign," and the change of July 26, 1942. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^12]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, "Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service," Record Group 262, administrative history, which gives "FCC order, July 28, 1942." https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html. The same guide's history line reads "Federal Broadcast Intelligence Service, 1942," which is an apparent typographical error.
|
||||
[^13]: Roop, Part I, p. 259, on Hyneman's memorandum for the FCC of March 2, 1945 proposing alternative names to avoid confusion with the FBI, the preference for Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service, the report in *On the Beam* of April 9, 1945, and, on p. 260, the reversal and the statement that the new name was "never formally adopted." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^14]: Harold N. Graves Jr., *War on the Short Wave* (Foreign Policy Association, Headline Books No. 30, 1941), Acknowledgments.
|
||||
[^15]: Princeton University Library, "Princeton Listening Center Records, 1939-1941" (AC015), finding aid, Scope and Contents and Biographical / Historical notes. https://findingaids.princeton.edu/catalog/AC015 (EAD at https://findingaids.princeton.edu/catalog/AC015.xml). The finding aid states that the project "was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation," that the center "continued its work successfully until June, 1941," and that its published book was *Propaganda by Short Wave*, edited by Harwood L. Childs and John B. Whitton (Princeton University Press, 1942).
|
||||
[^16]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on the Princeton Listening Center's launch in November 1939 with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, and on its absorption by FBIS in June. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^17]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 133, on the absorption of the Princeton Listening Center and Graves's post as Senior Administrative Officer. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/items/19152946-8fbb-4b9b-9da0-faca0979e718.
|
||||
[^18]: Roop, Part I, p. 10, describing Graves as "the young man who had been acting as director of the Princeton Listening Post since its inception" and naming the Princeton staff; Roop, Part I, pp. 93-95, on the Baltimore Sun article, Graves's memo of July 9, 1941 about his "embarrassment," the "dragging in" of the Princeton Listening Post, the "brain child" description, and the Eleanor Ragsdale column of September 8, 1941. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^19]: Roop, Part I, pp. 93-95. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^20]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," note 24: Nelson A. Rockefeller to James L. Fly, July 29, 1942, National Archives, RG 262, Entry 68, Box 22, quoted as "We have been able thus far to make good use of the material provided by teletype from the Kingsville Field Bureau of the Monitoring Service of your Commission." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^21]: FBIS Administrative Memorandum No. 16, "To Officers of the FBIS," January 22, 1943. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP82-00177R000300410017-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82-00177r000300410017-3
|
||||
[^22]: Roop, Part I, p. 10, on Free's editorship of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and "Mr. Free assumed office as Director on 16 June 1941" (p. 11); p. 35, on Free's contacts with BBC officials "very soon after he assumed office with the idea of attaching a staff to BBC." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^23]: Roop, Part I, pp. 36-37, quoting "With Lloyd Free still in London, Harold Graves and Tom Grandin took over at 316 F St. on 7 December 1941." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^24]: Roop, Part I, pp. 48-50, on Free's resignation in April 1942 "to accept a commission in the Army," his service as military attache in the United States Embassy in Switzerland, the appointment of Leigh of Bennington College, the $1,000 difference from Free's $8,000 salary and the appropriation bill provision, and Graves as Acting Director until Leigh took over on July 15, 1942. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^25]: Roop, Part I, p. 189, on Free and Graves's recruitment of Goodwin Watson of Columbia University, who "entered upon duty 17 November 1941." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^26]: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., acting under H. Res. 105 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 2. https://archive.org/details/1943-watson-dodd-lovett
|
||||
[^27]: Roop, Part I, p. 50, on the Analysis Section becoming the Analysis Division. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^28]: Central Intelligence Agency Reading Room, Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (National Archives records description, compiled by Walter W. Weinstein): "Goodwin Watson was Director of the Division from November 15, 1941, until November 15, 1943, when he was succeeded by Theodore Newcomb." https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp08t00376r000100250001-1
|
||||
[^29]: Roop, Part I, p. 122, on Newcomb, "who was second only to Watson in the Analysis Division," in a note of February 15, 1943. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947
|
||||
[^30]: Roop, Part I, p. 57, "In March 1942 the table of organization of the Analysis Division called for 37 analysts, assistants, and trainees, but with only 17 of the positions filled," and p. 58, "the planned table of organization was never reached." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^31]: Roop, Part I, p. 46, that Watson and Leites "were sent to London in September 1942" to set up analysis, and that "a two-man analysis staff remained" through the war. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^32]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on the Central European Radio Analysis, begun January 1943 by the German Section, and the Radio Report on the Far East, first published August 24, 1942 (RG 262, Entry 34, Box 1). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^33]: Roop, Part I, pp. 121-122 (Leigh's announcement of April 19, 1943; Graves on May 13, 1943; Eugene Katz's letter of June 18, 1943). https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947
|
||||
[^34]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 132-133, on Speier's report sent "a week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor," Free and Watson's reading of his work "with the greatest of interest," the February 1942 offer, and the Analysis Division as the "heart" of the service.
|
||||
[^35]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 132, note 51, citing Harold Graves to Hans Speier and Ernst Kris, December 23, 1941, and Lloyd Free to Hans Speier, January 31, 1942, RG 262, Entry 2, Box 66. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/items/19152946-8fbb-4b9b-9da0-faca0979e718.
|
||||
[^36]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 134, which places the letter of May 26, 1942 two months after Speier entered the Analysis Division and quotes it as stating that, "as a result of investigation," he had "been rated eligible on suitability for the position of Senior Political Analyst" (note 59: United States Civil Service Commission to Hans Speier, May 26, 1942, Speier Papers, Box 2, Folder 5). https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/items/19152946-8fbb-4b9b-9da0-faca0979e718.
|
||||
[^37]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 135, on Speier's colleagues George, Leites and Henry Kellermann and on Watson's praise, with the quoted phrases "extraordinarily good job of analysis" and "nobody in the United States whom I would willingly trade for him" (note 62).
|
||||
[^38]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 138 and p. 143 (note 90), on Watson leaving "under pressure from enemies of the New Deal" and Speier becoming acting chief analyst, overseeing thirty people.
|
||||
[^39]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 143 and note 90 (Theodore Newcomb to Col. S. A. Greenwell, December 4, 1943; Speier's Application for Federal Employment, Speier Papers, Box 2, Folder 5): "Speier replaced Watson as Acting Chief Analyst."
|
||||
[^40]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 145, on Speier's transfer on "May 22, 1944" from the Analysis Division to the Office of War Information, with Wallace Carroll as his immediate superior.
|
||||
[^41]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 136-137, on the memorandum of October 29, 1943, the seventeen of twenty-five predictions, Mark Abrams, Representative Joseph Martin and Senator Alexander Wiley.
|
||||
[^42]: Roop, Part I, p. 189, on Dies's letter to Fly of November 18, 1941, which expressed "deep concern" and named thirteen organizations. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^43]: Roop, Part I, pp. 190-191, on Fly's reply that Watson "belonged to only one of the 13 organizations Dies named," the Senate Appropriations Committee's deletion of the rider, Dodd's hiring as an editor in December 1941, and Watson's testimony of February 4, 1942. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947. Roop and Mercado spell the analyst's surname "Schumann"; Bessner writes "Schuman."
|
||||
[^44]: Roop, Part I, pp. 191-192, on Dies's House speech of February 1, 1943, listing 39 "communists," with Dodd, Watson and Schumann at the head of the list. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^45]: Congressional Record, vol. 89, pp. 623-624 (House, February 4, 1943, notice of the amendment naming thirty-nine employees), and pp. 645, 655 and 656 (House, February 5, 1943). Roop, Part I, pp. 191-192, states that a rider "immediately was attached" to the appropriation bill after Dies's speech. https://archive.org/details/sim_congressional-record-proceedings-and-debates_january-06-march-01-1943_89
|
||||
[^46]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on Congressman Dies accusing three FBIS employees, among dozens of civil servants, of "un-American beliefs." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^47]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," quoting Vice President Henry Wallace on Dies. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^48]: Hearings (as above), pp. iii-v and 1 (the text of H. Res. 105 and the membership; first sitting April 9, 1943, "pursuant to adjournment on Wednesday, April 7, 1943"). https://archive.org/details/1943-watson-dodd-lovett
|
||||
[^49]: Congressional Record, vol. 89, pp. 2788-2789 (House, March 31, 1943). https://archive.org/details/sim_congressional-record-proceedings-and-debates_march-02-april-05-1943_89
|
||||
[^50]: Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 89, p. 3068 (House, April 7, 1943). https://archive.org/details/sim_congressional-record-proceedings-and-debates_april-06-may-13-1943_89
|
||||
[^51]: Roop, Part I, pp. 192-193, on the subcommittee under Congressman Kerr, which started hearings on April 2, 1943 and reported on 21 April, the findings of "subversive activity" and "unfit," the three named men, and the statement that the subcommittee "was later accused of having its final report prepared before the men were called to testify." Roop states that the subcommittee was named by the Un-American Activities Committee. The printed hearings give the authority as House Resolution 105, adopted February 9, 1943, directed to the Committee on Appropriations (Hearings, pp. iii-v), and give the sitting at which Watson's testimony begins as April 9, 1943, against Roop's April 2. *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), likewise describes a special subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, appointed under a House resolution, whose report is H. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. The Monthly Catalog lists H. Rept. 448 (May 14, 1943, pursuant to H. Res. 105, "submitted by Mr. Kerr") on Watson, Dodd and Lovett; a February 1943 newspaper report names Kerr, a North Carolina Democrat, as chairman of the subcommittee. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/328/303.
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[^52]: Hearings (as above), Appendix D, H. Rept. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 327-334, including the finding that Schuman's case did not support a recommendation of unfitness and the findings on Watson and Dodd.
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[^53]: Congressional Record, vol. 89, pp. 4554-4555 (House, May 17, 1943). https://archive.org/details/sim_congressional-record-proceedings-and-debates_may-14-june-14-1943_89
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[^54]: Hearings (as above), pp. 100-105 and 118-119.
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[^55]: Congressional Record, vol. 89, p. 4583 (House, May 18, 1943), the page cited in *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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[^56]: Roop, Part I, p. 193, on the Senate's four rejections, its approval of the rider by 48 to 32, and the President's signature while denouncing the rider and declaring it unconstitutional.
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[^57]: Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, section 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450, as quoted in *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Roop, Part I, p. 193, note, gives the effective cutoff as November 21, 1943, where the statute as quoted gives 15 November. The enacted text also excepted accrued leave and salary and payment for jury or armed-forces service; the text proposed in the subcommittee's report (Hearings, p. 328) omitted the November 15 date and the reappointment clause. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/328/303.
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[^58]: *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), argued May 3-6, 1946, decided June 3, 1946, opinion of Justice Black. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/328/303. Mercado's article gives the middle name as "Morse."
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[^59]: Roop, Part I, pp. 194-195, on the attacks on Rhodes, Menefee and Speier; Fly's letter to J. Edgar Hoover of April 28, 1942, and the two informant reports, one calling the New York school a "refuge for exiled European communists" and the other calling it "a nest of pro-Nazi activities."
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[^60]: Roop, Part I, p. 196, on Cox, the Atlanta station case, the FCC's referral to the Justice Department, the House's naming of Cox as chairman in early 1943, and the appointment of Eugene Garey as investigator.
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[^61]: Roop, Part I, p. 197, on the removal of "three-fourths of FBIS personnel files," the subpoena of ten employees at 8:00 a.m., and "Star Chamber testimony," citing Leigh's article "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats" (subtitle "The case of FCC Chairman Fly and Congressman Cox"), *Harper's Magazine*, January 1945. https://harpers.org/archive/1945/01/politicians-vs-bureaucrats. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^62]: Roop, Part I, p. 198, on the single irregularity found at FBIS and the list of charges, including "masquerading," "intelligence" and "glorified news gathering agency." Mercado renders the last phrase as "glorified news agency."
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[^63]: Roop, Part I, p. 50, on the Cox counsel's charge that Leigh changed the name of the service to "dignify its activities," make it sound more like a war agency, and influence Congress to grant appropriations."
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[^64]: Roop, Part I, pp. 198-199, on the Washington Post's sixteen editorials, the FCC member who "agreed to petition the Speaker of the House to dismiss Cox as chairman," Cox's resignation after an emotional speech, Lea's succession, and Garey's dismissal. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947. Louis E. Miller (R-Mo.) and Richard B. Wigglesworth (R-Mass.) are the minority members named in *Broadcasting*, January 8, 1945. Full names: Clarence Frederick Lea (D-Calif.), Louis Ebenezer Miller (R-Mo.), Richard Bowditch Wigglesworth (R-Mass.) and Kenneth Douglas McKellar (D-Tenn.), per the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress as reproduced in the unitedstates/congress-legislators dataset.
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[^65]: "Lea Probe Demands Sweeping Law Change," *Broadcasting*, January 8, 1945, on the Miller and Wigglesworth minority reports and Wigglesworth's statements. https://www.worldradiohistory.com/Archive-BC/BC-1945/1945-01-08-BC.pdf.
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[^66]: Roop, Part I, pp. 200-201, on the May 1944 testimony of Leigh, Hensley, Porter and Graves; the Lea report of January 2, 1945 ("an efficient and worthwhile service"); the Miller and Wigglesworth minority report ("grave doubt"); and the majority passage quoted in *On the Beam* of February 3, 1945, in the note on p. 201. The hearings are *Hearings of the Special House Committee Investigating the FCC* (GPO, 1944), three volumes, with FBIS testimony beginning in Volume III, page 3439. Roop, Part I, p. 189, records Graves's resignation by the end of 1943.
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[^67]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on Leigh's newsletter of February 15, 1944: "The obvious conclusion is that the proposed cut relates to the opposition on the part of Representative Cox to FCC," the 30 percent figure, and Leigh's resignation "that summer." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
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[^68]: Roop, Part I, pp. 204-206, on the House Appropriations Committee's recommended cut of 25 percent for each FCC department, Senator McKellar's demand for proof, and the Senate Appropriations Committee's recommended cut of $500,000 that both houses approved. Mercado's figure of 30 percent is given at note 48.
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[^69]: Roop, Part I, pp. 206-207, on the absence of any stated congressional reason for the cut, Fly's being ruled out of order, the statement that "it was a punitive cut, made to punish Fly and FCC for defiance of Congress and for Fly's effrontery in asking the Department of Justice to prosecute Eugene Cox, a member of Congress," and, in the note on p. 207, Leigh's quotation of a member of Congress speaking privately, from Leigh's *Harper's Magazine* article, January 1945. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^70]: Roop, Part I, pp. 241-244, "Charles S. Hyneman, who succeeded Leigh as FBIS director on 27 July 1944," and p. 260, "from 27 July 1944 to 7 August 1945," and Shepherd's appointment as the fourth FBIS Director. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^71]: Roop, Part I, pp. 256-257 (note on the liaison study of April 29, 1944; abolition of the Special Reports Section on December 31, 1944), p. 259 (Far East Division retained "the only analytical work done in FBIS"), and pp. 267-268 (the protest of November 1944, Hyneman's response, and Robinson's letter of January 17, 1945). https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^72]: Roop, Part I, p. 268, on the Soviet Embassy's request of November 11, 1942 and the TASS arrangement in London in 1943. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^73]: Roop, Part I, p. 275, note, on the undated executive order with the name of President Truman, transferring FBIS functions to the Interim Research and Intelligence Service, "prepared by Shepherd and perhaps some representatives from State," and "never approved by the Secretary of State." Job 54-27, Box 15, CIA Records Center.
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[^74]: Roop, Part I, pp. 274-277, on the House Appropriations Committee's action of September 19, 1945, the FCC's news release of 26 September, the conference compromise of 1 December ($465,000) approved on 3 December, and the closing of operations on December 10, 1945.
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[^75]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," on the last Daily Report "on 4 December" and the FCC's termination "the following day." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
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[^76]: Federal Communications Commission, Twelfth Annual Report, fiscal year ended June 30, 1946, which states that FBIS "was discontinued as a Commission activity on December 30, 1945." https://archive.org/details/fcc_DOC-308665A1.
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[^77]: Roop, Part I, pp. 278-280, on Shepherd's letter of December 13, 1945 to the FCC, the token operations that followed, Patterson's letter of 21 December, Porter's reply of 27 December, the resumption on January 2, 1946 under War Department sponsorship, and the note on p. 279 that "No documents authorizing continued operations have been found, but permission may have been given orally." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^78]: Roop, Part I, pp. 299-300, on the creation of the CIG by executive order in January 1946, the Vandenberg memorandum to Souers in February 1946, and the five-member committee. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^79]: Central Intelligence Group, "Survey of the Function of Monitoring Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers," C.I.G. 1, memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, February 25, 1946, which states that FBIS functions were "taken over by the War Department on an interim basis on 30 December 1945." https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110003-4. Ad hoc committee report, March 18, 1946: https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110004-3.
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[^80]: Roop, Part I, pp. 301-303, on the ad hoc committee's recommendations (March 18, 1946), the War Department's refusal, the State Department's reply, C.I.G. 1/1 (April 26, 1946), C.I.G. 1/2 (May 8, 1946, signed by James S. Lay), and the State memorandum signed by William L. Langer on May 27, 1946, enclosed with C.I.G. 1/3 (June 4, 1946).
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[^81]: Roop, Part I, pp. 303-304, on the notice, signed for the Director of Central Intelligence by Col. John Dabney, that the Director had "assumed control" of FBIS on July 31, 1946, and on the personnel transfer to CIG on November 3, 1946, announced on 31 October. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^82]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, RG 262, administrative history: transfer to the Central Intelligence Group, "August 5, 1946"; "Abolished: November 1, 1946"; successors "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CIG, November-December, 1946," "Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, CIG, January-September 1947," and "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-." https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
|
||||
[^83]: CIG, "Background on Development of Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service," memorandum for the Chief, Information Branch, March 1946. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110001-6.
|
||||
[^84]: Roop, Part I, pp. 303-304, on the notice of October 31, 1946 that "the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service would immediately become the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), with all publications and letterheads changed accordingly." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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||||
[^85]: Roop, Part I, p. 305 and note, on Sibert's statement of December 31, 1946 "informing that the name had been changed to the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB)" and his wire of January 2, 1947 designating Russell Shepherd Chief, FBIB. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^86]: CIG, "'A' and 'X' Wire Services Furnished by Foreign Broadcast Information Branch," memorandum, June 10, 1947. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110015-1. Also memorandum on the May 6, 1947 interview of Colonel L. K. White, Acting Chief, FBIB, with Lloyd Stratton of the Associated Press. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400110022-3.
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[^87]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), p. 102, on the notice that field bureaus would no longer bear "the confusing name of Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB)," and on the camouflage of their connection with CIG. The notice is dated July 28, 1947. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
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||||
[^88]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," note 4: "The initial monitoring service was renamed the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service in 1942 and evolved into the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in 1967." Roop, Part I, pp. 303-304 (the notice of October 31, 1946) and the 1947 CIG memoranda already use the later name. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^89]: Roop, Part I, p. 2, "FBIS took form during those six years before its adoption by the Central Intelligence Agency, and came to CIA almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it." https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
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[^90]: Roop, Part II, pp. 151-152, on Shepherd's memorandum of November 5, 1946, the Assistant Director for Operations' presentation to the PRC on January 6, 1947, the 35-employee and $150,000 proposal, the reduced request of twelve staff at $61,000, the "stormy" early years, and the Special Reports Division (approved February 13, 1947, begun March 28, 1947, first Survey of Soviet Radio Broadcasts April 15, 1947); p. 2, on the announcement of Col. Lawrence K. White as Deputy Chief on January 9, 1947. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^91]: Roop, Part II, p. 56, "Shepherd resigned from FBIS on 29 September 1947," with Colonel White the new FBIS Chief. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690. Appointment of the fourth director: Roop, Part I, p. 260. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||
[^92]: Roop, Part II, p. 51, on Shepherd's visit to London from June 24, 1946, his meeting with "Malcolm Frost, Chief of the BBC Monitoring Service," the $250,000 figure, and the BBC Monitoring Service's 385 employees and $650,000 cost. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^93]: Roop, Part II, pp. 54-56, on the Shepherd-Frost negotiations and the notice of October 15, 1947. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||
[^94]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service History, Part III: 1957-1967" (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, May 1972), p. 2, "after 1957 FBIS had come of age as an established CIA unit"; p. 19, on the March 23, 1961 instruction to accept responsibility for propaganda indications; and pp. 4-5, "FBIS and the BBC were monitoring broadcasts from 90 countries in 1961. By the spring of 1963 this number had increased to 115." https://archive.org/details/CIADirectorateOfIntelligenceHistoricalSeriesForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart319571967.
|
||||
[^95]: Roop, Part I, p. 25, on the mailing list for the Daily Report issued on November 18, 1941; Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," states that the service "published its first Daily Report of translations on 18 November 1941." https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
||||
[^96]: Roop, Part I, p. 50, that Ellis G. Porter, "former editor of newspapers in Baltimore and Philadelphia," joined the staff in January 1942 "to direct publication of the Daily Report."
|
||||
[^97]: Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis," note 39: "FBIS, Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Far Eastern Section, 3 January 1946, NARA, RG 262, Entry 25, Box 1," and the text that the first issue of the new Daily Report was published in January 1946. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/archives/vol-45-no-5/fbis-against-the-axis-1941-1945-u/.
|
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[^98]: NARA, Guide to Federal Records, RG 262: "Daily reports of foreign radio broadcasts, 1941-45"; "Daily reports of the Far Eastern, Latin American, and European Sections, 1941-46"; "Weekly reviews of official foreign broadcasts, 1941-44"; "Radio reports on the Far East, 1942-45"; "Program schedules of foreign broadcasts, 1942-47"; and "Related Records: Records of the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch, 1947-48, in RG 263." https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
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