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37
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Aviem Sella.md
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@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
---
updated: 2026-10-12
category: "Military"
tags:
- Person
@ -7,22 +8,48 @@ tags:
summary: "Colonel Aviem Sella was an Israeli Air Force officer and a nuclear targeting expert who was implicated in the Jonathan Pollard espionage case, where he worked with Pollard to obtain intelligence from the U.S."
born: 1946-01-07
location: "Haifa, British Mandate Palestine"
relations:
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
reverse: true
start: 1987-03
role: "Indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington"
fn: 4
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Jonathan Pollard]]"
reverse: true
start: 1984-06
end: 1984-11
role: "Initial handler of Pollard"
fn: 3
---
Colonel [[Aviem Sella]] was an [[Israel|Israeli]] Air Force officer and a nuclear targeting expert who was implicated in the [[Jonathan Pollard]] espionage case, where he worked with [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] to obtain intelligence from the [[United States|U.S.]] Navy.[^1]
Colonel [[Aviem Sella]] was an [[Israel|Israeli]] Air Force officer and a nuclear targeting expert who was implicated in the [[Jonathan Pollard]] espionage case, where he worked with Pollard to obtain intelligence from the [[United States|U.S.]] Navy.[^1]
### Nuclear Targeting Expertise
Sella was one of the Israeli Air Force's leading nuclear bombing and targeting experts. He was specifically assigned to serve as [[Jonathan Pollard]]'s handler. Pollard insisted that his spying did not begin until July 1984, after a social meeting with Sella. Sella's mission was to help Pollard gather and evaluate essential intelligence, including advanced American intelligence on weather patterns, communication protocols, and data on emergency and alert procedures, as well as knowledge of the electromagnetic fields between [[Israel]] and its main targets in the [[Soviet Union]].[^2]
Sella was one of the Israeli Air Force's leading nuclear bombing and targeting experts. He was specifically assigned to serve as Jonathan Pollard's handler. Pollard insisted that his spying did not begin until July 1984, after a social meeting with Sella. Sella's mission was to help Pollard gather and evaluate essential intelligence, including advanced American intelligence on weather patterns, communication protocols, and data on emergency and alert procedures, as well as knowledge of the electromagnetic fields between Israel and its main targets in the [[Soviet Union]].[^2]
### Operational Shortcomings
Sella's superb skill and knowledge of nuclear targeting blinded [[Rafael Eitan]] and the Israeli intelligence community to the fact that Sella was a pilot who knew nothing about running a covert operation. When Pollard got into trouble in late 1985, Sella's main concern was fleeing the [[United States]] as quickly as possible before he, too, was arrested.[^2]
Sella's superb skill and knowledge of nuclear targeting blinded [[Rafael Eitan]] and the Israeli intelligence community to the fact that Sella was a pilot who knew nothing about running a covert operation. When Pollard got into trouble in late 1985, Sella's main concern was fleeing the United States as quickly as possible before he, too, was arrested.[^2]
The 1987 damage assessment records a different first contact from the one Pollard gave in his interrogations. It says Pollard volunteered in late June 1984, after meeting Sella through a pro-Israeli activist, and that he passed classified material to Sella at at least three meetings between June and August 1984.[^3] The July 1984 start that Hersh attributes to Pollard stands beside this record.[^2]
### Legal Consequences and Aftermath
Sella, who retired from the air force in disillusionment and disappointment, remained in [[Israel]], as of mid-1991 a fugitive from American justice. He has given friends and colleagues an account of his involvement that is more credible, but still far short of the whole story. He claimed he was recruited to try to control Pollard, who was drowning the Israeli intelligence bureaucracy in documents. By 1984, when Sella was approached, he had almost completed his requirement for a Ph.D. in computer science at [[New York University]], and the obvious thought was that his technical training would be an asset in evaluating and perhaps winnowing down Pollard's materials. Sella knew that Pollard had been recruited long before 1984, but he was eager for the assignment, believing that running a spy as important as Pollard would make his own climb to the top inevitable. Before taking the assignment, he checked with his superior, Major General [[Amos Lapidot]], the air force chief of staff, who assured him that Pollard was not a rogue and that clearance for his new assignment had been obtained from [[Yitzhak Rabin]], the minister of defense. Once involved, Sella complained to a friend that Pollard "was running crazy" and "was giving him things he didn't want and didn't need."[^2]
Sella was indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987 for his role in the affair.[^4] In January 1987 federal prosecutors had named him as an unindicted co-conspirator, a fourth Israeli beside three who were granted immunity.[^5]
The Knesset intelligence subcommittee chaired by [[Abba Eban]] criticized his judgment and said that he "excessively involved himself on his own initiative." It indicated that he may have lied in his testimony to the panel about the extent of his role, and it criticized the military superiors who allowed him leave to take part in what they surmised was a sensitive espionage mission.[^4]
Sella's appointment to command one of Israel's largest air bases set off a storm of controversy in the United States, and he eventually resigned from the new post, citing his concern for U.S.-Israeli relations.[^4] The [[Christian Science Monitor]] reported that the committees criticized the government for appointing him commander of Tel Nof Air Force Base after his involvement in the affair became known.[^6]
Sella, who retired from the air force in disillusionment and disappointment, remained in Israel, as of mid-1991 a fugitive from American justice. He has given friends and colleagues an account of his involvement that is more credible, but still far short of the whole story. He claimed he was recruited to try to control Pollard, who was drowning the Israeli intelligence bureaucracy in documents. By 1984, when Sella was approached, he had almost completed his requirement for a Ph.D. in computer science at [[New York University]], and the obvious thought was that his technical training would be an asset in evaluating and perhaps winnowing down Pollard's materials. Sella knew that Pollard had been recruited long before 1984, but he was eager for the assignment, believing that running a spy as important as Pollard would make his own climb to the top inevitable. Before taking the assignment, he checked with his superior, Major General [[Amos Lapidot]], the air force commander, who assured him that Pollard was not a rogue and that clearance for his new assignment had been obtained from [[Yitzhak Rabin]], the minister of defense. Once involved, Sella complained to a friend that Pollard "was running crazy" and "was giving him things he didn't want and didn't need."[^2]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 21.
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 21.
[^3]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment*, October 30, 1987, paragraph 5. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf
[^4]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0
[^5]: Howard Kurtz, "Spy Papers Kept by Israel, Court Told," *Washington Post*, January 7, 1987. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000403620007-3
[^6]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html

264
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Jonathan Pollard.md
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@ -4,49 +4,277 @@ tags:
- Person
- Military
- Israel
summary: "Pollard was an unhappy child in South Bend, Indiana, tormented and beaten in grade school for being Jewish."
- Espionage
- NavalIntelligence
- JonathanPollard
- LAKAM
- Parole
aliases:
- Jonathan Pollard
- Jonathan Jay Pollard
- Jonathan J. Pollard
- Pollard
created: 2026-10-12
updated: 2026-10-12
born: 1954-08-07
location: "Galveston, Texas"
summary: "Jonathan Jay Pollard was a Navy civilian intelligence analyst who spied for Israel from 1984 to 1985, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1987, and was paroled in 2015."
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Naval Intelligence Support Center]]"
start: 1979-09
end: 1984-06
role: "Research and watch analyst, Naval Ocean Surveillance and Naval Intelligence Support Center"
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Naval Investigative Service]]"
start: 1984-06
end: 1985-11
role: "Analyst, Anti-Terrorist Alert Center"
fn: 7
- type: informant_for
with: "[[LAKAM]]"
start: 1984-06
end: 1985-11
role: "Spied for the Israeli Scientific Liaison Bureau"
fn: 38
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Aviem Sella]]"
start: 1984-06
end: 1984-11
role: "First Israeli handler"
fn: 9
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Rafael Eitan]]"
start: 1984-11
end: 1985-11
role: "Controller of the operation"
fn: 11
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Yosef Yagur]]"
start: 1984-11
end: 1985-11
role: "Direct handler after Sella"
fn: 11
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Irit Erb]]"
start: 1985-01
end: 1985-11
role: "Recipient of biweekly deliveries"
fn: 12
- type: spouse_of
with: "[[Anne Henderson-Pollard]]"
start: 1985
fn: 25
- type: investigated
with: "[[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]"
reverse: true
start: 1985-11
fn: 29
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
reverse: true
start: 1985-11
end: 1987-03
fn: 48
---
[[Jonathan Pollard]] was a junior civilian analyst with the [[United States|U.S.]] Navy who became a paid spy for [[Israel]]. He began working in 1979 as a civilian employee of U.S. Navy intelligence and was recruited as an operative in the fall of 1981, three years earlier than he and the Israeli government have admitted. He was then working as an intelligence specialist with the Navy's Field Operations Intelligence Office.[^2]
[[Jonathan Pollard|Jonathan Jay Pollard]] was a civilian intelligence analyst with the [[United States|U.S.]] [[United States Navy|Navy]] who passed classified material to [[Israel]] from June 1984 until his arrest in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] on November 21, 1985.[^1] He began working in 1979 as a civilian employee of Navy intelligence.[^2] In the last year of his espionage he received between $1,500 and $2,500 a month, according to the appellate court.[^3] [[Seymour Hersh|Seymour M. Hersh]] wrote that Pollard was recruited as an operative in the fall of 1981, three years earlier than he and the Israeli government have admitted.[^4] He pleaded guilty on June 4, 1986 to one count of conspiracy to deliver national defense information to a foreign government and was sentenced to life imprisonment on March 4, 1987.
### Early Life and Motivation
Pollard was an unhappy child in [[South Bend]], [[Indiana]], tormented and beaten in grade school for being Jewish. He told an interviewer that the "turning point" of his life came as a result of the [[Six-Day War]], when he was thirteen. [[Israel]]'s victory was "emotionally intoxicating" and triggered his lifelong obsession with Israeli security, and his fantasies of being part of it. He told fellow undergraduates at [[Stanford University]] that he had dual citizenship and was a colonel in the Israeli Army. Bragging and fanciful claims marked his years at [[Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy]] at [[Tufts University]] in [[Boston]], where he enrolled in 1977. He failed to earn his degree, and also failed in an attempt to join the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. In early 1981, Pollard sought a job as a defense analyst with the [[American Israel Public Affairs Committee|AIPAC]], but AIPAC officials found his bragging about access to top-secret information inappropriate and "weird," and "got rid of him." There was a feeling that Pollard was part of a "sting" operation attempting to set up AIPAC, and he was clearly seen as trouble.[^2]
Pollard was an unhappy child in [[South Bend]], [[Indiana]], tormented and beaten in grade school for being Jewish. He told an interviewer that the "turning point" of his life came as a result of the [[Six-Day War]], when he was thirteen. Israel's victory was "emotionally intoxicating" and triggered his lifelong obsession with Israeli security, and his fantasies of being part of it.[^5]
He told fellow undergraduates at [[Stanford University]] that he had dual citizenship and was a colonel in the Israeli Army. Bragging and fanciful claims marked his years at the [[Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy]] at [[Tufts University]] in [[Boston]], where he enrolled in 1977. He failed to earn his degree, and also failed in an attempt to join the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. In early 1981, Pollard sought a job as a defense analyst with the [[American Israel Public Affairs Committee|AIPAC]], but AIPAC officials found his bragging about access to top-secret information inappropriate and "weird," and "got rid of him." There was a feeling that Pollard was part of a "sting" operation attempting to set up AIPAC, and he was clearly seen as trouble.[^6]
### Naval Career and Clearances
The 1987 damage assessment prepared by the Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee under the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] records Pollard's naval intelligence assignments from September 1979 to November 1985.[^2] He began as a research analyst at the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center in Suitland, Maryland, and in February 1980 became a merchant shipping analyst and watch officer. In 1980 he volunteered for Task Force 168, the naval element responsible for human intelligence collection, and was assigned to collect information from a South African defense attaché. The assessment records that he admitted in July 1980 to having lied about his South African contacts in order to impress others. In 1981 he was assigned as a Middle East warship analyst in the [[Naval Intelligence Support Center]] (NISC-33).
In February 1982 his association with Task Force 168 ended, and his Top Secret clearance and access to compartmented intelligence were suspended pending a fitness-for-duty evaluation by a psychiatrist. The assessment quotes the psychiatrist's finding that Pollard was "thoroughly capable of handling the duties of his job and not a security risk." His clearance was reinstated on the order of the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command.[^7] In June 1984 Pollard began temporary duty with the [[Anti-Terrorist Alert Center]] of the [[Naval Investigative Service]] (ATAC, NIS), working a rotating watch. In October 1984 he was permanently assigned there as an analyst. The assessment describes him as an employee of the [[Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office]] (NFOIO) and other components of naval intelligence for the whole of the period from 1979 to 1985.[^2]
### Recruitment and Scope of Espionage
Pollard offered his services to [[Israel]] in 1980 and 1981, but no serious Israeli intelligence official would consider recruiting an openly pro-Israel American Jew who worked for the American intelligence community, due to an unwritten law prohibiting the recruitment of any American Jew. However, [[Rafael Eitan]], the aggressive new director of [[LAKAM]], decided to change the rules after unproductive meetings with U.S. officials. He agreed with [[Ariel Sharon]] that the [[United States]] was holding back on intelligence essential to Israeli security, such as [[KH-11]] photography, and recruited Pollard in October 1981. Pollard's recruitment was viewed by military intelligence as "the worst fucking thing Rafi could have done."[^2]
Pollard offered his services to Israel in 1980 and 1981, but no serious Israeli intelligence official would consider recruiting an openly pro-Israel American Jew who worked for the American intelligence community, due to an unwritten law prohibiting the recruitment of any American Jew. However, [[Rafael Eitan]], the aggressive new director of [[LAKAM]], decided to change the rules after unproductive meetings with U.S. officials. He agreed with [[Ariel Sharon]] that the United States was holding back on intelligence essential to Israeli security, such as [[KH-11]] photography, and recruited Pollard in October 1981. Pollard's recruitment was viewed by military intelligence as "the worst fucking thing Rafi could have done."[^8]
At the height of his activity, in 1984 and 1985, one of his main assignments was the gathering of American intelligence relevant to [[Israel]]'s nuclear targeting of the oil fields and Soviet military installations in southern [[Russia]]. This fact was hidden from [[Department of Justice]] investigators and prosecutors by Israeli officials. Pollard insisted in all of his Justice Department interrogations that his spying did not begin until July 1984, after a social meeting with Israeli Air Force Colonel [[Aviem Sella]], who was one of his handlers.[^2]
The account Pollard gave investigators, as the 1987 damage assessment summarizes it, dates the relationship differently. The assessment says Pollard volunteered his services in late June 1984, after meeting [[Aviem Sella]] through a pro-Israeli activist who was an old friend of the Pollard family. He passed classified material to Sella at three meetings between June and August 1984.[^9] The defense sentencing memorandum says Pollard was put in contact with Sella in June 1984, that he provided material for several months without payment, and that compensation was agreed only in November 1984.[^10]
Pollard also gave the Israelis American intelligence on Soviet air defenses, especially the feared SA-5 surface-to-air missile system. He eventually turned over a copy of the U.S. intelligence community's annual review of the Soviet strategic arms system, known as the 11–38, which is considered one of the most sensitive documents in the U.S. government. Pollard also provided [[Israel]] with the codes for American diplomatic communications, enabling [[Israel]]'s signals intelligence agency to intercept cables and backchannel messages. In all, according to federal prosecutors, Pollard provided [[Israel]] with eighteen hundred documents - an estimated 500,000 pages - before his arrest.[^2]
The assessment places the turning point in Paris. In November 1984 Pollard met Eitan, described as the adviser on counterterrorism to the Israeli prime minister and the senior Israeli in charge of the case, and [[Yosef Yagur]], Counselor for Scientific Affairs at the Israeli Consulate in New York, who replaced Sella as Pollard's direct handler. The assessment records that Eitan emphasized that Pollard should resign from naval intelligence rather than undergo a polygraph examination.[^11] From late January 1985 Pollard made biweekly deliveries of classified material, on alternate Fridays, to the apartment of [[Irit Erb]], a secretary at the [[Israeli Embassy]] in Washington. He met Yagur at Erb's apartment on the last Saturday of each month. The assessment says his monthly salary was raised to $2,500 in February 1985.[^12]
Hersh wrote that in 1984 and 1985 one of Pollard's main assignments was gathering American intelligence relevant to Israel's nuclear targeting of the oil fields and Soviet military installations in southern [[Russia]]. Hersh wrote that this was hidden from [[Department of Justice]] investigators by Israeli officials. Pollard insisted in his Justice Department interrogations that his spying did not begin until July 1984, after a social meeting with Israeli Air Force Colonel Sella, who was one of his handlers.[^13]
Pollard also gave the Israelis American intelligence on Soviet air defenses, especially the feared SA-5 surface-to-air missile system. He eventually turned over a copy of the U.S. intelligence community's annual review of the Soviet strategic arms system, known as the 11-38, which Hersh described as one of the most sensitive documents in the U.S. government. Pollard also provided Israel with the codes for American diplomatic communications, enabling Israel's signals intelligence agency to intercept cables and backchannel messages.[^14]
The assessment states that most of the tasking Pollard received was intended to advance Israeli objectives. Sella and Yagur emphasized military and technical intelligence on the [[Soviet Union]], Arab states, and Pakistan. At the Paris meeting, Yagur ranked Arab and Pakistani nuclear intelligence first, followed by Arab exotic weaponry including chemical and biological weapons, then Soviet air defenses, and then Soviet aircraft and air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.[^15] The assessment lists among Israel's gains Pollard's deliveries concerning the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters near Tunis, Tunisian and Libyan air defenses, and Pakistan's plutonium reprocessing facility near Islamabad. Pollard told investigators that Yagur said the RASIN manual permitted Israel to begin monitoring a communications link between the Soviet General Staff in Moscow and the Soviet military assistance group in Damascus.[^16]
The executive summary of the assessment lists the Israeli collection requirements as Pollard gave them, "in descending order of priority," in the same sequence except that Soviet aircraft precede Soviet air defenses, and ends the list with Arab order-of-battle, deployments and readiness.[^17] The body of the assessment adds that "most of the tasking levied on Pollard by his handlers was intended to advance Israel's objectives," that Sella and Yagur "emphasized that Pollard should obtain military and technical intelligence on the Soviet Union, Arab states, and Pakistan," and that Yagur wanted to be told of Soviet reactive-armor technology and advanced Soviet SAM systems "so they could prepare for their appearance in Arab inventories." Pollard was also to telephone an emergency number and use the code word "20 percent" if he learned that war in the Middle East was imminent.[^18]
Under the heading "What the Israelis Did Not Ask For," the assessment opens with the words "According to Pollard" and states: "The Israelis never expressed interest in US military activities, plans, capabilities, or equipment." It adds that they "did not ask for intelligence on US communications per se" (the RASIN manual excepted), communications-security deficiencies, cryptologic systems or keying material; that Pollard "was not tasked to describe the pro- or anti-Israeli biases of individual intelligence analysts, nor was he asked to slant his own analyses for Israel's benefit," and that "[t]he Israelis expressed no serious interest in other US espionage cases," although Yagur asked about the damage from the Morison and Walker/Whitworth disclosures in casual conversation.[^19] The assessment states that Pollard "apparently exerted the strongest influence on what was compromised by virtue of his own access, interests, and collection initiatives," and that in terms of the quantity of identified intelligence stolen over seventeen months, with most of it passed from January to November 1985, "Pollard's operation has few parallels among known US espionage cases." It states that most of the documents address "at least tangentially" issues of major concern to Israeli security, many of them concerning Iran, Iraq and the Iran-Iraq War, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and military developments in Israel itself. It records that Pollard on his own initiative supplied three daily intelligence summaries, among them the Middle East and North Africa Summary, which yielded roughly 1,500 messages between mid-July 1984 and November 1985.[^19]
Eitan's own requests, as the assessment summarizes them, were of a different kind: information on the Palestine Liberation Organization's Force 17, CIA psychological studies or other intelligence containing "dirt" on senior Israeli officials, and information identifying the "rats" in Israel, "by which Eitan apparently meant Israelis who provided information to the United States." In debriefings that were corroborated by polygraph, Pollard said that Yagur, standing behind Eitan, "violently shook his head 'no'" at these requests and told him afterward that procuring such information would be grounds for immediate termination of the operation.[^18] The defense sentencing memorandum filed in March 1987 states that Eitan also asked for information regarding U.S. intelligence sources in Israel and for documents on U.S. knowledge of Israeli arms dealings with other countries, "particularly China," and of Israeli intelligence efforts in the United States, and that Pollard did not provide them "despite Eitan's threats of recrimination."[^10] The assessment records Pollard's recollection that Yagur on at least two occasions indicated that selected items of his intelligence were known and appreciated by "the highest levels of the Israeli Government."[^12]
The assessment gives approximate numbers of compromised published documents and an estimated 1,500 current intelligence summary messages, among them the Middle East and North Africa Summary.[^20] As the [[Washington Post]] reported in January 1987, federal prosecutors' sentencing memorandum described Pollard as having provided "Thousands of Pages" and said Israel had returned only 163 documents to the United States.[^21] According to the same report, the prosecutors' memorandum stated that the Israelis paid Pollard $2,500 a month, promised him another $300,000 in a Swiss account over ten years, and that he was eventually paid about $50,000.[^21] Hersh gave a different figure, attributed to federal prosecutors: eighteen hundred documents, an estimated 500,000 pages, before his arrest.[^22]
### Operational Methods and Wife's Involvement
[[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard's]] wife, [[Anne Henderson-Pollard]], was also working with him. [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] received computer access codes of intelligence reports from [[Robert McFarlane]] (referred to as "Mr. X") through [[Iris]], a [[LAKAM]] representative in [[Washington, D.C.]]. He would print the information, photocopy it, and give the copies to [[Iris]], who would then return the originals to the office. This allowed [[Israel]] to receive over a million pieces of paper, including reconnaissance satellite data, [[United States|U.S.]] and [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] aircraft information, and spare parts listed in secret catalogs.[^1]
Hersh's account places Pollard's wife, [[Anne Henderson-Pollard]], in the operation as well.[^23] [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that Pollard received computer access codes for intelligence reports from [[Robert McFarlane]], whom he called "Mr. X," through [[Iris]], a LAKAM representative in Washington. Pollard would print the information, photocopy it, and give the copies to Iris, who would return the originals to the office. Ben-Menashe wrote that this allowed Israel to receive over a million pieces of paper, including reconnaissance satellite data, U.S. and Soviet aircraft information, and spare parts listed in secret catalogs.[^24]
To facilitate the transfer of documents, Pollard's handlers in the [[United States]], who included [[Aviem Sella]] by mid-1984, even arranged for the Israeli government to provide, via its embassy in [[Washington, D.C.]], the most sophisticated photocopying machines for the reproduction of top-secret documents, including [[KH-11]] satellite photographs. These machines arrived with special metal shielding to prevent the interception of electronic emanations.[^2]
The 1992 appellate opinion describes Anne Pollard's involvement differently. It recounts that when Pollard was questioned after being stopped, he used the code word "cactus" in telephone calls to his wife, who then removed a suitcase of classified documents from the apartment and contacted his Israeli handlers. The court called this "her only active involvement in Pollard's espionage."[^25]
To facilitate the transfer of documents, Pollard's handlers in the United States, who included Sella by mid-1984, arranged for the Israeli government to provide, through its embassy in Washington, photocopying machines for the reproduction of top-secret documents, including KH-11 satellite photographs. These machines arrived with special metal shielding to prevent the interception of electronic emanations.[^26]
### KGB Connection and Arrest
Some of the intelligence gathered by [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] was passed to the [[KGB]] by [[Israel]], with the authorization of [[Yitzhak Shamir]]. The exposure of [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] led to his arrest and conviction for espionage. He was later identified as the spy with the arrest of [[Shabtai Kalmanowitch]] in late 1987.[^1]
Ben-Menashe wrote that some of the intelligence gathered by Pollard was passed to the [[KGB]] by Israel, with the authorization of [[Yitzhak Shamir]].[^27] He also wrote that Pollard was later identified as the spy in the arrest of [[Shabtai Kalmanowitch]] in late 1987.[^28]
### Israeli Government Response and Cover-up
The [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] entered the case on November 15, 1985 and began a series of interviews with Pollard, according to the counterintelligence history "Decade of the Spy."[^29] The appellate opinion records that agents of the FBI and the Naval Investigative Service stopped Pollard as he was leaving work and questioned him about the removal of classified material. During the interviews he lied and stalled for time, as his Israeli handlers had instructed him, while one handler left the country.[^30]
After Pollard's arrest, the top Israeli leadership denied having any knowledge of his activities, and two internal commissions cleared them of direct knowledge. However, Pollard himself argued that his Israeli handlers told him that "[[Israel]]'s dependence upon a ‘special source’" had been mentioned at Israeli cabinet meetings. He also stated that he was routinely provided with lists of intelligence items wanted, coordinated and prioritized by the heads of all the various military intelligence services. Much of the material he supplied, such as satellite photographs and communication intercepts, was clearly not being transferred through official channels.[^2]
On November 21, 1985 the Pollards drove to the Israeli Embassy and requested political asylum. The counterintelligence history gives the visit as about twenty minutes, and says the Israelis refused them asylum. The FBI arrested Pollard when they came out.[^31] The appellate court records that the Pollards had gained entrance to the embassy compound at one point before the Israelis turned them away. Pollard was charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. sections 794(a) and 793(e). Anne Pollard was arrested a day later as an accessory. The couple was held without bail, and she was released on bail in February 1986.[^32]
The Israeli officials most tarnished by the scandal were [[Rafael Eitan]] and [[Aviem Sella]]. However, Eitan did not suffer financially and was subsequently named to a high administrative position with the [[Israel Chemicals Company]], authorized by [[Ariel Sharon]]. Sella was promoted to brigadier general after his return from the [[United States]] and assigned as commander of [[Tel Nof]], the site of [[Israel]]'s nuclear-ready air force squadron. After American protests, Sella was instead named head of the [[Israel|Israeli Defense Force]] staff college, and later retired from the air force in disillusionment.[^2]
Israel announced after the arrest that the news was a complete surprise and that it would cooperate with the United States. The counterintelligence history says a post-arrest Israeli investigation, codenamed Siren, was launched, and that a few days later Israel announced that the Pollard case was a rogue operation conducted by a few intelligence operatives.[^33] The Post reported in May 1987 that Israel had branded the affair "a rogue operation" and disbanded the spy bureau.[^34] A delegation of officials from the FBI and the State and Justice departments, including [[Abraham Sofaer]], traveled to Israel in December 1985. The counterintelligence history says Israel did not give up its stonewalling until the delegation threatened to return to the United States.[^35]
On December 21, 1985 Israeli officials told the [[New York Times]] that Eitan had been removed from his post as head of the Liaison Bureau for Scientific Affairs, which was being dismantled, and was expected to retire quietly.[^36] The Christian Science Monitor later reported that Eitan had been made head of the [[Israel Chemicals Company]], one of the most prestigious executive positions in Israeli industry.[^37] In 1998 the Israeli government stated that Pollard had served as an Israeli agent handled by senior members of the Scientific Liaison Bureau, known in Hebrew as Lekam.[^38]
### Plea, Sentencing, and the Weinberger Submissions
Pollard sought to plead guilty in order to minimize his chance of a life sentence and to enable his wife to plead as well, which the government was otherwise unwilling to allow. The government would make a plea offer only after Pollard assisted the damage assessment and submitted to polygraph examinations and interviews. The plea agreement bound him to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. section 794(c), and the government agreed to recommend "a substantial period of incarceration and a monetary fine." Chief Judge [[Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.]] accepted the plea on June 4, 1986, after questioning Pollard at great length about his understanding of the rights he was surrendering.[^39]
Pollard's first memorandum in aid of sentencing, dated August 20, 1986, "submits his version of the offense in aid of sentencing by the Court."[^40] While awaiting sentencing, Pollard gave several interviews to [[Wolf Blitzer]], a reporter for the [[Jerusalem Post]], without first submitting his comments to the Director of Naval Intelligence as the plea agreement required. The government cited the interviews as evidence that he could not be trusted to refrain from disclosing national secrets.[^41]
The prosecutors' sentencing memorandum recommended a "substantial" prison term. It named three Israelis granted immunity from prosecution, Eitan, Yagur and Irit Erb, and a fourth, Sella, as an unindicted co-conspirator.[^42] The government's reply to Pollard's memoranda, dated March 3, 1987, disputed his account of the harm he had caused and stated that he had identified thousands of classified documents.[^43]
The government also submitted a highly classified declaration by Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] cataloguing the damage Pollard had done and opining that the damage had been "substantial and irrevocable." The day before sentencing, Weinberger submitted an unclassified supplemental declaration, executed March 3, 1987, which stated in part that "[i]t is difficult for me, even in the so-called 'year of the spy,' to conceive of a greater harm to national security than that caused by the defendant."[^44][^45] The declaration argued that "the punishment imposed should reflect the perfidy of the individual's actions, the magnitude of the treason committed, and the needs of national security." It also stated that "his loyalty to Israel transcends his loyalty to the United States." Weinberger wrote that Pollard had acknowledged, when confronted with a polygraph examination on February 25, 1987, that he had provided or confirmed information in a February 15 Washington Post article.[^46]
Pollard's counsel characterized the Secretary's words, "perhaps accurately," only as "rank hyperbole." Judge Williams, dissenting from the appellate majority in 1992, wrote that the repeated use of superlatives in the Weinberger memoranda "implied an appeal for the maximum."[^47]
Chief Judge Robinson sentenced Pollard to life in prison on March 4, 1987 and sentenced Anne Pollard to five years.[^48] Pollard did not appeal the sentence. His Rule 35 motion to reduce it was denied.[^49] The appellate opinion records that an affidavit by [[Alan Dershowitz]] stated that Goldberg, a retired Supreme Court Justice, had discussed the sentence with Chief Judge Robinson, who purportedly told him that Pollard had provided Israel with information demonstrating American knowledge of certain details of Israeli-South African defense cooperation and that this had "weighed heavily" in the sentence. Dershowitz claimed that Pollard never provided the Israelis that sort of information, and the affidavit asserted that Goldberg inferred that the government may have made improper ex parte submissions. Chief Judge Robinson declined to recuse himself, stated that the allegations of ex parte contacts were untrue, and refused without a hearing to let Pollard withdraw his plea.[^50]
### Post-Sentencing Litigation
Pollard's first motion under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 was filed on March 12, 1990. It sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the government had breached the plea agreement at sentencing and had linked his wife's plea to his own.[^51] The district court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in 1992.[^52] A second section 2255 motion, filed on September 20, 2000 by new counsel, alleged ineffective assistance by sentencing counsel. On July 22, 2005 the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Circuit Judge [[David Sentelle|Sentelle]], held that the second motion was untimely and declined to grant a certificate of appealability.[^53] The same opinion held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review claims for access to classified documents needed for a clemency petition to the President, and it vacated the denial of counsel's request for access.[^54]
### Clemency Applications
The counterintelligence history "Decade of the Spy" records that President [[George H. W. Bush]] denied clemency in January 1993, President [[Bill Clinton]] in March 1994, and Clinton a second time in 1997, when he cited Pollard's lack of remorse and said that shortening the sentence after ten years was unwarranted and would not serve the goal of deterrence.[^55] Israel granted Pollard citizenship in 1995.[^56]
The [[Office of the Pardon Attorney]] wrote on March 14, 2011 that Pollard, through counsel, had applied for commutation of sentence on October 15, 2010, and that the application remained pending.[^57] On December 21, 2010 former Attorney General [[Michael Mukasey]] wrote to President [[Barack Obama]] asking that he commute the sentence. Mukasey wrote that former CIA Director [[James Woolsey]] and former Senate Intelligence Committee chairman [[Dennis DeConcini]] "are familiar with the information Pollard disclosed and the circumstances of its disclosure" and "have expressed firmly their belief that his sentence should be commuted," that "the highly unusual submission to the sentencing court of affidavits from Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, seeking a heavier sentence than requested by the prosecutors despite Pollard's guilty plea and cooperation," as discussed in a submission by former Assistant Secretary of Defense [[Lawrence Korb]], "is deeply disturbing," and that "a life sentence can only be considered utterly disproportionate to the crime."[^58]
### Ben-Menashe's Claims and the "Mr. X" Allegation
Ben-Menashe's claim that Robert McFarlane had been recruited by Rafael Eitan and was "the famous Mr. X in the Pollard case" reached print through a 1991 [[Esquire]] article, "October Surprise," by [[Craig Unger]].[^59] The article attributed Ben-Menashe's statement that McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] had a "special relationship" with Israeli intelligence, and that McFarlane had been "recruited by Rafi Eitan," to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted for one of his clients, the [[Inslaw]] computer-software company. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that nothing in the affidavit supported the article's following sentences making McFarlane out to be an equivalent of Pollard, and that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship.'" The same opinion records that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^60] McFarlane sued the magazine. The [[United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit]] affirmed the judgment for Esquire on January 30, 1996. The judgment rested on a finding of no actual malice and on the dismissal of the claim against Unger for want of personal jurisdiction.[^61]
The opinion describes Ben-Menashe as "a self-professed former Israeli spy and a major source for conspiracy theorists," and records that the Esquire article quoted intelligence officials and journalists calling him a "fake" and a "con man."[^62] The same opinion notes that "[i]n Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^63]
### Israeli Inquiries
After Pollard's arrest, the top Israeli leadership denied having any knowledge of his activities. Pollard himself argued that his Israeli handlers told him that "Israel's dependence upon a 'special source'" had been mentioned at Israeli cabinet meetings. He also stated that he was routinely provided with lists of intelligence items wanted, coordinated and prioritized by the heads of all the various military intelligence services. Much of the material he supplied, such as satellite photographs and communication intercepts, was clearly not being transferred through official channels.[^64]
The [[Los Angeles Times]] reported on November 29, 1985 that Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] and Foreign Minister Shamir had been meeting daily to review the internal investigation, and that the essential elements of the case were believed to be clear to the three.[^65] In late February 1987 the Israeli embassy spokesman [[Yossi Gal]] said that Shamir had reiterated on a recent visit to Washington "that this was a rogue operation that was not authorized and against the will of the government."[^66] In a report from Jerusalem published March 11, 1987, [[Thomas L. Friedman]] quoted Shamir: "The State of Israel has no connection with Pollard or his family."[^67]
The Knesset's intelligence subcommittee, chaired by [[Abba Eban]], and a two-member cabinet panel chaired by Tel Aviv lawyer [[Yehoshua Rotenstreich]] reported on May 26, 1987. The Post reported that neither panel found evidence that the leadership knew of the operation, but that both found the senior political leadership responsible for failing to uncover and end it. The seven-member subcommittee singled out Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his predecessor [[Moshe Arens]], and said that Shimon Peres, Shamir and Rabin shared responsibility for the government's failure to live up to commitments made to the United States after Pollard's arrest. The Post reported that, contrary to government statements at the time, the subcommittee's report said the affair was "not a rogue operation" but one conducted by Israeli officials using official resources.[^68] The subcommittee accused Eitan of "a gross excess of authority" and said Sella "excessively involved himself on his own initiative." It indicated that Sella may have lied in his testimony about the extent of his role, and it criticized the Army Chief of Staff, [[Moshe Levy]], and [[Amos Lapidot]] for allowing Sella leave to take part in what they surmised was a sensitive espionage mission.[^69] The Rotenstreich panel contended that the "ruling troika" of Peres, Shamir and Rabin "did not take care to clarify facts sufficiently before transferring them to the U.S. authorities." The Post reported that the troika had reportedly pressed Rotenstreich to hand in his report after learning that Eban's was to be released, in the hope that his findings would be milder.[^70] Shamir told reporters that the government had no intention of resigning and that "the mountain was really a molehill and the earth did not move."[^71]
The Israeli Cabinet adopted the Rotenstreich findings, which held the entire government collectively responsible for failure to know that a secret spy unit in the Defense Ministry had hired Pollard.[^72] Rabin and Peres attacked the subcommittee as politically tainted. The subcommittee's report accused Rabin of failing "to follow up or increase supervision as he should have done" during the fourteen months when Pollard was active, and the Post reported that it criticized the promotions of Sella and Eitan, who became chairman of the country's largest state-owned company.[^70]
The Post reported that Sella had been indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987 for his role in the affair.[^73] Hersh wrote that after American protests Sella was instead named head of the Israel Defense Forces staff college, and that he later retired from the air force.[^74] The Post reported that Sella's promotion to command one of Israel's largest air bases had set off a storm of controversy in the United States, and that he eventually resigned from the new post, citing his concern for U.S.-Israeli relations.[^75]
The Israeli officials most tarnished by the affair were Eitan and Sella. Eitan did not suffer financially. He was subsequently named to a high administrative position with the Israel Chemicals Company, an appointment authorized by Ariel Sharon.[^76] Hersh wrote that Sella was promoted to brigadier general after his return from the United States and assigned as commander of [[Tel Nof]], the site of Israel's nuclear-ready air force squadron.[^77] The Christian Science Monitor reported that the committees criticized the government for appointing Sella commander of Tel Nof Air Force Base after his involvement in the affair became known.[^78]
### Aftermath and Sella's Account
Pollard refused to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office in [[Washington, D.C.]] for six months before finally giving up Sella's name as part of a plea bargain. It is not known whether prosecutors realized at the time that Sella's mission was linked to nuclear intelligence. The Israeli government refused U.S. demands for Sella's extradition, and he was indicted in absentia in March 1987, and declared a fugitive from justice in June 1990.[^2]
Pollard refused to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington for six months before finally giving up Sella's name as part of a plea bargain. It is not known whether prosecutors realized at the time that Sella's mission was linked to nuclear intelligence. Hersh wrote that Sella was indicted in absentia in March 1987 and declared a fugitive from justice in June 1990, and that the Israeli government refused U.S. demands for his extradition.[^79]
Sella has given friends and colleagues an account of his involvement that is more credible, but still far short of the whole story. He claimed he was recruited to try to control Pollard, who was drowning the Israeli intelligence bureaucracy in documents. Sella, who had almost completed his Ph.D. in computer science at [[New York University]], believed his technical training would be an asset in evaluating and perhaps winnowing down Pollard's materials. He knew that Pollard had been recruited long before 1984, but was eager for the assignment, believing it would advance his career. He checked with his superior, Major General [[Amos Lapidot]], who assured him that Pollard was not a rogue and that clearance for his new assignment had been obtained from [[Yitzhak Rabin]], the minister of defense. Once involved, Sella complained that Pollard "was running crazy" and "was giving him things he didn't want and didn't need."[^2]
Sella has given friends and colleagues an account of his involvement that is more credible, but still far short of the whole story. He claimed he was recruited to try to control Pollard, who was drowning the Israeli intelligence bureaucracy in documents. Sella, who had almost completed his Ph.D. in computer science at [[New York University]], believed his technical training would be an asset in evaluating and perhaps winnowing down Pollard's materials. He knew that Pollard had been recruited long before 1984, but was eager for the assignment, believing it would advance his career. He checked with his superior, Major General Lapidot, who assured him that Pollard was not a rogue and that clearance for his new assignment had been obtained from the defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Once involved, Sella complained that Pollard "was running crazy" and "was giving him things he didn't want and didn't need."[^80]
[[Leonard Garment]], hired by [[Israel]] to represent Sella, attempted to resolve the affair. He was pressured by a six-man Israeli delegation, including [[Chaim Joseph Zadok]], [[Meir Rosenne]], [[Elyakim Rubinstein]], [[Ram Caspi]], [[Avraham Shalom]], and [[Hanan Bar-on]], to file a factual proffer that downplayed Sella's involvement. Garment eventually withdrew from the case, stating he was unsure whether his client was Sella or the Israeli government. With his withdrawal, the Israeli government ended its attempt to protect Sella, effectively ending Sella's career.[^2]
[[Leonard Garment]], hired by Israel to represent Sella, attempted to resolve the affair. He was pressured by a six-man Israeli delegation, including [[Chaim Joseph Zadok]], [[Meir Rosenne]], [[Elyakim Rubinstein]], [[Ram Caspi]], [[Avraham Shalom]], and [[Hanan Bar-on]], to file a factual proffer that downplayed Sella's involvement. Garment eventually withdrew from the case, stating he was unsure whether his client was Sella or the Israeli government. With his withdrawal, the Israeli government ended its attempt to protect Sella, effectively ending Sella's career.[^81]
### Parole and Departure
Pollard was released from prison on November 20, 2015 and placed on parole. His conditions included a curfew, an electronic monitor that tracked his location, limits on the jobs he could take, and a prohibition on leaving the United States.[^56][^82] On November 20, 2020 the Justice Department announced that he had completed his parole. The Parole Commission said there was "no evidence to conclude that he is likely to violate the law." His lawyers, Eliot Lauer and Jacques Semmelman, said that he was "now a free man in all respects."[^83]
On December 30, 2020 Pollard and his wife Esther arrived at Ben Gurion International Airport on a private plane provided by the casino owner [[Sheldon Adelson]]. Prime Minister [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] greeted them and presented them with Israeli identity cards. Pollard said, "We are ecstatic to be home at last after 35 years."[^84]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 21, 22.
[^1]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Arrest of November 21, 1985, plea of June 4, 1986, and life sentence.
[^2]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Introduction, paragraph 2, and the career box headed "Pollard's Assignments and Security-Clearance Actions, With Naval Intelligence, 1979-85."
[^3]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Background narrative: payments of $1,500 to $2,500 a month during the last twelve months of the espionage.
[^4]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Hersh's account of the 1981 recruitment, which Pollard and the Israeli government are said to have dated later.
[^5]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's account of his childhood and of the Six-Day War, as Hersh reports it.
[^6]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. AIPAC's reaction to Pollard's applications and conduct, as Hersh reports it.
[^7]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Career box entries for February 1982 through October 1984.
[^8]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Account of the 1980-81 offers and of Eitan's decision to recruit Pollard in October 1981.
[^9]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraph 5 (late June 1984 volunteering; Sella meetings June to August 1984).
[^10]: Defendant Jonathan J. Pollard's Second Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), filed early March 1987. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc7.pdf Discussion of the sequence of contact and compensation, including the November 1984 agreement on $1,500 a month.
[^11]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraph 6 (Paris meetings in November 1984; Eitan's emphasis on resignation rather than a polygraph) and paragraph 7 (Yagur as direct handler).
[^12]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraph 7 (biweekly deliveries to Irit Erb's apartment, monthly meetings with Yagur, salary raised in February 1985).
[^13]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's claim that his spying began in July 1984 after a social meeting with Sella; the nuclear targeting assignment.
[^14]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Soviet air-defense material, the 11-38 review, and the diplomatic codes.
[^15]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 51 and 52 (Israeli tasking priorities and the Paris list).
[^16]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 79 to 82 (Israeli gains from the compromised material; the RASIN manual).
[^17]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Executive Summary, paragraph 11 (collection requirements in descending order of priority).
[^18]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 51 to 53 (the tasking assessment, the Paris list, Eitan's supplementary requests and Yagur's reaction).
[^19]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 58 and 63 to 66 ("What the Israelis Did Not Ask For"; the overview of compromised material).
[^20]: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, *The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment* (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 11 and 12 (approximate numbers of compromised published documents and an estimated 1,500 current intelligence summary messages).
[^21]: Howard Kurtz, "Spy Papers Kept by Israel, Court Told," *Washington Post*, January 7, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000403620007-3 Prosecutors' sentencing memorandum as reported, including the 163 returned documents.
[^22]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Figure attributed by Hersh to federal prosecutors.
[^23]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's wife's role in the operation, as Hersh relates it.
[^24]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). Lending copy: https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm Account of Iris, the access codes and the copying method.
[^25]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Narrative of the stop and the telephone calls; the court's characterization of Anne Pollard's involvement.
[^26]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Photocopying machines supplied through the Israeli embassy.
[^27]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). Lending copy: https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm Claimed transfers to the KGB and the Shamir authorization.
[^28]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). Lending copy: https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm Claim that Pollard was later identified as the spy in the Kalmanowitch arrest.
[^29]: "Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf Entry on the FBI's entry into the case on November 15, 1985 and the interviews.
[^30]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Background narrative of the stop, the interviews and the lies told in them.
[^31]: "Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf Account of the embassy visit and the arrest.
[^32]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Arrest on November 21, 1985; Anne Pollard's arrest the following day; the charges; the bail history.
[^33]: "Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf Israeli post-arrest response and the Siren investigation.
[^34]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Israel's official characterization of the affair as a rogue operation, and the disbanding of the bureau.
[^35]: "Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf The December 1985 delegation and Israel's eventual cooperation.
[^36]: Thomas L. Friedman, *New York Times*, December 22, 1985 (Jerusalem dateline December 21). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302120025-0 Removal of Eitan and the dismantling of the bureau.
[^37]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Eitan's later executive post.
[^38]: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Government statement on Jonathan Pollard," May 12, 1998, *Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents*, vol. 17 (1998-1999), no. 35. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc13.PDF
[^39]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Plea negotiations, the plea agreement (paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b)), and the June 4, 1986 plea.
[^40]: Defendant Jonathan J. Pollard's First Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), dated August 20, 1986. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/A-Pollard6.pdf Pollard's account of the offense.
[^41]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Pollard's interviews with a Jerusalem Post reporter before sentencing and the government's objection to them.
[^42]: Howard Kurtz, "Spy Papers Kept by Israel, Court Told," *Washington Post*, January 7, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000403620007-3 Government's recommended sentence, the immunity grants, and the unindicted co-conspirator.
[^43]: Government's Reply to Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), March 3, 1987. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/A-Pollard9.pdf Government's response to Pollard's memoranda.
[^44]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json The classified in camera declaration ("substantial and irrevocable") and the unclassified supplemental declaration.
[^45]: Supplemental Declaration of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, *United States v. Jonathan Jay Pollard*, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), executed March 3, 1987 (unclassified). http://www.irmep.org/ila/pollard/03041987weinberger.pdf Paragraphs 1 and 2.
[^46]: Supplemental Declaration of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, *United States v. Jonathan Jay Pollard*, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), executed March 3, 1987 (unclassified). http://www.irmep.org/ila/pollard/03041987weinberger.pdf Paragraph 4 (loyalty; the February 25 polygraph and the February 15 article).
[^47]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Dissent of Judge Williams on the Weinberger submissions.
[^48]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Sentences of March 4, 1987: life for Pollard and five years for Anne Pollard.
[^49]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Rule 35 motion and the decision not to appeal.
[^50]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json The Dershowitz affidavit, the Goldberg conversation and the South Africa reference, and the district court's refusal to recuse or hold a hearing.
[^51]: *United States v. Pollard*, 416 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005), decided July 22, 2005. https://static.case.law/f3d/416/cases/0048-01.json Procedural history of the March 12, 1990 and September 20, 2000 motions.
[^52]: *United States v. Pollard*, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Affirmance of the denial of the 1990 section 2255 motion.
[^53]: *United States v. Pollard*, 416 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005), decided July 22, 2005. https://static.case.law/f3d/416/cases/0048-01.json Holding that the successive section 2255 motion was untimely and that no certificate of appealability would issue.
[^54]: *United States v. Pollard*, 416 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005), decided July 22, 2005. https://static.case.law/f3d/416/cases/0048-01.json Holding on the clemency-access petition and the vacatur.
[^55]: "Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf Denials of clemency in January 1993, March 1994 and 1997.
[^56]: Matthew S. Schwartz, "Jonathan Pollard, Who Sold Cold War Secrets To Israel, Completes Parole," NPR, carried by *Georgia Public Broadcasting*, November 21, 2020. https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/21/jonathan-pollard-who-sold-cold-war-secrets-israel-completes-parole Release on November 20, 2015, the end of parole on November 20, 2020, and Israel\'s grant of citizenship in 1995.
[^57]: Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, letter to Grant F. Smith, FOIA Request No. 2011-036, March 14, 2011. https://www.israellobby.org/pollard/03142011Pollard_release.pdf Commutation application of October 15, 2010 pending.
[^58]: Michael B. Mukasey to President Barack Obama, letter of December 21, 2010. https://www.israellobby.org/pollard/12212010Mukasey.pdf Request for commutation; the Woolsey and DeConcini views; the Weinberger affidavits.
[^59]: Craig Unger, "October Surprise," *Esquire*, October 1991 (article quoted at length in the opinion cited below). *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996). https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json
[^60]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json The article's passage on the Inslaw affidavit; the court's finding that the recruitment clause and the following sentences are not in the affidavit; McFarlane's non-dispute that Ben-Menashe made the assertions to Unger.
[^61]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json Affirmance of the judgment for Esquire and the dismissal of the claim against Unger.
[^62]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json Description of Ben-Menashe and of the Esquire article's treatment of his credibility.
[^63]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json The opinion's note on persistent allegations about an unnamed second American.
[^64]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's account of what his handlers told him about cabinet discussion and intelligence priorities.
[^65]: "Pollard" report, *Los Angeles Times*, November 29, 1985. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000504890020-7
[^66]: *The Washington Post*, February 28, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000403620005-5
[^67]: Thomas L. Friedman, "Shamir Says Pollard's Fate Is No Concern of Israel," *The New York Times*, March 11, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302120009-8
[^68]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The two reports of May 26, 1987; the subcommittee's statement that the affair was not a rogue operation.
[^69]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The subcommittee's findings on Eitan and Sella, and its criticism of Levy and Lapidot.
[^70]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The Rotenstreich report's statement on the troika; the pressure to file it; Rabin and Peres's response to the subcommittee; criticism of Rabin's supervision and of the Sella and Eitan promotions.
[^71]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Shamir's remark to reporters.
[^72]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Cabinet adoption of the Rotenstreich findings and the collective-responsibility finding.
[^73]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Indictment of Sella by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987.
[^74]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's assignment to the staff college after American protests, and his later retirement.
[^75]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Sella's promotion and his resignation from the Tel Nof post.
[^76]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Eitan's post at the Israel Chemicals Company and the Sharon authorization.
[^77]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's promotion to brigadier general and his assignment to Tel Nof.
[^78]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Committees' criticism of Sella's appointment to command Tel Nof Air Force Base.
[^79]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's fugitive status in June 1990 and the Israeli refusal of extradition.
[^80]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's account of his role as Hersh relates it, and Pollard's conduct once Sella was involved.
[^81]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Garment's engagement, the Israeli delegation, and his withdrawal.
[^82]: National Security Archive, "Jonathan Pollard: Revisiting a Still Sensitive Case," Electronic Briefing Book (Richelson, December 14, 2012; reposted November 24, 2020). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2012-12-14/jonathan-pollard-spy-case-cias-1987-damage-assessment-declassified Parole conditions, including the travel restriction, as stated in the November 24, 2020 posting.
[^83]: Matthew S. Schwartz, "Jonathan Pollard, Who Sold Cold War Secrets To Israel, Completes Parole," NPR, carried by *Georgia Public Broadcasting*, November 21, 2020. https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/21/jonathan-pollard-who-sold-cold-war-secrets-israel-completes-parole Parole Commission statement and the lawyers' statement.
[^84]: Associated Press, "Reports convicted US spy Pollard arrives in Israel," December 30, 2020. https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/world/2020/12/30/reports-convicted-us-spy-pollard-arrives-in-israel/ Arrival on December 30, 2020, the reception and Israeli identity cards.

17
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Mark M. Richard.md
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@ -11,26 +11,29 @@ tags:
- DOJ
- Pollard
- IranContra
summary: "Deputy assistant attorney general in the Criminal Division for twenty years, named by a Senate investigator's source as knowing of Lowell Jensen's conduct in the INSLAW matter and questioned by the Bua inquiry over the Office of Special Investigations; he called INSLAW's charges slanderous."
summary: "Deputy assistant attorney general in the Criminal Division for twenty years; a Senate investigator's source said he knew of Lowell Jensen's conduct in the INSLAW matter, and he called INSLAW's charges slanderous."
died: 2009-05-23
location: "Washington, D.C."
created: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-10-12
---
Mark M. Richard (died May 23, 2009, Charlottesville, [[Virginia]], aged 69) was a career prosecutor of the [[Department of Justice]] for forty years, serving sixteen attorneys general from Ramsey Clark to Alberto Gonzales. Born in New York and raised in Brooklyn, he worked as a probation officer, graduated from Brooklyn Law School in 1967 and joined the department the same year, becoming chief of the fraud section. In 1979 he was made deputy assistant attorney general in the Criminal Division, a post he held for twenty years. He had a hand in the inquiry into Carter's budget director Bert Lance, the Billy Carter Libya lobbying case, the [[Jonathan Pollard]] espionage prosecution, the federal intervention at Waco and the mid-1990s investigation of Democratic National Committee contributions. From 1999 to 2007 he was the department's representative to the [[European Union]], leading counterterrorism coordination after September 2001 and negotiating extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties. He received the Presidential Rank Award, two Attorney General's Exceptional Service Awards and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] Director's Award; Attorney General Eric Holder spoke at his funeral, and the Criminal Division named a memorial award for him.[^1]
### Pollard and Iran-Contra
In 1986 [[Leonard Garment]] informed U.S. Attorney [[Joseph E. diGenova]] and Richard that he was withdrawing from the representation of the Israeli officer Aviem Sella in the Pollard matter. Richard's handwritten notes of a department briefing on the Iran-Contra figure [[Scott Weekly]] recorded: "Weekly posts on tape that he's tied into CIA and Hasenfus. Said he reports to people reporting to Bush."[^2][^3]
In December 1985 a United States delegation went to Israel to pursue the Pollard investigation. It included [[Abraham Sofaer]], the State Department legal adviser, [[Joseph E. diGenova]], the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Edward S.G. Dennis Jr., the Assistant Attorney General who headed the Criminal Division, William J. Birney, second-ranking prosecutor in the United States Attorney's office, and Richard, then a deputy assistant attorney general.[^2]
In 1986 [[Leonard Garment]] informed U.S. Attorney diGenova and Richard that he was withdrawing from the representation of the Israeli officer Aviem Sella in the Pollard matter. Richard's handwritten notes of a department briefing on the Iran-Contra figure [[Scott Weekly]] recorded: "Weekly posts on tape that he's tied into CIA and Hasenfus. Said he reports to people reporting to Bush."[^3][^4]
### The INSLAW Inquiry
A career department source of [[Ronald LeGrand]], chief investigator of the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]], said that Richard, [[John Keeney]] and [[Philip White]] knew "all about" [[Lowell Jensen]]'s conduct in the [[INSLAW]] matter and that Richard and White were "pretty upset" about it but would speak only under subpoena and oath. Interviewed by the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]], Richard said he had no knowledge of any wrongdoing by Jensen generally or of the kind described in [[Bill Hamilton]]'s affidavit, and Bua found no credible evidence for the allegation. INSLAW also suggested that the [[Office of Special Investigations]], the Nazi-hunting unit within the Criminal Division, was a covert intelligence arm distributing [[PROMIS]]. Bua's report records his reply: "Mr. Richard stated that INSLAW's charges are ridiculous. He said that OSI is only involved in its stated mission of locating and deporting Nazi war criminals and in related projects such as the analysis of Kurt Waldheim's role during World War II. He did, however, note that OSI does work with various intelligence agencies in fulfilling its mandate of locating war criminals. He categorically denied any involvement by OSI in covert operations, the dissemination of PROMIS or the death of Mr. Casolaro. He said that he considers these and other allegations made by INSLAW to be slanderous."[^4]
A career department source of [[Ronald LeGrand]], chief investigator of the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]], said that Richard, [[John Keeney]] and [[Philip White]] knew "all about" [[Lowell Jensen]]'s conduct in the [[INSLAW]] matter and that Richard and White were "pretty upset" about it but would speak only under subpoena and oath. Interviewed by the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]], Richard said he had no knowledge of any wrongdoing by Jensen generally or of the kind described in [[Bill Hamilton]]'s affidavit, and Bua found no credible evidence for the allegation. INSLAW also suggested that the [[Office of Special Investigations]], the Nazi-hunting unit within the Criminal Division, was a covert intelligence arm distributing [[PROMIS]]. Bua's report records his reply: "Mr. Richard stated that INSLAW's charges are ridiculous. He said that OSI is only involved in its stated mission of locating and deporting Nazi war criminals and in related projects such as the analysis of Kurt Waldheim's role during World War II. He did, however, note that OSI does work with various intelligence agencies in fulfilling its mandate of locating war criminals. He categorically denied any involvement by OSI in covert operations, the dissemination of PROMIS or the death of Mr. Casolaro. He said that he considers these and other allegations made by INSLAW to be slanderous."[^5]
### Footnotes
[^1]: "Mark M. Richard, Career Prosecutor With the Justice Department, Dies at 69," *The Washington Post,* June 3, 2009. Archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20141225083941/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/03/AR2009060303700.html
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option,* Random House, 1991, ch. 21.
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance,* Seven Stories, 1998, ch. 19.
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, p. 120 and the section on the Office of Special Investigations. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport
[^2]: "Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf
[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option,* Random House, 1991, ch. 21.
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance,* Seven Stories, 1998, ch. 19.
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.,* March 1993, p. 120 and the section on the Office of Special Investigations. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport

3
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Shimon Peres.md
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@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ tags:
- Nuclear
- Israel
summary: "Peres's rise to influence began in late 1953, when David Ben-Gurion appointed the then thirty-year-old Shimon Peres as director general of the ministry of defense."
updated: 2026-10-12
born: 1923-08-02
died: 2016-09-28
location: "Wiszniew, Poland"
@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ Documents obtained by [[Sasha Polakow-Suransky]] record meetings in March and Ju
### Controversies and Covert Operations
Peres's career was not without scandal. In 1976, a telegram intercepted by [[Unit 8200]] revealed details of bribes paid by a [[Lockheed Aircraft Company|Lockheed]] representative in Israel to Defense Minister Peres. The sum involved was $3.5 million, deposited in one of Peres's brother's business accounts in [[Europe]]. This damaging information, discovered by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], was subsequently covered up by Israeli military intelligence superiors.[^1]
Peres's career was not without scandal. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], a telegram intercepted by [[Unit 8200]] in 1976 revealed details of bribes paid by a [[Lockheed Aircraft Company|Lockheed]] representative in Israel to Defense Minister Peres. Ben-Menashe wrote that the sum involved was $3.5 million, deposited in one of Peres's brother's business accounts in [[Europe]], that he discovered the telegram, and that the information was subsequently covered up by Israeli military intelligence superiors.[^1]
The 1980s brought new controversies involving arms sales to [[Iran]]. In 1980, [[William J. Casey]] invited Peres, then [[Labor Party]] leader, to participate in secret meetings concerning arms sales to Iran. Peres secretly met with [[Mehdi Karrubi]] in [[Madrid]], actions that drew sharp criticism when they came to light. When [[Menachem Begin]] learned of this unauthorized diplomacy, he warned Peres that such actions without government knowledge would be considered treason.[^1]

13
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yaacov Nimrodi.md
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@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ tags:
- IranContra
- Arms
- Mossad
summary: "Yaacov Nimrodi was an Israeli arms dealer and former military intelligence attache in Iran who served alongside David Kimche and Al Schwimmer as part of the 'troika' that managed the first three Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages transfers in 1985."
summary: "Yaacov Nimrodi was an Israeli arms dealer and former military attache in Iran who served with David Kimche and Al Schwimmer in the troika that managed the first Iran-Contra arms transfers in 1985."
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-10-12
born: 1928
died: 2016-07-02
location: "Tel Aviv, Israel"
@ -21,9 +21,11 @@ Nimrodi is consistently identified as one of the three principal Israeli facilit
The arrangement began when Kimche approached U.S. National Security Advisor [[Robert McFarlane]] in mid-1985 to propose that American weapons transferred to Iran via Israel could produce the release of American hostages held in [[Lebanon]] and open a channel to Iranian moderates. President [[Ronald Reagan]] agreed. Nimrodi's role was to leverage his Iranian network - including contacts from his years as military attache - to identify Iranian interlocutors and facilitate the first weapons transfers.
The first transfer, of 96 TOW missiles from Israeli stocks in August 1985, was managed through the troika. A second TOW transfer of 408 missiles followed in September 1985. A shipment of 18 HAWK surface-to-air missiles was attempted in November 1985, but the operation was badly mismanaged, the missiles proved to be a version the Iranians could not use, and the transaction's exposure began the chain of events that led to the scandal.[^2]
The congressional committees investigating the Iran-Contra Affair recorded that [[Adnan Khashoggi]] introduced [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]] to Al Schwimmer, described as an adviser to then Israeli Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], and to Nimrodi. The report places an October 8, 1985 Washington meeting of Ghorbanifar with Schwimmer and Nimrodi. The same report records that David Kimche, director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, became involved in late June 1985.[^2]
Nimrodi stepped back from the operation by the end of 1985, as did Kimche, when the arms channel was handed off to [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], [[Oliver North]], and [[Amiram Nir]], whose management of the subsequent stages led eventually to public disclosure in November 1986.
The first transfer, of 96 TOW missiles from Israeli stocks in August 1985, was managed through the troika. A second TOW transfer of 408 missiles followed in September 1985. A shipment of 18 HAWK surface-to-air missiles was attempted in November 1985, but the operation was badly mismanaged, the missiles proved to be a version the Iranians could not use, and the transaction's exposure began the chain of events that led to the scandal.[^3]
Nimrodi stepped back from the operation by the end of 1985, as did Kimche, when the arms channel was handed off to Manucher Ghorbanifar, [[Oliver North]], and [[Amiram Nir]], whose management of the subsequent stages led eventually to public disclosure in November 1986.
### Business Career
@ -32,4 +34,5 @@ After his government service, Nimrodi established himself as a businessman with
### Footnotes
[^1]: "Yaakov Nimrodi," Israeli newspaper archives compiled in obituaries, July 2016.
[^2]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters.* United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1993.
[^2]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (S. Rept. 100-216, H. Rept. 100-433, 1987), chapter 10. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit
[^3]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters.* United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1993.

214
10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yitzhak Shamir.md
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@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
---
aliases:
- Yitzhak Shamir
- Yzernitzky
- Yitzhak Yizernitzky
- Samuel Singer
category: "Political Figure"
tags:
- KeyFigure
@ -6,38 +11,215 @@ tags:
- CIA
- Politician
- Israel
- Soviet
summary: "Israeli Prime Minister and former LEHI member who authorized intelligence sharing with the Soviet Union and oversaw covert arms deals with Iran and the Iran-Israel Joint Committee."
- Lehi
- SternGang
- Mossad
- OperationDamocles
- FolkeBernadotte
- IranContra
- JonathanPollard
- MadridConference
- RobertMaxwell
summary: "Israeli prime minister: one of three LEHI commanders in the 1940s, Mossad officer 1955 to 1965, foreign minister during the Iran arms channel, and prime minister during the Pollard affair and Madrid."
born: 1915-10-22
died: 2012-06-30
location: "Ruzhany, Belarus"
updated: 2026-10-12
relations:
- type: member_of
with: "[[LEHI]]"
role: "member and leader of the Stern Group"
start: 1940
end: 1948
fn: 1
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Mossad]]"
role: "operations officer; head of the Paris office under the cover name Samuel Singer"
start: 1955
end: 1965
fn: 1
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation Damocles]]"
role: "Paris office directing the campaign against German scientists working in Egypt"
start: 1962
end: 1963
fn: 17
- type: head_of
with: "[[Israel]]"
role: "foreign minister"
start: 1980-03-10
end: 1986-10-20
fn: 2
- type: head_of
with: "[[Israel]]"
role: "prime minister"
start: 1983-10-10
end: 1984-09-13
fn: 2
- type: head_of
with: "[[Israel]]"
role: "prime minister"
start: 1986-10-20
end: 1992-07
fn: 3
- type: head_of
with: "[[Likud Party]]"
role: "party leader, succeeding Menachem Begin"
start: 1983-09
fn: 1
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
role: "foreign minister whose consultation on the Israeli arms channel is recorded in the Tower Commission and Walsh materials"
start: 1985-06
end: 1986-10-20
fn: 27
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Madrid Conference]]"
role: "prime minister of Israel when the conference opened"
start: 1991-10-30
fn: 42
---
[[Yitzhak Shamir]] was a prominent [[Israel|Israeli]] politician who served as Prime Minister of [[Israel]]. He was a former member of [[LEHI]] (Stern Gang), a Jewish terrorist group, and later became a prominent figure in [[Mossad]], serving as operations chief for [[Europe]].[^1]
Yitzhak Shamir, also spelled Yzernitzky in some sources and born Yitzhak Jaziernicki, was born in 1915 in Ruzhany, then in Poland and now in Belarus, and died on June 30, 2012.[^1] He was one of three commanders of the Stern Group, the armed faction that called itself [[LEHI]], a senior officer of [[Mossad]] from 1955 to 1965 who ran its Paris office, and the leader of the [[Likud Party]] after [[Menachem Begin]]'s resignation in 1983.[^1] He served as [[Israel|Israeli]] foreign minister from March 1980 to October 1986 and as prime minister from October 1983 to September 1984 and again from October 1986 until the Labor government of [[Yitzhak Rabin]] took office in July 1992.[^2][^3]
### Anti-American Sentiments and Soviet Relations
### Stern Group and LEHI
[[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] was known for his anti-[[United States|American]] sentiments, stemming from his belief that the [[United States|U.S.]] was partially responsible for the Holocaust. He sought to open lines of communication between [[Israel]] and the [[East Bloc]] countries, particularly after becoming prime minister in 1983. He authorized intelligence exchanges with the [[Soviet Union]], including sanitized [[United States|American]] intelligence reports about nuclear issues and evaluations of [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] nuclear technology.[^1]
Shamir joined the [[Irgun Zvai Leumi|Irgun]] in 1937 and in 1940 became a founder of its splinter group, LEHI, known to the British as the [[Stern Gang]]; he was arrested twice by the British in 1940 and escaped both times, the second time from a detention facility in [[Eritrea]].[^1] After the death of [[Avraham Stern]] at the hands of British police in 1942, the group was led by a triumvirate. The [[Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem]] names the three as [[Israel Eldad]] (also Scheib), [[Nathan Yellin-Mor]] (also Friedman) and Shamir (also Yzernitzsky).[^4] The same reference describes Shamir as a member of the Irgun before he joined the Stern Gang, where he became one of its leaders.[^4]
### Coalition Government and Arms Trading
### Lord Moyne in Cairo
[[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] was a key figure in the [[Likud Party]]. He formed a bizarre coalition government with [[Shimon Peres]] of the [[Labor Party]] in 1984, sharing the roles of prime minister and foreign minister. [[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] had a close relationship with [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]], who served as his counterterrorism adviser and later ran the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]. [[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] was involved in the decision to supply [[Iran]] with arms in its war with [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein's]] [[Iraq]], believing it was in [[Israel|Israel's]] national security interest.[^1]
On November 6, 1944 two members of LEHI shot the British minister resident in the [[Middle East]], [[Lord Moyne]], outside his house in [[Cairo]]; his driver was also killed. The two men, Eliahu Bet-Tsuri and Eliahu Hakim, were captured at the scene, admitted the killing in court, and were tried, condemned and executed in early 1945.[^5] [[Anthony Eden]] told the House of Commons on November 9, 1944 that the two prisoners had confessed: "We are members of the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel organisation and what we have done was done on the instructions of this organisation. The organisation is that known as the Stern Group."[^6] The [[National Archives (United Kingdom)|National Archives]] at Kew holds Cabinet and Prime Minister's Office files titled "Assassination of Lord Moyne" (CAB 104/254 and PREM 4/51/11) and Foreign Office files on the trial and execution of the assassins (FO 141/1001, FO 954/5D and FO 371/41514 to 41517).[^7] The Encyclopedia states that Shamir "was one of the terrorists who planned the assassination."[^4]
### Pollard Espionage Case
### Folke Bernadotte
[[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] was also involved in the [[Jonathan Pollard]] espionage case, authorizing the transfer of [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence gleaned from the [[United States|United States]] to the [[Soviet Union]]. During his tenure as prime minister (1984-1986), Shamir authorized some of the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] material to be sanitized, retyped, and turned over to Soviet intelligence officials as a gesture of Israeli goodwill. This decision was consistent with his personal and political beliefs, as he viscerally disliked the [[United States]] and was fascinated with strong regimes, viewing the U.S. as "soft, bourgeois, materialistic and effete." He believed that by relaying the Pollard information to the Soviets, he was demonstrating that [[Israel]] could be a much more dependable and important collaborator in the [[Middle East]] than the "fickle" Arabs. Shamir's actions, if exposed, would have meant the end of the increasingly shaky Likud coalition and put the overall Israeli–United States relationship at risk.[^1][^2]
On September 17, 1948 [[Folke Bernadotte|Count Folke Bernadotte]], the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, was assassinated together with a French United Nations observer in a part of [[Jerusalem]] under Jewish control. The Yearbook of the United Nations prints the mediator's progress report, dated 18 September 1948, as document A/648.[^8] Eden told the Commons on September 20 that the House deplored "the callous and the seemingly purposeless assassination of Count Bernadotte."[^9] A [[Central Intelligence Agency]] weekly summary from October 1948 reported that the Provisional Government of Israel had not apprehended the assassins and that many members of the Stern Gang were still at large.[^10] Foreign Office files on the killing from 1948 and 1949 include the [[Sweden|Swedish]] government's dissatisfaction with the Israeli report to the Security Council.[^11]
[[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] was furious when the [[Oliver North|North]] group leaked the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] story, and sought to nip the newcomers in the bud.[^1]
Two former LEHI members described the killing on Israeli television and radio on September 9, 1988, in what The New York Times called the first public acknowledgement by members of the group. [[Yehoshua Zettler]] (also spelled Zeitler) said he directed the assassination, and Meshulam Markover said he led the four-man squad that blocked the mediator's car with a jeep on a Jerusalem street. According to their account Yehoshua Cohen, who had died two years earlier, fired the shots that killed the mediator and his French aide. Zeitler said he spoke out because he feared the United Nations would again try to force Israel into concessions. A spokesman for Shamir, then prime minister, said that Shamir had played no role in the assassination because the group had officially disbanded six months earlier.[^12] The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Zeitler said four people carried out the assassination and that Shamir was not directly implicated in the act, while Israel Eldad (Scheib) said Shamir was one of four men responsible for planning assassinations and could not confirm that Shamir attended the meeting at which Bernadotte's killing was ordered. Sweden insisted on a second apology; Israel refused.[^13]
### Palestinian and Regional Policy
The Encyclopedia reports that the decision to kill the mediator was taken at two clandestine meetings of the Stern Gang triumvirate, in June and September 1948. Shamir "was at the first meeting, which agreed in principle that the mediator had to be killed. The second meeting gave the order to go ahead."[^4] For the account of September 10, 1948, when Zettler drove Eldad from Jerusalem to a meeting in [[Tel Aviv]] with Nathan Yellin-Mor and Shamir, the Encyclopedia draws on [[Dan Kurzman]]'s [[Genesis 1948]].[^14] The Encyclopedia quotes the London Sunday Observer of September 18, 1988, under the headline "Death Warrant Returns to Haunt Shamir," as saying that Shamir "has not denied his part in the murder." A spokesman, [[Josef Ahimeir]], is quoted: "The Prime Minister is concentrating on the present and future problems of the State of Israel. We don't want to deal with this affair. All that can be said has been said."[^15] The Encyclopedia adds that the revelations prompted Sweden to demand that the case be reopened.[^4]
[[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] opposed [[United States|U.S.]] peace initiatives that would involve giving up territory in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]], and believed that [[Jordan]] should be the Palestinian state. Despite this public stance, [[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] initiated secret attempts to negotiate a solution to the Palestinian situation with the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]], discussing a plan to unseat [[King Hussein of Jordan|King Hussein]] of [[Jordan]] and establish a Palestinian state there.[^1]
### Mossad and Operation Damocles
### Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Programs
Roger Howard's [[Operation Damocles]] describes Shamir as "Mossad's European operations chief," who handpicked the agents for the operation.[^16] Howard also places him as head of the Paris office of Mossad, under the cover name Samuel Singer.[^17] The campaign Howard describes was directed by [[Isser Harel]], then head of Mossad, against German engineers and scientists working on [[Egypt]]'s rocket and missile program. Howard writes that Mossad's complicity in the disappearance of a Munich procurement company director on September 11, 1962 "has never been conclusively proven, but almost certainly this was just the beginning of Operation Damocles."[^16]
[[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] authorized [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] to undertake a secret mission to [[Peru]] to acquire nuclear substances for [[Israel|Israel's]] tactical atom bomb program. [[Yitzhak Shamir|Shamir]] was confronted by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] regarding the chemical weapons trade to [[Iraq]] and the need to secure the release of [[Israel|Israeli]] soldiers held in [[Lebanon]]. He initially refused to release [[C-130]] aircraft to [[Iran]] until the [[Israel|Israeli]] soldiers were freed, but later changed his mind. He also intervened to put on hold the execution list of individuals deemed enemies of the state of [[Israel]].[^1]
Howard records an attack on a German engineer in [[Lörrach]] on February 12, 1963. The attackers forced his car to stop on a narrow lane near his house, one agent fired at him, the weapon jammed, and the engineer returned fire before the attackers ran back to their car. Howard concludes that he "had narrowly survived."[^16] On November 27, 1962 a letter bomb sent from Germany injured a secretary in the office of a German scientist at the [[Heliopolis]] factory where the Egyptian rocket program was based.[^17] Howard places Shamir's Paris posting in 1962 and 1963; the Jewish Telegraphic Agency dates his service as a senior Mossad official to 1955 through 1965.[^1]
### Prime minister, 1983 to 1984
Shamir became prime minister on October 10, 1983.[^2] A December 1983 Central Intelligence Agency assessment titled "Israel: Economic Problems Facing the Shamir Government" reported that his government inherited severe economic problems. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange had been closed, and Israelis were buying dollars in such numbers that some banks ran out of foreign exchange.[^18] A [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] Post column of November 29, 1983 reported that Reagan and his top advisers were meeting Shamir and Defense Minister [[Moshe Arens]] behind closed doors. Its most important topic was how to implement the administration's decision to cooperate more closely with Israel in Lebanon. The column noted that on October 29 the president had signed a secret National Security Decision Directive calling for "closer strategic coordination with Israel in the Middle East." Its second topic was the Israeli-Lebanese agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon.[^19]
### Foreign minister, 1980 to 1983
Shamir was foreign minister from March 10, 1980.[^2] On October 4, 1982 [[George P. Shultz]], then secretary of state, told the Soviet foreign minister [[Andrei Gromyko]] in [[New York]] that he had put the question of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon to Shamir. Shamir had said that once the Syrians were out, Israel would leave all of Lebanon and "not occupy any part of it."[^20]
In February 1981 Prime Minister Menachem Begin sent Shamir to Washington to see [[Alexander Haig]], the secretary of state, because Begin was unhappy with the American position set out in a February 4 cable. According to Haig, Shamir was told that the [[United States]] could not prohibit Israeli sales of non-American items to Iran but opposed any arms deal with Iran and prohibited sales of American-origin arms. The [[Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force]] (1993) records that "Foreign Minister Shamir apparently heard Haig's message differently," and that he told Begin the United States objected to the sale of American-origin equipment.[^21] An affidavit by [[William Northrop]] asserted that Haig had authorized Israel to ship American weapons to Iran. The Task Force's review of the cable traffic and the participants' notes found that "no green light was ever given for the shipment of American-made weapons between Israel and Iran."[^21]
### Rotation with Shimon Peres, 1984 to 1986
From September 1984 to October 1986 Shamir served as foreign minister under [[Shimon Peres]], who was prime minister, and the two then exchanged posts on October 20, 1986.[^2] On September 27, 1984 Shultz telegraphed from New York that Shamir had told him Gromyko's manner "seemed slightly more moderate in their bilateral."[^22] The Foreign Relations of the United States volume for the period records that Gromyko had confirmed to Shamir that the Soviet Union supports the existence of an independent Israel.[^23]
The [[Bus 300 affair]] surfaced in June 1986. A [[Labor Party|Labor]] minister named in the report as Gur, the minister of health and a former army chief of staff, called for Shamir's resignation over his reported part in covering up the killing of two captured Palestinian bus hijackers by Israeli agents. The New York Times reported that Shamir had been prime minister when the 1984 hijacking took place, and that the head of [[Shin Bet]], [[Avraham Shalom]], had resigned.[^24] Shamir was quoted by Cabinet sources as saying "My conscience is clear."[^24]
A Central Intelligence Agency talking-points paper of September 29, 1986 said that Shamir, unlike Peres, was adamantly opposed to any kind of international conference for Middle East peace.[^25]
### Israeli arms channel and Iran-Contra
The congressional committees investigating the Iran-Contra Affair recorded that [[Adnan Khashoggi]] introduced [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]] to [[Al Schwimmer]], described as an adviser to then Prime Minister Peres, and to [[Yaacov Nimrodi]]. In late June 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, became involved. On August 2 and 3, 1985 he was in Washington, where [[Robert McFarlane]] told the Israelis that TOW missiles had been authorized.[^26]
The Tower Commission report gives Shultz's account of a conversation in which McFarlane said that "Foreign Minister Shamir had told Mr. Kimche that he wanted to know explicitly whether I was informed."[^27] A note by Hill dated August 6, 1985, cited in the [[Walsh Report]], records the same remark.[^28] [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]'s account places Shamir among those who decided on Israeli arms supplies to Iran in its war with [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein's]] [[Iraq]], a decision he says was made in the belief that it served Israel's national security interest.[^29]
In September 1986 a memorandum from [[Oliver North]] recorded that "Incoming PM Shamir and outgoing PM Peres have agreed that Nir will remain in his current capacity after the change of government in October." The memorandum refers to [[Amiram Nir]], who was then the Israeli official in the arms dealings.[^30] Ben-Menashe says that [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi Eitan]] served as Shamir's counterterrorism adviser and later ran the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].[^29]
### Pollard affair
The [[Los Angeles Times]] reported on November 29, 1985 that Peres, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shamir had been meeting daily to review the internal investigation into [[Jonathan Pollard]]'s activities. The paper reported that the essential elements of the case were believed to be clear to the three, who were hesitating about any public disclosure.[^31] In late February 1987 the Israeli embassy spokesman [[Yossi Gal]] said that Shamir had reiterated on a recent visit to Washington "that this was a rogue operation that was not authorized and against the will of the government."[^32]
Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment in the first week of March 1987. In a report from Jerusalem published March 11, 1987, [[Thomas L. Friedman]] quoted Shamir: "The State of Israel has no connection with Pollard or his family." Shamir rejected a formal inquiry: "There is no need for a commission of inquiry," he said. "The problem is not to investigate what happened. Those who need not know should continue not knowing." A committee headed by [[Abba Eban]] was to question the officials involved, through its intelligence subcommittee.[^33] Friedman wrote that Shamir's remarks "reflect a certain anti-American sentiment that has been brewing here in the last few days," directed at both American Jews and the American government.[^33] [[The Washington Times]] reported on March 11 that Shamir had said "the Pollard affair is closed," while the [[Knesset]] would conduct a full-scale investigation.[^34]
The Eban subcommittee and a two-member cabinet panel reported on May 26, 1987. The Washington Post reported that the subcommittee said Shimon Peres, Shamir and Rabin shared responsibility for the government's failure to live up to commitments made to the United States after Pollard's arrest, and that, contrary to the government's earlier statements, the subcommittee's report described the affair as "not a rogue operation." Shamir told reporters that the government had no intention of resigning and that "the mountain was really a molehill and the earth did not move."[^35] The Christian Science Monitor reported that the cabinet adopted the findings of its panel, which held the entire government collectively responsible.[^36]
Ben-Menashe wrote that Shamir authorized some of the Pollard material to be sanitized, retyped and turned over to Soviet intelligence officials as a gesture of Israeli goodwill during 1984 to 1986. Shamir was foreign minister for most of the 1984 to 1986 period, while Peres was prime minister.[^2] He writes that Shamir regarded the United States as "soft, bourgeois, materialistic and effete," and that Shamir believed the relay would show Israel to be a more dependable collaborator than the "fickle" Arabs.[^29] [[Seymour Hersh]]'s [[The Samson Option]] also describes Israeli passage of Pollard material to the Soviet Union.[^37] Ben-Menashe adds that Shamir was furious when the North group leaked the Pollard story and sought to end it.[^29]
### Second term and the Soviet channel, 1986 to 1988
Shamir again became prime minister on October 20, 1986.[^2] A 1988 briefing paper in the Foreign Relations of the United States records that Shamir's visit to Washington had been scheduled for March 14 to 17, 1988.[^38] In [[Moscow]] in April 1988 Shultz told [[Eduard Shevardnadze]] that Shamir "rejected some elements" of the American initiative, "accepted interrelationships, and accepted international auspices," and "was leery of a conference because he feared it would be authoritative." Shevardnadze told Shultz that "Shamir was more negative than Arafat," and said there was a question of who was in charge in Israel, the prime minister or the foreign minister.[^39]
The record of an Oval Office meeting on September 18, 1987, with Shultz, Senator Baker, [[Ken Duberstein]] and [[Frank Carlucci]], includes the line "Thatcher cable urges we go w/o Shamir," in a discussion of a Middle East international conference.[^40]
### Gulf War
The New York Times headlined on January 18, 1991 that Iraq had fired missiles at Israeli cities. On January 20, President [[George H. W. Bush]] telephoned Shamir twice from Camp David, at 3 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. Washington time, to thank Israel for its "restraint" in not retaliating for the Iraqi Scud attacks and to express his hope that Israel would let the United States retaliate on its behalf. The White House spokesman [[Marlin Fitzwater]] quoted the president as telling Shamir: "I understand the anguish of your people and your Government." Deputy Secretary of State [[Lawrence Eagleburger]] and Under Secretary of Defense [[Paul Wolfowitz]] were sent to Israel to coordinate policy, and American crews arrived that day to operate [[Patriot]] missile batteries, which Israel had resisted accepting until the first Scud fell on Tel Aviv.[^41] On January 21 the paper reported that Israeli tension eased a bit as new American help arrived.[^41] The Jewish Telegraphic Agency's obituary states that Shamir overruled members of his government who wanted to strike Iraq.[^1]
### Madrid Conference
The [[Madrid Conference]] began on October 30, 1991. The New York Times headlined that day "Bush and Gorbachev in Spain: let the talks begin," and the next day "Israel, Arabs face to face, begin quest for mideast peace."[^42] Shamir delivered Israel's opening address on October 31. He told the delegations that "the issue is not territory, but our existence," that "it will be regrettable if the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory," and that the goal of the bilateral negotiations was peace treaties with Israel's neighbors and interim self-government arrangements with the Palestinian Arabs. He appealed to Palestinian delegates to "renounce violence and terrorism" and said Israel could not "be expected to talk with people involved in such repulsive activities."[^43] The Tehiya, Tzomet and Moledet parties left his coalition over the talks, which led to early elections in which Labor defeated Likud.[^1]
### Loan guarantees, 1991 to 1992
In September 1991 Israel applied for $10 billion in American loan guarantees, and President Bush publicly asked that consideration be delayed. Israeli officials reacted, in the Christian Science Monitor's words, with a mixture of scorn and bitterness; one anonymous official called Bush's argument "nonsense" and hinted that Israel might reconsider attending the peace conference. Shamir, on Israeli television, answered a question about the effect on Israeli participation by recalling Secretary of State [[James Baker]]: "As Secretary Baker said, 'Everything has an effect.' This might have an effect as well." In a radio interview he predicted that if the Arabs were "handed such a gift, without even asking for it, they will dance on the roofs, make new and even bigger demands, and the peace process will become impossible."[^44] The Monitor reported in October that Shamir had rebuffed a request by Baker, during Baker's trip to Jerusalem, to delay the application, that a senior administration official had said the guarantees would hinge on a freeze on new settlement activity, and that pro-Israel senators had concluded they could not pass the guarantees over the president's opposition.[^45]
### Robert Maxwell
The publisher [[Robert Maxwell]] died in November 1991. The New York Times reported on November 9 that his body had been flown to Israel.[^46] The [[Jewish Telegraphic Agency]] reported that Maxwell was buried on Sunday on the Mount of Olives "with all the pomp of a state funeral," and that President [[Chaim Herzog]] and Prime Minister Shamir "headed a galaxy of dignitaries and politicians."[^47]
[[Daniel Pipes]], reviewing [[Gordon Thomas]]'s [[Gideon's Spies]] (1999) in [[Commentary]], wrote that the book presents Shamir as a "virulent" anti-American who would "do anything" to reduce Washington's influence in the world.[^48]
### Ben-Menashe's claims
Ben-Menashe wrote that Shamir authorized him to undertake a secret mission to [[Peru]] to acquire nuclear substances for Israel's tactical atomic bomb program. He also writes that he confronted Shamir about the chemical weapons trade to Iraq and the need to secure the release of Israeli soldiers held in [[Lebanon]].[^29] Ben-Menashe says that Shamir initially refused to release [[C-130]] aircraft to [[Iran]] until the soldiers were freed, and then changed his mind, and that Shamir intervened to put on hold an execution list of people deemed enemies of the state of Israel.[^29]
Ben-Menashe writes that Shamir's anti-American sentiment stemmed from a belief that the United States was partially responsible for the Holocaust. He says Shamir sought to open lines of communication with the [[East Bloc]] after becoming prime minister in 1983, and passed sanitized American intelligence reports on nuclear issues and assessments of Soviet nuclear technology to the [[Soviet Union]].[^29] He also says Shamir opposed American peace initiatives that would involve giving up territory in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]], held that [[Jordan]] should be the Palestinian state, and in secret discussed with the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]] a plan to unseat [[King Hussein of Jordan|King Hussein]].[^29]
The Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force found that Ben-Menashe made "several allegations that proved to be factually incorrect," and that documentary evidence showed he was not in Paris at the time he alleged. The Task Force also found the testimony of Ben-Menashe and of a second witness on the Madrid meetings "wholly lacking of any credibility."[^49]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 21.
[^1]: "Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's 7th prime minister, dies at 96," _Jewish Telegraphic Agency_, July 2012 (born 1915 in Ruzhany; Irgun 1937; Lehi 1940; one of three leaders after Stern's death; senior Mossad official 1955 to 1965; Likud leader on Begin's resignation in 1983; Gulf War; Madrid and the coalition departures). https://www.jta.org/?p=1789432
[^2]: _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988_, vol. I, biographical register, entry "Shamir, Yitzhak." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v01
[^3]: "Israel's Rabin Leaves Door Ajar For Ultra-Orthodox in Cabinet," _The Christian Science Monitor_, 14 July 1992 (refers to "outgoing Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Cabinet"). https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0714/14013.html
[^4]: Issa Nakhleh, _Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem_, vol. 1 (1991), entries on the Stern Gang, Lord Moyne and Count Bernadotte. https://archive.org/details/encyclopedia-of-the-palestine-problem-volume-i
[^5]: "The Assassination of Lord Moyne," _Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England_ (article text); The National Archives (Kew), FO 141/1001. https://www.jhse.org/pre-2015articles/the-assassination-of-lord-moyne
[^6]: "Assassination of Lord Moyne," HC Deb 9 November 1944, vol. 404, cols. 1538-41. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1944/nov/09/assassination-of-lord-moyne
[^7]: The National Archives (Kew), Discovery catalogue: CAB 104/254, "Assassination of Lord Moyne" (1944); PREM 4/51/11 (November 1944 to March 1945); FO 141/1001, "Lord Moyne: trial of his assassins" (1944); FO 954/5D/666 (5 December 1944); FO 371/41514 to 41517 (Code 66, file 33). https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
[^8]: _Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48_, "Tributes to Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot," and the document index entry for A/648, Progress report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, dated 18 September 1948. https://archive.org/details/yearbook-of-the-united-nations_1947-1948
[^9]: "Count Bernadotte (Assassination)," HC Deb 20 September 1948, vol. 456, col. 521. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/sep/20/count-bernadotte-assassination
[^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, weekly summary, October 1948 (CIA-RDP78-01617A002100020001-5). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a002100020001-5
[^11]: The National Archives (Kew), Discovery catalogue: FO 371/68696 (1948), "Assassination of UN Mediator Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot by Jews"; FO 371/75266 (1949), "Assassination of Count Bernadotte"; FO 371/75192 (1949). https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
[^12]: John Kifner, "2 Recount '48 Killing in Israel," _The New York Times_, 12 September 1988, p. A3. https://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/12/world/2-recount-48-killing-in-israel.html
[^13]: "Israel refuses to apologize for 1948 assassination," _Jewish Telegraphic Agency_, September 1988. https://jta.org/archive/israel-refuses-to-apologize-for-1948-assassination
[^14]: Dan Kurzman, _Genesis 1948_ (1970), pp. 555-556, as quoted in _Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem_ (see note 3). https://archive.org/details/genesis1948first00kurz
[^15]: Eric Silver, "Death Warrant Returns to Haunt Shamir," _The Sunday Observer_ (London), 18 September 1988, as quoted in _Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem_ (see note 3).
[^16]: Roger Howard, _Operation Damocles: Israel's Secret War against Hitler's Scientists in Egypt, 1954-1967_ (2013), chapter 1. https://archive.org/details/operationdamocle0000howa
[^17]: Roger Howard, _Operation Damocles_, chapter 16. https://archive.org/details/operationdamocle0000howa
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, NESA 83-10332, "Israel: Economic Problems Facing the Shamir Government" (December 1983). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84s00927r000200070002-4
[^19]: "Talks Focusing on Cooperation," _The Washington Post_ column, 29 November 1983 (reading-room copy). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000100140007-2
[^20]: _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988_, vol. III, document 221 (Shultz and Gromyko meeting, New York, 4 October 1982). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v03/d221
[^21]: _Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force_ (1993), section 9, "Israel Renews Request to Sell Arms, January 1981," and the section on the Northrop allegation. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
[^22]: Telegram from Secretary of State Shultz, New York, 27 September 1984, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988_, vol. IV, document 285. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v04/d285
[^23]: _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988_, vol. IV, document 287 (Gromyko meeting, 1984). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v04/d287
[^24]: "Charges of Cover-Up Bring Call for Shamir to Resign," _The New York Times_, 30 June 1986 (Jerusalem, 29 June; reading-room copy). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302120015-1
[^25]: Central Intelligence Agency, talking points, 29 September 1986 (CIA-RDP91B00874R000100280006-6). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp91b00874r000100280006-6
[^26]: _Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair_ (S. Rept. 100-216, H. Rept. 100-433, 1987), chapter 10. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit
[^27]: _Report of the President's Special Review Board_ (Tower Commission), 26 February 1987, account of Secretary Shultz's statements. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
[^28]: Lawrence E. Walsh, _Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters_, vol. I, chapter 24, note 59 (note by Hill, 6 August 1985). https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm
[^29]: Ari Ben-Menashe, _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_ (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
[^30]: Memorandum from Oliver North, September 1986, reproduced in the Tower Commission report. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
[^31]: "Pollard" report, _Los Angeles Times_, 29 November 1985 (reading-room copy, CIA-RDP90-00965R000504890020-7). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000504890020-7
[^32]: _The Washington Post_, 28 February 1987 (reading-room copy, CIA-RDP90-00965R000403620005-5). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000403620005-5
[^33]: Thomas L. Friedman, "Shamir Says Pollard's Fate Is No Concern of Israel," _The New York Times_, 11 March 1987 (Jerusalem, 10 March). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302120009-8
[^34]: _The Washington Times_, 11 March 1987 (reading-room copy, CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310041-1). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302310041-1
[^35]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," _The Washington Post_, 27 May 1987 (CIA reading-room copy CIA-RDP90-00965R000302080002-0). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0
[^36]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," _The Christian Science Monitor_, 28 May 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html
[^37]: Seymour M. Hersh, _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_ (Random House, 1991), chapter 21. https://archive.org/details/the-samson-option-seymour-hersh
[^38]: _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988_, vol. I, briefing paper of early 1988 (Shamir's visit scheduled for March 14 to 17). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v01
[^39]: Memorandum of conversation, Shultz and Shevardnadze, Moscow, April 1988, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988_, vol. VI, document 145. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v06/d145
[^40]: Record of the President's meeting with Secretary Shultz, Senator Baker, Ken Duberstein and Frank Carlucci in the Oval Office, 18 September 1987, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988_, vol. VI, document 77. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v06/d77
[^41]: Maureen Dowd, "War in the Gulf: The President; Bush Urges Israeli Restraint in Phone Appeals to Shamir," _The New York Times_, 20 January 1991, p. 16; headlines of 18 and 21 January 1991. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/20/world/war-gulf-president-bush-urges-israeli-restraint-phone-appeals-shamir.html
[^42]: _The New York Times_, 30 and 31 October 1991, headlines "Bush and Gorbachev in Spain: let the talks begin" and "Middle East talks: Israel, Arabs face to face, begin quest for mideast peace." https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/30/world/the-middle-east-talks-bush-and-gorbachev-in-spain-let-the-talks-begin.html and https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/31/world/middle-east-talks-israel-arabs-face-face-begin-quest-for-mideast-peace.html
[^43]: "Address by Prime Minister Shamir at the Madrid Peace Conference," 31 October 1991. https://jcpa-lecape.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Address-by-Prime-Minister-Shamir-at-the-Madrid-Peace-Conference.pdf
[^44]: "Israeli Leaders Move to Head Off Rift With Bush," _The Christian Science Monitor_, 9 September 1991. https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/0909/09031.html
[^45]: "Stance on Loan Guarantees Marks Significant Shift in US Israel Policy," _The Christian Science Monitor_, 8 October 1991. https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1008/08062.html
[^46]: "Maxwell's body flown to Israel," _The New York Times_, 9 November 1991. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/09/business/the-media-business-maxwell-s-body-flown-to-israel.html
[^47]: "Maxwell, Colossus Even in Death, Laid to Rest on Mount of Olives," _Jewish Telegraphic Agency_, 11 November 1991. https://www.jta.org/archive/maxwell-colossus-even-in-death-laid-to-rest-on-mount-of-olives
[^48]: Daniel Pipes, review of Gordon Thomas, _Gideon's Spies_, _Commentary_ (1999). https://www.commentary.org/articles/daniel-pipes/gideons-spies-by-gordon-thomas/
[^49]: _Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force_ (1993), summary of allegations by Ari Ben-Menashe (p. 8) and the section on the Madrid meetings. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce