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---
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updated: 2026-10-12
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tags:
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- Organization
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- Government
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@ -8,32 +9,47 @@ summary: "LAKAM (Hebrew acronym for Science Liaison Bureau) was an Israeli Minis
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start: 1957
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end: 1985
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location: "Tel Aviv, Israel"
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relations:
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- type: informant_for
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with: "[[Jonathan Pollard]]"
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reverse: true
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start: 1984-06
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end: 1985-11
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role: "Handled Pollard as an Israeli agent"
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fn: 9
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---
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[[LAKAM]] (Hebrew acronym for Science Liaison Bureau) was an Israeli Ministry of Defense intelligence agency, previously known as the Office of Special Tasks. It was set up to gather and exchange technology and intelligence with foreign military industries. Under its founding director [[Binyamin Blumberg]], LAKAM agents operated worldwide, collecting technical information and setting up front companies in [[Europe]] and [[Latin America]] to purchase high-tech equipment from the [[United States]] that U.S. export controls would otherwise deny to [[Israel]].[^1][^2]
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### Leadership and Operations
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In the early 1980s, LAKAM was widely known by its Hebrew acronym. [[Rafael Eitan]], a crony of [[Ariel Sharon]], was appointed its new head, succeeding [[Binyamin Blumberg]]. LAKAM operations in the [[United States]] produced a steady stream of routinely transferred scientific and technical documents, including [[KH-11]] imagery and reporting and assessments from U.S. embassies and intelligence operatives inside [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Jordan]], and [[Egypt]]. Some of this material was marked JUMBO, indicating it was not to be discussed with American counterparts.[^2]
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In the early 1980s, LAKAM was widely known by its Hebrew acronym. [[Rafael Eitan]], a crony of [[Ariel Sharon]], was appointed its new head, succeeding Binyamin Blumberg. LAKAM operations in the United States produced a steady stream of routinely transferred scientific and technical documents, including [[KH-11]] imagery and reporting and assessments from U.S. embassies and intelligence operatives inside [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Jordan]], and [[Egypt]]. Some of this material was marked JUMBO, indicating it was not to be discussed with American counterparts.[^2]
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### U.S. Spy Network Operations
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[[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]]'s operation to build a spy network in the [[United States|United States]] to obtain information about Palestinian terrorists was funded from [[LAKAM|LAKAM's]] budget. [[Iris]], a [[LAKAM]] representative in [[Washington, D.C.]], served as a conduit for intelligence reports between [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Jonathan Pollard]], and [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]].[^1]
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Rafi's operation to build a spy network in the United States to obtain information about Palestinian terrorists was funded from LAKAM's budget. [[Iris]], a LAKAM representative in [[Washington, D.C.]], served as a conduit for intelligence reports between [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Jonathan Pollard]], and Rafi.[^1]
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### Political Control and Funding
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[[LAKAM]] was later controlled by [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]] after [[Shimon Peres]] became prime minister in 1984, and its huge slush fund, which had once financed [[Labor Party|Labor]] projects, was then controlled by [[Rafael Eitan|Eitan]].[^1]
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LAKAM was later controlled by Rafi after [[Shimon Peres]] became prime minister in 1984, and its huge slush fund, which had once financed [[Labor Party|Labor]] projects, was then controlled by Eitan.[^1]
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### PROMIS Software Operation
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According to Gordon Thomas's account in *Gideon's Spies* (1999), drawing on Israeli intelligence sources, LAKAM's director [[Rafael Eitan]] personally arranged to obtain a copy of the [[PROMIS]] software from the [[Department of Justice|U.S. Department of Justice]] through back-channel contacts in the early 1980s. Eitan reportedly met with [[INSLAW]] founder [[Bill Hamilton]] while posing as a representative of the Israeli Ministry of Justice interested in PROMIS as a case management tool. After obtaining the software, Eitan assembled a team of former LAKAM programmers who reconstructed PROMIS and embedded a surveillance trapdoor - described as a $5,000 microchip - that allowed covert remote monitoring of database queries made by any user of the modified software. Eitan's reported statement on receiving PROMIS was: "We can use that program...it could be the most important intelligence tool that Israel has ever had."[^3]
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According to Gordon Thomas's account in *Gideon's Spies* (1999), drawing on Israeli intelligence sources, LAKAM's director Rafael Eitan personally arranged to obtain a copy of the [[PROMIS]] software from the [[Department of Justice|U.S. Department of Justice]] through back-channel contacts in the early 1980s. Eitan reportedly met with [[INSLAW]] founder [[Bill Hamilton]] while posing as a representative of the Israeli Ministry of Justice interested in PROMIS as a case management tool. After obtaining the software, Eitan assembled a team of former LAKAM programmers who reconstructed PROMIS and embedded a surveillance trapdoor - described as a $5,000 microchip - that allowed covert remote monitoring of database queries made by any user of the modified software. Eitan's reported statement on receiving PROMIS was: "We can use that program...it could be the most important intelligence tool that Israel has ever had."[^3]
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The modified software was then distributed internationally for use by foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies, channeled through [[Robert Maxwell]] and his Israeli computer company [[Degem]]. Total sales through this network, according to the allegations reviewed by Special Counsel Nicholas Bua, exceeded $500 million. The [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua Report]] (1993) found no credible evidence to support any of these allegations, concluding that only public-domain versions of PROMIS had ever been distributed to foreign entities.[^4]
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LAKAM was formally dissolved following the 1985 exposure of the [[Jonathan Pollard]] espionage case, after which its functions were redistributed to other Israeli intelligence services. Eitan, who had also run Pollard as an asset, left Israeli government service.[^2]
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In the weeks after Pollard's arrest, Israeli officials described the bureau as the Liaison Bureau for Scientific Affairs, which was being dismantled while its activities were reorganized.[^5] A press report dated December 6, 1985 gave the Hebrew acronym as LEKEM.[^6] In May 1987 the *Washington Post* reported that the spy agency involved had been disbanded, and the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that its head had been forced to resign and the unit disbanded.[^7][^8] In 1998 the Israeli government stated that Pollard had served as an Israeli agent handled by senior members of the Scientific Liaison Bureau, which it gave in Hebrew as Lekam.[^9]
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According to Hersh, LAKAM was formally dissolved following the 1985 exposure of the Jonathan Pollard espionage case, after which its functions were redistributed to other Israeli intelligence services. Eitan, who had also run Pollard as an asset, left Israeli government service.[^2]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
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[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991.
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[^3]: Thomas, Gordon. *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad.* St. Martin's Press, 1999.
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[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
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[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
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[^5]: Thomas L. Friedman, *New York Times*, December 22, 1985. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302120025-0
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[^6]: Press item dated December 6, 1985, CIA CREST collection, CIA-RDP90-00965R000201380005-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201380005-6
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[^7]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0
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[^8]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html
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[^9]: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Government statement on Jonathan Pollard," May 12, 1998. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc13.PDF
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ aliases:
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- Israeli Secret Intelligence Service
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- Israeli intelligence
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created: 2025-07-22
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updated: 2026-10-08
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updated: 2026-10-12
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title: Mossad
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tags:
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- Organization
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@ -86,17 +86,17 @@ relations:
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start: 1982
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end: 1982
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role: "the Mossad was made responsible for the link with the Phalangist leadership"
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fn: 14
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fn: 17
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- type: subject_of
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with: "[[Kahan Commission]]"
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start: 1982-09
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end: 1983-02-08
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fn: 15
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fn: 18
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]"
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start: 1980
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role: "joint committee with military intelligence for arms supply to Iran, according to Ari Ben-Menashe"
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fn: 17
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fn: 20
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---
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The Mossad (the Institute for Intelligence and Special Assignments, in the words of the 1983 [[Kahan Commission]]) is the foreign intelligence service of [[Israel]]. Its own website carries a directive of [[David Ben-Gurion]] on its creation and lists twelve directors from [[Reuven Shiloah]] in 1949 to [[Yossi Cohen]], who left in 2021: Shiloah (1949 to 1952), [[Isser Harel]] (1952 to 1963), [[Meir Amit]] (1963 to 1968), [[Zvi Zamir]] (1968 to 1974), [[Yitzhak Hofi]] (1974 to 1982), [[Nachum Admoni]] (1982 to 1989), [[Shabtai Shavit]] (1989 to 1996), [[Danny Yatom]] (1996 to 1998), [[Efraim Halevy]] (1998 to 2002), [[Meir Dagan]] (2002 to 2011), [[Tamir Pardo]] (2011 to 2016) and Cohen (2016 to 2021).[^1] The record below follows the service where it touches the American intelligence services, the nuclear program at [[Dimona]], and the Lebanon, Iran and computer-software episodes that run through this vault.[^2]
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@ -116,39 +116,43 @@ The CIA's Directorate of Operations name file on [[Adolf Eichmann]], released in
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A National Security Archive posting records that in the spring of 1963 "some top officials in Israel, primarily Mossad chief Isser Harel with the support of Foreign Minister [[Golda Meir]]," began through leaks to the Israeli press a public campaign about German scientists in Egypt developing ballistic missiles and radiological weapons, "possibly even nuclear weapons"; that the State Department intelligence chief Thomas Hughes asked the Director of Central Intelligence [[John McCone]] for a special estimate on advanced weapons programs in the United Arab Republic and Israel; and that the estimate of May 8, 1963 concluded that Israel "will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years" unless deterred, while the United Arab Republic did not have "the capability of producing a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future."[^7] The same posting dates the correspondence between [[John F. Kennedy]] and Ben-Gurion over Dimona inspections to those months; Mossad's own list ends Harel's term in 1963.[^1][^7]
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### The Paris office and Operation Damocles, 1962
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From 1962 the Paris office of Mossad was run by [[Yitzhak Shamir]], under the cover name Samuel Singer, according to Roger Howard's account of [[Operation Damocles]], the campaign directed by Isser Harel against German engineers and scientists working on Egypt's rocket program.[^8] Howard writes that Mossad's complicity in the disappearance of a Munich procurement company director in September 1962 "has never been conclusively proven, but almost certainly this was just the beginning of Operation Damocles."[^9] The Jewish Telegraphic Agency's obituary of Shamir states that between 1955 and 1965 he served as a senior Mossad official.[^10]
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### The May 1967 estimate and the June 1967 war
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[[David S. Robarge]], the CIA's chief historian, writes that on May 25, 1967 Tel Aviv submitted to Washington a Mossad estimate claiming the Israeli military was badly outgunned by a Soviet-backed Arab force. The CIA's [[Office of National Estimates]] appraised the paper within five hours: "We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation . . . was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials. We think it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser." [[Walt Rostow]] sent both papers to Johnson with a note that the CIA appraisal "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^8][^9] On June 1, 1967, the Mossad chief Meir Amit met Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]] in Washington; the memorandum of the conversation was written by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, [[Rufus Taylor]].[^10]
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[[David S. Robarge]], the CIA's chief historian, writes that on May 25, 1967 Tel Aviv submitted to Washington a Mossad estimate claiming the Israeli military was badly outgunned by a Soviet-backed Arab force. The CIA's [[Office of National Estimates]] appraised the paper within five hours: "We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation . . . was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials. We think it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser." [[Walt Rostow]] sent both papers to Johnson with a note that the CIA appraisal "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^11][^12] On June 1, 1967, the Mossad chief Meir Amit met Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]] in Washington; the memorandum of the conversation was written by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, [[Rufus Taylor]].[^13]
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### Plumbat, 1968
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Hersh wrote that Mossad wanted uranium ore of which "hundreds of tons" sat in a warehouse near Antwerp, controlled by Euratom, and that Dimona, "ostensibly a twenty-four-megawatt reactor capable of consuming no more than twenty-four tons of ore in a year," could not openly buy an eight-year supply. In March 1968, he wrote, Mossad approached one of its agents in West Germany to buy the ore for $4 million, allegedly for an Italian chemical company in Milan; Euratom approved the sale in October; the uranium left Antwerp aboard a vessel renamed the Scheersberg A, "purchased, with Mossad funds, by another Israeli agent-in-place in Turkey"; and at sea the ore was transferred to an Israeli freighter guarded by gunboats. The disappearance was known to Euratom within months, American and European agencies reported internally that Israel was involved, and it took nine years for the press to report it; Hersh cited published accounts "confirmed by Israeli officials" and a 1978 book, *The Plumbat Affair*.[^11]
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Hersh wrote that Mossad wanted uranium ore of which "hundreds of tons" sat in a warehouse near Antwerp, controlled by Euratom, and that Dimona, "ostensibly a twenty-four-megawatt reactor capable of consuming no more than twenty-four tons of ore in a year," could not openly buy an eight-year supply. In March 1968, he wrote, Mossad approached one of its agents in West Germany to buy the ore for $4 million, allegedly for an Italian chemical company in Milan; Euratom approved the sale in October; the uranium left Antwerp aboard a vessel renamed the Scheersberg A, "purchased, with Mossad funds, by another Israeli agent-in-place in Turkey"; and at sea the ore was transferred to an Israeli freighter guarded by gunboats. The disappearance was known to Euratom within months, American and European agencies reported internally that Israel was involved, and it took nine years for the press to report it; Hersh cited published accounts "confirmed by Israeli officials" and a 1978 book, *The Plumbat Affair*.[^14]
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On September 10, 1968, Raphael Eitan, whom the National Security Archive identifies as deputy chief of Mossad operations and the organizer of the Mossad and [[LAKAM]] team in the Plumbat operation, visited the [[Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation]] plant at Apollo, Pennsylvania, with three other Israelis, according to an Atomic Energy Commission security report of September 6, 1968.[^12]
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On September 10, 1968, Raphael Eitan, whom the National Security Archive identifies as deputy chief of Mossad operations and the organizer of the Mossad and [[LAKAM]] team in the Plumbat operation, visited the [[Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation]] plant at Apollo, Pennsylvania, with three other Israelis, according to an Atomic Energy Commission security report of September 6, 1968.[^15]
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### Osirak and the Lebanon war
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Hersh wrote that Hofi, "the director of Mossad," and the chief of military intelligence [[Yehoshua Saguy]] opposed the 1981 attack on [[Osirak bombing|Osirak]] "primarily because there was no evidence that Iraq was as yet capable of building a bomb," and that two weeks after the raid Hofi gave an interview, identified only by title under censorship, complaining about politicians who compromised secret intelligence, which in Hersh's account left "no doubt in the Israeli intelligence community" that Begin was the politician meant; Hersh added that Hofi was also a critic of [[Ariel Sharon]].[^13]
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Hersh wrote that Hofi, "the director of Mossad," and the chief of military intelligence [[Yehoshua Saguy]] opposed the 1981 attack on [[Osirak bombing|Osirak]] "primarily because there was no evidence that Iraq was as yet capable of building a bomb," and that two weeks after the raid Hofi gave an interview, identified only by title under censorship, complaining about politicians who compromised secret intelligence, which in Hersh's account left "no doubt in the Israeli intelligence community" that Begin was the politician meant; Hersh added that Hofi was also a critic of [[Ariel Sharon]].[^16]
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The Kahan Commission, reporting on the Sabra and Shatila massacres, wrote that Israel had extended aid to the Christian armed forces, that "the Mossad was made responsible for the link with the Phalangists," and that its representatives "maintained a rather close connection with the Phalangist leadership"; that the Mossad "to a not inconsiderable extent under the influence of constant and close contact with the Phalangist elite" favored strengthening the relationship while military intelligence emphasized the Phalangists' unreliability; and that the Mossad's head, in testimony of December 27, 1982, accepted that "subjective, and not only objective, relations also emerged." In the view prevailing among the Mossad agents before the war, the commission wrote, the Phalangists' atrocities were a thing of the past, although in meetings with the heads of the Mossad [[Bashir Gemayel]] had said things that "left no room for doubt" of his intention to eliminate the Palestinian problem in Lebanon even by "aberrant methods."[^14] In cables of September 15 the Mossad representative in Beirut reported the meetings of the chief of staff and the defense minister with the Phalangist leadership and that the Phalangists would enter West Beirut after the Israeli Defense Forces; a cable of September 16 at noon reported a coordination meeting to prepare the Phalangists "for operations to clear the city of terrorists," and another that they would start work at the Burj el-Barajneh camp. The head of the Mossad, who had assumed the post on September 12, 1982 after serving as deputy, learned of the decision to send the Phalangists into the camps only at the cabinet meeting of Thursday evening, did not give an assessment of their entry or express reservations, and was found by the commission to have shown an inaction that "should not be considered serious," and the commission considered it sufficient to determine responsibility without further recommendation.[^15]
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The Kahan Commission, reporting on the Sabra and Shatila massacres, wrote that Israel had extended aid to the Christian armed forces, that "the Mossad was made responsible for the link with the Phalangists," and that its representatives "maintained a rather close connection with the Phalangist leadership"; that the Mossad "to a not inconsiderable extent under the influence of constant and close contact with the Phalangist elite" favored strengthening the relationship while military intelligence emphasized the Phalangists' unreliability; and that the Mossad's head, in testimony of December 27, 1982, accepted that "subjective, and not only objective, relations also emerged." In the view prevailing among the Mossad agents before the war, the commission wrote, the Phalangists' atrocities were a thing of the past, although in meetings with the heads of the Mossad [[Bashir Gemayel]] had said things that "left no room for doubt" of his intention to eliminate the Palestinian problem in Lebanon even by "aberrant methods."[^17] In cables of September 15 the Mossad representative in Beirut reported the meetings of the chief of staff and the defense minister with the Phalangist leadership and that the Phalangists would enter West Beirut after the Israeli Defense Forces; a cable of September 16 at noon reported a coordination meeting to prepare the Phalangists "for operations to clear the city of terrorists," and another that they would start work at the Burj el-Barajneh camp. The head of the Mossad, who had assumed the post on September 12, 1982 after serving as deputy, learned of the decision to send the Phalangists into the camps only at the cabinet meeting of Thursday evening, did not give an assessment of their entry or express reservations, and was found by the commission to have shown an inaction that "should not be considered serious," and the commission considered it sufficient to determine responsibility without further recommendation.[^18]
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### Iran, 1980 and 1981
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[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that in the fall of 1980 Begin ordered the military intelligence chief [[Yehoshua Sagi]] and the Mossad's "acting director" Nachum Admoni to create an Iran-Israel Joint Committee of military intelligence and Mossad to supply arms to Iran; that [[David Kimche]], whom he called head of Tevel, was its senior member; and that after [[Yitzhak Shamir]] became prime minister members including Kimche were forced out and Eitan ran the committee.[^16][^17] The Mossad's own list gives Hofi as head from 1974 to 1982 and Admoni from 1982, and the Kahan Commission describes Admoni as deputy head until September 12, 1982.[^1][^14] The House October Surprise Task Force wrote that Eitan and Saguy had told the Israeli government they never met Ben-Menashe and that his Israeli military file showed work as a translator; Ben-Menashe was acquitted in New York in November 1990.[^18] See [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].
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[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that in the fall of 1980 Begin ordered the military intelligence chief [[Yehoshua Sagi]] and the Mossad's "acting director" Nachum Admoni to create an Iran-Israel Joint Committee of military intelligence and Mossad to supply arms to Iran; that [[David Kimche]], whom he called head of Tevel, was its senior member; and that after Yitzhak Shamir became prime minister members including Kimche were forced out and Eitan ran the committee.[^19][^20] The Mossad's own list gives Hofi as head from 1974 to 1982 and Admoni from 1982, and the Kahan Commission describes Admoni as deputy head until September 12, 1982.[^1][^17] The House October Surprise Task Force wrote that Eitan and Saguy had told the Israeli government they never met Ben-Menashe and that his Israeli military file showed work as a translator; Ben-Menashe was acquitted in New York in November 1990.[^21] See [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].
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### PROMIS, according to Ben-Menashe
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Ben-Menashe wrote that Eitan, as counterterrorism adviser to Begin and then to Shamir, took an interest in the software program [[PROMIS]]; that in 1982 [[Earl Brian]] approached Eitan about selling it to foreign intelligence agencies; that Eitan decided to have a "trap door" installed to give Israeli agents access to the computers of any service that bought it; that Ben-Menashe recruited his childhood friend [[Yehuda Ben-Hanan]], of Software and Engineering Consultants in California, to build the external access; that Eitan selected Jordan to test it and that Brian sold it through his company [[Hadron]]; and that [[Robert Maxwell]] "made a fortune out of it" through his companies.[^19] See [[PROMIS Software Scandal]].
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Ben-Menashe wrote that Eitan, as counterterrorism adviser to Begin and then to Shamir, took an interest in the software program [[PROMIS]]; that in 1982 [[Earl Brian]] approached Eitan about selling it to foreign intelligence agencies; that Eitan decided to have a "trap door" installed to give Israeli agents access to the computers of any service that bought it; that Ben-Menashe recruited his childhood friend [[Yehuda Ben-Hanan]], of Software and Engineering Consultants in California, to build the external access; that Eitan selected Jordan to test it and that Brian sold it through his company [[Hadron]]; and that [[Robert Maxwell]] "made a fortune out of it" through his companies.[^22] See [[PROMIS Software Scandal]].
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### Vanunu and the Mirror Group, 1986
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Hersh wrote that copies of the photographs [[Mordecai Vanunu]] took inside Dimona were made available in London, before the Sunday Times published, to an Israeli intelligence agent masquerading as an American reporter; that they were sent by courier to the office of Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], who ordered Mossad to get Vanunu out of London and into Israeli custody; that "no kidnapping could take place in England for diplomatic reasons"; and that Vanunu was enticed by a Mossad agent named Cindy Hanin Bentov (a pseudonym; see [[Cindy Hanin Bentov]]) to leave for Rome a few days before publication, where, according to Vanunu's account to relatives, he was drugged and returned to Israel by ship.[^20]
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Hersh wrote that copies of the photographs [[Mordecai Vanunu]] took inside Dimona were made available in London, before the Sunday Times published, to an Israeli intelligence agent masquerading as an American reporter; that they were sent by courier to the office of Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], who ordered Mossad to get Vanunu out of London and into Israeli custody; that "no kidnapping could take place in England for diplomatic reasons"; and that Vanunu was enticed by a Mossad agent named Cindy Hanin Bentov (a pseudonym; see [[Cindy Hanin Bentov]]) to leave for Rome a few days before publication, where, according to Vanunu's account to relatives, he was drugged and returned to Israel by ship.[^23]
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Ben-Menashe told Hersh that after Vanunu's photographs reached the Israeli leadership he and others were told that "Peres said, 'Let's make him an example'" rather than assassinating him; that the foreign editor of the Daily Mirror, [[Nicholas Davies]], "provided the framework" for the Sunday Mirror's hostile story of September 28, which went to Maxwell, publisher of the Mirror Group; and that Maxwell told him "I know what has to happen. I have already spoken to your bosses."[^21] The Sunday Mirror's reporters Tony Frost and Mark Souster were ordered by their editor to take the photographs to the Israeli embassy; the senior deputy editor John C. Parker understood that Maxwell had given the order; the news editor Peter J. Miller said that "the line we were instructed to take cost the Sunday Mirror a world-beating exclusive"; and the editor Michael Malloy acknowledged discussing the story with Maxwell, said there was "nothing sinister or strange" in it, and recalled that Maxwell ordered the photographs shown to the Israelis.[^21] The Mirror staff statements are those of the persons named.
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Ben-Menashe told Hersh that after Vanunu's photographs reached the Israeli leadership he and others were told that "Peres said, 'Let's make him an example'" rather than assassinating him; that the foreign editor of the Daily Mirror, [[Nicholas Davies]], "provided the framework" for the Sunday Mirror's hostile story of September 28, which went to Maxwell, publisher of the Mirror Group; and that Maxwell told him "I know what has to happen. I have already spoken to your bosses."[^24] The Sunday Mirror's reporters Tony Frost and Mark Souster were ordered by their editor to take the photographs to the Israeli embassy; the senior deputy editor John C. Parker understood that Maxwell had given the order; the news editor Peter J. Miller said that "the line we were instructed to take cost the Sunday Mirror a world-beating exclusive"; and the editor Michael Malloy acknowledged discussing the story with Maxwell, said there was "nothing sinister or strange" in it, and recalled that Maxwell ordered the photographs shown to the Israelis.[^24] The Mirror staff statements are those of the persons named.
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### Uri Geller
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|
||||
[[Jim Schnabel]] wrote that, according to Geller, [[Moshe Dayan]] asked [[Uri Geller]] "Now, what can you do for Israel?"; that "so the story goes" Geller then met the military intelligence chief [[Aharon Yariv]] and officials of Mossad and [[Shin Bet]], was tested by them and began to work for them, viewing targets in Syria and elsewhere; and that Yariv, in an interview with the science writer John Wilhelm in the mid-1970s, denied ever meeting or consulting with Geller. Schnabel wrote that Geller says he later met secretly in hotel rooms in the United States with Israeli officials to brief them on his experiences at [[Stanford Research Institute]] and was warned "not to do certain things" there; that in one of Geller's stories a tape recorder started to play by itself at a meeting with Mossad officers; and that among the "wild surmises" in the air when CIA officials asked Puthoff about Geller was that he was "part of some Mossad disinformation project, designed to spook the Arabs into believing that Israel possessed a paranormal superman," or that Israeli intelligence wanted to infiltrate SRI. Several Israeli officials came to SRI in the summer of 1973; [[Hal Puthoff|Harold Puthoff]] "had the impression that they were from Israeli military intelligence," and they said that Geller had done "surprisingly good work for them against Middle Eastern military targets" and asked whether it was luck or verifiable psychic ability.[^22]
|
||||
[[Jim Schnabel]] wrote that, according to Geller, [[Moshe Dayan]] asked [[Uri Geller]] "Now, what can you do for Israel?"; that "so the story goes" Geller then met the military intelligence chief [[Aharon Yariv]] and officials of Mossad and [[Shin Bet]], was tested by them and began to work for them, viewing targets in Syria and elsewhere; and that Yariv, in an interview with the science writer John Wilhelm in the mid-1970s, denied ever meeting or consulting with Geller. Schnabel wrote that Geller says he later met secretly in hotel rooms in the United States with Israeli officials to brief them on his experiences at [[Stanford Research Institute]] and was warned "not to do certain things" there; that in one of Geller's stories a tape recorder started to play by itself at a meeting with Mossad officers; and that among the "wild surmises" in the air when CIA officials asked Puthoff about Geller was that he was "part of some Mossad disinformation project, designed to spook the Arabs into believing that Israel possessed a paranormal superman," or that Israeli intelligence wanted to infiltrate SRI. Several Israeli officials came to SRI in the summer of 1973; [[Hal Puthoff|Harold Puthoff]] "had the impression that they were from Israeli military intelligence," and they said that Geller had done "surprisingly good work for them against Middle Eastern military targets" and asked whether it was luck or verifiable psychic ability.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -159,18 +163,21 @@ Ben-Menashe told Hersh that after Vanunu's photographs reached the Israeli leade
|
|||
[^5]: Feinstein, Tamara, ed., "The CIA Names File on Adolf Eichmann," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 150, March 24, 2005, citing the CIA Directorate of Operations file, vol. 1, document 49, and vol. 2, document 7. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB150/index.htm
|
||||
[^6]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 21, "Israel's Nuclear Spy," pp. 288-289.
|
||||
[^7]: Burr, William, and Avner Cohen, eds., "The Battle of the Letters, 1963," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 671, May 2, 2019, documents 17 and 22. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2019-05-02/battle-letters-1963-john-f-kennedy-david-ben-gurion-levi-eshkol-us-inspections-dimona
|
||||
[^8]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf
|
||||
[^9]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 61, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 25, 1967, with attached CIA appraisal. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
|
||||
[^10]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 124, Memorandum for the Record by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, June 1, 1967 (prepared June 2). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d124
|
||||
[^11]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 13, "An Israeli Decision," pp. 180-181.
|
||||
[^12]: National Security Archive, "The NUMEC Affair: Did Highly Enriched Uranium from the U.S. Aid Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program?" (November 2, 2016), Document 10 and commentary. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-11-02/numec-affair-did-highly-enriched-uranium-us-aid-israels-nuclear-weapons-program The identification of Eitan's role is the posting's commentary.
|
||||
[^13]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 1, pp. 9-11; chapter 21, p. 294 footnote (Hofi and Sharon).
|
||||
[^14]: Kahan Commission Report, sections on the Phalangists and the Mossad, on the Phalangists' entry into the camps, and on the head of the Mossad (note 2).
|
||||
[^15]: Kahan Commission Report (note 2), recommendations on the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the head of the Mossad.
|
||||
[^16]: Ben-Menashe, Ari, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, TrineDay, 2015 reprint of the 1992 edition, passages on the Joint Committee for Iran-Israel Relations, Tevel and the Mossad directorship. https://archive.org/details/profits-of-war-1992-ari-ben-menashe
|
||||
[^17]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, passage on Begin's order to Sagi and Admoni in the fall of 1980.
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*, H. Rept. 102-1102, January 3, 1993, section on Ben-Menashe (p. 97). https://archive.org/details/14148-h.rp.-1102 ; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 19, p. 260 footnote (acquittal in November 1990).
|
||||
[^19]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, chapter on PROMIS.
|
||||
[^20]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 15, "The Tunnel," pp. 197-198.
|
||||
[^21]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 22, "An Israeli Asset," pp. 311-315.
|
||||
[^22]: Schnabel, Jim, *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies*, Dell, 1997, chapter 9, "The Trickster." Full text read at https://archive.org/details/jim-schnabel-remote-viewers-the-secret-history-of-americas-psychic-spies_2
|
||||
[^8]: Roger Howard, _Operation Damocles: Israel's Secret War against Hitler's Scientists in Egypt, 1954-1967_ (2013), chapter 16. https://archive.org/details/operationdamocle0000howa
|
||||
[^9]: Roger Howard, _Operation Damocles_, chapter 1. https://archive.org/details/operationdamocle0000howa
|
||||
[^10]: "Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's 7th prime minister, dies at 96," _Jewish Telegraphic Agency_, July 2012. https://www.jta.org/?p=1789432
|
||||
[^11]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf
|
||||
[^12]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 61, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 25, 1967, with attached CIA appraisal. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
|
||||
[^13]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 124, Memorandum for the Record by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, June 1, 1967 (prepared June 2). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d124
|
||||
[^14]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 13, "An Israeli Decision," pp. 180-181.
|
||||
[^15]: National Security Archive, "The NUMEC Affair: Did Highly Enriched Uranium from the U.S. Aid Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program?" (November 2, 2016), Document 10 and commentary. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-11-02/numec-affair-did-highly-enriched-uranium-us-aid-israels-nuclear-weapons-program The identification of Eitan's role is the posting's commentary.
|
||||
[^16]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 1, pp. 9-11; chapter 21, p. 294 footnote (Hofi and Sharon).
|
||||
[^17]: Kahan Commission Report, sections on the Phalangists and the Mossad, on the Phalangists' entry into the camps, and on the head of the Mossad (note 2).
|
||||
[^18]: Kahan Commission Report (note 2), recommendations on the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the head of the Mossad.
|
||||
[^19]: Ben-Menashe, Ari, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, TrineDay, 2015 reprint of the 1992 edition, passages on the Joint Committee for Iran-Israel Relations, Tevel and the Mossad directorship. https://archive.org/details/profits-of-war-1992-ari-ben-menashe
|
||||
[^20]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, passage on Begin's order to Sagi and Admoni in the fall of 1980.
|
||||
[^21]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*, H. Rept. 102-1102, January 3, 1993, section on Ben-Menashe (p. 97). https://archive.org/details/14148-h.rp.-1102 ; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 19, p. 260 footnote (acquittal in November 1990).
|
||||
[^22]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, chapter on PROMIS.
|
||||
[^23]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 15, "The Tunnel," pp. 197-198.
|
||||
[^24]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 22, "An Israeli Asset," pp. 311-315.
|
||||
[^25]: Schnabel, Jim, *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies*, Dell, 1997, chapter 9, "The Trickster." Full text read at https://archive.org/details/jim-schnabel-remote-viewers-the-secret-history-of-americas-psychic-spies_2
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,30 +1,239 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Unit 8200
|
||||
- IDF Unit 8200
|
||||
- Israeli Defense Forces Unit 8200
|
||||
- Detachment 8200
|
||||
- Unit S.M. 2
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Program
|
||||
- IntelligenceOperation
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- Unit8200
|
||||
- Israel
|
||||
category: "Intelligence Operation"
|
||||
summary: "Unit 8200 is Israel's primary signals intelligence and code-breaking unit, housed at a base near Tel Aviv adjacent to a Mossad facility, operating under strict compartmentalized need-to-know protocols."
|
||||
- SignalsIntelligence
|
||||
- NSA
|
||||
- Snowden
|
||||
- Stuxnet
|
||||
- Spyware
|
||||
- NSOGroup
|
||||
- Carbyne
|
||||
- EhudBarak
|
||||
- JeffreyEpstein
|
||||
- Lavender
|
||||
- Refuseniks
|
||||
- AIMilitary
|
||||
summary: "Unit 8200 is the Israeli Defense Forces' signals-intelligence and cyber unit whose alumni have founded surveillance and cybersecurity firms and whose commander was exposed as the author of an AI-warfare book in 2024."
|
||||
start: 1952
|
||||
location: "near Tel Aviv, Israel"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
location: "Glilot Camps, Ramat HaSharon, Israel"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Yoel Ben-Porat]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "unit commander, per Ben-Menashe's account"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Sasson Yishaek]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "number-two in the code-breaking department, later commander"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Reuben Yirador]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "department commander"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Shulamit Ingerman]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "cryptographer, head of the Iranian desk"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Ari Ben-Menashe]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Iranian desk, code-breaking department, per his own account"
|
||||
start: 1975
|
||||
end: 1977
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Yosef Zeira]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "department commander, per Ben-Menashe's account"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Yossi Sariel]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "commander"
|
||||
end: 2024-09-12
|
||||
fn: 23
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Pinhas Buchris]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "commander; later director general of the Ministry of Defense"
|
||||
fn: 31
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Reuven Yerdor]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "in charge of the unit by early 1982, per Hersh's account"
|
||||
end: 1982
|
||||
fn: 34
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Nadav Zafrir]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "commander, who established the Israel Defense Forces Cyber Command"
|
||||
fn: 16
|
||||
- type: member_of
|
||||
with: "[[Aman]]"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: partner_of
|
||||
with: "[[NSA]]"
|
||||
start: 2009-03
|
||||
role: "intelligence-sharing memorandum of understanding, reached in principle March 2009"
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Operation Olympic Games]]"
|
||||
role: "payload development, per Sanger's account"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: partner_of
|
||||
with: "[[Minerva Project]]"
|
||||
start: 2020-09
|
||||
role: "admissions page headed Partner: IDF 8200"
|
||||
fn: 24
|
||||
---
|
||||
[[Unit 8200]] is an [[Israel|Israeli]] Signals Intelligence (Sigint) unit, specializing in code-breaking. It is housed in a base located near a country club north of [[Tel Aviv]], with a nearby building known as "the villa" belonging to [[Mossad]], where top-secret security meetings were held. The unit operates on a need-to-know basis, with departments requiring special permission to access each other's areas.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Key personnel mentioned in connection with [[Unit 8200]] include Col. [[Yoel Ben-Porat]] (unit commander, known as Buffy), Lt. Col. [[Sasson Yishaek]] (number-two in code-breaking, later commander), Col. [[Reuben Yirador]] (department commander), and [[Shulamit Ingerman]] (head of the Iranian desk and a cryptographer).[^1]
|
||||
[[Unit 8200]] is the signals-intelligence and cyber unit of the [[Israel Defense Forces]], attached to [[Aman]], the military intelligence directorate. Its central base is the Glilot Camps in [[Ramat HaSharon]], north of [[Tel Aviv]], close to the [[Mossad]] headquarters.[^1] Its alumni have founded surveillance and cybersecurity firms. A 2009 intelligence-sharing memorandum with the [[NSA]], disclosed in 2013, names the unit's counterpart only by its acronym. A 2014 refusal letter was signed by 43 of its veterans and reservists, and 2024 reporting tied the unit to AI-assisted targeting in the Gaza war.
|
||||
|
||||
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] was stationed in [[Unit 8200]]'s code-breaking department, specifically on the [[Iran|Iranian]] desk, from 1975 to 1977. He claims to have broken the [[Iran|Iranian]] diplomatic code, which allowed [[Israel|Israel]] to read coded messages faster than the [[Iran|Iranians]]. This breakthrough eliminated the need to "acquire" the weekly black book sent by diplomatic pouch to the [[Iran|Iranian]] embassy in [[Ramat Gan]].[^1]
|
||||
### Glilot base and origins
|
||||
|
||||
[[Unit 8200]] was involved in monitoring [[Iran|Iranian]] communications through satellite stations in Bet Ella and listening stations in northern [[Israel]], the [[Sinai]], and overseas (e.g., [[Japan]], [[Italy]], [[Ethiopia]]). These stations intercepted traffic from the [[Iran|Iranian]] Foreign Ministry, Royal Court, [[SAVAK]], and [[Iran|Iranian]] military intelligence.[^1]
|
||||
Ynet reported in August 2024 that the unit, designated Unit S.M. 2 when it moved to the Glilot base in 1952, was later renamed 8200. Sixteen years before that report, the army decided to evacuate most of the Glilot compound as part of a move to the [[Negev]]. The transition had been delayed repeatedly and was expected to take place in several phases over the following years.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1972, Col. [[Reuben Yirador]] decoded a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intercept (VENONA) that revealed the [[Soviet Union|Soviets]] were bugging the office of [[Golda Meir]], then Prime Minister of [[Israel]]. This discovery, along with [[Golda Meir|Meir's]] meeting with [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and her rejection of a peace settlement, informed [[Anwar Sadat]] and may have prompted the 1973 war.[^1]
|
||||
In [[Profits of War]] (1992), [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] placed the base near a country club north of Tel Aviv, with a nearby building known as "the villa" that belonged to Mossad and housed top-secret security meetings. He wrote that the unit operated on a need-to-know basis and that its departments required special permission to enter one another's areas.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1976, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], while on duty in [[Unit 8200]], intercepted a telegram detailing [[Lockheed Aircraft Company|Lockheed]] bribes paid to Defense Minister [[Shimon Peres]]. This information was subsequently covered up by superiors, including [[Yoel Ben-Porat|Buffy]] and [[Sasson Yishaek|Lt. Col. Yishaek]].[^1]
|
||||
### Personnel in the record
|
||||
|
||||
Ben-Menashe named the unit's commander as [[Yoel Ben-Porat]], known as Buffy. He named [[Sasson Yishaek]] as the number-two officer in the code-breaking department and later its commander, [[Reuben Yirador]] as a department commander, and [[Shulamit Ingerman]] as a cryptographer who headed the [[Iran|Iranian]] desk.[^2] He also wrote that [[Yosef Zeira]], a department commander in the mid-1970s, briefed a small team on the 1976 rescue at [[Operation Entebbe]] and ordered its members into communications isolation for the duration of the operation.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *The Samson Option* (1991) that by early 1982 Brigadier General [[Reuven Yerdor]], known as Rudi, was in charge of the unit. Hersh wrote that Yerdor had been an officer of the Israeli signals-intelligence detachment (then Detachment 515, later 8200), had cracked a Soviet code, and traveled to [[Washington, D.C.]] every three months for liaison meetings with the [[NSA]]. According to Hersh, [[Yehoshua Saguy]], the head of Aman, gave Yerdor two packets of documents over the 1981-82 New Year holiday, one of them daily and weekly summaries of worldwide NSA intercepts, and Yerdor received American technical data on Syrian air defenses in May 1982. The spelling Yerdor differs from the Yirador of Ben-Menashe's account, and the two names may refer to the same officer.[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Iranian desk and Ben-Menashe's account
|
||||
|
||||
Ben-Menashe wrote that he served on the Iranian desk of the code-breaking department from 1975 to 1977 and that he broke the Iranian diplomatic code. The break, he wrote, made it unnecessary to "acquire" the weekly black book sent by diplomatic pouch to the Iranian embassy in [[Ramat Gan]].[^2] He described satellite stations at [[Bet Ella]] and listening stations in northern [[Israel]], the [[Sinai]], and overseas in [[Japan]], [[Italy]] and [[Ethiopia]]. According to his account, these intercepted traffic from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the Royal Court, [[SAVAK]] and Iranian military intelligence.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Ben-Menashe wrote that in 1972 Yirador decoded a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intercept showing that the Soviets were bugging the office of [[Golda Meir]], then prime minister. The account names the intercept VENONA, the name of a United States program that ran from 1943 until the NSA closed it in 1980 and that decrypted Soviet cables, mostly from 1943 to 1945.[^3] Ben-Menashe linked the discovery, together with Meir's meeting with [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and her rejection of a peace settlement, to [[Anwar Sadat]]'s understanding of Israel's position. He wrote that it may have prompted the 1973 war.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1976, Ben-Menashe wrote, he intercepted while on duty a telegram detailing [[Lockheed Aircraft Company|Lockheed]] bribes paid to Defense Minister [[Shimon Peres]]. The sum was $3.5 million, deposited in one of Peres's brother's business accounts in [[Europe]]. Superiors, including Buffy and Lt. Col. Yishaek, covered the information up, he wrote.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Stuxnet and Olympic Games
|
||||
|
||||
In June 2012 [[David Sanger]] reported in *The New York Times* that President [[Barack Obama]] had accelerated cyberattacks against Iran's uranium enrichment program. The program had begun under the Bush administration and was code-named Olympic Games. A worm had escaped Iran's [[Natanz]] plant in the summer of 2010 and spread across the Internet. The last attack in the later series, the paper reported, "temporarily took out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran had spinning at the time to purify uranium." The account drew on interviews with current and former American, European and Israeli officials, none of whom would allow their names to be used.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
Sanger's book *Confront and Conceal* (2012) says that development of the payload enlisted Unit 8200, which had "deep intelligence about operations at Natanz", together with the NSA. The excerpt reported that bringing the Israelis on board was meant as a means to discourage a pre-emptive Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Kaspersky intrusion
|
||||
|
||||
*The New York Times* reported on October 10, 2017 that Israeli intelligence officers had hacked into the network of the Russian antivirus company Kaspersky Lab and watched "in real time as Russian government hackers searched computers around the world for the code names of American intelligence programs." The paper wrote that the Israelis alerted the United States, that they gave their NSA counterparts screenshots and other documentation, and that the Department of Homeland Security's September 13, 2017 order removing Kaspersky products from federal agencies rested in large part on intelligence from Israel's 2014 intrusion. The article drew on people briefed on the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity. The Israeli Embassy declined to comment and Kaspersky denied any involvement in the Russian operation.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
Kaspersky had published a report in June 2015 on an intrusion into its own network that it named Duqu 2.0, after the Duqu malware that researchers had linked to the nation states behind Stuxnet. The Times wrote that the company did not name Israel in that report, that the attackers were interested in Kaspersky's work on the "Equation Group," the industry term for the NSA, and that other victims included hotels and venues used for the negotiations on the Iran nuclear agreement, from which Israel was excluded.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2014 refusal letter
|
||||
|
||||
On September 11, 2014, a letter from 43 veterans and reservists of the unit was distributed to the media. Al Jazeera reported that it was addressed to the prime minister, the armed forces chief and the head of military intelligence. The letter declared: "We veterans of Unit 8200, reservists past and present, declare that we refuse to take part in activity against Palestinians and refuse to be tools to deepen the military control in the occupied territories." It was published less than three weeks after the Gaza offensive that killed more than 2,200 people.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Hanan Gefen]], a former commander of the unit, accused the signatories of a grave breach of trust. He said that if he were the serving commander he would put them on trial and remove them from the unit.[^6] Public radio coverage later that month carried the headline "Snowden Reveal Makes Israeli Spies' Protest An American Issue."[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
In January 2015 the army dismissed some of the signatories. Ynet reported that the decision ended the reserve service of the refuseniks, who received letters stating they would not be called up for reserve duty in the future. The Military Intelligence Directorate noted that only a small part of the 43 had been called up in recent years, and then for a handful of days. Ynet reported that the dismissals followed the media storm the letter had created.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### The NSA memorandum of understanding
|
||||
|
||||
On September 11, 2013, [[The Guardian]] published the text of an undated, five-page memorandum of understanding between the NSA and its Israeli counterpart, from a top-secret document "provided to the Guardian by whistleblower [[Edward Snowden]]." The reporters, [[Glenn Greenwald]], [[Laura Poitras]] and [[Ewen MacAskill]], wrote that the deal "was reached in principle in March 2009" and that the memorandum described itself as an agreement "pertaining to the protection of US persons." The full text was published with the article.[^9][^10]
|
||||
|
||||
The memorandum states that the NSA "routinely sends ISNU [the Israeli Sigint National Unit] minimized and unminimized raw collection." The counterpart is named ISNU, and the text does not name Unit 8200. The unit's role as the signals-intelligence arm of the Israeli military is the basis for the identification.[^1] Under the memorandum, Israel could keep "any files containing the identities of US persons" for up to a year and was to consult the NSA's special liaison adviser when such data appeared. Communications to or from an official of the US government were to be destroyed "upon recognition." The NSA was to "regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of US persons' identities."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The memorandum defines raw Sigint as including "unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content." It permits Israel to disseminate foreign intelligence concerning US persons derived from raw Sigint provided it does so "in a manner that does not identify the US person," and to release US person identities to outside parties with the NSA's written permission. The Guardian reported that Israeli personnel agreed not to deliberately target Americans identified in the data, that the NSA declined to say whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been asked to approve the sharing, and that the NSA spokesperson did not deny that personal data about Americans was included in the material sent.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The memorandum states that "This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights" and is neither an international agreement nor a legally binding instrument. An NSA spokesperson said that "Any US person information that is acquired as a result of NSA's surveillance activities is handled under procedures that are designed to protect privacy rights." The Guardian also quoted a top-secret report dated September 2007 that described the relationship as "overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### Alumni and the surveillance industry
|
||||
|
||||
The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project wrote that veterans of Unit 8200 "are known to have helped develop" the technology of [[NSO Group]], the spyware company co-founded in 2010 by two high-school friends.[^11] The two, [[Shalev Hulio]] and [[Omri Lavie]], are described by some accounts as unit alumni. In a January 2019 profile by [[Ronen Bergman]], Ynet wrote that Hulio "didn't serve in the IDF's elite Unit 8200," that his final posting was as commander of a Home Front Command search and rescue team, and that one of two friends from Hugim High School in Haifa who developed the technology of an earlier company, CommuniTech, had served in Unit 8200. Bergman quoted a senior intelligence official who said NSO was "another example of Israel's strategic capabilities, which were developed to protect its citizens and its national security, that have been proliferated by former members of the intelligence community." Hulio denied the claim and said that an early employee, the engineer who began building the first offensive tool in August 2010, "may have served in Unit 8200" but that the technology did not come from there.[^26] The profile also names [[Niv Carmi]], who worked at the Prime Minister's Office as a student, as the technical expert the investor Eddy Shalev required the founders to bring in.[^26] The OCCRP quoted [[Gadi Aviran]], who founded the intelligence firm [[Terrogence]], telling The New Yorker in 2019: "There was this huge pipeline of talent coming out of the military every year."[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### NSO Group litigation
|
||||
|
||||
[[WhatsApp]] sued NSO in October 2019 in the Northern District of California. A March 2020 order described the defendants, which the plaintiffs had attempted to serve through the Hague Convention, as Israeli entities.[^12] A July 2020 order described NSO as an Israeli limited liability company, described [[Q Cyber Technologies]] as an Israeli corporation and NSO's only active director and majority shareholder, and recorded the complaint's allegation that defendants sent malware through WhatsApp's system to about 1,400 mobile devices.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
On December 20, 2024, Judge [[Phyllis Hamilton]] granted WhatsApp's motion for partial summary judgment on liability under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and California's Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act. She denied NSO's motion for summary judgment and granted the sanctions motion in part. The order considered terminating sanctions, preferred evidentiary sanctions, and called defendants' limitation of Pegasus source-code production "simply impracticable for a lawsuit that is to be litigated in this district." It stated that a trial would proceed only on damages.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
On May 6, 2025 a jury returned a unanimous verdict of $444,719 in compensatory damages, the full amount WhatsApp sought, and $167,254,000 in punitive damages (Dkt. 736), a total of $167,698,719. The jury found that the defendants acted with malice, oppression or fraud.[^15][^27] On October 17, 2025 Judge Hamilton granted WhatsApp's motion for a permanent injunction and granted the defendants' motion for remittitur, reducing the punitive award to $4,002,471, the maximum she found permissible at a ratio of nine to one to compensatory damages under the Ninth Circuit's *Riley* framework. The order stated that the defendants had reverse-engineered WhatsApp's code to create a modified client and had repeatedly redesigned their software to avoid detection.[^27] WhatsApp accepted the remittitur on October 31, 2025. On November 12, 2025 the court entered a permanent injunction, which excluded the defendants' foreign sovereign customers and outside counsel from the parties it binds, and a final judgment of $4,447,190, consisting of $444,719 in compensatory and $4,002,471 in punitive damages.[^15][^28] On December 19, 2025 the court denied the defendants' motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
### Alumni in SEC filings
|
||||
|
||||
Executive biographies in SEC filings also name the unit. The annual report on Form 20-F filed by [[Check Point Software Technologies]] on March 17, 2025 describes its chief executive, [[Nadav Zafrir]], as having "served as Commander of Unit 8200, Israel's elite military technology unit, where he established the Israel Defense Forces Cyber Command." The report also lists him as a director of [[SolarEdge Technologies]].[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
The annual report on Form 20-F for 2022 of [[HUB Cyber Security]] states that the company "was founded in 2017 by veterans of the elite Unit 8200 and Unit 81 of the Israeli Defense Forces."[^17] The 2024 proxy statement of [[Playtika Holding]] describes a vice president for customer relationship management and analytics as having served, before joining the company, "in the elite Israeli military unit 8200."[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
### Carbyne and the Epstein investments
|
||||
|
||||
Minutes of a meeting of the board of directors of Reporty Homeland Security Ltd. (later [[Carbyne]]) on December 23, 2015 list as directors present Amir Elichai, Alex Dizengof, [[Ehud Barak]] and "Pinchas Bouchris," with the company's lawyer. The minutes record a resolution to seek $10 million from venture funds and a further investment of $500,000 by Barak expected by February 1, 2016. The minutes were among the records released in the Department of Justice's Epstein Library.[^30] Pinhas Buchris, identified in Calcalist's July 2019 reporting as "the former director of Israel's Unit 8200," sat on Carbyne's board in 2017 with Barak, Elichai and [[Nicole Junkermann]].[^31] In a December 2022 interview with Calcalist, Buchris described himself as a former officer of [[Sayeret Matkal]], commander of Unit 81 and of Unit 8200, and director general of the [[Ministry of Defense (Israel)|Ministry of Defense]], said he had introduced the unit to cyber operations in 1997, and spoke of his part in the 1976 [[Operation Entebbe]] rescue.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Forbes]] reported in February 2026 that Barak served on the company's board until 2019 and that [[Jeffrey Epstein]] invested through Barak.[^19] Epstein's stake was held through SUM (E.B.) Limited Partnership. In a February 28, 2019 email, the partnership's lawyer wrote that at the time of the initial investment it had received warrants for 61,251 Preferred A shares of Carbyne, and that exercising them would raise its holding from about 13 percent to about 26.33 percent. A later message in the chain told Epstein's lawyer [[Darren Indyke]] that [[Southern Trust Company]] had signed the additional investment agreement.[^35] On March 11, 2019, Barak wrote to Epstein in a thread that carried the subject line "Re: Carbyne warrants" and included a message forwarded by Indyke.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Gaza targeting reporting, 2024
|
||||
|
||||
On April 3, 2024, [[+972 Magazine]] and [[Local Call]] published a report by [[Yuval Abraham]] describing an AI-based system called [[Lavender (targeting system)]]. The report says six Israeli intelligence officers who served in the Gaza war described its use in generating human targets, and that four of them said it had marked some 37,000 Palestinians as suspected Hamas militants.[^21] The same report describes tracking software, called "Where's Daddy?" in the reporting, that alerted targeting officers when marked individuals entered their homes.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The report says that the commander of Unit 8200 wrote the 2021 book *The Human-Machine Team* under the pen name "Brigadier General Y.S.", and that five sources in the unit confirmed him as its author. It also cites a 2023 lecture at [[Tel Aviv University]] by a colonel the report calls "Col. Yoav," commander of the unit's Data Science and AI center, whose slides +972 obtained.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The IDF told +972 and Local Call that it did not use artificial intelligence to incriminate targets, describing its tools as "auxiliary tools that assist officers in the process of incrimination." The army said each target is examined individually.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
### The commander's identity
|
||||
|
||||
On April 5, 2024, The Guardian reported that the commander of Unit 8200, [[Yossi Sariel]], was the secret author of *The Human Machine Team*. The Guardian wrote that an electronic version of the book published on Amazon included an anonymous email address that traced to Sariel's name and to a private Google account, which exposed his unique ID and linked maps and calendar profiles. The Guardian reported that Sariel wrote the book with the army's permission after a year as a visiting researcher at the National Defense University in Washington.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
An IDF spokesperson told the Guardian that the email address was not Sariel's personal one, but "dedicated specifically for issues to do with the book itself." The army later described the exposure of Sariel's personal details as "a mistake."[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
On September 12, 2024, Sariel announced his resignation as commander. In his letter he wrote: "I did not fulfill the mission as I expected of myself, nor as my subordinates, superiors and the citizens of Israel expected of me." The army said he would be replaced "in the coming period."[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
### Minerva University admissions
|
||||
|
||||
A page on the admissions site of [[Minerva Project]] was headed "Partner: IDF 8200" in a capture of September 21, 2020. The page states that "IDF unit 8200 alumni have the mature perspective and technological experience to both benefit from and contribute to Minerva's diverse undergraduate experience." It is published under the company's name and carries no statement attributed to [[Ben Nelson]].[^2]
|
||||
A page on the admissions site of [[Minerva Project]] was headed "Partner: IDF 8200" in a capture of September 21, 2020. The page states that "IDF unit 8200 alumni have the mature perspective and technological experience to both benefit from and contribute to Minerva's diverse undergraduate experience." It is published under the company's name and carries no statement attributed to [[Ben Nelson]].[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
### Project 8200
|
||||
|
||||
A 2024 book by [[Frederick Atwater]] titled *Project 8200* presents remote-viewing transcripts concerning UAP bases. Records found do not establish whether [[Project 8200]] has any connection to this unit.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^2]: Minerva Schools at KGI, "Partner: IDF 8200," page captured September 21, 2020. https://www.minerva.kgi.edu/partners/partner-idf-8200/
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Ynet, "Intelligence and Cyberwarfare: Israeli locations Hezbollah targeted for destruction," August 25, 2024. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sy3etztic
|
||||
[^2]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^3]: Wilson Center, "The Venona Project." The program began in 1943, decoded its first cable in 1946, and ran until the NSA shut it down in 1980; most of the cables date from 1943 to 1945. https://wilsoncenter.org/article/venona-project
|
||||
[^4]: David E. Sanger, "Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran," *The New York Times*, June 1, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html
|
||||
[^5]: David E. Sanger, *Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power* (2012), excerpt as reported by *The Register*, June 1, 2012. https://www.theregister.com/2012/06/01/stuxnet_joint_us_israeli_op/
|
||||
[^6]: "Israeli reservists refuse to serve," *Al Jazeera*, September 13, 2014. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/9/13/israeli-reservists-refuse-to-serve
|
||||
[^7]: "Snowden Reveal Makes Israeli Spies' Protest An American Issue," *WGBH*, September 22, 2014. https://www.wgbh.org/news/2014-09-22/snowden-reveal-makes-israeli-spies-protest-an-american-issue
|
||||
[^8]: Yoav Zitun, "IDF dismisses several intel reservists over refusenik letter," *Ynetnews*, January 26, 2015. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/4619538
|
||||
[^9]: Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewen MacAskill, "Secret Deal Allows NSA to Share Americans' Data With Israel," *The Guardian*, September 11, 2013 (reprinted by AlterNet). https://www.alternet.org/2013/09/secret-deal-allows-nsa-share-americans-data-israel
|
||||
[^10]: "NSA and Israeli intelligence: memorandum of understanding, full document," *The Guardian*, September 11, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document
|
||||
[^11]: "Where NSO Group Came From and Why It's Just the Tip of the Iceberg," *OCCRP*, The Pegasus Project (article in the OCCRP series). https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-pegasus-project/where-nso-group-came-from-and-why-its-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg
|
||||
[^12]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order granting in part and denying in part motion to set aside default judgment (Dkt. 41, March 25, 2020), at 1-2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-0.pdf
|
||||
[^13]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order on motions to dismiss (Dkt. 111, July 16, 2020), pp. 1-2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-5.pdf
|
||||
[^14]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order re motions for summary judgment and sanctions (Dkt. 494, December 20, 2024), at 16. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-24.pdf
|
||||
[^15]: *WhatsApp LLC v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Final Judgment (Dkt. 810, November 12, 2025), p. 2, reciting the May 6, 2025 verdict (Dkt. 736) and the October 17, 2025 remittitur. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-44.pdf
|
||||
[^16]: Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., annual report on Form 20-F, filed March 17, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015922/000117891325000867/zk2532836.htm
|
||||
[^17]: HUB Cyber Security Ltd., annual report on Form 20-F for 2022, filed August 15, 2023. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1905660/000121390023067760/f20f2022_hubcyber.htm
|
||||
[^18]: Playtika Holding Corp., definitive proxy statement, filed April 26, 2024. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1828016/000182801624000011/playtika-20240425.htm
|
||||
[^19]: Thomas Brewster, "Epstein Could Have Made $100 Million On A Secret Police Tech Investment With Ehud Barak," *Forbes*, February 10, 2026. https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2026/02/10/epstein-police-surveillance-investments-with-ehud-barak/
|
||||
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02632339, DataSet 11, email from Ehud Barak to Jeffrey Epstein, "Re: Carbyne warrants," March 11, 2019, with a forwarded message from Darren Indyke. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02632339.pdf
|
||||
[^21]: Yuval Abraham, "'Lavender': The AI machine directing Israel's bombing spree in Gaza," *+972 Magazine* and *Local Call*, April 3, 2024. https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/
|
||||
[^22]: "Exclusive: Yossi Sariel unmasked as head of Unit 8200 and architect of AI strategy after book written under pen name reveals his Google account," *The Guardian*, April 5, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/05/top-israeli-spy-chief-exposes-his-true-identity-in-online-security-lapse
|
||||
[^23]: "Head of critical IDF intel unit resigns over Oct. 7 failure," *JNS*, September 12, 2024. https://www.jns.org/israel-news/head-of-critical-idf-intel-unit-resigns-over-oct-7-failure
|
||||
[^24]: Minerva Schools at KGI, "Partner: IDF 8200," page captured September 21, 2020. https://www.minerva.kgi.edu/partners/partner-idf-8200/ (Internet Archive capture, https://web.archive.org/web/20200921120000id_/https://www.minerva.kgi.edu/partners/partner-idf-8200/)
|
||||
[^25]: Frederick Atwater, *Project 8200: UFO/UAP Bases and Activities: The Original Remote Viewing Transcripts* (2024), ISBN-10 3911151047.
|
||||
[^26]: Ronen Bergman, "Weaving a cyber web," *Ynetnews*, January 11, 2019. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5444998,00.html
|
||||
[^27]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order re motion for permanent injunction, motion for remittitur or new trial, and motion to seal (Dkt. 802, October 17, 2025), pp. 1-2 and conclusion. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-40.pdf
|
||||
[^28]: *WhatsApp LLC v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order granting plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunction (Dkt. 809, November 12, 2025), p. 2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-43.pdf
|
||||
[^29]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order denying motion to stay permanent injunction (Dkt. 824, December 19, 2025). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-46.pdf
|
||||
[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01074544, DataSet 9, minutes of the meeting of the board of directors of Reporty Homeland Security Ltd., December 23, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA01074544.pdf
|
||||
[^31]: "The Ties That Bind: Ehud Barak's Business Network," *CTech (Calcalist)*, July 18, 2019. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3766639,00.html
|
||||
[^32]: "A Buchris story: The rise, fall, and comeback of an Israeli hero," *CTech (Calcalist)*, December 16, 2022. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/lwigv8m1o
|
||||
[^33]: Nicole Perlroth and Scott Shane, "How Israel Caught Russian Hackers Scouring the World for U.S. Secrets," *The New York Times*, October 10, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/technology/kaspersky-lab-israel-russia-hacking.html
|
||||
[^34]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), ch. 21.
|
||||
[^35]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02634615, DataSet 11, email chain "Carbyne warrants," February 28 to March 14, 2019. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02634615.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
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