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---
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created: 2025-03-05
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updated: 2026-10-08
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updated: 2026-10-12
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title: NSA
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aliases:
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- NSA
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@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ relations:
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start: 1975
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end: 1975
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fn: 2
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- type: partner_of
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with: "[[Unit 8200]]"
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start: 2009-03
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role: "memorandum of understanding on raw signals-intelligence sharing, reached in principle March 2009 (counterpart named ISNU)"
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fn: 18
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---
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- type: head_of
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with: "[[Bobby Ray Inman]]"
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@ -93,9 +98,15 @@ In [[Ground Saucer Watch]] v. CIA (D.D.C., Civil Action 78-859) the Central Inte
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[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *The Samson Option* that a former NSA official told him the KH-11 satellite, launched in December 1976, was considered the most important advance of its time in reconnaissance photography, that every military and civilian intelligence agency had an urgent requirement for its imagery, and that the NSA, responsible for all communications intelligence, had a role in scheduling the satellite to maximize collection. Hersh wrote that [[Jimmy Carter]]'s decision in March 1979 to give [[Israel]] direct access to KH-11 photographs disrupted that scheduling and was unpopular within the NSA and other agencies, and that during the [[Ronald Reagan]] administration it was learned that Israeli military officers were permitted to attend Pentagon meetings where future KH-11 missions and orbital paths were discussed, which dismayed some NSA officials.[^17]
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### Memorandum of understanding with the Israeli signals unit
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On September 11, 2013, [[The Guardian]] published the text of an undated, five-page memorandum of understanding between the NSA and its Israeli counterpart, from a top-secret document provided to the Guardian by [[Edward Snowden]]. The Guardian reported that the deal "was reached in principle in March 2009." The memorandum says that the NSA "routinely sends ISNU [the Israeli Sigint National Unit] minimized and unminimized raw collection," so that the material is not filtered in advance to remove communications of US citizens. The memorandum defines raw Sigint as including "unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content," and permits Israel to release US person identities to outside parties with the NSA's written permission. Israel could keep "any files containing the identities of US persons" for up to a year.[^18] The memorandum states that "This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights" and is neither an international agreement nor a legally binding instrument. The NSA was to "regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of US persons' identities." The text does not name [[Unit 8200]]; the unit is the signals-intelligence arm of the Israeli military.[^19]
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The Guardian reported that the NSA declined to say whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been asked to approve the sharing. A top-secret report dated September 2007, also quoted by the Guardian, described the relationship as "overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel."[^18]
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### USS Liberty intercepts, 2003 to 2007
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The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack on the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] in July 2003, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by [[A. Jay Cristol]] filed April 26, 2001. The letter of July 2, 2003, enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts and two summary reports, and states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield; it states that portions were withheld under Executive Order 12958 and under statutes including 18 U.S.C. 798 and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36.[^18] In January 2004 the agency's historian, [[David Hatch]], said the new material "doesn't settle much," according to the Financial Times, and that his reading of the air controller's conversations with two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that the ship was American.[^19] On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, stating: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."[^20] [[Oliver Kirby]], the NSA deputy director for operations/production in 1967, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations that made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.[^21] The Chicago Tribune reported on October 2, 2007 that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots; quoted Kirby as saying "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew"; quoted Michael Prostinak, a Hebrew linguist aboard the EC-121, as saying "there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet"; and reported that the posted tape designated A1104/A-02 begins at 2:29 p.m. local time and that a preceding tape designated A1104/A-01 is absent. An NSA media adviser did not respond to the Tribune's question about the difference.[^22]
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The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack on the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] in July 2003, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by [[A. Jay Cristol]] filed April 26, 2001. The letter of July 2, 2003, enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts and two summary reports, and states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield; it states that portions were withheld under Executive Order 12958 and under statutes including 18 U.S.C. 798 and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36.[^20] In January 2004 the agency's historian, [[David Hatch]], said the new material "doesn't settle much," according to the Financial Times, and that his reading of the air controller's conversations with two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that the ship was American.[^21] On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, stating: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."[^22] [[Oliver Kirby]], the NSA deputy director for operations/production in 1967, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations that made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.[^23] The Chicago Tribune reported on October 2, 2007 that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots; quoted Kirby as saying "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew"; quoted Michael Prostinak, a Hebrew linguist aboard the EC-121, as saying "there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet"; and reported that the posted tape designated A1104/A-02 begins at 2:29 p.m. local time and that a preceding tape designated A1104/A-01 is absent. An NSA media adviser did not respond to the Tribune's question about the difference.[^24]
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### Footnotes
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@ -116,8 +127,10 @@ The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack o
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[^15]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair*, H. Rept. 102-857, September 10, 1992, pp. 67 to 68, https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport. The report records these statements as Aviv's account to committee investigators.
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[^16]: Affidavit of Eugene F. Yeates, Chief, Office of Policy, National Security Agency, *Citizens Against Unidentified Flying Objects Secrecy v. National Security Agency*, Civil Action No. 80-1562 (D.D.C. 1980), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf).
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[^17]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991). Hersh attributes the account of the KH-11 scheduling to an unnamed former NSA official.
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[^18]: National Security Agency, letter from Louis F. Giles, Director of Policy, to A. Jay Cristol, FOIA Case 40039A, July 2, 2003. https://irp.fas.org/nsa/liberty.html
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[^19]: Guy Dinmore, *Financial Times*, January 13, 2004, reprinted by the History News Network. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/3027
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[^20]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
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[^21]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
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[^22]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/
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[^18]: Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewen MacAskill, "Secret Deal Allows NSA to Share Americans' Data With Israel," *The Guardian*, September 11, 2013 (reprinted by AlterNet). https://www.alternet.org/2013/09/secret-deal-allows-nsa-share-americans-data-israel ; memorandum full-text page, *The Guardian*, http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document
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[^19]: Ynet, "Intelligence and Cyberwarfare: Israeli locations Hezbollah targeted for destruction," August 25, 2024. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sy3etztic
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[^20]: National Security Agency, letter from Louis F. Giles, Director of Policy, to A. Jay Cristol, FOIA Case 40039A, July 2, 2003. https://irp.fas.org/nsa/liberty.html
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[^21]: Guy Dinmore, *Financial Times*, January 13, 2004, reprinted by the History News Network. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/3027
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[^22]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
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[^23]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
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[^24]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/
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