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40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Iran-Contra Affair.md
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
- Iran/Contra
- Iran-Contra scandal
created: 2024-04-25
updated: 2026-10-05
updated: 2026-10-12
tags:
- Event
- Political
@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ relations:
start: 1986-12-01
end: 1987-02-26
role: "President's Special Review Board, Executive Order 12575"
fn: 9
fn: 11
- type: investigated
with: "[[Kerry Committee]]"
reverse: true
start: 1987
end: 1988-12
role: "Senate subcommittee on Contra drug links and Noriega"
fn: 12
fn: 19
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Oliver North]]"
reverse: true
@ -68,21 +68,21 @@ relations:
start: 1985-12
end: 1986-11
role: "national security adviser who authorized the diversion; convicted April 7, 1990, reversed November 15, 1991"
fn: 11
fn: 18
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Richard Secord]]"
reverse: true
start: 1984
end: 1986-11
role: "retired Air Force general who ran the Enterprise; pleaded guilty November 8, 1989"
fn: 11
fn: 18
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Albert Hakim]]"
reverse: true
start: 1984
end: 1986-11
role: "Enterprise financial manager; pleaded guilty November 21, 1989"
fn: 11
fn: 18
- type: participant_in
with: "[[William J. Casey]]"
reverse: true
@ -110,7 +110,14 @@ relations:
start: 1987
end: 1993
role: "14 persons charged, 11 convicted, 2 convictions overturned, 2 pardoned before trial, 1 case dismissed"
fn: 11
fn: 18
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]"
reverse: true
role: "Vessey, Gabriel and Crowe appear in 1985 Weinberger diary entries on Iran contacts, Saudi contra funding and hostage rescue"
start: 1985-03
end: 1985-11
fn: 13
---
The Iran-Contra Affair was the exposure, in October and November 1986, of two secret operations of the [[Ronald Reagan]] administration: the military support of the [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] [[Contras]] during an October 1984 to October 1986 prohibition on such aid, and the sale of U.S. arms to [[Iran]] in contravention of stated U.S. policy. In late November 1986 officials announced that some of the proceeds of the Iran sales had been diverted to the Contras. The Independent Counsel's Final Report states that the two operations were coordinated by the staff of the [[National Security Council]] and merged when Iran sale funds were diverted to the Contra effort, and that "both the Iran and contra operations, separately, violated [[United States]] policy and law."[^1] The secrecy was pierced on October 5, 1986, when [[Sandinistas|Sandinista]] soldiers shot down an American cargo plane carrying supplies to the Contras and captured its sole surviving crew member, [[Eugene Hasenfus]]; on November 3, 1986 a Lebanese magazine reported the Iran sales; and on November 25, 1986 Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]] announced the diversion.[^1]
@ -118,7 +125,7 @@ The Iran-Contra Affair was the exposure, in October and November 1986, of two se
In December 1981 President Reagan signed a Finding authorizing a covert [[Central Intelligence Agency]] operation to support the anti-Sandinista rebels. The first [[Boland Amendment]] (December 21, 1982) prohibited funds for overthrowing the Nicaraguan government; in early December 1983 Contra funding was capped at $24 million; in April 1984 the CIA's mining of Nicaraguan harbors was exposed; and the October 1984 amendment provided that "no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual."[^2][^3] National security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]] had, according to his testimony, been told by Reagan to keep the Contras alive "body and soul," and assigned the task to NSC staff member [[Oliver North]]. In May 1984 Saudi ambassador Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]] agreed to give $1 million a month; [[Saudi Arabia]] ultimately gave $32 million and [[Taiwan]] $2 million.[^2][^4]
CIA Director [[William J. Casey]] reorganized the CIA's Operations Directorate in 1984, removing the Latin American Division chief [[Dewey Clarridge]] and installing [[Alan Fiers]] as chief of the Central American Task Force; Fiers soon learned who had "taken the reins on contra activities: North." The CIA's deputy director for operations [[Clair George]] told Fiers in November 1984 that Casey had promised the President to take care of the Contras and that any denial of operational activity by North would be "just for show." North, on Casey's recommendation, asked retired Air Force Major General [[Richard Secord]] to help the Contra leader [[Adolfo Calero]] buy arms with Saudi money.[^2] Walsh lists about $1.7 million in private contributions passed through the tax-exempt [[National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty]] to accounts North controlled, and approximately $4 million from the Iran arms sales; the fundraisers [[Carl Channell]] and [[Richard Miller]] pleaded guilty in 1987 to conspiracy to defraud the United States and named North as an unindicted co-conspirator.[^5][^1]
CIA Director [[William J. Casey]] reorganized the CIA's Operations Directorate in 1984, removing the Latin American Division chief [[Dewey Clarridge]] and installing [[Alan Fiers]] as chief of the Central American Task Force; Fiers soon learned who had "taken the reins on contra activities: North." The CIA's deputy director for operations [[Clair George]] told Fiers in November 1984 that Casey had promised the President to take care of the Contras and that any denial of operational activity by North would be "just for show." North, on Casey's recommendation, asked retired Air Force Major General [[Richard Secord]] to help the Contra leader [[Adolfo Calero]] buy arms with Saudi money.[^2] Walsh lists about $1.7 million in private contributions passed through the tax-exempt [[National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty]] to accounts North controlled, and approximately $4 million from the Iran arms sales; the fundraisers [[Carl Channell]] and [[Richard Miller]] pleaded guilty in 1987 to conspiracy to defraud the United States and named North as an unindicted co-conspirator.[^1][^5]
On August 10, 1985 North flew to [[Costa Rica]] to meet Ambassador [[Lewis Tambs]] and the CIA station chief [[Joseph Fernandez]] about a secret airstrip for the Contra operation; Costa Rican officials disclosed the airstrip on September 25, 1986 after Ambassador Tambs had called President [[Oscar Arias]] to cancel a press conference.[^3] In 1985 and 1986 the Enterprise's air operation flew from [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]], where General [[Juan Rafael Bustillo]] ordered the operation's warehouse; the Hasenfus shootdown "settled irrevocably the question of CIA assumption" of the operation, in the words of Walsh's Enterprise chapter.[^6]
@ -126,45 +133,50 @@ On August 10, 1985 North flew to [[Costa Rica]] to meet Ambassador [[Lewis Tambs
Secord and Albert [[Hakim]] founded [[Stanford Technology Trading Group International]] in 1983; by 1986, Walsh writes, its business "was the Enterprise." Its finances were managed in [[Switzerland]] by the fiduciary [[Compagnie de Services Fiduciaire]], controlled by the American tax lawyer [[Willard Zucker]]. In late June 1985 North and Secord met Calero and the Contra commander [[Enrique Bermudez]] in [[Miami]] and told them that private and third-country donors would pay the Enterprise directly, removing Calero as a money-handler. In July 1985 Zucker's firm created a Liberian shell, [[Defex]] S.A., deliberately named like the Portuguese arms firm Defex, so that the Enterprise's mark-ups would appear in its books as payments to the supplier; Zucker's memorandum of July 8, 1985 describes the objective as having "sufficient debit advices" to show payments "approximating the amounts received." The Enterprise's receiving account was moved to [[Lake Resources]] in [[Geneva]], and all receipts were commingled. Draws from Contra arms sales between April 1985 and September 1986 came to $4.579 million.[^6] The congressional Committees found that Secord testified his mark-up "averaged out almost exactly 20 percent" while the actual commission averaged 38 percent, and that Calero was unaware of it.[^3] In total the Walsh report counts "more than $47 million" through Enterprise accounts; the Committees' figure is nearly $48 million, of which $16.5 million supported the Contras or bought arms sold to them, $15.2 million was spent on Iran, Secord, Hakim and [[Thomas Clines]] took $6.6 million in commissions and profit, and about $1 million went to other North-sponsored covert operations.[^1][^3]
In July 1986 the Enterprise paid the Portuguese firm Defex $2.6 million and $500,000 to the arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] for Contra weapons. Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion is $3.6 million and excludes that $500,000 payment, because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify," as well as a $200,000 Jetstar and about $535,000 for the freighter *Erria*, bought in April 1986 through the Panamanian shell company Dolmy Business Inc. The Committees put the amount of the diversion at about $3.8 million of $16.1 million in Iran arms profits.[^6][^3] The writer [[Cheri Seymour]] wrote that Al-Kassar, a Syrian arms dealer, supplied drug profits to North for Contra arms, and Seymour and [[Gary Webb]] each state that the Tower Commission probe revealed Al-Kassar had been paid $1.2 million by Secord to move weapons from [[Israel]] to the Contras; the Tower Commission excerpts and the Walsh report, which place the Enterprise's payment to Al-Kassar at $500,000 in July 1986, contain no such figure. Seymour and Webb give the $1.2 million figure.[^7][^8]
In July 1986 the Enterprise paid the Portuguese firm Defex $2.6 million and $500,000 to the arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] for Contra weapons. Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion is $3.6 million and excludes that $500,000 payment, because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify," as well as a $200,000 Jetstar and about $535,000 for the freighter *Erria*, bought in April 1986 through the Panamanian shell company Dolmy Business Inc. The Committees put the amount of the diversion at about $3.8 million of $16.1 million in Iran arms profits.[^3][^6] The writer [[Cheri Seymour]] wrote that Al-Kassar, a Syrian arms dealer, supplied drug profits to North for Contra arms, and Seymour and [[Gary Webb]] each state that the Tower Commission probe revealed Al-Kassar had been paid $1.2 million by Secord to move weapons from [[Israel]] to the Contras; the Tower Commission excerpts and the Walsh report, which place the Enterprise's payment to Al-Kassar at $500,000 in July 1986, contain no such figure. Seymour and Webb give the $1.2 million figure.[^7][^8]
### The Iran arms sales
In 1985 the Israelis, working through [[Michael Ledeen]], [[David Kimche]], [[Yaacov Nimrodi]], [[Al Schwimmer]] and the broker Manucher Ghorbanifar, "an Iranian exile and former CIA informant who had been discredited by the agency as a fabricator,"[^6] sold 504 U.S.-made TOW missiles to Iran in August and September 1985 (96 on August 20 and 408 on September 14, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released) after McFarlane obtained President Reagan's approval for Israeli sales with U.S. replenishment; McFarlane stood alone in testifying that Reagan had approved them, until notes found late in the investigation corroborated him. On November 24 to 25, 1985 the CIA arranged an airlift of 18 HAWK missiles from Israel to Iran aboard a CIA front-company plane; Iran rejected them after test-firing one. Poindexter later testified that he destroyed the December 1985 Finding that retroactively authorized the shipment.[^4][^3] Israel paid $1 million into the Enterprise's Lake Resources account on November 20, 1985 for the airlift; the Enterprise spent $127,700, and approximately $870,000 remained in the account, which Secord testified North told him they could use "for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^6]
In 1985 the Israelis, working through [[Michael Ledeen]], [[David Kimche]], [[Yaacov Nimrodi]], [[Al Schwimmer]] and the broker Manucher Ghorbanifar, "an Iranian exile and former CIA informant who had been discredited by the agency as a fabricator,"[^6] sold 504 U.S.-made TOW missiles to Iran in August and September 1985 (96 on August 20 and 408 on September 14, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released) after McFarlane obtained President Reagan's approval for Israeli sales with U.S. replenishment; McFarlane stood alone in testifying that Reagan had approved them, until notes found late in the investigation corroborated him. On November 24 to 25, 1985 the CIA arranged an airlift of 18 HAWK missiles from Israel to Iran aboard a CIA front-company plane; Iran rejected them after test-firing one. Poindexter later testified that he destroyed the December 1985 Finding that retroactively authorized the shipment.[^3][^4] Israel paid $1 million into the Enterprise's Lake Resources account on November 20, 1985 for the airlift; the Enterprise spent $127,700, and approximately $870,000 remained in the account, which Secord testified North told him they could use "for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^6]
A January 17, 1986 Finding authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran with Secord as agent, and [[Amiram Nir]] replaced Kimche as the Israeli official in the deals. Ghorbanifar borrowed from the financier [[Adnan Khashoggi]]; between February 7 and 18, 1986 Khashoggi deposited $10 million into Lake Resources, of which $5 million came from his own account at the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] in [[Monte Carlo]] and the remainder from a wealthy woman in Monte Carlo and from Galliot Lines, owned by the Syrian banker [[Oussama Lababidi]]. North and Secord negotiated a price of $10,000 per TOW, while telling the [[Department of Defense|Defense Department]] and CIA that Secord would receive $6,000; the Pentagon sold to the CIA at $3,700. The Enterprise's direct expenses were about $716,000, leaving a surplus of $5.6 million. Between February 17 and 27, 1986 1,000 TOWs were shipped.[^6] The Tower Commission quotes Ghorbanifar as saying North was "greatly relieved" when told the Iranians would pay $10,000 rather than $6,500 per missile.[^9] On May 25, 1986 McFarlane, North and others flew to [[Tehran]] with HAWK spare parts and left on May 28 without a hostage release. An August 25, 1986 meeting in [[Brussels]] opened a "Second Channel" through a [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps|Revolutionary Guards]] officer; a further 500 TOWs were sent on October 28, 1986, and the Committees' chronology states that 2,004 TOWs were sent in all, not the 1,000 President Reagan cited at his November 19 press conference.[^3]
The Tower Commission report gives an account by [[George P. Shultz]] of a conversation in which McFarlane said that "Foreign Minister [[Yitzhak Shamir]] had told Mr. Kimche that he wanted to know explicitly whether I was informed."[^9] Shamir was foreign minister from March 1980 to October 20, 1986. In September 1986 a memorandum from North recorded that "Incoming PM Shamir and outgoing PM Peres have agreed that Nir will remain in his current capacity after the change of government in October."[^10]
A January 17, 1986 Finding authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran with Secord as agent, and [[Amiram Nir]] replaced Kimche as the Israeli official in the deals. Ghorbanifar borrowed from the financier [[Adnan Khashoggi]]; between February 7 and 18, 1986 Khashoggi deposited $10 million into Lake Resources, of which $5 million came from his own account at the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] in [[Monte Carlo]] and the remainder from a wealthy woman in Monte Carlo and from Galliot Lines, owned by the Syrian banker [[Oussama Lababidi]]. North and Secord negotiated a price of $10,000 per TOW, while telling the [[Department of Defense|Defense Department]] and CIA that Secord would receive $6,000; the Pentagon sold to the CIA at $3,700. The Enterprise's direct expenses were about $716,000, leaving a surplus of $5.6 million. Between February 17 and 27, 1986 1,000 TOWs were shipped.[^6] The Tower Commission quotes Ghorbanifar as saying North was "greatly relieved" when told the Iranians would pay $10,000 rather than $6,500 per missile.[^11] On May 25, 1986 McFarlane, North and others flew to [[Tehran]] with HAWK spare parts and left on May 28 without a hostage release. An August 25, 1986 meeting in [[Brussels]] opened a "Second Channel" through a [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps|Revolutionary Guards]] officer; a further 500 TOWs were sent on October 28, 1986, and the Committees' chronology states that 2,004 TOWs were sent in all, not the 1,000 President Reagan cited at his November 19 press conference.[^3]
### The diversion, exposure and cover-up
On December 6, 1985 North told an Israeli official he planned to use profits from future arms sales to support the Contras; on April 4, 1986 he wrote an unsigned memorandum proposing $12 million in residuals "to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces," which, the Tower Commission found, "no evidence has emerged" was ever placed before Poindexter, the President or any other official.[^3][^9] Poindexter told [[United States Congress|Congress]] he made the decision on his own, did not tell the President and believed he would have approved; North testified he believed the President authorized it. The Independent Counsel could not prove that Reagan authorized or knew of the diversion.[^1] In the Tower Commission's account Attorney General Meese told it that North said in their November 23, 1986 interview that the Israelis had handled the money and that he gave them numbers of three Swiss accounts opened by Calero; the March 1988 indictment charged that the statement about Calero was false.[^9][^10]
On December 6, 1985 North told an Israeli official he planned to use profits from future arms sales to support the Contras; on April 4, 1986 he wrote an unsigned memorandum proposing $12 million in residuals "to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces," which, the Tower Commission found, "no evidence has emerged" was ever placed before Poindexter, the President or any other official.[^3][^11] Poindexter told [[United States Congress|Congress]] he made the decision on his own, did not tell the President and believed he would have approved; North testified he believed the President authorized it. The Independent Counsel could not prove that Reagan authorized or knew of the diversion.[^1] In the Tower Commission's account Attorney General Meese told it that North said in their November 23, 1986 interview that the Israelis had handled the money and that he gave them numbers of three Swiss accounts opened by Calero; the March 1988 indictment charged that the statement about Calero was false.[^11][^12]
North began shredding documents on November 21, 1986 after being told [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] officials would inspect his files; a Justice Department official found the April 1986 memorandum on November 22; on November 24 Meese told Reagan of the diversion, and on November 25 Reagan announced Poindexter's resignation and North's dismissal.[^3] Walsh found that "the President's most senior advisers and the Cabinet members on the National Security Council participated in the strategy to make National Security staff members McFarlane, Poindexter and North the scapegoats," and that notes of Reagan's chief of staff [[Donald Regan]] showed Poindexter and Meese attempting to create a false account of the 1985 shipments from Israeli stocks; [[Weinberger]]'s diary notes, withheld from investigators until late 1991, and the notes of [[Charles Hill]] and [[Nicholas Platt]] of the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] showed that Secretaries [[Caspar Weinberger]] and [[George Shultz]] knew more than they told Congress. Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] "was fully aware of the Iran arms sales"; the Independent Counsel learned in December 1992 that he had not produced a diary containing contemporaneous notes, and the pardon of Weinberger on December 24, 1992 "pre-empted a trial in which defense counsel indicated that they intended to call Bush as a witness."[^1]
### Investigations
President Reagan created the President's Special Review Board, known as the [[Tower Commission]], on December 1, 1986 under Executive Order 12575, with former Senator [[John Tower]] as chairman. Its report of February 26, 1987 stated that Poindexter, North, Israeli participants and other key witnesses "refused to appear before the board," that the bank records could not be obtained, and that "there was considerable evidence before the board of a diversion to support the contras. But the board had no hard proof."[^9][^3] The [[Lawrence Walsh|Independent Counsel]] was appointed on December 19, 1986. The Senate and House select committees were set up on January 6 and 7, 1987, held televised hearings from May 5 to August 3, 1987 with more than 250 hours of testimony from 28 public witnesses, took North's testimony for six days beginning July 7 and Poindexter's for five beginning July 15, and issued their report on November 18, 1987.[^3]
President Reagan created the President's Special Review Board, known as the [[Tower Commission]], on December 1, 1986 under Executive Order 12575, with former Senator [[John Tower]] as chairman. Its report of February 26, 1987 stated that Poindexter, North, Israeli participants and other key witnesses "refused to appear before the board," that the bank records could not be obtained, and that "there was considerable evidence before the board of a diversion to support the contras. But the board had no hard proof."[^3][^11] The [[Lawrence Walsh|Independent Counsel]] was appointed on December 19, 1986. The Senate and House select committees were set up on January 6 and 7, 1987, held televised hearings from May 5 to August 3, 1987 with more than 250 hours of testimony from 28 public witnesses, took North's testimony for six days beginning July 7 and Poindexter's for five beginning July 15, and issued their report on November 18, 1987.[^3]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff appear in the independent counsel's record of the Defense Department. Walsh's Part VIII records that General [[John W. Vessey, Jr.]], then chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], recalled that Weinberger told him "incredulously," after attending a White House meeting in the summer of 1985, that someone had proposed contacts with Iran.[^13] Vessey recalled that Prince Bandar bin Sultan told him on two occasions that the Saudis were funding the contras, that on each occasion he reported the statement to Weinberger, and that Weinberger responded that he did not want the issue to become public; in his April 17, 1987 deposition to the Select Committees he described one such occasion.[^14] Weinberger's daily notes for March 13, 1985, made after a meeting with Vessey ("Jack Vessey in office alone"), record that Weinberger "passed on to him Jack Vessey's report that Bandar is giving $25 million to Contras" in a call to Robert McFarlane the same day, with the suggestion that, if so, the United States go for "covert non-lethal aid of $14 mil."[^13] The memorandum for the record of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [[John N. McMahon]] on the March 15, 1985 breakfast of Weinberger, William J. Casey and McMahon records Weinberger's statement that he had heard that Bandar had earmarked $25 million for the contras in $5 million increments.[^15] The diary entry for August 22, 1985 records a meeting in Weinberger's office with McFarlane, [[Colin Powell]] and General [[Charles Gabriel]], the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs, at which an Israeli message that two Iranians had offered to return some hostages was discussed.[^16] The diary entry for November 21, 1985 records [[William J. Crowe, Jr.]] in office, regarding the president's decisions at Geneva and hostage rescue attempts.[^17]
Walsh's Final Report (August 4, 1993) states that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented, and that "large volumes of highly relevant, contemporaneously created documents were systematically and willfully withheld from investigators by several Reagan Administration officials." Casey, hospitalized with a fatal illness before the Independent Counsel was appointed, was never formally investigated. Walsh observed that the problems were "not those of rogue operations, but rather those of Executive Branch efforts to evade congressional oversight," and that grants of immunity to North, Poindexter and [[Albert Hakim]] by Congress, and the attorney general's discretion under the [[Classified Information Procedures Act]] to refuse to declassify information, undermined prosecutions.[^1]
### Prosecutions and pardons
After the Independent Counsel's appointment 14 persons were charged, 11 were convicted (two convictions being overturned on appeal), two were pardoned before trial and one case was dismissed when the Bush administration declined to declassify information needed at trial. Pleas: Carl Channell (April 29, 1987) and Richard Miller (May 6, 1987); McFarlane (March 11, 1988); Secord (November 8, 1989, one felony of false statements to Congress); Hakim (November 21, 1989, a misdemeanor of supplementing North's salary, with Lake Resources Inc. pleading to theft of government property); Fiers (July 9, 1991, two misdemeanors); [[Elliott Abrams]] (October 7, 1991, two misdemeanors, including his solicitation of $10 million from the Sultan of [[Brunei]]). Convictions at trial: Clines (September 18, 1990, four tax-related felonies, 16 months); North (May 4, 1989, three counts, vacated July 20, 1990, dismissed September 16, 1991); Poindexter (April 7, 1990, five felony counts, reversed November 15, 1991, certiorari denied December 7, 1992, indictment dismissed in 1993); George (December 9, 1992, two felonies, pardoned before sentencing). The case against Joseph Fernandez was dismissed on November 24, 1989 after Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]] blocked the disclosure of classified information ruled relevant to the defense; the Fourth Circuit upheld that ruling on September 6, 1990.[^11]
After the Independent Counsel's appointment 14 persons were charged, 11 were convicted (two convictions being overturned on appeal), two were pardoned before trial and one case was dismissed when the Bush administration declined to declassify information needed at trial. Pleas: Carl Channell (April 29, 1987) and Richard Miller (May 6, 1987); McFarlane (March 11, 1988); Secord (November 8, 1989, one felony of false statements to Congress); Hakim (November 21, 1989, a misdemeanor of supplementing North's salary, with Lake Resources Inc. pleading to theft of government property); Fiers (July 9, 1991, two misdemeanors); [[Elliott Abrams]] (October 7, 1991, two misdemeanors, including his solicitation of $10 million from the Sultan of [[Brunei]]). Convictions at trial: Clines (September 18, 1990, four tax-related felonies, 16 months); North (May 4, 1989, three counts, vacated July 20, 1990, dismissed September 16, 1991); Poindexter (April 7, 1990, five felony counts, reversed November 15, 1991, certiorari denied December 7, 1992, indictment dismissed in 1993); George (December 9, 1992, two felonies, pardoned before sentencing). The case against Joseph Fernandez was dismissed on November 24, 1989 after Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]] blocked the disclosure of classified information ruled relevant to the defense; the Fourth Circuit upheld that ruling on September 6, 1990.[^18]
On December 24, 1992 President Bush pardoned Weinberger (indicted June 16, 1992, trial set for January 5, 1993), [[Duane Clarridge]] (indicted November 26, 1991 on seven counts of perjury and false statements, trial set for March 15, 1993), George, Abrams, Fiers and McFarlane. Fernandez, whose case had been dismissed, was not among those pardoned.[^11]
On December 24, 1992 President Bush pardoned Weinberger (indicted June 16, 1992, trial set for January 5, 1993), [[Duane Clarridge]] (indicted November 26, 1991 on seven counts of perjury and false statements, trial set for March 15, 1993), George, Abrams, Fiers and McFarlane. Fernandez, whose case had been dismissed, was not among those pardoned.[^18]
### The Contra network and drug trafficking
The Kerry Committee's report of December 1988 stated that "individuals who provided support for the Contras were involved in drug trafficking, the supply network of the Contras was used by drug trafficking organizations, and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers," and that "in each case, one or another agency of the U.S. government had information regarding the involvement either while it was occurring, or immediately thereafter." It found that the State Department paid funds Congress had authorized for humanitarian assistance to traffickers, "in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges." It found no evidence that the Contra leadership participated directly in narcotics smuggling, but that the FDN "did move Contra funds through a narcotics trafficking enterprise and money laundering operation," and that "some officials may have turned a blind eye." It concluded that "there are serious questions as to whether or not U.S. officials involved in Central America failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war effort against Nicaragua," citing the delay in dealing with [[Manuel Noriega]], the premature public announcement of the DEA's [[Barry Seal]] sting of Sandinista officials shortly before a crucial congressional vote on Contra aid, and the case of the Honduran General [[Jose Bueso Rosa|José Bueso-Rosa]], convicted of a plot to assassinate President [[Roberto Suazo Cordova|Roberto Suazo Córdova]] financed by a $40 million cocaine sale, who received a light sentence after U.S. officials intervened.[^12] The Kerry report also described Contra supply contractors paid by the State Department's Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office, the Contra supply officer [[Mario Calero]]'s agreement with the pilot [[Frank Moss]], and the passage of Contra funds through traffickers.[^12]
The Kerry Committee's report of December 1988 stated that "individuals who provided support for the Contras were involved in drug trafficking, the supply network of the Contras was used by drug trafficking organizations, and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers," and that "in each case, one or another agency of the U.S. government had information regarding the involvement either while it was occurring, or immediately thereafter." It found that the State Department paid funds Congress had authorized for humanitarian assistance to traffickers, "in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges." It found no evidence that the Contra leadership participated directly in narcotics smuggling, but that the FDN "did move Contra funds through a narcotics trafficking enterprise and money laundering operation," and that "some officials may have turned a blind eye." It concluded that "there are serious questions as to whether or not U.S. officials involved in Central America failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war effort against Nicaragua," citing the delay in dealing with [[Manuel Noriega]], the premature public announcement of the DEA's [[Barry Seal]] sting of Sandinista officials shortly before a crucial congressional vote on Contra aid, and the case of the Honduran General [[Jose Bueso Rosa|José Bueso-Rosa]], convicted of a plot to assassinate President [[Roberto Suazo Cordova|Roberto Suazo Córdova]] financed by a $40 million cocaine sale, who received a light sentence after U.S. officials intervened.[^19] The Kerry report also described Contra supply contractors paid by the State Department's Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office, the Contra supply officer [[Mario Calero]]'s agreement with the pilot [[Frank Moss]], and the passage of Contra funds through traffickers.[^19]
The National Security Archive's briefing book prints North's notebook for July 12, 1985, in which Secord is quoted as saying that "14 M to finance [the arms in a Honduran warehouse] came from drugs," and North's August 9, 1985 entry that a Honduran DC-6 used for runs out of New Orleans "is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; the briefing book also notes that DEA agents testified on July 28, 1988 that North had wanted $1.5 million in Cartel money carried by a DEA informant given to the Contras.[^10] The Kerry report states that the pilot [[Floyd Carlton]] testified that Noriega was paid $100,000 to $250,000 for each of four cocaine flights he piloted for the [[Medellin Cartel]], and that the same Panamanian general met North in June 1985 and again in [[London]] on September 22, 1986 to discuss sabotage in Nicaragua; when North proposed a meeting on August 23, 1986, Poindexter replied, "I have nothing against him other than his illegal activities," and Walsh records that the decision was made not to pay Noriega the $1 million.[^12][^10][^13]
The National Security Archive's briefing book prints North's notebook for July 12, 1985, in which Secord is quoted as saying that "14 M to finance [the arms in a Honduran warehouse] came from drugs," and North's August 9, 1985 entry that a Honduran DC-6 used for runs out of New Orleans "is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; the briefing book also notes that DEA agents testified on July 28, 1988 that North had wanted $1.5 million in Cartel money carried by a DEA informant given to the Contras.[^12] The Kerry report states that the pilot [[Floyd Carlton]] testified that Noriega was paid $100,000 to $250,000 for each of four cocaine flights he piloted for the [[Medellin Cartel]], and that the same Panamanian general met North in June 1985 and again in [[London]] on September 22, 1986 to discuss sabotage in Nicaragua; when North proposed a meeting on August 23, 1986, Poindexter replied, "I have nothing against him other than his illegal activities," and Walsh records that the decision was made not to pay Noriega the $1 million.[^12][^19][^20]
Webb wrote that Kerry investigation director [[Jack Blum]] told him: "We were even dumped on by the Iran-Contra Committee. They wouldn't touch this issue with a ten-foot pole," and that during North's July 1987 testimony two men from Baltimore stood with a banner reading "Ask about the cocaine smuggling" before police removed them. Webb also wrote that the plane shot down over Nicaragua was a Fairchild C-123K called The Fat Lady, based at [[Mena, Arkansas]] before Barry Seal sold it, after which it flew weapons for North and the [[FDN]]; that Hasenfus was a former [[Air America]] cargo handler; that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on Seal's joint CIA-DEA sting of the Sandinistas and allegedly leaked it to the press shortly before a critical vote on Contra aid; and that the Enterprise's flights from Ilopango reportedly brought cocaine back on return flights, with Hangar No. 4 there used by the CIA until it was turned over to North's operation in 1985. The Committees' account identifies the aircraft only as one belonging to the Enterprise, with a [[Southern Air Transport]] identification card found on the pilot.[^8][^3]
Webb wrote that Kerry investigation director [[Jack Blum]] told him: "We were even dumped on by the Iran-Contra Committee. They wouldn't touch this issue with a ten-foot pole," and that during North's July 1987 testimony two men from Baltimore stood with a banner reading "Ask about the cocaine smuggling" before police removed them. Webb also wrote that the plane shot down over Nicaragua was a Fairchild C-123K called The Fat Lady, based at [[Mena, Arkansas]] before Barry Seal sold it, after which it flew weapons for North and the [[FDN]]; that Hasenfus was a former [[Air America]] cargo handler; that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on Seal's joint CIA-DEA sting of the Sandinistas and allegedly leaked it to the press shortly before a critical vote on Contra aid; and that the Enterprise's flights from Ilopango reportedly brought cocaine back on return flights, with Hangar No. 4 there used by the CIA until it was turned over to North's operation in 1985. The Committees' account identifies the aircraft only as one belonging to the Enterprise, with a [[Southern Air Transport]] identification card found on the pilot.[^3][^8]
### The Octopus and the BCCI cluster
The writer Cheri Seymour wrote that the Iran-Contra Affair was a significant component of [[Danny Casolaro]]'s "[[The Octopus]]" investigation, which Casolaro believed was interconnected with the [[PROMIS Software Scandal]] and the BCCI scandal; that he obtained photocopies of checks drawn on BCCI accounts for Khashoggi and Ghorbanifar from [[Bob Bickel]], who had them from the [[October Surprise]] source [[Richard Brenneke]]; that [[Ian Stuart Spiro]]'s name appeared in North's notebooks and his death was linked to a spy network and the affair; that [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], a self-described Israeli military intelligence officer, tipped off the Lebanese magazine; and that the former White House aide [[Barbara Honegger]] alleged in her book *October Surprise* that Al-Kassar's heroin smuggling network in [[Italy]] was used to launder [[North Atlantic Treaty Organization|NATO]] arms stocks, diverting them to Iran with the help of Italian intelligence officials linked to the P2 lodge.[^7] The Walsh report places Khashoggi's own BCCI account in Monte Carlo as the origin of $5 million of the February 1986 bridge financing.[^6]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels, August 4, 1993), Executive Summary. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
[^2]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "Iran/contra: The Underlying Facts," sections "The Reagan Administration's Contra Policy," "The Funding Cut-Off." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
[^3]: Brinkley, Joel, and Stephen Engelberg, eds. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with the Minority Views*, abridged edition (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1988), "Iran-Contra Chronology," Parts I to III and the Committees' findings (S. Rept. 100-216, H. Rept. 100-433, November 18, 1987). https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
@ -173,8 +185,15 @@ The writer Cheri Seymour wrote that the Iran-Contra Affair was a significant com
[^6]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, "The Enterprise and Its Finances," including notes 5, 30 to 35 and 51. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_08.htm
[^7]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
[^8]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, Prologue, ch. 6 ("They were doing their patriotic duty") and ch. 4.
[^9]: Tower Commission, *Report of the President's Special Review Board* (February 26, 1987), Part I, "Contra Diversion" and "N.S.C. Staff and Support for the Contras" (excerpts published by the American Presidency Project). https://archive.org/details/tower-commission-report-excerpts-reagan
[^10]: National Security Archive, "The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations," Electronic Briefing Book No. 2 (North notebooks of July 12 and August 9, 1985; North and Poindexter electronic messages of August 23, 1986). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/index.html
[^11]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^12]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (December 1988), "Summary of Findings," chapters on the Contras and on Panama, and the Conclusions. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^13]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "United States v. Elliott Abrams," section on the September 19 and 20, 1986 meetings. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^9]: Report of the President's Special Review Board (Tower Commission), February 26, 1987. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
[^10]: Memorandum from Oliver North, September 1986, reproduced in the Tower Commission report. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit
[^11]: Tower Commission, *Report of the President's Special Review Board* (February 26, 1987), Part I, "Contra Diversion" and "N.S.C. Staff and Support for the Contras" (excerpts published by the American Presidency Project). https://archive.org/details/tower-commission-report-excerpts-reagan
[^12]: National Security Archive, "The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations," Electronic Briefing Book No. 2 (North notebooks of July 12 and August 9, 1985; North and Poindexter electronic messages of August 23, 1986). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/index.html
[^13]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, Part VIII, notes 10 and 165 (Vessey, Select Committees deposition, April 17, 1987, pp. 30-31; Weinberger diary, March 13, 1985, ALZ 0039320B-C). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^14]: Walsh, Part VIII, notes 168-170 (Vessey, FBI 302, June 11, 1992, pp. 6-7; Vessey, FBI 302, February 11, 1987, p. 1; Vessey, Select Committees Deposition, April 17, 1987, pp. 5-9). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^15]: Walsh, Part VIII, note 167 (McMahon, memorandum for the record, March 15, 1985, ER 26,187-88 and ER 92-00116-17). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^16]: Walsh, Part VIII, notes 16-18 (Weinberger diary, August 22, 1985, ALZ 0039606-07; Weinberger calendar, LC-007474; Powell, Select Committees deposition, June 19, 1987, p. 5). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^17]: Walsh, Part VIII, citing Weinberger diary, November 21, 1985 (ALZ 0039802-03). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^18]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^19]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165 (December 1988), "Summary of Findings," chapters on the Contras and on Panama, and the Conclusions. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^20]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "United States v. Elliott Abrams," section on the September 19 and 20, 1986 meetings. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm

11
40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Lockheed bribe scandal.md
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@ -4,22 +4,23 @@ aliases:
- Lockheed bribe scandal
- Lockheed bribery scandal
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-12
tags:
- Event
- Scandal
- Israel
- UnitedStates
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
summary: "1976 scandal involving bribes paid by Lockheed Aircraft Company to Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres and other international figures."
summary: "1976 scandal over Lockheed Aircraft Company payments to international figures, including Ari Ben-Menashe's account of a bribe to Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres."
start: 1976-01-01
location: "Israel"
---
The Lockheed bribe scandal refers to a series of bribery incidents involving the [[Lockheed Aircraft Company]]. In [[Israel]], a specific instance of this scandal came to light in 1976 through an intercepted telegram.[^1]
The Lockheed bribe scandal refers to a series of bribery incidents involving the [[Lockheed Aircraft Company]]. In his 1992 book, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] described a specific instance in [[Israel]] that he said came to light in 1976 through an intercepted telegram.[^1]
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]], while serving as a duty officer in [[Unit 8200]], intercepted a telegram from the [[Iran|Iranian]] Embassy in [[Ramat Gan]] to [[Tehran]]. This telegram detailed a meeting between a Lockheed representative in Israel and [[Shimon Peres]], then Defense Minister, revealing a bribe of $3.5 million deposited into one of Peres's brother's business accounts in [[Europe]].[^1]
In his 1992 book, Ben-Menashe wrote that, while serving as a duty officer in [[Unit 8200]], he intercepted a telegram from the [[Iran|Iranian]] Embassy in [[Ramat Gan]] to [[Tehran]]. He wrote that the telegram detailed a meeting between a Lockheed representative in Israel and [[Shimon Peres]], then Defense Minister, revealing a bribe of $3.5 million deposited into one of Peres's brother's business accounts in [[Europe]].[^1]
Despite the explosive nature of this information, it was covered up by Israeli military intelligence superiors, including [[Yoel Ben-Porat|Col. Yoel Ben-Porat]] and [[Sasson Yishaek|Lt. Col. Sasson Yishaek]]. The original telegram, its translation, and related logs were ordered to be erased, and the young woman working with Ari Ben-Menashe was transferred to another unit. No public disclosure or inquiry was ever made regarding Israel's involvement in the scandal.[^1]
He wrote that the information was covered up by Israeli military intelligence superiors, including [[Yoel Ben-Porat|Col. Yoel Ben-Porat]] and [[Sasson Yishaek|Lt. Col. Sasson Yishaek]], that the original telegram, its translation, and related logs were ordered to be erased, and that the young woman working with him was transferred to another unit. He wrote that no public disclosure or inquiry was ever made regarding Israel's involvement in the scandal.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

37
40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Operation NORTHWOODS.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Operation NORTHWOODS
aliases:
- Northwoods
@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ category: "Intelligence Scandal"
summary: "Joint Chiefs of Staff paper of March 13, 1962 proposing staged incidents, blamed on Cuba, as pretexts for a U.S. invasion; declassified in 1997 and publicized by James Bamford in 2001."
start: 1962-03-13
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]"
reverse: true
role: "submitted JCS 1969/321 with Enclosure A to Secretary McNamara"
start: 1962-03-13
fn: 5
---
Operation NORTHWOODS was a set of proposals developed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff under General [[Lyman Lemnitzer]] and formally submitted to Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] on March 13, 1962. The document, titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba," proposed creating or staging a series of violent incidents - including attacks on American citizens - that could be attributed to [[Cuba]] and used as a pretext for a U.S. military invasion. [[James Bamford]] wrote that the proposals were rejected by McNamara and President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^1] The document was declassified in 1997 through the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act and brought to wide public attention by journalist James Bamford.[^1]
@ -25,7 +32,9 @@ Operation NORTHWOODS was a set of proposals developed by the United States Joint
Operation NORTHWOODS was developed within the framework of [[Operation Mongoose]] and the broader Kennedy administration effort to develop options for ending [[Fidel Castro|Castro]]'s rule in Cuba. After the [[Bay of Pigs]] failure in April 1961, American military and intelligence planners continued to develop contingency plans for a direct military intervention in Cuba. The strategic problem was the absence of a legitimate trigger - a clear provocation or attack by Cuba that could justify military action before world opinion and the [[United Nations]].
General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Department of Defense's Office of Special Operations developed NORTHWOODS as a response to this problem. The document proposed manufacturing the trigger.[^1]
Earlier Joint Chiefs planning on Cuba had already proposed an incident as justification. On April 26, 1961 the Joint Chiefs sent Secretary of Defense McNamara a memorandum (JCSM-278-61, "Cuba") answering his memorandum of April 20 with an analysis of courses of action for the overthrow of the Castro government. It cited CINCLANT Operation Plan 312-61 as a plan "which has previously been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and recommended: "One action that is recommended is the creation of an incident which will provide justification for the overthrow of the Castro government by the United States."[^2] [[Earle G. Wheeler]] signed for the Joint Chiefs, above the typed signature of [[Arleigh Burke]], chief of naval operations.[^2]
General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, signed the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 13, 1962, which responded to a March 5 request from the Chief of Operations of Operation Mongoose, [[Edward Lansdale]], Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, relayed through Brigadier General [[William H. Craig]], the Joint Chiefs' representative on his group; the Joint Staff drew up the list of pretexts.[^3] The document proposed manufacturing the trigger.[^1]
### Proposed Operations
@ -35,6 +44,8 @@ The NORTHWOODS document proposed a range of false-flag operations:
Simulated attacks on Guantanamo: Staging mortar attacks on the Guantanamo perimeter, having U.S. Marines fire at each other in a way that could be attributed to Cuban snipers, and blowing up ammunition at Guantanamo and blaming Cuba.
The annex, which states that its courses of action "are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order," proposed that "a 'Remember the Maine' incident could be arranged in several forms," including the destruction of a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blaming Cuba, or an unmanned vessel exploded near Havana or Santiago. Its appendix described the purpose of the plan as enabling "a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective."[^4] The Joint Chiefs' cover memorandum recommended that the enclosure be forwarded to the secretary of defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, and that it not be forwarded to unified commanders, to U.S. officers assigned to NATO, or to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee.[^5]
Terror campaign in Miami and Washington D.C.: The document proposed staging "a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington." This included sinking boats carrying Cuban refugees, attacks on Cuban exiles who had "been to retaliate against any Cubans who assisted the US in the invasion," and U.S.-staged bombings.
Staged aircraft incidents: Proposing to use CIA aircraft painted to simulate Cuban Air Force colors to harass or "attack" U.S. aircraft over international waters, creating incidents that could be documented and publicized. A separate proposal suggested that a passenger aircraft could be hijacked by a "Cuban" (actually a U.S. covert operations team), diverting it and creating an international incident.
@ -43,9 +54,9 @@ Killing of Americans: The document explicitly contemplated staging incidents in
### Rejection
On March 6, 1962 [[Edward Lansdale]], chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wrote that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^2] The Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 13 recommended that the paper be forwarded "as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes." The paper (JCS 1969/321) rested on the premise that intervention "will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances," and a draft memorandum appended to it stated that a plan built from the suggestions "would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale."[^3]
On March 6, 1962 Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wrote that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^6]On March 5, 1962 the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, wrote to General Craig with the request, under the subject "Operation MONGOOSE." The Joint Chiefs' memorandum takes "cognizance of a suggested course of action proposed by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area," citing a March 8, 1962 memorandum from the chief of naval operations to the Joint Chiefs titled "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)."[^7] The Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 13 recommended that the paper be forwarded "as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes." The paper (JCS 1969/321) rested on the premise that intervention "will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances," and a draft memorandum appended to it stated that a plan built from the suggestions "would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale."[^8]
On March 16, 1962 President Kennedy met with [[John A. McCone]], General [[Maxwell Taylor]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Lemnitzer to discuss the Mongoose guidelines. [[U. Alexis Johnson]]'s handwritten note records that "The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action," and that "no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^4] At the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), according to McCone's notes, the "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^5]
On March 16, 1962 President Kennedy met with [[John A. McCone]], General [[Maxwell Taylor]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Lemnitzer to discuss the Mongoose guidelines. [[U. Alexis Johnson]]'s handwritten note records that "The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action," and that "no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^9] On April 5, 1962 the Special Group concluded that Mongoose should re-examine its basic philosophy "with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention," and five days later (April 10) the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both questions put by General Maxwell Taylor, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so.[^10] At the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), according to McCone's notes, the "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^11]
Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction.[^1] In July 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint Lemnitzer as JCS Chairman when his term expired; Lemnitzer was transferred to command [[NATO]] forces in Europe. The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
@ -53,13 +64,19 @@ Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting wit
The document remained classified for thirty-five years and was among the records released in 1997 under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required declassification of documents relating to the Kennedy assassination regardless of their original security designation. NORTHWOODS was included because it was part of the operational planning environment in which Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs were operating in 1962-1963.
James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^6]
James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^12]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.* Doubleday, 2001. Original document: "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (TS), JCS files, March 13, 1962; declassified 1997. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
[^2]: Lansdale to Goodwin, March 6, 1962 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 310. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
[^3]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, signed by L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, with Enclosure A, its appendix and annex, and Enclosure B, from JCS 1969/321 (Top Secret, Special Handling, Noforn; declassified 1997). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^4]: Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and editorial note quoting U. Alexis Johnson's handwritten covering memorandum of March 16, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 314. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314
[^5]: Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone on the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
[^6]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.
[^2]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-278-61, "Cuba," April 26, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 178. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d178
[^3]: JCS 1969/321 (memorandum of March 13, 1962 and appendix); Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, chapter 11 and note 2, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509 ; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 310 and list of persons, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10
[^4]: JCS 1969/321, Enclosure A, appendix, paragraph 3, and the annex "Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba," paragraphs 2-3. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^5]: JCS 1969/321, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 13, 1962, paragraphs 2 and 8. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^6]: Lansdale to Goodwin, March 6, 1962 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 310. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
[^7]: Memorandum for General Craig from the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject "Operation MONGOOSE," March 5, 1962, and memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, from the Chief of Naval Operations, subject "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)," March 8, 1962, both cited in footnotes in JCS 1969/321, with paragraph 3 of the enclosure memorandum. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^8]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, signed by L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, with Enclosure A, its appendix and annex, and Enclosure B, from JCS 1969/321 (Top Secret, Special Handling, Noforn; declassified 1997). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^9]: Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and editorial note quoting U. Alexis Johnson's handwritten covering memorandum of March 16, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 314. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314
[^10]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11, pp. 158-160. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
[^11]: Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone on the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
[^12]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.

36
40 - EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Gulf of Tonkin Incident.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Gulf of Tonkin Incident
aliases:
- Gulf of Tonkin
@ -23,7 +23,14 @@ relations:
reverse: true
start: 1964-08-03
role: "Secretary of Defense; briefed congressional leaders"
fn: 4
fn: 6
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]"
reverse: true
role: "issued DeSoto patrol orders JCS 7680 and 7681 and attended the August 4 Pentagon meeting"
start: 1964-08-02
end: 1964-08-04
fn: 2
---
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident refers to two separate events on August 2 and August 4, 1964, in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam, the second of which was used by the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration to obtain congressional authorization for the dramatic escalation of American involvement in [[Vietnam War|the Vietnam War]]. Subsequent declassification - principally of [[NSA]] documents released in 2005 - confirmed what internal doubts at the time suggested: the August 4 "attack" almost certainly did not occur.[^1]
@ -34,13 +41,15 @@ On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox, a destroyer conducting electronic intelligenc
The Maddox was conducting DESOTO patrols - intelligence-gathering missions that collected electronic signals from North Vietnamese radar and communications installations. The patrols ran in coordination with South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnamese coastal targets. North Vietnam apparently attacked the Maddox in response to those raids, believing American vessels were directly supporting the attacks.
The [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] handled the orders for the patrol after the engagement. At 12:25 p.m. Washington time on August 2, 1964, Chairman [[Earle G. Wheeler]] sent [[Ulysses S. Grant Sharp|Admiral Sharp]], commander in chief of the Pacific, telegram JCS 7680 authorizing the DeSoto patrol to continue in the Gulf of Tonkin on routes and times specified by the Pacific Fleet, with the closest approach to the North Vietnamese mainland set at 11 miles and combat air patrol kept to seaward of the destroyers.[^2] The telegram records that the Pacific Fleet had asked for the resumption of the patrols "at the earliest," and that the Pacific command concurred.[^2] At 6:49 p.m. the same day, JCS 7681 instructed that if the destroyers were attacked in international waters, 11 miles or more offshore, the commander was to destroy the attacking forces, but that "pursuit into hostile waters or air space is not authorized."[^3]
### Secretary of Defense briefings, August 3 and 4, 1964
On August 3, 1964 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, [[Peter Solbert]], sent [[Robert S. McNamara]] a memorandum on the aftermath of the Maddox engagement. Among the actions it listed were the aerial mining of North Vietnamese naval bases or harbors and further covert [[Operation 34-A]] missions against those bases.[^2]
On August 3, 1964 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, [[Peter Solbert]], sent [[Robert S. McNamara]] a memorandum on the aftermath of the Maddox engagement. Among the actions it listed were the aerial mining of North Vietnamese naval bases or harbors and further covert [[Operation 34-A]] missions against those bases.[^4]
In a telephone call at 10:30 a.m. on August 3, McNamara proposed explaining the covert naval operations to Congress: "And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on."[^3]
In a telephone call at 10:30 a.m. on August 3, McNamara proposed explaining the covert naval operations to Congress: "And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on."[^5]
At the meeting of congressional leaders on August 4, McNamara began his briefing: "The first indication we had of another attack on the destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy, was received at 7:30 A.M. today."[^4] In a 9:43 a.m. call that day, McNamara said of the destroyer: "this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked tonight." [[John Prados]] wrote that McNamara's later public statements on the 34-A link were made against this record.[^5]
At the meeting of congressional leaders on August 4, McNamara began his briefing: "The first indication we had of another attack on the destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy, was received at 7:30 A.M. today."[^6] In a 9:43 a.m. call that day, McNamara said of the destroyer: "this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked tonight." [[John Prados]] wrote that McNamara's later public statements on the 34-A link were made against this record.[^7]
### August 4: The Fabricated Attack
@ -48,6 +57,8 @@ On August 4, 1964, the Maddox and USS Turner Joy reported that they were under a
Captain John Herrick, commanding the Maddox, sent a message to Washington the same day stating that many of the reported "torpedoes" were likely false readings from sonar conditions and that there was "freak weather effects on radar" and "overeager sonar men." He recommended a "complete evaluation before any further action." This cable was available to Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and the Johnson White House.[^1]
On August 4, 1964, at 11:40 a.m., McNamara, Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], [[McGeorge Bundy]], Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [[Marshall Green]], and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at the Pentagon. The Foreign Relations editorial note, drawing on the August 28 Top Secret chronology that Bundy submitted to the president on September 4, records McNamara describing five options at that meeting. At 12:04 p.m. the civilians moved to McNamara's office, where the options were refined to three: "1. Sharp limited strikes against such target as PT boats, PT bases, oil depots, etc. 2. Continuing pressure, i.e., mining the Vietnam coast. 3. A combination of both."[^8] The Joint Chiefs stayed in the dining room until 1:49 p.m. and, at their direction, General Burchinal telephoned McNamara at the White House to recommend the sharp limited response option.[^8]
Despite these doubts, Johnson and McNamara presented the August 4 incident to Congress and the public as a clear unprovoked attack requiring a military response. NSA signals intelligence was cited as corroborating the attack; in fact, the signals were later determined to have been misinterpreted or fabricated by NSA analysts seeking to confirm the attack rather than evaluate it objectively.
### Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
@ -66,13 +77,16 @@ In 2005, the NSA released previously classified documents including a 2001 inter
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is significant both as a historical event - the manufactured pretext for the most costly American military engagement of the Cold War - and as a paradigm case in discussions of false-flag operations and government deception. Read alongside the declassified [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] document proposing staged incidents to justify Cuba intervention (1962), Tonkin demonstrated that American officials were not only willing to plan such fabrications but to execute them.
The incident also illustrated the institutional dynamics of intelligence assessment under political pressure: the NSA analysis that confirmed the August 4 attack reflected what policymakers wanted to hear rather than what the evidence showed - a pattern subsequently analyzed in discussions of intelligence and policy.[^6]
The incident also illustrated the institutional dynamics of intelligence assessment under political pressure: the NSA analysis that confirmed the August 4 attack reflected what policymakers wanted to hear rather than what the evidence showed - a pattern subsequently analyzed in discussions of intelligence and policy.[^9]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hanyok, Robert J. "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964." *Cryptologic Quarterly.* NSA. Declassified 2005; available at nsarchive.gwu.edu. Moise, Edwin E. *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.* University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
[^2]: Peter Solbert, memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, August 3, 1964 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 268. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d268
[^3]: Telephone conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara, August 3, 1964, 10:30 a.m., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 132. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/tapes.htm
[^4]: Notes of the Leadership Meeting, White House, August 4, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 280. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d280
[^5]: John Prados, "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later," National Security Archive, August 4, 2004 (telephone conversation of August 4, 1964, 9:43 a.m.). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm
[^6]: The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel edition). Beacon Press, 1971. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam.* Basic Books, 2001.
[^2]: Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp), telegram JCS 7680, August 2, 1964, 12:25 p.m., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 259. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d259
[^3]: Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, Pacific, telegram JCS 7681, August 2, 1964, 6:49 p.m., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 261. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d261
[^4]: Peter Solbert, memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, August 3, 1964 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 268. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d268
[^5]: Telephone conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara, August 3, 1964, 10:30 a.m., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 132. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/tapes.htm
[^6]: Notes of the Leadership Meeting, White House, August 4, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 280. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d280
[^7]: John Prados, "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later," National Security Archive, August 4, 2004 (telephone conversation of August 4, 1964, 9:43 a.m.). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm
[^8]: Editorial note on the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and Green at the Pentagon, August 4, 1964, 11:40 a.m., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 276. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d276
[^9]: The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel edition). Beacon Press, 1971. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam.* Basic Books, 2001.