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---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Gulf of Tonkin Incident
aliases:
- Gulf of Tonkin
@ -23,7 +23,14 @@ relations:
reverse: true
start: 1964-08-03
role: "Secretary of Defense; briefed congressional leaders"
fn: 4
fn: 6
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]"
reverse: true
role: "issued DeSoto patrol orders JCS 7680 and 7681 and attended the August 4 Pentagon meeting"
start: 1964-08-02
end: 1964-08-04
fn: 2
---
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident refers to two separate events on August 2 and August 4, 1964, in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam, the second of which was used by the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration to obtain congressional authorization for the dramatic escalation of American involvement in [[Vietnam War|the Vietnam War]]. Subsequent declassification - principally of [[NSA]] documents released in 2005 - confirmed what internal doubts at the time suggested: the August 4 "attack" almost certainly did not occur.[^1]
@ -34,13 +41,15 @@ On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox, a destroyer conducting electronic intelligenc
The Maddox was conducting DESOTO patrols - intelligence-gathering missions that collected electronic signals from North Vietnamese radar and communications installations. The patrols ran in coordination with South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnamese coastal targets. North Vietnam apparently attacked the Maddox in response to those raids, believing American vessels were directly supporting the attacks.
The [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] handled the orders for the patrol after the engagement. At 12:25 p.m. Washington time on August 2, 1964, Chairman [[Earle G. Wheeler]] sent [[Ulysses S. Grant Sharp|Admiral Sharp]], commander in chief of the Pacific, telegram JCS 7680 authorizing the DeSoto patrol to continue in the Gulf of Tonkin on routes and times specified by the Pacific Fleet, with the closest approach to the North Vietnamese mainland set at 11 miles and combat air patrol kept to seaward of the destroyers.[^2] The telegram records that the Pacific Fleet had asked for the resumption of the patrols "at the earliest," and that the Pacific command concurred.[^2] At 6:49 p.m. the same day, JCS 7681 instructed that if the destroyers were attacked in international waters, 11 miles or more offshore, the commander was to destroy the attacking forces, but that "pursuit into hostile waters or air space is not authorized."[^3]
### Secretary of Defense briefings, August 3 and 4, 1964
On August 3, 1964 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, [[Peter Solbert]], sent [[Robert S. McNamara]] a memorandum on the aftermath of the Maddox engagement. Among the actions it listed were the aerial mining of North Vietnamese naval bases or harbors and further covert [[Operation 34-A]] missions against those bases.[^2]
On August 3, 1964 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, [[Peter Solbert]], sent [[Robert S. McNamara]] a memorandum on the aftermath of the Maddox engagement. Among the actions it listed were the aerial mining of North Vietnamese naval bases or harbors and further covert [[Operation 34-A]] missions against those bases.[^4]
In a telephone call at 10:30 a.m. on August 3, McNamara proposed explaining the covert naval operations to Congress: "And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on."[^3]
In a telephone call at 10:30 a.m. on August 3, McNamara proposed explaining the covert naval operations to Congress: "And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on."[^5]
At the meeting of congressional leaders on August 4, McNamara began his briefing: "The first indication we had of another attack on the destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy, was received at 7:30 A.M. today."[^4] In a 9:43 a.m. call that day, McNamara said of the destroyer: "this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked tonight." [[John Prados]] wrote that McNamara's later public statements on the 34-A link were made against this record.[^5]
At the meeting of congressional leaders on August 4, McNamara began his briefing: "The first indication we had of another attack on the destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy, was received at 7:30 A.M. today."[^6] In a 9:43 a.m. call that day, McNamara said of the destroyer: "this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked tonight." [[John Prados]] wrote that McNamara's later public statements on the 34-A link were made against this record.[^7]
### August 4: The Fabricated Attack
@ -48,6 +57,8 @@ On August 4, 1964, the Maddox and USS Turner Joy reported that they were under a
Captain John Herrick, commanding the Maddox, sent a message to Washington the same day stating that many of the reported "torpedoes" were likely false readings from sonar conditions and that there was "freak weather effects on radar" and "overeager sonar men." He recommended a "complete evaluation before any further action." This cable was available to Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and the Johnson White House.[^1]
On August 4, 1964, at 11:40 a.m., McNamara, Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], [[McGeorge Bundy]], Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [[Marshall Green]], and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at the Pentagon. The Foreign Relations editorial note, drawing on the August 28 Top Secret chronology that Bundy submitted to the president on September 4, records McNamara describing five options at that meeting. At 12:04 p.m. the civilians moved to McNamara's office, where the options were refined to three: "1. Sharp limited strikes against such target as PT boats, PT bases, oil depots, etc. 2. Continuing pressure, i.e., mining the Vietnam coast. 3. A combination of both."[^8] The Joint Chiefs stayed in the dining room until 1:49 p.m. and, at their direction, General Burchinal telephoned McNamara at the White House to recommend the sharp limited response option.[^8]
Despite these doubts, Johnson and McNamara presented the August 4 incident to Congress and the public as a clear unprovoked attack requiring a military response. NSA signals intelligence was cited as corroborating the attack; in fact, the signals were later determined to have been misinterpreted or fabricated by NSA analysts seeking to confirm the attack rather than evaluate it objectively.
### Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
@ -66,13 +77,16 @@ In 2005, the NSA released previously classified documents including a 2001 inter
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is significant both as a historical event - the manufactured pretext for the most costly American military engagement of the Cold War - and as a paradigm case in discussions of false-flag operations and government deception. Read alongside the declassified [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] document proposing staged incidents to justify Cuba intervention (1962), Tonkin demonstrated that American officials were not only willing to plan such fabrications but to execute them.
The incident also illustrated the institutional dynamics of intelligence assessment under political pressure: the NSA analysis that confirmed the August 4 attack reflected what policymakers wanted to hear rather than what the evidence showed - a pattern subsequently analyzed in discussions of intelligence and policy.[^6]
The incident also illustrated the institutional dynamics of intelligence assessment under political pressure: the NSA analysis that confirmed the August 4 attack reflected what policymakers wanted to hear rather than what the evidence showed - a pattern subsequently analyzed in discussions of intelligence and policy.[^9]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hanyok, Robert J. "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964." *Cryptologic Quarterly.* NSA. Declassified 2005; available at nsarchive.gwu.edu. Moise, Edwin E. *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.* University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
[^2]: Peter Solbert, memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, August 3, 1964 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 268. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d268
[^3]: Telephone conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara, August 3, 1964, 10:30 a.m., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 132. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/tapes.htm
[^4]: Notes of the Leadership Meeting, White House, August 4, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 280. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d280
[^5]: John Prados, "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later," National Security Archive, August 4, 2004 (telephone conversation of August 4, 1964, 9:43 a.m.). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm
[^6]: The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel edition). Beacon Press, 1971. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam.* Basic Books, 2001.
[^2]: Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp), telegram JCS 7680, August 2, 1964, 12:25 p.m., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 259. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d259
[^3]: Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, Pacific, telegram JCS 7681, August 2, 1964, 6:49 p.m., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 261. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d261
[^4]: Peter Solbert, memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, August 3, 1964 (Top Secret; Sensitive), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 268. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d268
[^5]: Telephone conversation, Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara, August 3, 1964, 10:30 a.m., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 132. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/tapes.htm
[^6]: Notes of the Leadership Meeting, White House, August 4, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. I, Document 280. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d280
[^7]: John Prados, "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later," National Security Archive, August 4, 2004 (telephone conversation of August 4, 1964, 9:43 a.m.). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm
[^8]: Editorial note on the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and Green at the Pentagon, August 4, 1964, 11:40 a.m., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 276. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d276
[^9]: The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel edition). Beacon Press, 1971. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam.* Basic Books, 2001.