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27
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/Federal Reserve Board.md
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@ -11,22 +11,26 @@ tags:
- Intelligence
summary: "Governing body of the U.S. central banking system, which approved the BCCI-backed takeover of Financial General Bankshares in 1981 on false assurances and fined BCCI 200 million dollars in July 1991."
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-09-23
updated: 2026-10-26
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: investigated
with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
start: 1991-01-03
fn: 3
fn: 6
---
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) is the governing body of the [[United States]] central banking system, established by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and headquartered in [[Washington, D.C.]] The Board consists of seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, serving 14-year terms. The Federal Reserve is responsible for U.S. monetary policy, banking supervision and regulation, and maintenance of the financial system's stability. As a bank regulator, the Federal Reserve holds primary supervisory authority over bank holding companies - a jurisdiction directly relevant to the [[BCCI]] scandal.[^1]
### Origins
[[Frank A. Vanderlip]] wrote of the meeting at the [[Jekyll Island]] Club, Georgia, in late 1910 that "I do not feel it is any exaggeration to speak of our secret expedition to Jekyl Island as the occasion of the actual conception of what eventually became the Federal Reserve System."[^2] The group went to help [[Nelson W. Aldrich]] prepare the report and banking bill of the [[National Monetary Commission]]. Vanderlip wrote that the men asked to go were "Henry Davison, Paul Warburg, Ben Strong, and myself," with [[A. Piatt Andrew]] coming from Washington, and that "We were told to leave our last names behind us."[^3] The [[Pritzker Military Museum & Library]] finding aid for the Davison family states: "Many believe this meeting led to the creation of the Federal Reserve."[^4]
### BCCI and First American Bankshares
The Federal Reserve Board is prominently implicated in the BCCI scandal through its regulatory approval of the acquisition of [[First American Bankshares]], the largest bank holding company in the Washington, D.C. area. In 1981-1982, a group of Middle Eastern investors fronted by [[Clark Clifford]] - the Washington super-lawyer and former Secretary of Defense - and his law partner [[Robert Altman]] sought [[Federal Reserve]] approval to purchase First American (then called Financial General Bankshares). The investors represented themselves as independent Arab investors with no connection to BCCI.
The Federal Reserve approved the acquisition. In reality, BCCI secretly controlled the purchase: the nominally independent Arab investors were BCCI nominees whose shares were financed by BCCI, and BCCI chairman [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] made the key decisions about First American's management. Clifford and Altman maintained publicly - and in sworn testimony to the Federal Reserve - that BCCI did not control First American, which congressional investigators and prosecutors subsequently concluded was false. Clifford and Altman were indicted in 1992 for fraud in connection with the deception of the Federal Reserve; Clifford was ultimately not tried due to ill health, while Altman was acquitted.[^2]
The Federal Reserve approved the acquisition. In reality, BCCI secretly controlled the purchase: the nominally independent Arab investors were BCCI nominees whose shares were financed by BCCI, and BCCI chairman [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] made the key decisions about First American's management. Clifford and Altman maintained publicly - and in sworn testimony to the Federal Reserve - that BCCI did not control First American, which congressional investigators and prosecutors subsequently concluded was false. Clifford and Altman were indicted in 1992 for fraud in connection with the deception of the Federal Reserve; Clifford was ultimately not tried due to ill health, while Altman was acquitted.[^5]
The Federal Reserve's failure to detect BCCI's secret ownership of First American - despite BCCI's known reputation in the international banking community as an institution with irregular practices - was identified by the [[Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry Committee investigation]] and the [[Bank of England]]'s [[Bingham Report]] as reflecting significant regulatory failure. The Federal Reserve paid insufficiently close attention to the backgrounds of investors seeking approval, relied on representations without adequate independent investigation, and permitted BCCI principals to escape detection for nearly a decade.
@ -36,18 +40,21 @@ Following the July 1991 closure of BCCI by international regulators, the Federal
### Iran-Contra Financial Flows
The Federal Reserve System's broader role in the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] was as the institutional infrastructure through which the financial flows of the "Enterprise" - [[Oliver North]]'s off-books covert operations fund - moved through the banking system. Accounts at major U.S. banks, Swiss numbered accounts, and the network of front companies managed by [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]] all operated through correspondent banking relationships that passed through the Federal Reserve's payment system. The Federal Reserve itself was not involved in or aware of these operations, but its payment infrastructure was the medium through which the illegal financial transactions moved.[^2]
The Federal Reserve System's broader role in the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] was as the institutional infrastructure through which the financial flows of the "Enterprise" - [[Oliver North]]'s off-books covert operations fund - moved through the banking system. Accounts at major U.S. banks, Swiss numbered accounts, and the network of front companies managed by [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]] all operated through correspondent banking relationships that passed through the Federal Reserve's payment system. The Federal Reserve itself was not involved in or aware of these operations, but its payment infrastructure was the medium through which the illegal financial transactions moved.[^5]
### The Kerry-Brown Findings
The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] found that when the Board approved the takeover of [[Financial General Bankshares]] by [[Credit and Commerce American Holdings]] in 1981 "it had substantial circumstantial evidence before it to suggest that BCCI was behind the bank's purchase," and that it "would not have approved the CCAH application but for the false statements made to it." It relied on representations from the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] and other agencies that they had no objections, and on the reputation of BCCI's lawyers, Clark Clifford and the former Federal Reserve counsel Baldwin Tuttle. Paul Volcker, who signed the approval, testified in 1991 that he "wasn't aware" of [[Kamal Adham]]'s intelligence background. The Treasury failed to pass on what the CIA told it in 1985 and 1986 about BCCI's ownership of [[First American Bank|First American]], although "[[Internal Revenue Service|IRS]] agents did provide important information to the Federal Reserve on this issue in early 1989, which the Federal Reserve failed adequately to investigate at the time." The purchase of the [[National Bank of Georgia]] in 1986 was an obvious warning sign not investigated until late 1990.[^3][^4]
The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] found that when the Board approved the takeover of [[Financial General Bankshares]] by [[Credit and Commerce American Holdings]] in 1981 "it had substantial circumstantial evidence before it to suggest that BCCI was behind the bank's purchase," and that it "would not have approved the CCAH application but for the false statements made to it." It relied on representations from the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] and other agencies that they had no objections, and on the reputation of BCCI's lawyers, Clark Clifford and the former Federal Reserve counsel Baldwin Tuttle. Paul Volcker, who signed the approval, testified in 1991 that he "wasn't aware" of [[Kamal Adham]]'s intelligence background. The Treasury failed to pass on what the CIA told it in 1985 and 1986 about BCCI's ownership of [[First American Bank|First American]], although "[[Internal Revenue Service|IRS]] agents did provide important information to the Federal Reserve on this issue in early 1989, which the Federal Reserve failed adequately to investigate at the time." The purchase of the [[National Bank of Georgia]] in 1986 was an obvious warning sign not investigated until late 1990.[^6][^7]
The Board opened a formal investigation on January 3, 1991, which the report called "aggressive and diligent." In mid-March 1991 it sent two investigators, Richard Small and Thomas Baxter, to [[Abu Dhabi]], where they were refused direct access to BCCI's files. On July 29, 1991, the day of the New York County indictments, it assessed a fine of 200 million dollars against BCCI, one of 37 million dollars against [[Ghaith R. Pharaon|Ghaith Pharaon]] and one of 20 million dollars against the BCCI official Kemal Shoaib; with the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] and District Attorney [[Robert Morgenthau]] it reached a plea agreement on December 17, 1991, under which BCCI's liquidators forfeited about 500 million dollars of BCCI's American assets. The report said that the Board's cooperation with the subcommittee "was unique among federal agencies."[^3] The [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]'s head of the Criminal Division, [[Robert Mueller]], told the subcommittee that the information on BCCI's secret ownership "was passed on to the Federal Reserve after the October 1988 takedown," quoting the Board's general counsel, Virgil Mattingly, that it was "the kind of allegation [that] they had heard before."[^5]
The Board opened a formal investigation on January 3, 1991, which the report called "aggressive and diligent." In mid-March 1991 it sent two investigators, Richard Small and Thomas Baxter, to [[Abu Dhabi]], where they were refused direct access to BCCI's files. On July 29, 1991, the day of the New York County indictments, it assessed a fine of 200 million dollars against BCCI, one of 37 million dollars against [[Ghaith R. Pharaon|Ghaith Pharaon]] and one of 20 million dollars against the BCCI official Kemal Shoaib; with the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] and District Attorney [[Robert Morgenthau]] it reached a plea agreement on December 17, 1991, under which BCCI's liquidators forfeited about 500 million dollars of BCCI's American assets. The report said that the Board's cooperation with the subcommittee "was unique among federal agencies."[^6] The [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]'s head of the Criminal Division, [[Robert Mueller]], told the subcommittee that the information on BCCI's secret ownership "was passed on to the Federal Reserve after the October 1988 takedown," quoting the Board's general counsel, Virgil Mattingly, that it was "the kind of allegation [that] they had heard before."[^8]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Kerry, John and Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992.
[^2]: Beaty, Jonathan and S.C. Gwynne. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI.* Random House, 1993.
[^3]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 12, "The Regulators." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
[^4]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
[^5]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 8, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: The Justice Department and the U.S. Customs Service." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/08just.htm
[^2]: Frank A. Vanderlip, *From Farm Boy to Financier* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1935), p. 210. https://archive.org/details/from-farm-boy-to-financier-by-frank-vanderlip
[^3]: Frank A. Vanderlip, *From Farm Boy to Financier* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1935), pp. 213 to 214. https://archive.org/details/from-farm-boy-to-financier-by-frank-vanderlip
[^4]: Pritzker Military Museum & Library, Davison Family Collection, biographical note on Henry Pomeroy Davison. https://www.pritzkermilitary.org/sites/default/files/files/Davison_Finding_Aid_Feb_2018.pdf
[^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and S.C. Gwynne. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI.* Random House, 1993.
[^6]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 12, "The Regulators." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
[^7]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
[^8]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 8, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: The Justice Department and the U.S. Customs Service." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/08just.htm

91
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/CIAA.md
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ tags:
summary: "Roosevelt's wartime Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, headed by Nelson Rockefeller, the first official US government propaganda operation, which built economic, media and political infrastructure in Latin America."
location: Washington, DC
created: 2026-06-05
updated: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-26
---
The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) was a wartime US government agency created on August 16, 1940, by order of the [[Council of National Defense]] and placed under the direction of [[Nelson Rockefeller]]. Its official mandate was to promote hemispheric solidarity and counter Axis influence in [[Latin America]]; in practice it functioned as the first official US propaganda operation, a vehicle for expanding American corporate dominance in the hemisphere, and a testing ground for the psychological warfare and covert operations techniques that would be institutionalized in the postwar [[CIA]].[^1]
@ -35,55 +35,55 @@ The CIAA's Inter-American Affairs Committee, as established under Executive Orde
### Personnel and Corporate Character
The CIAA's top positions were filled with corporate executives. [[John Hay Whitney]], financier and film producer, led the Motion Picture Division. [[Will Clayton]], chairman of [[Anderson, Clayton and Company]] and at one time the world's largest cotton trader, served as deputy coordinator with responsibility for commodity and raw materials programs. [[Percy Douglas]] of [[Otis Elevator]] oversaw exports management. [[Paul Nitze]], investment banker, served as finance director from 1942, then moved to the Metals and Minerals Branch of the [[Board of Economic Warfare]] in 1943, before becoming director of the Foreign Procurement and Development Branch of the [[Foreign Economic Administration]]. Wallace Harrison, the architect who had worked on [[Rockefeller Center]], was appointed director of the renamed OIAA in March 1945 at an annual salary of $10,000 per Executive Order 9532.[^8]
The CIAA's top positions were filled with corporate executives. [[John Hay Whitney]], financier and film producer, directed the Motion Picture Division in 1942 (a July 1942 issue of the trade weekly credits him with launching its film activities),[^8] working with Nelson Rockefeller on the film program; in January 1942 the trade weekly reported that the two had selected [[Walt Disney]] to make goodwill films for South America.[^9] By October 1942 [[Francis Alstock]] had succeeded him as director of the division.[^10] [[Will Clayton]], chairman of [[Anderson, Clayton and Company]] and at one time the world's largest cotton trader, served as deputy coordinator with responsibility for commodity and raw materials programs. [[Percy Douglas]] of [[Otis Elevator]] oversaw exports management. [[Paul Nitze]], investment banker, served as finance director from 1942, then moved to the Metals and Minerals Branch of the [[Board of Economic Warfare]] in 1943, before becoming director of the Foreign Procurement and Development Branch of the [[Foreign Economic Administration]]. Wallace Harrison, the architect who had worked on [[Rockefeller Center]], was appointed director of the renamed OIAA in March 1945 at an annual salary of $10,000 per Executive Order 9532.[^11]
Nelson Rockefeller's own fraternal network ran the operation: brother [[Laurance Rockefeller]]'s aviation investments and Eastern Airlines directorship dovetailed with the CIAA's aviation dominance program. The family's [[Standard Oil]] subsidiaries benefited directly from CIAA-built infrastructure (roads, airfields, rubber programs) across the hemisphere.[^9]
Nelson Rockefeller's own fraternal network ran the operation: brother [[Laurance Rockefeller]]'s aviation investments and Eastern Airlines directorship dovetailed with the CIAA's aviation dominance program. The family's [[Standard Oil]] subsidiaries benefited directly from CIAA-built infrastructure (roads, airfields, rubber programs) across the hemisphere.[^12]
Staff critics complained that CIAA coordinating committees in Brazil and elsewhere were composed of "the biggest businessmen" with "the most reactionary" policy views. [[Josephus Daniels]], the liberal former ambassador, warned Roosevelt that the war would see "the forces of privilege" return to control of government, "with monopoly strongly entrenched in business, manufacturing, finance and government."[^10]
Staff critics complained that CIAA coordinating committees in Brazil and elsewhere were composed of "the biggest businessmen" with "the most reactionary" policy views. [[Josephus Daniels]], the liberal former ambassador, warned Roosevelt that the war would see "the forces of privilege" return to control of government, "with monopoly strongly entrenched in business, manufacturing, finance and government."[^13]
The CIAA was penetrated by Soviet intelligence during the war. Venona project decrypts identified six American employees who engaged in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union; the agency's code name in Soviet intelligence communications was "Cabaret."[^11]
The CIAA was penetrated by Soviet intelligence during the war. Venona project decrypts identified six American employees who engaged in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union; the agency's code name in Soviet intelligence communications was "Cabaret."[^14]
### Propaganda Operations
The CIAA built or subsidized shortwave broadcasting infrastructure reaching every country in the hemisphere. Its flagship radio operation was [[La Cadena de las Américas]], founded in 1941 as a joint project with the [[Columbia Broadcasting System]] (CBS) under CBS president [[William S. Paley]] and journalists [[Paul White]] and [[Edmund Chester]]. The network consisted of 64 stations across 18 countries and broadcast in Spanish and English; after the war its supervision was gradually transferred to the State Department's [[Voice of America]]. The CIAA also produced the CBS *Viva América* program.[^12]
The CIAA built or subsidized shortwave broadcasting infrastructure reaching every country in the hemisphere. Its flagship radio operation was [[La Cadena de las Américas]], founded in 1941 as a joint project with the [[Columbia Broadcasting System]] (CBS) under CBS president [[William S. Paley]] and journalists [[Paul White]] and [[Edmund Chester]]. The network consisted of 64 stations across 18 countries and broadcast in Spanish and English; after the war its supervision was gradually transferred to the State Department's [[Voice of America]]. The CIAA also produced the CBS *Viva América* program.[^15]
The CIAA controlled Latin American press access to newsprint, a critical wartime scarcity, conditioning that access on editorial cooperation. It compiled a "Proclaimed List" of Axis-owned or Axis-sympathizing newspapers and radio stations across the hemisphere, circulated beginning July 1941 under the informal Latin American name "La Lista Negra." Some 1,800 firms and individuals were publicly declared Axis-affiliated and frozen out of US goods and credit. During the first half of 1941 alone, US exporters dropped more than 1,000 South American accounts under CIAA pressure.[^13]
The CIAA controlled Latin American press access to newsprint, a critical wartime scarcity, conditioning that access on editorial cooperation. It compiled a "Proclaimed List" of Axis-owned or Axis-sympathizing newspapers and radio stations across the hemisphere, circulated beginning July 1941 under the informal Latin American name "La Lista Negra." Some 1,800 firms and individuals were publicly declared Axis-affiliated and frozen out of US goods and credit. During the first half of 1941 alone, US exporters dropped more than 1,000 South American accounts under CIAA pressure.[^16]
Hollywood studios were pressured to deny films to theaters showing German or Italian content, and the CIAA filled the vacuum with its own newsreels and political films. In early 1941 the CIAA reached out to [[Walt Disney]], whose studio had been facing financial difficulty; Nelson Rockefeller arranged a government-underwritten goodwill tour of South America for Disney and roughly twenty composers, artists, and technicians. The tour produced *Saludos Amigos*, which premiered in Rio de Janeiro on August 24, 1942, and opened in the United States on February 6, 1943, and *The Three Caballeros* (1944). Both films were shown throughout Latin America using CIAA mobile projectors. The CIAA sponsored goodwill tours by [[Orson Welles]], [[Bing Crosby]], [[George Balanchine]], and [[John Ford]] in 1941-1943.[^14]
Hollywood studios were pressured to deny films to theaters showing German or Italian content, and the CIAA filled the vacuum with its own newsreels and political films. In early 1941 the CIAA reached out to Walt Disney, whose studio had been facing financial difficulty; Nelson Rockefeller arranged a government-underwritten goodwill tour of South America for Disney and roughly twenty composers, artists, and technicians. The tour produced *Saludos Amigos*, which premiered in Rio de Janeiro on August 24, 1942, and opened in the United States on February 6, 1943, and *The Three Caballeros* (1944). Both films were shown throughout Latin America using CIAA mobile projectors. The CIAA sponsored goodwill tours by [[Orson Welles]], [[Bing Crosby]], [[George Balanchine]], and [[John Ford]] in 1941-1943.[^17]
The CIAA's Publications and Information Division, run by [[Francis Jamieson]] (a [[Pulitzer Prize]]-winning reporter and future Rockefeller campaign manager), produced the magazine *En Guardia* (registered with the US Postal Office on April 8, 1941, with the first issue in summer 1941 and the third issue circulating in October). Circulation reached 750,000 copies per issue by peak production, distributed free to politicians, journalists, and business executives. Propaganda posters and editorial cartoons were produced through contractors coordinated by Jamieson's New York office; these materials are documented in NARA Record Group 229, series "Propaganda Materials, 1941-1945" (NAID 540082) and "Status of Projects Reports, 1942-1945" (NAID 2067594).[^15]
The CIAA's Publications and Information Division, run by [[Francis Jamieson]] (a [[Pulitzer Prize]]-winning reporter and future Rockefeller campaign manager), produced the magazine *En Guardia* (registered with the US Postal Office on April 8, 1941, with the first issue in summer 1941 and the third issue circulating in October). Circulation reached 750,000 copies per issue by peak production, distributed free to politicians, journalists, and business executives. Propaganda posters and editorial cartoons were produced through contractors coordinated by Jamieson's New York office; these materials are documented in NARA Record Group 229, series "Propaganda Materials, 1941-1945" (NAID 540082) and "Status of Projects Reports, 1942-1945" (NAID 2067594).[^18]
The CIAA was one of the heaviest users of the [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]]. On March 5, 1942 Nelson Rockefeller wrote to FCC chairman [[James L. Fly]] to thank the commission for the "invaluable aid" the service supplied to his organization. On July 29, 1942 he reported that the CIAA daily news roundup on Latin American affairs included 400 to 500 words a day drawn from the Kingsville transcripts.[^16] On July 7, 1942 [[Goodwin Watson]] wrote to Rockefeller about an offer the CIAA had made to the service's analyst John W. Gardner, and proposed that officials of the two offices settle the matter together.[^17] On January 2, 1943 [[Robert D. Leigh]] wrote to Rockefeller suggesting that the CIAA set up a system like the service's for releasing information about Latin America.[^17]
The CIAA was one of the heaviest users of the [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]]. On March 5, 1942 Nelson Rockefeller wrote to FCC chairman [[James L. Fly]] to thank the commission for the "invaluable aid" the service supplied to his organization. On July 29, 1942 he reported that the CIAA daily news roundup on Latin American affairs included 400 to 500 words a day drawn from the Kingsville transcripts.[^19] On July 7, 1942 [[Goodwin Watson]] wrote to Rockefeller about an offer the CIAA had made to the service's analyst John W. Gardner, and proposed that officials of the two offices settle the matter together.[^20] On January 2, 1943 [[Robert D. Leigh]] wrote to Rockefeller suggesting that the CIAA set up a system like the service's for releasing information about Latin America.[^20]
### Aviation and Infrastructure
The CIAA funded and coordinated displacement of Axis-affiliated airlines from South American routes and integrated Latin American air forces into a US-led hemispheric defense system. The Panair do Brazil operations in northeastern Brazil (a Pan American subsidiary) received War Department financing to build airfields beginning in June 1941; the Natal airbase was built in 1942. CIAA-funded airfields and trans-Andean highways served the immediate war effort while creating the infrastructure for postwar corporate penetration of the interior.[^18]
The CIAA funded and coordinated displacement of Axis-affiliated airlines from South American routes and integrated Latin American air forces into a US-led hemispheric defense system. The Panair do Brazil operations in northeastern Brazil (a Pan American subsidiary) received War Department financing to build airfields beginning in June 1941; the Natal airbase was built in 1942. CIAA-funded airfields and trans-Andean highways served the immediate war effort while creating the infrastructure for postwar corporate penetration of the interior.[^21]
The trans-Andean highway to [[Pucallpa]], Peru, funded by the CIAA, passed within fifteen miles of the [[Ganso Azul]] oil field, the Amazon basin's only proven petroleum source at the time. This highway also enabled the [[Summer Institute of Linguistics]] to establish its Amazonian base at [[Yarinacocha]] adjacent to the road.[^19]
The trans-Andean highway to [[Pucallpa]], Peru, funded by the CIAA, passed within fifteen miles of the [[Ganso Azul]] oil field, the Amazon basin's only proven petroleum source at the time. This highway also enabled the [[Summer Institute of Linguistics]] to establish its Amazonian base at [[Yarinacocha]] adjacent to the road.[^22]
Record Group 229 at NARA includes a [[Department of Transportation]] series totaling 129 linear feet, documenting CIAA aviation, ocean shipping, railway, and highway programs across the hemisphere.[^20]
Record Group 229 at NARA includes a [[Department of Transportation]] series totaling 129 linear feet, documenting CIAA aviation, ocean shipping, railway, and highway programs across the hemisphere.[^23]
### Rubber Program and the Amazon
The CIAA was assigned the task of reviving Amazon rubber production after Japanese forces overran British Far East plantations in 1942, eliminating 92 percent of the US rubber supply. The US and Brazil entered a formal rubber agreement in March 1942 under which the US committed a $5 million fund to improve raw rubber production in the Amazon and guaranteed purchase of all Brazilian exportable rubber through 1946 at fixed prices. The US paid the Brazilian government $100 for each worker delivered to the Amazon as a "rubber soldier."[^21]
The CIAA was assigned the task of reviving Amazon rubber production after Japanese forces overran British Far East plantations in 1942, eliminating 92 percent of the US rubber supply. The US and Brazil entered a formal rubber agreement in March 1942 under which the US committed a $5 million fund to improve raw rubber production in the Amazon and guaranteed purchase of all Brazilian exportable rubber through 1946 at fixed prices. The US paid the Brazilian government $100 for each worker delivered to the Amazon as a "rubber soldier."[^24]
The rubber program was administered through a network of agencies: the [[Rubber Reserve Company]] (incorporated June 28, 1940, as an RFC subsidiary), which controlled stockpiling and disposal; the [[Rubber Development Corporation]], which managed Amazon operations and was financed through special funds established under the Washington Accords governing Brazil's wartime cooperation; the Brazilian [[SEMTA]] (Serviço Especial de Mobilização de Trabalhadores para a Amazônia), which recruited labor; [[SAVA]] for labor placement; the [[Banco de Credito da Borracha]] for production financing; and the [[SESP]] health and sanitation service.[^22]
The rubber program was administered through a network of agencies: the [[Rubber Reserve Company]] (incorporated June 28, 1940, as an RFC subsidiary), which controlled stockpiling and disposal; the [[Rubber Development Corporation]], which managed Amazon operations and was financed through special funds established under the Washington Accords governing Brazil's wartime cooperation; the Brazilian [[SEMTA]] (Serviço Especial de Mobilização de Trabalhadores para a Amazônia), which recruited labor; [[SAVA]] for labor placement; the [[Banco de Credito da Borracha]] for production financing; and the [[SESP]] health and sanitation service.[^25]
Between 1943 and 1945 approximately 60,000 people were recruited to work as rubber tappers in the Amazon interior. The results were catastrophic for the workers: roughly one-third died within the first year of the program, a ratio that climbed toward one-half before the war ended. Survivors were indentured to seringal operators through permanent debts inherited across generations. CIAA-administered health and sanitation programs for rubber workers, documented in NARA Record Group 229, included the Servicio Especial de Saude Publica, with quarterly reports from 1944 and 1946-1950, and architectural and engineering plans for water supply, drainage, and sewer systems from 1937-1951.[^23]
Between 1943 and 1945 approximately 60,000 people were recruited to work as rubber tappers in the Amazon interior. The results were catastrophic for the workers: roughly one-third died within the first year of the program, a ratio that climbed toward one-half before the war ended. Survivors were indentured to seringal operators through permanent debts inherited across generations. CIAA-administered health and sanitation programs for rubber workers, documented in NARA Record Group 229, included the Servicio Especial de Saude Publica, with quarterly reports from 1944 and 1946-1950, and architectural and engineering plans for water supply, drainage, and sewer systems from 1937-1951.[^26]
The CIAA also oversaw the [[Metals Reserve Company]] (incorporated June 28, 1940, as an RFC subsidiary), which procured approximately 50 kinds of strategic metals and minerals from 51 countries; Bolivia's tin and tungsten, Chile's copper and nitrates, Colombia's platinum and mercury, and Venezuela's oil were among the primary Latin American targets of preclusive buying. By January 1941 the CIAA had been assigned the specific task of assembling data on Axis purchases of strategic materials in Latin America to support preclusive buying recommendations.[^24]
The CIAA also oversaw the [[Metals Reserve Company]] (incorporated June 28, 1940, as an RFC subsidiary), which procured approximately 50 kinds of strategic metals and minerals from 51 countries; Bolivia's tin and tungsten, Chile's copper and nitrates, Colombia's platinum and mercury, and Venezuela's oil were among the primary Latin American targets of preclusive buying. By January 1941 the CIAA had been assigned the specific task of assembling data on Axis purchases of strategic materials in Latin America to support preclusive buying recommendations.[^27]
### Health and Sanitation Programs
Beginning in spring 1942 the CIAA developed a major health and sanitation program for Latin America, operating through the [[Institute of Inter-American Affairs]] (IIAA), incorporated as a US government corporation in 1942. The IIAA established joint US-Latin American "Servicios" organizations across the hemisphere, each representing cooperative programs in public health, sanitation, agriculture, and education. Coordinating committee records for Brazil and Peru, covering 1941-1946, are held in Record Group 229; they include architectural and engineering plans for 660 health and sanitation infrastructure projects across the hemisphere.[^25]
Beginning in spring 1942 the CIAA developed a major health and sanitation program for Latin America, operating through the [[Institute of Inter-American Affairs]] (IIAA), incorporated as a US government corporation in 1942. The IIAA established joint US-Latin American "Servicios" organizations across the hemisphere, each representing cooperative programs in public health, sanitation, agriculture, and education. Coordinating committee records for Brazil and Peru, covering 1941-1946, are held in Record Group 229; they include architectural and engineering plans for 660 health and sanitation infrastructure projects across the hemisphere.[^28]
### Dissolution and Succession
Rockefeller was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs at the State Department's general reorganization on December 20, 1944, when the position was formally created. He served under both Roosevelt and Truman through 1945.[^26]
Rockefeller was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs at the State Department's general reorganization on December 20, 1944, when the position was formally created. He served under both Roosevelt and Truman through 1945.[^29]
After Rockefeller's departure, Wallace Harrison became director of the renamed Office of Inter-American Affairs under Executive Order 9532 (March 23, 1945). Executive Order 9608 (August 31, 1945) transferred OIAA informational activities to the State Department after the end of the war. Executive Order 9710 (April 10, 1946, effective May 20, 1946), signed by President [[Harry S. Truman]], abolished the office entirely; the Secretary of State received control over five subsidiary corporations: the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the [[Inter-American Educational Foundation]], the [[Institute of Inter-American Transportation]], the [[Inter-American Navigation Corporation]], and [[Prencin-radio]], along with all records, property, funds, and remaining personnel.[^27]
After Rockefeller's departure, Wallace Harrison became director of the renamed Office of Inter-American Affairs under Executive Order 9532 (March 23, 1945). Executive Order 9608 (August 31, 1945) transferred OIAA informational activities to the State Department after the end of the war. Executive Order 9710 (April 10, 1946, effective May 20, 1946), signed by President [[Harry S. Truman]], abolished the office entirely; the Secretary of State received control over five subsidiary corporations: the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the [[Inter-American Educational Foundation]], the [[Institute of Inter-American Transportation]], the [[Inter-American Navigation Corporation]], and [[Prencin-radio]], along with all records, property, funds, and remaining personnel.[^30]
The CIAA's personnel, techniques, and institutional relationships migrated into the State Department, the new CIA, and Rockefeller's private instruments, the [[IBEC]] and [[AIA]]. The FBI's Special Intelligence Service transferred its Latin American networks, communications systems, and personnel to the CIA during the same period. The CIAA's methods, particularly press control, radio operations, controlled newsprint, and the use of private business executives for public policy, became templates for CIA covert operations in the subsequent decade.[^28]
The CIAA's personnel, techniques, and institutional relationships migrated into the State Department, the new CIA, and Rockefeller's private instruments, the [[IBEC]] and [[AIA]]. The FBI's Special Intelligence Service transferred its Latin American networks, communications systems, and personnel to the CIA during the same period. The CIAA's methods, particularly press control, radio operations, controlled newsprint, and the use of private business executives for public policy, became templates for CIA covert operations in the subsequent decade.[^31]
### Archival Holdings
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Records of the Office of Inter-American Affairs are held at NARA as Record Group
- Division of Agriculture (1 linear foot)
- Department of Special Services (1 linear foot)
Audiovisual materials include 45 reels of motion picture film documenting Latin American activities and dignitaries' visits (1940-1945), 24 sound recordings of Spanish and English radio broadcasts (1941-1947), 3,386 still photographs including the Rockefeller Collection, 79 posters and drawings (1941-1945), 55 maps of South American locations, and 660 architectural and engineering plans for health and sanitation infrastructure. Records of subsidiary corporations and minutes of their meetings cover 1942-1949.[^29]
Audiovisual materials include 45 reels of motion picture film documenting Latin American activities and dignitaries' visits (1940-1945), 24 sound recordings of Spanish and English radio broadcasts (1941-1947), 3,386 still photographs including the Rockefeller Collection, 79 posters and drawings (1941-1945), 55 maps of South American locations, and 660 architectural and engineering plans for health and sanitation infrastructure. Records of subsidiary corporations and minutes of their meetings cover 1942-1949.[^32]
### Footnotes
@ -109,25 +109,28 @@ Audiovisual materials include 45 reels of motion picture film documenting Latin
[^5]: SCADTA German employee dismissals June 8, 1940; airline reorganized as Avianca June 14, 1940: Pan American Historical Foundation, panam.org; Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8.
[^6]: FBI Special Intelligence Service founding, June 24, 1940: FBI, "A Brief History of the FBI," fbi.gov/history/brief-history; FBI, "Special Intelligence Service," fbi.gov/history/brief-history/special-intelligence-service. OSS Western Hemisphere exclusion: CIA, "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency." Hoover/Rockefeller coordination: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("Nelson's Grand Alliance").
[^7]: Executive Order 8840, July 30, 1941; Export-Import Bank lending authority increase: "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947.
[^8]: Paul Nitze as finance director, 1942: Truman Library, Oral History Interviews with Paul H. Nitze, August 1975. Will Clayton as deputy coordinator: Texas State Historical Association, "William Lockhart Clayton." Wallace Harrison salary: Executive Order 9532, March 23, 1945. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("The Business Imperative").
[^9]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("The Secret War for the Skies").
[^10]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("The Business Imperative").
[^11]: Venona project, "Cabaret" code name and six identified CIAA employees: CIA, "Venona: Soviet Espionage and The American Response, 1939-1957"; NSA, "Venona: The Spy Messages," nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/venona/releases/1944_usciaa.pdf.
[^12]: La Cadena de las Américas, founded 1941, 64 stations in 18 countries: "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947; Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8.
[^13]: Proclaimed List, July 1941, 1,800 firms: TIME, "War Front: Blacklist"; FRUS 1941 Vol. VI, Document 313 (history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v06/d313). Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("Nelson's Grand Alliance").
[^14]: *Saludos Amigos* premiere Rio de Janeiro August 24, 1942; US release February 6, 1943; Disney goodwill tour facilitated by CIAA: Dale Adams, "Saludos Amigos: Hollywood and FDR's Good Neighbor Policy," *Quarterly Review of Film and Video* 24, no. 3 (2007); Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8.
[^15]: *En Guardia* registered April 8, 1941; first issue summer 1941; circulation 750,000: research paper, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, scholarworks.utrgv.edu/art_fac/3/. NARA RG 229, "Propaganda Materials, 1941-1945" (NAID 540082); "Status of Projects Reports, 1942-1945" (NAID 2067594): NARA blog, text-message.blogs.archives.gov, September 26, 2017. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 and Ch. 13 ("The Junta Regroups").
[^16]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (CIA, approved April 1969), pp. 158-159, on the letters of March 5, 1942 and July 29, 1942. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947. Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis, 1941-1945," note 24, gives the July 29, 1942 letter with the Kingsville passage. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol45no5/html/v45i5a04p.htm.
[^17]: Roop, Part I, pp. 218-219, on Watson's letter of July 7, 1942, and pp. 101-102, on Leigh's letter of January 2, 1943. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^18]: Panair do Brazil airfield agreement June 1941; Natal airbase 1942: The Pan Am Historical Foundation, panam.org. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("The Secret War for the Skies").
[^19]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("Wings over the Amazon").
[^20]: NARA RG 229 Department of Transportation series, 129 linear feet: archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/229.html.
[^21]: US-Brazil rubber agreement, March 1942; $5 million fund; $100 per worker; guaranteed purchase through 1946: Americas Quarterly, "The Amazon's Greatest Generation?"; Quintus Curtius, "Brazil's Rubber Soldiers."
[^22]: Rubber Reserve Company incorporated June 28, 1940 as RFC subsidiary: Jesse H. Jones, *Fifty Billion Dollars: My Thirteen Years with the RFC* (Macmillan, 1951), pp. 406-415. Rubber Development Corporation, SEMTA, Washington Accords: ResearchGate, "Os Soldados da Borracha." FRUS 1943, Vol. V, Document 627 (September 9, 1943, McAshan to Ambassador Caffery): history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v05/d627. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 and Ch. 12.
[^23]: 60,000 rubber workers recruited 1943-1945; mortality estimates: Americas Quarterly, "The Amazon's Greatest Generation?"; Quintus Curtius, "Brazil's Rubber Soldiers." SESP records and health infrastructure plans: NARA RG 229; "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 and Ch. 12.
[^24]: Metals Reserve Company incorporated June 28, 1940 as RFC subsidiary (alongside Rubber Reserve Company and Defense Plant Corporation, all created the same day): Jesse H. Jones, *Fifty Billion Dollars*, pp. 389-405. Preclusive buying data assembly by January 1941: "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947. Strategic materials by country: Foreign Affairs, "Our Economic Warfare," April 1942.
[^25]: Institute of Inter-American Affairs incorporated 1942: NARA, "Records of the Office of Inter-American Affairs." Servicios programs and 660 infrastructure plans: NARA RG 229; "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8.
[^26]: Rockefeller appointed Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, entry on duty December 20, 1944: State Department Historical Office, "List of Assistant Secretaries of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs," history.state.gov; Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 and Ch. 12-13.
[^27]: Executive Order 9532, March 23, 1945; Executive Order 9608, August 31, 1945; Executive Order 9710, April 10, 1946, effective May 20, 1946; five subsidiary corporations transferred to Secretary of State: American Presidency Project.
[^28]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8, Ch. 12-13. SIS networks transferred to CIA at CIA's founding in 1947: CIA, "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency," cia.gov/stories/story/the-office-of-strategic-services-americas-first-intelligence-agency/.
[^29]: NARA RG 229 full description: archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/229.html; "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947.
[^8]: *Motion Picture Herald*, July 4, 1942 (film activities "launched by John Hay Whitney"; Alstock "formerly Mr. Whitney's aide"). https://archive.org/details/motionpictureher148unse
[^9]: "Rockefeller and Whitney Hire Disney to Make Goodwill Films," *Motion Picture Herald*, January 10, 1942 (selection of Walt Disney by Nelson Rockefeller and John Hay Whitney as first Hollywood producer of films for the goodwill program; South American cartoons to be produced at cost). https://archive.org/details/motionpictureher146unse
[^10]: *Motion Picture Herald*, October 3, 1942 (staff changes at Nelson Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs: "Francis Alstock, who succeeded John Hay Whitney as director of the motion picture division"). https://archive.org/details/motionpictureher1481unse
[^11]: Paul Nitze as finance director, 1942: Truman Library, Oral History Interviews with Paul H. Nitze, August 1975. Will Clayton as deputy coordinator: Texas State Historical Association, "William Lockhart Clayton." Wallace Harrison salary: Executive Order 9532, March 23, 1945. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("The Business Imperative").
[^12]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("The Secret War for the Skies").
[^13]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("The Business Imperative").
[^14]: Venona project, "Cabaret" code name and six identified CIAA employees: CIA, "Venona: Soviet Espionage and The American Response, 1939-1957"; NSA, "Venona: The Spy Messages," nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/venona/releases/1944_usciaa.pdf.
[^15]: La Cadena de las Américas, founded 1941, 64 stations in 18 countries: "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947; Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8.
[^16]: Proclaimed List, July 1941, 1,800 firms: TIME, "War Front: Blacklist"; FRUS 1941 Vol. VI, Document 313 (history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v06/d313). Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("Nelson's Grand Alliance").
[^17]: *Saludos Amigos* premiere Rio de Janeiro August 24, 1942; US release February 6, 1943; Disney goodwill tour facilitated by CIAA: Dale Adams, "Saludos Amigos: Hollywood and FDR's Good Neighbor Policy," *Quarterly Review of Film and Video* 24, no. 3 (2007); Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8.
[^18]: *En Guardia* registered April 8, 1941; first issue summer 1941; circulation 750,000: research paper, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, scholarworks.utrgv.edu/art_fac/3/. NARA RG 229, "Propaganda Materials, 1941-1945" (NAID 540082); "Status of Projects Reports, 1942-1945" (NAID 2067594): NARA blog, text-message.blogs.archives.gov, September 26, 2017. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 and Ch. 13 ("The Junta Regroups").
[^19]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (CIA, approved April 1969), pp. 158-159, on the letters of March 5, 1942 and July 29, 1942. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947. Mercado, "FBIS Against the Axis, 1941-1945," note 24, gives the July 29, 1942 letter with the Kingsville passage. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol45no5/html/v45i5a04p.htm.
[^20]: Roop, Part I, pp. 218-219, on Watson's letter of July 7, 1942, and pp. 101-102, on Leigh's letter of January 2, 1943. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^21]: Panair do Brazil airfield agreement June 1941; Natal airbase 1942: The Pan Am Historical Foundation, panam.org. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("The Secret War for the Skies").
[^22]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 ("Wings over the Amazon").
[^23]: NARA RG 229 Department of Transportation series, 129 linear feet: archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/229.html.
[^24]: US-Brazil rubber agreement, March 1942; $5 million fund; $100 per worker; guaranteed purchase through 1946: Americas Quarterly, "The Amazon's Greatest Generation?"; Quintus Curtius, "Brazil's Rubber Soldiers."
[^25]: Rubber Reserve Company incorporated June 28, 1940 as RFC subsidiary: Jesse H. Jones, *Fifty Billion Dollars: My Thirteen Years with the RFC* (Macmillan, 1951), pp. 406-415. Rubber Development Corporation, SEMTA, Washington Accords: ResearchGate, "Os Soldados da Borracha." FRUS 1943, Vol. V, Document 627 (September 9, 1943, McAshan to Ambassador Caffery): history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v05/d627. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 and Ch. 12.
[^26]: 60,000 rubber workers recruited 1943-1945; mortality estimates: Americas Quarterly, "The Amazon's Greatest Generation?"; Quintus Curtius, "Brazil's Rubber Soldiers." SESP records and health infrastructure plans: NARA RG 229; "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 and Ch. 12.
[^27]: Metals Reserve Company incorporated June 28, 1940 as RFC subsidiary (alongside Rubber Reserve Company and Defense Plant Corporation, all created the same day): Jesse H. Jones, *Fifty Billion Dollars*, pp. 389-405. Preclusive buying data assembly by January 1941: "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947. Strategic materials by country: Foreign Affairs, "Our Economic Warfare," April 1942.
[^28]: Institute of Inter-American Affairs incorporated 1942: NARA, "Records of the Office of Inter-American Affairs." Servicios programs and 660 infrastructure plans: NARA RG 229; "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947. Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8.
[^29]: Rockefeller appointed Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, entry on duty December 20, 1944: State Department Historical Office, "List of Assistant Secretaries of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs," history.state.gov; Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8 and Ch. 12-13.
[^30]: Executive Order 9532, March 23, 1945; Executive Order 9608, August 31, 1945; Executive Order 9710, April 10, 1946, effective May 20, 1946; five subsidiary corporations transferred to Secretary of State: American Presidency Project.
[^31]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 8, Ch. 12-13. SIS networks transferred to CIA at CIA's founding in 1947: CIA, "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency," cia.gov/stories/story/the-office-of-strategic-services-americas-first-intelligence-agency/.
[^32]: NARA RG 229 full description: archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/229.html; "History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," 1947.

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Central Intelligence Agency.md
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@ -22,31 +22,31 @@ relations:
role: "Office of Security release of police techniques through LEAA"
start: 1970
end: 1973
fn: 14
fn: 18
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Bobby Ray Inman]]"
reverse: true
role: "deputy director"
start: 1981-02
end: 1982-04
fn: 41
fn: 45
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Psychological Strategy Board]]"
role: "Member agency; the Director of Central Intelligence chaired meeting M-8"
start: 1952-01-10
fn: 68
fn: 72
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Max Millikan]]"
reverse: true
role: "Assistant Director, Research and Reports (1951); Special Consultant (1952)"
start: 1951-01
end: 1952-03
fn: 69
fn: 73
- type: funded
with: "[[Center for International Studies]]"
role: "agency money reported to have set up the center in 1951; $300,000 reported in 1967"
start: 1951
fn: 76
fn: 80
- type: employed_by
with: "[[F. Trubee Davison]]"
reverse: true
@ -59,7 +59,14 @@ relations:
reverse: true
start: 1995
role: "analyst; described as a CIA scientist (Farley, 1995) and CIA analyst (Cox Committee, 1999)"
fn: 53
fn: 57
- type: employed_by
with: "[[William Sloane Coffin]]"
reverse: true
start: 1950
end: 1953
role: "served abroad during the Korean War; three years as an agent by his own account"
fn: 14
---
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
@ -69,35 +76,37 @@ The CIA, particularly through its Photographic Intelligence Division, was instru
In July 1951 an [[Associated Press]] item reported that [[F. Trubee Davison]], formerly Assistant Secretary of War for Air and president of the [[American Museum of Natural History]], would join the Agency on July 16 as a principal assistant to [[Walter Bedell Smith]], and that he probably would do personnel work.[^3] A memorandum from Davison dated September 11, 1951 appears on a CIA routing slip addressed to the Assistant Director (Personnel).[^4] A Springfield (Ohio) Sun editorial of July 1951 reported that Davison had "been appointed director of personnel and assistant to Lieut. General Walter Bedell Smith, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency," and that the Agency "has been rather unfortunate in its chiefs."[^5] A memorandum of September 10, 1951 from [[Allen Dulles|Allen W. Dulles]], then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, is addressed to "Trubee Davison, Esq. (Asst. Director, Personnel)."[^6] Davison chaired the Agency's Career Service Committee: the minutes of its second meeting (October 1, 1951) record that the committee separated a Trainee Program from a Career Service Program, that "the establishment of a Career Corps, as such, had been disapproved by the DCI," and that of the first class of nineteen trainees sixteen had graduated and fourteen been placed; the minutes of its fourteenth meeting (January 1952) list him with Matthew Baird, Director of Training, and [[Sherman Kent]], Assistant Director for National Estimates.[^7] The New York Times reported in 1974 that he left the post in April 1952, "when it was announced that he had completed his mission of organizing the C.I.A.'s personnel."[^8] CIA documents of 1968, 1969 and 1972 name [[Hugh T. Cunningham]] as the Agency's Director of Training.[^9] The Covert Action Information Bulletin reported in 1990 that Cunningham served in the Agency from 1947 to 1973 and that Davison, Cunningham, [[William P. Bundy]] and [[Dino Pionzio]] (deputy chief of station in [[Santiago]] in 1970) were members of the Yale society [[Skull and Bones]].[^10] [[Antony C. Sutton]]'s index of members lists Davison under the class of 1918, Cunningham (Hugh Terry) under 1934, Bundy under 1939 and Pionzio under 1950.[^11]
[[William Sloane Coffin]], a Yale chaplain from 1958, served with the agency from 1950 to 1953, and [[Tim Weiner]] places him in Munich as a new recruit assigned to the Russian émigré program of [[Frank Wisner]]'s Eastern Europe operations, recruited by his brother-in-law [[Frank Lindsay]].[^12] In Weiner's account the program, run with the Solidarists, moved from leaflets and balloons to four-man parachute missions into the Soviet Union, and Coffin later called it "a fundamentally bad idea."[^12] A retrospective in a December 12, 1969 memorandum for the 303 Committee states that "assistance to the émigrés for the eventuality of war with or revolution within the USSR was unrealistic."[^13] In a 1967 television interview Coffin said he had been "three years an agent for the CIA."[^14] A 1987 speech by [[Robert M. Gates]], then the agency's deputy director for intelligence, lists Coffin among academics who joined the agency and says he left the [[Union Theological Seminary]] to join it for the duration of the Korean War, before becoming chaplain at Yale.[^15]
### Early Involvement in Psi Research
The CIA's interest in psi research dates back to the early 1970s, partly in response to rumors of extensive Soviet psi research. Following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying, the CIA came under unprecedented scrutiny from Congress. This led to a preference for "clean" spying methods, making psychic intelligence an appealing, low-profile alternative to traditional human intelligence (HUMINT).[^1]
In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the [[White House]].[^12]
In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for [[Hal Puthoff]]'s psi research program at [[Stanford Research Institute]] (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.[^1] In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the [[Stargate Project]], a program that trained individuals in [[Remote Viewing]] to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the [[White House]].[^16]
### The Search for Behavioral Control
Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^13]
Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^17]
### Police Technique Program Through LEAA
From 1970 the Office of Security used the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]] as its channel for releasing agency techniques to police. A June 10, 1970 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence recommended LEAA as "the best vehicle to expand dissemination of this technique to all public law enforcement officials in the United States" for the Trace Metal Detection Technique, which the Director had declassified.[^14] The memorandum carried the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Plans, [[Thomas Karamessines]]. It stated that the only stipulation placed on recipients was that there be "no public connection between the technique and this Agency."[^14]
From 1970 the Office of Security used the [[LEAA|Law Enforcement Assistance Administration]] as its channel for releasing agency techniques to police. A June 10, 1970 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence recommended LEAA as "the best vehicle to expand dissemination of this technique to all public law enforcement officials in the United States" for the Trace Metal Detection Technique, which the Director had declassified.[^18] The memorandum carried the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Plans, [[Thomas Karamessines]]. It stated that the only stipulation placed on recipients was that there be "no public connection between the technique and this Agency."[^18]
Between June 1970 and December 1971 Office of Security representatives demonstrated the technique to approximately 35 police departments, three professional police associations and representatives of 83 other state and local departments. Outside the Washington area they appeared as "consultants" to LEAA, and "no mention was made of the Agency."[^15] The office provided six men to LEAA in 1970 for the same briefings.[^16]
Between June 1970 and December 1971 Office of Security representatives demonstrated the technique to approximately 35 police departments, three professional police associations and representatives of 83 other state and local departments. Outside the Washington area they appeared as "consultants" to LEAA, and "no mention was made of the Agency."[^19] The office provided six men to LEAA in 1970 for the same briefings.[^20]
The Explosive Residue Detection Technique was declassified in March 1971, and the Security Office recommended dissemination through LEAA or the LEAA-funded National Bomb Data Center.[^15] On November 10, 1971 agency officers demonstrated it to LEAA staff and then met [[Lester Shubin]] and [[Marc Nerenstone]], whom the memorandum describes as "both witting of the Agency's role in the development of the technique."[^17]
The Explosive Residue Detection Technique was declassified in March 1971, and the Security Office recommended dissemination through LEAA or the LEAA-funded National Bomb Data Center.[^19] On November 10, 1971 agency officers demonstrated it to LEAA staff and then met [[Lester Shubin]] and [[Marc Nerenstone]], whom the memorandum describes as "both witting of the Agency's role in the development of the technique."[^21]
A February 16, 1972 Office of Security memorandum records that LEAA never reimbursed the agency's travel costs "because of their desire to avoid unclassified (i.e. public) reimbursement of the money to CIA" and that "LEAA indicated it did not wish to be publicly affiliated with CIA."[^18] A May 9, 1973 survey of the Office of Research and Development recorded that an adhesive restraint, a non-lethal incapacitation system, had been made available to LEAA in August 1972. It said that "if they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control."[^19] On June 18, 1973 the House adopted by voice vote the Holtzman amendment to H.R. 8152, which the Office of Legislative Counsel summarized as prohibiting LEAA from using the agency's services, equipment, personnel and facilities.[^20]
A February 16, 1972 Office of Security memorandum records that LEAA never reimbursed the agency's travel costs "because of their desire to avoid unclassified (i.e. public) reimbursement of the money to CIA" and that "LEAA indicated it did not wish to be publicly affiliated with CIA."[^22] A May 9, 1973 survey of the Office of Research and Development recorded that an adhesive restraint, a non-lethal incapacitation system, had been made available to LEAA in August 1972. It said that "if they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control."[^23] On June 18, 1973 the House adopted by voice vote the Holtzman amendment to H.R. 8152, which the Office of Legislative Counsel summarized as prohibiting LEAA from using the agency's services, equipment, personnel and facilities.[^24]
Section 508 of the Crime Control Act of 1973 authorized LEAA to use federal agency services "(not including the Central Intelligence Agency)," a restriction absent from the 1968 statute.[^21] An Office of General Counsel memorandum of October 15, 1973 concluded that the agency was not required to reject all LEAA requests and would decide each one case by case.[^22] In July 1978 the Office of Legislative Counsel reviewed reauthorization language that would bar any use of CIA services by LEAA, and reported that the agency did not endorse the provision but had no formal objection to it.[^23] On November 14, 1975 an agency officer briefed two staff members of a House select committee on the LEAA liaison. The memorandum records that the agency discontinued liaison with LEAA in 1973 as a result of the Kennedy-Holtzman amendment, and that one staff member asked where the agency fit into the operation of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, described as "a communications network between police intelligence agencies"; the officer answered that he knew of no such nationwide network in which the agency had taken part.[^24]
Section 508 of the Crime Control Act of 1973 authorized LEAA to use federal agency services "(not including the Central Intelligence Agency)," a restriction absent from the 1968 statute.[^25] An Office of General Counsel memorandum of October 15, 1973 concluded that the agency was not required to reject all LEAA requests and would decide each one case by case.[^26] In July 1978 the Office of Legislative Counsel reviewed reauthorization language that would bar any use of CIA services by LEAA, and reported that the agency did not endorse the provision but had no formal objection to it.[^27] On November 14, 1975 an agency officer briefed two staff members of a House select committee on the LEAA liaison. The memorandum records that the agency discontinued liaison with LEAA in 1973 as a result of the Kennedy-Holtzman amendment, and that one staff member asked where the agency fit into the operation of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, described as "a communications network between police intelligence agencies"; the officer answered that he knew of no such nationwide network in which the agency had taken part.[^28]
### The 1977 Notifications to Institutions
In the summer of 1977 the agency located MKULTRA documents it had believed destroyed in 1973, and notified the institutions named in them. Director of Central Intelligence [[Stansfield Turner]] wrote to Senator [[Daniel K. Inouye]] on August 2, 1977 that the agency now held "the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants" and the names of 80 institutions where the work was done or with which the researchers were affiliated. He listed them as 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, and 3 penal institutions. The names went to the Senate committee on a classified basis, and the Director wrote that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent."[^25]
In the summer of 1977 the agency located MKULTRA documents it had believed destroyed in 1973, and notified the institutions named in them. Director of Central Intelligence [[Stansfield Turner]] wrote to Senator [[Daniel K. Inouye]] on August 2, 1977 that the agency now held "the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants" and the names of 80 institutions where the work was done or with which the researchers were affiliated. He listed them as 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, and 3 penal institutions. The names went to the Senate committee on a classified basis, and the Director wrote that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent."[^29]
General Counsel [[Anthony A. Lapham]] wrote to each institution in August 1977. The letter stated that the institution "is included among the institutions at which some portion of this CIA-sponsored research appears to have been performed or with which one or more individuals performing some aspect of this research were affiliated," and that the agency "does not intend to reveal to the public the identities of any institutions that knowingly or unknowingly were involved in MKULTRA activities, or the names of individual researchers."[^26] On September 7, 1977 A. R. Cinquegrana of the Office of General Counsel sent the president of the [[New School for Social Research]], [[John R. Everett]], copies of the two MKULTRA subproject files relating to the school, with a letter stating that "the name of the School has been reinserted wherever it appears in the original documents."[^27] Lapham's letter of November 7, 1977 asked whether each institution had itself made its correspondence public, and wrote that "Where an institution has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts."[^28] On March 17, 1978 Assistant General Counsel Cinquegrana wrote that the agency would presume an institution wished its identity protected if it did not respond by April 15, 1978.[^29]
General Counsel [[Anthony A. Lapham]] wrote to each institution in August 1977. The letter stated that the institution "is included among the institutions at which some portion of this CIA-sponsored research appears to have been performed or with which one or more individuals performing some aspect of this research were affiliated," and that the agency "does not intend to reveal to the public the identities of any institutions that knowingly or unknowingly were involved in MKULTRA activities, or the names of individual researchers."[^30] On September 7, 1977 A. R. Cinquegrana of the Office of General Counsel sent the president of the [[New School for Social Research]], [[John R. Everett]], copies of the two MKULTRA subproject files relating to the school, with a letter stating that "the name of the School has been reinserted wherever it appears in the original documents."[^31] Lapham's letter of November 7, 1977 asked whether each institution had itself made its correspondence public, and wrote that "Where an institution has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts."[^32] On March 17, 1978 Assistant General Counsel Cinquegrana wrote that the agency would presume an institution wished its identity protected if it did not respond by April 15, 1978.[^33]
The Senate Health Subcommittee invited the presidents of 20 institutions to testify on September 20 and 21, 1977. Only one accepted, and that president was not scheduled to testify because the others declined.[^30]
The Senate Health Subcommittee invited the presidents of 20 institutions to testify on September 20 and 21, 1977. Only one accepted, and that president was not scheduled to testify because the others declined.[^34]
### Notable Operations and Impact
@ -119,103 +128,103 @@ Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]]
### Involvement with BCCI
The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^31] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^31] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^32]
The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^35] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^35] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^36]
In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^33] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^34] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^35]
In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^37] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^38] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^39]
William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^36] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^36]
William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^40] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^40]
The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^37]
The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^41]
### Operations and Activities
The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^38] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^38]
The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^42] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^42]
In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^39] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^39]
In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^43] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^43]
### Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1981 to 1982
President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^40] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^41] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^40]
President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^44] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^45] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^44]
The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^42] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^43]
The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^46] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^47]
### Senior Review Panel
The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^44] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^44] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^45]
The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^48] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^48] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^49]
### UAP Research and Secrecy
The CIA has a long and complex history with the [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.[^12]
The CIA has a long and complex history with the [[Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena]] (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.[^16]
The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. [[Dr. William Livingston]], who served as a medical advisor to the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.[^12]
The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. [[Dr. William Livingston]], who served as a medical advisor to the [[Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program]] (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.[^16]
In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the [[UAP Task Force]] and is a member of the current [[All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office]] (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.[^12]
In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the [[UAP Task Force]] and is a member of the current [[All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office]] (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.[^16]
### Dark Alliance Investigation
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^46]
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^50]
### Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^47]
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^51]
Webb wrote that the pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money, and that he was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^47] The CIA Inspector General's 1998 report stated that CIA records show a CIA independent contractor used the alias "Ivan Gomez" in Costa Rica in the 1980s, that CIA records place the contractor in the United States during April and May 1982, and that he denied meeting Carlos Cabezas.[^48]
Webb wrote that the pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money, and that he was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^51] The CIA Inspector General's 1998 report stated that CIA records show a CIA independent contractor used the alias "Ivan Gomez" in Costa Rica in the 1980s, that CIA records place the contractor in the United States during April and May 1982, and that he denied meeting Carlos Cabezas.[^52]
### The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^49]
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^53]
### Ilopango Obstruction
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^50] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^51]
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.[^54] On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.[^55]
### Inspector General Investigation
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^49]
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^53]
### Hughes Electronics and the Pandolfi Estimate, 1995 to 1998
On July 19, 1995 an analyst from the agency's Directorate of Intelligence visited the Hughes facility in El Segundo, California, while researching a draft National Intelligence Estimate on the effect of technology transfers on China's military capabilities. The analyst was [[Ronald Pandolfi]].[^52] The analyst alleged that during a visit to the plant he came across information indicating that technical data had been improperly passed by Hughes to the PRC in connection with the 1995 failure investigation of a Long March 2E, and that the agency ignored his request for a formal report to headquarters.[^53] The Congressional Research Service reports that in April 1996 Pandolfi had reportedly prepared an estimate on how Hughes may have helped improve China's missile capabilities, and that the agency did not approve it.[^54] The New York Times reported that agency officials said the estimate was "not 'rigorous' enough" and that it was not distributed to other government officials.[^52]
On July 19, 1995 an analyst from the agency's Directorate of Intelligence visited the Hughes facility in El Segundo, California, while researching a draft National Intelligence Estimate on the effect of technology transfers on China's military capabilities. The analyst was [[Ronald Pandolfi]].[^56] The analyst alleged that during a visit to the plant he came across information indicating that technical data had been improperly passed by Hughes to the PRC in connection with the 1995 failure investigation of a Long March 2E, and that the agency ignored his request for a formal report to headquarters.[^57] The Congressional Research Service reports that in April 1996 Pandolfi had reportedly prepared an estimate on how Hughes may have helped improve China's missile capabilities, and that the agency did not approve it.[^58] The New York Times reported that agency officials said the estimate was "not 'rigorous' enough" and that it was not distributed to other government officials.[^56]
In September 1998 the agency told Hughes about Pandolfi's briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee, according to an internal cable of September 23, 1998. The Cox Committee judged that the agency's notification was "ill-advised and an impediment" to the committee's investigation, and the agency said it had notified Hughes "as a courtesy."[^53] Bill Harlow, an agency spokesman, declined in December 1998 to discuss Pandolfi's experiences or the 1996 estimate "because of the investigations."[^52] The Congressional Research Service reports that Senator Richard Shelby said in September 2000 that the Justice Department had decided not to charge an unnamed CIA official with obstructing a Senate investigation.[^54]
In September 1998 the agency told Hughes about Pandolfi's briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee, according to an internal cable of September 23, 1998. The Cox Committee judged that the agency's notification was "ill-advised and an impediment" to the committee's investigation, and the agency said it had notified Hughes "as a courtesy."[^57] Bill Harlow, an agency spokesman, declined in December 1998 to discuss Pandolfi's experiences or the 1996 estimate "because of the investigations."[^56] The Congressional Research Service reports that Senator Richard Shelby said in September 2000 that the Justice Department had decided not to charge an unnamed CIA official with obstructing a Senate investigation.[^58]
### Iran-Contra Indictments
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^46]
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^50]
### Interrogation videotapes and the 2004 to 2006 directorship
[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^55] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^56] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^57]
[[Porter Goss]], a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.[^59] His executive director, [[Kyle Foggo]], the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor [[Brent Wilkes]] obtain large CIA contracts.[^60] Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.[^61]
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^58] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^58]
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]'s 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of [[Abu Zubaydah]] and [[Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri]] on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.[^62] In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney [[John Rizzo]] wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."[^62]
Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^59] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^60]
Emails released by the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the [[American Civil Liberties Union]], state that in November 2005 [[Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.|Jose Rodriguez]] told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.[^63] On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor [[John Durham]] would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.[^64]
### Foreign Broadcast Information Service
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^61] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^62] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^63]
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^65] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^66] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^67]
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^64]
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^68]
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^65]
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^69]
### Psychological warfare liaison, 1946 to 1952
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^66]
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^70]
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^67]
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^71]
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^68]
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^72]
In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^69] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^70] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^71] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^72] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^73] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^74] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^75]
In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, [[Max Millikan]] wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."[^73] On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."[^74] A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.[^75] A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.[^76] A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."[^77] A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.[^78] In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."[^79]
The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^76] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^77] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^78]
The agency's financing of the [[Center for International Studies]] at MIT is recorded in several places. [[Patrick Oster]] reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."[^80] Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"[^81] [[Andreas Lowenfeld]], of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."[^82]
The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^79] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^80]
The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."[^83] The [[Project Troy]] report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."[^84]
In February 1961 Allen W. Dulles wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^81]
In February 1961 Allen W. Dulles wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.[^85]
A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^82] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^83] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^84] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^85] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^86]
A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.[^86] A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, [[Walt Rostow]], [[Wilfred Malenbaum]], [[Everett Hagen]], [[Evsey Domar]] and [[Thomas Schelling]], each listed under the Center for International Studies.[^87] A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a [[National Review]] Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that [[Richard Bissell]] and [[Robert Amory]] "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."[^88] The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."[^89] A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."[^90]
### Footnotes
@ -230,78 +239,82 @@ A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENI
[^9]: CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP84-00780R003200020017-9 (May 15, 1969), CIA-RDP84-00780R003200020006-1 (1968) and CIA-RDP80-00536A000300070001-5 (Midcareer Course No. 32, 1972). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80-00536a000300070001-5
[^10]: "Bush's Boy's Club: Skull and Bones," *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, no. 33 (Winter 1990), pp. 20 to 22. https://archive.org/details/CAIB33
[^11]: Antony C. Sutton, *America's Secret Establishment* (1983), index of members by class year. https://archive.org/details/americas_secret_establishment-skull_and_bones
[^12]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
[^13]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Release of Trace Metal Detection Technique to Law Enforcement Officials," June 10, 1970, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150029-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150029-5
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum on the relationship with LEAA, CIA CREST document C01435053. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435053
[^16]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, "Relationship with Police," CIA CREST document C01435041. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435041
[^17]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security memorandum, "Technology Transfer of ERDT to LEAA," November 10, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150007-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150007-9
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum for the Deputy Director of Security, "LEAA Request for Agency Support, Where's What," February 16, 1972, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200060130-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000200060130-3
[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, "Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 9, 1973, CIA CREST document 01430445, entry on LEAA. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01430445
[^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, summary of the Holtzman Amendment, CIA-RDP76M00527R000700190003-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp76m00527r000700190003-1
[^21]: Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-83, sec. 508, 87 Stat. 211 (August 6, 1973). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg197.pdf
[^22]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, memorandum for the record, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," OGC 73-1954, October 15, 1973, CIA-RDP75-00793R000300160026-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00793r000300160026-2
[^23]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Reauthorization Legislation," July 12, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050017-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r001800050017-0
[^24]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Review Staff, "Briefing of House Select Committee Staff re LEAA Relationships," November 14, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110024-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp89b00552r000100110024-1
[^25]: Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (figures at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
[^26]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, August 1977 (stamped August 15, 1977), in NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 94-95.
[^27]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, September 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 7. https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
[^28]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, November 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 3.
[^29]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, March 17, 1978, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 1.
[^30]: Thomas, Jo, "Extent of University Work for C.I.A. Is Hard to Pin Down," New York Times, October 9, 1977, CIA reading room clipping CIA-RDP88-01315R000300390007-3.
[^31]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
[^32]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
[^33]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
[^34]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
[^35]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
[^36]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
[^37]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
[^38]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
[^39]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
[^40]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
[^41]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
[^42]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
[^43]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
[^44]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^45]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
[^46]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^47]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^48]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation Concerning Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States, Volume I, January 29, 1998, findings on Carlos Cabezas and "Ivan Gomez." https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
[^49]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^50]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
[^51]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
[^52]: Gerth, Jeff, "Old Concerns Over Data Transfer to China Get New Attention," *The New York Times,* December 7, 1998, section A, p. 20, archived copy at https://web.archive.org/web/20201101033224/https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/07/us/old-concerns-over-data-transfer-to-china-get-new-attention.html
[^53]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Report (Cox Report), H. Rept. 105-851, vol. II, ch. 5, pp. 55-57, and Appendix A, pp. 208-209, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt851/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt851.pdf
[^54]: Congressional Research Service, "China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers under U.S. Satellite Export Policy: Actions and Chronology," report 98-485 F, entries for April 1996 and September 1998, with notes 76 and 77, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/98-485F.html
[^55]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
[^56]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
[^57]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
[^58]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
[^59]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
[^60]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
[^61]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^62]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
[^63]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^64]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
[^65]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
[^66]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
[^67]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
[^68]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
[^69]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
[^70]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
[^71]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
[^72]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
[^73]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
[^74]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
[^75]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
[^76]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
[^77]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
[^78]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
[^79]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
[^80]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
[^81]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
[^82]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
[^83]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
[^84]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
[^85]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
[^86]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4
[^12]: Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (Doubleday, 2007), chapter 5, section "A Fundamentally Bad Idea." https://archive.org/details/legacy-of-ashes-the-history-of-the-cia-tim-weiner
[^13]: Memorandum for the 303 Committee, "U.S. Policy on Support for Covert Action Involving Emigres Directed at the Soviet Union," December 12, 1969, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XII, document 106, p. 322. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v12/d106
[^14]: Radio TV Reports, Inc., transcript of "Rev. Coffin Interviewed," *The Today Show*, WRC-TV, July 25, 1967, CIA-RDP75-00001R000300020003-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp75-00001r000300020003-0
[^15]: Robert M. Gates, "CIA and the University," address to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, October 10, 1987, CIA-RDP89G00720R000500070019-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp89g00720r000500070019-9
[^16]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
[^17]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Release of Trace Metal Detection Technique to Law Enforcement Officials," June 10, 1970, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150029-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150029-5
[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum on the relationship with LEAA, CIA CREST document C01435053. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435053
[^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, "Relationship with Police," CIA CREST document C01435041. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435041
[^21]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security memorandum, "Technology Transfer of ERDT to LEAA," November 10, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150007-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150007-9
[^22]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum for the Deputy Director of Security, "LEAA Request for Agency Support, Where's What," February 16, 1972, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200060130-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000200060130-3
[^23]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, "Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 9, 1973, CIA CREST document 01430445, entry on LEAA. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01430445
[^24]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, summary of the Holtzman Amendment, CIA-RDP76M00527R000700190003-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp76m00527r000700190003-1
[^25]: Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-83, sec. 508, 87 Stat. 211 (August 6, 1973). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg197.pdf
[^26]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, memorandum for the record, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," OGC 73-1954, October 15, 1973, CIA-RDP75-00793R000300160026-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00793r000300160026-2
[^27]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Reauthorization Legislation," July 12, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050017-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r001800050017-0
[^28]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Review Staff, "Briefing of House Select Committee Staff re LEAA Relationships," November 14, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110024-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp89b00552r000100110024-1
[^29]: Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (figures at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
[^30]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, August 1977 (stamped August 15, 1977), in NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 94-95.
[^31]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, September 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 7. https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
[^32]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, November 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 3.
[^33]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, March 17, 1978, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 1.
[^34]: Thomas, Jo, "Extent of University Work for C.I.A. Is Hard to Pin Down," New York Times, October 9, 1977, CIA reading room clipping CIA-RDP88-01315R000300390007-3.
[^35]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
[^36]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
[^37]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
[^38]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
[^39]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
[^40]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
[^41]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
[^42]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
[^43]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
[^44]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
[^45]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
[^46]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
[^47]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
[^48]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
[^49]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
[^50]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^51]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
[^52]: CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation Concerning Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States, Volume I, January 29, 1998, findings on Carlos Cabezas and "Ivan Gomez." https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
[^53]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^54]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
[^55]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm
[^56]: Gerth, Jeff, "Old Concerns Over Data Transfer to China Get New Attention," *The New York Times,* December 7, 1998, section A, p. 20, archived copy at https://web.archive.org/web/20201101033224/https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/07/us/old-concerns-over-data-transfer-to-china-get-new-attention.html
[^57]: U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Report (Cox Report), H. Rept. 105-851, vol. II, ch. 5, pp. 55-57, and Appendix A, pp. 208-209, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt851/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt851.pdf
[^58]: Congressional Research Service, "China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers under U.S. Satellite Export Policy: Actions and Chronology," report 98-485 F, entries for April 1996 and September 1998, with notes 76 and 77, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/98-485F.html
[^59]: Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220
[^60]: JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/
[^61]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html
[^62]: Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf
[^63]: NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750
[^64]: JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/
[^65]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^66]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
[^67]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
[^68]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
[^69]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
[^70]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
[^71]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
[^72]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
[^73]: Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1
[^74]: Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2
[^75]: CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1
[^76]: CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3
[^77]: Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6
[^78]: Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5
[^79]: A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0
[^80]: Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8
[^81]: Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8
[^82]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
[^83]: FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57
[^84]: CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
[^85]: Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9
[^86]: CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2
[^87]: CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7
[^88]: CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9
[^89]: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055
[^90]: CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4