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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ The Gehlen Organization (Organisation Gehlen), commonly called "the Org," was a
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### Origins: The Gehlen Deal
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In April-May 1945, anticipating German defeat, Gehlen had the files of Fremde Heere Ost microfilmed and the film containers buried in the Austrian Alps, as Gehlen's memoir states. The CIA history's statement by Gehlen's deputy Gerhard Wessel records that after Hitler relieved Gehlen on April 9, 1945 the microfilmed Fremde Heere Ost files were moved by army truck and dispersed in three places in southern Germany: near the Wilder Kaiser, near Marquartstein and near Schliersee.[^2] He surrendered to U.S. Army forces on May 22, 1945, and immediately proposed a bargain to his American captors: his organization, its accumulated records on the Soviet military and political structure, and its agent networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in exchange for American protection, funding, and operational support.
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In April-May 1945, anticipating German defeat, Gehlen had the files of Fremde Heere Ost microfilmed and the film containers buried in secret locations in the Bavarian mountains, as Gehlen's memoir states. The CIA history's statement by Gehlen's deputy Gerhard Wessel records that after Hitler relieved Gehlen on April 9, 1945 the microfilmed Fremde Heere Ost files were moved by army truck and dispersed in three places in southern Germany: near the Wilder Kaiser, near Marquartstein and near Schliersee.[^2] He surrendered to U.S. Army forces on May 22, 1945, and immediately proposed a bargain to his American captors: his organization, its accumulated records on the Soviet military and political structure, and its agent networks in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in exchange for American protection, funding, and operational support.
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The offer was accepted by the Strategic Services Unit, successor to the Office of Strategic Services, and Gehlen was transported to the United States in August 1945 for debriefing at Fort Hunt, Virginia. He returned to Germany in 1946 to begin operations under American supervision. The CIA, formally established in 1947, inherited the arrangement from its predecessor organizations and took over direct management of the Gehlen network.[^1]
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@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The first Historians' Commission volume, by Christoph Rass, rests on a random sa
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### Former SS and SD Staff in the CIA's Name Files
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The CIA acknowledged an intelligence relationship with Gehlen for the first time in an October 2000 court filing in Oglesby v. Army; the Disclosure Act processing released the Army's 2,100-page Gehlen file and nearly 2,100 further pages from CIA files.[^8] The Interagency Working Group historians found that nine of fourteen second-tier CIA name files involved individuals who had contact with the Organization.[^9] Emil Augsburg, an SD major and Wannsee Institute department director, was taken on by 1953 and regarded as a "shining star" of counterintelligence; Gehlen required him in 1954 to work outside Pullach, and he was dismissed in 1966.[^9] Wilhelm Krichbaum, former head of the Wehrmacht Secret Field Police, was a district chief in the Organization; a 1963 document apparently from the BND concluded he had worked for the Soviets since 1950.[^9] Hans Sommer, a Gestapo official, was recruited for counterespionage in early 1950 and dropped in 1953; Wilfried Krallert was picked up in 1952; Franz Six was reported to have joined in the mid-1950s.[^9] In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had transferred a number of former SS and SD officials, among them Six, Augsburg and Franz Goering, to camouflaged positions.[^9] Friedrich Panzinger, released from Soviet custody in 1956 with a mission to penetrate the BND, reported it and was used as a double agent until his suicide in 1959.[^9]
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The CIA acknowledged an intelligence relationship with Gehlen for the first time in an October 2000 court filing in Oglesby v. Army; the Disclosure Act processing released the Army's 2,100-page Gehlen file and nearly 2,100 further pages from CIA files.[^8] The CIA's records on Gehlen had been withheld under the Director of Central Intelligence's obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods, and the agency pledged to acknowledge the relationship in records processed under the Act. The Working Group describes Gehlen as a man who "is not considered a Nazi war criminal" but who "had served as Hitler's senior military intelligence officer on the Eastern Front," and states that the Organization "included operatives and agents with Nazi, collaborationist, and war criminal backgrounds."[^8] The Interagency Working Group historians found that nine of fourteen second-tier CIA name files involved individuals who had contact with the Organization.[^9] Emil Augsburg, an SD major and Wannsee Institute department director, was taken on by 1953 and regarded as a "shining star" of counterintelligence; Gehlen required him in 1954 to work outside Pullach, and he was dismissed in 1966.[^9] Wilhelm Krichbaum, former head of the Wehrmacht Secret Field Police, was a district chief in the Organization; a 1963 document apparently from the BND concluded he had worked for the Soviets since 1950.[^9] Hans Sommer, a Gestapo official, was recruited for counterespionage in early 1950 and dropped in 1953; Wilfried Krallert was picked up in 1952; Franz Six was reported to have joined in the mid-1950s.[^9] In 1963 the East German media charged that Gehlen had transferred a number of former SS and SD officials, among them Six, Augsburg and Franz Goering, to camouflaged positions.[^9] Friedrich Panzinger, released from Soviet custody in 1956 with a mission to penetrate the BND, reported it and was used as a double agent until his suicide in 1959.[^9]
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The CIA's own records, as disclosed through Freedom of Information Act releases, documented awareness of the Nazi personnel inheritance. Agency officials weighed the operational value of Gehlen's network against the security and political risks of employing former Nazis, consistently prioritizing operational continuity. The arrangement created long-term political vulnerabilities when the personnel roster became more widely known.[^1]
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@ -60,8 +60,12 @@ The CIA's own records, as disclosed through Freedom of Information Act releases,
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The Org was penetrated by Soviet intelligence from its early years. The most serious known penetration was [[Heinz Felfe]], who joined the Org in 1951 and rose to become chief of counterintelligence (the CIA study describes him as deputy chief of the section, in practice its real chief). Felfe was a former SS officer who had been recruited by Soviet intelligence and operated as a KGB agent within the Org and its successor the BND for approximately a decade before being exposed in November 1961. His position in counterintelligence gave him access to the operations, agent identities, and procedures that he was tasked with protecting - a near-ideal placement for a Soviet penetration agent.[^1]
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The CIA's documentary history states that the service "suffered devastating penetrations by the KGB as seen by the Hans Clemons and Heinz Felfe spy scandals of the early 1960s" and that the KGB's exploitation of former Nazis led to further Stasi penetrations until 1989.[^12] Gerhard L. Weinberg, chair of the Working Group's Historical Advisory Panel, wrote that the newly released records would make clearer the story of an intelligence operation "financed for years by American taxpayers but largely run from Moscow."[^13]
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Additional penetrations were identified over the years, and the extent of Soviet knowledge of Org operations has never been fully assessed. The KGB had specific and well-founded interest in penetrating the Gehlen network given both its CIA connection and its operational focus on the Soviet bloc.[^1]
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The CIA's documentary history records that in 1950 James H. Critchfield cut Gehlen's projects from 150 to 49 and then to 10 and told Gehlen that his organization was "considered definitely second class in any intelligence activity of a more difficult or sophisticated nature." In 1953 Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger M. Keyes criticized the agency's role in Germany, and Deputy Director of Plans [[Frank Wisner]] answered that there was "no adequate answer or correction of the assumption that we rely very largely upon the [Gehlen Organization] effort for intelligence on Eastern Europe generally," adding that the CIA had its own independent operations.[^11]
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### Transition to the BND
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When West Germany recovered sovereignty in 1955 and joined [[NATO]], negotiations transferred the Gehlen Organization from American to West German government control. The BND was formally established on April 1, 1956, with Gehlen as its first president. The BND retained the Pullach compound, its personnel roster, and its operational assets. The CIA-BND liaison relationship that replaced the CIA-Org relationship maintained close cooperation on Soviet bloc intelligence through the remainder of the Cold War.[^1]
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@ -80,3 +84,6 @@ The CIA held the Organization in what its own history calls "trusteeship" from 1
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[^8]: Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress*, April 2007, Figure 12. https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf
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[^9]: Breitman, Richard, "Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records," Interagency Working Group, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/historical-analysis-by-breitman.pdf
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[^10]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1949-56*, Vol. 1, declassified 2007. https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1949-1956
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[^11]: Central Intelligence Agency, *Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the BND, 1945-49*, Vol. 1, introduction, p. xxvii. https://archive.org/details/CIAAndTheOriginsOfTheBND1945-1949
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[^12]: *Forging an Intelligence Partnership*, Vol. 1, introduction, pp. xxvii-xxviii.
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[^13]: Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Perspectives," in Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress*, April 2007, p. 104. https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ The Department of Justice, established in 1870 under the Attorney General, conta
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### INSLAW and PROMIS
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In March 1982 the Executive Office for United States Attorneys contracted with [[INSLAW]], the company of [[Bill Hamilton]] and [[Nancy Hamilton]], to install PROMIS in the largest U.S. Attorneys' offices; within a month the department's project manager [[C. Madison Brewer]] and contracting officer [[Peter Videnieks]] were disputing INSLAW's proprietary claims, payments were withheld, and in 1985 the company entered Chapter 11. Deputy Attorney General [[Arnold Burns]] told the Office of Professional Responsibility in 1986 that INSLAW's claim was "legitimate" and that the government "would probably lose the case in court," yet the litigation continued. On September 28, 1987, Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] found that the department had "taken, converted, stole, INSLAW's enhanced PROMIS by trickery, fraud, and deceit"; the district court affirmed in 1988 and the D.C. Circuit reversed on jurisdiction in 1991. Bason was not reappointed, the transcript of his ruling having reached the selection panel's chair, Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]], from the U.S. Attorney's civil chief [[Royce Lamberth]]. [[Elliot Richardson]], retained by INSLAW, called the affair "a high-tech Watergate." The [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] under [[Jack Brooks]] opened its investigation in 1989 and reported in September 1992 "strong evidence" that the department "acted willfully and fraudulently"; INSLAW alleged that [[Earl Brian]], a friend of Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]], had been given the software to sell to foreign intelligence services, and a document on department letterhead dated May 14, 1985, and signed by [[William Bradford Reynolds]] was later produced as a plan to distribute a modified PROMIS in the [[Middle East]]. [[Ronald LeGrand]] of the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] relayed a career department source's judgment that INSLAW "is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than Watergate." Attorney General [[William Barr]] appointed [[Nicholas J. Bua]] special counsel in 1991; his report of March 1993 found no credible evidence of wrongdoing, and Attorney General [[Janet Reno]]'s review of September 1994 concurred, after Associate Attorney General [[Webster Hubbell]] had announced a nationwide investigation of [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death. The Senate referred INSLAW's claims to the [[United States Court of Federal Claims]], where Judge [[Christine Odell Cook Miller]] ruled in July 1997 that every version of PROMIS was in the public domain. The writer Gordon Thomas and [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] said that [[Rafael Eitan]] of [[LAKAM]] acquired a copy through back-channel contacts with the department in the early 1980s, and the department's own successor system, the Integrated Case Management System, employed one of PROMIS's original designers, [[Dennis W. Wright]].[^4]
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In March 1982 the Executive Office for United States Attorneys contracted with [[INSLAW]], the company of [[Bill Hamilton]] and [[Nancy Hamilton]], to install PROMIS in the largest U.S. Attorneys' offices; within a month the department's project manager [[C. Madison Brewer]] and contracting officer [[Peter Videnieks]] were disputing INSLAW's proprietary claims, payments were withheld, and in 1985 the company entered Chapter 11. Deputy Attorney General [[Arnold Burns]] told the Office of Professional Responsibility in 1986 that INSLAW's claim was "legitimate" and that the government "would probably lose the case in court," yet the litigation continued. On September 28, 1987, Bankruptcy Judge [[George Francis Bason, Jr.|George Bason]] found that the department "took, converted, stole, Inslaw's enhanced PROMIS by trickery, fraud, and deceit"; the district court affirmed in 1988 and the D.C. Circuit reversed on jurisdiction in 1991. Bason was not reappointed, the transcript of his ruling having reached the selection panel's chair, Judge [[Norma H. Johnson]], from the U.S. Attorney's civil chief [[Royce Lamberth]]. [[Elliot Richardson]], retained by INSLAW, called the affair "a high-tech Watergate." The [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] under [[Jack Brooks]] opened its investigation in 1989 and reported in September 1992 "strong evidence" that the department "acted willfully and fraudulently"; INSLAW alleged that [[Earl Brian]], a friend of Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]], had been given the software to sell to foreign intelligence services, and a document on department letterhead dated May 14, 1985, and signed by [[William Bradford Reynolds]] was later produced as a plan to distribute a modified PROMIS in the [[Middle East]]. [[Ronald LeGrand]] of the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] relayed a career department source's judgment that INSLAW "is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than Watergate." Attorney General [[William Barr]] appointed [[Nicholas J. Bua]] special counsel in 1991; his report of March 1993 found no credible evidence of wrongdoing, and Attorney General [[Janet Reno]]'s review of September 1994 concurred, after Associate Attorney General [[Webster Hubbell]] had announced a nationwide investigation of [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death. The Senate referred INSLAW's claims to the [[United States Court of Federal Claims]], where Judge [[Christine Odell Cook Miller]] ruled in July 1997 that every version of PROMIS was in the public domain. The writer Gordon Thomas and [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] said that [[Rafael Eitan]] of [[LAKAM]] acquired a copy through back-channel contacts with the department in the early 1980s, and the department's own successor system, the Integrated Case Management System, employed one of PROMIS's original designers, [[Dennis W. Wright]].[^4]
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### The CIA and Prosecution
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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---
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created: 2024-04-26
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updated: 2026-10-12
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updated: 2026-10-14
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title: LEAA
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aliases:
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- LEAA
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@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ The House Judiciary Committee's 1992 report on the INSLAW affair states that in
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A 1979 PROMIS dataset for [[St. Louis]], deposited with the [[Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research]], states that PROMIS "was first used in 1971 in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia," and that LEAA then "awarded a grant to the [[Institute for Law and Social Research]] (INSLAW)" to make the system transferable to other jurisdictions.[^11]
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LEAA funded the original PROMIS software development, beginning with an exploratory grant to the DC U.S. Attorney's Office in 1969 to create a case management system.[^12] The design work was done under LEAA grant 70-DF-047, administered by the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] and carried out by [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]], and PROMIS became operational in the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]] on January 1, 1971. A May 1971 Peat Marwick overview prepared for the Office of Crime Analysis under that grant records that the team was headed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]], the office's director, and [[Charles R. Work]], deputy director of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office.[^13] The grant is reported as $60,000, paid to Peat Marwick for the design work at the direction of U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]], with [[Bill Hamilton]] as project manager.[^12] In April 1973 [[Patrick Healy]], executive director of the [[National District Attorneys Association]], told the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee that PROMIS was "Developed under a $290,000 LEAA grant," that it had led to a 25-percent increase in convictions for certain serious misdemeanors in the District of Columbia, and that Jacoby, by then executive director of the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]], and Work, whom he called an assistant U.S. attorney, had developed it.[^14] The National Center for Prosecution Management appears in LEAA's fiscal 1971 grant list as grant 71-DF-1093 for $292,925, made through the Maryland State Planning Agency to the National District Attorneys Association as subgrantee to develop guidelines and minimum standards for measuring the efficiency of prosecutors' offices.[^15] LEAA's push to spread the system ran through several channels. In August 1971 LEAA Administrator Leonard wrote to approximately 1,300 prosecutors encouraging adoption of PROMIS-style systems. At peak, LEAA grants accounted for up to 80 percent of INSLAW's operating income.[^12] Work was deputy chief and then chief of the Superior Court Division from 1969 to 1973 and served as LEAA Deputy Administrator from 1973 to 1975; a White House announcement of January 26, 1976 recorded that he had resigned effective November 21, 1975.[^16] As Deputy Administrator he continued grants to INSLAW and promoted adoption through the National Center for Prosecution Management, which was established with LEAA funding in December 1971 with Jacoby as its first executive director.[^12]
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LEAA funded the original PROMIS software development, beginning with an exploratory grant to the DC U.S. Attorney's Office in 1969 to create a case management system.[^12] The design work was done under LEAA grant 70-DF-047, administered by the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] and carried out by [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]], and PROMIS became operational in the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]] on January 1, 1971. A May 1971 Peat Marwick overview prepared for the Office of Crime Analysis under that grant records that the team was headed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]], the office's director, and [[Charles R. Work]], deputy director of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office.[^13] The grant is reported as $60,000, paid to Peat Marwick for the design work at the direction of U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]], with [[Bill Hamilton]] as project manager.[^12] In April 1973 [[Patrick Healy]], executive director of the [[National District Attorneys Association]], told the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee that PROMIS was "Developed under a $290,000 LEAA grant," that it had led to a 25-percent increase in convictions for certain serious misdemeanors in the District of Columbia, and that Jacoby, by then executive director of the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]], and Work, whom he called an assistant U.S. attorney, had developed it.[^14] The National Center for Prosecution Management appears in LEAA's fiscal 1971 grant list as grant 71-DF-1093 for $292,925, made through the Maryland State Planning Agency to the National District Attorneys Association as subgrantee to develop guidelines and minimum standards for measuring the efficiency of prosecutors' offices.[^15] LEAA's push to spread the system ran through several channels. In August 1971 LEAA Administrator Leonard wrote to approximately 1,300 prosecutors encouraging adoption of PROMIS-style systems. At peak, LEAA grants accounted for up to 80 percent of INSLAW's operating income.[^12] Work was deputy chief and then chief of the Superior Court Division from 1969 to 1973 and served as LEAA Deputy Administrator from 1973 to 1975; a White House announcement of January 26, 1976 recorded that he had resigned effective November 21, 1975.[^16] As Deputy Administrator he continued grants to INSLAW and promoted adoption through the National Center for Prosecution Management, which was established with LEAA funding in December 1971 with Jacoby as its first executive director.[^12][^14]
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LEAA also funded a three-grant research project run by the Institute for Law and Social Research (grants 74-NI-99-0008, 75-NI-99-0111 and 76-NI-99-0118). The project's 1977 highlights volume states that the grants were awarded under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and describes its data as covering about 100,000 street-crime cases received by District of Columbia prosecutors.[^17] The volume lists 17 publications from the project, and credits Charles R. Work with the program's origination, saying that his "creative imagination and determination were indispensable to the origination and growth of the whole PROMIS program."[^17]
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@ -1,23 +1,32 @@
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---
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category: "U.S. Government"
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created: 2024-04-26
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updated: 2026-05-01
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updated: 2026-10-14
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tags:
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- Organization
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- PROMIS
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- INSLAW
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- LEAA
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summary: "The National Center for Prosecution Management was a nonprofit corporation established by the Department of Justice with LEAA funding in December 1971 to provide technical and management assistance to prosecutors nationwide, promote adoption of the PROMIS software system, and conduct research on the prosecution function, with Joan E. Jacoby as its first Executive Director."
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summary: "The National Center for Prosecution Management was a nonprofit established with LEAA funding in December 1971 through a National District Attorneys Association grant, with Joan E. Jacoby as its first Executive Director."
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start: 1971
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location: "Washington, D.C."
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relations:
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- type: funded
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with: "[[LEAA]]"
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role: "grant to the National District Attorney's Association establishing the center"
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start: 1971-12
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reverse: true
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fn: 2
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---
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The National Center for Prosecution Management (NCPM) was a nonprofit corporation established by the [[Department of Justice]] with [[LEAA]] funding in December 1971. Its mandate was to provide management and technical assistance to prosecutors nationwide, promote adoption of the [[PROMIS]] software system, and conduct research on prosecution practices and criminal justice administration.[^1]
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The National Center for Prosecution Management (NCPM) was a nonprofit corporation established with [[LEAA]] funding in December 1971 through a grant to the [[National District Attorneys Association]]. Its mandate was to provide management and technical assistance to prosecutors nationwide, promote adoption of the [[PROMIS]] software system, and conduct research on prosecution practices and criminal justice administration.[^2]
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### Founding and Leadership
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LEAA provided an initial grant of $292,925 in December 1971 to establish the Center. Subsequent grants funded specific program areas: $68,675 in 1972 for technical manuals on case screening and paperwork flow, and $54,057 for a technical assistance program. In 1973 LEAA awarded the Center $528,365 total -- $296,462 for operations, $159,564 for four additional manuals, and $72,339 to expand technical assistance.[^1]
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LEAA provided an initial grant of $292,925 in December 1971 to establish the Center. Subsequent grants funded specific program areas: $68,675 in 1972 for technical manuals on case screening and paperwork flow, and $54,057 for a technical assistance program.[^1] The LEAA's fiscal 1972 report lists a $54,057 entry for the National District Attorney's Association under "Prosecutors technical assistance."[^2] In 1973 LEAA awarded the Center $528,365 in total: $296,462 for operations, $159,564 for four additional manuals, and $72,339 to expand technical assistance.[^1]
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[[Joan E. Jacoby]], who had co-directed the original 1969 PROMIS design team, served as the Center's first Executive Director. [[James M. Etheridge]], also a member of the original 1969 team, served as Deputy Director. Both worked closely with [[Charles R. Work]], [[Bill Hamilton]], and [[INSLAW]] to expand PROMIS implementation across the country.[^1]
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In fiscal 1973 the Center had received about $1 million in grants through the National District Attorneys Association and had been in operation for less than two years, with a staff of 18 in Washington. The LEAA's fiscal 1973 report lists the [[National College of District Attorneys]] and the [[Institute for Court Management]] as sponsors alongside the association.[^3]
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[[Joan E. Jacoby]], who had co-directed the original 1969 PROMIS design team, served as the Center's first Executive Director.[^1][^5] [[James M. Etheridge]], also a member of the original 1969 team, served as Deputy Director.[^1][^5] Both worked closely with [[Charles R. Work]], [[Bill Hamilton]], and [[INSLAW]] to expand PROMIS implementation across the country.[^1] A transcript of the April 1973 hearing of a House Judiciary subcommittee identifies Jacoby as executive director of the Center, and the hearing's appendices carry manuals issued under her name as executive director.[^4]
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### Executive Board
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@ -26,3 +35,7 @@ The Center's executive board was composed of leading figures from prosecutorial
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
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[^2]: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1972*, court improvement section (grant to the National District Attorney's Association for standards to measure the efficiency of prosecutors' offices through a new National Center for Prosecution Management), and the grant listing for the National District Attorney's Association entry "Prosecutors technical assistance" at $54,057. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/148302NCJRS.pdf
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[^3]: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1973*, section on prosecutors' offices (grants to the National Center for Prosecution Management and the National College of District Attorneys; the center funded by some $1 million in grants through the National District Attorneys Association, in operation less than two years, staff of 18, sponsored by the National College of District Attorneys and the Institute for Court Management as well as the association). https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/147380NCJRS.pdf
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[^4]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, *Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings*, Serial No. 4 (1973), statement of Patrick F. Healy, April 4, 1973 ("Joan E. Jacoby who is now the executive director of the National Center for Prosecution Management"), and appendix exhibits listing Joan E. Jacoby, Executive Director, National Center for Prosecution Management, 1900 L Street NW, Suite 701. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
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[^5]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
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@ -1,24 +1,37 @@
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---
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category: "U.S. Government"
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created: 2024-04-26
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updated: 2026-05-01
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updated: 2026-10-14
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tags:
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- Organization
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- PROMIS
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- INSLAW
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- DC Government
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summary: "The Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia was a DC government research unit whose Director, Joan E. Jacoby, co-led the 1969 team that commissioned and designed the PROMIS software under a $60,000 LEAA grant, and later administered the National Center for Prosecution Management."
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summary: "The Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia was a DC government research unit whose Director, Joan E. Jacoby, co-led the 1969 team that designed PROMIS for the U.S. Attorney's office."
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location: "Washington, D.C."
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relations:
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- type: head_of
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with: "[[Joan E. Jacoby]]"
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role: "director"
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start: 1969
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end: 1972
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reverse: true
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fn: 4
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---
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The Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia was a small governmental research and analysis unit operating within the DC government. It had no federal counterpart and appears to have operated primarily to support criminal justice planning and prosecution management for the District.
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### Role in PROMIS Development
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In 1969, the office administered the $60,000 LEAA grant (70-DF-047) to [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]] that funded the design of the original [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS)]] for the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]]. [[Joan E. Jacoby]], then Director of the office, co-directed the design team alongside [[Charles R. Work]] (Deputy Chief of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office), with [[Bill Hamilton]] of Peat Marwick serving as project manager. The resulting system was deployed January 1, 1971.[^1]
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In 1969, the office administered the $60,000 LEAA grant (70-DF-047) to [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]] that funded the design of the original [[PROMIS|Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS)]] for the [[U.S. Attorney's office|DC U.S. Attorney's Office]]. [[Joan E. Jacoby]], then Director of the office, co-directed the design team alongside [[Charles R. Work]] (Deputy Director of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office), with [[Bill Hamilton]] of Peat Marwick serving as project manager.[^1] A May 1971 system overview prepared for the office under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047 states that the design team "was headed by Mrs. Joan E. Jacoby, Director of the Office of Crime Analysis," and that the system became operational on January 1, 1971.[^3]
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Jacoby remained Director of the office at least through 1972, overseeing early PROMIS operations and accompanying research. She subsequently became the first Executive Director of the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]], a nonprofit established by the [[Department of Justice]] with LEAA funding to provide technical assistance to prosecutors nationwide.[^2]
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The office described PROMIS as the critical component of its own Project TRACE (Tracking, Retrieval and Analysis of Criminal Events), an offender-tracking system from arrest through sentencing and incarceration, and the LEAA funded both TRACE and PROMIS.[^3] The case evaluation systems used in PROMIS were developed by the office for the U.S. Attorney's office in 1969.[^4]
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Jacoby is listed as director on the office's 1972 *Final Report: Project TRACE*.[^4] She subsequently became the first Executive Director of the [[National Center for Prosecution Management]], a nonprofit established with LEAA funding through a grant to the [[National District Attorneys Association]] to provide technical assistance to prosecutors nationwide.[^2][^5]
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### Footnotes
|
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|
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[^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
|
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[^2]: Office of Justice Programs, National Criminal Justice Reference Service. "The Prosecutor's Charging Decision: A Policy Perspective." OJP Publication No. 35832. ojp.gov.
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[^3]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, NCJ 32469, title page, abstract, introduction and note 1 to the design team passage. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
|
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[^4]: Jacoby, Joan E., *The Prosecutor's Charging Decision: A Policy Perspective* (January 1977), note 1 to the chapter on case evaluation systems and bibliography (*Final Report: Project TRACE*, Joan Jacoby, Director, Office of Crime Analysis, Government of the District of Columbia, 1972), NCJ 35832. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/35832NCJRS.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, *Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings*, Serial No. 4 (1973), statement of Patrick F. Healy, April 4, 1973, identifying Joan E. Jacoby as now the executive director of the National Center for Prosecution Management. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit
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@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
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---
|
||||
category: "U.S. Government"
|
||||
created: 2024-04-26
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-01
|
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updated: 2026-10-14
|
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tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
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- PROMIS
|
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- INSLAW
|
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- DoJ
|
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summary: "The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia was the original client for the PROMIS case management software, commissioning the system in 1969 under U.S. Attorney Thomas A. Flannery and deploying it January 1, 1971; the EOUSA later signed the March 1982 implementation contract with INSLAW that became the central dispute in the PROMIS Software Scandal."
|
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summary: "The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia commissioned PROMIS in 1969, deployed it January 1, 1971, and signed the March 1982 INSLAW implementation contract at the center of the PROMIS Software Scandal."
|
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location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
---
|
||||
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia is the federal prosecutor's office responsible for both local criminal matters (unique among U.S. Attorneys' offices due to DC's non-state status) and federal crimes within the District. As used throughout the INSLAW files and the [[House Committee on the Judiciary|House Judiciary Committee]]'s PROMIS investigation, "the U.S. Attorney's Office" refers to this DC office unless otherwise specified.
|
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|
||||
### Role in PROMIS Development
|
||||
|
||||
In 1969, U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]] perceived an urgent need for improved case management tools to handle the volume of cases flowing through the DC office. He directed the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] to commission a computerized case tracking system, funded by a $60,000 [[LEAA]] grant (70-DF-047) administered through [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. The design team was co-directed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] (then Deputy Chief of the office's Superior Court Division), with [[Bill Hamilton]] of Peat Marwick as project manager. The resulting system, the Prosecutor's Management Information System ([[PROMIS]]), was deployed January 1, 1971.[^1]
|
||||
In 1969, U.S. Attorney [[Thomas A. Flannery]] perceived an urgent need for improved case management tools to handle the volume of cases flowing through the DC office. He directed the [[Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia]] to commission a computerized case tracking system, funded by a $60,000 [[LEAA]] grant (70-DF-047) administered through [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]. The design team was co-directed by [[Joan E. Jacoby]] and [[Charles R. Work]] (then Deputy Director of the office's Superior Court Division), with [[Bill Hamilton]] of Peat Marwick as project manager.[^1][^2] The resulting system, the Prosecutor's Management Information System ([[PROMIS]]), was deployed January 1, 1971.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The DC office became the first PROMIS site and served as the demonstration platform for the system's national expansion. LEAA subsequently funded [[INSLAW]] to adapt PROMIS for adoption by other jurisdictions, and provided grants to municipalities converting to the system.[^1]
|
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|
||||
|
|
@ -25,3 +25,4 @@ The [[Executive Office for United States Attorneys]] (EOUSA), which administers
|
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### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
|
||||
[^2]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., *System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS* (May 1971), prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047, note 1 to the passage on the design team, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf
|
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