disinfozone/The_Info_Web
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions
The_Info_Web/20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/LEAA.md

45 KiB
Raw Blame History

created updated title aliases tags description category summary start end location relations
2024-04-26 2026-10-14 LEAA
LEAA
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
Organization
USGovernment
LawEnforcement
PROMIS
INSLAW
CIA
BehaviorModification
PoliceIntelligence
NCJRS
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funded PROMIS and its national expansion, carried the CIA's police technique program through the early 1970s, and financed the behavior-control research that a Senate subcommittee examined in 1974. U.S. Government The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was a Justice Department grant agency created in 1968 that funded the PROMIS software and, through the 1970s, behavior-control research that the Senate later examined. 1968 1984 Washington, D.C.
type with reverse start end role fn
head_of Jerris Leonard true 1971 1973 Administrator 2
type with reverse start end role fn
head_of Donald E. Santarelli true 1973 1974 Administrator 3
type with reverse start end role fn
employed_by Charles R. Work true 1973 1975 Deputy Administrator 16
type with start fn
founded National Criminal Justice Reference Service 1971 2
type with start end fn
funded INSLAW 1973 1981 10
type with start fn
funded Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 1973 27
type with start fn
funded Neuro-Research Foundation 1972 43
type with start fn
funded American Justice Institute 1970 42
type with reverse start role fn
employed_by Alvin Ash true 1977 Systems Development Division 17
type with start end fn
funded Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co 1970 1971 13
type with start fn
funded National Center for Prosecution Management 1971 15
type with start fn
funded National Bureau of Standards 1972 41
type with start end fn
partner_of Central Intelligence Agency 1970 1973 29
type with start end fn
funded Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia 1970 1971 13
type with reverse start end fn
investigated Senate Judiciary Committee true 1973 1974 24

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was a grant-making agency within the Department of Justice, created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson on June 19, 1968.1 It made block and discretionary grants to state and local police, courts and corrections agencies, financed research, and paid for the development of the PROMIS case-management software. Its grant programs had been winding down since 1980, and its authorizing statute was replaced in 1984.

Creation and structure

Part A of Title I placed the agency "within the Department of Justice, under the general authority of the Attorney General," under an Administrator and two Associate Administrators appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.1 The agency's third annual report says it "formally came into being" on October 21, 1968, when its first administrators took office under recess appointments. It began with a staff of 25, and by December 19, 1968, every state had created a State Criminal Justice Planning Agency.2

Jerris Leonard, the Administrator-designate, appointed an eight-member task force that began work on March 29, 1971. The task force followed a decision by Attorney General John N. Mitchell to endorse an internal review of the agency's operations.2 Leonard led the agency until 1973, when Donald E. Santarelli became Administrator; Santarelli served until 1974.3 In March 1973 Associate Administrators Richard W. Velde and Clarence M. Coster accompanied Attorney General Richard Kleindienst at the House Judiciary Committee's oversight hearings on the agency.4 Santarelli's February 14, 1974 announcement described a reorganization he had set in motion ten months earlier, after becoming Administrator.5

Appropriations

Congress appropriated $63,000,000 for fiscal 1969, $268,119,000 for fiscal 1970, $529,000,000 for fiscal 1971 ($480 million in the regular appropriation and $49 million in a supplemental), $698,919,000 for fiscal 1972, $855,597,000 for fiscal 1973, $870,675,000 for fiscal 1974, $895,000,000 for fiscal 1975, $809,638,000 for fiscal 1976, $204,960,000 for the transition quarter of July to September 1976 and $753,000,000 for fiscal 1977, a total of $5,947,908,000 that included appropriations under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. The fiscal 1978 appropriation was $647,250,000.67 The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 had authorized $650 million for fiscal 1971, $1.15 billion for fiscal 1972 and $1.75 billion for fiscal 1973. It required that from fiscal 1972 not less than 20 percent of action funds go to a new corrections program.7 LEAA's own 1976 summary gives the Safe Streets Act appropriations as $856 million for 1973, $871 million for 1974 and $880 million for 1975, adds $25 million for 1975 under the Juvenile Justice Act ($15 million new and $10 million reprogrammed from LEAA funds), and describes the fiscal 1976 budget of $809.6 million as about 10 percent below the previous year's.8 The Justice Department's statement at a 1981 Senate hearing gave $895 million in 1975 as the highest level the agency reached, and the figure fell in each later year. The Crime Control Act of 1973 and the Crime Control Act of 1976 each extended the authorization for three years and added administrative requirements.9

PROMIS, INSLAW and prosecutor management

The House Judiciary Committee's 1992 report on the INSLAW affair states that in the 1970s LEAA "funded the development by INSLAW" of the PROMIS software, and that the original version "was funded entirely with Government funds and was in the public domain."10 The report describes INSLAW itself as "a nonprofit corporation funded almost entirely through Government grants and contracts."10

A 1979 PROMIS dataset for St. Louis, deposited with the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, states that PROMIS "was first used in 1971 in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia," and that LEAA then "awarded a grant to the Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW)" to make the system transferable to other jurisdictions.11

LEAA funded the original PROMIS software development, beginning with an exploratory grant to the DC U.S. Attorney's Office in 1969 to create a case management system.12 The design work was done under LEAA grant 70-DF-047, administered by the Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia and carried out by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co, and PROMIS became operational in the U.S. Attorney's office on January 1, 1971. A May 1971 Peat Marwick overview prepared for the Office of Crime Analysis under that grant records that the team was headed by Joan E. Jacoby, the office's director, and Charles R. Work, deputy director of the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office.13 The grant is reported as $60,000, paid to Peat Marwick for the design work at the direction of U.S. Attorney Thomas A. Flannery, with Bill Hamilton as project manager.12 In April 1973 Patrick Healy, executive director of the National District Attorneys Association, told the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee that PROMIS was "Developed under a $290,000 LEAA grant," that it had led to a 25-percent increase in convictions for certain serious misdemeanors in the District of Columbia, and that Jacoby, by then executive director of the National Center for Prosecution Management, and Work, whom he called an assistant U.S. attorney, had developed it.14 The National Center for Prosecution Management appears in LEAA's fiscal 1971 grant list as grant 71-DF-1093 for $292,925, made through the Maryland State Planning Agency to the National District Attorneys Association as subgrantee to develop guidelines and minimum standards for measuring the efficiency of prosecutors' offices.15 LEAA's push to spread the system ran through several channels. In August 1971 LEAA Administrator Leonard wrote to approximately 1,300 prosecutors encouraging adoption of PROMIS-style systems. At peak, LEAA grants accounted for up to 80 percent of INSLAW's operating income.12 Work was deputy chief and then chief of the Superior Court Division from 1969 to 1973 and served as LEAA Deputy Administrator from 1973 to 1975; a White House announcement of January 26, 1976 recorded that he had resigned effective November 21, 1975.16 As Deputy Administrator he continued grants to INSLAW and promoted adoption through the National Center for Prosecution Management, which was established with LEAA funding in December 1971 with Jacoby as its first executive director.1214

LEAA also funded a three-grant research project run by the Institute for Law and Social Research (grants 74-NI-99-0008, 75-NI-99-0111 and 76-NI-99-0118). The project's 1977 highlights volume states that the grants were awarded under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and describes its data as covering about 100,000 street-crime cases received by District of Columbia prosecutors.17 The volume lists 17 publications from the project, and credits Charles R. Work with the program's origination, saying that his "creative imagination and determination were indispensable to the origination and growth of the whole PROMIS program."17

Bankruptcy Judge George Francis Bason, Jr. found in the INSLAW adversary proceeding that during the 1970s the Institute for Law and Social Research obtained cost-plus grants and contracts largely from LEAA, that LEAA "designated PROMIS as an exemplary project" and encouraged state and local governments to implement it, that in 1979 LEAA awarded the Institute a three-year cost-plus contract for PROMIS upkeep and upgrade services, that in 1980 the Institute received notice that LEAA funding would be extinguished beginning in May 1981, and that "when LEAA was liquidated" in 1981 the contract was assigned to the Justice Department's newly created Bureau of Justice Statistics, which lacked funds for its final year.18 A 1989 Senate staff study states that the software "had been developed originally under grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration."19

A May 6, 1983 memorandum by Jack Rugh, deputy project manager for the Justice Department's PROMIS contract, recorded that C. Madison Brewer had instructed him "to make a copy of an LEAA version of PROMIS available to Dr. Ben Orr, a representative of the Government of Israel."20 The House report also records that Statistics Canada, a Canadian government agency, had admitted using a public domain PROMIS version, and that according to officials contacted by Hamilton the version "was obtained through the LEAA in the late 1970's."21

The House report describes a computer procurement in which government-owned versions of PROMIS were made available to potential bidders for benchmarking, and it lists the four LEAA versions, for DEC, IBM, Wang and Burroughs, among those supplied.22 In February 1973 U.S. Attorney Harold H. Titus Jr. made the decision to upgrade PROMIS from batch processing to a real-time online system capable of tracking more than 160 variables per case.23 The 1977 highlights volume credits Alvin Ash of LEAA's Systems Development Division with "farsighted and steadfast support of PROMIS," including its development, nationwide transfer and research potential.17 Ash, a programmer and systems analyst at Computer Usage Company who had helped develop PROMIS for the U.S. Attorney's Office, later worked at LEAA and sat on the INSLAW advisory board. DALITE, a case-management system developed in Alameda County while Lowell Jensen was district attorney, competed with PROMIS during LEAA's late-1970s evaluation of transferable prosecutor systems. The 1989 Senate staff study records an Alameda County assistant district attorney's statement that both the county's pilot research program and the development of DALITE were funded by the State of California with grant money provided from LEAA. It also records a Los Angeles County employee's account of feeling pressure from Alameda County employees to use DALITE, which he compared to the kind "you feel on a used car lot," and his statement that Jensen had seemed "hopeful and anxious" that Los Angeles would select it; the staff reported that none of the other employees it spoke to knew of any pressure on anyone to select DALITE and that it found no information to support a theory that Jensen held a bias against Hamilton, INSLAW or PROMIS.19

National Criminal Justice Reference Service

In fiscal 1971 LEAA "made plans" to establish a National Criminal Justice Reference Service, an information service meant to collect research and development reports and to document action project results sponsored by LEAA and other agencies.2 The NCJRS now hosts a digitized copy of the 1974 Senate subcommittee print on behavior modification.24

Police intelligence and organized crime

The organized crime section of the fiscal 1971 report, prepared by the agency's Organized Crime Program Division, set out goals for that year. One of them read "Intelligence. Knowledge is the key factor in any effort against organized crime," and the section called for a statewide intelligence capability and multi-state systems that could pool information across jurisdictions.25

In December 1976 Penthouse described the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit as "a little-known organization" that "links the intelligence squads of almost every major police force in the United States and Canada," and said it was a private club not answerable to voters, taxpayers or elected officials.26

At the House Judiciary Committee's hearing of March 15, 1973, Associate Administrator Velde testified that LEAA's current statistics budget held $1 million for an operational automated organized crime information system, which "will be given to the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, LEIU," supporting about 135 terminals and a computer system with the index operated by the Michigan State Police. He said the system held public record information only and that "There is no direct Federal involvement other than the LEAA money."27 LEAA's grant classification scheme, reprinted in a November 1977 General Accounting Office overview, carried an "Intelligence Unit" category defined as units collecting information for the evaluation of crime and criminals, such as the structure and workings of organized crime and illegal narcotics operations, and a "Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)" category defined as "An independent unit organized, trained, and equipped to function during emergency situations," covering "Civil disorders, riots, snipers, the taking of hostages."6 A Washington Post piece of November 28, 1972, "Street Crime in Newark and Elsewhere," printed in the 1973 hearing record, reported the criticism that LEAA had "squandered its money mindlessly on hardware," citing "three tanks for Birmingham and a plane for the Indiana State Police."28

CIA dissemination of police techniques

The Office of Security of the Central Intelligence Agency used LEAA as a channel for dispersing police techniques from 1970. A June 10, 1970 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, proposed releasing the Trace Metal Detection Technique to law enforcement. The memorandum recommended LEAA over a police professional association, which it said represented only a portion of the national police community. It also said that friction between that association and J. Edgar Hoover meant "it is probable that Mr. Hoover would resent our use of the Association in invading what he has traditionally considered his exclusive domain."29 The memorandum recorded the concurrence of Thomas Karamessines. The only stipulation imposed on recipients, it said, was that there be "no public connection between the technique and this Agency."29

A later Office of Security summary records that the technique was demonstrated to approximately 35 police departments, three professional police associations and representatives of 83 other state and local departments between June 1970 and December 1971. Outside the Washington area, the CIA representatives were identified as "consultants" to LEAA, and "no mention was made of the Agency."30 The summary says the office provided six men to LEAA in 1970 to brief police and local officials on the technique.31

An August 27, 1971 status report to the Director of Central Intelligence said that 19 police departments had used the technique in criminal investigations. It said LEAA had distributed 3,000 manuals from the initial printing and 800 from the second, and that more than 2,000 people had been trained. It quoted LEAA's assessment that "We consider the entire program from its inception to date to have been an unqualified success."32

The same office moved its explosive residue method into the same channel. In March 1971 the Director of Central Intelligence declassified the Explosive Residue Detection Technique, and the Security Office recommended dissemination through LEAA or the LEAA-funded National Bomb Data Center.30 On November 10, 1971 agency officers demonstrated the technique to LEAA staff, and then held two more hours of discussion with Lester Shubin and Marc Nerenstone, whom the memorandum describes as "both witting of the Agency's role in the development of the technique." It says LEAA appeared likely to farm the technique out as a grant.33

A February 16, 1972 Office of Security memorandum records an LEAA request that the agency reprint, at LEAA expense and for LEAA distribution, the classified edition of the book "Where's What," written under Brookings Institution sponsorship; an LEAA consultant had recommended against making the request. The memorandum states that during the first year of the Trace Metal Detection Technique transfer LEAA never reimbursed the agency's travel costs because of "their desire to avoid unclassified (i.e. public) reimbursement of the money to CIA," that "LEAA indicated it did not wish to be publicly affiliated with CIA," and that "CIA has complied with this desire." It recommended that the agency decline.34

A May 9, 1973 survey of the Office of Research and Development recorded that an ORD-developed adhesive restraint, a non-lethal incapacitation system, had been made available to LEAA in August 1972. It said: "If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control." The survey names Shubin as the LEAA contact.35

On June 18, 1973 the House adopted by voice vote, without committee consideration, an amendment by Representative Elizabeth Holtzman to H.R. 8152, the bill amending title I of the 1968 act. The agency's Office of Legislative Counsel summarized its effect as prohibiting LEAA from using the services, equipment, personnel and facilities of the agency, and recorded that the sponsor's statement included an allegation that the agency had been involved in the bugging of Dr. Fielding's office; an agency position paper stated that the Director of Central Intelligence had directed that such activities be undertaken in future only in the most compelling circumstances and with his personal approval, and opposed a flat statutory prohibition.36 The statutory basis for this relationship changed in 1973. Section 508 of the Crime Control Act of 1973 authorized LEAA to use the services of federal agencies "(not including the Central Intelligence Agency)."37 The 1968 text contains no such exclusion. An Office of General Counsel memorandum of October 15, 1973, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," recorded a call from an LEAA legal office official about the agency's authority under sections 508 and 513 of the Crime Control Act of 1973, and concluded that the agency had not decided that it was required to reject all requests from LEAA; each request would be decided at the appropriate command level.38 In July 1978 the agency reviewed proposed reauthorization language that would bar any use of CIA services by LEAA. The Office of Legislative Counsel told the Office of Security that the agency did not endorse the provision but would have no formal objection to its inclusion.39 On November 14, 1975 an agency officer who had been present at the start and the end of the relationship briefed two staff members of a House select committee on it. The memorandum of the briefing records that the agency discontinued liaison with LEAA in 1973 as a result of the Kennedy-Holtzman amendment; that one staff member said he had recently developed information about the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, "a communications network between police intelligence agencies," and asked where the agency fit into its operation; and that the officer answered that he had never heard of the organization and knew of no such nationwide network in which the agency had taken part.40

Equipment, jail records and crowd control

The 1972 police equipment survey, prepared for LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice by the Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory of the National Bureau of Standards, asked departments about helmets with built-in communications. Half of the 139 departments that expressed a need for them gave crowd control or riots as their reason.41

LEAA's fiscal 1971 report lists a $2,751 grant to the American Justice Institute of Sacramento, supplementing an earlier grant, to examine a prison adjustment center for inmates who become violent or present discipline problems.42 The agency's Office of Criminal Justice Programs made a later grant to the institute for the Jail Information System. The system grew out of the need the institute perceived during its LEAA-funded Jail Overcrowding and Pretrial Detainee Program.

Behavior modification and the 1974 Senate inquiry

The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by Sam J. Ervin, began its inquiry into behavior control technology in late 1971, when several unrelated programs appeared to point toward a new technology of behavior control. The psychosurgery controversy was reappearing at the time. A study of the relationship between brain disease and violence at Boston City Hospital was funded jointly by LEAA and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The subcommittee also learned of the Federal Bureau of Prisons proposed Center for Behavioral Research at Butner, North Carolina, which it described as financed in part by LEAA, and wrote that a presidential veto of the appropriations bill that provided additional funds for the Boston City Hospital project added to speculation that similar programs might be reinstated at Butner.24 The same print names Massachusetts General Hospital as the site of an LEAA-funded study of the causes and predictors of violence that tested whether fingerprint classifications and a particular chromosome configuration indicate a greater proneness to violence.43 LEAA's letter of October 27, 1972, printed in the appendix, states that the project, "the Medical Epidemiology of Criminals," was funded under a grant to the Neuro Research Foundation of Boston, "of which Dr. William Sweet is President," and awarded through the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA's research arm; the Senate letter it answers asked about LEAA funding for work by Sweet "at Boston City Hospital."43

The subcommittee said that LEAA, "because of its law enforcement mission and large appropriations, attracted a wide variety of grant requests dealing with this type of research." Among the projects it described was a study titled "The Medical Epidemiology of Criminals," prepared by the Neuro-Research Foundation of Boston, which tested dermatoglyphic patterns and chromosome configurations as indicators of violent tendencies.44

The most prominent proposal was the Center for the Study and Reduction of Violence at the University of California, Los Angeles Neuropsychiatric Institute, which first drew the subcommittee's attention to LEAA's behavioral programs. Its September 1, 1972 project description listed five lines of research, including biological, neurological and psychological studies. A memorandum by a staff psychologist at Atascadero State Hospital, one of the institutions participating in the planned center, described an electro-physiological laboratory able to record heart rate, galvanic skin response, penis volume and brain waves in response to audio-visual stimuli. Its planned satellite facilities included the state hospitals at Atascadero, Camarillo and Vacaville, and the subcommittee noted that Vacaville and Atascadero had attracted substantial notoriety for allegedly unethical procedures. The proposed director, Louis Jolyon West, discussed acquiring an old Nike missile base in the Santa Monica Mountains for the center.45 A memorandum of April 5, 1973 from the Committee Opposing Psychiatric Abuse of Prisoners, printed in the subcommittee's appendix, recorded that Ronald Reagan had announced in his January 1973 State of the State message the formation of a Center for the Reduction of Life-Threatening Behavior. It said a proposal had been submitted to the California Council on Criminal Justice and would be considered by the Senate Health and Welfare Committee on April 11.45 LEAA told the subcommittee that it had not received the UCLA project for funding consideration.5 LEAA also told the subcommittee that its policy on the rights of human subjects consisted solely of a requirement of prior LEAA approval for medical research not specifically detailed in state plans; the subcommittee set that single sentence beside the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's forty pages of guidelines.45

Santarelli had been special counsel to Ervin's subcommittee from 1968 to 1969.3 In January 1974 Ervin asked Santarelli for a moratorium on LEAA support for behavioral research until the agency had guidelines comparable to those then under consideration by Congress and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. On February 14, 1974 Santarelli announced that he had banned LEAA funds for medical research, chemotherapy, psychosurgery and behavior modification. He said there "are no technical skills on the staff to screen, evaluate, or monitor such projects."5 In response to the subcommittee's request, the agency produced an April 10, 1974 computer printout describing 537 projects that dealt in some way with the modification of behavior. In an August 29, 1974 letter LEAA reported that 390 of the 537 had ended before the guideline took effect, that 110 of the remaining 147 involved no medical procedures, and that 35 involved only routine medical procedures.5

The subcommittee's account of the Bureau of Prisons is separate from its account of LEAA. Project START (Special Treatment and Rehabilitative Training) was a Bureau program at the Federal Medical Center for Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri that required roughly fifteen prisoners to take part involuntarily, placing them in solitary cells with privileges earned through "good days," and no attempt was made to obtain their consent. The print dates the Bureau's operations memorandum October 25, 1972 and states that the Bureau quietly cancelled the program in February 1974.46 A federal court opinion records that START was initiated on September 11, 1972, that 99 individuals were considered for it, 26 were found appropriate referrals and 19 participated, and that Bureau Director Norman A. Carlson informed the court by letter of February 11, 1974 that it would be terminated on or before March 1, 1974. On July 31, 1974 Judge John W. Oliver of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted the prisoners partial summary judgment on whether transfer into START without notice, charges and hearing denied due process, and dismissed the other issues as moot.47 The Butner facility, then called the Federal Center for Correctional Research and originally named the Center for Behavioral Research, was to be a separate institution in the same compound, and the psychiatrist Martin Groder was named to head it. The subcommittee wrote that its mail indicated "the specter had been raised of an isolated enclave in which various forms of radical experimentation would be conducted using prisoners as subjects," recorded repeated assurances that no psychosurgery, no chemotherapy and no aversive conditioning of any kind would be tested or used there, and recorded Groder's statement that all participants would be volunteers.46

Abolition and successors

The Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 separated LEAA into four agencies: the Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics (OJARS), the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and LEAA itself. The statute set up OJARS under the general policy control of the Attorney General.48 The Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980 removed the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention from LEAA.9

The administration proposed phasing LEAA out three months after the 1979 act was signed, and requested no fiscal 1981 appropriation for state and local criminal justice programs. Congress appropriated no fiscal 1981 funds for LEAA, and funded the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the juvenile office at a combined $146 million.9 The Justice Department's statement at the October 28, 1981 hearing recorded that LEAA had no program funds after fiscal 1980 and had only administrative funds to close out previously funded programs.9

The loss of LEAA funding created a crisis for INSLAW. Without the grants that had sustained the company's operations, Bill Hamilton incorporated INSLAW as a for-profit Delaware corporation in January 1981 and sought to commercialize PROMIS.10 The House report says that in March 1982 the Justice Department awarded INSLAW a $10 million, three-year contract to implement the public domain version of PROMIS; the company's search for replacement revenue led directly to that contract.10 On March 13, 1985, Elliot Richardson and Santarelli, described as the former LEAA Administrator, met Acting Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen and asked him to authorize negotiations with INSLAW and to appoint someone to investigate its complaints.49

The House report calls the selection of C. Madison Brewer from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys to serve as PROMIS project manager a curious choice, since Brewer had worked for Bill Hamilton between 1974 and 1976 as general counsel of the Institute for Law and Social Research.50 The dispute over the contract is known as the PROMIS Software Scandal.

The Justice Assistance Act of 1984 replaced Part A of Title I with an Office of Justice Programs headed by an Assistant Attorney General. Functions that had been carried out by LEAA were assigned to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and references to LEAA in other laws were to be read as references to the Bureau where they applied to those functions.51

Footnotes

  1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, title I, part A, sec. 101, 82 Stat. 197, 198 (June 19, 1968). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-82/pdf/STATUTE-82-Pg197.pdf ↩︎

  2. U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971 (December 31, 1971), on the agency's start, staff, task force, and National Criminal Justice Reference Service. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215 ↩︎

  3. The American Presidency Project, announcement of the intention to nominate Donald Eugene Santarelli to the Board of Directors of the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, June 5, 1981 (Administrator of LEAA 1973 to 1974; special counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Constitutional Rights, Senator Sam Ervin, chairman, 1968 to 1969; associate deputy attorney general 1969 to 1972). https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/nomination-donald-eugene-santarelli-be-member-the-board-directors-the-united-states ↩︎

  4. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 4 (March 15 to April 5, 1973), witness list and testimony of March 15, 1973. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit ↩︎

  5. Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, pp. 39-40 (Ervin letter of January 1974; LEAA announcement of February 14, 1974; LEAA printout of April 10, 1974 with 537 projects; LEAA letter of August 29, 1974), and appendix, LEAA response that it had not received the UCLA project. ↩︎

  6. U.S. General Accounting Office, Overview of Activities Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, GGD-78-21 (November 29, 1977), appropriation history table (fiscal years 1969 to 1977 and fiscal 1978) and appendix action-category definitions, Intelligence Unit and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), pp. 105-106 of the appendix, NCJ 60372. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/60372NCJRS.pdf ↩︎

  7. Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971, "LEAA Appropriations History" and the text on the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-644). https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215 ↩︎

  8. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: A Partnership for Crime Control (1976), "LEAA Budget History" and fiscal year 1976 budget, ERIC ED 126270. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED126270 ↩︎

  9. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Oversight of the Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, hearing of October 28, 1981, Serial No. J-97-74 (Washington: GPO, 1982). https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0256 ↩︎

  10. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess. (September 10, 1992), section I, "Summary," pp. 1-2. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport ↩︎

  11. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, ICPSR 8225, Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS), St. Louis, 1979, principal investigator Institute for Law and Social Research, Inc., codebook introduction. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR08225.v1 ↩︎

  12. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Public Law 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167 (December 27, 1979); Office of Justice Programs, National Criminal Justice Reference Service, historical records. ↩︎

  13. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., System Overview and Report Formats for PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management Information System): A Computer-Based System for the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, prepared for the District of Columbia Government Office of Crime Analysis under LEAA Grant No. 70-DF-047 (May 1971), title page, abstract and introductory note 1, NCJ 32469. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/32469NCJRS.pdf ↩︎

  14. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings, Serial No. 4 (1973), statement of Patrick Healy, executive director, National District Attorneys Association, April 4, 1973, p. 454. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit ↩︎

  15. Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971, grant list, grant 71-DF-1093, Maryland SPA, subgrantee National District Attorneys Association, "National Center for Prosecution Management," $292,925. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215 ↩︎

  16. The American Presidency Project, announcement of the intention to appoint Charles R. Work to the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, June 10, 1985 (Deputy Chief and Chief, Superior Court Division, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, 1969 to 1973; Deputy Administrator, LEAA, 1973 to 1975), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/260238; White House Office of the Press Secretary, release of January 26, 1976 (Paul K. Wormeli to succeed Work, who resigned effective November 21, 1975), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, https://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0248/whpr19760126-013.pdf ↩︎

  17. Institute for Law and Social Research, PROMIS Research Project Highlights (1977), NCJ-40229, copyright page, acknowledgments and project summary. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/40229NCJRS.pdf ↩︎

  18. In re INSLAW, Inc., 83 B.R. 89 (Bankr. D.D.C. January 25, 1988), findings of fact 2, 7, 11 and 13. https://static.case.law/br/83/cases/0089-01.json ↩︎

  19. U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, staff study of the Department of Justice's dealings with INSLAW, Inc., Committee Print, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1989), summary section and the section on Jensen and DALITE (pp. 16-17, with note 10, staff interview of Donald G. Ingraham, May 31, 1988). https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0145 ↩︎

  20. U.S. House of Representatives, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, section on the LEAA versions of PROMIS and the Rugh memorandum of May 6, 1983 (p. 48). ↩︎

  21. U.S. House of Representatives, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, p. 58, passage on the Statistics Canada use of a public domain PROMIS version. ↩︎

  22. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857 (September 10, 1992), pp. 46-47, on the benchmarking copies of PROMIS. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport ↩︎

  23. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, 102d Cong., 2d sess. (September 10, 1992). ↩︎

  24. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, committee print (Washington: GPO, November 1974), pp. 18-19 (printed page numbers), NCJRS digitization, NCJ 142690. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/142690NCJRS.pdf ↩︎

  25. Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971, Organized Crime Program Division, goals for FY 1971, p. 62. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215 ↩︎

  26. Penthouse, "America's Secret Police Network," December 1976, text preserved in CIA CREST document CIA-RDP90-01208R000100200015-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-01208r000100200015-5 ↩︎

  27. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings, Serial No. 4 (1973), testimony of March 15, 1973, p. 83 (Velde on the automated organized crime information system and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit). https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit ↩︎

  28. "Street Crime in Newark and Elsewhere," Washington Post, November 28, 1972, reprinted in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 5, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Hearings, Serial No. 4 (1973), p. 502. https://archive.org/details/lawenforcementas00unit ↩︎

  29. Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Release of Trace Metal Detection Technique to Law Enforcement Officials," June 10, 1970, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150029-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150029-5 ↩︎

  30. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum on the relationship with LEAA, CIA CREST document C01435053, on the Explosive Residue Detection Technique entries. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435053 ↩︎

  31. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, "Relationship with Police," CIA CREST document C01435041, covering May 1966 to January 1973. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435041 ↩︎

  32. Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum, "Trace Metal Detection Technique - Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: A Status Report," August 27, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150008-8, with attachments. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150008-8 ↩︎

  33. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security memorandum, "Technology Transfer of ERDT to LEAA," November 10, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150007-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150007-9 ↩︎

  34. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum for the Deputy Director of Security, "LEAA Request for Agency Support, Where's What," February 16, 1972, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200060130-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000200060130-3 ↩︎

  35. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, "Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 9, 1973, CIA CREST document 01430445, entry on LEAA. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01430445 ↩︎

  36. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, summary of the Holtzman Amendment to H.R. 8152 (status as of June 22, 1973), CIA-RDP76M00527R000700190003-1, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp76m00527r000700190003-1; "The So-Called Holtzman Amendment," CIA-RDP75B00380R000100060091-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75b00380r000100060091-9 ↩︎

  37. Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-83, sec. 508, 87 Stat. 211 (August 6, 1973). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg197.pdf ↩︎

  38. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, memorandum for the record, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," OGC 73-1954, October 15, 1973, CIA-RDP75-00793R000300160026-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00793r000300160026-2 ↩︎

  39. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Reauthorization Legislation," July 12, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050017-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r001800050017-0 ↩︎

  40. Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Review Staff, "Briefing of House Select Committee Staff re LEAA Relationships," November 14, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110024-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp89b00552r000100110024-1 ↩︎

  41. National Bureau of Standards, LEAA Police Equipment Survey of 1972, vol. II, Equipment and Supplies, NBS Special Publication 480-2 (June 1977), crowd control and helmet communications section. https://archive.org/details/leaapoliceequip00lawe ↩︎

  42. Third Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971, grant NI 71-023-G, Prison Adjustment Center, American Justice Institute, Sacramento, December 8, 1970 to February 15, 1971. https://archive.org/details/ERIC_ED072215 ↩︎

  43. Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, p. 36 (Massachusetts General Hospital) and appendix Items III.A.1 and III.A.2 (Ervin letter and LEAA letter of October 27, 1972). https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/142690NCJRS.pdf ↩︎

  44. Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, p. 18 (the Boston study and the Neuro-Research Foundation final report) and p. 35 (LEAA section). ↩︎

  45. Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, pp. 36-38 (Center for the Study and Reduction of Violence, project description of September 1, 1972, the Atascadero staff psychologist's memorandum, the West letter, and LEAA review procedures); appendix memorandum of the Committee Opposing Psychiatric Abuse of Prisoners, April 5, 1973. ↩︎

  46. Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification, pp. 32-34 (Bureau of Prisons, Project START, and the Federal Center for Correctional Research at Butner), with the Project START operations memorandum of October 25, 1972 printed in the appendix. ↩︎

  47. Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. July 31, 1974) (Oliver, J.). https://static.case.law/f-supp/379/cases/0338-01.json ↩︎

  48. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-157, sec. 2 (part A, sec. 101), 93 Stat. 1167, 1170 (December 27, 1979), and sec. 801 (Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics), 93 Stat. 1201. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/STATUTE-93-Pg1167.pdf ↩︎

  49. U.S. House of Representatives, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857, pp. 82-83, section on the March 13, 1985 meeting with D. Lowell Jensen. ↩︎

  50. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857 (September 10, 1992), p. 19, on the selection of C. Madison Brewer from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport ↩︎

  51. Justice Assistance Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, title II, ch. VI, sec. 603 (part A of title I, Office of Justice Programs), 98 Stat. 2078; sec. 609I (references to LEAA), 98 Stat. 1837 et seq. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg1837.pdf ↩︎