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- 2026-10-09T1437 · [[United States Information Agency]]
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- 2026-10-09T1437 · [[Rand Corporation]]
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- 2026-10-09T1437 · [[Stansfield Turner]]
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- 2026-10-09T1436 · [[Central Intelligence Agency]]
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- 2026-10-09T1435 · [[Office of Strategic Services]]
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- 2026-10-09T1435 · [[Office of Strategic Services]]
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- 2026-10-09T1435 · [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]]
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- 2026-10-09T1435 · [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]]
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- 2026-10-09T1433 · [[Gilbert Roller]]
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- 2026-10-09T1433 · [[Gilbert Roller]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Atomic Energy Commission]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Atomic Energy Commission]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Project Blue Book]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Project Blue Book]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Central Intelligence Agency]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Allen Dulles]]
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- 2026-10-09T1333 · [[Allen Dulles]]
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- 2026-10-09T1331 · [[Kim Philby]]
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- 2026-10-09T1331 · [[Kim Philby]]
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- 2026-10-09T1330 · [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]
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- 2026-10-09T1330 · [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]]
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- 2026-10-09T1259 · [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]]
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- 2026-10-09T1259 · [[Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology]]
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- 2026-10-09T1258 · [[National Reconnaissance Office]]
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- 2026-10-09T1258 · [[National Reconnaissance Office]]
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- 2026-10-09T1258 · [[Eileen Garrett]]
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- 2026-10-09T1258 · [[Eileen Garrett]]
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- 2026-10-09T1256 · [[Rand Corporation]]
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- 2026-10-09T1256 · [[James Monroe]]
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- 2026-10-09T1256 · [[James Monroe]]
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- 2026-10-09T1256 · [[John Gittinger]]
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- 2026-10-09T1256 · [[John Gittinger]]
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- 2026-10-09T1253 · [[Robert M. Brier]]
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- 2026-10-09T1253 · [[Robert M. Brier]]
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@ -96,5 +98,3 @@
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- 2026-10-08T1935 · [[Michael Riconosciuto]]
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- 2026-10-08T1935 · [[Michael Riconosciuto]]
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- 2026-10-08T1935 · [[John Singlaub]]
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- 2026-10-08T1935 · [[John Singlaub]]
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- 2026-10-08T1935 · [[Ariel Sharon]]
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- 2026-10-08T1935 · [[Ariel Sharon]]
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- 2026-10-08T1935 · [[Anastasio Somoza]]
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- 2026-10-08T1935 · [[Robert S. McNamara]]
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@ -12,19 +12,24 @@ location: "Highland Park, Illinois"
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Stansfield Turner (1923–2018) was an American admiral who served as the [[Director of Central Intelligence|DCI]] under President [[Jimmy Carter]] from 1977 to 1981. His tenure at the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] was marked by significant changes, including a reduction in [[Human Intelligence|HUMINT]] capabilities, which was seen as being on the wane following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying.[^1]
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Stansfield Turner (1923–2018) was an American admiral who served as the [[Director of Central Intelligence|DCI]] under President [[Jimmy Carter]] from 1977 to 1981. His tenure at the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] was marked by significant changes, including a reduction in [[Human Intelligence|HUMINT]] capabilities, which was seen as being on the wane following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying.[^1]
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As Director of Central Intelligence, Turner abruptly cut back intelligence liaison with [[Israel]] and other friendly nations as part of a restructuring of the CIA. This move was met with disquiet from the Israelis, who were accustomed to warmer treatment from previous administrations.[^3]
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As Director of Central Intelligence, Turner abruptly cut back intelligence liaison with [[Israel]] and other friendly nations as part of a restructuring of the CIA. This move was met with disquiet from the Israelis, who were accustomed to warmer treatment from previous administrations.[^2]
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In an interview in 2002, Turner stated, "When I was first introduced to this idea of [[Parapsychology|parapsychology]] I was very skeptical. Then I began to think about it, and we all know of people who seem to have some kind of psychic powers." His acceptance of the phenomena, despite his initial skepticism, was crucial for the continuation of the [[Stargate Project|Stargate]] program.[^1]
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In an interview in 2002, Turner stated, "When I was first introduced to this idea of [[Parapsychology|parapsychology]] I was very skeptical. Then I began to think about it, and we all know of people who seem to have some kind of psychic powers." His acceptance of the phenomena, despite his initial skepticism, was crucial for the continuation of the [[Stargate Project|Stargate]] program.[^1]
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Turner was widely disliked within the Agency for abruptly firing two hundred case officers in CIA stations around the world in October 1977. He seemed to prefer "arm's-length collection techniques," such as satellite photography and communications intercepts, over traditional spy work. This preference for "clean" spying methods inadvertently made psychic intelligence, or [[PSI-INT]], seem like an ideal alternative in the political context of the time.[^1]
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Turner was widely disliked within the Agency for abruptly firing two hundred case officers in CIA stations around the world in October 1977. He seemed to prefer "arm's-length collection techniques," such as satellite photography and communications intercepts, over traditional spy work. This preference for "clean" spying methods inadvertently made psychic intelligence, or [[PSI-INT]], seem like an ideal alternative in the political context of the time.[^1]
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Turner was also a member of the board of directors for [[Wackenhut Corporation]], a security firm with extensive ties to government and intelligence agencies.[^2]
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Turner was also a member of the board of directors for [[Wackenhut Corporation]], a security firm with extensive ties to government and intelligence agencies.[^3]
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During Jimmy Carter's presidency, Turner's leadership of the CIA saw the agency distanced from death-squad interdiction due to Carter's human rights foreign policy in [[Latin America]].[^2]
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During Jimmy Carter's presidency, Turner's leadership of the CIA saw the agency distanced from death-squad interdiction due to Carter's human rights foreign policy in [[Latin America]].[^3]
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### Notifications to Institutions, 1977
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On August 2, 1977 Turner wrote to Senator [[Daniel K. Inouye]] that the agency had recovered MKULTRA documents naming researchers and institutions, and that "We are now in possession of the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants." He wrote that the names were being given to the committee "on a classified basis," that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent," and that he was "working closely with the Attorney General and with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on this matter."[^4]
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### Footnotes
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
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[^1]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
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[^2]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
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[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
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[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
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[^3]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
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[^4]: Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (185 researchers at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102; Attorney General passage at p. 103). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
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@ -23,7 +23,12 @@ relations:
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role: "deputy director"
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role: "deputy director"
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start: 1981-02
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start: 1981-02
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end: 1982-04
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end: 1982-04
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fn: 15
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fn: 21
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Psychological Strategy Board]]"
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role: "Member agency; the Director of Central Intelligence chaired meeting M-8"
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start: 1952-01-10
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fn: 37
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---
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---
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The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
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The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.[^1]
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@ -39,6 +44,14 @@ In 1972, the CIA, through officials like [[Kenneth A. Kress|Ken Kress]] from the
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Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^4]
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Since [[World War II]] the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at [[Dachau]] and [[Albert Hofmann]]'s discovery of [[LSD]]. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of [[Josef Cardinal Mindszenty]] in [[Hungary]], whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through [[Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke|Project BLUEBIRD]] (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]] under the [[Office of Technical Service|Technical Services Staff]], with [[Richard Helms]] its most important sponsor and his protégé [[Sidney Gottlieb]] running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.[^4]
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### The 1977 Notifications to Institutions
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In the summer of 1977 the agency located MKULTRA documents it had believed destroyed in 1973, and notified the institutions named in them. Director of Central Intelligence [[Stansfield Turner]] wrote to Senator [[Daniel K. Inouye]] on August 2, 1977 that the agency now held "the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants" and the names of 80 institutions where the work was done or with which the researchers were affiliated. He listed them as 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, and 3 penal institutions. The names went to the Senate committee on a classified basis, and the Director wrote that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent."[^5]
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General Counsel [[Anthony A. Lapham]] wrote to each institution in August 1977. The letter stated that the institution "is included among the institutions at which some portion of this CIA-sponsored research appears to have been performed or with which one or more individuals performing some aspect of this research were affiliated," and that the agency "does not intend to reveal to the public the identities of any institutions that knowingly or unknowingly were involved in MKULTRA activities, or the names of individual researchers."[^6] On September 7, 1977 A. R. Cinquegrana of the Office of General Counsel sent the president of the [[New School for Social Research]], [[John R. Everett]], copies of the two MKULTRA subproject files relating to the school, with a letter stating that "the name of the School has been reinserted wherever it appears in the original documents."[^7] Lapham's letter of November 7, 1977 asked whether each institution had itself made its correspondence public, and wrote that "Where an institution has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts."[^8] On March 17, 1978 Assistant General Counsel Cinquegrana wrote that the agency would presume an institution wished its identity protected if it did not respond by April 15, 1978.[^9]
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The Senate Health Subcommittee invited the presidents of 20 institutions to testify on September 20 and 21, 1977. Only one accepted, and that president was not scheduled to testify because the others declined.[^10]
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### Notable Operations and Impact
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### Notable Operations and Impact
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* Semipalatinsk: CIA officials tasked [[Pat Price]] with remote viewing a mysterious Soviet military research facility at Semipalatinsk. Price's detailed descriptions of a gantry crane and large metal spheres were later confirmed by satellite photography, significantly impressing the Agency and securing further funding for SRI's psi research.[^1]
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* Semipalatinsk: CIA officials tasked [[Pat Price]] with remote viewing a mysterious Soviet military research facility at Semipalatinsk. Price's detailed descriptions of a gantry crane and large metal spheres were later confirmed by satellite photography, significantly impressing the Agency and securing further funding for SRI's psi research.[^1]
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The CIA's relationship with [[Israel]]i intelligence, particularly [[Mossad]], was extensive, involving 28 formal cooperative ventures in strategic intelligence since the 1950s. These arrangements were often financed off-the-books through a special contingency fund maintained by the Director of Central Intelligence. One such operation, code-named KK MOUNTAIN, involved millions in annual cash payments to Mossad in exchange for their agents acting as American surrogates in North Africa and other regions. Other agreements financed Israeli operations in [[Syria]] and the [[Soviet Union]], where the CIA found it difficult to operate.[^2]
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The CIA's relationship with [[Israel]]i intelligence, particularly [[Mossad]], was extensive, involving 28 formal cooperative ventures in strategic intelligence since the 1950s. These arrangements were often financed off-the-books through a special contingency fund maintained by the Director of Central Intelligence. One such operation, code-named KK MOUNTAIN, involved millions in annual cash payments to Mossad in exchange for their agents acting as American surrogates in North Africa and other regions. Other agreements financed Israeli operations in [[Syria]] and the [[Soviet Union]], where the CIA found it difficult to operate.[^2]
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In 1977, [[Stansfield Turner]], then Director of Central Intelligence, abruptly cut back intelligence liaison with Israel as part of a CIA restructuring. This led to a sharp reduction in the flow of intelligence from Israel to [[Washington, D.C.]]. However, the CIA's "embarrassingly inept reporting on [[Iran]]", particularly their failure to anticipate the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, forced the American leadership to turn back to Israeli help in anticipating world events. This contributed to the March 1979 KH-11 agreement, which granted Israel access to high-tech satellite imagery.[^2]
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In 1977, Stansfield Turner, then Director of Central Intelligence, abruptly cut back intelligence liaison with Israel as part of a CIA restructuring. This led to a sharp reduction in the flow of intelligence from Israel to [[Washington, D.C.]]. However, the CIA's "embarrassingly inept reporting on [[Iran]]", particularly their failure to anticipate the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, forced the American leadership to turn back to Israeli help in anticipating world events. This contributed to the March 1979 KH-11 agreement, which granted Israel access to high-tech satellite imagery.[^2]
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Initially, the KH-11 satellite's images were tightly restricted, even to close allies like [[Great Britain]]. However, [[Jimmy Carter]]'s decision to provide Israel with direct access to the KH-11 in March 1979 disrupted the satellite's careful scheduling and meant less access for some American intelligence agencies. This decision was suspected by some American intelligence officials as a reward for the [[Camp David Accords|Camp David summit]].[^2]
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Initially, the KH-11 satellite's images were tightly restricted, even to close allies like [[Great Britain]]. However, [[Jimmy Carter]]'s decision to provide Israel with direct access to the KH-11 in March 1979 disrupted the satellite's careful scheduling and meant less access for some American intelligence agencies. This decision was suspected by some American intelligence officials as a reward for the [[Camp David Accords|Camp David summit]].[^2]
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@ -59,29 +72,29 @@ Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing]]
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### Involvement with BCCI
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### Involvement with BCCI
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The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^5] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^5] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^6]
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The CIA used the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in [[Central America]].[^11] Even before [[Oliver North]] established his network for illegal payments to the [[Contras]], the [[National Security Council]] used BCCI to channel money to them through [[Saudi Arabia]].[^11] The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.[^12]
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In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^7] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^8] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^9]
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In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned [[First American Bank]] since 1982.[^13] In 1991, Acting CIA Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.[^14] The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.[^15]
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William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^10] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^10]
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William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.[^16] The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.[^16]
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The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^11]
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The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, [[Douglas Mulholland]], who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the [[State Department]], the Defense Intelligence Agency, the [[National Security Agency]], the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] and the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the [[Madison Hotel]] in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.[^17]
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### Operations and Activities
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### Operations and Activities
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The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^12] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^12]
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The CIA sent the [[Inter-Services Intelligence|Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]] agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through [[Pakistan]] during the [[Soviet-Afghan War]].[^18] The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the [[Mujahideen]], but once delivered to [[Karachi]], the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.[^18]
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In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^13] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^13]
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In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.[^19] This became the largest covert-action program since [[World War Two]].[^19]
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### Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1981 to 1982
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### Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1981 to 1982
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President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^14] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^15] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^14]
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President Ronald Reagan nominated [[Bobby Ray Inman]], then director of the [[NSA]], as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.[^20] The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.[^21] The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.[^20]
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The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^16] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^17]
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The [[Philadelphia Inquirer]] reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.[^22] A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."[^23]
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### Senior Review Panel
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### Senior Review Panel
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The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^18] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^18] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^19]
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The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of [[Robert Gates]], Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."[^24] The Senate report records that [[James D. Theberge]] served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^24] Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside [[William Leonhart]], B. McPherson and, on some, [[Richard L. Walker]] or [[Courtland D. Perkins]].[^25]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### UAP Research and Secrecy
|
### UAP Research and Secrecy
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -93,37 +106,45 @@ In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigatio
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Dark Alliance Investigation
|
### Dark Alliance Investigation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^20]
|
The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by [[Dewey Clarridge]] from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]] in 1980 and [[Eden Pastora]] in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in [[Costa Rica]], notably [[Joseph Fernandez|Joseph Fernández]] from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.[^26]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case
|
### Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^21]
|
Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of [[Cocaine]] being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]]. When defense attorneys in the [[Frogman Case]] obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to [[San Francisco]] and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."[^27]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^21]
|
The pseudonymous agent [[Ivan Gomez|Iván Gómez]], assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money. He was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.[^27]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department
|
### The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^22]
|
In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.[^28]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Ilopango Obstruction
|
### Ilopango Obstruction
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^23]
|
When [[DEA]] agent [[Celerino Castillo]] began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly. In April 1986 the El Salvador station sent a cable asking the Costa Rica station to persuade the DEA to back off: "El Salvador Station would appreciate Costa Rica Station advising DEA not to make any inquiries into anyone re: Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate CIA supported operations were conducted from this facility."[^29]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Inspector General Investigation
|
### Inspector General Investigation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^22]
|
CIA Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] testified before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.[^28]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Iran-Contra Indictments
|
### Iran-Contra Indictments
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^20]
|
Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. [[Alan Fiers]] pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director [[George H.W. Bush]].[^26]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Foreign Broadcast Information Service
|
### Foreign Broadcast Information Service
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^24] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^25] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^26]
|
The [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] became a unit of the agency in 1947. The [[War Department]] had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the [[National Security Act of 1947]] replaced the [[Central Intelligence Group]] with the agency.[^30] The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."[^31] The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."[^32]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^27]
|
Within the agency the service sat under the [[Assistant Director for Operations]]. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. [[Lawrence K. White]] was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.[^33]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^28]
|
The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.[^34]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Psychological warfare liaison, 1946 to 1952
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the [[Office of War Information]]. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the [[National Intelligence Authority]], and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the [[State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee]].[^35]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the [[Office of Special Operations]] and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.[^36]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the [[Psychological Strategy Board]] was chaired by [[Walter Bedell Smith]], the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. [[Edward W. Barrett]], Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.[^37]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Footnotes
|
### Footnotes
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -131,27 +152,36 @@ The service's functions were folded into the [[Open Source Center]] in November
|
||||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
|
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
|
||||||
[^3]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
|
[^3]: Elizondo, Luis. *Imminent*. William Morrow, 2024.
|
||||||
[^4]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
|
[^4]: John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2.
|
||||||
[^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
|
[^5]: Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (figures at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
|
||||||
[^6]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
|
[^6]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, August 1977 (stamped August 15, 1977), in NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 94-95.
|
||||||
[^7]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
|
[^7]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, September 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 7. https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027
|
||||||
[^8]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
|
[^8]: Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, November 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 3.
|
||||||
[^9]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
|
[^9]: Cinquegrana, A. R., Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, March 17, 1978, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 1.
|
||||||
[^10]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
|
[^10]: Thomas, Jo, "Extent of University Work for C.I.A. Is Hard to Pin Down," New York Times, October 9, 1977, CIA reading room clipping CIA-RDP88-01315R000300390007-3.
|
||||||
[^11]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
|
[^11]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126.
|
||||||
[^12]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
|
[^12]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147.
|
||||||
[^13]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
|
[^13]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12.
|
||||||
[^14]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
|
[^14]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9.
|
||||||
[^15]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
|
[^15]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
|
||||||
[^16]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
|
[^16]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347.
|
||||||
[^17]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
|
[^17]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
|
||||||
[^18]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
|
[^18]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334.
|
||||||
[^19]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
|
[^19]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341.
|
||||||
[^20]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
[^20]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html
|
||||||
[^21]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
[^21]: George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3
|
||||||
[^22]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
|
[^22]: Michael J. Sniffen, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7
|
||||||
[^23]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
[^23]: CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5
|
||||||
[^24]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
[^24]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
|
||||||
[^25]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
|
[^25]: CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1
|
||||||
[^26]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
[^26]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||||
[^27]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
[^27]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom"
|
||||||
[^28]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
|
[^28]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
|
||||||
|
[^29]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends"
|
||||||
|
[^30]: Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||||
|
[^31]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html.
|
||||||
|
[^32]: Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947.
|
||||||
|
[^33]: Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690.
|
||||||
|
[^34]: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html.
|
||||||
|
[^35]: Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9
|
||||||
|
[^36]: Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0
|
||||||
|
[^37]: Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ summary: "Federal agency created by Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 to run the
|
||||||
start: 1953-08-01
|
start: 1953-08-01
|
||||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||||
created: 2026-09-24
|
created: 2026-09-24
|
||||||
updated: 2026-09-24
|
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||||
relations:
|
relations:
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Theodore C. Streibert]]"
|
with: "[[Theodore C. Streibert]]"
|
||||||
|
|
@ -27,109 +27,116 @@ relations:
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1953-08-04
|
start: 1953-08-04
|
||||||
end: 1956-11-15
|
end: 1956-11-15
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Arthur Larson]]"
|
with: "[[Arthur Larson]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1956-11-14
|
start: 1956-11-14
|
||||||
end: 1957-10-27
|
end: 1957-10-27
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[George V. Allen]]"
|
with: "[[George V. Allen]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1957-11-15
|
start: 1957-11-15
|
||||||
end: 1960-12-01
|
end: 1960-12-01
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Edward R. Murrow]]"
|
with: "[[Edward R. Murrow]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1961-03-15
|
start: 1961-03-15
|
||||||
end: 1964-01-20
|
end: 1964-01-20
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Carl Rowan]]"
|
with: "[[Carl Rowan]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1964-02-27
|
start: 1964-02-27
|
||||||
end: 1965-07-10
|
end: 1965-07-10
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Leonard Marks]]"
|
with: "[[Leonard Marks]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1965-09-01
|
start: 1965-09-01
|
||||||
end: 1968-12-06
|
end: 1968-12-06
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Frank Shakespeare]]"
|
with: "[[Frank Shakespeare]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1969-02-07
|
start: 1969-02-07
|
||||||
end: 1973-02-07
|
end: 1973-02-07
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[James Keogh]]"
|
with: "[[James Keogh]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1973-02-08
|
start: 1973-02-08
|
||||||
end: 1976-11-30
|
end: 1976-11-30
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[John E. Reinhardt]]"
|
with: "[[John E. Reinhardt]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1977-03-23
|
start: 1977-03-23
|
||||||
end: 1980-08-29
|
end: 1980-08-29
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Charles Z. Wick]]"
|
with: "[[Charles Z. Wick]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1981-06-09
|
start: 1981-06-09
|
||||||
end: 1989-01-20
|
end: 1989-01-20
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Bruce Gelb]]"
|
with: "[[Bruce Gelb]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1989-04-14
|
start: 1989-04-14
|
||||||
end: 1991-03-20
|
end: 1991-03-20
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Henry Catto]]"
|
with: "[[Henry Catto]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1991-05-09
|
start: 1991-05-09
|
||||||
end: 1993-01
|
end: 1993-01
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
- type: head_of
|
- type: head_of
|
||||||
with: "[[Joseph Duffey]]"
|
with: "[[Joseph Duffey]]"
|
||||||
reverse: true
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
role: "director"
|
role: "director"
|
||||||
start: 1993-06-03
|
start: 1993-06-03
|
||||||
|
fn: 4
|
||||||
|
- type: partner_of
|
||||||
|
with: "[[Office of War Information]]"
|
||||||
|
role: "Successor for OWI's foreign dissemination functions, through the State Department interim service, 1945 to 1953"
|
||||||
|
start: 1945-08-31
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 2
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The United States Information Agency was created by Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, which President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] sent to [[Congress]] on June 1, 1953, and which took effect on August 1, 1953. Section 1(a) reads: "There is hereby established a new agency which shall be known as the United States Information Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Agency." The Director was to be "appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" at 17,500 dollars a year, and "The Secretary of State shall advise with the President concerning the appointment and tenure of the Director." Section 1(c) created a Deputy Director at 16,000 dollars.[^1]
|
The United States Information Agency was created by Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, which President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] sent to [[Congress]] on June 1, 1953, and which took effect on August 1, 1953. Section 1(a) reads: "There is hereby established a new agency which shall be known as the United States Information Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Agency." The Director was to be "appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" at 17,500 dollars a year, and "The Secretary of State shall advise with the President concerning the appointment and tenure of the Director." Section 1(c) created a Deputy Director at 16,000 dollars.[^1]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The agency's foreign information functions descended from the [[Office of War Information]]. Executive Order 9608 of August 31, 1945 transferred OWI's foreign functions, together with the informational functions of the [[Office of Inter-American Affairs]] performed abroad, to an interim International Information Service in the [[State Department]]. The National Archives lists the foreign dissemination functions as in the State Department from 1945 to 1953 and in the United States Information Agency from 1953.[^2][^3] The agency's own records are in RG 306 at the National Archives.[^3]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Functions
|
### Functions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Section 2 of the plan transferred to the Director "the functions vested in the Secretary of State by Title V of the [[Smith-Mundt Act|United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948]], as amended," with related functions on the interchange of books and periodicals, aid to libraries, and the information programs in [[Germany]] and [[Austria]] previously run by the [[Mutual Security Agency]]. Section 2(c)(1) kept content with the [[State Department]]: "The Secretary of State shall direct the policy and control the content of a program, for use abroad, on official United States positions."[^1]
|
Section 2 of the plan transferred to the Director "the functions vested in the Secretary of State by Title V of the [[Smith-Mundt Act|United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948]], as amended," with related functions on the interchange of books and periodicals, aid to libraries, and the information programs in [[Germany]] and [[Austria]] previously run by the [[Mutual Security Agency]]. Section 2(c)(1) kept content with the State Department: "The Secretary of State shall direct the policy and control the content of a program, for use abroad, on official United States positions."[^1]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The agency was "known overseas as the U.S. Information Service" and was "responsible for the U.S. Government's overseas information and cultural programs, including the [[Voice of America]]."[^2]
|
The agency was "known overseas as the U.S. Information Service" and was "responsible for the U.S. Government's overseas information and cultural programs, including the [[Voice of America]]."[^4]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[[National Security Action Memorandum 124]] of January 18, 1962, established the [[NSC Special Group|Special Group (Counterinsurgency)]], on which representatives of the agency sat with officials of the [[Agency for International Development]] and [[Robert Kennedy]].[^3]
|
[[National Security Action Memorandum 124]] of January 18, 1962, established the [[NSC Special Group|Special Group (Counterinsurgency)]], on which representatives of the agency sat with officials of the [[Agency for International Development]] and [[Robert Kennedy]].[^5]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Names
|
### Names
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 (91 Stat. 1636) abolished the agency and established in its place the International Communication Agency, effective April 1, 1978. Public Law 97-241 of August 24, 1982 (96 Stat. 291), restored the earlier name.[^2]
|
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 (91 Stat. 1636) abolished the agency and established in its place the International Communication Agency, effective April 1, 1978. Public Law 97-241 of August 24, 1982 (96 Stat. 291), restored the earlier name.[^4]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Directors
|
### Directors
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Directors and their dates of service were:[^2]
|
Directors and their dates of service were:[^4]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- [[Theodore C. Streibert]], August 4, 1953, to November 15, 1956
|
- [[Theodore C. Streibert]], August 4, 1953, to November 15, 1956
|
||||||
- [[Arthur Larson]], November 14, 1956, to October 27, 1957
|
- [[Arthur Larson]], November 14, 1956, to October 27, 1957
|
||||||
|
|
@ -145,11 +152,13 @@ Directors and their dates of service were:[^2]
|
||||||
- [[Henry Catto|Henry E. Catto]], May 9, 1991, to January 1993
|
- [[Henry Catto|Henry E. Catto]], May 9, 1991, to January 1993
|
||||||
- [[Joseph Duffey|Joseph D. Duffey]], appointed May 25, 1993, entered on duty June 3, 1993
|
- [[Joseph Duffey|Joseph D. Duffey]], appointed May 25, 1993, entered on duty June 3, 1993
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[[Mark W. Everson]] began his service in the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration at the agency in 1982, during Wick's directorship.[^4]
|
[[Mark W. Everson]] began his service in the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration at the agency in 1982, during Wick's directorship.[^6]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Footnotes
|
### Footnotes
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[^1]: Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, 67 Stat. 642-643, effective August 1, 1953. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-67/pdf/STATUTE-67-Pg642.pdf
|
[^1]: Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, 67 Stat. 642-643, effective August 1, 1953. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-67/pdf/STATUTE-67-Pg642.pdf
|
||||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. "Director of the U.S. Information Agency." Archived February 11, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260211080812/https://1997-2001.state.gov/about_state/history/officers/usia.html
|
[^2]: Executive Order 9608, "Providing for the Termination of the Office of War Information, and for the Disposition of Its Functions and of Certain Functions of the Office of Inter-American Affairs," August 31, 1945, Federal Register, September 1, 1945, 10 F.R. 11223. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1945-09-01/pdf/FR-1945-09-01.pdf
|
||||||
[^3]: NSAM No. 124, January 18, 1962. Department of Defense Mandatory Declassification Review release 12-M-3087, "The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) from January 18, 1962, to November 21, 1963." https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/MDR_Releases/FY12/12-M-3087
|
[^3]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 208, administrative history, "Successor Agencies," and "Related Records" (Records of the U.S. Information Agency, RG 306). https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/208.html
|
||||||
[^4]: National Archives and Records Administration. Catalog Record ID 3936205. catalog.archives.gov.
|
[^4]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. "Director of the U.S. Information Agency." Archived February 11, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260211080812/https://1997-2001.state.gov/about_state/history/officers/usia.html
|
||||||
|
[^5]: NSAM No. 124, January 18, 1962. Department of Defense Mandatory Declassification Review release 12-M-3087, "The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) from January 18, 1962, to November 21, 1963." https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/MDR_Releases/FY12/12-M-3087
|
||||||
|
[^6]: National Archives and Records Administration. Catalog Record ID 3936205. catalog.archives.gov.
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ relations:
|
||||||
start: 1948-07
|
start: 1948-07
|
||||||
end: 1960
|
end: 1960
|
||||||
fn: 2
|
fn: 2
|
||||||
|
- type: employed_by
|
||||||
|
with: "[[Leo Rosten]]"
|
||||||
|
reverse: true
|
||||||
|
role: "member of the 1946 committee on social scientists; came to RAND through W. Allen Wallis (Bessner, note 89)"
|
||||||
|
start: 1946
|
||||||
|
fn: 3
|
||||||
summary: "The Rand Corporation is the Air Force's principal Cold War nonprofit think tank in Santa Monica, founded as Project RAND in 1946, whose Vietnam-era Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study produced suppressed critical findings."
|
summary: "The Rand Corporation is the Air Force's principal Cold War nonprofit think tank in Santa Monica, founded as Project RAND in 1946, whose Vietnam-era Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study produced suppressed critical findings."
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
The Rand Corporation, whose name is an acronym for Research and Development, is headquartered in [[Santa Monica, California]], with a Washington, D.C., office near the [[White House]]. It arose from the partnership between university scientists and the military that developed during the Second World War, established as Project RAND in 1946 with the [[U.S. Air Force]] as its primary institutional sponsor and incorporated as an independent nonprofit in 1948. It is not primarily a psychological research organization; economists and political scientists form the largest part of its staff. In the [[Cold War]] it was among the first institutions to apply systematic psychological and social scientific methods to military problems, including censorship policy, the psychological effects of weapons, propaganda organization, and, most controversially, the morale and motivation of enemy forces during the [[Vietnam War]].[^1]
|
The Rand Corporation, whose name is an acronym for Research and Development, is headquartered in [[Santa Monica, California]], with a Washington, D.C., office near the [[White House]]. It arose from the partnership between university scientists and the military that developed during the Second World War, established as Project RAND in 1946 with the [[U.S. Air Force]] as its primary institutional sponsor and incorporated as an independent nonprofit in 1948. It is not primarily a psychological research organization; economists and political scientists form the largest part of its staff. In the [[Cold War]] it was among the first institutions to apply systematic psychological and social scientific methods to military problems, including censorship policy, the psychological effects of weapons, propaganda organization, and, most controversially, the morale and motivation of enemy forces during the [[Vietnam War]].[^1]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -30,17 +36,19 @@ The Rand Corporation, whose name is an acronym for Research and Development, is
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
In the summer of 1946 a committee of [[Herbert Goldhamer]], Olaf Helmer, Frederick Mosteller, [[Leo Rosten]], W. Allen Wallis, [[Warren Weaver]] and Samuel Wilks began to consider which social scientists to bring to Project RAND. In September 1947 Project RAND held a Conference of Social Scientists in New York (September 14 to 19; RAND R-106, June 9, 1948) to recruit leaders for its planned Social Science and Economics divisions. The thirty-five participants included [[Ernst Kris]], [[Franz Neumann]], [[Harold Lasswell]], [[Bernard Brodie]], [[Ruth Benedict]], Charles Dollard and [[Pendleton Herring]] of the [[Carnegie Corporation]], Donald Young of the [[Social Science Research Council]] and Warren Weaver of the [[Rockefeller Foundation]], an early RAND consultant. Weaver told the group that every piece of knowledge in sociology, economics and political science would be forged into "weapons" for the defense of democracy; [[Frank Collbohm]] told them that the Air Force "makes available to RAND information in other fields, intelligence, plans, etc."[^2]
|
In the summer of 1946 a committee of [[Herbert Goldhamer]], Olaf Helmer, Frederick Mosteller, [[Leo Rosten]], W. Allen Wallis, [[Warren Weaver]] and Samuel Wilks began to consider which social scientists to bring to Project RAND. In September 1947 Project RAND held a Conference of Social Scientists in New York (September 14 to 19; RAND R-106, June 9, 1948) to recruit leaders for its planned Social Science and Economics divisions. The thirty-five participants included [[Ernst Kris]], [[Franz Neumann]], [[Harold Lasswell]], [[Bernard Brodie]], [[Ruth Benedict]], Charles Dollard and [[Pendleton Herring]] of the [[Carnegie Corporation]], Donald Young of the [[Social Science Research Council]] and Warren Weaver of the [[Rockefeller Foundation]], an early RAND consultant. Weaver told the group that every piece of knowledge in sociology, economics and political science would be forged into "weapons" for the defense of democracy; [[Frank Collbohm]] told them that the Air Force "makes available to RAND information in other fields, intelligence, plans, etc."[^2]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[[Hans Speier]] came to RAND from the [[New School for Social Research]], where from April 1, 1941 he had co-directed with Kris the [[Research Project on Totalitarian Communication]] under Rockefeller Foundation grants. At the [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] he was offered the post of Senior Political Analyst by [[Goodwin Watson]] in February 1942 and became Principal Political Analyst in November 1942; after Watson left he became Acting Chief Analyst, and on May 22, 1944 he transferred to the [[Office of War Information]]'s Overseas Operations Branch.[^3] A connection he made at the OWI with Rosten brought him to RAND's attention.[^2] He consulted from May 1948 and headed the Social Science Division from July 1948, keeping it in Washington until 1957. He hired [[Alexander George]], [[Nathan Leites]], Phil Davison and William Kaufmann, several of them colleagues from the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, used Leon Gouré, [[John Herz]] and [[Otto Kirchheimer]] as consultants, held a "Q" clearance, and opened a RAND office in Wiesbaden. In October 1960 the divisions were reorganized into departments, Goldhamer succeeded him, and Speier joined the Research Council (chairman 1961 to 1962).[^2][^4]
|
Rosten, who had served in the [[Office of War Information]] as liaison between Washington and Hollywood, was one of the committee's members. Bessner says Rosten came to RAND through W. Allen Wallis, who had worked with Helmer and Williams on the Applied Mathematics Panel during the war.[^3]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
[[Hans Speier]] came to RAND from the [[New School for Social Research]], where from April 1, 1941 he had co-directed with Kris the [[Research Project on Totalitarian Communication]] under Rockefeller Foundation grants. At the [[Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service]] he was offered the post of Senior Political Analyst by [[Goodwin Watson]] in February 1942 and became Principal Political Analyst in November 1942; after Watson left he became Acting Chief Analyst, and on May 22, 1944 he transferred to the Office of War Information's Overseas Operations Branch.[^4] A connection he made at the OWI with Rosten brought him to RAND's attention.[^2] He consulted from May 1948 and headed the Social Science Division from July 1948, keeping it in Washington until 1957. He hired [[Alexander George]], [[Nathan Leites]], Phil Davison and William Kaufmann, several of them colleagues from the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, used Leon Gouré, [[John Herz]] and [[Otto Kirchheimer]] as consultants, held a "Q" clearance, and opened a RAND office in Wiesbaden. In October 1960 the divisions were reorganized into departments, Goldhamer succeeded him, and Speier joined the Research Council (chairman 1961 to 1962).[^2][^5]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Incorporation and Ford Loan
|
### Incorporation and Ford Loan
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
RAND was incorporated as an independent nonprofit on May 14, 1948. [[H. Rowan Gaither]] and Collbohm arranged the separation from [[Douglas Aircraft]] with a $100,000 interest-free loan and a $300,000 credit guarantee from [[Henry Ford II]] of the [[Ford Foundation]], plus a $150,000 Wells Fargo credit line; the loan was extended to $1,000,000 in 1950 and later converted to a grant. The Carnegie Corporation, the National Science Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation were among RAND's other early financial supporters.[^5]
|
RAND was incorporated as an independent nonprofit on May 14, 1948. [[H. Rowan Gaither]] and Collbohm arranged the separation from [[Douglas Aircraft]] with a $100,000 interest-free loan and a $300,000 credit guarantee from [[Henry Ford II]] of the [[Ford Foundation]], plus a $150,000 Wells Fargo credit line; the loan was extended to $1,000,000 in 1950 and later converted to a grant. The Carnegie Corporation, the National Science Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation were among RAND's other early financial supporters.[^6]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Superstitions Study and Korea
|
### Superstitions Study and Korea
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The division issued Jean M. Hungerford's RM-365, "The Exploitation of Superstitions for Purposes of Psychological Warfare" (April 14, 1950, marked a working paper). It surveys superstition in wartime Germany (astrologers, fortune-tellers, chain letters, with a Security Service report of May 21, 1942 on chain letters translated in an appendix), in other belligerent countries and in the postwar Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; it records Goebbels's 1942 diary entries on counter-horoscopes and a plan for occultist propaganda, German agents posing as astrologers in France in 1940, and the OSS black radio program Operation Hermit, which used astrology and fortune-telling in broadcasts to Nanking. It proposes astrology and fortune-telling to predict dire events likely to befall the enemy, chain letters to burden the enemy postal system, and word-of-mouth rumors introduced by agents, and it states that the files of wartime "black" propagandists were not examined. Its sources include the FCC's weekly reports on Nazi propaganda for 1943 and early 1944, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service Central European Analysis reports, and Kris and Speier's German Radio Propaganda.[^6]
|
The division issued Jean M. Hungerford's RM-365, "The Exploitation of Superstitions for Purposes of Psychological Warfare" (April 14, 1950, marked a working paper). It surveys superstition in wartime Germany (astrologers, fortune-tellers, chain letters, with a Security Service report of May 21, 1942 on chain letters translated in an appendix), in other belligerent countries and in the postwar Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; it records Goebbels's 1942 diary entries on counter-horoscopes and a plan for occultist propaganda, German agents posing as astrologers in France in 1940, and the OSS black radio program Operation Hermit, which used astrology and fortune-telling in broadcasts to Nanking. It proposes astrology and fortune-telling to predict dire events likely to befall the enemy, chain letters to burden the enemy postal system, and word-of-mouth rumors introduced by agents, and it states that the files of wartime "black" propagandists were not examined. Its sources include the FCC's weekly reports on Nazi propaganda for 1943 and early 1944, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service Central European Analysis reports, and Kris and Speier's German Radio Propaganda.[^7]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
After the outbreak of the Korean War a team including Goldhamer, George, Davison, Ewald Schnitzer and a Hungerford (Bessner writes "Jay Hungerford"; RM-365 is credited to Jean M. Hungerford, and records found do not establish whether they are the same person) visited Korea; from August 24, 1951, Goldhamer advised the American armistice delegation at Kaesong and circulated Speier's papers and Leites's The Operational Code of the Politburo (RAND, 1951) to the negotiators. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy was reported to carry the Operational Code on helicopter trips.[^7]
|
After the outbreak of the Korean War a team including Goldhamer, George, Davison, Ewald Schnitzer and a Hungerford (Bessner writes "Jay Hungerford"; RM-365 is credited to Jean M. Hungerford, and records found do not establish whether they are the same person) visited Korea; from August 24, 1951, Goldhamer advised the American armistice delegation at Kaesong and circulated Speier's papers and Leites's The Operational Code of the Politburo (RAND, 1951) to the negotiators. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy was reported to carry the Operational Code on helicopter trips.[^8]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Early Psychological Work
|
### Early Psychological Work
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -88,20 +96,21 @@ Rand's Santa Monica headquarters is described in accounts from the period as res
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Remote Viewing Era References
|
### Remote Viewing Era References
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
In accounts of the 1970s parapsychology research milieu, Rand is noted as larger and more prestigious than the [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]] among scientific think tanks, and it figures in the French accounts of 1959 and 1960 of a [[The Nautilus (Telepathy Project)|USS Nautilus]] telepathy experiment, which the U.S. Navy denied and which a 1975 DIA study called rumors.[^8][^9]
|
In accounts of the 1970s parapsychology research milieu, Rand is noted as larger and more prestigious than the [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]] among scientific think tanks, and it figures in the French accounts of 1959 and 1960 of a [[The Nautilus (Telepathy Project)|USS Nautilus]] telepathy experiment, which the U.S. Navy denied and which a 1975 DIA study called rumors.[^9][^10]
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In Le Matin des magiciens, [[Jacques Bergier]] and [[Louis Pauwels]] wrote that at the beginning of 1957 the Rand Corporation laid before [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|President Eisenhower]] a report proposing telepathy for communicating with submarines, particularly under the polar ice cap, and that the report had no effect for a year. In the same chapter they list Rand among the organizations with parapsychology study laboratories, and a footnote cites a "Rapport de la Rand Corporation, 31 août 1958" in connection with a statement that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission proposed in 1958 to use clairvoyants to guess where Russian bombs would fall.[^10] A report to Soviet Defense Minister [[Rodion Malinovsky]] of March 1960, as quoted by [[I. V. Tsykunov]], says that from the end of 1957 Rand, Westinghouse and Bell Telephone had been working intensively on telepathy.[^11]
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In Le Matin des magiciens, [[Jacques Bergier]] and [[Louis Pauwels]] wrote that at the beginning of 1957 the Rand Corporation laid before [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|President Eisenhower]] a report proposing telepathy for communicating with submarines, particularly under the polar ice cap, and that the report had no effect for a year. In the same chapter they list Rand among the organizations with parapsychology study laboratories, and a footnote cites a "Rapport de la Rand Corporation, 31 août 1958" in connection with a statement that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission proposed in 1958 to use clairvoyants to guess where Russian bombs would fall.[^11] A report to Soviet Defense Minister [[Rodion Malinovsky]] of March 1960, as quoted by [[I. V. Tsykunov]], says that from the end of 1957 Rand, Westinghouse and Bell Telephone had been working intensively on telepathy.[^12]
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### Footnotes
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Peter Watson, *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*. Basic Books, 1978. pp. 388-394 (Ch. 21), 462-468 (App. II); Mai Elliott, *RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era*. RAND CP-564, 2010; Anthony Russo, "Looking Backward: RAND and Vietnam," *Ramparts*, October 1972; RAND report series: RM-4507/3-ISA (March 1965), RM-4911-2-ISA/ARPA (1966), RM-5446-1-ISA/ARPA (October 1967), RM-5462-1 (November 1969), RM-6131-1 (September 1970).
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[^1]: Peter Watson, *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*. Basic Books, 1978. pp. 388-394 (Ch. 21), 462-468 (App. II); Mai Elliott, *RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era*. RAND CP-564, 2010; Anthony Russo, "Looking Backward: RAND and Vietnam," *Ramparts*, October 1972; RAND report series: RM-4507/3-ISA (March 1965), RM-4911-2-ISA/ARPA (1966), RM-5446-1-ISA/ARPA (October 1967), RM-5462-1 (November 1969), RM-6131-1 (September 1970).
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[^2]: Daniel Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD diss., Duke University, 2013), pp. 187-200 and notes 76-123; conference participants at p. 190 note 88; Rosten at pp. 190-191 note 89; Weaver at p. 192; Q clearance at p. 198. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/232a76ac-f2d8-4827-99fe-50b3b109fa6c/content. Deutsche Biographie, "Speier, Hans" (sfz123260), and the University at Albany Speier Papers finding aid (GER-084) give the same RAND dates.
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[^2]: Daniel Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD diss., Duke University, 2013), pp. 187-200 and notes 76-123; conference participants at p. 190 note 88; Rosten at pp. 190-191 note 89; Weaver at p. 192; Q clearance at p. 198. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/232a76ac-f2d8-4827-99fe-50b3b109fa6c/content. Deutsche Biographie, "Speier, Hans" (sfz123260), and the University at Albany Speier Papers finding aid (GER-084) give the same RAND dates.
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[^3]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," introduction p. 13 (the OWI connection with Rosten; Speier recruited several of his Analysis Division colleagues to RAND), pp. 132-137 (February 1942 offer; Principal Political Analyst, November 1942; Acting Chief Analyst after Watson's departure, p. 137) and pp. 145-146 (transfer to the Overseas Operations Branch, May 22, 1944).
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[^3]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," note 89 ("He came to RAND through Allen Wallis"); introduction, p. 13 ("a connection that Speier made at the OWI with Leo Rosten brought Speier to the RAND Corporation"). Sole source for the Rosten route.
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[^4]: Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, German Radio Propaganda (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), Preface (work begun April 1, 1941).
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[^4]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," introduction p. 13 (the OWI connection with Rosten; Speier recruited several of his Analysis Division colleagues to RAND), pp. 132-137 (February 1942 offer; Principal Political Analyst, November 1942; Acting Chief Analyst after Watson's departure, p. 137) and pp. 145-146 (transfer to the Overseas Operations Branch, May 22, 1944).
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[^5]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 187 note 76.
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[^5]: Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, German Radio Propaganda (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), Preface (work begun April 1, 1941).
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[^6]: RAND RM-365, Jean M. Hungerford, The Exploitation of Superstitions for Purposes of Psychological Warfare (April 14, 1950; ASTIA ATI 210637), full text at https://archive.org/details/1950-hungerford-exploitation-of-superstitions-for-purposes-of-psychological-warfare; rand.org record https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM365.html. Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 201 note 128 (dates it April 15, 1950).
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[^6]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 187 note 76.
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[^7]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 205-207 and notes 145-150, citing Goldhamer, The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir, and Robert C. Tucker's memoir for the Joy detail.
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[^7]: RAND RM-365, Jean M. Hungerford, The Exploitation of Superstitions for Purposes of Psychological Warfare (April 14, 1950; ASTIA ATI 210637), full text at https://archive.org/details/1950-hungerford-exploitation-of-superstitions-for-purposes-of-psychological-warfare; rand.org record https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM365.html. Bessner, "The Night Watchman," p. 201 note 128 (dates it April 15, 1950).
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[^8]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
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[^8]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 205-207 and notes 145-150, citing Goldhamer, The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir, and Robert C. Tucker's memoir for the Joy detail.
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[^9]: Maire, Louis F., III, and J. D. LaMothe. *Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research*, DST-1810S-387-75, September 1975, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500420001-2, https://cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000500420001-2.
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[^9]: Schnabel, Jim. *Remote Viewers*. Dell, 1997.
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[^10]: Pauwels, Louis, and Jacques Bergier. *Le Matin des magiciens*, abridged and annotated university edition prepared by Yvonne Lenard with Monica Faulkner (Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 136-141.
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[^10]: Maire, Louis F., III, and J. D. LaMothe. *Soviet and Czechoslovakian Parapsychology Research*, DST-1810S-387-75, September 1975, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500420001-2, https://cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000500420001-2.
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[^11]: Tsykunov, I. V. "От фантазии к реальности: как история «Наутилуса» открыла гонку сверхъестественных вооружений между СССР и США" [From fantasy to reality: how the story of the Nautilus opened the race for supernatural weapons between the USSR and the USA]. Aliter, no. 20 (2023), pp. 34-55. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ot-fantazii-k-realnosti-kak-istoriya-nautilusa-otkryla-gonku-sverhestestvennyh-vooruzheniy-mezhdu-sssr-i-ssha. Sole source for the passages so cited.
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[^11]: Pauwels, Louis, and Jacques Bergier. *Le Matin des magiciens*, abridged and annotated university edition prepared by Yvonne Lenard with Monica Faulkner (Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 136-141.
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[^12]: Tsykunov, I. V. "От фантазии к реальности: как история «Наутилуса» открыла гонку сверхъестественных вооружений между СССР и США" [From fantasy to reality: how the story of the Nautilus opened the race for supernatural weapons between the USSR and the USA]. Aliter, no. 20 (2023), pp. 34-55. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ot-fantazii-k-realnosti-kak-istoriya-nautilusa-otkryla-gonku-sverhestestvennyh-vooruzheniy-mezhdu-sssr-i-ssha. Sole source for the passages so cited.
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