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13
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Fred Hitz.md
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@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ tags:
summary: CIA Inspector General whose 1998 investigation and congressional testimony revealed the agency's secret 1982 agreement with the Justice Department exempting CIA assets from drug crimes reporting.
born: 1939-10-14
location: "Washington, D.C."
updated: 2026-10-12
---
Fred P. Hitz was the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Inspector General who conducted the agency's internal investigation into Contra drug trafficking and testified before Congress in March 1998 about his findings.[^1]
@ -17,6 +18,14 @@ Fred P. Hitz was the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Inspector General who condu
Appearing before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998, Hitz delivered some of the most damaging admissions in the agency's history. "Let me be frank about what we are finding," Hitz testified. "There are instances where CIA did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity." When Congressman Norman Dicks asked whether any of these allegations involved trafficking in the [[United States]], Hitz answered: "Yes."[^1]
### The 1954 Origin and the 1975 Regulation
The arrangement that the 1982 agreement later formalized dated from 1954. According to a memorandum by [[Lawrence Houston]], the CIA's general counsel, Houston discussed the reporting of federal crimes with Deputy Attorney General [[William P. Rogers]] on February 18, 1954, and the two agreed that the CIA would determine whether a potential violation by persons associated with the agency was referred to the Justice Department for prosecution. The memorandum states that the arrangement rested on the belief that the CIA was in the best position to determine whether classified information might be revealed in such a prosecution.[^2]
In July 1975 [[Richard Thornburgh]], then assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, reminded the agency of its duty under 28 U.S.C. 535, and the CIA general counsel, [[John Warner]], replied that any informal referral agreement from the past had been abrogated. The agency's headquarters regulation of November 28, 1975 provided that crimes by government officers would be reported to the Attorney General and added that "CIA will not exercise a prosecutorial function."[^3][^4]
In an interview for PBS Frontline (Drug Wars), Hitz said his staff "weren't ever able to find a memorandum of conversation or any evidence that indicated why it was done," and: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^5]
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
Hitz revealed that from 1982 to 1995, the CIA operated under a secret agreement with the Justice Department that exempted the agency from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees, a category defined to include agents, assets, and non-staff employees. The agreement was "hammered out" between CIA director William Casey and U.S. Attorney General William French Smith in 1982. "The period of 1982 to 1995 was one in which there was no official requirement to report on allegations of drug trafficking with respect to non-employees of the agency," Hitz testified.[^1]
@ -28,3 +37,7 @@ Hitz's 400-page report, released in late 1998, was filled with examples of CIA c
### Footnotes
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
[^2]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story*, Findings paragraph 42. https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
[^3]: Same report, Findings paragraph 43 (letter of July 24, 1975; reply of July 29, 1975).
[^4]: Same report, Findings paragraph 44.
[^5]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html

32
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Henry A. Kissinger.md
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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
- Henry Kissinger
- Kissinger
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-10-09
updated: 2026-10-12
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- KeyFigure
@ -119,37 +119,9 @@ On December 6, 1975, in Jakarta, Kissinger and President Ford met with Indonesia
### Telephone Transcripts
Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. Upon leaving office in January 1977, Kissinger removed the transcripts as personal papers and secretly shipped them to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]] on October 29, 1976, before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access. State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The [[National Security Archive]] drafted a complaint against both the Archivist of the United States and the Secretary of State on February 13, 2001; the government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in August 2001. The collection runs to more than 15,000 pages. These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.[^telcons]
Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the transcripts as personal papers from his State Department office to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]], before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access.[^kissrc] State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The [[National Security Archive]] began corresponding with the Archivist of the United States, [[John W. Carlin]], about recovering the transcripts in January 1999. A complaint written by its pro bono counsel at [[Mayer Brown]] was presented to the Archivist and the Secretary of State on January 25, 2001, and its attorneys wrote again to the State Department, the National Archives and the Department of Justice on April 25, 2001. The government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in 2001, and a State Department statement of August 8, 2001 credited the Archive with prompting the recovery. On May 26, 2004 the National Archives released about 20,000 pages of the transcripts, covering Kissinger's service from 1969 to August 1974.[^nsa123] These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.[^telcons]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12.
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 16.
[^bio]: Nobel Committee, "Henry Kissinger – Biographical," *NobelPrize.org*, 1973. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/kissinger/biographical/
[^seminar]: Harvard Crimson, "Kissinger, Harvard and the FBI," November 16, 1979; Frank Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), pp. 312-315 (CIA cutout funding to Harvard International Seminar).
[^ssp]: Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Brothers Fund records, Special Studies Project, RG 4, 1956-1964 (finding aid FA387), rockarch.org; *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports* (Doubleday, 1961).
[^nwfp]: Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957); Hoover Institution review, https://www.hoover.org/research/nuclear-weapons-and-foreign-policy-henry-kissinger-council-foreign-relations-1957
[^state]: Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "Henry A. (Heinz Alfred) Kissinger," *People - Department History*, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kissinger-henry-a
[^doc11]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.1: White House Telcon, Kissinger to Melvin Laird, March 15, 1969. Source: DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations.
[^doc12]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.2: White House Telcon, Kissinger-Nixon, March 17, 1969. Source: DNSA.
[^doc13]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.3: White House Telcon, General Wheeler to Kissinger, March 18, 1969. Source: DNSA.
[^doc16]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.6: FBI Memorandum, "Colonel Alexander M. Haig Technical Surveillance Request," May 12, 1969. Source: Elliot Richardson Papers, Library of Congress.
[^doc17]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.7: FBI J. Edgar Hoover Wiretap Surveillance Report to President Nixon, May 11, 1970. Source: Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
[^halperin]: *Halperin v. Kissinger*, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976); settled November 1992.
[^chile]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 437, ed. Peter Kornbluh (September 11, 2013), Documents 1-10; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973 (U.S. Government Publishing Office).
[^condor]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 4.1: State Department Action Memorandum, "Operation Condor," August 30, 1976; Document 4.2: State Department Cable, "Actions Taken," September 16, 1976. Source: National Security Archive FOIA.
[^doc32]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 3.2: State Department Memcon, "Secretary's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti," October 7, 1976. Source: FOIA release, November 2003.
[^doc33]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 3.3: State Department Memo, "Foreign Minister Guzzetti Euphoric over Visit," October 19, 1976. Source: Argentina Declassification Project, August 20, 2002.
[^doc51]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 5.1: U.S. Consulate Dacca Cable, "Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan," April 6, 1971. Source: NARA, RG 59, SN 70-73.
[^doc52]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 5.2: White House Memorandum for the President, "Policy Options Toward Pakistan," April 28, 1971. Source: NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625.
[^doc61]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62; Document 4: Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 (Secret/Nodis), December 6, 1975. Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A3.
[^telcons]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 852, ed. William Burr (February 13, 2024), Documents 1-34; NSAEBB No. 123 (The Kissinger Telcons) and NSAEBB No. 263 (The Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts).
[^c1]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995. Ch. 25, 27.
[^c2]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29.
[^c3]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 24.
[^friele]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29; Rockefeller Archive Center, Berent Friele Papers (FA468).
[^qp1]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy*, document 42, editorial note on the Quantico II Panel, pp. 153-154, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d42. Lists "Dr. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard University" among the twelve invited on August 16, 1955.
[^qp2]: "Psychological Aspects of United States Strategy: Source Book of Individual Papers," November 1955, CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp86b00269r000300120001-4. Contents, paper 16, "Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR," by Henry A. Kissinger.
[^qp3]: Daniel Morris Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD dissertation, Duke University, 2013), p. 261 and note 129, citing Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 151. Bessner's note 129 is on his list of the eleven members: it states that Henry Kissinger attended some sessions, as did members of the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, the Operations Coordinating Board and the NSC.
[^qp4]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 264-265 and note 146, citing Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (Simon & Schuster, 2005), pp. 90-91, on the two men's earlier contact at the first panel.
[^qp5]: Rockefeller Archive Center, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, Hugh Morrow Interviews, Series Q, Subseries 2, "Henry Kissinger Interview," Spring 1980, scope note, https://dimes.rockarch.org/collections/H45i6yf7MUHuaRwQVupvg5.

15
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Leonard Leo.md
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@ -11,10 +11,17 @@ tags:
- SupremeCourt
- JudicialCrisisNetwork
- ConcordFund
summary: "Leonard Leo is an American conservative legal activist, the longtime executive vice president of the Federalist Society, the principal architect of the Supreme Court conservative supermajority through the Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett confirmations, and the chairman of Teneo Network, who has directed approximately one billion dollars in dark-money spending through a network of linked 501(c)(4) vehicles to reshape the American judiciary."
summary: "Leonard Leo is a conservative legal activist, longtime Federalist Society executive vice president and Teneo Network chairman, who directed roughly one billion dollars in dark-money spending through linked 501(c)(4) groups."
location: "United States"
relations:
- type: investigated
with: "[[Senate Judiciary Committee]]"
reverse: true
start: 2023-07-11
role: "requested information on his interactions with Supreme Court justices and records on his donor-group network; his counsel declined to provide it"
fn: 7
created: 2026-06-18
updated: 2026-06-18
updated: 2026-10-12
---
Leonard Leo is an American conservative legal activist who served as the longtime executive vice president of the [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] and who has been the principal architect of the [[Supreme Court|Supreme Court]]'s conservative supermajority through his role advising President [[Donald Trump]] on the selection and confirmation of [[Neil Gorsuch|Neil Gorsuch]] (2017), [[Brett Kavanaugh|Brett Kavanaugh]] (2018), and [[Amy Coney Barrett|Amy Coney Barrett]] (2020). Leo became chairman of the [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] in 2021 and has directed approximately one billion dollars in dark-money spending through a network of linked 501(c)(4) vehicles, including the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]), to reshape the American judiciary and, through the Teneo chairmanship, to extend the operational model across American institutional life.[^1][^2][^3]
@ -29,7 +36,9 @@ The *ProPublica* profile "We Don't Talk About Leonard" (March 2023) is the found
Leo's dark-money operation runs through a network of linked 501(c)(4) organizations that permit political spending without donor disclosure. The primary vehicle is the Judicial Crisis Network (now the Concord Fund), which [[CREW|Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington]] reported brought in nearly 48.1 million dollars in a single reporting period to support the conservative judicial-confirmations project. The broader network of Leo-linked organizations has funneled over one billion dollars in undisclosed spending across the judicial-selection, political-advocacy, and institutional-influence operations, per the [[Alliance for Justice|Alliance for Justice]] and [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] investigations.[^2][^5][^6]
The dark-money infrastructure operates through a layered structure of 501(c)(4) social-welfare organizations and 501(c)(3) charities that transfer funds to each other in chains designed to obscure the original donors. The [[Senate Judiciary Committee|Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Dick Durbin|Dick Durbin]] has sought Leo's records and testimony; Leo has declined to comply, and his counsel's letter to the Committee (July 2023) pushed back on the "dark money" and "phony front groups" characterizations. The investigative record relies on leaked tax filings, whistleblower disclosures, and the reporting of ProPublica, CREW, and the Alliance for Justice.[^3][^7]
The dark-money infrastructure operates through a layered structure of 501(c)(4) social-welfare organizations and 501(c)(3) charities that transfer funds to each other in chains designed to obscure the original donors. The [[Senate Judiciary Committee|Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Dick Durbin|Dick Durbin]] has sought Leo's records and testimony; Leo has declined to comply. The investigative record relies on leaked tax filings, whistleblower disclosures, and the reporting of ProPublica, CREW, and the Alliance for Justice.[^3][^7]
On July 11, 2023, Chairman Durbin and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, chair of the Federal Courts subcommittee, asked Leo for information about his interactions with Supreme Court justices.[^7] Leo's counsel, [[David B. Rivkin Jr.]] of [[Baker & Hostetler]], replied on July 25, 2023 that the inquiry exceeded the constitutional limits on the committee's investigative authority and infringed Leo's First Amendment rights. The letter quoted Whitehouse's description of Leo as "the little spider that you find at the center of the dark money web," argued that the inquiry was motivated by hostility to his views, and said that the committee's ethics bill, S. 359, which the committee ordered reported on July 20, 2023, raised separation-of-powers objections. It closed: "We will not be part of that journey."[^7]
### The Teneo Chairmanship and the Institutional Expansion

29
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Lyman Lemnitzer.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Lyman Lemnitzer
aliases:
- General Lemnitzer
@ -13,13 +13,20 @@ tags:
- ColdWar
- 1960s
category: "Military"
summary: "General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962 who signed the Operation NORTHWOODS document proposing staged false-flag attacks against Americans to justify an invasion of Cuba, was transferred to command NATO forces in Europe after President Kennedy rejected the proposals and declined to reappoint him."
summary: "General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962, signed the Operation NORTHWOODS memorandum, and then served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 1963 to 1969."
born: 1899-08-29
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[NATO]]"
role: "Supreme Allied Commander Europe"
start: 1963-01-01
end: 1969-07-01
fn: 1
died: 1988-11-12
location: "Washington, D.C."
---
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 - November 12, 1988) served as Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] from October 1960 to October 1962. His tenure as Chairman is primarily remembered in the historical record for his signature on [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] - the March 13, 1962 document proposing staged false-flag operations, including attacks on American citizens, that could be blamed on [[Cuba]] and used to justify a U.S. military invasion. The proposals were rejected by Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^1]
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 - November 12, 1988) served as Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] from October 1, 1960 to September 30, 1962.[^1] His tenure as Chairman is primarily remembered in the historical record for his signature on [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] - the March 13, 1962 document proposing staged false-flag operations, including attacks on American citizens, that could be blamed on [[Cuba]] and used to justify a U.S. military invasion. The proposals were rejected by Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^2]
### Military Career
@ -33,15 +40,21 @@ The context for Operation NORTHWOODS was the problem that confronted U.S. milita
On March 13, 1962, Lemnitzer signed a document titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" and submitted it to Secretary of Defense McNamara. The document - which became publicly known as Operation NORTHWOODS after declassification in 1997 - proposed manufacturing the pretext for invasion through a series of false-flag operations. These included staging a Cuban attack on a U.S. Navy vessel at [[Guantanamo Bay]], organizing a fake "terror campaign" in Miami and Washington, D.C., staging aircraft incidents in which planes would be "attacked" by ostensibly Cuban aircraft, and explicitly contemplating staged incidents in which American civilians would be killed.
McNamara rejected the document. Kennedy's displeasure with Lemnitzer's overall approach to Cuba and civil-military relations was clear; when Lemnitzer's term as JCS Chairman expired in October 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint him. Lemnitzer was instead appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe ([[SACEUR]]), commanding NATO forces from 1963 to 1969.[^1]
McNamara rejected the document. Kennedy's displeasure with Lemnitzer's overall approach to Cuba and civil-military relations was clear; when Lemnitzer's term as JCS Chairman expired in 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint him. Lemnitzer was instead appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe ([[SACEUR]]), commanding NATO forces from 1963 to 1969.[^2] His move to the European command was announced in July 1962; at the news conference of July 23, 1962 Kennedy said Lemnitzer "could have retired in October and there would have been a vacancy as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^3] He became Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command on November 1, 1962 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe on January 1, 1963, and he retired on July 1, 1969.[^1]
### Later Career
In 1975 Lemnitzer served on the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (the [[Rockefeller Commission]]), and from 1976 to 1978 he served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.[^1]
### Significance
Lemnitzer's role in NORTHWOODS is historically significant primarily for what it reveals about how senior American military officers thought about manufactured pretexts for military action. The document is not unique in Cold War operational planning history - planners in multiple governments explored similar concepts - but its systematic treatment and formal submission through the chain of command make it an unusually clear record of such thinking.
The fact that Kennedy and McNamara rejected NORTHWOODS has been cited by historians as evidence that civilian oversight mechanisms functioned in this instance - the system produced the correct outcome despite the Joint Chiefs' submission of an extraordinary proposal. Critics note that the rejection was not accompanied by any disciplinary action against the officers involved, and that Lemnitzer's subsequent NATO command represented a promotion in terms of theater command authority.[^2]
The fact that Kennedy and McNamara rejected NORTHWOODS has been cited by historians as evidence that civilian oversight mechanisms functioned in this instance - the system produced the correct outcome despite the Joint Chiefs' submission of an extraordinary proposal. Critics note that the rejection was not accompanied by any disciplinary action against the officers involved, and that Lemnitzer's subsequent NATO command represented a promotion in terms of theater command authority.[^4]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.* Doubleday, 2001. Original document: "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (TS), JCS files, March 13, 1962; declassified 1997. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
[^2]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007. Prados, John. *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* Dial Press, 1982.
[^1]: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, biography of General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2024). https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Lyman-Louis-Lemnitzer
[^2]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.* Doubleday, 2001. Original document: "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (TS), JCS files, March 13, 1962; declassified 1997. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
[^3]: John F. Kennedy, news conference no. 39, July 23, 1962. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-39
[^4]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007. Prados, John. *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* Dial Press, 1982.

85
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Norwin Meneses.md
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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ aliases:
- El Perico
- El Maestro
created: 2026-05-17
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-12
category: "Organized Crime"
tags:
- Person
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ relations:
reverse: true
start: 1989-02-08
role: "sealed San Francisco indictment, conspiracy to distribute cocaine"
fn: 19
fn: 20
- type: investigated
with: "[[Sandra Smith]]"
reverse: true
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
start: 1986-09
end: 1991-11
role: "San Francisco historical conspiracy case and 1989 fugitive file"
fn: 19
fn: 20
---
Norwin Meneses Cantarero, born June 21, 1943, and known in Nicaragua as "El Rey de la Droga" and "El Perico," was a [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] cocaine trafficker who moved between [[Managua]], the [[San Francisco]] Bay Area and [[Costa Rica]].[^1] From 1980 the [[DEA]] and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] opened a series of cases on his family's organization, in which his nephews and associates were convicted and he was not; from July 1986 the DEA's Costa Rica office used him as a source and then as an informant while the FBI in San Francisco was assembling a case against him; a sealed federal indictment followed in 1989; and Nicaraguan police arrested him on November 3, 1991 with 764 kilograms of cocaine.[^1][^2] [[Gary Webb]] wrote that he was the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel's]] representative in Nicaragua and a recruiter, arms supplier and benefactor of the [[Contras]]; the Justice Department's Inspector General found he gave the Contras little, dealt with all sides, and had no CIA connection.[^1][^3]
@ -81,63 +81,63 @@ Immigration records show that on September 11, 1980 Meneses was refused admissio
DEA agent [[Sandra Smith]], who worked in the San Francisco office from 1974 until 1984, opened her first case on the organization in July 1980, when police searching the San Francisco house of his nephew Roger Meneses found twenty pounds of cocaine; the charges were dismissed because the search followed an illegal traffic stop. In September 1981 a Baldwin Park police tip led her to follow a Los Angeles dealer, Julio Bermudez, who flew to San Francisco, visited a house in Dale City that belonged to [[Carlos Cabezas]] and then the house of another nephew, Jairo Meneses; Los Angeles police seized $12,000, three pounds of cocaine and a ledger entry "11-11 90,000 to Jairo," and Bermudez said he had gotten the drugs from Norwin Meneses. A November 16, 1981 search of Jairo's house produced $9,000 and ledgers, and prosecution was declined by Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Eric Swenson]] because no drugs were found. Smith filed a November 1981 affidavit stating that the DEA "has developed information over the past several years that the Meneses Family has been involved in the smuggling and distribution of cocaine in the San Francisco Bay Area"; she said she wanted a task force and was refused, which she attributed to the low status of women at the agency and not to the CIA, and she shredded her personal notes when she left in December 1984 after offering them to a colleague who declined. Her supervisor Saverio Weidl said she never asked him to lead a task force.[^1][^6] Webb wrote that Smith called the case "the only thing that I ever worked, in all the time I worked there, that I thought was really big."[^4] The San Jose paper's report that her investigation was halted for reasons "not clear" was examined by the Inspector General, who found no improper halt; he also noted that Smith's own surveillance report had recorded that Cabezas lived at the Dale City house, contrary to the newspaper.[^1]
The IRS opened a net-worth tax case in 1983 and closed it because it could establish income for only one year and Meneses could claim a cash hoard from Nicaragua. DEA agent John Rotunno then ran two cases: undercover purchases from November 1983 to January 1984 led to nine arrests beginning in February 1984, including Roger Meneses, who received six years; and an informant's report that Norwin wanted him to run the San Francisco operation because he disapproved of Jairo's management led, on November 27, 1984, to the arrest of Jairo Meneses and [[Renato Pena]] after they delivered a kilogram to undercover officers. Jairo told Agent Thomas Ma that Norwin had supplied the cocaine and had been waiting at Jairo's house for the money, then fled to Costa Rica, and that the organization sold on consignment to ten to twelve buyers, one of them [[Danilo Blandon]]. Jairo and Pena pleaded guilty on June 10, 1985 and each received a year in a work-furlough facility. Ma opened a case on Norwin on January 23, 1985 and closed it in June 1986 because the informants' arrests made their information stale; he and Rotunno said no one pressured them.[^1]
The IRS opened a net-worth tax case in 1983 and closed it because it could establish income for only one year and Meneses could claim a cash hoard from Nicaragua. The San Francisco United States Attorney's Office had declined prosecution in the tax case that year because of weak or insufficient evidence, and the IRS concurred with that decision.[^7] DEA agent John Rotunno then ran two cases: undercover purchases from November 1983 to January 1984 led to nine arrests beginning in February 1984, including Roger Meneses, who received six years; and an informant's report that Norwin wanted him to run the San Francisco operation because he disapproved of Jairo's management led, on November 27, 1984, to the arrest of Jairo Meneses and [[Renato Pena]] after they delivered a kilogram to undercover officers. Jairo told Agent Thomas Ma that Norwin had supplied the cocaine and had been waiting at Jairo's house for the money, then fled to Costa Rica, and that the organization sold on consignment to ten to twelve buyers, one of them [[Danilo Blandon]]. Jairo and Pena pleaded guilty on June 10, 1985 and each received a year in a work-furlough facility. Ma opened a case on Norwin on January 23, 1985 and closed it in June 1986 because the informants' arrests made their information stale; he and Rotunno said no one pressured them.[^1]
### The agent in the bowling alley
Jairo Meneses's lawyer told the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility in June 1985 that Norwin had paid a DEA agent for information. Jairo said that in the summer of 1982 Norwin tried to hand the agent $5,000 in a bowling alley in Dale City and that he passed it on; Pena said he overheard the Meneses discuss it. The agent, and a confidential informant who said he had posed as a "crooked" agent to the Meneses, denied any payment; a DEA polygraph found Jairo deceptive and the FBI's July 1986 polygraphs found Jairo and Pena deceptive; the DEA cleared the agent on February 3, 1986. Meneses repeated the allegation to Gonzalez in February 1987, saying he paid the agent $5,000 "on numerous occasions." Pena told the Inspector General in 1997 that the agent warned Norwin weeks before the February 1983 Frogman arrests; he also told the Inspector General, which noted the conflict, that FBI agent Manuel Hinojosa had heard from him only of a paid San Francisco police officer. Webb wrote that Pena told the Justice Department of a DEA agent on Meneses's payroll who warned of the arrests of [[Julio Zavala]] and Cabezas.[^6][^7] A San Francisco economist given the pseudonym "David Morrison" told FBI agents on January 21, 1987 that a Customs officer had told him Meneses would have been arrested in 1983 or 1984 but for a warning from a corrupt DEA officer; Morrison told the Inspector General he had no first-hand information and that the Customs officer said no such thing.[^6]
Jairo Meneses's lawyer told the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility in June 1985 that Norwin had paid a DEA agent for information. Jairo said that in the summer of 1982 Norwin tried to hand the agent $5,000 in a bowling alley in Dale City and that he passed it on; Pena said he overheard the Meneses discuss it. The agent, and a confidential informant who said he had posed as a "crooked" agent to the Meneses, denied any payment; a DEA polygraph found Jairo deceptive and the FBI's July 1986 polygraphs found Jairo and Pena deceptive; the DEA cleared the agent on February 3, 1986. Meneses repeated the allegation to Gonzalez in February 1987, saying he paid the agent $5,000 "on numerous occasions." Pena told the Inspector General in 1997 that the agent warned Norwin weeks before the February 1983 Frogman arrests; he also told the Inspector General, which noted the conflict, that FBI agent Manuel Hinojosa had heard from him only of a paid San Francisco police officer. Webb wrote that Pena told the Justice Department of a DEA agent on Meneses's payroll who warned of the arrests of [[Julio Zavala]] and Cabezas.[^6][^8] A San Francisco economist given the pseudonym "David Morrison" told FBI agents on January 21, 1987 that a Customs officer had told him Meneses would have been arrested in 1983 or 1984 but for a warning from a corrupt DEA officer; Morrison told the Inspector General he had no first-hand information and that the Customs officer said no such thing.[^6]
### The Contras
The records agree that Meneses attended Contra meetings in San Francisco and gave some money; they disagree on how much and why. Meneses told the CIA's Inspector General that between 1983 and 1984 his main role was recruiting Nicaraguans for the [[FDN]] at the request of [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]], that he sat on a fundraising committee without leading it, that he gave at most about $3,000 between 1982 and 1984, and that Bermúdez "was very strict and did not want anyone involved in drugs." He told the Justice Department he gave about $3,000 between 1982 and 1985 and denied that he or anyone sold drugs for the Contras.[^5][^8] Webb quoted Meneses as saying he became Bermúdez's "intelligence and security adviser in California," that Bermúdez was a friend since he was a lieutenant, that Edmundo had known Bermúdez since childhood, and that "nobody would join the Contra forces down there without my knowledge and approval." Webb cited [[Dennis Ainsworth]], a San Francisco Contra supporter, telling the FBI in 1987 that Meneses and Bermúdez dealt arms and drugs, and later telling Webb that Meneses "was national. And he was totally protected."[^4]
The records agree that Meneses attended Contra meetings in San Francisco and gave some money; they disagree on how much and why. Meneses told the CIA's Inspector General that between 1983 and 1984 his main role was recruiting Nicaraguans for the [[FDN]] at the request of [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]], that he sat on a fundraising committee without leading it, that he gave at most about $3,000 between 1982 and 1984, and that Bermúdez "was very strict and did not want anyone involved in drugs." He told the Justice Department he gave about $3,000 between 1982 and 1985 and denied that he or anyone sold drugs for the Contras.[^5][^9] Webb quoted Meneses as saying he became Bermúdez's "intelligence and security adviser in California," that Bermúdez was a friend since he was a lieutenant, that Edmundo had known Bermúdez since childhood, and that "nobody would join the Contra forces down there without my knowledge and approval." Webb cited [[Dennis Ainsworth]], a San Francisco Contra supporter, telling the FBI in 1987 that Meneses and Bermúdez dealt arms and drugs, and later telling Webb that Meneses "was national. And he was totally protected."[^4]
[[Adolfo Calero]] told the Inspector General he met Meneses at Contra social events in San Francisco, that Meneses never held an FDN position, that Bermúdez told him Meneses had visited the Contras' first Honduran camp and given the troops a crossbow, and that he would have remembered receiving $500. The Examiner reported on June 23, 1986 that Calero said he had met Meneses as many as four times.[^5] [[Edgar Chamorro]] told the Examiner that he and [[Frank Arana]] flew to San Francisco in October 1982 to name local FDN leaders, that Meneses stood in the back of the meeting, helped arrange a Los Angeles meeting the next day, and was "one of the main contacts in L.A."; Renato Pena, the self-styled FDN representative in northern California from late 1982 to mid-1984, told federal investigators in 1997 that he heard Meneses telephone Bermúdez in Honduras and relay requests for silencers, crossbows and military equipment.[^5][^9] The FDN representative who replaced Pena, Tony Navarro, said Meneses came to a couple of meetings, was never a member and, as far as he knew, gave nothing; the Contra supporter Carlos Rocha put Meneses's gifts at perhaps $5,000; "David Morrison" recalled hearing of a $40,000 donation in 1981 and that Meneses traded weapons for cocaine paste with the Sandinistas.[^5][^6] The Inspector General found Navarro, Rocha and LA CI-1 substantially credible and found no concrete evidence, "such as bank records or drug ledgers," that money from Blandón or Meneses reached the Contras; it concluded that Meneses's reputation preceded him in the exile community, so that people dealing with him "knew or should have known" his money was probably illicit.[^5] The Inspector General also reported that several people familiar with him said he "lacked any political allegiance and would deal with anyone who would provide cocaine at the lowest price," and that Jairo Meneses told prosecutors in 1986 he dealt with leaders of both the Contras and the Sandinistas, getting cocaine from Sandinista officials through Margarita Castana, a niece of the Sandinista commander Bayardo Arce.[^1][^5]
[[Adolfo Calero]] told the Inspector General he met Meneses at Contra social events in San Francisco, that Meneses never held an FDN position, that Bermúdez told him Meneses had visited the Contras' first Honduran camp and given the troops a crossbow, and that he would have remembered receiving $500. The Examiner reported on June 23, 1986 that Calero said he had met Meneses as many as four times.[^5] [[Edgar Chamorro]] told the Examiner that he and [[Frank Arana]] flew to San Francisco in October 1982 to name local FDN leaders, that Meneses stood in the back of the meeting, helped arrange a Los Angeles meeting the next day, and was "one of the main contacts in L.A."; Renato Pena, the self-styled FDN representative in northern California from late 1982 to mid-1984, told federal investigators in 1997 that he heard Meneses telephone Bermúdez in Honduras and relay requests for silencers, crossbows and military equipment.[^5][^10] The FDN representative who replaced Pena, Tony Navarro, said Meneses came to a couple of meetings, was never a member and, as far as he knew, gave nothing; the Contra supporter Carlos Rocha put Meneses's gifts at perhaps $5,000; "David Morrison" recalled hearing of a $40,000 donation in 1981 and that Meneses traded weapons for cocaine paste with the Sandinistas.[^5][^6] The Inspector General found Navarro, Rocha and LA CI-1 substantially credible and found no concrete evidence, "such as bank records or drug ledgers," that money from Blandón or Meneses reached the Contras; it concluded that Meneses's reputation preceded him in the exile community, so that people dealing with him "knew or should have known" his money was probably illicit.[^5] The Inspector General also reported that several people familiar with him said he "lacked any political allegiance and would deal with anyone who would provide cocaine at the lowest price," and that Jairo Meneses told prosecutors in 1986 he dealt with leaders of both the Contras and the Sandinistas, getting cocaine from Sandinista officials through Margarita Castana, a niece of the Sandinista commander Bayardo Arce.[^1][^5]
In April 1986 a DEA analyst interviewed an informant the Inspector General calls SR3, who had worked on the Meneses investigation for three years and was considered extremely reliable; SR3 said Meneses was trafficking both for himself and to raise money for the Contras, that some proceeds bought weapons in Colombia, and that Meneses boasted that "United States agents would assist him." SR3 had no first-hand knowledge beyond what Meneses told him.[^5] Pena told the DEA in the early 1980s that the CIA allowed the Contras to fly drugs into the United States; the Inspector General records he did not repeat it, and told the inspectors he made six to eight trips carrying $600,000 to nearly $1 million from San Francisco to a Colombian called "Carlos" in Los Angeles and returned with six to eight kilograms of cocaine each time, and that "Carlos" said "we are helping your cause with this drug thing."[^5] A CIA domestic station cable of October 22, 1982, relaying an INS informant, reported links between a religious organization and two Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary groups involving "an exchange in the US of narcotics for arms" and a planned meeting in Costa Rica; the November 3 follow-up named Pena as one of four FDN representatives; headquarters instructed the station on November 13 not to pursue it because of the involvement of United States persons and said on November 17 that the informant had probably been misinformed.[^5][^8]
In April 1986 a DEA analyst interviewed an informant the Inspector General calls SR3, who had worked on the Meneses investigation for three years and was considered extremely reliable; SR3 said Meneses was trafficking both for himself and to raise money for the Contras, that some proceeds bought weapons in Colombia, and that Meneses boasted that "United States agents would assist him." SR3 had no first-hand knowledge beyond what Meneses told him.[^5] Pena told the DEA in the early 1980s that the CIA allowed the Contras to fly drugs into the United States; the Inspector General records he did not repeat it, and told the inspectors he made six to eight trips carrying $600,000 to nearly $1 million from San Francisco to a Colombian called "Carlos" in Los Angeles and returned with six to eight kilograms of cocaine each time, and that "Carlos" said "we are helping your cause with this drug thing."[^5] A CIA domestic station cable of October 22, 1982, relaying an INS informant, reported links between a religious organization and two Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary groups involving "an exchange in the US of narcotics for arms" and a planned meeting in Costa Rica; the November 3 follow-up named Pena as one of four FDN representatives; headquarters instructed the station on November 13 not to pursue it because of the involvement of United States persons and said on November 17 that the informant had probably been misinformed.[^5][^9]
Webb described Meneses's FDN role as public, with Contra functions at his homes, and cited Cornejo saying Meneses's "heart and soul was into the movement"; he also wrote that Meneses worked with [[Ronald Lister]] on weapons for El Salvador and the Contras, with Meneses telling investigators that "if I told you where we got them, governments would fall," and that he introduced Blandón through [[Donald Barrios]] and gave him the seminar on selling cocaine.[^9] Meneses told the Inspector General that he and Blandón grew up together and were related, that he knew nothing of Blandón's trafficking, and that Blandón "tended to exaggerate his importance."[^5][^8] He told Rosenfeld in 1986 that he had trafficked cocaine for about six months in 1982 and stopped because a relative became ill from it; the *Examiner* article ran two days before the House vote on the $100 million Contra aid package, Webb wrote, and drew no major newspaper's follow-up.[^5][^10]
Webb described Meneses's FDN role as public, with Contra functions at his homes, and cited Cornejo saying Meneses's "heart and soul was into the movement"; he also wrote that Meneses worked with [[Ronald Lister]] on weapons for El Salvador and the Contras, with Meneses telling investigators that "if I told you where we got them, governments would fall," and that he introduced Blandón through [[Donald Barrios]] and gave him the seminar on selling cocaine.[^10] Meneses told the Inspector General that he and Blandón grew up together and were related, that he knew nothing of Blandón's trafficking, and that Blandón "tended to exaggerate his importance."[^5][^9] He told Rosenfeld in 1986 that he had trafficked cocaine for about six months in 1982 and stopped because a relative became ill from it; the *Examiner* article ran two days before the House vote on the $100 million Contra aid package, Webb wrote, and drew no major newspaper's follow-up.[^5][^11]
### The Frogman network
Webb wrote that Meneses's Costa Rican pipeline ran through [[Horacio Pereira]] and [[Troilo Sanchez|Troilo Sánchez]], who supplied Peruvian cocaine hidden in woven baskets to Julio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas in San Francisco, with profits carried back to Costa Rica and Honduras.[^7] Cabezas told the Inspector General in 1997 that Meneses had no connection to the Zavala organization and was not affiliated with any Contra group; Troilo Sánchez said Pereira and Meneses had trafficked together since before Somoza fell; the FBI's November 8, 1982 teletype named Pereira "the major source of cocaine smuggling from Costa Rica to the United States."[^11][^12] The Senate's Kerry subcommittee reported that Pereira was convicted in Costa Rica in 1985 and sentenced to 12 years; the Justice Department's inspectors were told he was dead.[^12][^13]
Webb wrote that Meneses's Costa Rican pipeline ran through [[Horacio Pereira]] and [[Troilo Sanchez|Troilo Sánchez]], who supplied Peruvian cocaine hidden in woven baskets to Julio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas in San Francisco, with profits carried back to Costa Rica and Honduras.[^8] Cabezas told the Inspector General in 1997 that Meneses had no connection to the Zavala organization and was not affiliated with any Contra group; Troilo Sánchez said Pereira and Meneses had trafficked together since before Somoza fell; the FBI's November 8, 1982 teletype named Pereira "the major source of cocaine smuggling from Costa Rica to the United States."[^12][^13] The Senate's Kerry subcommittee reported that Pereira was convicted in Costa Rica in 1985 and sentenced to 12 years; the Justice Department's inspectors were told he was dead.[^13][^14]
### Costa Rica
Jairo's account puts Meneses's flight to Costa Rica in late November 1984; an FBI report put his departure in 1985, when he sold his San Francisco properties; the Inspector General records that a 1984 DEA Costa Rica report already described him as living there and smuggling kilograms.[^1] CIA cables reported that on December 5, 1984 a station relayed allegations that Meneses, a trafficker called Tuto Munkel and Sebastian "Guachan" Gonzalez Mendieta were known as the "Nicaraguan Mafia, dealing in drugs, weapons smuggling and laundering of counterfeit money," and that Meneses owned a restaurant in which Gonzalez might have had an interest; a June 11, 1986 cable relayed that in August or September 1984 Meneses asked the Contra leader [[Fernando Chamorro|Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro]] to help "move drugs" to the United States; the CIA's inspectors found no record that it followed up.[^8][^14] An informant told the DEA that Meneses had political protection from Jose Marti Figueres, son of the former Costa Rican president, according to Webb, who also reported that the Costa Rican newspaper *La Nación* ran a series in December 1986 describing Meneses as a Contra financier hiding in the country.[^15][^16] A DEA cable of December 3, 1986 reported he had been identified as a major trafficker in the leading Costa Rican newspaper and was afraid of publicity or deportation.[^17]
Jairo's account puts Meneses's flight to Costa Rica in late November 1984; an FBI report put his departure in 1985, when he sold his San Francisco properties; the Inspector General records that a 1984 DEA Costa Rica report already described him as living there and smuggling kilograms.[^1] CIA cables reported that on December 5, 1984 a station relayed allegations that Meneses, a trafficker called Tuto Munkel and Sebastian "Guachan" Gonzalez Mendieta were known as the "Nicaraguan Mafia, dealing in drugs, weapons smuggling and laundering of counterfeit money," and that Meneses owned a restaurant in which Gonzalez might have had an interest; a June 11, 1986 cable relayed that in August or September 1984 Meneses asked the Contra leader [[Fernando Chamorro|Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro]] to help "move drugs" to the United States; the CIA's inspectors found no record that it followed up.[^9][^15] An informant told the DEA that Meneses had political protection from Jose Marti Figueres, son of the former Costa Rican president, according to Webb, who also reported that the Costa Rican newspaper *La Nación* ran a series in December 1986 describing Meneses as a Contra financier hiding in the country.[^16][^17] A DEA cable of December 3, 1986 reported he had been identified as a major trafficker in the leading Costa Rican newspaper and was afraid of publicity or deportation.[^18]
### DEA source and informant, 1986 to 1990
In July 1986 Meneses went to the DEA's Costa Rica office and told agent [[Sandalio Gonzalez]] that he wanted to cooperate; Gonzalez's report listed three reasons: to clear a minor problem with the IRS, to end his drug trafficking, and to help President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s drug war and "total commitment to free his native land." Meneses named about twenty-one major traffickers, including Blandón, whom he called a Sandinista sympathizer distributing hundred-kilogram lots, and he refused to testify, to be seen near the embassy or to be a registered informant. Gonzalez treated him as a source of information and not an informant, which the DEA's manual defines differently and which kept him out of the DEA's informant database until 1987.[^17] Meneses told Webb he had helped the DEA in the case of the February 1985 murder of agent [[Kiki Camarena|Enrique "Kiki" Camarena]] and met the DEA attaché Robert J. Nieves in late 1985; Webb wrote that the claim could not be corroborated, though Gonzalez's report noted that Meneses "helped the DEA in the past."[^15]
In July 1986 Meneses went to the DEA's Costa Rica office and told agent [[Sandalio Gonzalez]] that he wanted to cooperate; Gonzalez's report listed three reasons: to clear a minor problem with the IRS, to end his drug trafficking, and to help President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s drug war and "total commitment to free his native land." Meneses named about twenty-one major traffickers, including Blandón, whom he called a Sandinista sympathizer distributing hundred-kilogram lots, and he refused to testify, to be seen near the embassy or to be a registered informant. Gonzalez treated him as a source of information and not an informant, which the DEA's manual defines differently and which kept him out of the DEA's informant database until 1987.[^18] Meneses told Webb he had helped the DEA in the case of the February 1985 murder of agent [[Kiki Camarena|Enrique "Kiki" Camarena]] and met the DEA attaché Robert J. Nieves in late 1985; Webb wrote that the claim could not be corroborated, though Gonzalez's report noted that Meneses "helped the DEA in the past."[^16]
On October 9, 1986 Gonzalez opened a DEA case on Blandón on Meneses's information. On December 21, 1986 Meneses and DEA CI-1, an experienced informant who claimed to have worked for the CIA years before in Europe and the Soviet Union, left Costa Rica for Los Angeles in a plan Gonzalez filed as "Operation Perico." They met Blandón and [[Ivan Torres]] on January 7 and 15, 1987, and DEA CI-1 recorded that the traffickers called Meneses "El Maestro" and treated him as retired from the business two or three years before. The Los Angeles DEA had agreed to the plan on December 23, after the departure; the DEA offices in Riverside and San Francisco and the FBI were not coordinated, and Aukland did not learn of it until January. Gonzalez's later reports quoted Torres on CIA tolerance of Contra trafficking and recorded that Pastora wished to enter cocaine trafficking to funnel money to the Contras and had asked Meneses to find a buyer for a DC-3 at Ilopango.[^17] Webb wrote that the informant was a CIA operative known as "Roberto," that the FBI in San Francisco issued warrants for both men and they fled, and that Meneses then said he would never return or testify; the Inspector General records DEA CI-1's claim of a warning from DEA agent Eddie Hill, which Hill denied, and found no FBI warrant in January 1987. The Mexican "Roberto" whom Troilo Sánchez said Meneses introduced to him in 1987 did not resemble the CIA contractor who used the alias Ivan Gómez.[^16][^17][^18]
On October 9, 1986 Gonzalez opened a DEA case on Blandón on Meneses's information. On December 21, 1986 Meneses and DEA CI-1, an experienced informant who claimed to have worked for the CIA years before in Europe and the Soviet Union, left Costa Rica for Los Angeles in a plan Gonzalez filed as "Operation Perico." They met Blandón and [[Ivan Torres]] on January 7 and 15, 1987, and DEA CI-1 recorded that the traffickers called Meneses "El Maestro" and treated him as retired from the business two or three years before. The Los Angeles DEA had agreed to the plan on December 23, after the departure; the DEA offices in Riverside and San Francisco and the FBI were not coordinated, and Aukland did not learn of it until January. Gonzalez's later reports quoted Torres on CIA tolerance of Contra trafficking and recorded that Pastora wished to enter cocaine trafficking to funnel money to the Contras and had asked Meneses to find a buyer for a DC-3 at Ilopango.[^18] Webb wrote that the informant was a CIA operative known as "Roberto," that the FBI in San Francisco issued warrants for both men and they fled, and that Meneses then said he would never return or testify; the Inspector General records DEA CI-1's claim of a warning from DEA agent Eddie Hill, which Hill denied, and found no FBI warrant in January 1987. The Mexican "Roberto" whom Troilo Sánchez said Meneses introduced to him in 1987 did not resemble the CIA contractor who used the alias Ivan Gómez.[^17][^18][^19]
On January 29, 1987 the DEA's San Francisco office cabled that the FBI had "an indictable case against the CI" and asked whether an indictment "will result in national security problems with other agencies"; the Inspector General noted that the San Francisco FBI had source information that Meneses might have worked for the CIA and that the Iran-Contra independent counsel's inquiry was just beginning. On February 27, 1987 the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office wrote that, on assurances from Assistant U.S. Attorney Crossan Andersen in Los Angeles, it would defer prosecution because Meneses would "be required to plead guilty to a cocaine-related charge as part of his cooperation agreement"; no written agreement was found and Andersen and Swenson did not recall one, and the FBI placed its case in inactive status.[^17] Webb wrote that recently released Justice Department records show no such cooperation agreement existed.[^16] Meneses's conditions for returning, in June 1987, were anonymity, no testimony, contact only with named DEA personnel and restoration of resident status; headquarters refused on June 26 to guarantee that his identity would never come out in court, the Los Angeles case was declined on July 17, and Gonzalez nevertheless registered him as an informant on July 24, 1987, with a form that listed "no pending charges known at this time."[^6][^17]
On January 29, 1987 the DEA's San Francisco office cabled that the FBI had "an indictable case against the CI" and asked whether an indictment "will result in national security problems with other agencies"; the Inspector General noted that the San Francisco FBI had source information that Meneses might have worked for the CIA and that the Iran-Contra independent counsel's inquiry was just beginning. On February 27, 1987 the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office wrote that, on assurances from Assistant U.S. Attorney Crossan Andersen in Los Angeles, it would defer prosecution because Meneses would "be required to plead guilty to a cocaine-related charge as part of his cooperation agreement"; no written agreement was found and Andersen and Swenson did not recall one, and the FBI placed its case in inactive status.[^18] Webb wrote that recently released Justice Department records show no such cooperation agreement existed.[^17] Meneses's conditions for returning, in June 1987, were anonymity, no testimony, contact only with named DEA personnel and restoration of resident status; headquarters refused on June 26 to guarantee that his identity would never come out in court, the Los Angeles case was declined on July 17, and Gonzalez nevertheless registered him as an informant on July 24, 1987, with a form that listed "no pending charges known at this time."[^6][^18]
In September 1987, on a visa waiver the DEA requested over State Department and CIA information that he was a narcotics kingpin, Meneses went with DEA CI-1 to Miami, where he met Blandón, and to San Francisco, where an FBI informant said he was telling associates he worked for the CIA; they returned in November and December 1987, producing a case against Aparicio Moreno. An INS stop in Miami in September 1988, when the DEA said it had not expected him, ended with his agreeing to leave. Gonzalez moved to Mexico City in January 1988 and agent James Rivera took over, working cases on cocaine from Panama through Costa Rica. Meneses traveled for the DEA to Miami, Los Angeles and Colombia in 1989, and the DEA deactivated him on December 23, 1989 because none of his cases "appears to have any chance of fruition." He was reactivated on May 10, 1990 after reporting that Blandón wanted help moving cocaine from Central America to Florida, paid $500, and closed on August 16, 1990. The DEA's payments totaled $7,377.50 in thirteen payments.[^2][^6][^19]
In September 1987, on a visa waiver the DEA requested over State Department and CIA information that he was a narcotics kingpin, Meneses went with DEA CI-1 to Miami, where he met Blandón, and to San Francisco, where an FBI informant said he was telling associates he worked for the CIA; they returned in November and December 1987, producing a case against Aparicio Moreno. An INS stop in Miami in September 1988, when the DEA said it had not expected him, ended with his agreeing to leave. Gonzalez moved to Mexico City in January 1988 and agent James Rivera took over, working cases on cocaine from Panama through Costa Rica. Meneses traveled for the DEA to Miami, Los Angeles and Colombia in 1989, and the DEA deactivated him on December 23, 1989 because none of his cases "appears to have any chance of fruition." He was reactivated on May 10, 1990 after reporting that Blandón wanted help moving cocaine from Central America to Florida, paid $500, and closed on August 16, 1990. The DEA's payments totaled $7,377.50 in thirteen payments.[^2][^6][^20]
Meanwhile the San Francisco FBI's Donald Hale wrote to headquarters in January 1988 that "it became apparent to the FBI that Norwin Meneses was, and may still be, an informant of DEA" and "an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency," on the word of a source who said Meneses was bragging that this was why he was not prosecuted. On April 15, 1988 headquarters relayed the CIA general counsel's reply, dated March 31, 1988, that a search found no information that Meneses was ever employed by or an informant for the CIA and that the CIA had no objection to prosecution.[^8][^19] A grand jury in San Francisco indicted Meneses on February 8, 1989 on two counts, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, from a 1984 sale to an undercover agent in which he was the source, and possession with intent to distribute, from a 1985 informant's report; the indictment was sealed and a no-bail warrant issued. Swenson wrote that the reason was "upcoming Statute of Limitations problems," and told Agent Stephen Tse in 1991 that the case was "old and very weak." The warrant was entered in the FBI's NCIC database on April 12, 1989; the indictment was unsealed on August 4, 1997.[^2][^19] Rivera said he did not know of the warrant when he requested a visa for Meneses that year. On January 22, 1990 the DEA's country attaché Ron Lard told an FBI legal attaché that Meneses was "a very valuable and current active DEA source," though he had been deactivated the previous month; the San Francisco FBI replied on February 12 that it would not have sought the indictment had it known. No extradition request was ever made, and a treaty with Costa Rica did not cover drug offenses.[^19]
Meanwhile the San Francisco FBI's Donald Hale wrote to headquarters in January 1988 that "it became apparent to the FBI that Norwin Meneses was, and may still be, an informant of DEA" and "an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency," on the word of a source who said Meneses was bragging that this was why he was not prosecuted. On April 15, 1988 headquarters relayed the CIA general counsel's reply, dated March 31, 1988, that a search found no information that Meneses was ever employed by or an informant for the CIA and that the CIA had no objection to prosecution.[^9][^20] A grand jury in San Francisco indicted Meneses on February 8, 1989 on two counts, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, from a 1984 sale to an undercover agent in which he was the source, and possession with intent to distribute, from a 1985 informant's report; the indictment was sealed and a no-bail warrant issued. Swenson wrote that the reason was "upcoming Statute of Limitations problems," and told Agent Stephen Tse in 1991 that the case was "old and very weak." The warrant was entered in the FBI's NCIC database on April 12, 1989; the indictment was unsealed on August 4, 1997.[^2][^20] Rivera said he did not know of the warrant when he requested a visa for Meneses that year. On January 22, 1990 the DEA's country attaché Ron Lard told an FBI legal attaché that Meneses was "a very valuable and current active DEA source," though he had been deactivated the previous month; the San Francisco FBI replied on February 12 that it would not have sought the indictment had it known. No extradition request was ever made, and a treaty with Costa Rica did not cover drug offenses.[^20]
### Nicaragua, 1990 to 1997
After the Sandinistas lost the 1990 election Meneses returned to Nicaragua, where, Webb wrote, he sought $12 million in confiscated holdings and recruited the former Sandinista intelligence officer [[Enrique Miranda]] to reopen his routes through concealed airstrips, including one near Rosita.[^20] In September 1991 a DEA informant told the Guatemala office he was driving a car loaded with cocaine from Managua to Houston for Meneses and Miranda, and DEA cases opened in Guatemala, Houston and Los Angeles; on September 23 Lard told the FBI that Meneses had contacted the DEA again, and agent Federico Villarreal met him two or three times in Managua, without a record of reactivation or payment.[^19] On November 3, 1991 the Nicaraguan National Police arrested Meneses, his half-brother Luis Enrique Meneses, Miranda, an engineer who concealed the cocaine, Carmelo Lacayo Briceño, and Carlos Francisco Merlo Bermúdez, seizing about 764 kilograms of cocaine and a kilogram of heroin being loaded into vehicles for the United States; a CIA station reported the arrest on November 4 and a DO update called him "the top Cali Cartel trafficker in Nicaragua."[^2][^8] Webb wrote that police chief Rene Vivas said Meneses told him "he had the backing of a higher power, a superpower" and was working for the United States to get Sandinista officials on drug charges, that Roger Mayorga complained that Villarreal had been meeting him secretly, and that the State Department pressed the Chamorro government to dismiss Vivas.[^20] Webb gave the seizure as 725 kilograms; the Inspector General and the CIA give 764. Villarreal told the Inspector General he did not send Meneses against the Sandinistas and that Meneses may have wanted to be able to say he was still working for the DEA.[^2]
After the Sandinistas lost the 1990 election Meneses returned to Nicaragua, where, Webb wrote, he sought $12 million in confiscated holdings and recruited the former Sandinista intelligence officer [[Enrique Miranda]] to reopen his routes through concealed airstrips, including one near Rosita.[^21] In September 1991 a DEA informant told the Guatemala office he was driving a car loaded with cocaine from Managua to Houston for Meneses and Miranda, and DEA cases opened in Guatemala, Houston and Los Angeles; on September 23 Lard told the FBI that Meneses had contacted the DEA again, and agent Federico Villarreal met him two or three times in Managua, without a record of reactivation or payment.[^20] On November 3, 1991 the Nicaraguan National Police arrested Meneses, his half-brother Luis Enrique Meneses, Miranda, an engineer who concealed the cocaine, Carmelo Lacayo Briceño, and Carlos Francisco Merlo Bermúdez, seizing about 764 kilograms of cocaine and a kilogram of heroin being loaded into vehicles for the United States; a CIA station reported the arrest on November 4 and a DO update called him "the top Cali Cartel trafficker in Nicaragua."[^2][^9] Webb wrote that police chief Rene Vivas said Meneses told him "he had the backing of a higher power, a superpower" and was working for the United States to get Sandinista officials on drug charges, that Roger Mayorga complained that Villarreal had been meeting him secretly, and that the State Department pressed the Chamorro government to dismiss Vivas.[^21] Webb gave the seizure as 725 kilograms; the Inspector General and the CIA give 764. Villarreal told the Inspector General he did not send Meneses against the Sandinistas and that Meneses may have wanted to be able to say he was still working for the DEA.[^2]
Meneses was convicted on August 16, 1992 and sentenced to 300 months; Miranda received 168 months. The term was later reduced to twelve and a half years, and the U.S. Embassy reported his release on November 14, 1997.[^2] Webb and the journalist [[Georg Hodel]] interviewed him at Tipitapa prison in January 1996, where Webb wrote the guards murmured "Señor"; Meneses told the Justice Department's inspectors in April 1997 that he had never dealt drugs, that the Sandinistas set him up and that he never cooperated with any United States agency, and told the CIA's inspectors he never dealt with the CIA.[^1][^8][^21]
Meneses was convicted on August 16, 1992 and sentenced to 300 months; Miranda received 168 months. The term was later reduced to twelve and a half years, and the U.S. Embassy reported his release on November 14, 1997.[^2] Webb and the journalist [[Georg Hodel]] interviewed him at Tipitapa prison in January 1996, where Webb wrote the guards murmured "Señor"; Meneses told the Justice Department's inspectors in April 1997 that he had never dealt drugs, that the Sandinistas set him up and that he never cooperated with any United States agency, and told the CIA's inspectors he never dealt with the CIA.[^1][^9][^22]
### Miranda and Ilopango
Miranda testified at the 1991 trial that Meneses financed the Contras with cocaine and that the Salvadoran Air Force landed his shipments at a Texas base. Webb relayed more: that cocaine from Colombia reached Costa Rican strips including the farm of the CIA-linked [[John Hull]], that [[Marcos Aguado]] and Meneses supervised loading at [[Ilopango Airbase]] onto aircraft of the Salvadoran Air Force and of [[Southern Air Transport]], and that guns went south and drugs north.[^22] Miranda told the Inspector General that his knowledge was all from Meneses and Aguado; that he said he had witnessed a shipment in Texas and, pressed, said he had not; that he had been paid about $3,500 a month by the CIA for eight months in 1985 and was accused of being a double agent; and that he had never raised Contra trafficking when the DEA debriefed him in 1996. The Inspector General concluded his allegations "lack substantial force"; the CIA's inspectors said he could provide nothing to corroborate them. Miranda also said the Sandinistas asked him in 1981 to recruit Meneses for their drug operation and that Meneses declined, telling him he was already selling for the Contras with CIA support and that he stopped in September 1985.[^8][^23]
Miranda testified at the 1991 trial that Meneses financed the Contras with cocaine and that the Salvadoran Air Force landed his shipments at a Texas base. Webb relayed more: that cocaine from Colombia reached Costa Rican strips including the farm of the CIA-linked [[John Hull]], that [[Marcos Aguado]] and Meneses supervised loading at [[Ilopango Airbase]] onto aircraft of the Salvadoran Air Force and of [[Southern Air Transport]], and that guns went south and drugs north.[^23] Miranda told the Inspector General that his knowledge was all from Meneses and Aguado; that he said he had witnessed a shipment in Texas and, pressed, said he had not; that he had been paid about $3,500 a month by the CIA for eight months in 1985 and was accused of being a double agent; and that he had never raised Contra trafficking when the DEA debriefed him in 1996. The Inspector General concluded his allegations "lack substantial force"; the CIA's inspectors said he could provide nothing to corroborate them. Miranda also said the Sandinistas asked him in 1981 to recruit Meneses for their drug operation and that Meneses declined, telling him he was already selling for the Contras with CIA support and that he stopped in September 1985.[^9][^24]
The San Jose Mercury News reported on August 18, 1996 that at his 1991 trial Meneses testified that Aguado had sold him an auto transport trailer, which Meneses's men were stuffing with cocaine when Nicaraguan police arrived; Aguado was not charged, and the newspaper could not reach him. The newspaper also reported Meneses describing Aguado as one of his oldest friends, a Nicaraguan who worked for the Salvadoran air force high command.[^24] Webb put the trailer's price at $125,000 and wrote that Aguado, interviewed, denied knowing how Meneses would use it.[^25]
The San Jose Mercury News reported on August 18, 1996 that at his 1991 trial Meneses testified that Aguado had sold him an auto transport trailer, which Meneses's men were stuffing with cocaine when Nicaraguan police arrived; Aguado was not charged, and the newspaper could not reach him. The newspaper also reported Meneses describing Aguado as one of his oldest friends, a Nicaraguan who worked for the Salvadoran air force high command.[^25] Webb put the trailer's price at $125,000 and wrote that Aguado, interviewed, denied knowing how Meneses would use it.[^26]
### CIA records and the arrangement of the claims
The CIA's Inspector General found that Meneses's name first appeared in agency files in 1983 and that its cables described him as the "kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua prior to the fall of Somoza" and, in December 1984, as a Miami resident because of "unspecified drug related charges by the Costa Rican government"; that the agency answered the FBI's 1986 and 1988 inquiries and a September 3, 1987 State Department name trace with these reports and a denial of any relationship; and that on December 4, 1995, after the DEA warned that Meneses would claim to have trafficked for the CIA, headquarters asked a station about the "extensive entries" in its traces. The station replied it had nothing substantiating his Contra claims.[^8] The cable reads, in part, "DEA has been alerted that Meneses will undoubtedly claim that he was trafficking narcotics on behalf of CIA to generate money for the Contras."[^8] Webb wrote that Mayorga believed Meneses worked for the CIA in Costa Rica in money laundering through his brother Jaime's currency exchange and fronts including a restaurant across from the embassy, and that Cornejo said Meneses's business "expanded terrifically" while he was supposedly a DEA informant.[^15] The Inspector General reported that the FBI's San Francisco source and DEA agents heard Meneses claim CIA ties, that the CIA denied them every time it was asked, and that "some rumor and speculation" was "largely fueled by his own bragging."[^2]
The CIA's Inspector General found that Meneses's name first appeared in agency files in 1983 and that its cables described him as the "kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua prior to the fall of Somoza" and, in December 1984, as a Miami resident because of "unspecified drug related charges by the Costa Rican government"; that the agency answered the FBI's 1986 and 1988 inquiries and a September 3, 1987 State Department name trace with these reports and a denial of any relationship; and that on December 4, 1995, after the DEA warned that Meneses would claim to have trafficked for the CIA, headquarters asked a station about the "extensive entries" in its traces. The station replied it had nothing substantiating his Contra claims.[^9] The cable reads, in part, "DEA has been alerted that Meneses will undoubtedly claim that he was trafficking narcotics on behalf of CIA to generate money for the Contras."[^9] Webb wrote that Mayorga believed Meneses worked for the CIA in Costa Rica in money laundering through his brother Jaime's currency exchange and fronts including a restaurant across from the embassy, and that Cornejo said Meneses's business "expanded terrifically" while he was supposedly a DEA informant.[^16] The Inspector General reported that the FBI's San Francisco source and DEA agents heard Meneses claim CIA ties, that the CIA denied them every time it was asked, and that "some rumor and speculation" was "largely fueled by his own bragging."[^2]
The San Francisco DEA agent accused in 1985 told the Inspector General that Meneses, whom he met in 1982, called himself "a revolutionary and not interested in drug trafficking," and said he had the "impression" Meneses was moving guns for the Contras; the agent asked the CIA in San Francisco, which denied any connection.[^6] DEA CI-1 told the inspectors that Meneses said in 1986 or 1987 that when the Contra revolution began he met "American agents" he assumed were with the CIA and showed them how to cross into and out of Nicaragua.[^5]
### Family
Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area traffickers, Jairo as the son of Edmundo and Blandón's partner in Nicaraguan hotels and casinos; the Justice Department's inspectors could not locate Jairo and received an unconfirmed report that he was killed in Nicaragua in 1991 or 1992.[^5][^15] Webb described Rafael Cornejo as a Bay Area distributor for Meneses since the mid-1970s, convicted of tax evasion in 1985 and indicted for cocaine trafficking in 1992, against whom Blandón later cooperated.[^3][^26] Webb listed Marcos Aguado as a CIA-trained pilot and business associate; the CIA's Inspector General recorded that Miranda's allegations about Aguado could not be supported.[^14][^15]
Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area traffickers, Jairo as the son of Edmundo and Blandón's partner in Nicaraguan hotels and casinos; the Justice Department's inspectors could not locate Jairo and received an unconfirmed report that he was killed in Nicaragua in 1991 or 1992.[^5][^16] Webb described Rafael Cornejo as a Bay Area distributor for Meneses since the mid-1970s, convicted of tax evasion in 1985 and indicted for cocaine trafficking in 1992, against whom Blandón later cooperated.[^3][^27] Webb listed Marcos Aguado as a CIA-trained pilot and business associate; the CIA's Inspector General recorded that Miranda's allegations about Aguado could not be supported.[^15][^16]
### Footnotes
@ -147,23 +147,24 @@ Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area trafficke
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 3: "The brotherhood of military minds."
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IV, section B (OIG investigation regarding support of the Contras by Blandon and Meneses), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch04p2.htm
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections F-G ("David Morrison," alleged DEA corruption, DEA use of Meneses as an informant), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p2.htm
[^7]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom."
[^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Ross, Blandon, Meneses), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings1.html
[^9]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
[^10]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 15: "This thing is a tidal wave."
[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX (Carlos Cabezas), sections A-E, https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p1.htm
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX, sections F-G (assessment of Cabezas' allegations), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p2.htm
[^13]: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 59-60 (the San Francisco Frogman case, UDN-FARN and PCNE), https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume II: The Contra Story, October 8, 1998, section on Southern Front Contras, https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html
[^15]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 11: "They were looking in the other direction."
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 20: "It is a sensitive matter."
[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section G (the 1987 Los Angeles OCDETF investigation), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p4.htm
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Northern California story, the Frogman Case), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections H-I (the 1989 indictment and post-indictment activities), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p3.htm
[^20]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 23: "He had the backing of a superpower."
[^21]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue: "It was like they didn't want to know."
[^22]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends."
[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter VII (Enrique Miranda-Jaime), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch07.htm
[^24]: San Jose Mercury News, August 18, 1996 (Gary Webb, "Testimony Links U.S. to Drugs-Guns Trade Dealers Got Their 'Own Little Arsenal,'" Dark Alliance series), https://people.duke.edu/~ldbaker/clippings/da1.html
[^25]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), Chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and Cast of Characters.
[^26]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section K (the 1992 San Diego prosecution of Blandon), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p6.htm
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, section on the 1983 tax case. https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p1.htm
[^8]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom."
[^9]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Ross, Blandon, Meneses), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings1.html
[^10]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
[^11]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 15: "This thing is a tidal wave."
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX (Carlos Cabezas), sections A-E, https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p1.htm
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX, sections F-G (assessment of Cabezas' allegations), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p2.htm
[^14]: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 59-60 (the San Francisco Frogman case, UDN-FARN and PCNE), https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume II: The Contra Story, October 8, 1998, section on Southern Front Contras, https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 11: "They were looking in the other direction."
[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 20: "It is a sensitive matter."
[^18]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section G (the 1987 Los Angeles OCDETF investigation), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p4.htm
[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Northern California story, the Frogman Case), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections H-I (the 1989 indictment and post-indictment activities), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p3.htm
[^21]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 23: "He had the backing of a superpower."
[^22]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue: "It was like they didn't want to know."
[^23]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends."
[^24]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter VII (Enrique Miranda-Jaime), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch07.htm
[^25]: San Jose Mercury News, August 18, 1996 (Gary Webb, "Testimony Links U.S. to Drugs-Guns Trade Dealers Got Their 'Own Little Arsenal,'" Dark Alliance series), https://people.duke.edu/~ldbaker/clippings/da1.html
[^26]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), Chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and Cast of Characters.
[^27]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section K (the 1992 San Diego prosecution of Blandon), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p6.htm

18
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Patrice Lumumba.md
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Patrice Lumumba
aliases:
- Patrice Emery Lumumba
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags:
- ColdWar
- Decolonization
category: "Political Figure"
summary: "Patrice Lumumba was the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the independent Congo (June 1960), deposed and delivered to Katangan forces by a CIA-backed conspiracy involving Joseph Mobutu within months of independence, and killed on January 17, 1961 - a case the Church Committee found involved CIA assassination planning, making him the emblematic victim of Cold War CIA intervention in African decolonization."
summary: "Patrice Lumumba, first elected Prime Minister of the independent Congo, was deposed in 1960 and delivered to Katangan forces, and was killed on January 17, 1961; the Church Committee found CIA assassination planning."
born: 1925-07-02
died: 1961-01-17
location: "Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), Congo"
@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ Patrice Emery Lumumba (July 2, 1925 - January 17, 1961) was the first Prime Mini
The Belgian Congo achieved independence on June 30, 1960. Lumumba, who had won legislative elections as leader of the Mouvement National Congolais, became Prime Minister in a coalition government with President Joseph Kasavubu. The transition was immediately chaotic: the Congolese army mutinied against Belgian officers; Belgian paratroopers intervened to protect Belgian nationals; and the mineral-rich Katanga province, under [[Moise Tshombe]], declared independence with Belgian support on July 11, 1960.
Lumumba appealed first to the [[United Nations]], which sent peacekeepers but declined to use them to reintegrate Katanga. He then appealed to the United States, which refused, and finally to the [[Soviet Union]], which provided transport aircraft and military advisors. The Soviet connection was the critical factor in the American and Belgian decisions to seek Lumumba's removal: in the context of Cold War competition for influence in newly decolonized Africa, an independent Congolese government with Soviet ties represented an intolerable risk from the American perspective.[^1]
Lumumba appealed first to the [[United Nations]], which sent peacekeepers but declined to use them to reintegrate Katanga. He then went to the United States, and finally appealed to the [[Soviet Union]], which provided transport aircraft and military advisors. The Soviet connection was the critical factor in the American and Belgian decisions to seek Lumumba's removal: in the context of Cold War competition for influence in newly decolonized Africa, an independent Congolese government with Soviet ties represented an intolerable risk from the American perspective.[^1]
On July 14, 1960, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to take the steps needed to provide the Congolese government with military assistance after the [[Katanga]] secession.[^2] On August 9, 1960, it reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."[^3] According to the Church Committee, Lumumba visited Washington in late July 1960, where Secretary of State [[Christian Herter]] pledged economic aid, and after the events of September 5 and 14 he asked the United Nations force for protection.[^4] On February 21, 1961, the Council noted with deep regret the announced killing of Lumumba, [[Maurice Mpolo]] and [[Joseph Okito]], urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the [[Congo]] of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that an immediate and impartial investigation be held into the circumstances of the deaths.[^5]
### CIA Involvement
@ -40,7 +42,7 @@ The CIA facilitated Lumumba's capture by providing intelligence on his movements
### Church Committee Findings
The 1975 [[Church Committee]] investigated CIA involvement in Lumumba's death and found:
The 1975 Church Committee investigated CIA involvement in Lumumba's death and found:
- CIA Director Dulles had authorized assassination planning targeting Lumumba
- The CIA had prepared and dispatched a biological toxin specifically for use against him
@ -53,9 +55,13 @@ The committee concluded that while the CIA had clearly planned and intended to a
Lumumba's death established the pattern of Cold War CIA intervention in African independence movements that characterized subsequent decades. His assassination brought Mobutu Sese Seko to power as a long-term CIA client who would rule the renamed country Zaire until 1997. The Congo became a staging ground for subsequent CIA operations, particularly during the [[Angola|Angolan]] civil war (1975-1991) when CIA-supplied [[Zaire]]-based forces supported [[UNITA]] against the [[MPLA]].
Lumumba's legacy in pan-African and anticolonial political tradition was significant; he became a martyred symbol of African self-determination. The Belgian government formally acknowledged Belgian involvement in his death in 2002.[^2]
Lumumba's legacy in pan-African and anticolonial political tradition was significant; he became a martyred symbol of African self-determination. The Belgian government formally acknowledged Belgian involvement in his death in 2002.[^6]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
[^2]: Weissman, Stephen R. "What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2014.
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 143 (1960), July 14, 1960, paragraph 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F143%20(1960)&l=en&t=pdf
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 146 (1960), August 9, 1960, paragraph 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F146%20(1960)&l=en&t=pdf
[^4]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
[^5]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20(1961)&l=en&t=pdf
[^6]: Weissman, Stephen R. "What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2014.

43
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Robert McFarlane.md
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@ -47,14 +47,14 @@ relations:
start: 1984
end: 1986-11
role: "organized third-country Contra funding, an early advocate of the Iran arms sales, and led the May 1986 mission to Tehran"
fn: 7
fn: 8
- type: prosecuted
with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
reverse: true
start: 1988-03-11
end: 1992-12-24
role: "pleaded guilty March 11, 1988 to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress; sentenced March 3, 1989; pardoned December 24, 1992"
fn: 9
fn: 10
---
Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a [[United States Naval Academy|Naval Academy]] graduate and Marine Corps officer who served as President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s national security adviser from October 1983 to December 1985. Before that he had been deputy to his predecessor [[William Clark]], counselor to Secretary of State [[Alexander Haig]], a staff member of the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]], and military aide to [[Henry Kissinger]] when Kissinger was national security adviser to [[Richard Nixon]]. He commanded the first U.S. Marine battery to land in the Republic of [[Vietnam]], completed two tours, received a Bronze Star, and resigned from the [[United States Marine Corps]] as a lieutenant colonel.[^1] [[Lawrence Walsh]]'s Final Report records that under Reagan the [[National Security Council]] staff "at times became operational, taking on primary responsibility for the execution of the [[Iran]] and contra covert operations," and that McFarlane "did not shrink from the operational tasks that were of high personal interest to the President," delegating some of them to his deputy director of political-military affairs, [[Oliver North]].[^1]
@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a [[United States Naval Academy|Naval Academy]] gr
On January 6, 1984 the National Security Planning Group approved "immediate efforts to obtain additional funding of $10-15 million from foreign or domestic sources," the current $24 million appropriation to the [[Contras]] being enough only through June; McFarlane was responsible for carrying it out with North and the NSC staff member [[Constantine Menges]]. On February 21, 1984 he warned Reagan that the program would have to be curtailed by May or June unless new money was found.[^1][^2] In late March 1984 [[William J. Casey]] sent him a memorandum urging that Israel and other countries be asked for weapons and money, and in April McFarlane sent the NSC staff member [[Howard Teicher]] to ask the Israelis; the mission was unsuccessful, and when Secretary of State [[George Shultz]] learned of it from the embassy in [[Israel]] McFarlane told him Teicher had gone "on his own hook."[^1]
In May 1984 he met the Saudi ambassador, Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], and explained Reagan's concern about the gap in Contra financing; days later Bandar volunteered $1 million a month. McFarlane obtained from North a Contra bank account number and gave it to Bandar. He later testified that he told Reagan and Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] within a day or two, and that when he put the first contribution to the President on a card in the daily briefing book with the words that no one else knew of it, Reagan answered, in writing or orally, "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^1] At the June 25, 1984 National Security Planning Group meeting, where Shultz quoted Chief of Staff [[James Baker]] as calling third-country solicitations an "impeachable offense," McFarlane said: "I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas [contras] until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." Walsh noted that none of the participants raised the fact that the Saudi solicitation had already occurred. Attorney General [[William French Smith]] ruled the next day that third-country funding was permissible so long as no U.S. funds were used and no repayment was expected.[^1] The [[Boland Amendment]] of October 1984 then barred funds of any agency "involved in intelligence activities" from supporting [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] military or paramilitary operations "directly or indirectly."[^3]
In May 1984 he met the Saudi ambassador, Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], and explained Reagan's concern about the gap in Contra financing; days later Bandar volunteered $1 million a month. McFarlane obtained from North a Contra bank account number and gave it to Bandar. A Ministry of Defence memorandum disclosed at a later criminal trial, the Guardian reported, showed that from 1988 the Ministry's head of arms sales helped set up regular quarterly payments to Bandar from [[Al-Yamamah]] arms-deal funds, which BAE made on the Ministry's instruction.[^3] He later testified that he told Reagan and Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] within a day or two, and that when he put the first contribution to the President on a card in the daily briefing book with the words that no one else knew of it, Reagan answered, in writing or orally, "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^1] At the June 25, 1984 National Security Planning Group meeting, where Shultz quoted Chief of Staff [[James Baker]] as calling third-country solicitations an "impeachable offense," McFarlane said: "I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas [contras] until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." Walsh noted that none of the participants raised the fact that the Saudi solicitation had already occurred. Attorney General [[William French Smith]] ruled the next day that third-country funding was permissible so long as no U.S. funds were used and no repayment was expected.[^1] The [[Boland Amendment]] of October 1984 then barred funds of any agency "involved in intelligence activities" from supporting [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] military or paramilitary operations "directly or indirectly."[^4]
McFarlane testified that in spring and summer of 1984 Reagan let it be known "very clearly" that the Contras were to be kept together "body and soul," and that he discussed the directive with his deputy [[Donald Fortier]] and with North; he said he told North that no one could "solicit, encourage, coerce, or broker the transmission of money" to the Contras. Walsh found that he assigned the work to North and that North kept him generally informed. A September 2, 1984 North request to approach a private donor for a "civilian" helicopter drew McFarlane's marginal note "I don't think this is legal."[^1] Walsh's conclusion on the arrangement was that Reagan "put McFarlane in a difficult position," and that McFarlane "put his subordinates in an equally difficult position by delegating to them the operational tasks."[^1]
The writer [[Gary Webb]] reported that in January 1985, as the [[FDN]] spent its last batch of [[Central Intelligence Agency]] money and Contra forces retreated from Nicaragua into [[Honduras]], McFarlane told the FDN leader [[Adolfo Calero]] it might be time to think about "cutting both our losses and theirs," after twelve months that had included the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, a bombing at [[Eden Pastora]]'s jungle headquarters and exposure of a CIA-printed terrorism manual.[^4] In February 1985 the Saudis agreed to give an additional $24 million, according to the New York Times editors' chronology of the Committees' report; Walsh puts the Saudi total at $32 million for the period, with [[Taiwan]] adding $2 million.[^1][^5]
The writer [[Gary Webb]] reported that in January 1985, as the [[FDN]] spent its last batch of [[Central Intelligence Agency]] money and Contra forces retreated from Nicaragua into [[Honduras]], McFarlane told the FDN leader [[Adolfo Calero]] it might be time to think about "cutting both our losses and theirs," after twelve months that had included the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, a bombing at [[Eden Pastora]]'s jungle headquarters and exposure of a CIA-printed terrorism manual.[^5] In February 1985 the Saudis agreed to give an additional $24 million, according to the New York Times editors' chronology of the Committees' report; Walsh puts the Saudi total at $32 million for the period, with [[Taiwan]] adding $2 million.[^1][^6]
### Contra memoranda and the 1985 letters to Congress
@ -76,38 +76,39 @@ On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote Hamilton that "at no time did I or any memb
### The Iran initiative, 1985 to 1986
McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^6] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^5][^7]
McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^7] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^6][^8]
On July 3, 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.[^1][^5] Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of [[Charles Hill]], Weinberger and Chief of Staff [[Donald Regan]] obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.[^1] Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.[^1]
On July 3, 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.[^1][^6] Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of [[Charles Hill]], Weinberger and Chief of Staff [[Donald Regan]] obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.[^1] Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.[^1]
McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calling on you from time to time" and wrote that he trusted McFarlane would "still permit me to call on you." On December 7 he attended the White House residence meeting on Iran, and on December 8 he flew to London with North to meet [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], Kimche and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1][^5] He stayed in contact with North and Poindexter on the NSC's PROFs computer system from a terminal at his home. On May 25, 1986 he arrived in [[Tehran]] with North and others carrying HAWK spare parts, and, according to Walsh, a cake; the party left on May 28 without a hostage release. North's contemporaneous note records that they were "heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." After the trip McFarlane and North briefed Reagan, Bush and Regan; Walsh records that McFarlane "was concerned about North's revelation regarding the Iran/contra diversion, but said he shared the information with no one," and recommended to Poindexter that North be returned to the Marine Corps.[^1]
McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calling on you from time to time" and wrote that he trusted McFarlane would "still permit me to call on you." On December 7 he attended the White House residence meeting on Iran, and on December 8 he flew to London with North to meet [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], Kimche and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1][^6] He stayed in contact with North and Poindexter on the NSC's PROFs computer system from a terminal at his home. On May 25, 1986 he arrived in [[Tehran]] with North and others carrying HAWK spare parts, and, according to Walsh, a cake; the party left on May 28 without a hostage release. North's contemporaneous note records that they were "heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." After the trip McFarlane and North briefed Reagan, Bush and Regan; Walsh records that McFarlane "was concerned about North's revelation regarding the Iran/contra diversion, but said he shared the information with no one," and recommended to Poindexter that North be returned to the Marine Corps.[^1]
### Exposure, plea and pardon
After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^8]
After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^9]
On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^9] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^10] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^9]
On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^10] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^11] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^10]
### Esquire article and lawsuit
In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^11] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^11]
In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^12] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^12]
McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^11] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^11]
McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^12] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^12]
### Death
McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^8]
McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^9]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels, August 4, 1993), ch. 1, "United States v. Robert C. McFarlane" (citing McFarlane, North trial testimony, March 10 to 16, 1989; Select Committees testimony, May 11 to 13, 1987; SSCI testimony, December 7, 1986; NSPG minutes, June 25, 1984; Hill, Weinberger and Regan notes). https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
[^2]: Brinkley, Joel, and Stephen Engelberg, eds. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with the Minority Views*, abridged edition (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1988), "Iran-Contra Chronology," entry for February 21, 1984. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
[^3]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it."
[^5]: Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., *Report of the Congressional Committees*, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
[^6]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
[^8]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
[^9]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^10]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
[^11]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json
[^3]: "Suppressed report on UK-Saudi arms deal discovered in archive," *The Guardian,* March 24, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
[^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it."
[^6]: Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., *Report of the Congressional Committees*, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
[^8]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
[^9]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
[^10]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
[^11]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
[^12]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json

32
10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Ronald LeGrand.md
View file

@ -6,18 +6,38 @@ tags:
- CIA
- DoJ
- INSLAW
summary: "Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the Senate Judiciary Committee."
summary: "Ronald LeGrand was the Senate Judiciary Committee's chief investigator who in May 1988 relayed to INSLAW a Justice Department source's allegations that the source later denied."
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Senate Judiciary Committee]]"
role: "chief investigator"
start: 1988
fn: 4
updated: 2026-10-12
---
Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]. In late April 1988, he telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW]], to request a full briefing on the disputes between Inslaw and the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. Hamilton and his [[Nancy Hamilton|wife]] subsequently briefed LeGrand at Inslaw on the morning of May 11. Two days later, LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information from a trusted senior Justice Department career official. This source, who had been in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department since the [[Watergate scandal]] under President [[Richard Nixon]], told LeGrand to convey to the Hamiltons that "What you think happened, did happen. You are not crazy. But you do not know squat about how dirty the INSLAW case really is. If you ever learn even half of it, you will be sickened. INSLAW is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than [[Watergate]]. The Justice Department has been compromised at every level on the INSLAW case."[^1]
Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]. In late April 1988, he telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW]], to request a full briefing on the disputes between Inslaw and the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. Hamilton and his [[Nancy Hamilton|wife]] subsequently briefed LeGrand at Inslaw on the morning of May 11. Two days later, LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information from a trusted senior Justice Department career official. According to Cheri Seymour, this source had been in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department since the [[Watergate scandal]] under President [[Richard Nixon]]; the source told LeGrand to convey to the Hamiltons that "What you think happened, did happen. You are not crazy. But you do not know squat about how dirty the INSLAW case really is. If you ever learn even half of it, you will be sickened. INSLAW is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than [[Watergate]]. The Justice Department has been compromised at every level on the INSLAW case."[^1]
The source also stated that [[Lowell Jensen]] engineered Inslaw's problems and relied on [[Miles Matthews]], [[James Knapp]], and [[James Johnston]]. Miles Matthews allegedly stated in the presence of LeGrand's source that "Lowell [Jensen] wants to get INSLAW out of the way and give the business to friends." The source further indicated that [[John Keeney]], [[Mark M. Richard|Mark Richard]], and [[Philip White]] knew "all about" Jensen's malfeasance, and that while Richard and White were "pretty upset," they would not disclose what they knew except under subpoena and oath. The source also believed that documents related to [[Project Eagle]] were shredded inside the DOJ, but suggested Inslaw should subpoena paperwork prepared by a Jensen subordinate regarding the purchase of large quantities of computer hardware for which senior DOJ career staff saw no justification.[^2]
The source also informed INSLAW through LeGrand that the Criminal Division had served as the nerve center for the scheme to drive INSLAW out of business by engineering sham contract disputes. LeGrand's communication was a significant turning point for the Hamiltons, as it provided internal corroboration of their suspicions regarding the theft of the [[PROMIS]] software.[^1] However, the Special Counsel's investigation found that LeGrand provided little corroboration of Hamilton's allegations during a sworn statement to House investigators.
The source also informed INSLAW through LeGrand that the Criminal Division had served as the nerve center for the scheme to drive INSLAW out of business by engineering sham contract disputes. LeGrand's communication was a significant turning point for the Hamiltons, as it provided internal corroboration of their suspicions regarding the theft of the [[PROMIS]] software.[^1] However, in a sworn statement to House investigators LeGrand provided, in the words of the House report, "little corroboration" of Hamilton's allegations.
LeGrand informed House investigators and the Special Counsel that, as far as he knew, none of the information provided to him by his source was obtained first-hand. The Special Counsel interviewed LeGrand's source, a long-time career employee of the Department of Justice, who stated that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or Inslaw, and had not heard any credible rumors about such misconduct. This source indicated that the subject of Inslaw came up during a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988. He suggested contacting Miles Matthews because Matthews was responsible for procurement in the Criminal Division and the source disliked or distrusted him. The source denied ever mentioning Jensen, Richard, White, Johnston, or Knapp to LeGrand, and did not believe any of these individuals would be involved in any type of cover-up. Furthermore, the source denied that any statements attributed to him in Hamilton's affidavit were accurate, and he never said or believed any of the comments attributed to him, never had reason to believe that identified DOJ officials were involved in wrongdoing, or that Project Eagle documents were improperly shredded. The Special Counsel's investigation ultimately found no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior DOJ officials.[^2]
LeGrand informed House investigators and the Special Counsel that, as far as he knew, none of the information provided to him by his source was obtained first-hand.[^2]
### Later Accounts
LeGrand, a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent, was asked by House Judiciary Committee investigators to identify the trusted source so that they could contact that person, and he declined. He said he would consider giving a sworn statement if the committee made a request to Chairwoman [[Cardiss Collins]] of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, to which he had moved from the Senate committee; the committee's chairman wrote to Collins on July 20, 1990. Investigators then made numerous attempts to schedule the statement, LeGrand left the Washington area without informing the committee, and the committee wrote to him again on November 20, 1990. On February 14, 1991, he gave a sworn statement in which, in the House report's words, he provided "little corroboration" of the Hamiltons' allegations. He attributed the discrepancy to "the unintentional merging of comments from different persons" that the Hamiltons had credited to the trusted source, and said that he had gathered information from several individuals during his inquiry.[^3] Asked whether the source had said that the INSLAW case was "a lot dirtier" than Watergate "both in its breadth and in its depth," he answered that the source had said there was more to the matter than people were aware of and had made a comparison to Watergate, but that he did not recall those words. He again declined to name the source.[^3]
On October 11, 1988, [[Elliot Richardson]], counsel to INSLAW, had sent a memorandum summarizing LeGrand's statements to [[Robin Ross]], an assistant to Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]].[^4] Hamilton's December 22, 1989 affidavit states that LeGrand had confirmed what he told Hamilton on several occasions after May 1988.[^5] LeGrand told House investigators and Special Counsel Bua that, as far as he knew, none of the information from his source was obtained first-hand, and he confirmed to both that he believed the source had given him some of the information reflected in Hamilton's affidavit.[^5] When Bua's team contacted LeGrand, who no longer worked for the Senate, he said he would describe the source's information but would not disclose the source's identity.[^6]
LeGrand later gave a different account. At the Department of Justice's request, he submitted an affidavit, filed as a declaration in INSLAW's bankruptcy case (Case No. 85-0070), refuting INSLAW's claim that he had conveyed "highly specific" allegations to the Hamiltons. He stated that he had told them of "general allegations, rumors," and of information heard from different sources about various persons in the department. The House report describes the affidavit's assertion that the source had no personal knowledge of the department's handling of the matter as "striking," coming after several years of LeGrand's statements to William Hamilton, to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and to the House committee. His sworn statement of February 14, 1991 to House investigators, his acknowledgment to House investigators and to Bua that the source had given him some of the information in Hamilton's affidavit, and the October 11, 1988 memorandum remain in the record beside the affidavit. The House report adds that Hamilton later alleged to the committee that Roger Pauley, a Justice Department official, was LeGrand's contact within the department.[^3]
The source gave a further account on February 7, 1994, to the Justice Department review team that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] ordered to examine Bua's report. The source had refused to be interviewed by Bua and by the House investigators; the review's report states that he agreed to be interviewed by the review team because of his respect for and confidence in Reno. The interview took place in a private dining room at a local club, with LeGrand and Morgan Frankel, Assistant Legal Counsel of the United States Senate, present. The source identified himself to the team, which stated that it verified that he is a long-time career employee of the department, and said that he had known LeGrand for about 20 years (Hamilton's affidavit gives 15). He told the team that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or INSLAW and had heard no rumors he would consider credible; that the subject of INSLAW came up in a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988; that he suggested LeGrand contact Miles Matthews because Matthews was responsible for procurement in the Criminal Division and the source disliked or distrusted him; and that he never mentioned Lowell Jensen, Mark Richard, Philip White, James Johnston or James Knapp to LeGrand and did not believe any of them would be involved in any type of cover-up. When the review team read him the passage from Hamilton's affidavit, he said that none of the statements or beliefs attributed to him were accurate, and that he had no reason to believe that documents relating to Project Eagle were improperly shredded.[^5] The review team wrote that it had concluded there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior department officials. In its own account Bua's report had recorded that Matthews, Knapp, Johnston, White, Keeney and Richard each denied knowledge of the wrongdoing described in Hamilton's affidavit.[^5] INSLAW's rebuttal to the Bua report had criticized the special counsel for not investigating the allegations attributed to the source.[^5]
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### Footnotes
[^1]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
[^3]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, H. Rept. 102-857 (1992), section 7, "Ronald LeGrand Denies INSLAW's Assertions," pp. 62-64. https://archive.org/stream/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport/TheInslawAffair_djvu.txt
[^4]: Bua report (March 1993), section 10, "Ronald LeGrand," pp. 113-114, quoting Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit, including the October 11, 1988 Richardson memorandum.
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, section IV.B.1, pp. 22-28, citing Bua Report 113-120 and INSLAW Rebuttal 44-46. Bound with the Bua report: https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
[^6]: Bua report, section 10, p. 114: "we contacted LeGrand, who no longer works for the Senate. LeGrand said he would tell us about his source's information, but would not disclose his source's identity."