17 KiB
| title | aliases | created | updated | category | tags | summary | born | died | location | relations | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Henry A. Kissinger |
|
2026-05-14 | 2026-10-12 | Intelligence & Government |
|
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Nixon and Ford who endorsed Israel's nuclear program at Dimona and privately argued that Japan and Israel were better served by the bomb than the Non-Proliferation Treaty. | 1923-05-27 | 2023-11-29 | Fürth, Germany |
|
Henry A. Kissinger was an American diplomat and political scientist who served as the United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. In the fall of 1967, while a Harvard University professor and consultant on Vietnam to the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, Kissinger visited Tel Aviv to teach for a week at the Israeli Defense College. At the end of his course, he went to William N. Dale's office in the embassy and sent an urgent, top-secret message to the White House, warning about Dimona and concluding that Israel was making nuclear warheads.1
Kissinger approached inauguration day on January 20, 1969, convinced that Israel's nuclear ambitions were justified and understandable. Once in office, he and Nixon endorsed Israel's nuclear ambitions and shared a contempt for the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Kissinger told his staff in the first months of 1969 that Japan, as well as Israel, would be better off with the bomb than without it, believing that nuclear weapons were essential to the national security of both nations. His view was pragmatic: most major powers would eventually obtain nuclear weapons, and the United States could benefit most by helping them do so rather than engaging in futile exercises in morality.2
Kissinger's support for Israel's nuclear weapons program was widely known to the Israeli leadership. This was overtly signaled by the decision in 1969 to end the Floyd L. Culler, Jr. inspections of Dimona, a move that became American policy for the next two decades, signifying that Israel had gone nuclear and the United States would not intervene.2
Biographical Record
Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born on May 27, 1923, in Fürth, Bavaria, to a German-Jewish family. The family emigrated to the United States in 1938. Kissinger was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on June 19, 1943, while serving in the U.S. Army. He earned a B.A. summa cum laude from Harvard College in 1950, an M.A. in 1952, and a Ph.D. in 1954, with a dissertation later published as A World Restored (1957).[^bio]
He died on November 29, 2023, at his home in Kent, Connecticut, at the age of 100.[^bio]
Harvard Career
Kissinger's academic career at Harvard ran from 1951 to 1971, with a leave of absence beginning January 1969 when he entered government service. He directed the Harvard International Seminar from 1951 to 1971, a program that brought rising foreign policy figures from Europe and Asia to Cambridge each summer. Beginning in 1957, he served as Associate Director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. He directed the Harvard Defense Studies Program from 1958 to 1971. His last seminar at the Center for International Affairs was held on December 16, 1968, before he departed for Washington, D.C. to serve as Nixon's National Security Advisor.[^bio]
The Harvard International Seminar received funding from at least three CIA cutouts, including The Asia Foundation, The Fairfield Foundation, and American Friends of the Middle East, the last of which channeled approximately $243,000 to the program. After CIA funding was publicly exposed in 1967, the Ford Foundation assumed financial support for the program.[^seminar]
Quantico Panels, 1955
Kissinger attended some sessions of the first Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel at the Marine Corps Schools in June 1955, as did members of the State and Defense departments and the Central Intelligence Agency.[^qp3] On August 16, 1955, Nelson Rockefeller invited him, then a Harvard academic, to a second panel on the psychological aspects of future United States strategy, which is called Quantico II in the record.[^qp1] The panel's twelve members met in Washington in late August and at Quantico in September, with Frederick L. Anderson designated chairman.[^qp1] Kissinger took the place of Hans Speier, who had planned a trip to Germany for the Rand Corporation. Daniel Bessner describes the meeting as crucial to Kissinger's career, and states that Rockefeller became his political patron after it.[^qp4] The Rockefeller Archive Center describes its folder of Kissinger's Spring 1980 interview in the Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers as stating that Kissinger "met Nelson Rockefeller while serving on the staff of the Quantico II conference in the mid-1950s"; Bessner, citing Isaacson, places the two men's first meeting at the first panel.[^qp5][^qp4] Kissinger's paper "Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR" appears in the November 1955 source book, which the panel submitted on November 29, 1955.[^qp1][^qp2]
Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project
Kissinger served as director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, a policy planning initiative convened by Nelson Rockefeller that ran from 1956 to 1960, with the final publication appearing in 1961. The project produced a volume entitled Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports (Doubleday, 1961), which sold over 400,000 copies.
The project was organized into seven panels examining sweeping strategic and domestic issues. Dean Rusk chaired Panel I (International Objectives and Strategies). Kissinger, director of the whole project until his resignation on June 30, 1958, directed the report of Panel II (International Security: The Military Aspect), whose members included Roswell Gilpatric, Townsend Hoopes, Edward Teller, Henry Luce, and Laurance Rockefeller. Panel III (International Economic and Social Objectives) was chaired by Milton Katz. Panel IV (U.S. Economic and Social Policy) was chaired by Thomas B. McCabe. Panel V (U.S. Utilization of Human Resources) was chaired by John W. Gardner. Panel VI (U.S. Democratic Process) was chaired by James A. Perkins. Panel VII (The Moral Framework of National Purpose), chaired by Richard McKeon, produced a report by Robert Heilbroner that was not published.[^ssp]
The project was Kissinger's primary institutional bridge to the Rockefeller family network prior to his entry into government. Roswell Gilpatric subsequently served as Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy administration. Nelson Rockefeller retained Kissinger as his personal foreign policy consultant after the project concluded.[^c1]
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957)
Kissinger's book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Harper, 1957) grew out of eighteen months of work with a study group organized by the Council on Foreign Relations and led by Gordon Dean, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The book argued for a doctrine of limited nuclear war as an alternative to massive retaliation, and established Kissinger as a leading voice on strategic doctrine. Panel II of the Rockefeller Special Studies Project built on the same framework.[^nwfp]
Brazil and 1964 Coup
A week before the April 1964 Brazilian military coup that overthrew Joao Goulart, Nelson Rockefeller's longtime Latin American representative Berent Friele briefed both Nelson Rockefeller and Kissinger on Brazil's political crisis. Friele, a Norwegian-born coffee dealer who had served as Rockefeller's country director in Brazil during the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) programs in World War II, had maintained a dense network of contacts in Brazilian business and military circles. His briefing dismissed Goulart's constitutional reform proposals as demagoguery and characterized the opposition's plans favorably.[^c2]
After the coup, Friele functioned as a back-channel between the Nixon administration and the Brazilian military government. A secret communications channel was established between Nixon and Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu Medici through Kissinger, with Brazilian contacts including figures close to Friele.[^friele]
Bay of Pigs
When news of the Bay of Pigs invasion reached Harvard in April 1961, Kissinger told students who asked his view: "Well, as long as we're there, I don't think it would do us any good to lose."[^c3]
Government Service
Kissinger was appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on January 20, 1969, the date of Nixon's inauguration. He was appointed Secretary of State on September 21, 1973, and took office the following day, September 22, 1973. He held both positions concurrently until November 3, 1975, when President Ford removed him as National Security Advisor. He continued as Secretary of State until January 20, 1977.[^state]
Cambodia Secret Bombing
On March 15, 1969, Kissinger transmitted Nixon's order to commence the secret bombing of Cambodia (Operation Menu, first phase: Operation Breakfast) to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Kissinger briefed Nixon on preparations on March 17, 1969, and received a report on the first raid's results on the evening of March 18, 1969, commenting that "the impact must have been something."[^doc11][^doc12][^doc13]
FBI Wiretap Program
On May 9, 1969, following the publication of a New York Times report by William Beecher on the secret Cambodia bombing, Kissinger contacted FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and arranged surveillance on Morton Halperin, an NSC staffer and former Harvard colleague. The following day, General Alexander Haig went to FBI headquarters on Kissinger's behalf to submit a formal surveillance request covering Halperin and three others, including NSC staffer Helmut Sonnenfeldt and State Department official William Sullivan. A May 12, 1969, FBI memorandum documents the "Colonel Alexander M. Haig Technical Surveillance Request." A May 11, 1970, FBI report from Hoover to Nixon summarized results of the surveillance program. Between May 1969 and February 1971, seventeen individuals (thirteen government officials and four journalists) were subjected to wiretapping under this program, which produced no evidence of leaks.[^doc16][^doc17] The litigation arising from the program, Halperin v. Kissinger, was settled in 1992 after twenty years.[^halperin]
Chile
Kissinger's documented role in U.S. intervention against Chilean President Salvador Allende spans the period from Allende's electoral victory in September 1970 through the Pinochet era. A September 12, 1970, telephone conversation between Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers discussed blocking Allende's inauguration. On September 15, 1970, CIA Director Richard Helms's handwritten notes from a White House meeting record Nixon ordering the CIA to "make the economy scream" and authorizing a coup. On October 15, 1970, Kissinger met with Helms and General Haig at the White House to discuss coup planning with General Roberto Viaux; CIA officers assessed Viaux's chances of success at "one in twenty." On November 5, 1970, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum arguing Allende posed "one of the most serious challenges" ever to U.S. interests in the hemisphere.
On September 16, 1973, three days after the coup that killed Allende, Kissinger spoke by telephone with Nixon about U.S. involvement. On June 8, 1976, Kissinger met privately with General Augusto Pinochet in Santiago, telling him "you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world." These exchanges are documented in NSAEBB No. 437 and in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXI (Chile, 1969-1973).[^chile]
The post-coup period included Kissinger's endorsement of Operation Condor, the multinational assassination program coordinated by the Southern Cone military dictatorships. On August 30, 1976, Kissinger received a State Department action memorandum requesting approval for a formal warning to the Condor governments against conducting international assassinations. On September 16, 1976, Kissinger rescinded the proposed warning and ordered "no further action be taken on this matter." Five days later, on September 21, 1976, Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt were killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C.[^condor]
Argentina
On June 30, 1976, Kissinger rebuked a State Department aide for a demarche criticizing Argentine death squads. On October 7, 1976, in a meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister César Augusto Guzzetti, Kissinger stated: "The quicker you succeed the better." On October 19, 1976, U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill cabled Washington to protest that Kissinger's approach had emboldened the junta.[^doc32][^doc33]
East Pakistan / Bangladesh
On April 6, 1971, U.S. Consul General Archer Blood in Dacca sent what became known as the "Blood Telegram," a dissent channel cable signed by twenty diplomatic staff members condemning the Pakistani military's actions in East Pakistan as genocide and calling U.S. policy "moral bankruptcy." Kissinger's April 28, 1971, memorandum to Nixon presented policy options; Nixon handwrote "Don't squeeze Yahya at this time" in the margin, reflecting the administration's priority of the Pakistan channel to China. Blood was recalled from his post. Casualty estimates for the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan range up to three million civilian deaths.[^doc51][^doc52]
East Timor
On December 6, 1975, in Jakarta, Kissinger and President Ford met with Indonesian President Suharto the day before Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. The meeting is documented in Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579, classified Secret/Nodis, from Gerald R. Ford Library records. Kissinger told Suharto: "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly." He noted that "the use of US-made arms could create problems," but framed this as a question of how the operation was construed legally. Ford stated: "We will understand and will not press you on the issue." The East Timor Truth Commission subsequently concluded that U.S. material support was "fundamental to the Indonesian invasion." Casualty estimates range from 100,000 to 180,000 Timorese deaths. These materials are documented in NSAEBB No. 62.[^doc61]
Telephone Transcripts
Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the transcripts as personal papers from his State Department office to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in Tarrytown, New York, before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access.[^kissrc] State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, New York Times column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The National Security Archive began corresponding with the Archivist of the United States, John W. Carlin, about recovering the transcripts in January 1999. A complaint written by its pro bono counsel at Mayer Brown was presented to the Archivist and the Secretary of State on January 25, 2001, and its attorneys wrote again to the State Department, the National Archives and the Department of Justice on April 25, 2001. The government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in 2001, and a State Department statement of August 8, 2001 credited the Archive with prompting the recovery. On May 26, 2004 the National Archives released about 20,000 pages of the transcripts, covering Kissinger's service from 1969 to August 1974.[^nsa123] These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.[^telcons]