vault backup: 2026-09-22 19:06:17

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/1995 AIR evaluation of Star Gate.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ created: 2026-09-21
 updated: 2026-09-22
 ---
 
-In 1995, following a directive from Congress, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] took custody of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]]'s [[STARGATE PROJECT|Star Gate]] program, "which involved the use of paranormal phenomena, primarily 'remote viewing,' for intelligence collection," declassified its own parapsychology work of the 1970s "in order to facilitate a new, external review," and in June contracted the [[American Institutes for Research]] through its Office of Research and Development to evaluate it. The program had three parts: "'Operations,' using remote viewing to collect intelligence against foreign targets; 'Research and Development,' using laboratory studies to find new ways to improve remote viewing for use in the intelligence world; and 'Foreign Assessment,' the analysis of foreign activities to develop or exploit the paranormal." The foreign assessment part was excluded from the review. Operations "continued until the Spring of 1995, when the program was suspended."[^1]
+In 1995, following a directive from Congress, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] took custody of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]]'s [[Stargate Project|Star Gate]] program, "which involved the use of paranormal phenomena, primarily 'remote viewing,' for intelligence collection," declassified its own parapsychology work of the 1970s "in order to facilitate a new, external review," and in June contracted the [[American Institutes for Research]] through its Office of Research and Development to evaluate it. The program had three parts: "'Operations,' using remote viewing to collect intelligence against foreign targets; 'Research and Development,' using laboratory studies to find new ways to improve remote viewing for use in the intelligence world; and 'Foreign Assessment,' the analysis of foreign activities to develop or exploit the paranormal." The foreign assessment part was excluded from the review. Operations "continued until the Spring of 1995, when the program was suspended."[^1]
 
 The review was first offered to the [[National Research Council]]. The CIA's chronology of the transfer ([[1995 transfer of Star Gate to the CIA]]) records that on March 15, 1995, "after informal discussions with NRC, panel member selection begins: Jessica Utts, [[John Palmer]], [[James Alcock]], and Ray Hyman contacted by NRC and agree to act as commissioned reviewers," and that on May 10 "NRC formally rejects CIA study proposal citing prior definitive study. NRC stated unequivocally that 'the case for remote viewing... is virtually nonexistent.'" The CIA met AIR's president the same day; the contract was signed on June 12, and ORD's independent contractor later described AIR as the "replacement organization for the NRC." The Office of Research and Development had told the Executive Director in advance that "we do NOT intend to ask our blue ribbon panel to tell us if there is or is not anything to the concept, rather we intend to ask them to review the STARGATE program to assess its overall value to the USG based on intelligence value, process validity, customer satisfaction, and foreign assessment activity as directed by Congress," and that "it is possible that our panel will recommend that we do NOT proceed with the program." The CIA's briefing slides on the review state that the "DIA program manager asked to identify most favorable users of remote viewing," that "AIR conducted standard interviews of these users on location with CIA present," and that the "commissioned reviews exchanged, rebuttals permitted, AIR arbitrated final conclusions for CIA key recommendations."[^900][^901]
 

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/1995 transfer of Star Gate to the CIA.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ created: 2026-09-22
 updated: 2026-09-22
 ---
 
-In the classified annex to the defense appropriations act for fiscal 1995, Senate conferees wrote that "in the post-cold war era, the nature and activities of the STARGATE Program are more relevant to the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP) than the military Intelligence services. Therefore, the conferees direct the Director of DIA to transfer ten civilian billets and $500,000 that are currently dedicated to the STARGATE program to the CIAP. The transfer of STARGATE resources and management to the CIAP should be completed by July 1, 1995." The [[Director of Central Intelligence|DCI]] was to report by March 1, 1995, on "1) management strategy; 2) transfer status; and 3) identification of a program manager." The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] took the [[STARGATE PROJECT|Star Gate]] program from the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on July 1, 1995, and on September 27 the Director of Research and Development proposed that recommendations to terminate remote-viewing operations and research "within the intelligence community" be forwarded to [[United States Congress|Congress]].[^1][^2]
+In the classified annex to the defense appropriations act for fiscal 1995, Senate conferees wrote that "in the post-cold war era, the nature and activities of the STARGATE Program are more relevant to the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP) than the military Intelligence services. Therefore, the conferees direct the Director of DIA to transfer ten civilian billets and $500,000 that are currently dedicated to the STARGATE program to the CIAP. The transfer of STARGATE resources and management to the CIAP should be completed by July 1, 1995." The [[Director of Central Intelligence|DCI]] was to report by March 1, 1995, on "1) management strategy; 2) transfer status; and 3) identification of a program manager." The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] took the [[Stargate Project|Star Gate]] program from the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on July 1, 1995, and on September 27 the Director of Research and Development proposed that recommendations to terminate remote-viewing operations and research "within the intelligence community" be forwarded to [[United States Congress|Congress]].[^1][^2]
 
 ### The Directed Action
 

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ created: 2026-09-21
 updated: 2026-09-22
 ---
 
-The Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee, chaired by [[Manfred Gale]] of the Army staff and known in the program as the Gale Committee, reported in December 1979 on the Defense Department's parapsychology work: the [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]] remote-viewing research, the psychokinesis contract of the Army Missile Command (MICOM) at [[Redstone Arsenal]], the replication trials of the [[Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity]] at [[Aberdeen Proving Ground]], and the [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]] unit at [[Fort Meade]] ([[STARGATE PROJECT|Grill Flame]]). "In June 1979 it was suggested by Dr. [[Walter LaBerge|LaBerge]], then Under Secretary of the Army, that a Scientific Evaluation Committee be appointed to review the Army's parapsychological activities. In early July 1979, Dr. [[Ruth Davis]] recommended that because of the special interest of the Secretary of Defense, that the Committee review the total DOD posture and report directly to the GRILL FLAME Oversight Committee." Its mission was "to review the parapsychological research, investigations, and applications within DOD and the intelligence community," "to assess the validity of claims made for the alleged existence of the PSI phenomena," and "to recommend a course of action for DOD." Members "were carefully screened to avoid any persons with preconceived notions for or against the subject under investigation"; "since 1972, the combined funding for DOD and the intelligence community was less than a total of $1.5M." The report's security guide stated that "all connection between official U.S. Government interest or participation in the generic field of Parapsychology is classified a minimum of SECRET, caveat NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION," and that "future security planning for GRILL FLAME includes making it totally a special access program."[^1]
+The Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee, chaired by [[Manfred Gale]] of the Army staff and known in the program as the Gale Committee, reported in December 1979 on the Defense Department's parapsychology work: the [[Stanford Research Institute|SRI]] remote-viewing research, the psychokinesis contract of the Army Missile Command (MICOM) at [[Redstone Arsenal]], the replication trials of the [[Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity]] at [[Aberdeen Proving Ground]], and the [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]] unit at [[Fort Meade]] ([[Stargate Project|Grill Flame]]). "In June 1979 it was suggested by Dr. [[Walter LaBerge|LaBerge]], then Under Secretary of the Army, that a Scientific Evaluation Committee be appointed to review the Army's parapsychological activities. In early July 1979, Dr. [[Ruth Davis]] recommended that because of the special interest of the Secretary of Defense, that the Committee review the total DOD posture and report directly to the GRILL FLAME Oversight Committee." Its mission was "to review the parapsychological research, investigations, and applications within DOD and the intelligence community," "to assess the validity of claims made for the alleged existence of the PSI phenomena," and "to recommend a course of action for DOD." Members "were carefully screened to avoid any persons with preconceived notions for or against the subject under investigation"; "since 1972, the combined funding for DOD and the intelligence community was less than a total of $1.5M." The report's security guide stated that "all connection between official U.S. Government interest or participation in the generic field of Parapsychology is classified a minimum of SECRET, caveat NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION," and that "future security planning for GRILL FLAME includes making it totally a special access program."[^1]
 
 ### Membership and Visits
 

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Iran-Contra Affair.md

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Between 1982 and 1986, Congress passed a series of amendments (known as the Bola
 
 [[Oliver North]], a Lieutenant Colonel in the [[United States Marine Corps]] serving on the National Security Council staff, ran an illegal Contra resupply operation from the White House. He was alleged to have received drug profits from [[Monzer Al-Kassar]], a Syrian kingpin and arms dealer, which were then used to purchase arms for the Contras. The United States Tower Commission probe into Iran-gate specifically revealed that Al-Kassar had been paid $1.2 million by North's co-conspirator, General [[Richard Secord]], to facilitate the movement of weapons from [[Israel]] to the Contras.[^1][^3]
 
-North's "Enterprise" used [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]] to funnel weapons to the Contras and reportedly brought [[cocaine]] back on return flights.[^4]
+North's "Enterprise" used [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]] to funnel weapons to the Contras and reportedly brought [[Cocaine]] back on return flights.[^4]
 
 ### Arms-for-Hostages Middlemen
 

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Project Abbreviation.md

@@ -15,19 +15,27 @@ summary: "The RCMP's 1999-2000 national security inquiry, run by Sean McDade, in
 start: 1990-11
 end: 2000-09
 location: "Ottawa"
+relations:
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Sean McDade]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1999
+    end: 2000
+    role: "RCMP investigator"
+    fn: 2
 created: 2026-09-22
 updated: 2026-09-22
 ---
 
-Project Abbreviation was the code name of a [[Royal Canadian Mounted Police|RCMP]] national security investigation, conducted through 1999 and 2000 by the investigator [[Sean McDade]], whose email handle was "simorp," into whether software used by Canadian federal agencies, including the RCMP itself and the [[Canadian Security Intelligence Service|CSIS]], was a version of [[INSLAW]]'s [[PROMIS]] fitted with a "trap door" giving American and Israeli intelligence access to Canadian data. The *Toronto Star* disclosed it on August 25, 2000, in a report by Valerie Lawton and Allan Thompson; Reuters reported the same day that "Canadian police are investigating whether U.S. and Israeli spies used rigged computer software to hack into Canada's top secret intelligence files," and that the Mounties "had interviewed a number of people linked to the Promis affair." The same day the RCMP spokesman Staff Sergeant Mike Gaudet told the Globe and Mail that the inquiry, under way for "several months," had produced "absolutely nothing to date to indicate national security has been compromised in any way," adding that the force had to investigate every allegation of the kind. The CSIS spokesman Dan Lambert said the service had conducted "its own in-depth review in 1991 and found that it had no copies of Promis, bootlegged or otherwise, and never had." On September 16, 2000, the Star reported the end of the inquiry, with Gaudet stating: "We're saying today that we do not have Promis software."[^1][^2]
+Project Abbreviation was the code name of a [[Royal Canadian Mounted Police|RCMP]] national security investigation, conducted through 1999 and 2000 by the investigator [[Sean McDade]], whose email handle was "simorp," into whether software used by Canadian federal agencies, including the RCMP itself and the [[Canadian Security Intelligence Service|CSIS]], was a version of [[INSLAW]]'s [[PROMIS]] fitted with a "trap door" giving American and Israeli intelligence access to Canadian data. The *Toronto Star* disclosed it on August 25, 2000, in a report by [[Valerie Lawton]] and [[Allan Thompson]]; Reuters reported the same day that "Canadian police are investigating whether U.S. and Israeli spies used rigged computer software to hack into Canada's top secret intelligence files," and that the Mounties "had interviewed a number of people linked to the Promis affair." The same day the RCMP spokesman Staff Sergeant Mike Gaudet told the Globe and Mail that the inquiry, under way for "several months," had produced "absolutely nothing to date to indicate national security has been compromised in any way," adding that the force had to investigate every allegation of the kind. The CSIS spokesman Dan Lambert said the service had conducted "its own in-depth review in 1991 and found that it had no copies of Promis, bootlegged or otherwise, and never had." On September 16, 2000, the Star reported the end of the inquiry, with Gaudet stating: "We're saying today that we do not have Promis software."[^1][^2]
 
 ### The 1991 Origin
 
-The Canadian trail began with a survey. On November 5, 1990, Marc Valois of the federal Department of Communications telephoned [[Patricia Hamilton]], the Hamiltons' daughter and INSLAW's sales manager for Canada, to say that INSLAW's PROMIS was "currently operating in agencies and departments of the Federal Government of Canada" at "more than 900 locations," and in January 1991 the Canadian Workplace Automation Research Centre sent INSLAW vendor questionnaires on the same premise. In Montreal on January 30, 1991, Denis LaChance of the department told her the RCMP was running the software at 900 locations; an RCMP officer at headquarters in [[Ottawa]] told her on February 1 that he knew of no PROMIS in the force and to disregard the letters. INSLAW, which swore it had never sold PROMIS to any Canadian agency, filed her affidavit in the bankruptcy court in February 1991. Chairman [[Jack Brooks]] of the [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] asked the Canadian embassy for access to the officials; the embassy's Jonathan Fried, reluctant "having been burned" before, allowed interviews on March 22 or 23, 1991, only with government counsel present, not under oath, and on condition the men never became public witnesses. Valois and LaChance then said they had identified the software wrongly: the "PROMIS" in Canadian use was a project-management package of the same name sold by the Strategic Software Planning Corporation of Massimo Grimaldi, who swore he had sold a few copies to Public Works Canada and the Canadian International Development Agency in May 1986; the RCMP had not been part of the survey. On December 4, 1991, the Canadian ambassador wrote that "the RCMP and CSIS report they do not use any case management software." The committee called the letter "conclusory" and wrote in 1992 that "without direct access to RCMP, CSIS and other Canadian officials, the committee has been effectively thwarted in its attempt to support or reject the contention that INSLAW software was transferred to the Canadian Government." The Justice Department's 1994 review traced the error to "a college student working on the inventory" and concluded that "the 'PROMIS' program in use by certain Canadian agencies is not a version of INSLAW's PROMIS but rather a totally different program developed by a different company."[^3][^4]
+The Canadian trail began with a survey. On November 5, 1990, Marc Valois of the federal Department of Communications telephoned [[Patricia Hamilton]], the Hamiltons' daughter and INSLAW's sales manager for Canada, to say that INSLAW's PROMIS was "currently operating in agencies and departments of the Federal Government of Canada" at "more than 900 locations," and in January 1991 the Canadian Workplace Automation Research Centre sent INSLAW vendor questionnaires on the same premise. In Montreal on January 30, 1991, Denis LaChance of the department told her the RCMP was running the software at 900 locations; an RCMP officer at headquarters in [[Ottawa]] told her on February 1 that he knew of no PROMIS in the force and to disregard the letters. INSLAW, which swore it had never sold PROMIS to any Canadian agency, filed her affidavit in the bankruptcy court in February 1991. Chairman [[Jack Brooks]] of the [[House Committee on the Judiciary]] asked the Canadian embassy for access to the officials; the embassy's Jonathan Fried, reluctant "having been burned" before, allowed interviews on March 22 or 23, 1991, only with government counsel present, not under oath, and on condition the men never became public witnesses. Valois and LaChance then said they had identified the software wrongly: the "PROMIS" in Canadian use was a project-management package of the same name sold by the Strategic Software Planning Corporation of Massimo Grimaldi, who swore he had sold a few copies to Public Works Canada and the Canadian International Development Agency in May 1986; the RCMP had not been part of the survey. On December 4, 1991, the Canadian ambassador wrote that "the RCMP and CSIS report they do not use any case management software." The committee called the letter "conclusory" and wrote in 1992 that "without direct access to RCMP, CSIS and other Canadian officials, the committee has been effectively thwarted in its attempt to support or reject the contention that INSLAW software was transferred to the Canadian Government." The [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]'s 1994 review traced the error to "a college student working on the inventory" and concluded that "the 'PROMIS' program in use by certain Canadian agencies is not a version of INSLAW's PROMIS but rather a totally different program developed by a different company."[^3][^4]
 
 ### The 2000 Investigation
 
-McDade's inquiry, authorized at the top of the force, took him secretly into the United States in February 2000, to [[Cheri Seymour]] and the Hercules, California, detective [[Sue Todd]], to the files behind Seymour's book on [[Danny Casolaro]], and to former investigators of the PROMIS and Cabazon matters, and back to a "war room" in Ottawa; the account of the investigation from his side is on his page. The Star's reports of August 2000 quoted the RCMP spokesman Sergeant Marc Richer ("I cannot either confirm or deny what you're looking into"); Louis Buffardi, Riconosciuto's lawyer, who said RCMP officers had interviewed his client "eight or nine months" earlier and were "probing a possible breach of Canada's national security"; the former Justice Department PROMIS project manager [[C. Madison Brewer]], who called the allegations "fantasy"; and McDade: "I kind of get a chuckle out of how something so small has been blown out of proportion." [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] told the paper that Canadian authorities had questioned him about PROMIS seven years earlier, during the security screening for his citizenship. On August 26 the Star reported, from unnamed sources, that the inquiry also concerned allegations that [[Robert Maxwell]] "may have acted as a middleman in selling the rigged software to Canada," and that a second former Israeli spy, "now living in New York," had been interviewed. [[Bill Hamilton]] said he had spoken with the chief investigator "probably dozens" of times and that his sources put the sale to Canada at 31 million dollars in 1983. After the closure Hamilton said McDade had earlier told him that the RCMP acquired PROMIS "from a company in Massachusetts" and that it "was modified by a Toronto firm," and Seymour told the Star: "(McDade) said that they had a paper trail on the Promis software being purchased by the RCMP. He told me that." The Star described McDade as "an Ottawa-Carleton regional police officer on secondment to the RCMP" who had refused its requests for an interview.[^2] [[Michael Riconosciuto]]'s affidavit of March 21, 1991, had sworn that "some of the modifications that I made were specifically designed to facilitate the implementation of PROMIS within two agencies of the Government of Canada: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS)," and that "the proprietary version of PROMIS, as modified by me, was, in fact, implemented in both"; the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] had found him "totally unreliable." A second Canadian witness, the former Nesbitt Thomson broker [[John A. Belton]], told the department's 1994 reviewers that CSIS had bought 10 to 12 million dollars of PROMIS in 1984 and that [[Earl Brian]] had sold it to the Bank of Montreal for 2 million dollars in May 1987, without producing any document; they found him "unbelievable." Fourteen months after the Star's disclosure, on October 16, 2001, Fox News reported that "Canada has actually investigated potential tampering with its Promis programs" as a live example in its story on [[Robert Hanssen]] and Osama bin Laden. The Canadian government's Access to Information index lists a request for RCMP records "mentioning 'PROMIS,' 'INSLAW,' 'PROJECT ABBREVIATION,' or 'PROMIS software' and by RCMP investigator Sean McDade" from 1991 to 2001.[^1][^4][^5]
+McDade's inquiry, authorized at the top of the force, took him secretly into the [[United States]] in February 2000, to [[Cheri Seymour]] and the Hercules, California, detective [[Sue Todd]], to the files behind Seymour's book on [[Danny Casolaro]], and to former investigators of the PROMIS and Cabazon matters, and back to a "war room" in Ottawa; the account of the investigation from his side is on his page. The Star's reports of August 2000 quoted the RCMP spokesman Sergeant Marc Richer ("I cannot either confirm or deny what you're looking into"); Louis Buffardi, Riconosciuto's lawyer, who said RCMP officers had interviewed his client "eight or nine months" earlier and were "probing a possible breach of Canada's national security"; the former Justice Department PROMIS project manager [[C. Madison Brewer]], who called the allegations "fantasy"; and McDade: "I kind of get a chuckle out of how something so small has been blown out of proportion." [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] told the paper that Canadian authorities had questioned him about PROMIS seven years earlier, during the security screening for his citizenship. On August 26 the Star reported, from unnamed sources, that the inquiry also concerned allegations that [[Robert Maxwell]] "may have acted as a middleman in selling the rigged software to Canada," and that a second former Israeli spy, "now living in New York," had been interviewed. [[Bill Hamilton]] said he had spoken with the chief investigator "probably dozens" of times and that his sources put the sale to Canada at 31 million dollars in 1983. After the closure Hamilton said McDade had earlier told him that the RCMP acquired PROMIS "from a company in Massachusetts" and that it "was modified by a Toronto firm," and Seymour told the Star: "(McDade) said that they had a paper trail on the Promis software being purchased by the RCMP. He told me that." The Star described McDade as "an Ottawa-Carleton regional police officer on secondment to the RCMP" who had refused its requests for an interview.[^2] [[Michael Riconosciuto]]'s affidavit of March 21, 1991, had sworn that "some of the modifications that I made were specifically designed to facilitate the implementation of PROMIS within two agencies of the Government of Canada: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS)," and that "the proprietary version of PROMIS, as modified by me, was, in fact, implemented in both"; the special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] had found him "totally unreliable." A second Canadian witness, the former Nesbitt Thomson broker [[John A. Belton]], told the department's 1994 reviewers that CSIS had bought 10 to 12 million dollars of PROMIS in 1984 and that [[Earl Brian]] had sold it to the Bank of Montreal for 2 million dollars in May 1987, without producing any document; they found him "unbelievable." Fourteen months after the Star's disclosure, on October 16, 2001, Fox News reported that "Canada has actually investigated potential tampering with its Promis programs" as a live example in its story on [[Robert Hanssen]] and Osama bin Laden. The Canadian government's Access to Information index lists a request for RCMP records "mentioning 'PROMIS,' 'INSLAW,' 'PROJECT ABBREVIATION,' or 'PROMIS software' and by RCMP investigator Sean McDade" from 1991 to 2001.[^1][^4][^5]
 
 ### Footnotes