46 lines
No EOL
5.8 KiB
Markdown
46 lines
No EOL
5.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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category: "Political Figure"
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tags:
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- Person
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- Nuclear
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- Israel
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summary: "In 1956, Golda Meir replaced Moshe Sharett as Foreign Minister, bringing her distinctive approach to Israel's international relations."
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updated: 2026-10-12
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born: 1898-05-03
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died: 1978-12-08
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location: "Kyiv, Ukraine (then Russian Empire)"
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---
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[[Golda Meir]] was a prominent [[Israel|Israeli]] politician who served as Foreign Minister and later as Prime Minister, playing crucial roles in Israel's diplomatic relations, nuclear policy decisions, and regional strategic calculations during some of the most critical periods in the nation's history.
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### Rise to Foreign Minister and Nuclear Policy
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In 1956, Golda Meir replaced [[Moshe Sharett]] as Foreign Minister, bringing her distinctive approach to Israel's international relations. She endorsed [[David Ben-Gurion]]'s argument for preventive war, aligning herself with the more hawkish elements within the government. However, despite her official position as Foreign Minister, her ministry was repeatedly bypassed by Ben-Gurion, [[Shimon Peres]], [[Moshe Dayan]], and [[Ernst David Bergmann]] as Israel broadened its involvement with [[France]] in nuclear matters. This pattern of exclusion from the most sensitive nuclear discussions reflected the tight circle of decision-makers who controlled Israel's most classified programs.[^2]
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### Diplomatic Initiatives and International Relations
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As Foreign Minister, Meir was instrumental in expanding Israel's diplomatic footprint during a crucial period of nation-building. She pushed for the exchange of diplomatic relations between Israel and [[Germany]] in the late 1950s, a politically sensitive initiative given the recent history of the Holocaust. Additionally, she worked to open relations with [[Paraguay]], demonstrating Israel's efforts to build ties beyond its immediate region and traditional allies.[^1]
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### Jordan Relations and Palestinian Policy
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Meir's approach to regional politics was shaped by her personal relationships and strategic calculations. In 1948, she formed a friendship with [[King Abdullah of Jordan|King Abdullah]] of [[Jordan]], and both leaders believed the Palestinian problem would eventually resolve itself - a view that would prove overly optimistic in subsequent decades.[^1]
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This perspective influenced a critical decision during her later tenure. Her choice to mobilize the IDF against the [[Syria|Syrians]] in 1970, during a crisis with the [[PLO]] in Jordan, had far-reaching consequences. While this action prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan and kept [[King Hussein of Jordan|King Hussein]] in power, it also represented a complex strategic calculation. The intervention pleased the [[United States|Americans]] by preventing a threat to [[Saudi Arabia|Saudi]] oilfields, but was seen by some as a major setback for Israel's long-term strategic interest in a Palestinian state.[^1]
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### Prime Ministerial Challenges and Intelligence Vulnerabilities
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During her tenure as Prime Minister, Meir faced significant intelligence challenges that would have lasting implications for Israel's security. [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that in 1972 her office was bugged by the [[Soviet Union|Soviets]], a security breach that he said was discovered by [[Reuben Yirador]] of [[Unit 8200]]. Ben-Menashe wrote that this bugging operation, combined with her meeting with [[Leonid Brezhnev]] in [[Finland]] and her rejection of his peace proposal, provided [[Anwar Sadat]] with intelligence about Israel's attitude toward potential negotiations, and that this may have contributed to Sadat's decision to launch the 1973 war, as he gained insight into Israel's diplomatic positions and strategic thinking.[^1]
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### The Yom Kippur War and Nuclear Alert
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During the desperate early days of the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]], on Monday, October 8, Golda Meir convened her closest aides, the "kitchen cabinet," in her office in [[Tel Aviv]]. Faced with the imminent collapse of Israeli forces, the leadership resolved to implement three critical decisions: rally its collapsing forces for a major counterattack; arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse and subsequent need for the [[Samson Option]]; and inform [[Washington, D.C.]] of its unprecedented nuclear action to demand an emergency airlift of replacement arms and ammunition. Meir, who chain-smoked and slept very little during the early stages of the war, was reportedly confused and concerned by Moshe Dayan's report of imminent collapse. The decision to arm the weapons of last resort, code-named the "Temple" weapons, was reached easily, though there were more complicated discussions about the number of warheads to arm and their targeting. An Israeli assumption was that the Soviets, who would learn of the nuclear arming, would then be compelled to urge their allies in [[Egypt]] and Syria to limit their offensive. This drastic step also aimed to force the United States to begin an immediate and massive resupply of the Israeli military.[^3]
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### Political Controversies
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Meir's leadership style and decisions also generated internal criticism within Israel's military establishment. She was publicly criticized by [[Ariel Sharon]] in a _Playboy_ magazine interview, a breach of military protocol that had serious consequences. This public criticism led to Sharon being thrown out of the military in 1970, demonstrating the strict standards for military discipline and public discourse that Meir enforced during her tenure.[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. _Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network_. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
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[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 3.
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[^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. _The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy_. Random House, 1991. Chapter 17. |