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National Commercial Bank

His father, Salem bin Mahfouz, was a Yemeni-born money-changer who founded NCB, the first and largest private bank in Saudi Arabia.¹ Bin Mahfouz succeeded his father in the management of NCB. By the 1990s he personally held 75 percent of the bank, and his wife, Naela Kaaki, held the remaining 25 percent.¹ The 2005 English judgment records that he was involved in the bank's management from about 1990 until July 1992, latterly as chief operating officer, and that he resigned from the bank in July 1992. It records that he returned as chairman from the summer of 1996 until August 1999.² The plaintiffs in the September 11 litigation alleged that he became NCB's president and chief executive in 1986 and remained so until 1999, and that he was at the same time chief operating officer and a major shareholder of BCCI.³

The English judgment records that his father sold 50 percent of NCB to the Saudi government in August 1999 to prepare the bank for an initial public offering, and that his sons remained NCB board members until December 2002, when the family sold its remaining shareholding.² The federal court in New York recorded that the parties agreed the Saudi Public Investment Fund bought 50 percent of NCB's shares in May 1999, that it sold 10 percent to the General Organization for Social Insurance later in 1999, and that in late 2002 it agreed to buy 30 percent of the remaining shares from the bin Mahfouz family, a purchase completed in January 2003.³ The Second Circuit records that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia bought out his controlling interest in 1999.⁴ Beaty and Gwynne wrote that in 1999, following the collapse of BCCI, the Saudi government purchased a controlling 50 percent stake in NCB for at least 1 billion dollars, partly used to retire bin Mahfouz's personal debts, after which the Mahfouz family retained a 34 percent stake but bin Mahfouz surrendered all management positions.¹

BCCI Shares and First American

The Kerry-Brown report described bin Mahfouz as "head of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia and the most powerful banker in the Middle East." It wrote that BCCI first considered and attempted the forced sale strategy later applied to First American "in 1986 in connection with the purchases of BCCI and CCAH stock by" bin Mahfouz. He had bought shares of both BCCI and Credit and Commerce American Holdings (CCAH), the holding company that secretly controlled First American, "under a complex agreement that would permit him to purchase both banks, or to hold his interests temporarily with BCCI guaranteeing to buy them back at no risk to bin Mahfouz." The report states that "After auditors for National Commercial Bank raised questions about bin Mahfouz's actions regarding BCCI, the transactions were fully unwound by 1989, leaving the First American problem for BCCI unsolved."⁵

The report records that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued charges against bin Mahfouz, dated July 2, 1992, under the docket number 92-074.⁵ Its chapter on Clark Clifford and Robert Altman describes a seventh count against Altman concerning the purchase of CCAH shares by Masriq, "an entity controlled by Saudi banker Khalid bin Mahfouz, against whom the Federal Reserve has issued separate charges, treated elsewhere in this report." The same chapter states that the Federal Reserve's findings remained subject to a hearing.⁶

In September 1990 Price Waterhouse learned that BCCI had concealed further lending of over $500 million to its major customers by "parking" that lending with the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia, "controlled by Khalid bin Mahfouz, the most powerful banker in the Middle East." The auditors also learned that since the removal of Swaleh Naqvi the practice had continued "with the knowledge and approval of the Board representative of the controlling shareholders," the government of Abu Dhabi.⁷ The Abu Dhabi chapter repeats the Price Waterhouse finding and adds that bin Mahfouz was "later indicted in the United States in connection with his activities pertaining to BCCI and First American." It records a written answer by a witness named Al Sayegh, asked about a loan by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority that financed the buy-back of BCCI shares by bin Mahfouz, that he was "not aware of the details of the loan."⁸

The Middle East Economic Survey archive lists a report that NCB rejected the allegations of malpractice leveled against its chief operating officer, bin Mahfouz, in the Price Waterhouse report on BCCI submitted to the Bank of England in mid-1991; the archive's excerpt says the report claimed he was "implicated in irregular..." dealings.⁹

Indictment and Settlement

On July 1, 1992, Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau presented a state grand jury indictment naming bin Mahfouz and his associate Haroon Kahlon on charges of defrauding BCCI depositors and investors of 300 million dollars and abetting a conspiracy by top BCCI officers to conceal the bank's true ownership and financial condition from regulators. The indictment as reported at the time states that between 1986 and 1988 bin Mahfouz invested more than 700 million dollars in BCCI and 140 million dollars in CCAH, which secretly owned First American Bank. Of the payments he received for selling those shares, at least 300 million dollars came from BCCI's own funds, recorded on the bank's books as fictitious loans and confirmed to auditors as performing assets. The reports stated that as a result BCCI's auditors and regulators were led to believe that bin Mahfouz remained a major shareholder through at least April 1990.¹⁰ The Federal Reserve moved against NCB's New York branch the same month, on the ground that bin Mahfouz had misled American regulators.¹⁰ The Middle East Economic Survey archive lists the closing of NCB's New York branch by the US Comptroller of the Currency in its issue of July 13, 1992, a week after its report that bin Mahfouz planned an "aggressive response" to the fraud charges.⁹ Bin Mahfouz resigned as NCB chairman on or around July 8, 1992, to contest the charges.¹⁰

On December 9, 1992, BCCI's court-appointed liquidators sued bin Mahfouz, Kahlon and NCB in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, seeking more than 10.5 billion dollars trebled. The complaint, as summarized by Judge Joyce Hens Green, alleged three groups of acts from January 1986 to July 1991: acquisition of BCCI and CCAH shares and BCCI capital notes for bin Mahfouz and NCB under a "Procurement Deed" dated July 24, 1986, with Agha Hasan Abedi and Swaleh Naqvi; BCCI's repurchase of those shares, undisclosed to regulators and funded, the liquidators alleged, with money stolen from depositors; and an agreement, with Kahlon's help, for NCB to assume more than 200 million dollars of non-performing BCCI loans. The court enjoined bin Mahfouz and Kahlon from moving assets in the United States on December 10, 1992, and on February 12, 1993 issued a preliminary injunction against bin Mahfouz, finding a substantial likelihood of success against him and NCB. On July 26, 1993 it conditionally dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds in favor of a parallel English suit for the same 10.5 billion dollars filed on the day the American complaint was filed.¹¹

On December 23, 1993, bin Mahfouz agreed to pay 225 million dollars to resolve the federal and New York state charges. The Washington Post headline of December 24, 1993 read "Saudi to Pay $225 Million in BCCI Settlement."¹² MEED reported that the New York Supreme Court dismissed all the criminal charges against him on December 23, that the Federal Reserve agreed to take no further action against him or NCB in relation to BCCI, and that prosecutors had charged that he violated American law by buying 29 percent of a BCCI subsidiary that controlled a US bank group without federal clearance. It reported the distribution as 35 million dollars to the U.S. Treasury, 1 million dollars each to New York State and New York City, and 188 million dollars to a settlement fund held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, through which bin Mahfouz, NCB and Kahlon could satisfy any judgments in the pending civil claims. It quoted the prosecutor, assistant district attorney James Kindler, that the money would be paid out to defrauded BCCI depositors and creditors overseas, and reported that the payment brought the money recovered by the district attorney's office to 880 million dollars against Morgenthau's estimate of 12 billion dollars in BCCI losses. Bin Mahfouz was quoted as saying he had accepted the agreements "as a business decision and for peace of mind" and had maintained that he was innocent.¹³

American Banker reported on December 28, 1993 that the 225 million dollars was paid on behalf of bin Mahfouz, "former chief operating officer of the National Commercial Bank of Saudia Arabia," Kahlon and a New York financial firm, Eastbrook Inc., that 37 million dollars went to state and local governments and 188 million dollars to a special reserve fund, and that all charges against bin Mahfouz were dropped. Kahlon and Eastbrook pleaded guilty to state charges of failing to register as a broker. Bin Mahfouz's statement noted that authorities had initially sought nearly 780 million dollars, and his lawyer, Gary P. Naftalis, said his "slate is cleared."¹⁴ Bin Mahfouz admitted no criminal guilt.¹³¹⁴ The Middle East Economic Survey archive lists headlines of December 5, 1994 and February 6, 1995 reporting that a settlement between bin Mahfouz and NCB and the BCCI liquidators was imminent.⁹

A 2013 federal appellate opinion recited the plaintiffs' allegation that NCB's New York office closed in 1992.⁴ A district court in 2005 recorded NCB's contacts with New York as a branch office until 1992 and a subsidiary, SNCB Securities, until 2001.³

The PROMIS Letter

Cheri Seymour's account of Danny Casolaro's investigation of the PROMIS software dispute reproduces a letter dated May 16, 1985, from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, to William F. Weld, then United States Attorney in Boston, Massachusetts. The text, as Seymour printed it, reads: "As agreed Messrs. Manichur [sic] Ghorbanifar, Adnan Khashoggi, and Richard Armitage will broker the transaction of Promise software to Sheik Klahid bin Mahfouz for resale and general distribution as gifts in his region contingent upon the three conditions we last spoke of. Promise must have a soft arrival. No paperwork, customs, or delay. It must be equipped with the special data retrieval unit. As before, you must walk the financial aspects through Credit Suisse into National Commercial Bank. If you encounter any problems contact me directly."¹⁵

The letter places bin Mahfouz beside Manucher Ghorbanifar, Adnan Khashoggi and Richard Armitage. Seymour wrote that the document had been authenticated through Donald Carr, who showed it to Reynolds in 2005. Reynolds told Carr that Lowell Jensen's secretary brought the letter to him for signature because Jensen was out of the building and the letter had to be sent that day. He said he signed the letter but did not draft it. He also told Carr that he had a vague recollection that Edwin Meese had recused himself from PROMIS matters when he became attorney general in February 1985.¹⁵

The document placed bin Mahfouz alongside Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi, both of whom were simultaneously central to the arms-for-hostages pipeline that became the Iran-Contra Affair, in a network brokering intelligence-modified software to the Middle East.

A letter from Weld dated February 29, 1988, which Seymour reproduced, addressed allegations by INSLAW against Meese and two Justice Department officials. It stated that the Public Integrity Section had concluded that "the information submitted is not sufficiently specific to constitute grounds to initiate a preliminary investigation," and recommended that the materials go to the Office of Professional Responsibility. Seymour wrote that "It appeared to be a conflict of interest to me" that Weld had been asked to facilitate the PROMISE financing in 1985 and declined the INSLAW inquiry one month before he resigned from the department.¹⁵

Houston and Harken

In June 1992 the Houston Chronicle reported that the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were reviewing accusations that the Houston businessman James R. Bath had guided Saudi money into Houston, a review that the newspaper said stemmed in part from court documents obtained in litigation by Bath's former real estate associate Bill White. It reported that Bath had said in a sworn deposition that he was "the sole director of Skyway Aircraft Leasing Ltd., a company that a court document shows is owned by Khaled bin Mahfouz." It reported that in 1990 Bath bought the Express Auto Park garage at William P. Hobby Airport for 8.4 million dollars, "which included a $1.4 million loan provided by Mahfouz, according to transaction documents," that Bath bought Houston Gulf Airport in 1977 on behalf of Salem bin Laden, and that after Binladen died in 1988, "his interests in the airport were taken over by Mahfouz, according to court documents." Bath had invested 50,000 dollars in the Arbusto '79 and Arbusto '80 partnerships of George W. Bush. The newspaper wrote: "There is no available evidence to show whether the money came from Saudi interests."¹⁶

Time reported in October 1991 that Bath became a shareholder and director of Houston's Main Bank in 1978 with former Treasury Secretary John Connally, the Saudi financier Ghaith R. Pharaon, "an alleged B.C.C.I. front man," and bin Mahfouz, "who subsequently became a major B.C.C.I. shareholder." It wrote that Pharaon later sold his Main Bank holdings and bought the National Bank of Georgia, "allegedly on behalf of B.C.C.I.," and that one Bath company, Skyway Aircraft, leased a 10 million dollar Gulfstream II to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.¹⁷

Lucy Komisar wrote in 2007 that in 1976, when George H.W. Bush headed the Central Intelligence Agency, the agency sold some planes of its proprietary airline Air America to Skyway, "a company owned by Bath and Bin Mahfouz." She wrote that bin Mahfouz's family bought 20 to 30 percent of BCCI's stock for nearly one billion dollars and that bin Mahfouz was put on its board. She also wrote that when Harken Energy got into financial trouble in 1987, Jackson Stephens helped it obtain 25 million dollars from the Union Bank of Switzerland, and that a board seat went to Harken shareholder Abdullah Taha Bakhsh, "whose chief banker was BCCI shareholder Bin Mahfouz." In her account Harken gained new investors after 1988, among them Salem bin Laden and bin Mahfouz.¹⁸ Harken's proxy statement of April 25, 1994 listed Bakhsh as holding 6,935,364 shares, 11.66 percent of its common stock.¹⁹

The book False Profits, by Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, described Bakhsh as "a big shareholder in Harken" and wrote that "The sheikh's principal banker is another BCCI insider, Bin Mahfouz."²⁰

Muwafaq Foundation

The Second Circuit recited the plaintiffs' allegation that bin Mahfouz was a co-founder of the Muwafaq Foundation with Yasin al-Qadi, and that the foundation was a vehicle for funding terrorist organizations.⁴ The plaintiffs in the Burnett action described his son Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz as a director of the Blessed Relief Society, also called Muwaffaq, and alleged that direct donations to the foundation were received through NCB facilities and that the foundation gave Osama bin Laden 3 million dollars in 1998; the New York court summarized those allegations in 2005.³ In the 2005 English proceedings the claimants stated that bin Mahfouz had publicly admitted donating money to the foundation at its inception but was never involved in running it. The claimants stated that the foundation worked with UNICEF, the World Food Programme, Save the Children and UNHCR, that it was wound up between 1996 and 1998, and that no government or international body had listed it as a supporter of terrorism.²

On October 12, 2001, the Treasury Department announced terrorist asset freezes that included al-Qadi, and its statement, as CNN quoted it, said the Muwafaq Foundation "has been identified as an al Qaeda front funded by wealthy Saudi businessmen." Al-Qadi told CNN that he had never been associated with Osama bin Laden and had never sent him money, that the foundation was charitable and shut down in 1996, and that a London newsletter had accused it of involvement in an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, for which the foundation sued and won. CNN also reported a Chicago Tribune account that al-Qadi and the foundation became targets of an FBI investigation in 1998 and that an FBI affidavit alleged he transferred 820,000 dollars to Hamas through the Quranic Literacy Institute; his attorney said the money was a loan to the Chicago charity.²¹ The Second Circuit records that al-Qadi was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist the same day.⁴ The English judgment records that the Treasury had characterized the foundation as an al Qaeda front.²

The staff monograph on terrorist financing prepared for the 9/11 Commission states in a footnote that within weeks after September 11 the United States used its new powers of designation to freeze the assets of a prominent Saudi citizen, Yasin al Qadi, and that the action apparently created backlash in the Saudi government.²² Arab News reported in December 2005 that a Swiss court had concluded, on December 12, that nothing in the file allowed the conclusion that al-Qadi knew or could have known that his payments, made for a university in Yemen, could serve to finance the attacks of September 11, 2001.²³

The 1999 Saudi Audit

In October 1999 USA Today reported that the transfers to New York and London banks were discovered in April of that year, "after the royal family ordered an audit of NCB and its founder and former chairman, Khalid bin Mahfouz." The article cited a Saudi government audit obtained by U.S. intelligence and said that five of Saudi Arabia's top business executives had ordered NCB to make the transfers. It attributed the account to intelligence officials.²⁴ The Burnett and Ashton plaintiffs later alleged, as the New York court summarized, that a 1998 NCB audit revealed irregularities involving direct donations to several charities and that 74 million dollars had been funneled by the bank's Zakat Committee to the International Islamic Relief Organization.³

NCB and bin Mahfouz denied that any such audit existed. The English judgment records that an NCB executive told the Chicago Tribune on October 28, 2001: "I can tell you absolutely, categorically there was no such audit ... That never took place." The judgment also records a Washington Post correction of March 3, 2002, reporting a denial by a representative of bin Mahfouz, and a USA Today correction stating that the newspaper "has not been able to locate any record of such an audit and has no reason to believe that one was conducted."²

English Libel Judgment

In December 2003 the claimants, bin Mahfouz and his sons Abdulrahman and Sultan bin Mahfouz, learned that Funding Evil, the book by Rachel Ehrenfeld published in the United States by Bonus Books in 2003, was being sold in England. The book alleged that the bin Mahfouz family was one of the main sponsors of al Qaeda and that NCB was used as a conduit for its financing. The judgment records that the book also claimed that the Saudi government had audited NCB and bin Mahfouz in 1999, and that about 23 hard copies had been sold in England.² Ehrenfeld did not appear in the English action. On December 7, 2004, the High Court's Queen's Bench Division entered a default judgment and an injunction against her and Bonus Books. On May 3, 2005, Mr Justice Eady granted a declaration that the statements were false, damages of 10,000 pounds to each claimant (described in the judgment as the top level permitted under the summary procedure of the Defamation Act 1996), a confirmed injunction, and costs. The application was supported by a witness statement from the claimants' legal adviser, Cherif Sedky, and by evidence from each claimant. No defence was entered, and the findings of falsity rest on that evidence, which was not challenged. The judge noted that any later determination in the New York proceedings would not necessarily decide the issue of truth or falsity addressed in his judgment.²

The judgment records the claimants' evidence of earlier suits. The libel action against Associated Newspapers, publisher of the Mail on Sunday, concluded with a statement read in open court on January 13, 2004, that there was "No truth whatsoever" in the allegations that bin Mahfouz supported Osama bin Laden's terrorist activities. A statement in open court of March 15, 2004 ended the action by bin Mahfouz and Nimir against Pluto Press and Michael Griffin over the book Reaping the Whirlwind, with an apology and damages. Default judgment was entered against Guillaume Dasquié and the claims against Jean-Charles Brisard were continuing; a separate default judgment of January 30, 2004 over a report by Brisard and his companies carried damages of 10,000 pounds.²

The judgment records the claimants' answers to the points made on Ehrenfeld's behalf in pre-action correspondence. On BCCI, the claimants stated that he was never accused of money laundering, bribery, arms dealing or financing terrorism, that he was for a short period a non-executive director of the bank, and that the allegations against him concerned how he bought and sold his shareholding and were settled without admissions. They stated that the Kerry-Brown report contained only one reference to him, in its chapter 4, and was not critical of him.² The Senate report as published names him in its chapters on later acquisitions, accountants, Clifford and Altman, and Abu Dhabi, in the passages quoted above, and cites the Federal Reserve's charges against him.⁵⁶⁷⁸

The judgment records that Ehrenfeld's book cited an article by Kevin Dowling as the source for a statement that Madeleine Albright had told the Saudi defense minister that bin Mahfouz had deposited millions of dollars into terrorist accounts. Dowling wrote to the claimants' solicitors on March 19, 2004, that the statement and others he had made were false and that he had never intended the article to be published. The judge wrote that the source "has effectively collapsed."²

The 2005 judgment also recorded that Ehrenfeld's preface to a later edition said bin Mahfouz had commenced proceedings against her on October 19, 2004, and that by May 3, 2005 no evidence supporting her claims that he and the Muwafaq Foundation and NCB had supported al Qaeda and Hamas had been produced. It recorded the allegations in her New York complaint (docket 04CV9641, filed December 8, 2004) that, according to a former CIA counterterrorism expert, NCB was used as a financial conduit before 1999 and that its Zakat Committee funded the Islamic Relief Organisation to the extent of 74 million dollars.²

New York Litigation

Ehrenfeld filed a declaratory judgment action against bin Mahfouz in the Southern District of New York in December 2004. The district court dismissed it for lack of personal jurisdiction. In 2007 the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal under CPLR 302(a)(3), denied jurisdictional discovery, and certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question whether CPLR 302(a)(1) confers jurisdiction over a person who sued a New York resident in a non-U.S. court and whose success in that suit required acts in New York.²⁵

The New York Court of Appeals answered on December 20, 2007: "Because these contacts do not constitute the transaction of business in this state, we conclude that CPLR 302 (a) (1) does not confer jurisdiction."²⁶ The court held that the communications and service in New York were "intended to further his assertion of rights under the laws of England."²⁶

On March 3, 2008, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the basis of the New York decision. It held that Ehrenfeld had waived a First Amendment argument by not raising it in the district court or on the earlier appeal, and it declined to defer its decision while a bill amending the long-arm statute was pending in the New York Legislature.²⁷

The amendment was enacted in April 2008, and was known as the Libel Terrorism Protection Act. As the bill memorandum of the New York City Bar Association describes it, the amendment to CPLR 302 gives New York courts jurisdiction over an action seeking a declaration that a foreign defamation judgment against a New York resident is unenforceable, and the amendment to CPLR 5304 allows courts to decline enforcement of foreign defamation judgments where the foreign law gives less protection to speech than the federal and New York constitutions.²⁸ The federal Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act) was signed on August 10, 2010.²⁹

September 11 Litigation

Bin Mahfouz and his son Abdulrahman were defendants in the consolidated suits brought by families of September 11 victims in the Southern District of New York. In January 2005 Judge Casey dismissed the Burnett complaint against Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz for lack of personal jurisdiction, denied without prejudice NCB's motions to dismiss the Burnett and Ashton complaints for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction pending limited jurisdictional discovery, and dismissed the negligence claims against NCB. The opinion summarized the plaintiffs' allegations that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda used NCB as "a financial arm, operating as a financial conduit," and that a 1999 Senate report on BCCI detailed NCB's role in hiding assets, money laundering and sponsoring international terrorism.³ The claimants told the English court in 2005 that no substantive decision in those suits was likely for several years.² In 2013 the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims against both men for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court wrote that the plaintiffs' allegations against them were "conclusory," and that "the only nonconclusory allegations against these three defendants are that they served in various positions of authority within organizations that are alleged to have supported terrorist organizations." The court recited the plaintiffs' allegation that bin Mahfouz "is among al Qaida's most significant individual financiers."⁴

Death

Bin Mahfouz died in Jeddah on August 16, 2009.³⁰

Footnotes

Beaty, Jonathan, and S.C. Gwynne. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. Random House, 1993. ↩︎
Mahfouz v Ehrenfeld [2005] EWHC 1156 (QB), Eady J, May 3, 2005, paras. 1 to 8, 14 to 21, 27 to 38, 43 to 60 and 74 to 75. The judgment was entered on the claimants' evidence after the defendants did not appear. https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/qb/2005/1156 ↩︎
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005), sections on National Commercial Bank and Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz and the footnote on the sale of NCB shares, summarizing the Ashton and Burnett complaints. https://static.case.law/f-supp-2d/349/cases/0765-01.json ↩︎
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Asat Trust Reg.), 714 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2013), background on the NCB defendants (including the New York office, the 1999 buyout in n. 124, the Muwafaq Foundation and the October 12, 2001 designation of al-Qadi) and holding on personal jurisdiction over Khaled and Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz. https://static.case.law/f3d/714/cases/0659-01.json ↩︎
Kerry, John, and Hank Brown. The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. December 1992, ch. 7, "BCCI in the United States: Later Acquisitions," and n. 69: "Charges, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, In the matter of Khalid bin Mahfouz, 92-074, July 2, 1992." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/07later.htm ↩︎
Kerry and Brown, The BCCI Affair, ch. 13, "Clifford and Altman." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/13clifford.htm ↩︎
Kerry and Brown, The BCCI Affair, ch. 10, "BCCI and Its Accountants." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/10accounta.htm ↩︎
Kerry and Brown, The BCCI Affair, ch. 14, "Abu Dhabi." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/14abudhabi.htm ↩︎
Middle East Economic Survey archive, headline listing: "NCB Rejects Allegations of Malpractice in BCCI Debacle"; "Mahfouz Plans 'Aggressive Response' to Fraud Charges" (July 6, 1992); "US Comptroller of Currency Closes NCB's New York Branch" (July 13, 1992); "Settlement Between Khalid Bin Mahfouz/NCB And BCCI Liquidators Imminent" (December 5, 1994); "Luxembourg Court Approves BCCI Settlement; Settlement With Mahfouz/NCB Imminent" (February 6, 1995). https://archives.mees.com/issues/1013/articles/37187 ↩︎
UPI, "Top Saudi Banker Indicted in BCCI Fraud," July 1, 1992. ↩︎
BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), Societe Anonyme v. Mahfouz, 828 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. July 26, 1993) (Green, J.), Civ. A. No. 92-2763. https://static.case.law/f-supp/828/cases/0092-01.json ↩︎
The Washington Post, "Saudi to Pay $225 Million in BCCI Settlement," December 24, 1993. ↩︎
MEED, "Bin Mahfouz settles BCCI suit in the US," December 1993. https://www.meed.com/bin-mahfouz-settles-bcci-suit-in-the-us/ ↩︎
American Banker, "$225 million paid in BCCI settlement," December 28, 1993. https://www.americanbanker.com/-34035-1.html ↩︎
Seymour, Cheri. The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal. TrineDay, 2010, pp. 363 to 364. ↩︎
Urban, Jerry. "Bush Said Friend's Arbusto Investment Was His Own, Not Saudi Money," Houston Chronicle, June 4, 1992. Reproduced at https://911timeline.s3.amazonaws.com/1990s/houstonchronicle060492.html ↩︎
Beaty, Jonathan. "A Mysterious Mover of Money and Planes," Time, October 28, 1991. https://time.com/archive/6718843/a-mysterious-mover-of-money-and-planes/ ↩︎
Komisar, Lucy. "Questions Linger About Bushes and BCCI," Inter Press Service, April 4, 2007. https://www.ipsnews.net/2007/04/finance-questions-linger-about-bushes-and-bcci/ ↩︎
Harken Energy Corporation, proxy statement (Schedule 14A), filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission April 25, 1994. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/313478/0000950134-94-000454.txt ↩︎
Truell, Peter, and Larry Gurwin. False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire. Houghton Mifflin, 1992, p. 370. https://archive.org/details/bypetertruellauthorlarrygurwinauthorfalseprofitstheinsidestoryofbccitheworldsmos ↩︎
CNN, "Saudi says he has not given money to bin Laden," October 15, 2001. https://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/10/15/inv.saudi.frozen.assets/index.html ↩︎
Roth, John, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille. Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 118 n. 133. https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf ↩︎
Arab News, "Saudi Execs Praise Swiss Decision in Al-Qadi Case," December 25, 2005. https://www.arabnews.com/node/277882 ↩︎
USA Today, "Saudi money aiding bin Laden," October 29, 1999, as reprinted by the Deseret News. https://www.deseret.com/1999/10/29/19472940/saudis-giving-millions-to-bin-laden-u-s-says ↩︎
Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542, 545 (2d Cir. 2007). https://static.case.law/f3d/489/cases/0542-01.json ↩︎
Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 508 to 512 (2007). https://static.case.law/ny3d/9/cases/0501-01.json ↩︎
Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008). https://static.case.law/f3d/518/cases/0102-01.json ↩︎
New York City Bar Association, memorandum on the bill to amend CPLR 302 and 5304 (the Libel Terrorism Protection bill), 2008. https://www.nycbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/LTPA.pdf ↩︎
Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101 to 4105. ↩︎
"Khalid bin Mahfouz: 1949-2009," Asharq Al-Awsat, August 18, 2009. https://en-archive.aawsat.com/2009/08/18/khalid-bin-mahfouz-1949-2009/ ↩︎

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