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aliases category tags summary born died location created updated relations
Anwar al-Sadat
Anwar el-Sadat
Anwar el Sadat
Anwar as-Sadat
Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat
Sadat
Political Figure
Person
Politician
Egypt
Israel
SovietUnion
CampDavid
YomKippurWar
KamalAdham
BCCI
AshrafMarwan
SafariClub
Abwehr
CIA
Egyptian president whose 1978 Camp David accords with Menachem Begin led to the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and who was assassinated in Cairo on October 6, 1981. 1918-12-25 1981-10-06 Mit Abu al-Kawm, Al-Minufiyya, Egypt 2025-08-05 2026-10-12
type with role fn
head_of Egypt President of Egypt 10
type with role start end fn
participant_in Camp David summit negotiated the Camp David frameworks with Menachem Begin and Jimmy Carter 1978-08-08 1978-09-17 34
type with role start end fn
partner_of Menachem Begin co-signatories of the Camp David frameworks and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty 1978-09-17 1979-03-26 34
type with reverse role start fn
funded Central Intelligence Agency true payments made on behalf of the CIA through Kamal Adham while Sadat was vice president, according to press accounts cited by the Senate BCCI report 1970 23
type with role start fn
participant_in Safari Club Egyptian intelligence service listed among the members of the 1976 arrangement organized by Alexandre de Marenches 1976 36
type with role start fn
participant_in 1952 Egyptian Revolution member of the Free Officers movement that ousted King Farouk, according to a CIA memorandum of 1970 1952-07-23 9
type with reverse role start fn
reported_to Ashraf Marwan true aide and special emissary sent to Saudi and Algerian leaders in 1974 1973 21

Anwar Sadat was the President of Egypt until his assassination in Cairo on October 6, 1981. In 1978, he successfully concluded the Camp David summit with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, a significant step towards peace in the Middle East.1 His career also includes a 1942 case in which a British security report said that he had been sending messages to the enemy, the expulsion of Soviet military advisers in 1972, the back channels that ran through Kamal Adham and Ashraf Marwan, the intelligence failure before the Yom Kippur War, and the attack that killed him in 1981.

Early life and the 1942 Abwehr contacts

Sadat was born on December 25, 1918, in Mit Abu al-Kawm, in Al-Minufiyya province, Egypt. In 1942 he was a captain of the Egyptian Army serving as commandant of the wireless section at the headquarters of the Frontier Brigade at Gabal Asfar, according to a report of August 12, 1942 in the British file on the German agent Eppler.2

Johannes Eppler and Hans-Gerd Sandstede were agents of the Abwehr who worked under an operation called Salaam, headed by Laszlo Almasy. The interrogation reports in the same British file describe Eppler's contacts with young Egyptian officers who opposed the British occupation, among them Sadat.3 The file records that Sadat gave Eppler a telephone number for the Cairo signal squadron, which Eppler wrote in his diary, and that on July 24, 1942 Sadat came to the houseboat where the agents were staying and took away the American wireless set they had left there. A statement in the file also records that the transmitter had been thrown into the river.4

Egyptian police arrested Sadat at 1 a.m. on August 12, 1942, and handed him to Egyptian Army Intelligence at noon. A report of that day in the file says that a diary found in his possession contained entries stating that he had been sending messages from Gabal Asfar to the enemy.2 A Court of Enquiry convened by the Egyptian Minister of National Defence to hear the case was allowed two British officers to sit on it.5

A letter of October 19, 1942 from the Defence Security Office, Egypt, to M.I.5 reported that Sadat and the flight lieutenant Hassan Ezzat had been found guilty after a preliminary trial by the Court of Enquiry, had been discharged from the Army, and had been interned for the duration of the war. The letter added that before an Egyptian court martial "they would have been acquitted."6 Sadat's own account of his early career is in his autobiography, In Search of Identity (1978).7

The Free Officers and the 1952 coup

A State Department weekly summary of July 28, 1952 recorded that on the night of July 22 to 23 Major General Mohamed Naguib "led a quiet and effective coup" which took over the armed forces in Cairo and later the country, "carried out by approximately 300 Army and Air Force officers." The summary traced the movement to junior officers who had resented the older generals since the Palestine war and the Arms Scandal, and recorded that in January 1952 they had elected Naguib president of the Cairo Officers' Club over the candidate of the Commander-in-Chief.8

A Central Intelligence Agency intelligence memorandum of September 29, 1970, written the day after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, described Sadat as the only remaining vice president, who "has held a great variety of posts since participating with Nasir in the 'free officers' movement that ousted King Farouk in 1952." The memorandum called him "a perennial figurehead," said he "owed his position more to his loyalty to Nasir than to his political strength or acumen," and judged it doubtful that he would hold the presidency for more than an interim period.9

The expulsion of the Soviet advisers, 1972

In July 1972 Sadat ended the Soviet military advisory program in Egypt. A State Department telegram of July 19, 1972 to the Interests Section in Egypt instructed the embassy that the United States "should not repeat not inject itself in any way into current developments in Egyptian-Soviet relations."10 A memorandum from Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, to Henry A. Kissinger of July 24, 1972 reported that an unnamed contact had asserted that Sadat's decision to terminate the program "has created a new opportunity for the USG," and had urged the United States to move "with minimal delay" toward a plan to put to Sadat for a peaceful settlement.11

On February 6, 1973, King Hussein of Jordan read to Richard Nixon from an aide-memoire which called the expulsion "perhaps the most significant event" of the period.12

Ari Ben-Menashe wrote that Sadat was informed by the Soviet Union about Israel attitude towards a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, following Golda Meir meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in 1972. Ben-Menashe wrote that this intelligence may have prompted Sadat to launch a war against Israel in 1973 to force them to the peace table. In the same passage he wrote that Sadat was primarily interested in regaining the Sinai for Egypt and was not keen on the Gaza Strip because of its large Palestinian population. He also wrote that Sadat and Begin later developed a face-saving formula over the Palestinian issue, leading to the Camp David Accords.13 Ben-Menashe also attributed a Soviet bugging of Meir's office to Reuben Yirador of Unit 8200.13

The Yom Kippur War and the intelligence failure

A Central Intelligence Agency intelligence memorandum of November 26, 1971 on Sadat's "year of decision" speeches judged that his pledge to liberate Sinai "with our own blood" had to be taken seriously, and that although the Egyptians would probably maneuver politically, "there is always the danger that the Egyptians could attack out of sheer frustration."14

In April 1973 Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum on Sadat's speech of March 26, 1973, which Kissinger summarized as declaring that "The stage which Egypt is entering is one of all-out confrontation."15

A post-war report by the Intelligence Community Staff, printed in the Foreign Relations series, explains the estimate that prevailed through the summer of 1973. It quotes the analysts' view that "The whole thrust of President Sadat's activities since last spring has been in the direction of bringing moral, political, and economic force to bear on Israel in tacit acknowledgment of Arab unreadiness to make war." The report then states that "Sadat and Asad might make the decision to go to war with little or no consideration of the chances of a disastrous military outcome."16

The Central Intelligence Agency's 2013 study of the war, prepared with the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, calls Sadat "the mastermind" of the Egyptian and Syrian attacks, who had "done a brilliant job of misleading the Israelis" and American intelligence. The study records that Lawrence Eagleburger, then a senior assistant to Kissinger, said Kissinger had concluded from fairly raw intelligence that Sadat was going to start a war before the Intelligence Community itself did.17

A cable from Zvi Zamir, then head of the Mossad, to the military secretary of Prime Minister Golda Meir, dated October 5, 1973, begins "The Egyptian army and the Syrian army are poised to launch an attack on Israel on Saturday 6.10.73 at dusk" and gives the source's assessment as a "99 percent chance" that the attack would be launched that day. The Israel State Archives released the cable on September 17, 2018; The Times of Israel, reporting on the release, identified the source as Marwan, described as a confidant of Sadat.18

Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and the Marwan channel

Marwan carried Sadat's messages in the Syrian-Israeli disengagement talks of 1974. A May 1974 memorandum from Brent Scowcroft to Nixon records that Sadat "agreed and made available a close assistant of his, Ashraf Marwan, who will make parallel efforts in these two capitals," meaning King Faisal in Saudi Arabia and Houari Boumediene in Algeria.19

In a memorandum of conversation held in Jerusalem on May 6, 1974, Kissinger reported that "Marwan says if Asad rejects it, he should think about it for two days, and Faisal and he would send emissaries."20 In November 1974 a memorandum from Scowcroft to Gerald R. Ford reported that Sadat had sent "his special emissary, Ashraf Marwan, from Cairo to Riyadh" to brief the Saudi king.21 In December 1974 Kissinger told Ford, "I think we are facing a major crisis with Sadat," and said Sadat could send "Fahmy or his personal aide, Marwan."22

Kamal Adham and the CIA payments

A 1992 report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Bank of Credit and Commerce International described Adham as "the CIA's principal liaison for the entire Middle East from the mid-1960's through 1979." The report stated that press accounts from the late 1970s described Adham as having made payments on behalf of the CIA to Sadat when Sadat was Nasser's vice president and in financial difficulty. It quoted Bob Woodward on the arrangement: "In 1970, the Saudis had provided then Egyptian Vice President Sadat with a regular income. It was impossible to determine where Saudi interests in these arrangements ended and American CIA interests began."23

The Senate report says that Adham, at the Federal Reserve Board hearing on the takeover of First American Bank in April 1981, did not mention that he had been the most important liaison between the United States and Sadat in the negotiation of the Camp David accords. The report's finding is that the key role Adham played at Camp David "was apparently to encourage other Arab political figures not to repudiate Sadat for agreeing to peace with Israel." Clark Clifford stated in sworn interrogatories that he believed Adham's roles were coincidental.24

Adham's place in the channel is visible in the record of 1974 and 1976. In May 1974 a cable from Harold Saunders, Kissinger's envoy in Saudi Arabia, reported that "Adham and Rashid Pharaon are regarded here as the men most likely to reflect the King's thinking."20 In August 1976, in Tehran, Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton Jr. told Kissinger that "Adham's thesis is that the Arabs must be brought together and only then can they get the PLO under control."25 In February 1980 the American embassy in Jidda reported that Crown Prince Fahd had referred to information from Marwan, "the now deposed head of Arab arms," and that the "Saudi principal in this venture was Kamal Adham, now out of favor here."26

The Camp David accords

On February 17, 1977, in Cairo, Sadat told Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that "now the time is ripe for a permanent solution, a 'global solution' to establish peace here once and for all."27

On November 9, 1977 Sadat told the Egyptian People's Assembly, "I am ready to go to their house, to the Knesset itself, to debate them"; the American embassy in Cairo reported the offer as a first for an Arab leader.28 On the evening of November 19, 1977 he arrived at Ben Gurion Airport for the first visit to Israel by an Arab head of state since 1948, stayed 36 hours in Jerusalem, and addressed the Knesset.29 On November 23 the embassy reported that Sadat called the trip his "greatest victory," greater than the October war.30

In August 1978 the Central Intelligence Agency reported to Zbigniew Brzezinski, in a raw report not finally evaluated, that the summit could produce "two separate but related achievements": a publicly announced agreement on principles based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 with a Palestinian component, and a secret framework agreement to be signed by Sadat and Begin with Jimmy Carter as witness.31 On August 26, 1978, at Ismailia, Sadat told Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts that the Israelis "would not have been able to do so if the U.S. satellite photography had not been furnished to the Israelis," and that the photography had revealed his 25th Division preparing to cross the Canal.32

The two framework agreements were signed on September 17, 1978. The Nobel Prize committee awarded the 1978 Peace Prize jointly to Sadat and Begin "for jointly having negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel in 1978."33 The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed on March 26, 1979.34 A Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of April 9, 1975, "A Coming of Age: The Foreign Policy of Anwar Sadat," had called his foreign policy "unremarkable by pragmatic Western standards" and, "by the standards of the Arab world, ... revolutionary."35

The Safari Club

In 1976 Alexandre de Marenches, the director of the French SDECE, organized an informal intelligence arrangement called the Safari Club. According to Marenches's memoir, The Fourth World War (1992), written with David Andelman, the arrangement drew on the intelligence services of several states, and Egypt's General Intelligence Service is listed among its members in the accounts that describe it.36 A history by Joseph Trento describes the same arrangement over several chapters.37

The New York Times reported on October 8, 1981, citing American officials, that in 1980 President Carter made plans with Sadat, the Saudi leaders and the French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing for covert action against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, using Egyptian and Sudanese paramilitary forces, and that the plan was shelved when Giscard lost his bid for reelection in the spring of 1981.38

Marwan's death

Marwan fell from the balcony of his London apartment in June 2007. At the inquest in July 2010 at Westminster Coroner's Court, the coroner William Dolman recorded an open verdict, stating that there was no evidence to support a finding of either suicide or unlawful killing, and said that claims about the death belonged to "the murky and secretive world of espionage." He asked, "Did he jump or did he fall? The evidence does not provide a clear answer." Marwan's widow told the inquest that her husband had never spoken of suicide but had expressed fears that he might be killed, and said outside court that she believed someone had thrown him over the balcony.3940

The assassination, October 6, 1981

On September 3 and 4, 1981, Sadat launched a crackdown that swept nearly 1,600 Egyptians into prison. The Middle East Research and Information Project, reporting in November 1981, described the arrests as coming four weeks before the assassination.41 Former Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky said in December 1984 that, on information from Israel, Austrian police intercepted a weapons shipment at Vienna's airport on August 1, 1981, ten days before Sadat was to arrive for a private visit in Salzburg. Kreisky said, "I was forced to ask Egyptian President Sadat at the time to postpone his trip to Salzburg, because I could not guarantee his security."42

Sadat was shot on October 6, 1981 at a military parade outside Cairo marking the anniversary of the 1973 crossing. Newsweek reported that a junior lieutenant stepped from a truck and threw a grenade, and that accomplices then fired submachine guns and threw grenades.43 The same report stated that the United States had contributed $25 million toward Sadat's security over the years, that the Secret Service had trained Egyptian security men beginning in 1974, and that the Central Intelligence Agency had supplied communications equipment to protect messages between Sadat's bodyguards.43 The New York Times reported the next day, citing American officials, that Sadat had asked President Nixon for help with his personal protection and that the Secret Service and the CIA had provided advice and equipment through contacts with his bodyguards from 1974.38

Secretary of State Alexander Haig said on October 7 that, citing intelligence reports from Egypt, he attributed the assassination to a group of fundamentalists centered primarily in certain military units, and that there was "no direct link" and "no evidence" of external involvement.44 On the morning of October 8 the columnist Jack Anderson said on a television broadcast that he had had access to a secret CIA preliminary post-mortem, and that the CIA "has no clear idea who was behind the plot, but the agency believes the least likely culprits would be Egyptian Army dissidents."45 A memorandum of October 16, 1981 from the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council thanked a CIA branch for its work in producing the Special National Intelligence Estimate on the regional implications of the assassination.46

On the evening of the assassination G. Gordon Liddy spoke at the University of Texas at Austin. The Austin American-Statesman quoted him: "There was a time when we would have known what happened and who did it. We might have even known about it beforehand and have been able to warn him."47

On March 6, 1982 a three-man Supreme Military Court sentenced five of 24 defendants to death, among them Lieutenant Khaled Islambouli, whom United Press International described as the accused mastermind. Five others received life terms, twelve received hard labor, and two were acquitted. Prosecutors said the plan was to begin an effort to overthrow the government and install an Iranian-style Islamic republic.48 The Washington Post reported from Cairo that the court "condemned five Moslem extremists to death" and meted out sentences ranging from life to five years in prison to 17 accomplices.49 On April 15, 1982, a day after Hosni Mubarak rejected a plea for clemency, Islambouli, 24, and Sergeant Hussein Abbas, 28, were shot by firing squad at the Red Mountain firing range east of Cairo, and three others were hanged at Bab El-Khalk prison, under a news blackout.50

Footnotes

  1. Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. ↩︎

  2. The National Archives (UK), KV 2/1467, report on the arrests of Hassan Ezzat and Mohamed Anwar el Sadati, August 12, 1942, enclosed with a letter of August 26, 1942 to Sir David Petrie of M.I.5. Transcribed in the Salaam-Condor compilation, Part II, https://www.cdvandt.org/Salaam-Condor-Eppler-Sandstede-part-II-V2.pdf. ↩︎

  3. Salaam-Condor compilation, Part I, citing KV 2/1467 and KV 2/1468 (interrogation reports on Johannes Eppler and Hans-Gerd Sandstede), https://www.cdvandtext2.org/Salaam-Condor-Eppler-Sandstede-V3.pdf; Part II, introduction, https://www.cdvandt.org/Salaam-Condor-Eppler-Sandstede-part-II-V2.pdf. ↩︎

  4. KV 2/1467, interrogation summaries of Eppler and Sandstede, July and August 1942, as transcribed in the Salaam-Condor compilation, Part II, https://www.cdvandt.org/Salaam-Condor-Eppler-Sandstede-part-II-V2.pdf. ↩︎

  5. KV 2/1467, Court of Enquiry report on the case of Captain Mohamed Effendi Anwar El Sadati and the aviator Hassan Effendi Abdel Azim Ezzat, Military Information Bureau, Koubri Koubbeh, August 1942, transcribed in the Salaam-Condor compilation, Part II. ↩︎

  6. KV 2/1467, letter from the Defence Security Office, Egypt, to Sir David Petrie, M.I.5, October 19, 1942, transcribed in the Salaam-Condor compilation, Part II. ↩︎

  7. Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. Harper and Row, 1978. ↩︎

  8. Memorandum by Alta F. Fowler to the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, "Weekly Summary of Events, Egypt and the Sudan, July 22-28, 1952," Washington, July 28, 1952, Document 997, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IX, Part 2, The Near and Middle East, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d997. ↩︎

  9. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum No. 1467/70, "Nasir's Death: The Immediate Aftermath," September 29, 1970, CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090046-7, CIA Reading Room, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp85t00875r001100090046-7. ↩︎

  10. Telegram from the Department of State to the Interests Section in Egypt, Washington, July 19, 1972, 2253Z, Document 298, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d298. ↩︎

  11. Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 24, 1972, Document 299, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIII, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d299. ↩︎

  12. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 6, 1973, Document 14, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d14. The quoted sentence is from the King's aide-memoire. ↩︎

  13. Ben-Menashe, Ari. Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015). ↩︎

  14. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum, "Sadat Makes His 1971 Decision," November 26, 1971, CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150023-9, CIA Reading Room, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79m00098a000200150023-9. ↩︎

  15. Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, April 1973, Document 42, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d42. ↩︎

  16. Report Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff, Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 83-M00171R, Document 412, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d412. ↩︎

  17. President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, with the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, January 30, 2013, PDF pages 19 and 20, https://www.cia.gov/static/c92e6ff4c7b383b2c719ac47c87f45ce/President-Nixon-and-the-Role-of-Intelligence-in-the-1973-Arab-Israeli-War.pdf. ↩︎

  18. Zvi Zamir, cable to the military secretary of Prime Minister Golda Meir, October 5, 1973, Israel State Archives, released September 17, 2018, as quoted in Judah Ari Gross, "'Odds of war lower than low': Papers highlight intel failures in Yom Kippur War," The Times of Israel, September 17, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/odds-of-war-lower-than-low-papers-highlight-intel-failures-in-yom-kippur-war/. ↩︎

  19. Memorandum from the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Nixon, May 1974, Document 43, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d43. ↩︎

  20. Memorandum of conversation, Jerusalem, May 6, 1974, Document 46, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d46. The Adham and Pharaon passage is from a cable from Saudi Arabia that Kissinger read to his interlocutors in the same meeting. ↩︎

  21. Memorandum from Scowcroft to President Ford, November 6, 1974, Document 116, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d116. ↩︎

  22. Memorandum of conversation, Oval Office, Ford and Kissinger, December 1974, Document 124, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d124. The FRUS editorial note says the original is misdated December 18. ↩︎

  23. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Senator John Kerry and Senator Hank Brown, S. Prt. 102-140, December 1992, pp. 299-300 (notes 779-780), quoting Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, Simon and Schuster, 1987, p. 352. ↩︎

  24. S. Prt. 102-140, pp. 300-301 (notes 782-789), including the Bert Lance testimony, S. Hrg. 102-350, Part 3, p. 22, and Clark Clifford's sworn interrogatories. ↩︎

  25. Memorandum of conversation, Tehran, August 7, 1976, Document 292, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d292. Alfred Leroy Atherton Jr. was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from April 25, 1974 to April 13, 1978: Office of the Historian, "Alfred Leroy Atherton Jr.," https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/atherton-alfred-leroy. ↩︎

  26. Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Jidda, February 1980, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, p. 1090, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf. ↩︎

  27. Memorandum of conversation, Cairo, February 17, 1977, Document 10, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v08/pdf/frus1977-80v08.pdf. ↩︎

  28. Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, Cairo, November 9, 1977, Document 144, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v08/pdf/frus1977-80v08.pdf. ↩︎

  29. Editorial Note, Document 152, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v08/pdf/frus1977-80v08.pdf. ↩︎

  30. Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, Cairo, November 23, 1977, Document 155, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v08/pdf/frus1977-80v08.pdf. ↩︎

  31. Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Turner to Brzezinski, Washington, August 21, 1978, Document 14, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf. ↩︎

  32. Memorandum of conversation, Ismailia, August 26, 1978, Document 16, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf. ↩︎

  33. Nobel Prize, 1978 Peace Prize announcement, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1978/summary/. ↩︎

  34. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, introductory material on the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signed March 26, 1979, and the volume's date range for the August 8 to September 17, 1978 summit, https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v09/pdf/frus1977-80v09.pdf. ↩︎

  35. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum No. 0088/75, "A Coming of Age: The Foreign Policy of Anwar Sadat," April 9, 1975, CIA-RDP85T00353R000100160001-8, CIA Reading Room, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp85t00353r000100160001-8. ↩︎

  36. De Marenches, Alexandre, and David Andelman. The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and Espionage in the Age of Terrorism. Random House, 1992. ↩︎

  37. Trento, Joseph. Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network. Carroll and Graf, 2005, pp. 52-108. ↩︎

  38. Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Had Advised Sadat Since '74," New York Times, October 8, 1981, as filed in the CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP90-00552R000505250105-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505250105-0. ↩︎

  39. Associated Press, in Ynetnews, "Inquest: Egyptian spy suspect's death unexplained," https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3919938,00.html. The coroner was William Dolman. ↩︎

  40. "Open verdict for Egyptian Mossad spy death," The Jewish Chronicle, July 21, 2010, https://www.thejc.com/news/open-verdict-for-egyptian-mossad-spy-death-t4qjb776. ↩︎

  41. Stork, Joe, "Massive Arrests Precede Sadat's Assassination," MERIP Reports, November 23, 1981, https://www.merip.org/1981/11/massive-arrests-precede-sadats-assassination/. ↩︎

  42. "Israelis provided good tip on threat to Sadat in '81," Baltimore Sun, December 6, 1984, as filed in the CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720001-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000605720001-2. ↩︎

  43. "'An Act of Infamy,'" Newsweek, October 19, 1981, as filed in the CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720007-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000605720007-6. ↩︎

  44. Don Oberdorfer, "Haig Warns 'External Powers,'" Washington Post, October 8, 1981, as filed in the CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720012-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000605720012-0. ↩︎

  45. Jack Anderson, "The Sadat Assassination," Good Morning America, ABC, WJLA-TV Washington, October 8, 1981, Radio TV Reports transcript, CIA-RDP90-00965R000100160041-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000100160041-2. ↩︎

  46. Memorandum from the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, October 16, 1981, on the Special National Intelligence Estimate on the regional implications of President Sadat's assassination, CIA-RDP83B00140R000100040014-6, CIA Reading Room, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00140r000100040014-6. ↩︎

  47. "Convicted Watergate plotter G. Gordon Liddy...," Austin American-Statesman, October 7, 1981, as filed in the CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP90-00806R000201150031-8, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00806r000201150031-8. ↩︎

  48. W. G. Kirolos, "Five given death for Sadat assassination," United Press International, Cairo, March 6, 1982, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/03/06/Five-given-death-for-Sadat-assassination/6203384238800/. ↩︎

  49. "5 Get Death Penalty for Assassinating Sadat," Washington Post, March 7, 1982 (Cairo dateline March 6), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/03/07/5-get-death-penalty-for-assassinating-sadat/d83e7d01-8fcd-4f4d-8916-87dd45879256/. ↩︎

  50. W. G. Kirolos, "Execute five for Sadat assassination," United Press International, Cairo, April 15, 1982, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/04/15/Execute-five-for-Sadat-assassination/5516387694800/. ↩︎