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Air Force and the Nixon White House

Henry B. Gonzalez, the chairman of the House Banking Committee, told the House on April 28, 1992 that early in his career Scowcroft served one year as air attaché at the United States Embassy in Belgrade in Yugoslavia.⁵ After earning a Ph.D. and working in academia from 1962 to 1968, he held a succession of national security posts in the Department of Defense.⁵ In 1971 President Richard Nixon appointed him military aide to the President, and in 1973 Henry A. Kissinger chose him as deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs.⁵ The Scowcroft Group's biography of him describes a twenty-nine-year military career that began with graduation from United States Military Academy and ended at the rank of lieutenant general after service as Deputy National Security Advisor.³ R. W. Apple Jr., who wrote the introduction to the Tower Commission report, described him as "a retired Air Force general who served several Republican presidents as a key foreign-policy adviser."⁶

Deputy to Kissinger, 1973 to 1975

A memorandum for the record that Admiral Thomas H. Moorer prepared on October 26, 1973 reproduces Kissinger's record of schedule for a meeting in Washington on the night of October 24 to 25, 1973 (10:30 p.m. to 3:30 a.m.), which lists the attendees as Kissinger, James R. Schlesinger, William Colby, Moorer, Scowcroft, Alexander Haig and Jonathan Howe. The memorandum lists among the actions taken that day the setting of DEFCON III, during the Yom Kippur War.⁷ Kissinger later recalled that immediately after the alert was set he instructed Scowcroft to call Anatoly Dobrynin to tell him to desist from all action until there was a U.S. reply, "and to warn him that any unilateral actions by the Soviet Union would have the most serious consequences."⁷ The Foreign Relations of the United States editors note that Ray Cline called the meeting a "curious little rump NSC meeting" in the Winter 1974 to 1975 issue of Foreign Policy.⁷ Gonzalez told the House that Scowcroft often took charge of the National Security Council while Kissinger was fulfilling his duties as Secretary of State.⁸

National security adviser to Ford, 1975 to 1977

On May 27, 1975 Ford met in the White House Cabinet Room with Schlesinger, Colby, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Ingersoll and Scowcroft, who is listed in the memorandum of conversation as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, about a New York Times article by Seymour Hersh on American submarine intercept missions in Soviet waters. Ford said: "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Scowcroft said: "The real problem is not the press. The real problem is the people who are leaking the material to the press. They are the ones we have to go after."⁹

At a news conference on November 3, 1975, Ford announced that "Brent Scowcroft, who has been serving ably for 3 years as Deputy Assistant at the White House, will move up to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs" when Kissinger relinquished that post to devote his full time to being Secretary of State.¹⁰ The report of the Tower Commission summarizes that "Under President Ford, Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft became National Security Advisor, with Henry Kissinger remaining as Secretary of State."¹¹

In April 1976 Scowcroft briefed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller before an April 20 courtesy call on Anastasio Somoza at the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Washington, covering Nicaraguan affairs and U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.¹² Gonzalez told the House that Scowcroft resigned the post during the Jimmy Carter administration but stayed active as a member of the President's general advisory committee on arms control.¹³

Kissinger Associates and the BNL account, 1982 to 1989

In 1982 Scowcroft joined Kissinger in setting up Kissinger Associates, according to Gonzalez, who said Scowcroft served as vice chairman and head of the firm's Washington, D.C. office until he became national security adviser in January 1989.¹⁴ The firm's biography of him states that in that capacity he advised and assisted US and foreign corporate leaders on global joint venture opportunities, strategic planning and risk assessment.³

Frederick Lacey, who was appointed as special counsel in the BNL Scandal investigation, wrote that Scowcroft had served as vice president of Kissinger Associates and had headed its Washington, D.C. office before joining the Bush administration as national security adviser in January 1989.¹⁵ Lacey's report states: "It is clear that, while at Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft and Eagleburger came into contact with BNL management. I have seen nothing, however, to suggest that they knew of BNL-Atlanta's wrongful loans to Iraq or influenced the prosecution of this matter."¹⁵ The passage refers to Lawrence Eagleburger, who had been president of the firm and became deputy secretary of state.

Gonzalez told the House that Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger "maintain that they were unaware of the BNL loans to Iraq. I offer no definitive proof that they were aware of the BNL loans."¹⁶ He reported that Scowcroft worked on the account of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro at Kissinger Associates, met BNL management on numerous occasions, and briefed the bank's board on international political and economic developments on three occasions between 1986 and 1989, and that when the president of BNL traveled to the United States for the annual International Monetary Fund conference he met Kissinger and Scowcroft in New York City.¹⁷ Gonzalez reported that a former head of BNL's American operations said he attended a 1987 meeting in New York with Alan Stoga, the head of BNL's Rome headquarters, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger, convened to give BNL advice on doing business in several countries including India, and that Stoga and Scowcroft took the BNL officers to lunch afterward.¹⁸ Gonzalez said: "BNL was a client of Mr. Scowcroft's while he was the vice-chairman of Kissinger Associates. Mr. Scowcroft regularly provided advice to BNL's management and received hefty fees in return."¹⁹

Luigi Sardelli, BNL's regional manager in the United States, gave the Banking Committee written answers in 1993 in which he stated that in February 1989 Dr. Pedde, BNL's managing director, asked him to contact Stoga, that he understood the bank was looking for space in Washington and that, because Scowcroft had just been appointed to the Bush White House, his mission may have been to find out whether a room would be available at Kissinger Associates in Washington for a BNL officer. Sardelli wrote that he did not recall posing the question to Stoga, and that he never discussed any loan to Iraq with Kissinger Associates.²⁰

Scowcroft Commission, 1983

On January 3, 1983 President Ronald Reagan announced the establishment of a bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission) to review the strategic modernization program, with particular focus on the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile system and its basing alternatives, and named "The Honorable Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to serve as Chairman." The other members were Thomas C. Reed as vice chairman, Nicholas Brady, Harold Brown, William Clements, John Deutch, Alexander M. Haig Jr., Richard Helms, John Lyons of the AFL-CIO, Vice Admiral Levering Smith and James Woolsey.²¹ The statement notes that Reagan signed the establishing executive order the same day in the Cabinet Room with Scowcroft, several commission members, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger present.²¹ Executive Order 12400 set the commission at no more than fifteen members, directed it to report by February 18, 1983, provided that information supplied to or developed by it would not, to the extent permitted by law, be available for public inspection, and assigned its administrative support to the Secretary of Defense.²²

On April 19, 1983 Reagan, acknowledging "Brent Scowcroft, the Commission's Chairman," announced that the commission had unanimously arrived at its recommendations and that he would send them to Congress with his endorsement; he said the commission had held dozens of formal meetings and talked to over 200 technical experts.²³ On April 9, 1984 Reagan issued a statement on the commission's final report, saying that it reiterated the original recommendations, namely an arms control structure with incentives for stability at reduced levels, deployment of 100 MX missile and development of a small single-warhead ICBM, and that it recommended extreme caution in proceeding to engineering development of an active strategic defense system.²⁴

Council on Foreign Relations, 1984 to 1986

The annual report of the Council on Foreign Relations for July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 lists Scowcroft among the directors with terms expiring in 1986, alongside Harold Brown, Lane Kirkland, Juanita Kreps and Robert Scalapino. He is listed on the Membership Committee chaired by Theodore Hesburgh and on the five-member board Nominating Committee with Nicholas Katzenbach, Philip Geyelin, William D. Rogers and Marina Whitman. The report records a Council session of former national security advisers, chaired jointly by Winston Lord and Eagleburger, at which Zbigniew Brzezinski, Walt Rostow and Scowcroft spoke, and a Council book, Michael Krepon's Strategic Stalemate, with parallel prefaces by Scowcroft and Paul Warnke.²⁵

Tower Commission, 1987

Scowcroft was one of the members of the President's Special Review Board, chaired by John Tower, with Edmund Muskie as the other member.²⁶ The board examined the Iran-Contra affair and the role of the National Security Council in it. Apple's introduction reports that Scowcroft considered the lack of written records "appalling" and added: "It may be that some went into the shredder, but we can't prove it."²⁶

National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989

National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," is dated October 2, 1989 and was addressed to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense and Energy, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Information Agency. Its section on Iraq reads in part: "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq." It continues that "any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions" and that "Any breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response." A further paragraph states: "We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area," and that the United States should consider sales of non-lethal military assistance, training courses and medical exchanges to Iraq's defense establishment on a case by case basis.²⁷

Gonzalez told the House that after the BNL offices in Atlanta were raided in August 1989, the White House and the National Security Council acted to protect the Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program that the Commodity Credit Corporation ran. He said that State Department officials, including Secretary James A. Baker III, "repeatedly referred to NSD-26 which stated that 'the President wished to improve relations with Iraq'" as the justification for pressing other agencies to approve the program.²⁸ State Department talking points for the November 8, 1989 meeting of the National Advisory Council deputies, which Gonzalez reproduced, read: "In NSD-26, the President mandated that we seek to improve and expand our relationship with Iraq."²⁹

Gonzalez stated that under Scowcroft's direction the NSC staff was heavily involved in winning approval of the one billion dollar program for fiscal 1990 in late 1989, and that Scowcroft himself was directly involved in trying to win the release of the second 500 million dollar installment, which was delayed because of the BNL scandal.³⁰ A State Department memorandum of March 5, 1990, which Gonzalez quoted, states: "National Security Council staff [NSCS] contacted the USDA March 2 to inquire about the delay after the Iraqi Ambassador complained to General Scowcroft."³¹ Gonzalez said the United States Department of Agriculture sent a background memorandum to Scowcroft in preparation for the NSC meeting in May 1990 stating that "it cannot be overemphasized that any constraint on CCC credit guarantees must not be based on a foreign policy rationale," and said the program was suspended at that meeting. He also quoted a May 25, 1990 Treasury Department memorandum summarizing a meeting of Agriculture, Treasury and State officials: "The NSC prevailed on Agriculture to say only that their investigation showed the improprieties may have occurred and remained silent on the suspension."³²

On May 18, 1992 Gonzalez named Scowcroft, C. Boyden Gray, John Schmitz, Richard Haass, Clayton Yeutter and others as White House and NSC staff involved in the decision and in the administrative review of the BNL scandal, said that "many White House and NSC staff were involved" and asked why neither Scowcroft nor Eagleburger had recused himself, and said: "So the White House and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action in order to save the CCC Program for Iraq."³³ The same Record pages print his letter of October 1, 1991 asking Scowcroft for the President's report on exports of nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile technology to Iraq, Scowcroft's reply of November 1, 1991 offering a copy of the report "as a courtesy," Gonzalez's letter of April 29, 1992 asking Scowcroft for all NSC information on Carlos Cardoen and Gerald Bull, and his letter of the same date to Bush asking that Scowcroft and the other named staff be made available for interview.³⁴

Gonzalez described an interagency group of lawyers chaired by C. Nicholas Rostow, the NSC's legal adviser, which met in April 1991 and which he called the "Rostow gang." He said the group "gave the White House a direct hand in regulating the flow of information to the Congress, thus limiting oversight of Iraq policy."³⁵ In a May 2, 1991 letter to Bush, Gonzalez detailed his concerns about the links among BNL, Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger.³⁶

The report of the independent counsel Lacey, printed in the Banking Committee record, quotes a February 8, 1991 memorandum from Rostow to Scowcroft at the National Security Council on the BNL indictment, which names Robert Mueller and states: "I have informed Robert Mueller ... of your reluctance to seek an indictment of Iraqi government officials whom we are unlikely to take into custody."³⁷

Alan Friedman wrote that Bryan Siebert of the United States Department of Energy "had been waging a lonely and unsuccessful battle to get James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to do something about the steady flow of U.S. exports that were materially assisting Iraq's nuclear weapons program." Friedman wrote that on May 18, 1990 Scowcroft telephoned Secretary of Agriculture Yeutter and asked him "not to put out any press release today saying we are terminating the program" of credit guarantees, and that Scowcroft's aides "objected to any measures 'that singled out Iraq.'" Friedman quoted Scowcroft's staff as saying of cancelling the second 500 million dollars: "We would be shooting ourselves in the foot." Friedman wrote that Matrix Churchill "was not discussed at the cabinet meeting, even though the Central Intelligence Agency had reported its activities to both the White House and the State Department in November 1989." According to Friedman, Rostow told Gonzalez's investigator that "it would be a cold day in hell before Congress got NSD 26."³⁸

Beijing after Tiananmen, 1989

On July 2, 1989 Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger met Deng Xiaoping and Premier Li Peng in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The memorandum of conversation records Deng saying that the turmoil in China had begun shortly after Bush took office, that the United States was too deeply involved in it, that U.S. foreign policy had cornered China, and that the aim of what he called the counter-revolutionary rebellion had been to overthrow the People's Republic. Deng said that the person who tied the knot should be the one to untie it, and that his hope was that the United States would do so.³⁹

Scowcroft and Eagleburger returned to Beijing in December 1989. At a banquet on December 9 Qian toasted the health of Scowcroft, Eagleburger and Lilley and the resumption and development of normal Sino-U.S. relations. On December 10 Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Ambassador James R. Lilley, Chase Untermeyer and the National Security Council's Asian affairs director Douglas Paal attended a working luncheon with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, and Scowcroft met Li Peng from 8:45 to 9:40 a.m., with a meeting with the General Secretary scheduled for 9:45. Li Peng asked Scowcroft whether the United States considered the Cold War ended after the Malta meeting.⁴⁰

Gulf War decisions, 1990

On July 28, 1990, in a telephone call from Kennebunkport, Maine, Maine, Bush told King Hussein of Jordan, who was about to travel to Baghdad, that he had "just had lunch with Barbara, my daughter, and Brent Scowcroft," that there were problems with Iraq's behavior he would rather not discuss on that line, and that the United States had tried to send signals to Saddam Hussein with a congressional delegation. The King asked Bush to tell Scowcroft hello.⁴¹ On August 2, 1990, aboard Air Force One en route to Aspen, Colorado, Colorado, Bush told King Hussein and President Hosni Mubarak that the United States was "very surprised at this outrageous invasion."⁴² On August 3 Bush told Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by telephone that "Brent will be talking with Woerner" (Manfred Wörner) and that "Brent is here and will get in touch"; Thatcher thanked him for "all the kind things you said at Aspen," and Bush replied: "I told Brent to keep you informed."⁴³

On August 2, 1990 Iraqi tanks sped the 80 miles to Kuwait City to begin the occupation of Kuwait.⁴⁴ James P. Pfiffner wrote that on August 3, 1990, at a White House meeting, Scowcroft made the argument that the invasion was something the United States could not leave unanswered.⁴⁴ Pfiffner quoted a White House official as saying: "it was Brent's presentation at one of the meetings on August 3, that Friday after the invasion, that made clear what the stakes were, crystallized people's thinking and galvanized support for a very strong response." Pfiffner's note attributes the quotation to an article by Andrew Rosenthal in the New York Times of February 21, 1991.⁴⁵ In late September 1990 Colin Powell went to the White House with Richard Cheney to meet with Bush and Scowcroft, for what Pfiffner described as the most formal presentation of the sanctions option to the president.⁴⁶

Essay against an attack on Iraq, August 2002

On August 15, 2002 Scowcroft published an essay in the Wall Street Journal under the headline "Don't Attack Saddam."⁴⁷⁴⁸ A news report of the essay quotes him as writing that if the United States "were seen to be turning our backs" on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute "in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us."⁴⁷ The same report quotes him as writing: "There is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive."⁴⁷

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 2001 to 2005

On October 5, 2001 the White House announced that President George W. Bush intended to appoint "Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft who will serve as Chairman" of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, for a term of two years, together with Cresencio Arcos, Jim Barksdale, Robert Addison Day, Stephen Friedman, Alfred Lerner, Ray Hunt, Rita Hauser, David E. Jeremiah, Arnold Kanter, James C. Langdon Jr., Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, John Streicker, Pete Wilson and Philip Zelikow.⁴⁹

Steve Clemons wrote on October 27, 2005 that Scowcroft was not asked by the President to return to the board when his term expired at the end of 2004, that most had assumed he would continue as chairman, and that at a gathering at the home of Brzezinski just after the New Year Scowcroft reportedly said: "I just got fired." Clemons wrote that on January 6 Scowcroft spoke with Brzezinski at the New America Foundation.⁵⁰ Jeffrey Goldberg published "Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Scowcroft Against the Bush Administration?" in The New Yorker of October 31, 2005, in which Scowcroft described his objections to the administration's Iraq policy; Goldberg's article also drew on an interview with George H.W. Bush.⁵¹ Robert Bryce wrote in Salon on November 17, 2005 that Bush had dismissed Scowcroft from the chairmanship about a year earlier because of his criticism of the decision to invade Iraq.⁵²

On October 27, 2005 the White House announced that Stephen Friedman would be appointed to the board for a term beginning on December 20, 2005, and that he would be designated its chairman upon appointment. The announcement also named Hunt, Donald Evans, Arthur B. Culvahouse, William O. DeWitt Jr., Lee Hamilton and others as members.⁵³

The Scowcroft Group

The Scowcroft Group states that it was founded in 1994 by Scowcroft and is an international business advisory firm that has served US and multinational firms in a variety of sectors.⁴ Its services include geopolitical risk, sanctions and export controls, energy and resource security and scenario planning, and it lists partnerships with Fulcrum Macro Advisors, Vriens & Partners and McLarty Associates.⁵⁴

Aspen Strategy Group roster, 2016

On August 8, 2016 Tom Pritzker wrote to Jeffrey Epstein that he had just finished a presentation on leadership to the "grand pooh baahs of Aspen Strategy Group." Epstein asked "who attends," and Pritzker replied: "You have to be a bit of a wonk to know some of the names, but Nye, Scowcroft and Nicholas Burns run it (Scowcroft being replaced by Condoleezza Rice)." The message lists members including David Petraeus, Madeleine Albright, Stephen Hadley, Jake Sullivan, William Burns and John Sawers (MI6).⁵⁵

Footnotes

Brookings Institution, "Remembering Brent Scowcroft: A True National Security Maverick," which states that he served two presidents, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush, after a career in the United States Air Force. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/remembering-brent-scowcroft-a-true-national-security-maverick ↩︎
Atlantic Council, "The Passing of Brent Scowcroft: March 19, 1925 - August 6, 2020," press release. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/the-passing-of-brent-scowcroft-march-19-1925-august-6-2020/ ↩︎
The Scowcroft Group, "General Scowcroft" (national security adviser to both Presidents Ford and Bush; vice chairman of Kissinger Associates 1982 to 1989; twenty-nine-year military career; the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the President's Special Review Board; chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board). https://www.scowcroft.com/generalscowcroft ↩︎
The Scowcroft Group, "Our Firm" ("Founded in 1994 by General Brent Scowcroft"). https://www.scowcroft.com/ourfirm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," Congressional Record, House, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (Belgrade air attache, academia 1962 to 1968, Department of Defense posts, 1971 military aide, 1973 deputy to Kissinger). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board (1987), introduction by R. W. Apple Jr. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269, memorandum for the record by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, October 26, 1973, Washington, October 24/25, 1973, with editorial notes citing Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," Foreign Policy, no. 17 (Winter 1974-1975), p. 128. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d269 ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (Scowcroft often took charge of the National Security Council while Kissinger was Secretary of State; succeeded Kissinger as national security adviser in 1975). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft. National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. The memorandum is partly declassified. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf ↩︎
"The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975, statement on personnel changes in the administration. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60 ↩︎
The Tower Commission Report (1987), the report's historical summary of the National Security Advisor's role under President Ford. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. E-11, part 1, Document 263, memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Vice President Rockefeller, "Call on Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza, Tuesday, April 20, 1976," Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 14. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p1/d263 ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (resigned the post during the Carter administration; member of the President's general advisory committee on arms control). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, p. H2695 (joined Kissinger in setting up Kissinger Associates in 1982; vice chairman and head of the Washington office until January 1989). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Testimony of Former Employees of the BNL, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), pp. 514-515. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, p. H2694 (quoting the denials of Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger and the statement "I offer no definitive proof that they were aware of the BNL loans"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, p. H2696 (BNL account, three board briefings between 1986 and 1989, and the BNL president's meeting with Kissinger and Scowcroft in New York). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, p. H2698 (1987 New York meeting as reported by Gonzalez from a former head of BNL's American operations; lunch taken by Stoga and Scowcroft). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, p. H2699 (quoted sentences on BNL's client relationship and "hefty fees"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Luigi Sardelli, written responses to Chairman Gonzalez's questions, in U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Testimony of Former Employees of the BNL, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), p. 164. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit ↩︎
Ronald Reagan, "Statement Announcing the Establishment and Membership of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, and Designation of Chairman and Vice Chairman," January 3, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-announcing-establishment-and-membership-presidents-commission-strategic ↩︎
Executive Order 12400, "President's Commission on Strategic Forces," January 3, 1983, sections 1 to 4, Federal Register, vol. 48, no. 3 (January 5, 1983), pp. 381-382. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1983-01-05/pdf/FR-1983-01-05.pdf ↩︎
Ronald Reagan, "Remarks Endorsing the Recommendations in the Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 19, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/41983a ↩︎
Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Final Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," April 9, 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-final-report-presidents-commission-strategic-forces ↩︎
Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 (New York, 1985): Officers and Directors; Membership Committee; Nominating Committee; former National Security Advisers session; Krepon, Strategic Stalemate. CIA CREST copy, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00806r000100210066-5 ↩︎
The Tower Commission Report (1987), title page (John Tower, chairman; Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, members) and Apple introduction. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit ↩︎
National Security Directive 26, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," October 2, 1989, signed by George Bush, sections "Arms Sales," "Iraq" and "Iran," declassified, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. https://web.archive.org/web/2022/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd26.pdf ↩︎
Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on Commodity Credit Corporation credits for Iraq and NSD-26, Congressional Record, House, March 2, 1992, p. H863. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920302g.htm ↩︎
Congressional Record, House, March 2, 1992, p. H867, State Department "Talking Points for NAC Deputies Meeting, November 8, 1989," reproduced in Gonzalez's remarks. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920302g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, pp. H2696-H2697 (late 1989 $1 billion allocation and NSC direction; second $500 million installment). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, April 28, 1992, p. H2697, quoting a State Department memorandum of March 5, 1990. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on the USDA review and the NSC, Congressional Record, House, March 16, 1992, p. H1278 (USDA background memorandum to Scowcroft before the May 1990 NSC meeting; Treasury Department memorandum of May 25, 1990). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920316g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Henry B. Special order on BNL, Congressional Record, House, May 18, 1992, pp. H3367-H3368 (list of White House and NSC staff; recusal question; "So the White House and NSC, armed with National Security Directive 26, sprang into action"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, May 18, 1992, pp. H3373-H3374 (letters of October 1, 1991, November 1, 1991 and April 29, 1992). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Henry B. Remarks on the NSC legal group, Congressional Record, House, March 16, 1992, pp. H1274-H1275 (Rostow meeting in April 1991; "Rostow gang"). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920316g.htm ↩︎
Gonzalez, Congressional Record, May 18, 1992, p. H3367 (letter to President Bush of May 2, 1991). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920518g.htm ↩︎
Lacey, "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," in Serial No. 103-95, p. 598 (memorandum from Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft, February 8, 1991, Lacey Ex.). https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit ↩︎
Friedman, Alan. Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (Bantam, 1993), pp. 153-156, 162, 192, 216, 221. ↩︎
Memorandum of conversation, LTG Brent Scowcroft, Deng Xiaoping et al., Great Hall of the People, July 2, 1989, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, in "U.S. Government Documents Following Tiananmen Square Crackdown" (compilation pp. 19-32), published by ChinaFile. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6184537/U-S-Government-Documents-Following-Tiananmen.pdf ↩︎
Toast of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, December 9, 1989; memorandum of conversation, working luncheon, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, December 10, 1989; memorandum of conversation, Premier Li Peng and General Scowcroft, December 10, 1989, Beijing, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, in the same compilation. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6184537/U-S-Government-Documents-Following-Tiananmen.pdf ↩︎
Memorandum of telephone conversation, Bush and King Hussein of Jordan, July 28, 1990, Kennebunkport, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-07-28--Hussein%20I.pdf ↩︎
Memorandum of telephone conversation, Bush, King Hussein and President Mubarak, August 2, 1990, aboard Air Force One, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-02--Hussein%20I.pdf ↩︎
Memorandum of conversation, telephone call to Prime Minister Thatcher, August 3, 1990, Oval Office, 3:03 to 3:10 p.m., George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons. https://web.archive.org/web/20221024145017/https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-08-03--Thatcher.pdf ↩︎
Pfiffner, James P. "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," chapter 1 in Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner and Raymond A. Moore, eds., The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War (Praeger, 1993), section "The Decision to Commit U.S. Troops." ↩︎
Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," note 4, citing Andrew Rosenthal, "Scowcroft and Gates: A Team Rivals Baker," New York Times, February 21, 1991, p. A14. ↩︎
Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," chapter 1 (late September 1990 meeting of Powell, Cheney, Bush and Scowcroft). ↩︎
"Top Republicans Break With Bush on Iraq Strategy," news report of August 16, 2002 quoting Scowcroft's essay in the Wall Street Journal, reproduced on the World Systems Network list. https://wsarch.ucr.edu/wsnmail/2002/msg00949.html ↩︎
"Brent Scowcroft is Wrong: We Must Attack Saddam," Middle East Forum, August 20, 2002, identifying the essay as "Don't Attack Saddam" in the Wall Street Journal "on Thursday." https://www.meforum.org/brent-scowcroft-is-wrong-we-must-attack-saddam ↩︎
White House, "Personnel Announcement," October 5, 2001, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, including "Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft who will serve as Chairman." https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011005-8.html ↩︎
Clemons, Steve. "Stephen Friedman Named to Chair President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," The Washington Note, October 27, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/stephen_friedma/ ↩︎
Goldberg, Jeffrey. "Breaking Ranks: What Turned Brent Scowcroft Against the Bush Administration?," The New Yorker, October 31, 2005, as excerpted in Clemons, Steve. "Brent Scowcroft 'Breaks Ranks' with George W. Bush in Major New Yorker Article," The Washington Note, October 23, 2005. https://washingtonnote.com/brent_scowcroft_2/ ↩︎
Bryce, Robert. "Top-secret cronies," Salon, November 17, 2005. https://www.salon.com/2005/11/17/pfiab/ ↩︎
White House, "Personnel Announcement," October 27, 2005, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Stephen Friedman designated chairman, term beginning December 20, 2005. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051027-7.html ↩︎
The Scowcroft Group, "What We Offer" and "Our Firm" (partnerships). https://www.scowcroft.com/whatwedo ↩︎
U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01783338, DataSet 10, email exchange between Tom Pritzker and Jeffrey Epstein, August 8, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01783338.pdf ↩︎

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