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2026-05-15 2026-10-14 Gamal Abdel Nasser
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Gamal Abdel Nasir
Gamal Abdul Nasser
Nasser
Nasir
Political Figure
Person
Egypt
Politician
PanArabism
ColdWar
SuezCrisis
SixDayWar
Yemen
FreeOfficers
Soviet
CIA
Mossad
MI6
LavonAffair
1950s
1960s
1970s
Gamal Abdel Nasser was Egypt's president from 1956 to 1970, whose nationalization of the Suez Canal and closure of the Strait of Tiran preceded the 1956 and 1967 wars. 1918-01-15 1970-09-28 Alexandria, Egypt
type with role start end fn
head_of Egypt President 1956 1970 1
type with role start end fn
participant_in Suez Crisis Egyptian head of state 1956-07-26 1956-11-07 1
type with start end fn
participant_in Bandung Conference 1955-04-18 1955-04-24 17

Gamal Abdel Nasser (January 15, 1918 to September 28, 1970) was the second president of Egypt, serving from 1956 until his death. A founding member of the Free Officers Movement that overthrew King Farouk in 1952, Nasser became the dominant figure in Arab nationalism and the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War. His presidency was defined by the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, the Anglo-French-Israeli war that followed, Egypt's move toward the Soviet bloc, and the wars with Israel of 1956 and 1967. Seymour Hersh wrote that his promotion of Pan-Arabism, the idea of a unified Arab nation transcending existing state boundaries, alarmed Israel, which turned to the United States for diplomatic support, and that his ability to articulate Arab grievances against the colonial powers gave him a regional standing no other Arab leader of the period matched.12

Free Officers and the first American contacts

Copeland wrote in The Game Player that in late March 1952, four months before the coup that ousted King Farouk, Kermit Roosevelt and Nasser began a series of meetings, that Roosevelt first met a committee of officers far enough from the center of the movement to be expendable, and that a second meeting was attended by Nasser himself. Copeland wrote that he attended none of them, although he and a colleague waited in the hotel during the third, and that he wrote up the agreement Roosevelt and Nasser reached from Roosevelt's oral account. Of the second meeting he wrote that Mohamed Hassanein Heikal "can deny all he wants; it was documented and photographed."3

Embassy officers in Cairo held a dinner meeting on October 11, 1952 with Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasir, as the record spells his name, together with Major Hakim Amer and Major Salah Salem, members of the Free Officers' military high committee; Ambassador Jefferson Caffery reported it the next day.4 On May 20, 1953 the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, told the National Security Council that the situation in Egypt had taken a critical turn, that the Soviets were assuring the Egyptian government of all possible support against the "Anglo-American imperialists", and that the British forces in the Suez area were "the last stronghold of the Western powers in the Middle East".5

On May 12, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met the Revolutionary Command Council representatives at the American embassy in Cairo. The notetakers recorded that from one point it was extremely difficult to take notes because the officers, Nasser in particular, spoke in low voices. Nasser said that "nobody" would now accept the statement that the British could be genuine allies of the Arabs.6 In June 1953 the military leadership announced that Egypt was a republic, with General Mohamed Naguib as president and premier and Nasser as vice premier and minister of the interior; Caffery reported the announcement on June 18.7 Later that month Nasser and Hakim Amer told the embassy that Egypt desired a complete interim arms purchase, and that their current interest was in "some showy items" to boost army morale and strengthen Amer's position as newly appointed commander in chief.8 Hersh wrote that Nasser emerged as premier in 1954 after the 1952 coup.2

On September 27, 1954 representatives of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Foreign Operations Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency met in the Operations Coordinating Board's offices on military assistance to Egypt. The record states that "Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Bissell described briefly the situation in Egypt" (the CIA's Kermit Roosevelt and Richard Bissell); the group proposed that someone get in touch with Colonel Nasir about up to $10 million for purchases of American military supplies. A memorandum of the following day by Deputy Assistant Secretary Joseph Jernegan states that there was "some merit in the CIA argument that Nasir genuinely believes we are committed to give him some military help" and that he "can be very useful to us in the Near Eastern picture if properly supported and cultivated".9

Miles Copeland, a CIA officer, was a friend of Nasser and was known for his hostility to Israel. Copeland wrote in The Game of Nations that $3,000,000 in unvouchered funds was offered to Nasser as a "personal gift" over the doubts of Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, who told him that if anybody delivered the money to Nasser it would have to be Copeland. Copeland wrote that he told Hassan Touhami, head of Nasser's bodyguard unit, that the sum was available if he wanted it, and that Touhami answered: "We can always find some use for $3,000,000. Let's see what it looks like." After obtaining Nasser's personal assurance that the money was acceptable, Copeland wrote, he drove two suitcases containing $3,000,000 in cash to Touhami's house in Ma'adi. Copeland wrote that Nasser received $2,999,990, and that Nasser used the money to build a tower on Gezira island, the Cairo Tower, which Nasser's aides called, in Copeland's transliteration, "el wa'ef rusjel," roughly translatable as "Roosevelt's erection." Copeland wrote that Kermit Roosevelt had taken the lead in Washington in arguing for the offer, that the story leaked in July 1955, eight months after Nasser received the money, and that State Department officials who knew of it blamed Roosevelt because they thought he had tried to make a fool of Nasser, while Touhami and Nasser's other close associates saw the amount as an attempted bribe.10 Egyptian government documents published by Major General Adel Shaheen state that the American government gave Nasser between $1 million and $3 million as a "personal gift" and that Nasser, insulted, put the funds into the state treasury and spent them on the tower.11 Hersh wrote that the CIA's interest in Nasser fluctuated between viewing him as a potentially useful nationalist counterweight to Soviet influence and seeing him as a destabilizing force in a region critical to Western oil supply.2

Operation Susannah and the Cairo trial

In the summer of 1954 Israeli military intelligence ran Operation Susannah (the Lavon Affair) in Egypt, recruiting Egyptian Jews to plant bombs in cinemas, libraries and American educational centers; the attacks were to be blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Communists, at a time when Egypt was negotiating with Britain over the evacuation of the Suez Canal zone. After the operation failed, eleven Egyptian Jews were arrested. The trial in Egypt ran from December 11, 1954 to January 27, 1955; Moshe Marzouk and Shmuel Azar were sentenced to hanging, two defendants were acquitted, and six received long prison terms.12 The IDF Archives page states that Pinhas Lavon, the defense minister, denied knowing of the operation, that Colonel Benjamin Gibli, head of military intelligence, "claimed to have received a verbal instruction from Lavon", that Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan also blamed the defense minister, and that a two-member commission of inquiry appointed by Prime Minister Moshe Sharett "did not succeed in exposing the truth." Gibli and Major Motke Ben-Zur, commander of Unit 131, were dismissed and Lavon resigned in February 1955.12

On December 17, 1954 Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban told Acting Assistant Secretary Jernegan in Washington that the Alexandria trial of Jews charged with espionage was among the discouraging developments and "held serious dangers"; the State Department's reply, which Jernegan read from notes, was that the American ambassador in Cairo had informally told the Egyptian government that "handing down death sentences to the accused eleven Jews could seriously affect the security situation in the area."13 The Foreign Relations volume for 1955 records that the Supreme Military Tribunal, which had begun the trial of thirteen persons charged with spying for Israel on December 11, 1954, made public its sentences on January 27, 1955: of ten defendants present, two were sentenced to death, two acquitted and six sentenced to hard labor for terms from two years to life, and that Eban appealed to the United States for clemency the same day.14 On October 11, 1955 Eban told Assistant Secretary George Allen that Nasser "had promised that there would be no death sentences for the 'Zionist spies'" and that "Several of these people were then hanged", which he said played a major part in the Israeli raid on Gaza of February 28, 1955.15 On December 5, 1955 the American ambassador in Israel told the Israeli official Herzog that Israel in the summer of 1954 "for no good purpose had activated sabotage group in Egypt", that once Muslim Brotherhood members had been executed it was inevitable that some of the Jews would meet the same fate, and that the hanging of "Jewish spies" and the Bat Galim case had so inflamed Israeli opinion that the Gaza incident followed.16

Arms from the Soviet bloc and the Bandung Conference

Hersh wrote that after an Israeli raid on an Egyptian military camp at Gaza in February 1955, Nasser began seeking arms outside Western channels.2 The Asia-Africa Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, was held from April 18 to 24, 1955.17 Hersh wrote that Nasser received a promise of arms from Chinese premier Chou En-lai at the conference.2

In May 1955 a U.S. government cable reported that Soviet Ambassador Daniil Solod had offered technical and economic assistance on May 23 and that Nasser, declining it, asked whether the USSR would barter heavy artillery for cotton. The cable described the arrangement, if finalized, as "the first sale of arms by the USSR outside the Soviet bloc since World War II."18 Hersh wrote that Soviet delegations arrived in Cairo in July 1955, and that by September 1955 Nasser had announced that Egypt would receive 200 Soviet bombers, 230 tanks, 200 troop carriers, and more than 500 artillery pieces, along with Soviet advisers, a deal that altered the military balance in the Middle East and drew Egypt toward the Soviet orbit.2 A State Department editorial note for a message of September 28, 1955 refers to Copeland's account, at pages 160 to 165 of The Game of Nations, of the circumstances in which the message reached the State Department.19

Omega, the Aswan Dam offer and the Suez Canal

On March 28, 1956 Dulles sent President Dwight D. Eisenhower a memorandum proposing that the United States adjust its Near East policies "to let Colonel Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation treatment from the United States", avoiding for the time being "any open break", with planning "at once with a view to possibly more drastic action" if the courses did not work. Eisenhower approved it the same day.20 The State Department adopted the code name Omega for the handling of material on the policy; those personally informed of Omega by Dulles included Allen Dulles of the CIA.21 At an April 1, 1956 meeting at Dulles's residence with Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador, Dulles proposed secret rather than public cooperation with the United Kingdom, delay of the International Bank's decision on the High Aswan Dam, and winning King Saud away from Nasser; Makins said the British took a dimmer view of the chance of bringing Nasser around, and agreed that in the first phase "we ought to keep Nasser guessing."21

On July 19, 1956, Dulles told the Egyptian ambassador, Ahmed Hussein, that "he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that it was not feasible at present for the United States to go forward with this undertaking" and that the foreign aid program had been injured more by the proposal to assist in financing the dam than by anything else.22

On July 26, 1956, in a broadcast from Alexandria, Nasser announced a presidential decree nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, whose existence rested on an Egyptian joint stock concession dating from the nineteenth century.1 At a conference with Eisenhower on July 27, Dulles said that there was "a note of desperation in Nasser's action, relating to the Aswan Dam."23 On July 29 Miles Copeland was among those present at a meeting on Suez at Dulles's home with Allen Dulles and other officials.24 At a July 31 meeting Treasury Secretary George Humphrey cited the danger that the United States might be pressed into agreeing to finance the dam in return for Nasser's giving up the canal, which he said could only build up his prestige; Dulles answered that "Nasser must be made to disgorge his theft."25 On August 13 Kermit Roosevelt attended a meeting on the Suez situation with Allen Dulles, Gordon Gray, Arthur Flemming, Humphrey and others, according to the Secretary's appointment book cited in the Foreign Relations volume.26

British plans to kill Nasser

Stephen Dorril reported in 1985 that Anthony Nutting, a minister of state at the Foreign Office who resigned over Suez, said on Channel 4's The End of Empire that Prime Minister Anthony Eden had telephoned him over an open line and shouted: "What is all this poppy-cock you have sent me about isolation and quarantining Nasser. Can't you understand...that I want Nasser murdered!" Dorril dates the call about six months before the invasion, and adds a Daily Telegraph report that Eden told the Foreign Office's senior civil servant, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the same.27 According to Chapman Pincher, in collaboration with leaders of the Special Air Service, a plan was drawn up to kill Nasser and his bodyguards with canisters of poison gas, which Eden vetoed; Dorril names former MI6 head Maurice Oldfield as a possible source for Pincher.27 Dorril also relayed a second MI6 plan, under an officer named "Colonel Yarrow", to be carried out by Egyptian officers: the Egyptian Air Force intelligence chief Mahmoud Khalil was met by an MI6 contact in Rome in February 1957 and received £162,500 by November for a coup to restore the monarchy, and Nasser announced the "restoration plot" on December 23. Per the account Dorril cites, Khalil was never really working with the British.27 Dorril quotes Wilbur Crane Eveland's Ropes of Sand on a drunk envoy of MI6 deputy director George Young at a Beirut meeting who said "Teams had been fielded to assassinate Nasser", and Anthony Verrier's Through the Looking Glass for the claim that Eden ordered Nasser's assassination before leaving for Jamaica and that "the Prime Ministerial order was disobeyed."27 Andrew Kelly wrote that Eden worked on plans, "in conjunction with the British Secret Intelligence Service", to assassinate Nasser either covertly or through a large-scale invasion.28

A September 5, 1956 document in the Foreign Relations volume states that the danger of assassination or other acts of individual terrorism against those suspected of undue partiality for the West would continue almost indefinitely.29 On October 9, 1956 Egyptian official Ali Sabry told Assistant Secretary William Rountree in New York that the Egyptian government had realized for some time that the British and French were actively seeking the downfall of the regime, and that recent actions of the United States, particularly the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer and the manner of it, had raised serious questions as to American intentions.30 Hersh wrote that Israeli intelligence believed Copeland was responsible for American pressure on Israel, Britain and France to withdraw from the Suez Canal area in 1956, and for pushing Israel to withdraw from Sinai.2 Hersh also wrote that Britain, France and Israel conducted secret planning and launched a coordinated invasion in October 1956, with Israeli forces attacking the Sinai while British and French forces seized the Canal Zone, and that Eisenhower, angry at being excluded from the planning and fearing Soviet exploitation of the crisis, forced all three to withdraw. He wrote that the outcome cemented Nasser's standing as a hero of decolonization and weakened British and French influence in the region.2

German scientists and the Egyptian rocket program

Ronen Bergman's 2010 article "Killing the Killers" describes Nasser's July 1962 announcement of four successful missile tests, and an Egyptian plan to build some 900 missiles at a secret facility in the desert, Factory 333, staffed by German scientists. Egypt still needed the German scientists to begin mass production, and Bergman writes that the Mossad called the first operation of its campaign against them Damocles.31 He writes that Heinz Krug, head of Intra, a shell company for Factory 333, vanished in Munich in September 1962; that two parcel bombs sent in November 1962 to the project's director, Wolfgang Pilz, maimed his secretary and killed five Egyptian workers; that in February 1963 the scientist Hans Kleinwachter escaped an ambush in Switzerland; and that in April 1963 two Mossad agents in Basel threatened Paul Goerke, the project manager, and his daughter. According to Bergman, Israel then shared its intelligence on Factory 333 with the West German government, which pressured the scientists to quit; nearly all accepted and Egypt abandoned the plot.31

In February 1965 the State Department told its embassy in Israel that it was "disturbed at continued press campaign about alleged role Cubic Corporation in UAR rocket program and hiring of German technicians from Litton subsidiaries."32 On February 15, 1965 presidential emissary Robert Komer reported from Tel Aviv that after a tense session with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on American arms for Jordan he had raised "the Cubic matter, UAR missiles, and Jordan waters" to ease the tension.33

Syria and the United Arab Republic

The union of Egypt and Syria, formally called the United Arab Republic, took effect in February 1958.34 Israel's view, as recorded in a February 27, 1958 memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Eban, was that "Soviet influence would dominate Nasser's policies from the very outset of the union."35 By July 1958 the Syrians wanted more independence, and Nasser had already been forced to make certain concessions to them.36

Yemen

Egyptian forces appeared in Yemen after the republican revolution of 1962. A Central Intelligence Agency special memorandum of November 5, 1965 states that the revolution made no substantial change until Egyptian forces appeared and Egyptian influence rose in republican Yemen, which led to strong British fears of UAR meddling in Aden.37 In May 1964, after Nasser's visit to Yemen, Secretary of State Dean Rusk recalled reports that morale among Egyptian troops there was poor and asked a Saudi official whether the UAR was determined to stay.38 A May 1964 State Department paper for the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) listed disengagement of Egyptian forces from Yemen and a continued bar on Saudi support of the royalists among the steps toward minimizing the potential for UAR-Saudi conflict.39 In June 1966 Rusk told Walt Rostow by telephone that Lyndon B. Johnson should emphasize American interest in a Yemen settlement that would return Egyptian troops to Egypt.40

The Six-Day War

On May 21, 1967 the American embassy in the United Arab Republic reported that an Egyptian official named Aziz had told Miles Copeland, a former CIA officer in Cairo on private business, that UAR forces had been given orders to "hit Israelis with everything they have" if anything erupted along the border; the embassy's chargé commented that Copeland's account might not be accurate.41 On May 22 the State Department instructed its embassies to remain in close contact in light of reports of a UAR decision to close the Strait of Tiran.42 The same day Rostow wrote the Israeli ambassador, Avraham Harman, that the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba should be handled "in a peaceful manner, preferably through the United Nations", and that the presence of UAR troops on UAR territory "is not in itself illegal."43

On May 24 Luke Battle told Johnson that until Nasser threatened to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba he would have agreed with Richard Helms that all Nasser wanted was a limited propaganda victory; Battle added that he could not help but wonder whether Nasser had more Soviet support than the United States knew about, "or had gone slightly insane."44 On May 31 Hussein of Jordan said that Nasser had told him that in case of American intervention against the UAR he was prepared to ask for Soviet assistance.45 On June 7 Rostow sent Johnson a memorandum proposing quiet beginnings of discussions with moderate Arabs and, as a separate item, encouragement of "arrangements which tend to split the Arab world"; in connection with the discussions, the memorandum states that "men like Eugene Black, Robert Anderson, Raymond Hare, Kermit Roosevelt might be helpful."46

Death and succession

Nasser died on September 28, 1970, from a heart attack after hosting the Arab League summit in Cairo. He was 52. According to Annie Jacobsen's account, the death was preceded by an unusual event. Israeli psychic Uri Geller, performing a telepathy demonstration at the Tzavta Theater in Tel Aviv, became physically ill during the performance and announced that Nasser "had just died or is about to die." Israeli journalist Ruth Hefer, in the audience, called her contact at Israel Radio International and was told there was no news about Nasser. Twenty minutes later, someone announced that Radio Cairo had confirmed Nasser's death from a heart attack.47

The incident was widely reported in Israel and boosted Geller's local reputation. Prime Minister Golda Meir is reported to have quipped, when asked about Israel's future, "Don't ask me... Ask Uri Geller."47 Nasser's successor was Anwar Sadat, who charted a dramatically different course for Egyptian foreign policy and made peace with Israel through the 1978 Camp David Accords.47

Saudi channel and Kamal Adham

Joseph Kechichian's article in Gulf News states that King Faisal of Saudi Arabia created the General Intelligence Directorate and gave it to Kamal Adham, whom the article calls the first (and only) ethnic non-Arab chief of Saudi intelligence.48 Kechichian writes that Adham's Egyptian contacts allowed him to fashion the 1967 Faisal-Nasser reconciliation, and that Adham befriended Sadat when Sadat was vice president and encouraged him after he became president in 1970.48 The article says Adham held the post until 1979, when King Khalid replaced him with Turki Al Faisal, and that his contacts with the Central Intelligence Agency were "unusually intimate."48 Citing Bob Woodward, Kechichian writes that in 1970 the Saudis provided Sadat with a regular income.48

Footnotes

  1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Document 1 (editorial note on the July 26, 1956 nationalization broadcast). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d1 ↩︎

  2. Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. ↩︎

  3. Copeland, Miles. The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA's Original Political Operative. London: Aurum Press, 1989, pp. 153-155. ↩︎

  4. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 2, Document 1015, telegram from the Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery), October 12, 1952, reporting the previous evening's dinner. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d1015 ↩︎

  5. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 2, Document 1169, memorandum of discussion at the 145th meeting of the National Security Council, May 20, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d1169 ↩︎

  6. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 1, Document 5, memorandum of conversation prepared in the Embassy in Cairo, May 12, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d5 ↩︎

  7. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 2, Document 1191, telegram from the Ambassador in Egypt, June 19, 1953, and its note on the June 18 announcement. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d1191 ↩︎

  8. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 2, Document 1193, June 29, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d1193 ↩︎

  9. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 2, Document 1364, memoranda of September 28, 1954 (Jernegan to the Acting Secretary of State, and Staats to the Operations Coordinating Board on the September 27 meeting). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d1364 ↩︎

  10. Copeland, Miles. The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969, pp. 148-150. ↩︎

  11. Shariff, Omar. "Cairo Tower: Symbol of Egyptian pride, and Cold War politics." Gulf News, updated October 27, 2021, citing documents published by Maj. Gen. Adel Shaheen. https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/cairo-tower-symbol-of-egyptian-pride--and-cold-war-politics-1.83250980 ↩︎

  12. Israel Defense Forces and Defense Establishment Archives, "The 'Unfortunate' or the Lavon Affair" (online exhibition). https://archives.mod.gov.il/sites/English/Exhibitions/Pages/The-Lavon-affair.aspx. ↩︎

  13. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 1, Document 935, memorandum of conversation by Jernegan, December 17, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d935 ↩︎

  14. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Document 4, editorial note on the trial that began December 11, 1954, and Document 11, telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, January 28, 1955, with its editorial note on the January 27 sentences. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d11 ↩︎

  15. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Document 333, memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, October 11, 1955. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d333 ↩︎

  16. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Document 435, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, Tel Aviv, December 5, 1955. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d435 ↩︎

  17. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Document 52, which states that the Asia-Africa Conference at Bandung was held April 18-24, 1955. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d52 ↩︎

  18. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Document 136, May 23, 1955. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d136 ↩︎

  19. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Document 318, telephone conversation of September 28, 1955 and editorial note citing Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), pp. 160-165. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d318 ↩︎

  20. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, Document 223, memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, March 28, 1956. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d223 ↩︎

  21. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Document 232, editorial note on Omega and memorandum of conversation, Secretary Dulles's residence, April 1, 1956. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d232 ↩︎

  22. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XV, Document 478, memorandum of conversation, Washington, July 19, 1956. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d478 ↩︎

  23. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, Document 3, memorandum of a conference with the President, July 27, 1956. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d3 ↩︎

  24. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Document 23, editorial note on the July 29, 1956 meeting, citing the Dulles Papers. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d23 ↩︎

  25. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Document 34, July 31, 1956. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d34 ↩︎

  26. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Document 57, editorial note on the August 13, 1956 meeting, citing the Secretary's Appointment Book. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d57 ↩︎

  27. Dorril, Stephen. "Trying to kill Nasser." Lobster, issue 9 (1985), citing the Daily Telegraph of May 24, 25 and 29, 1985, Chapman Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery, p. 206, Bloch and Fitzgerald, British Intelligence and Covert Action (Brandon Books, 1982), p. 126, Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand (Norton, 1980) and Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass (1983). https://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/article/issue/9/trying-to-kill-nasser ↩︎

  28. Kelly, Andrew. ANZUS and the Early Cold War, ch. 8, "Suez." Open Book Publishers, 2018. https://books.openedition.org/obp/7111 ↩︎

  29. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Document 175, September 5, 1956. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d175 ↩︎

  30. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Document 315, memorandum of conversation, Waldorf Astoria, New York, October 9, 1956. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d315 ↩︎

  31. Bergman, Ronen. "Killing the Killers." Newsweek, December 13, 2010. https://www.newsweek.com/killing-killers-69081 ↩︎

  32. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967, Document 131, February 1, 1965. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v18/d131 ↩︎

  33. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 150, telegram from the Embassy in Israel (Komer), February 15, 1965. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v18/d150 ↩︎

  34. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Document 11, editorial note on the Syro-Egyptian union, officially the United Arab Republic. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d11 ↩︎

  35. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XIII, Document 10, February 27, 1958. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v13/d10 ↩︎

  36. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XIII, Document 31, July 27, 1958. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v13/d31 ↩︎

  37. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 67, Central Intelligence Agency special memorandum, November 5, 1965. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d67 ↩︎

  38. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, Document 226, memorandum of conversation, May 15, 1964. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d226 ↩︎

  39. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, Document 227, memorandum from Assistant Secretary Talbot to the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), May 1964. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d227 ↩︎

  40. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXI, Document 274, June 21, 1966, record of a telephone conversation between Rusk and Rostow. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d274 ↩︎

  41. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 28, telegram from the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, May 21, 1967, including the editorial note on Aziz and Copeland. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d28 ↩︎

  42. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 35, May 22, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d35 ↩︎

  43. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 36, letter from Rostow to the Israeli Ambassador (Harman), May 22, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 ↩︎

  44. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 54, memorandum for the record of the May 24, 1967 meeting. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d54 ↩︎

  45. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 107, telegram from the Embassy in Jordan, May 31, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d107 ↩︎

  46. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 189, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, June 7, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d189 ↩︎

  47. Jacobsen, Annie. Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis. Little, Brown and Company, 2017. ↩︎

  48. Kechichian, Joseph A. "The man behind the scenes." Gulf News, updated September 15, 2018 (the Woodward claim is Kechichian's citation of Woodward). https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/the-man-behind-the-scenes-1.581564 ↩︎