25 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
25 lines
3 KiB
Markdown
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category: "Intelligence & Government"
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tags:
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- Person
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- CIA
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- NSA
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- Israel
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- Soviet
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- Military
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summary: "Reuven Yerdor, also known as Rudi, was an accomplished linguist and a senior officer in Israel's Detachment 515 (later redesignated Detachment 8200), which is in charge of signals intelligence and code-breaking."
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---
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Reuven Yerdor, also known as Rudi, was an accomplished linguist and a senior officer in [[Israel]]'s Detachment 515 (later redesignated Detachment 8200), which is in charge of signals intelligence and code-breaking. He had cracked a Soviet code, for which he later received [[Israel]]'s highest defense medal. By early 1982, Yerdor had been promoted to brigadier general and was in charge of [[Unit 8200]], the Israeli communications intelligence service.[^1]
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Yerdor worked closely with his counterparts in the American [[NSA|NSA]], traveling to [[Washington, D.C.]] every three months for liaison meetings. His official title was deputy chief of staff for military intelligence in the [[Israel]]. Over the 1981–82 New Year's holiday, Yerdor was summoned by [[Yehoshua Saguy]], the head of Aman (military intelligence), and given two packets of documents to evaluate: one with highly technical American intelligence describing a Soviet military system in the hands of the Arabs, and the other with daily and weekly summaries of worldwide [[NSA|NSA]] intercepts.[^1]
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In February 1982, [[Israel]] learned that the Soviets had decided to upgrade the Syrian air defense command with SA-5 missiles. Yerdor was told that there was very little intelligence available on the system, but two days later, he received full U.S. intelligence on the SA-5, which made it clear it was not as good as feared. In mid-May 1982, three weeks before the invasion of [[Lebanon]], Yerdor's office received an astonishing assortment of invaluable American technical data about the air defense systems in [[Syria]], including detailed information on side-looking radar, electronic maps, and precise frequency of operations for [[Syria]]'s SA-6, SA-8, and advanced SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems.[^1]
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Yerdor had little respect for [[Rafael Eitan]] and worried about the long-range implications of Israeli intelligence activities in the [[United States]], its best ally. He was convinced Eitan was driven by personal ambition and a need to settle old scores with [[Yitzhak Hofi]], the head of [[Mossad]], and [[Avraham Shalom]], Shin Beth's director. He also believed that Eitan had recruited two or more Americans, and was dismayed by the fact that [[Jonathan Pollard]]'s material, marked JUMBO, was not supposed to be discussed with American counterparts.[^1]
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[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] was aware of Yerdor's distress about the spying, noting that Yerdor was "bitching about the fact that Eitan was compromising [[Israel]]'s relations with the [[United States]]."[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 21.
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