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The Office in Statute

For purposes of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, "Attorney General" means the Attorney General, the Acting Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General. Section 102 of the 1978 act lets the President, "through the Attorney General," authorize electronic surveillance without a court order for up to one year if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath the conditions the act sets out.²

The 1954 Crimes-Reporting Arrangement

On February 18, 1954, Lawrence Houston, general counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, discussed the reporting of federal crimes with Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers. According to Houston's memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, the two agreed that the CIA would decide whether a potential violation by persons associated with the agency was referred to the Justice Department for prosecution, because the agency was best placed to judge whether classified information might be revealed at trial. The memorandum records an obligation to refer matters that could be prosecuted without revealing classified information, with doubts resolved in favor of referral. The two agreed that no formal written agreement was needed.³

In the mid-1970s the arrangement became known and drew criticism in Congress.⁴ On July 24, 1975, Richard Thornburgh, then assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, wrote to CIA general counsel John Warner to remind the agency of its duty under 28 U.S.C. 535 to report possible violations of Title 18 by government officers and employees. Warner replied on July 29 that "any other informal referral agreement that may have been in effect in the past was abrogated," while noting that the director was charged under the National Security Act of 1947 with protecting intelligence sources and methods, and that the CIA would seek the Justice Department's advice on cases that would be reported.⁴ The CIA headquarters regulation in force on November 28, 1975 required that crimes by agency officers be reported to the inspector general, who would inform the general counsel, and that crimes by government officers be reported to the Attorney General. It added that "CIA will not exercise a prosecutorial function."⁵

The 1982 Memorandum of Understanding

Attorney General William French Smith signed a crimes-reporting memorandum of understanding with the CIA on February 11, 1982, and William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, signed it on March 2, 1982. The memorandum governed crimes reporting from March 2, 1982 to August 3, 1995.⁶ It defined "employee" for reporting purposes to cover staff and contract employees and former officers for offenses committed during their employment. Assets, agents and independent contractors fell into the non-employee category, whose list of reportable federal offenses did not include narcotics violations. The memorandum still required reporting of "any" federal law violation by employees, so narcotics violations by staff remained reportable.⁶

Smith's letter of February 11, 1982 stated that the memorandum contained no formal requirement to report narcotics violations by non-employees, and urged continued cooperation with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration. A Justice Department memorandum of February 8, 1985 stated explicitly that no such requirement existed and suggested that the memorandum would have to be renegotiated to add one.⁶ The memorandum also allowed the CIA general counsel to report any other possible offense when he believed it should be reported. The CIA used that discretion in 1984, when information linking a Southern Front Contra member to the trafficker Jorge Morales was reported to the Justice Department, and in a 1988 referral concerning another Contra official.⁷ The agency's inspector general found no information indicating that the non-inclusion of narcotics violations by assets was intended to protect Contra activities, and also found that the CIA acted inconsistently in handling allegations that Contra-related organizations and individuals were involved in drug trafficking.⁷

The text of Smith's letter was placed in the Congressional Record by Representative Maxine Waters in May 1998. Robert Parry reported that the letter described the matter as "the need to add narcotics violations to the list of reportable non-employee crimes," and that Smith wrote: "in view of the fine cooperation the Drug Enforcement Administration has received from CIA, no formal requirement regarding the reporting of narcotics violations has been included in these procedures." Parry reported that Casey wrote to Smith on March 2, 1982 that he was "pleased that these procedures, which I believe strike the proper balance between enforcement of the law and protection of intelligence sources and methods, will now be forwarded to other agencies covered by them for signing by the heads of the agencies."⁸ On the House floor on July 17, 1998 Waters said that the CIA and the Attorney General "had a secret Memorandum of Understanding that allowed drug trafficking by CIA assets to go unreported to law enforcement."⁹

Webb's epilogue states that the memorandum exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting, that drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report, and, after quoting Inspector General Fred Hitz's March 1998 House testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."¹ The text of the memorandum, summarized above, shows narcotics violations by non-employees absent from the reporting list.⁶

Hitz, the CIA inspector general who wrote the report, said in an interview for the PBS series Frontline that his staff "weren't ever able to find a memorandum of conversation or any evidence that indicated why it was done," and that if agents or assets had been defined as employees, credible allegations of drug activity would have had to be reported to the Justice Department. He said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking." He added that the staff did find awareness that proven allegations "would destroy the whole purpose of the Contra endeavor," which did not translate into practical guidance for officers in the field.¹⁰

The memorandum was revised in August 1995. Under the revision, assets and independent contractors again counted as employees for reporting purposes, and narcotics violations were added to the list of non-employee offenses that had to be reported.¹¹ For the thirteen years the 1982 memorandum governed, narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of reportable offenses.

Contra Cases Before the Department

Webb wrote that the Attorney General's office intervened to reduce sentences for Contra-connected drug traffickers such as Bueso Rosa and declined to prosecute Norwin Meneses despite evidence of his trafficking.¹ The records of the two cases show the following actors.

The Kerry Committee reported in December 1988 that senior United States officials had intervened with a federal judge to reduce the sentence of the Honduran general Jose Bueso Rosa to five years. He had been convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova of Honduras, a plot to be financed from the sale in the United States of $40 million in cocaine seized in connection with it, and the other defendants received sentences of as long as forty years. Officials of the United States government also arranged for Bueso Rosa to serve his sentence in a minimum-security facility at a United States military base in Florida.¹²

According to Mark M. Richard, deputy assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, who described the matter in a deposition before the Iran-Contra committee, the Pentagon took the initiative in supporting the interventions, and at a meeting Oliver North, General Paul Gorman, Elliott Abrams and Dewey Clarridge agreed that Bueso Rosa should be accommodated. Richard said the State Department's position had changed, and he opposed the interventions. The subcommittee noted that the Justice Department had publicized the conspiracy as the most significant narco-terrorism case yet discovered, and that William Webster, the FBI director, had said at the time of the arrests: "We don't want international terrorists to establish beachheads or bases for operations in the United States." Francis McNeil testified to the subcommittee that the successful intervention, over the objections of the Justice Department, undermined President Reagan's policies on terrorism, narcotics and democracy.¹²

The subcommittee also reported that the government's factual admissions in the trial of Oliver North, released on April 6, 1989, stated that in mid-September 1986 North advised Admiral John Poindexter that Ambassador John Negroponte, General Gorman of the Southern Command, the senior CIA officer Clarridge and North had worked out arrangements with Bueso Rosa for support of the Contra resistance, and that North suggested efforts be made on Bueso Rosa's behalf to deter him from disclosing details of those covert activities.¹²

The Justice Department's own inspector general recorded a series of declinations in the case of Norwin Meneses, a San Francisco cocaine trafficker. An assistant United States attorney in San Francisco had declined to prosecute him for car thefts, as the San Francisco FBI reported in 1979. In 1981 an assistant United States attorney, Eric Swenson, declined to prosecute his nephew Jairo Meneses after an arrest in which no narcotics were found, and in 1983 the San Francisco United States Attorney's Office declined a tax case against Norwin Meneses for weak or insufficient evidence.¹³

Kennedy and the Mafia Overlaps, 1961 to 1964

Robert Kennedy served as attorney general under his brother from 1961 until 1964. A Justice Department deportation sent Carlos Marcello to Guatemala on April 4, 1961. An FBI memorandum of May 24, 1961 records the account of Paul Loeb, chief of the CIA station in Guatemala City, who said that he understood Kennedy had conferred with Allen Dulles and asked for the CIA director's help in making Guatemala accept Marcello as a citizen.¹⁴

The Church Committee wrote that Kennedy "played an active role in the MONGOOSE Operation, a role unrelated to his position as Attorney General."¹⁵ On May 7, 1962, CIA officers briefed the Attorney General on the operation that had used Johnny Roselli, Sam Giancana and Robert Maheu against Fidel Castro, and on a wiretap the CIA had helped Maheu install. The Church Committee quoted the inspector general's conclusion that the Attorney General "was not told that the gambling syndicate operation had already been reactivated." On April 24, 1962, Herbert J. Miller, assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, had advised that the national interest would preclude prosecution based on the tap, and after the CIA briefing a decision was made not to prosecute.¹⁶ On October 7, 1963 J. Edgar Hoover asked the Attorney General's permission for a wiretap on Martin Luther King Jr.'s residence. According to a memorandum by Courtney Evans, Kennedy noted on October 10 that "the last thing we could afford to have would be a discovery of a wiretap on King's residence."¹⁷

Mitchell, Chile and the Vesco Case

John N. Mitchell served as attorney general from January 21, 1969 until March 1, 1972.¹⁸ A Senate intelligence committee staff report on Chile records that on September 15, 1970, after Allende finished first in the Chilean presidential vote, Donald Kendall of PepsiCo introduced Agustin Edwards, owner of El Mercurio, to Attorney General Mitchell and to Henry A. Kissinger.¹⁹

Mitchell and Maurice Stans, the former commerce secretary, were indicted in Manhattan in May 1973 on charges connected with a contribution from the financier Robert Vesco. A jury acquitted both of all nine counts on April 28, 1974. Vesco had fled the country. Mitchell still faced conspiracy, obstruction and perjury charges in Washington in connection with the Watergate cover-up.²⁰

Two accounts of how Epstein came to Steven Hoffenberg survive. Hoffenberg told the journalist Vicky Ward that the two men were introduced by Douglas Leese, a British defense contractor, and Epstein said they were introduced by Mitchell.²¹

Ramsey Clark and the Shaw Investigation

On April 14, 1967, an FBI Domestic Intelligence Division note recorded that Ramsey Clark, then attorney general, had told reporters that the bureau had investigated Clay Shaw and cleared him.²²

Hubbard's 1951 Letter

In 1951 L. Ron Hubbard wrote to the Attorney General in Washington, claiming that Communist Party members had wiped out a half-million-dollar operation for him and that his life was in danger. The letter is preserved in the FBI's headquarters file on Hubbard.²³ In the letter Hubbard also wrote that Sara Northrup "had attached herself to a Jack Parsons, the rocket expert, during the war and when she left him he was a wreck," and that she was "strangely intimate with many scientists of Los Alamos." The copy of the letter in the FBI headquarters file has the name after "attached herself to" redacted under exemptions b6 and b7C, and the copy in the FBI's separate Scientology file prints the name as Jack Parsons.²³²⁴

Levi and the Letelier Investigation, 1976

At an October 21, 1976 meeting, Attorney General Edward Levi and other Justice Department officials discussed the investigation of the murder of Orlando Letelier with several of Letelier's colleagues and his widow, Isabel Letelier. The Washington Post reported that, according to several sources, the colleagues expressed misgivings about the CIA's role in the investigation and urged Levi to use formal subpoenas to obtain information from the agency, and that Levi rejected the proposal, saying that the CIA was cooperating and that such a move was not timely. The same account reported a belief at the CIA that Chilean operatives had not carried out the bombing, which George H. W. Bush, the Director of Central Intelligence, was said to have expressed to Secretary of State Kissinger the week before.²⁵

Griffin Bell and the ITT Perjury Cases

Griffin Bell was attorney general from January 1977 to August 1979. The Justice Department charged two ITT Corporation executives in March 1978 with lying to the Senate about the company's 1973 testimony. A wire report of March 21, 1978 stated that CIA Director Stansfield Turner had met Bell on the preceding Thursday to express his concern.²⁶ Three charges against one of them were dropped in August 1978, and the department dropped the perjury case against an ITT official in March 1979.²⁷ The August 1979 guidelines that Bell issued under Executive Order 12036 were the ones the 1982 memorandum later replaced.²⁸

Meese, Wedtech and INSLAW

Before becoming attorney general, Meese was counselor to the President. A Senate subcommittee report transmitted in May 1988 on Wedtech recorded that the company contacted a San Francisco attorney, Mr. Wallach, a close friend of Meese, who contacted Meese and his deputy, James Jenkins, on numerous occasions on Wedtech's behalf. Meese asked his staff to ensure that Wedtech received a "fair hearing" on an Army engine contract, and Jenkins convened a May 19, 1982 meeting of agency officials on the subject. In 1985, at Wallach's invitation, Meese entered a limited partnership with W. Franklyn Chinn, a Wedtech consultant who later became a director of the company. Chinn and his associate, Rusty London, were paid more than $1.4 million in cash and stock in 1985 and 1986 for their services to Wedtech. Meese testified at the 1988 trial of Lyn Nofziger and Mark Bragg that he knew Wallach was a Welbilt consultant but did not know whether he was paid, and that he scanned what Wallach sent him but may have read as little as 10 percent of it carefully.²⁹

Independent counsel James C. McKay filed an 814-page report on Meese that a three-judge panel made public on July 18, 1988, about two weeks after Meese announced his resignation. It reported seven areas of ethical concern, including a 1985 tax return that omitted capital gains. The Christian Science Monitor reported that McKay believed Meese violated the law by "willfully filing a materially false tax return," and that, in McKay's words, "the trier of fact would probably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Meese violated" the conflict-of-interest law in telecommunications matters in 1986 and 1987. He declined to prosecute in both areas, stating that the evidence showed Meese intended to file an amended return and pay the tax, and that there was "no evidence that Mr. Meese acted from motivation for personal gain." The report gave its greatest attention to Meese's involvement in a proposed Iraqi oil pipeline and found insufficient evidence to charge a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and found insufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing in his intervention for Wedtech.³⁰

In the INSLAW dispute, the company's court pleadings described "a conspiracy among friends of Attorney General Meese" to obtain a lucrative automation contract from the Justice Department. The special counsel's report records that Hadron, a software company controlled by a long-time friend of Meese, offered to buy INSLAW, and that when Bill Hamilton refused, the chairman of Hadron said, "We have ways of making you sell." A September 1989 staff study of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found no proof that Meese, Lowell Jensen, the deputy attorney general, or other Justice Department officials were involved in a conspiracy to ruin INSLAW or to steal its PROMIS software.³¹

Thornburgh and the INSLAW Claims

On October 11, 1988, Elliot Richardson, then counsel to INSLAW, sent a memorandum to Robin Ross, an assistant to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, summarizing statements from a source that had been relayed by a man named LeGrand.³¹

The House Committee on the Judiciary, chaired by Jack Brooks, reported on September 10, 1992 (H. Rept. 102-857) that its investigation "largely supports the findings of two Federal courts that the Department 'took, converted, stole' INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS by 'trickery, fraud and deceit,' and that this misappropriation involved officials at the highest levels of the Department of Justice." It reported that it could not reach a definitive conclusion on the allegation of a high-level conspiracy, in part because of the Department's lack of cooperation: Attorney General Thornburgh "repeatedly reneged on agreements" to provide access to information and witnesses, and the committee was compelled to subpoena him for documents, some of which the Department said had been misplaced or accidentally destroyed. The report recorded Richardson's contention to the committee that the circumstances constituted a possible criminal conspiracy involving Meese, Jensen, Earl Brian and Justice Department officials, quoted Deputy Attorney General Jensen's sworn statement that he regularly informed the Attorney General of all aspects of the contract, and recorded Meese's denial of any knowledge of bias against INSLAW. It noted sworn statements from witnesses including Ari Ben-Menashe and Michael Riconosciuto that the software was distributed internationally, and wrote that "corroborating evidence for a number of their claims made under oath has been found." The Justice Department's firing of Anthony Pasciuto after he gave the Hamiltons information, and the recantation of the sworn statement of Judge Cornelius Blackshear after a conversation with a Justice Department lawyer, were set out as evidence of possible cover-up.³²

Barr, the INSLAW Special Counsel and the BNL Inquiry

On November 7, 1991, Attorney General William Barr appointed Judge Nicholas J. Bua as special counsel to investigate all allegations of wrongdoing in connection with INSLAW.³¹

Barr told the Miller Center's oral history project that he regarded an independent counsel as unnecessary in the INSLAW and BNL matters because they did not meet the statutory test, and that on INSLAW he "could never quite understand what the allegation was." He said he announced the Bua appointment at his confirmation hearing in response to a question from Senator Paul Simon, and had promised Bua "carte blanche."³³

On the BNL Scandal loans to Iraq, Barr told the same project that, in the face of congressional demands for an independent counsel, he used his "inherent authority to appoint outsiders to come in and conduct investigations." He said he first called former attorney general Benjamin Civiletti, who wanted to do it but concluded he could not because of an upcoming trial, and then picked the retired judge Frederick Lacey.³³ Lacey's report states that Barr appointed him on October 16, 1992 as independent counsel under 28 C.F.R. Part 600; that on October 27 Barr accepted his recommendation to begin a preliminary investigation under the Independent Counsel statute and asked for a report by December 8, 1992; and that his appointment followed letters from Senator David Boren and the House and Senate Judiciary Committees about the Justice Department's conduct in the BNL prosecution of Christopher Drogoul.³⁴ The report, dated December 8, 1992, concluded that with the exception of the conduct of a Justice Department official named Kloske, the evidence was "clear and convincing" that intent to obstruct or cover up any aspect of the Drogoul prosecution was lacking, and that he had "found no credible evidence" that anyone in the Department or the Atlanta United States Attorney's Office acted to obstruct justice or make false statements. It added that his investigation "does suggest that a possible exception may exist with respect to the conduct of Mr. Kloske, and the Attorney General may wish to consider further investigation," and recommended that Barr notify the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that there were no reasonable grounds to believe further investigation was warranted.³⁴ Barr said in the interview that Lacey "came out with a report after the election saying that Iraqgate was all nonsense."³³

In the same interview Barr said that at the end of the administration he advised George H.W. Bush to pardon Caspar Weinberger and "about five others," and of the Iran-Contra Affair pardons: "I certainly did not oppose any of them."³³

Barr and the Epstein Prosecution

Barr was attorney general when the Southern District of New York prosecuted Jeffrey Epstein in 2019. In a deposition before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on August 18, 2025, Barr was asked whether he had recused himself from the Justice Department's review of the Florida prosecution and plea agreement. He answered, "No, I didn't recuse myself." He said the New York investigation was "the only thing that I was aware of going on when I was there," and, asked about the review, answered, "I don't recall playing a role in the review of that." He said he had considered whether to recuse from the New York matter, that the decision not to recuse was based on input from the department's ethics office by his recollection, and that "I wasn't hovering over that or involved in that" as to the department's 2019 inquiry into the Florida plea deal.³⁵

Asked about his father's role as headmaster of the Dalton School, Barr said "It's not pertinent at all." Asked whether he would investigate the non-prosecution agreement, in light of Kirkland & Ellis's representation of Epstein in that matter and Barr's former employment with the firm, he said: "I actually don't think I would've had to recuse myself from that. But I just was never involved in that."³⁶

The 2007 Non-Prosecution Agreement

Alexander Acosta was the United States attorney for the Southern District of Florida when the federal investigation of Epstein was resolved. The non-prosecution agreement was signed on September 24, 2007. Epstein's defense sought review by the Criminal Division and then by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, primarily on whether federal jurisdiction existed over what the defense called "a quintessentially state matter." On June 23, 2008 the Office of the Deputy Attorney General informed defense counsel that the deputy attorney general would not intervene, and Epstein pleaded guilty in state court on June 30, 2008.³⁷

The Office of Professional Responsibility found in November 2020 that Acosta "made the pivotal decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein" through a state-based plea, and that he "participated in its drafting and approved it, with knowledge of its terms." The office stated that Acosta had "plenary authority" as United States attorney to resolve the case as he deemed appropriate. It found no clear and unambiguous standard that required Acosta to indict Epstein on federal charges or that prohibited his decision to defer prosecution to the state, and no evidence that the decision was based on corruption or on impermissible considerations such as Epstein's wealth, status or associations. It found no evidence that a breakfast meeting between Acosta and one of Epstein's defense counsel in October 2007 led to the agreement, which had been signed weeks earlier. OPR concluded that Acosta did not commit professional misconduct, but that the decision to resolve the federal investigation through the agreement "constitutes poor judgment" because the agreement was "a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest," and that he also exercised poor judgment when he failed to make certain that the state would notify victims identified in the federal investigation of the state plea hearing.³⁸

Reno and the Wilcher Letter

Seymour wrote that Paul Wilcher hand-delivered a 100-page letter to Attorney General Janet Reno on May 21, 1993, claiming that holdover Justice Department employees from the Reagan and Bush administrations were responsible for a number of cover-ups unknown to the Attorney General. Wilcher was then investigating the October Surprise incident and the INSLAW case.³⁹

The Epstein Files, 2025 and 2026

The Justice Department under Pam Bondi released a first phase of declassified Epstein files on February 27, 2025.⁴⁰ On November 19, 2025 Congress enacted the Epstein Files Transparency Act, Public Law 119-38. It required the attorney general to make publicly available within 30 days all unclassified Justice Department, FBI and United States Attorneys' office records relating to Epstein, permitted the attorney general to withhold or redact information identifying victims and certain other material, and required a report to the Judiciary committees within 15 days after the release was completed. Section 2(b) provides that "No record shall be withheld, delayed, or redacted on the basis of embarrassment, reputational harm, or political sensitivity, including to any government official, public figure, or foreign dignitary."⁴¹

An unsigned Justice Department and FBI memorandum dated July 7, 2025 stated that the review of Epstein holdings, which included more than 300 gigabytes of data and physical evidence, "revealed no incriminating 'client list,'" that there was "no credible evidence found that Epstein blackmailed prominent individuals," and that "no further disclosure would be appropriate or warranted." It stated that FBI investigators concluded that Epstein committed suicide in his cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center on August 10, 2019, and that the FBI's review of video footage confirmed that from about 10:40 p.m. on August 9 until about 6:30 a.m. the next morning nobody entered any of the tiers in the special housing unit.⁴² Senator Richard Durbin wrote to Bondi about the memorandum on July 18, 2025.⁴²

On April 2, 2026 Donald Trump announced that Bondi would leave office and that Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche would serve as acting attorney general.⁴³ The Senate confirmed Blanche as attorney general on August 8, 2026 by a vote of 50 to 49.⁴⁴

Footnotes

Webb, Gary. Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue. ↩︎
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, § 101(g) and § 102(a)(1). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf ↩︎
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG), Volume II, The Contra Story, Findings ¶ 42 (memorandum of Lawrence Houston, 1954). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04 ↩︎
Same report, Findings ¶ 43 (Thornburgh letter of July 24, 1975; Warner reply of July 29, 1975). ↩︎
Same report, Findings ¶ 44 (Headquarters Regulation 7-1 a(7), in force as of November 28, 1975). ↩︎
Same report, Findings ¶¶ 24-25 (memorandum signed February 11 and March 2, 1982; governing dates March 2, 1982 to August 3, 1995; Smith letter of February 11, 1982; Justice Department memorandum of February 8, 1985). ↩︎
Same report, Findings ¶ 34 (no information found of intent to protect Contra activities), ¶ 35 (inconsistent CIA handling of allegations), and ¶ 39 (general counsel's discretion; 1984 report on Jorge Morales; 1988 referral). ↩︎
Robert Parry, "Contra-Cocaine: Evidence of Premeditation," Consortium News, June 1, 1998 (quoting the Smith letter of February 11, 1982 and the Casey letter of March 2, 1982, as placed in the Congressional Record by Representative Waters on May 7, 1998). https://consortiumnews.com/archive/crack12.html ↩︎
Congressional Record, House, July 17, 1998, p. H5847-H5848 (remarks of Representative Waters). https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/1998_cr/h980717-cia.htm ↩︎
PBS Frontline, Drug Wars, interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html ↩︎
Same report, Findings ¶ 26 (August 1995 revision). ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy (December 1988), pp. 121-122 (Bueso-Rosa section, including the deposition of Mark M. Richard before the Iran-Contra committee). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy (December 1997), Chapter III (Norwin Meneses), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p1.htm ↩︎
Federal Bureau of Investigation, memorandum, R. O. Lallier to A. H. Belmont, May 24, 1961, file 92-2713-175,176, NARA record 124-10210-10327 (reporting the account of Paul Loeb). ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (S. Rept. 94-465, 1975), p. 140. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎
Same report, pp. 131-134 (May 7, 1962 briefing; quotation of the Inspector General's report; Herbert J. Miller's advice of April 24, 1962). ↩︎
Church Committee, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III (1976), Section IV.B, pp. 115-116 (Evans memoranda of October 10 and 21, 1963; Hoover memorandum of October 7, 1963). ↩︎
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, "John Newton Mitchell," Attorneys General biography. https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/mitchell-john-newton ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973 (staff report, December 18, 1975), p. 11. https://archive.org/details/CovertActionInChile196373 ↩︎
Associated Press, "Jury acquits Mitchell, Stans," State News (Michigan State University), April 29, 1974, p. 1. https://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/state_news/1974/state_news_19740429.pdf ↩︎
Vicky Ward, "The Talented Mr. Epstein," Vanity Fair, March 2003, https://vickyward.com/article/the-talented-mr-epstein/ ; Vicky Ward, "Jeffrey Epstein's Sick Story Played Out for Years in Plain Sight," The Daily Beast, July 9, 2019, https://www.thedailybeast.com/jeffrey-epsteins-sick-story-played-out-for-years-in-plain-sight/ ↩︎
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Domestic Intelligence Division, informative note, April 14, 1967, JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 124-10369-10048. ↩︎
L. Ron Hubbard, letter to the Attorney General, 1951, in FBI headquarters file "Hubbard, L. Ron HQ-1." https://archive.org/details/HubbardL.RonHQ1 ↩︎
L. Ron Hubbard, letter to the Attorney General, 1951, in FBI file "Church of Scientology / L. Ron Hubbard," Part 5. https://archive.org/details/churchofscientologyl.ronhubbard ↩︎
"No New Leads Uncovered by Letelier Probe," The Washington Post, November 1, 1976, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP99-00498R000100020097-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp99-00498r000100020097-6 ↩︎
"2 ITT Men Charged with Senate Lies," wire report, March 21, 1978, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP09T00207R001000030069-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09t00207r001000030069-7 ↩︎
"2 ITT Men Charged with Senate Lies," wire report, March 21, 1978, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP09T00207R001000030069-7; "3 Charges Dropped Against ITT Executive," The Washington Star, August 9, 1978, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP09T00207R001000030079-6; "U.S. Drops ITT Official's Perjury Case," The Washington Post, March 8, 1979. ↩︎
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG), Volume II, The Contra Story, discussion of the 1982 memorandum and the August 1979 guidelines promulgated by Attorney General Bell under Executive Order 12036. https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04 ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Wedtech: A Review of Federal Procurement Decisions (letter of transmittal May 4, 1988), pp. 12-13. https://archive.org/details/WedtechReport ↩︎
Barbara Bradley, "Meese probe ends; scrutiny of attorney generalship continues," The Christian Science Monitor, July 19, 1988, quoting the report of Independent Counsel James C. McKay. https://www.csmonitor.com/1988/0719/aed.html ↩︎
U.S. Department of Justice, Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc. (March 1993), Introduction, and the sections on the Hadron offer, the INSLAW pleadings, the September 1989 Senate staff study, and the October 11, 1988 Richardson memorandum. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport ↩︎
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report, H. Rept. 102-857 (September 10, 1992), Summary, pp. 1-12. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport ↩︎
Miller Center, University of Virginia, "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H. W. Bush Oral History Project (remarks on Bua, Lacey, Civiletti, inherent authority, and the pardons). https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history ↩︎
Lacey, Frederick B., "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," Part I, December 8, 1992, reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Serial No. 103-95 (1994), pp. 343-345 (appointment, letter of October 27, 1992) and pp. 523, 531-532 (conclusions and recommendation). https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit ↩︎
Deposition of William P. Barr, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, August 18, 2025, pp. 47-48 and 51. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf ↩︎
Same transcript, pp. 51 and 92-93. ↩︎
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigation into the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's Resolution of Its 2006-2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the Investigation, Executive Summary, November 2020, pp. 2-3. https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl ↩︎
Same, pp. 10-12. ↩︎
Seymour, Cheri. The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal. TrineDay, 2010. ↩︎
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, press release, "Attorney General Pamela Bondi Releases First Phase of Declassified Epstein Files," February 27, 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-pamela-bondi-releases-first-phase-declassified-epstein-files ↩︎
Epstein Files Transparency Act, Pub. L. 119-38, 139 Stat. 656 (enacted November 19, 2025), §§ 2(a), 2(c)(1) and 3. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ38/pdf/PLAW-119publ38.pdf ↩︎
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation, unsigned memorandum, July 7, 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1407001/dl?inline ; Senator Richard J. Durbin, letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi, July 18, 2025. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2025-07-18-rjd-letter-to-ag-bondi-re-epstein?download=1 ↩︎
"Trump fires Pam Bondi as attorney general, installs Todd Blanche as acting AG," CBS News, April 2, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-pam-bondi-attorney-general/ ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote 119th Congress, 2nd Session, Vote No. 230, on the nomination of Todd Blanche to be Attorney General (PN1078), August 8, 2026, 50 yeas and 49 nays. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1192/vote_119_2_00230.htm ↩︎

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