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Security Council and the Cold War

The first veto was cast by the Soviet Union on February 16, 1946, on a draft resolution concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Syria. The first United States veto followed on March 17, 1970, on a draft concerning Southern Rhodesia.² On September 10, 1972, the United States vetoed S/10784, a draft submitted by Guinea, Somalia and Yugoslavia that called on the parties to the Middle East conflict to "cease immediately all military operations and to exercise the greatest restraint."³ Later United States vetoes on Middle East drafts included S/10974 (July 1973, the Middle East situation and the occupied territories), S/11898 (December 1975, Israel air attacks against Lebanon) and S/11940 (January 1976, Palestinian self-determination and withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967); the United States cast the only negative vote on each.⁴ The same tabulation lists further United States vetoes on Middle East drafts in the following decades.

The United States also vetoed the Security Council draft on the 1983 invasion of Grenada (S/16077/Rev.1, October 27, 1983, 13-1-1), Nicaragua's draft on the mining of its ports (S/16463, April 4, 1984, 13-1-1), and the draft on compliance with the International Court of Justice judgment in Nicaragua's case against the United States (S/18428, October 28, 1986, 11-1-3).⁵ No Security Council measure came out of the Contra war in Nicaragua, and the covert operations in El Salvador and Guatemala proceeded without effective United Nations constraint.

On January 7, 1980, the Council voted 13-2-0 on S/13729, the draft on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; two days later resolution 462 recorded "the lack of unanimity of its permanent members" that had "prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility" and called an emergency special session of the General Assembly.⁶ That session's resolution ES-6/2 of January 14, 1980 called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.⁷ The Soviet Union cast the veto when drafts on Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia (S/13027, January 15, 1979) and on the China-Viet Nam border (S/13162, March 16, 1979) failed 13-2-0, and Russia and China vetoed a series of drafts on Syria beginning with S/2011/612 in October 2011.⁸ The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 came before the Council on a United States draft (S/5182, October 22, 1962) calling for the dismantling and withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba and for a United Nations observer corps.⁹

When the Security Council was blocked, the General Assembly acted in the 1956 crises. On November 2, 1956, its first emergency special session called for an immediate cease-fire in the fighting around the Suez Canal and the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines.¹⁰ On November 4, its second emergency special session addressed the situation in Hungary caused by foreign intervention.¹¹ On November 1, Imre Nagy's cabinet had decided unanimously, János Kádár included, to renounce Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact and declare neutrality, and the government asked the Secretary-General in a telegram to place the question on the United Nations agenda with special dispatch and asked the four great powers to help defend the country's neutrality.¹²

On July 7, 1950, the Security Council requested that the United States designate the commander of the forces made available to a unified command in Korea, in the Korean War.¹³ Seymour Hersh wrote that David Ben-Gurion had secretly offered to send Israeli troops to fight alongside United Nations forces in South Korea, and that Harry S. Truman declined the offer, reportedly fearing it would bind him to a security arrangement with Israel.¹⁴

Israel and the Bernadotte mission

On May 14, 1948, the General Assembly authorized a United Nations Mediator in Palestine.¹⁵ The post went to Count Folke Bernadotte. Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948, in the part of the city under Jewish control, together with a French United Nations observer.¹⁶ On September 20, 1948, Anthony Eden told the House of Commons that he felt sure the whole House would join in deploring "the callous and the seemingly purposeless assassination of Count Bernadotte."¹⁷ The General Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948, on the Palestinian refugees resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid to those who chose not to return.¹⁸

Congo, Lumumba, and the death of Dag Hammarskjöld

On July 14, 1960, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to take the steps needed to provide the Congolese government with military assistance after the Katanga secession.¹⁹ On August 9, 1960, it called on Belgium to withdraw its troops from Katanga and reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."²⁰ Patrice Lumumba, who had appealed to the United Nations, visited Washington in late July 1960, where Secretary of State Christian Herter pledged economic aid. After he was dismissed by Joseph Kasavubu on September 5 and lost the power struggle to Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, who seized power on September 14, Lumumba asked the United Nations force for protection.²¹

The Church Committee documented the American side of the same weeks. A cable of August 18, 1960 from Bronson Tweedy, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Africa Division, referred to "your and our belief Lumumba must be removed if possible"; on August 19 Richard Bissell cabled "You are authorized proceed with operation" to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group; and on August 26 Allen Dulles cabled the Leopoldville station that "targets of opportunity may present themselves to you" and authorized up to $100,000 for "crash programs."²² The Committee reported that in the fall of 1960 two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba, that poisons were sent to the Congo and that exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba, and wrote that it "does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing" by Congolese rivals in early 1961. On the question of authority, the Committee wrote that the chain of events was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower," while the countervailing testimony and the ambiguity of the records precluded a finding that the President intended an assassination effort.²³

Lumumba was transferred on January 17, 1961 to the custody of the Katanga authorities, who announced his death several weeks later.²¹²⁴ On February 21, 1961, the Security Council noted "with deep regret" the announced killing of Lumumba, Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito, urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that "an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished."²⁵

Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General, died on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when a Swedish aircraft carrying sixteen people, flight SE-BDY, crashed near Ndola in what was then Northern Rhodesia. All aboard died. The Rhodesian civil aviation board of investigation found no definitive cause and could not rule out a "wilful act of some person or persons unknown"; a Rhodesian commission of inquiry under Chief Justice Sir John Clayden reported in February 1962 that the pilots had allowed the aircraft to descend too low; and the United Nations commission of inquiry reported in April 1962 that it had found no evidence of sabotage or attack but that these possibilities could not be excluded, and was unable to determine the cause.²⁶ The Foreign Relations editorial note dates a report of the Commission of Investigation to March 8, 1962.²⁷ On October 26, 1962, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1759 (XVII), which took note of that report and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Assembly of any new evidence.²⁸

In 2013 a commission of jurists chaired by Sir Stephen Sedley, assembled by an enabling committee under Lord Lea of Crondall rather than by the United Nations, and including Hans Corell, Richard Goldstone and Wilhelmina Thomassen, reported on whether the evidence would justify reopening the inquiry. Its report recorded that "there appear also to be relevant but classified records held by the US National Security Agency." It set out the account of Charles Southall, who recalled that shortly after midnight on the night of the crash a recording was played back in which a male voice said "I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. I'm going down to make a run on it. Yes, it's the Transair DC6. It's the plane," followed by the sound of cannon fire and the words "I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing." The Eminent Person wrote in 2022 of Southall: "It has not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer who was assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961."²⁹³⁰ The Commission concluded: "There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola." It also wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA," and that the sabotage claim was not capable of verification.³¹

The Independent Panel of Experts, appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246 and headed by Mohamed Chande Othman, reported in June 2015 (transmitted by the Secretary-General on July 2, 2015). It assigned moderate probative value to nine new eyewitness accounts of more than one aircraft in the air, to the claims of two persons who heard or read alleged intercepts of an attack on SE-BDY, to new information on the air capability of Katanga, and to the possibility that communications from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine were intercepted. It found that claims by mercenaries that they shot the aircraft down lacked credibility.³² In December 2016 the General Assembly, by resolution 71/260, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an eminent person, urged all Member States to release relevant records, and encouraged them to declassify records that "remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact."³³

On September 5, 2017, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of Othman, appointed as Eminent Person. The transmittal letter records his conclusion "that it is almost certain that Dag Hammarskjöld and the members of the party accompanying him were not assassinated after landing and that all passengers died from injuries sustained during the plane crash, either instantaneously or soon after," and that he "considered it plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash." Othman cited "ample eyewitness evidence that tends to establish that there was more than one aircraft in the air at the time flight SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola, that any aircraft present other than flight SE-BDY was a jet and that flight SE-BDY was on fire before it collided with the ground," and wrote that SE-BDY "may have been fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by one or more other aircraft." He noted that "it remains possible that the crash was an accident caused by pilot error without external interference," that it was "not possible at present to conclude whether sabotage was a cause," and "a lack of access to original documents concerning an 'Operation Celeste'" relating to the hypothesis that a bomb had been planted on the aircraft.³⁴ He further concluded "that the burden of proof has now shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of records and archives in their custody or possession, including those that remain classified, for potentially relevant information."³⁴

The eight Member States identified in April and May 2017 as most likely to hold relevant information were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States; responses came from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.³⁵ The report stated that new information from the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations and individuals "appears to establish that Rhodesian and United Kingdom authorities intercepted United Nations communications in the Congo in 1961," and that the United States confirmed "for the first time" the presence of its military assets in and around Ndola on the night of the crash, including between one and three Dakota aircraft with equipment able to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances. Of the two American personnel who had claimed to have heard or read a transmission about an attack, the 2017 report records that Southall had died in 2015 (the 2019 report records that the Eminent Person was informed in 2017, and the reports of 2019, 2022 and 2024 state that both men had passed away as of 2018), and the service record of the other, Paul Abram, a United States Air Force Security Services officer, was confirmed by the United States only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time.³⁶

The report of September 12, 2019 reaffirmed those conclusions: "My work under the current mandate does not provide grounds to disturb either finding," namely that it was plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause and that the burden of proof had shifted to Member States.³⁷ In 2018 the Eminent Person requested fourteen Member States to each appoint an independent and high-ranking official to review their intelligence, security and defence archives: Angola, Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Germany, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.³⁸ The Secretary-General's letter recorded new information on probable intercepts by Member States of relevant communications, the capacity of the armed forces of Katanga or others to stage an attack, including with aircraft and airstrips, the presence in the area of foreign paramilitary personnel, including pilots, and intelligence personnel, and further information on the South African Institute for Maritime Research in the context of Operation Celeste. It also recorded that not all Member States appointed an Independent Appointee, that searches had not been exhaustive in all, and that the burden of proof remained with Member States.³⁷

The 2019 report stated that Member States including the United Kingdom and the United States received intercepts of communications of the United Nations Operation in the Congo throughout 1961, including encoded communications on sensitive military matters, discussed at a high level by the British High Commissioner Lord Alport, the United States Consul in Elisabethville William C. Canup and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky. It stated that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine "appear to have been intercepted by British and United States signals and intelligence agencies," that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of National Security Agency activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on flight SE-BDY, that both had died by 2018 without a substantive response from the United States to requests for clarification made since 2015, and that it had not been possible to conclude whether sabotage was a cause, owing in part to difficulties in obtaining access to documentation in South Africa.³⁹

The report of August 25, 2022 stated that "it remains plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash."⁴⁰ It recorded that encrypted communications sent by Hammarskjöld using the CX-52 cryptographic machines "appear to have been intercepted and read by Member States' signals and intelligence agencies," and that the claim that the CIA or NSA covertly monitored United Nations communications, in an operation known in the CIA first as "Thesaurus" and later as "Rubicon," "has not been refuted by the Member States concerned."⁴⁰ The report recorded that reporting by SRF, the Washington Post and ZDF in 2020 was "stated to be based on a 96-page account completed in 2004 by the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence and an oral history compiled by German intelligence officials in 2008."⁴¹

The 2014 Commission of Jurists recorded that in July 1998 the National Intelligence Agency passed to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission a file that contained about a dozen documents on South African Institute for Maritime Research letterhead, relating to an operation codenamed "Celeste" that purported to report a bomb planted on Hammarskjöld's aircraft.⁴² The TRC's chairman, Desmond Tutu, released copies of eight of the documents at the commission's final press conference in August 1998, and the originals were passed to the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar.⁴² South Africa wrote to the United Nations on July 1, 2016 that "a revelation made during" the TRC hearings had pointed to a possible involvement of the institute.⁴³ The 2022 report recorded that a renewed search of South African archives produced no originals, and that the address and telephone number on the letterhead did not match Johannesburg directory listings for 1960 and 1961, which it wrote "may be another flag suggesting that the documents are not authentic."⁴⁴

The 2019 report recorded that the Secret Intelligence Service officer Neil Ritchie, the British consul in Katanga Denzil Dunnett and the British High Commissioner in Salisbury, Lord Alport, made arrangements in September 1961 for the Ndola meeting with Tshombe, and that the arrangements used the facilities of the Union Minière.⁴⁵ The 2022 report wrote that Ritchie flew a Union Minière engineer to Kitwe in Northern Rhodesia in September 1961, where the engineer worked with a British commercial figure who called himself British intelligence, to relay messages between the governments of Katanga, Northern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom.⁴⁶

The report of September 9, 2024 stated that the United States and West Germany "appear to have had covert and direct 'backdoor' access" to messages sent by Hammarskjöld with the CX-52.⁴⁷ It identified three Dakota aircraft at Ndola, one under the naval attaché for air in Pretoria, Commander Don Ely, one under the air force attaché for air in Pretoria, Colonel Don Gaylor, and a third flown from Elisabethville by Colonel Benjamin Matlick, and stated that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis to consider that these or other aircraft ... may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY."⁴⁸ It recorded that Charles Southall and Paul Abram had both passed away as of 2018, and that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict their claims "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."⁴⁹

General Assembly resolution 70/11 of November 19, 2015 asked the Secretary-General to pursue the Panel's pending requests for information and to explore the feasibility of a central archival holding.⁵⁰ Resolution 72/252 of December 24, 2017 requested the Secretary-General to reappoint the Eminent Person and asked Member States to appoint independent, high-ranking officials to review their intelligence, security and defence archives.⁵¹ Resolution 74/248 of December 27, 2019 and resolution 77/252 of December 30, 2022 reappointed the Eminent Person.⁵¹

Cuba and the United Nations

On April 15, 1961, the day of the air raids that preceded the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, the General Assembly's First Committee heard Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa accuse the United States of aggression, and Adlai Stevenson told the committee that according to his information the raids had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had landed in Florida and asked for political asylum.⁵² On April 16, Stevenson cabled the Department of State, for the Secretary of State (Dean Rusk) and Dulles, that he was "greatly disturbed by clear indications" that the bombing incidents "were launched in part at least from outside Cuba," that his answers to Roa "were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba," and that he did not understand why he had not been "warned and provided pre-prepared material."⁵³ The operation ended on April 19, 1961, with the capture of its exile force.⁵⁴

Iraq: sanctions, inspections, and Oil-for-Food

The Security Council condemned the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and decided on August 6, 1990 that all States should prevent trade with Iraq, in the aftermath of the Gulf War.⁵⁵ Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, set the cease-fire terms and provided for a special commission to verify the destruction of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.⁵⁶ The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) operated in Iraq from 1991. UNSCOM evacuated all of its personnel from Iraq in December 1998, immediately before the American and British strikes, and Iraq has barred arms inspections since.⁵⁷

Barton Gellman reported in the Washington Post on March 2, 1999 that United States intelligence services had infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into the arms control teams to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of UNSCOM. According to that report, the technicians who installed the commission's remote camera monitoring system in 1996 were intelligence operatives, the repeater stations they built contained antennas that intercepted Iraqi microwave military communications, and at least two technicians lent to run the system were employees of the CIA's clandestine service. A second channel, code-named Shake the Tree, used commercial scanners to intercept Iraqi radio transmissions; it was known to UNSCOM's leaders, was disclosed by the Post and the Boston Globe in January 1999, and was confirmed by the United States government that month. Gellman wrote that the United States decided not to inform Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus or his successor Richard Butler about the second operation, and that the CIA notified Charles Duelfer, the American deputy to both, to help ensure that headquarters staff did not interfere.⁵⁷

Ekeus said in that report that he did not believe covert antennas could have been built into the video relay system, and that if the United States had used UNSCOM cover for espionage "we have always stood against that"; he cited the 1991 inspection in which American team leaders reported directly to Washington, which, in his words, "we stopped." Butler's spokesman said Butler had no knowledge of the allegations, and Gellman reported that Butler was quoted in a private conversation as saying "If all this stuff turns out to be true, then Rolf Ekeus and I have been played for suckers, haven't we?"⁵⁷ In a PBS Frontline (PBS) interview, Butler said that he had approved "gifts to us, of persons and technology" to crack Iraqi deceit, that he had disapproved of some proposals as edging "towards a line that we shouldn't cross," and that he could not know whether others were piggy-backing on UNSCOM without telling him.⁵⁸ Gellman told Frontline that when David Kay was in the parking lot and smuggled out documents in 1991, Washington heard of their contents as soon as New York, that Ekeus was angry and forbade direct communications like that, and that he was "quite confident they continued."⁵⁹ The Financial Times reported on July 30, 2002 that Ekeus told the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet that he had learned after leaving his position that the United States had placed two of its own agents among the inspectors.⁶⁰

On January 6, 1999, the spokesman for the Secretary-General, Fred Eckhard, told the noon briefing that the Secretary-General had "no evidence of any kind" that UNSCOM had assisted United States intelligence, and that Butler had "categorically denied them" when the Secretary-General asked him.⁶¹

UNSCOM was succeeded by UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), established by Security Council resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999.⁶² UNMOVIC inspectors under Hans Blix were in Iraq when the United States and United Kingdom invaded in March 2003, asserting that Saddam Hussein retained prohibited weapons programs. No such programs were found.

The UN inspection effort also employed Karen Jansen, a U.S. Army major and United Nations inspector who worked on the search for Iraqi biological weapons sites. Ruth Sinai reported for the Associated Press that Jansen carried sketches of two sites where the Iraqi leader had supposedly stashed biological weapons, produced by Ed Dames of Psi, a private firm specializing in remote viewing, and that the sketches were generated through remote viewing.⁶³

The Oil-for-Food Programme, established under Security Council Resolution 986 of April 14, 1995, permitted Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase food and medicine under UN supervision, and became operational in December 1996.⁶⁴ The Independent Inquiry Committee chaired by Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve, issued its final report on October 27, 2005. The report found that more than 2,200 companies had paid kickbacks to the Iraqi government in the form of inland transportation fees, after-sales-service fees, or both, and listed 2,253 companies in its humanitarian kickback tables. Oil surcharges were paid in connection with the contracts of 139 companies.⁶⁵ The Christian Science Monitor reported on October 28, 2005 that the report named companies and individuals from 66 countries as having sent kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's government, and from 40 countries as having paid illegal oil surcharges.⁶⁶ The report also stated that Iraq dispensed oil allocations to a wide array of individuals and groups "whom it considered influential in their respective countries and who espoused pro-Iraq views or organized anti-sanctions activities," and that Iraq favored companies from countries it perceived as friendly, in particular permanent members of the Security Council.⁶⁷

The committee's findings on Benon Sevan, the programme's executive director, were that he corruptly received oil allocations and cash proceeds from 1998 through 2001. The proceeds passed through a business controlled by Fakhry Abdelnour and reached a Swiss bank account controlled by Fred Nadler, the brother-in-law of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The committee also described an Iraqi scheme in 1996 to bribe Boutros-Ghali through Samir Vincent, and wrote that it did not have evidence that Boutros-Ghali took part in or was aware of any of this corrupt activity.⁶⁸

Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim

Kurt Waldheim served as the fourth Secretary-General from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1981.⁶⁹ He was elected President of Austria in 1986. On December 14, 1987, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that the United States had placed him on its watch list for unwanted aliens, that Neil Sher of the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations said the documents behind the decision showed direct involvement in atrocities and could not be handed over to the international commission of historians that Waldheim had convened, and that Waldheim again rejected charges that he participated in reprisals against civilians or in the deportation of Jews to concentration camps.⁷⁰

On April 27, 2001, the National Archives and Records Administration opened the CIA's name files on Waldheim, together with files on Adolf Hitler, Klaus Barbie, Adolf Eichmann, Josef Mengele, and Heinrich Müller. The Archives stated that Waldheim had not been an intelligence resource for the United States, and that the CIA could not conclude that the Soviet Union had used or blackmailed Waldheim with information about his Nazi past.⁷¹

Penetration of UN communications

A January 31, 2003 email from Frank Koza, chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the National Security Agency, to the British signals agency GCHQ asked for insight into plans to vote on Iraq-related resolutions and for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." The Observer published the memo on March 2, 2003 under the headline "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war"; its article described the targets as the delegations of Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Pakistan, the "Middle Six," and quoted the memo's request for the "whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises." The Observer reported that three former intelligence operatives judged the memo authentic and that the NSA switchboard connected its reporters to Koza's extension.⁷²⁷³

The memo was leaked by Katharine Gun, who worked at GCHQ. She had been charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence at the Central Criminal Court. The Attorney General's statement to Parliament said that the evidential deficiency related to the prosecution's inability "to disprove the defence of necessity to be raised on the particular facts of this case," and that the determination had nothing to do with advice given by the Attorney General on the legality of the Iraq war.⁷⁴

In August 2013 Der Spiegel reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that the National Security Agency had bugged the United Nations' New York headquarters. According to the report, NSA experts cracked the codes of the UN video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is part of the UN system, and an NSA bugging program in more than 80 embassies and consulates.⁷⁵

Chile, arms embargoes, and the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control

Ari Ben-Menashe wrote that Alan Sanders of ITICO supplied blueprints for cluster bombs to Carlos Cardoen, and that Cardoen produced the bombs under a covert United States license despite a United Nations arms embargo against Chile.⁷⁶ Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977, adopted unanimously under Chapter VII, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.⁷⁷⁷⁸

On July 14, 1976, Carmelo Soria, a Spanish-Chilean official of the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) of ECLAC, was kidnapped by DINA agents as he left work and was murdered. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found in Report 133/99 that his body and car were left in a stream, that the Chilean courts had determined that State agents participated in the crime and their identities were established, that Chile had violated his rights, and that the self-amnesty decree law was incompatible with the American Convention.⁷⁹

In an October 1991 affidavit given to Bill Hamilton of INSLAW, Lester Coleman stated that third-party funds, including from the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control in Vienna, were generally made available for the purchase of the PROMIS systems that a DEA proprietary company sold to drug abuse control agencies in several Middle Eastern countries.⁸⁰ The fund was a precursor to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The fund received funding from sources connected to the CIA-backed anti-narcotics efforts that intersected with the Contra resupply networks.

Envoys and mediators

Security Council resolution 721 of November 27, 1991 approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia, a post held from October 8, 1991 by Cyrus Vance.⁸¹ In resolution 1495 of July 31, 2003 the Council supported the peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara presented by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, James A. Baker III, who served in that role from 1997 to 2004.⁸²

CRIES and UNICEF

The CRIES (Study and Research Center on Children and Sexuality) was a Belgian group whose members were convicted in Brussels in March 1988. A UPI report of March 7, 1988 stated that sixteen people were convicted of participating in a child sex ring that used a laboratory in the cellar of a UNICEF office to develop photographs, that Jozef Verbeeck, the former director of UNICEF's Brussels office, received two years in prison, and that CRIES served as a cover organization for the ring.⁸³ UNICEF's institutional name was exploited by the CRIES network, which used a UNICEF umbrella for operations until the connection was exposed in 1986. S. Dovey wrote that the X-witness dossier compiled under Judge Jean-Marc Connerotte after the 1996 appeal described the network as having used UNICEF in the production of pornography.⁸⁴

Epstein-linked diplomacy

Between November 2015 and January 2017, Jeffrey Epstein exchanged iMessages with Vitaly Churkin, Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from April 2006 until his death. The Justice Department's Epstein productions include a message log beginning November 16, 2015, in which Epstein wrote, "I'm in town wed- fri if you have time . Jeffrey Epstein."⁸⁵ On August 28, 2016 Epstein wrote to Churkin, "Ehud Barak and TOM Barrack at house tomorw . You are always welcome," and an email from his office that day recorded that Churkin would join the lunch with Epstein, Ehud Barak and Tom Barrack; on September 6, 2016 Epstein offered an introduction to Tom Pritzker, and the logs reference a meeting with Larry Summers in January 2016.⁸⁶

Churkin collapsed in his office in February 2017 and died on February 20, 2017, at the age of 64. CBS News reported on March 10, 2017 that the State Department had asked the city in writing on February 24 not to reveal the autopsy results, because Churkin's diplomatic immunity survives his death, and that the city's law department then told the medical examiner's office not to release further information.⁸⁷

Unidentified flying objects at the United Nations

In July 1968, J. Allen Hynek told the House Committee on Science and Astronautics that "the United States seek the cooperation of the United Nations in establishing a means for the impartial and free interchange among nations of information about, and reports of, unidentified flying objects," which he described as "a sort of international clearinghouse for the exchange of information on this subject," and that Congress should establish a UFO Scientific Board of Inquiry.⁸⁸

On July 7, 1978, Grenada's Deputy Permanent Representative asked for the inclusion on the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena," with an explanatory memorandum; the General Assembly allocated it to the Special Political Committee on September 20, 1978.⁸⁹ In the general debate on October 12, 1978, Eric Gairy, the prime minister of Grenada, told the General Assembly that the subject of unidentified flying objects should be studied with research coordinated by United Nations organizations, and that a centre for UFO research might be established in Grenada.⁹⁰

On November 27, 1978, Gairy introduced to the Special Political Committee draft resolution A/SPC/33/L.20, which would have recommended that the United Nations, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, "initiate, conduct and co-ordinate research into the nature and origin of unidentified flying objects," asked the Secretary-General to invite Member States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to submit information and proposals by May 31, 1979, and provided for a group of experts to meet during the sessions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. After consultations the Committee agreed by consensus on a draft decision, and Grenada did not press the draft resolution to a vote.⁸⁹ The decision, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on December 18, 1978 as decision 33/426, took note of Grenada's statements and draft resolutions, invited interested Member States to co-ordinate at the national level scientific research and investigation into extraterrestrial life, including unidentified flying objects, requested the Secretary-General to transmit the Grenada statements and documentation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for its 1979 session, and provided that the Committee would permit Grenada, at its request, to present its views.⁹¹

The committee's summary record of the 35th meeting, on November 27, 1978, lists Gairy, Grenada's Minister of Education Wellington Friday, and Hynek (designated as speaking for Grenada), followed by Jacques Vallee, whose entry carries no delegation designation, and by Lt. Col. Coyne on an October 18, 1973 helicopter encounter over Ohio. Gairy told the committee that several scientists formed part of Grenada's delegation and that Grenada had invited scientists who had taken part in the First International Congress on the UFO Phenomenon (Acapulco, April 1977) to make statements. Hynek said UFO reports had been assembled from 133 countries. Vallee said the phenomenon had a physical, a psycho-physiological and a social-belief aspect and that he had studied reports from France and the United States for over 15 years.⁹² The committee approved the four-paragraph text of the decision by consensus at its 47th meeting on December 8, 1978.⁹³

In 1994, Laurance Rockefeller wrote to the White House science adviser, John H. Gibbons, that preliminary talks had been held about a United Nations conference on extraterrestrial intelligence.⁹⁴

Footnotes

"Charter of the United Nations," signed June 26, 1945, in force October 24, 1945; Article 27 on Security Council voting. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text ↩︎
Security Council Report, "The Veto," Security Council working methods: first veto cast by the USSR on February 16, 1946 on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Syria (S/PV.23); first United States veto March 17, 1970. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php ↩︎
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Security Council Report, "The Security Council Veto" (table), rows for October 27, 1983 (S/16077/Rev.1), April 4, 1984 (S/16463) and October 28, 1986 (S/18428, S/PV.2718); drafts S/16463 and S/18428 at https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2F16463&l=en&t=pdf and https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2F18428&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
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