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The trust and the 1911 decision

The government's bill alleged that the conspiracy was formed "in or about the year 1870" by John D. Rockefeller, William Rockefeller and Henry Flagler, and that the defendants pursued it in three periods: 1870 to 1882, 1882 to 1899 and 1899 to the filing of the bill.² The bill named the Standard Oil Company of Ohio and sixty-two other corporations and partnerships as defendants, with seven individuals.³ It alleged that the so-called trust of 1882, and the 1899 acquisition by the New Jersey corporation of the shares of the defendant companies, were combinations of independent or competing concerns, and that the combination had obtained "a complete mastery over the Oil industry, controlling 90 per cent of the business of producing, shipping, refining, and selling petroleum and its products."⁴⁵

The appeal was brought by "The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and thirty-three other corporations," together with John D. Rockefeller, William Rockefeller and five other individuals.⁶ Edward Douglass White delivered the opinion of the Court on May 15, 1911, which affirmed the decree under the antitrust act of 1890 with directions to modify it and kept jurisdiction in the court below to compel compliance.⁷ John Marshall Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part.⁸

Oliver Hazard Payne, a Yale graduate of the class of 1863 and a brother of Flora Payne, the wife of William Collins Whitney, served as the company's treasurer until 1884 and then sat on its board until his death in 1917, according to the Yale Obituary Record.⁹ The decree in the government's suit names "Oliver H. Payne" among the seven individual defendants, beside John D. Rockefeller and William Rockefeller, in the list reproduced in the Court's opinion.¹⁰ The Yale record states that Payne's nephews were Harry Payne Whitney, Payne Whitney and Henry Payne Bingham.⁹

Ida M. Tarbell wrote that the South Improvement Company's stockholders in 1872 included "O. H. Payne, Cleveland" with 180 shares, the same holding as the Rockefeller, Flagler and Bostwick interests, and that Payne "soon after became" a stockholder in the Standard Oil Company.¹¹ In the House Committee on Commerce inquiry into the railroads' contracts with the Standard Oil Company, the committee summoned "O. H. Payne, treasurer of the Standard Oil Company" with the railroad officers, and Tarbell wrote that Mr. Payne "refused also to furnish the committee with information."¹² When the Ohio legislature elected Henry B. Payne to the Senate in January 1884, Tarbell wrote that his son Oliver, "at that time treasurer of the Standard Oil Company," was one of the backers of the Payne boom at the Neil House in Columbus.¹³ The Ohio House select committee's testimony, printed as Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 106 (1886), records the Cleveland lawyer L. A. Russell answering, when asked whether he recognized "the principal officers of the great corporation known as the Standard Oil Company" among the workers for Henry B. Payne, that "there was Oliver H. Payne, Henry B. Payne's son, who was the leader and manager of the Payne forces ... Oliver Payne was at that time treasurer of the Standard Oil Company," and a member, L. C. Cole, testifying that "the Standard Oil Company, with its officers and workers, were here in force. The secretary and the treasurer of the company were here."¹⁴ The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections reported on July 15, 1886 that the testimony was "merely cumulative and speculative," and the Senate voted 44 to 17 on July 23, 1886 to drop the matter.¹⁵ The Evening World of New York wrote at his death in 1917 that after the government's antitrust suits had reorganized the Standard Oil and tobacco "trusts" he withdrew from the directorates.¹⁶

Successor companies

The Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) changed its name to Exxon Corporation in November 1972; on November 30, 1999 a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon was merged into Mobil Corporation and Exxon changed its name to Exxon Mobil Corporation, a New Jersey corporation incorporated in 1882.¹⁷ The Standard Oil Company of California, incorporated in Delaware in 1926, took the name Chevron Corporation in 1984, ChevronTexaco Corporation in 2001, and Chevron Corporation again in 2005.¹⁸ The Senate's 1974 print, in describing the five defendants in the 1953 cartel case, gives their then-current names as Exxon (Standard Oil of New Jersey), Mobil (Socony-Vacuum Oil Company), Socal (Standard Oil of California), Texaco (The Texas Company) and Gulf Oil.¹⁹

The 1929 agreements with I.G. Farben

The company's chemical relationship with I.G. Farben rested on four agreements dated November 9, 1929. Thurman Arnold, the assistant attorney general in charge of antitrust, described them to the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program on March 26, 1942 as the "division of the fields" agreement, the four-party agreement, the coordination agreement and the German sales agreement.²⁰ Arnold testified that Standard turned its non-oil chemical processes over to I.G., and that I.G. turned over to Standard the patents and discoveries that directly concerned oil production, including synthetic gasoline, so that each company held a world monopoly in its field.²¹ The arrangement created two patent pools, one for synthetic rubber and chemicals controlled from Germany and one for synthetic gasoline controlled by Standard Oil.²²

Arnold gave his own account of the motive in the same testimony: "these arrangements were not entered into with any desire to help Germany. The sole motive was an attempt on the part of the Standard Oil to get a protected market, to eliminate independent competition, and, finally, to restrict world production in order to maintain that control."²³ He read into the record a letter signed by Walter C. Teagle of Standard, in which each party proposed "to hold itself willing to take care of any future eventualities in a spirit of mutual helpfulness" and, if performance of the agreements were restrained or prevented "by operation of any existing or future law" or the beneficial interest of either party alienated "by operation of law or governmental authority," to "enter into new negotiations in the spirit of the present agreements."²⁴

Arnold identified a second set of arrangements as the Hague Memorandum, made in September 1939, which he said carried the 1929 conspiracy through the war between Germany and United Kingdom. He read a letter of October 12, 1939 from Frank A. Howard, the president of the Standard Oil Development Company, stating that in Netherlands "They delivered to me assignments of some 2,000 foreign patents" and that the parties had worked toward "complete plans for a modus Vivendi which would operate through the term of the war, whether or not the United States came in."²⁵

William S. Farish, the president of the New Jersey company, testified on March 31, 1942 and described the 1939 readjustment. The company's patent licensing had run through two American corporations, Standard-I.G. and Jasco, in one of which Standard held 80 per cent and in the other 50 per cent, the Germans holding the other shares; the stock holdings represented roughly the German participations in licensing fixed by the 1929 contracts. Farish said that substantially all the patents had originated with I.G. and that legal title to most of them, especially the foreign patents, had been left in I.G. to avoid the expense of transfers.²⁶ The assignments were taken by an American trustee who, if the United States went to war with Germany, would be subject to account to the Alien Property Custodian for any equitable interest of the Germans. The German 20 per cent interest in Standard-I.G. was purchased at book value ($20,000), and the Germans retained title to their 20 per cent of the royalties.²⁷

The same agreements appear in the first order the Custodian issued. Vesting Order No. 1, signed by Leo T. Crowley on March 25, 1942 (the date of the consent decree) and published in the Federal Register on March 31, 1942, vested all right, title and interest of I.G. Farbenindustrie, A.G. in the Division of Fields Agreement of November 9, 1929 and the Jasco Agreement of September 30, 1930; the four-party, coordination and German sales agreements; a series of agreements of October 7, 1938 among Ruhrchemie, I.G., Royal Dutch Shell and M.W. Kellogg Company on hydrocarbon synthesis; the Hague Memorandum dated September 25, 1939, effective September 1, 1939; the trust agreement executed March 8, 1940 by Walter Schaefer and Harold Koechling; and a trust agreement of August 31, 1939 among Frank A. Howard, W.E. Currie and P.L. Young. The order also vested the stock, patents and contracts of the Standard Catalytic Company, the capital stock of Jasco, Inc. (including five certificates held by Schaefer and Koechling as trustees), and all patents held by or in the name of Standard-I.G. Company, Standard Catalytic Company, Jasco, Inc. or W.E. Currie, listed in four schedules.²⁸ The Custodian's annual report for March 11, 1942 to June 30, 1943, a period in which 1,792 vesting orders were issued, lists it first and states that German holders of American patents had "acquired a substantial influence in American industry" through patent contracts, naming synthetic rubber among the affected industries.²⁹³⁰

The Federal Trade Commission's staff later recorded the German marketing side of the relationship: an agreement of 1928 among Standard (New Jersey), Royal Dutch Shell and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which together controlled more than 60 percent of the German domestic market, with the cooperation reported of the marketing subsidiaries of Leuna and I.G. Farben, and the distributor Deutsche Gasolin A.G. owned 50 percent by Standard and 50 percent by I.G. Farbenindustrie in 1933.³¹

Synthetic rubber and the buna patents

Arnold told the Truman Committee that I.G. Farben had "the deciding voice on policy questions with respect to buna synthetic rubber." He said that between 1932 and 1934 four rubber companies and one chemical company approached Standard seeking licenses, and that negotiations in 1932 between B.F. Goodrich and Standard were subject to the supervision of I.G., which refused to accept various portions of the proposed terms.³² Howard's letter of February 6, 1940 to E.J. Sadler stated the company's position: "The interest of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey in the buna process dates back to the original agreement of 1929 between I. G. and Jersey."³³ Arnold also said that for Standard's own butyl development the company licensed only two rubber companies, apart from specialty companies.³⁴

The company issued a release on the day of the consent decree, introduced as Exhibit 359, which stated that "The developments made under these agreements have advanced the progress of American industry and its ability to meet the war emergency."³⁵ Arnold asked the committee to keep the release in mind when weighing the documents, one of which showed that the company had refused to let the British have a sample of rubber as late as 1941.³⁶

Ethyl, aviation fuel and the German plants

Standard and General Motors each held 50 per cent of the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation, described in the 1942 criminal information as sole producer of the tetraethyl lead used in nearly all American motor fuels.³⁷ In 1940 the Supreme Court recorded that Standard "owns one-half of the capital stock" of Ethyl and that "The remainder is owned by General Motors Corporation and E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company."³⁸ Howard's February 6, 1940 letter reported that Ethyl G.m.b.H., a German company owned half by the British Associated Ethyl Company and half by I.G. Farbenindustrie, paid in full a debt of nearly $900,000 owed to the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation about one month after the war began, although it could have deferred payment for two more months.³⁹

The committee's summary states that Standard, through the New Jersey company as well as its subsidiary, helped build an aviation gasoline plant for Germany at Hamburg as late as 1939. It cites a memorandum signed by E.J. Gohr dated August 1, 1939 describing I.G. representatives leaving New York City on August 4 for a week in the South and Indiana and returning to New York for discussions on the detailed design of the plant, and a letter of August 11, 1939 from R.P. Russell of the Standard Oil Development Company stating that the company was "not only willing but anxious to do everything we can to assist the Kellogg and I. G. gentlemen in preparing the process design."⁴⁰ Farish's statement of March 31, 1942 answered the charge that the German subsidiary D.A.P.G. had planned a plant at Hamburg in 1938 or 1939 with the words "This is true and as a German corporation, operating in Germany, with which country we were not then at war, it could not have done otherwise," and called the charge that Standard shipped to Italian and German air lines in Brazil contrary to the wishes of the State Department "unfounded."⁴¹

The summary also quotes a memorandum from Howard to Teagle and Farish on the effect of the cartel agreement on fuels for the Army Air Corps: "To meet the very proper desires of the Air Corps as expressed to us we shall have to violate our agreements and perhaps forfeit the confidence of our associates, both American and foreign." The summary concludes that Standard "met with difficulties in developing aviation gasoline for our own Army because of the cartel agreement."⁴²

Standard's Brazilian subsidiary and the German-controlled line Condor Syndikat and the Lineas Aereas Transcontinentales Italianas line, which ran from Italy to Brazil, were the subject of testimony by Adolf Berle, the assistant secretary of state. Berle said the Secretary of State requested in March 1941 that Standard Oil of New Jersey make no sales to the two lines except from New York or Aruba; that the department had reason to believe, and Standard had reported, that the lines were drawing supplies from the Brazilian subsidiary; and that after a conference on April 14, 1941 the company agreed to supply them, if at all, only through that subsidiary, which would deliver only with the approval of the American ambassador in Rio de Janeiro.⁴³

On March 25, 1942 the Department of Justice filed a criminal information and a complaint against Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) and entered a consent decree with it. The information named as defendants the New Jersey company, the Delaware corporation of similar name, the Standard Oil Development Company, the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, the Standard Catalytic Company, Jasco, Inc., the Hydro Engineering and Chemical Company, and Teagle, Farish and Howard.³⁷ Arnold told the committee on March 27 that the company pleaded nolo contendere and paid fines of $50,000. Asked by Harry S. Truman, the committee's chairman, why the fines were so small, Arnold said the department judged that getting the patents loose was more important than fines large enough to involve years of litigation. The chairman remarked that the fines were "rather out of proportion with other fines," and Arnold answered, "I have to confess they are somewhat out of proportion." Arnold said he had not been present at the New York negotiations, which covered a period of weeks, and that "when the smoke all cleared away and the matter reached my office, it was simply a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and at that point, after consultation with a number of people, I finally took it." Asked by the committee's chief counsel, Hugh A. Fulton, whether the company had held back the butyl patents during the negotiations, Arnold said: "Butyl had not been made available."⁴⁴

Arnold said the decree compelled Standard to license anyone royalty-free under the crucial rubber patents and the other patents involved in the conspiracy, including the toluol patents, and required the company to transfer the know-how for them; he said he was reluctant to sign because the decree had no provision allowing the Attorney General or the court to pass on future relations between I.G. Farben and Standard. He said the company had indicated its willingness to make restitution "in the sum of millions of dollars and at the cost of its future domination of the industry."⁴⁵ He put the cost of the royalty-free licensing to the company at possibly $10,000,000, and said the company's release gave $6,000,000.⁴⁶ The final judgment required the defendants to dissolve the Hydro Patents Company and the Hydro Engineering and Chemical Company within one year, enjoined them from entering into patent transfer arrangements with I.G. Farben without notice to the Attorney General, and recorded the Alien Property Custodian's consent to the decree, including limits on royalties and compulsory licensing under the patents.⁴⁷ The information had described the Hydro Patents Company as the vehicle for the hydrogenation process in the United States under the Mutual Licensing Plan of July 11, 1930.⁴⁸

The Federal Trade Commission staff report

The Federal Trade Commission resolved on December 2, 1949 to investigate agreements among American petroleum companies and with their foreign partners; the Department of Justice deferred its own investigation to avoid duplicating the commission's work, and the commission's staff filed its report in October 1951.⁴⁹ Published in 1952 as a committee print of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, the report listed Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) as one of seven international companies, with crude production in 1949 of 1,317.7 thousand barrels daily.⁵⁰ It recorded that Creole Petroleum Corp. was a subsidiary of the New Jersey company and that the company owned 30 percent of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line.⁵¹ It described the board of Aramco as three members each from Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), Standard Oil Co. of California and Texas Co., one from Socony-Vacuum and one with no listed affiliation, and stated that the directors of Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum who determined Aramco policy also shaped the behavior of the Iraq Petroleum Company.⁵²

The Justice Department report to the National Security Council of January 1953 stated that "an indictment could have been returned on the basis of the Federal Trade Commission's staff report and a small number of documents in the possession of the Department of Justice," and that the pending investigation was being conducted "with the aid of a committee composed of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and Justice."⁵³ The commission's evidence also covered the domestic side of the cartel, including production curtailment on the Gulf Coast and the profit Standard of California earned on its Middle East oil at prices charged to the United States Navy.⁵⁴

Aramco and the Saudi concessions

Standard of California obtained a petroleum concession in Saudi Arabia in 1933, located wholly within the territory of the 1928 Red Line Agreement; the concession passed to Aramco, which was owned by Standard of California and The Texas Company.⁵⁵ The Achnacarry Agreement, which Walter Teagle of Standard, Sir Henri Deterding of Royal Dutch Shell and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company made in September 1928, aimed to eliminate competition among the parties, prevent overproduction and divide world markets on an "as is" basis.⁵⁶

Aramco's production rose from 21,296 barrels daily in 1944 to 58,386 in 1945, most of it for military use, and its owners sought a permanent market.⁵⁷ Discussions between Standard of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum and the two owners began before mid-1946; an agreement in principle was reached in December 1946, and formal agreements were signed on March 12, 1947 giving Jersey a 30 percent and Socony a 10 percent interest in Aramco and the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line, conditional on a favorable settlement of the red-line controversy by March 12, 1951.⁵⁸ Jersey was to pay $76,500,000 and Socony $25,500,000 for their stock, and both guaranteed $102,000,000 in bank loans. The agreements became effective in December 1948, after the withdrawal in November 1948 of the suit brought by the Compagnie Française des Pétroles; the Commission's staff put the total financial cost to the two companies for their 40 percent interest at nearly one-half billion dollars, and noted that they obtained a veto over amendments to Aramco's bylaws.⁵⁹ The 1974 print's account of operations under the Red Line agreement states that, on the excuse that Aramco's owners were "unable to finance" a pipeline to the Mediterranean, Jersey and Socony-Vacuum were admitted to partnership; that both agreed to guarantee loans totaling $273,000,000 and became parties to joint contracts for oil from Aramco for eighteen years in the ratio 3:3:3:1; and that this "provided for the transfer of effective control of Aramco to the two American companies, Jersey and Socony."⁵⁵

In April 1945, when Standard of California and Texas still owned Aramco, Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton wrote to Assistant Secretary James C. Dunn on ways of helping the government of Saudi Arabia meet its budget deficit that the department "should avoid putting the Arabian American Oil Company in an embarrassing position without giving it every opportunity to stand on its own feet."⁶⁰ In June 1945 the American minister in Saudi Arabia, William A. Eddy, predicted that the king's alternative to American assistance would be "to bleed Aramco for loans to stabilize his economy," and wrote that the company's opinion was that "Aramco is the substance and the Legation the shadow."⁶¹ In August 1945 the State Department described a proposed arrangement under which Navy oil would carry a royalty of 15 cents a barrel, against the 23 cents specified in the existing Aramco concession.⁶²

The grand jury and the cartel case

The Attorney General's report to the National Security Council of January 1953 stated that the cartel had existed since 1928 and that seven of the major oil companies controlled all major oil producing areas outside the United States, all foreign refining operations and the patents covering refining processes, divided world markets and maintained non-competitive world prices. It stated that a decision to terminate the investigation "would be regarded by the world as a confession that our abhorrence of monopoly and restrictive cartel activities does not extend to the world's most important single industry."⁴⁹⁶³ Frank Church's preface to the 1974 print records the sequence: the Attorney General announced a grand jury investigation on July 17, 1952, subpoenas went to 21 companies in August, and the State Department had opposed the investigation from the outset (Acheson memorandum of April 16, 1952).⁶⁴ On January 12, 1953, in the last days of the Truman administration, Truman wrote to Attorney General James P. McGranery directing a civil suit instead of the grand jury, conditioned on the voluntary production of documents; the department filed a civil complaint on April 14, 1953 in the District Court for the District of Columbia naming Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil of California, The Texas Company and Gulf Oil, alleging violations of the Sherman Act from 1928, and the case was transferred to the Southern District of New York at the defendants' request.⁶⁵

Iran and the 1954 consortium

Church wrote that in March 1951 Iran had nationalized all local assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, that Secretary of State Dean Acheson had considered developing an American capability to restore Iranian production even in the absence of the company, and that the Justice Department believed the cooperation of the established major American companies was not required.⁶⁴⁶⁵ Herbert Hoover Jr. was appointed the new administration's special representative on the Iranian problem. On August 6, 1953 National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 875b designated the Attorney General to "develop a solution which would protect the interests of the free world in the Near East as a vital source of petroleum supplies," and in October 1953 overall authority was transferred from the Attorney General to the Secretary of State.⁶⁵⁶⁶ Church wrote that the American majors, encouraged by the downgrading of the cartel case to a civil action, stated that they would be willing to participate in a solution because of the "large national security interests involved" (letter from Orvil Harden, December 4, 1953).⁶⁶

Representatives of eight companies, namely the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Royal Dutch Shell, Compagnie Française des Pétroles, Standard Oil France, Standard of California, Texas, Gulf and Socony, met in London on December 14, 15 and 17, 1953 at the invitation of the Anglo-Iranian company, with Hoover attending as an observer at the request of the Justice Department.⁶⁷ John Foster Dulles's memorandum of January 8, 1954 records that after the meeting of the National Security Council that day he, Wilson, Humphrey, Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. and Anderson discussed legal clearance for the American companies, and that the Attorney General "felt that he could give some sort of agreement not to sue" if requested in the national interest, and that the pending lawsuit would be continued in a way that would avoid undesirable publicity, which "would require some cooperation from the attorneys for the oil companies."⁶⁸ On January 13, 1954 the assistant attorney general Stanley N. Barnes and the antitrust attorney Leonard Emmerglick gave Brownell the division's two primary objections to the consortium agreement: the possible use of a veto by the Anglo-Iranian company, the British government and the Iranian government, and the lack of freedom to set prices and markets.⁶⁹ The National Security Council decided on January 14 that the security interests of the United States required the American petroleum companies to participate in an international consortium.⁶⁶

On January 20, 1954 Brownell advised the National Security Council that the consortium, if organized as described and with the freedom of each member to sell oil at prices it determined, did not violate the antitrust laws. The opinion was given "subject to the express reservation of all rights of the United States" to continue prosecuting the action against Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and others, pending in the Southern District of New York as Civil No. 86-27.⁷⁰ Hoover wrote on January 21 that the "five United States companies now named in the Cartel antitrust case are the only ones from this country who meet such a criteria" for participation in an Iranian settlement.⁷¹

The consortium's composition as set out on April 1, 1954 gave the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 40 per cent, Royal Dutch Shell 14 per cent, Compagnie Française des Pétroles 6 per cent, and 8 per cent each to Jersey Standard, Socony-Vacuum, California Standard, Gulf Oil and Texas, making the American share 40 per cent; its negotiating representatives for Tehran were Harden of Jersey Standard, Snow of the Anglo-Iranian company and Loudon of Royal Dutch Shell.⁷² By May 1954 the consortium insisted that it control extraction and refining as principals, while the Iranians insisted that management remain under the National Iranian Oil Company, and Ambassador Loy Henderson reported that the two sides were moving toward an agency arrangement.⁷³ A joint Iranian-British statement of August 5, 1954 set compensation at 25 million pounds payable over ten years, free of interest, with payments beginning no earlier than January 1, 1957.⁷⁴ On September 21, 1954 the Finance Minister, Ali Amini, introduced into the Majlis a single-article bill to ratify an agreement signed by Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company on one side and by Gulf, Socony Vacuum, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of California, the Texas Oil Company, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, N.V. Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and Compagnie Française des Pétroles on the other.⁷⁵ The Iranian Senate ratified the agreement on October 28, 1954 by 41 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions.⁷⁶

Church's preface describes the later course of the consortium and the cartel case. Clause 28 of the Participants Agreement, which he printed for the first time, permitted companies holding an aggregate of 31 percent or more of the equity to set crude production at any level below the desires of the rest of the members; the Antitrust Division attorney Emmerglick wrote on August 19, 1954 that the "plan goes beyond the premises upon which the Attorney General's opinion delivered to the National Security Council was based." The Attorney General, who "felt that he had already crossed this bridge on January 20," approved the plan, and on September 15, 1954 "agreed that approval of the consortium was inconsistent with the cartel case as the complaint is drawn and that necessarily the case must proceed with emphasis on the marketing aspects and not on the production control aspects."⁶⁶⁷⁷ The Statement of Claims prepared in 1961 concerned marketing; consent decrees were entered against Gulf, Exxon and Texaco, and the case against Mobil and Socal was dismissed without prejudice. Church wrote that the National Security Council "perverted the law" and that "nowhere is there any reference to consultation with the United States Congress."⁷⁷

Guatemala, June 1954

On June 16, 1954, in a telephone call recorded by Secretary of State Dulles's secretary, Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, told John Foster Dulles that he was seeing that morning "men from Standard of NJ" who would "lay before him their position with regard to the small country down south," and that besides finding out their position he would "possibly slow things up without formalized action." The call concerned the Central Intelligence Agency operation against the government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala; the Secretary asked whether Bourke B. Hickenlooper might introduce a sanctions bill in the Senate.⁷⁸

Latin America and the Rockefeller Network

Standard Oil of New Jersey's extensive holdings in Venezuela and across Latin America made the region central to the family's interests, and the young Nelson Rockefeller became a director of the company's Venezuelan subsidiary, Creole Petroleum, in the 1930s. His effort to manage the political risk to those holdings led to his 1940 appointment as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the wartime office that fused commercial interests, intelligence collection, and propaganda across the hemisphere.⁷⁹ Creole Petroleum Corp. was a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) in 1949.⁸⁰ Executive Order 8840 of July 30, 1941 established the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs within the Executive Office of the President and defined its functions and duties.⁸¹

Footnotes

Chernow, Ron. Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. Random House, 1998. ↩︎
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (decided May 15, 1911), statement of the bill (conspiracy alleged "in or about the year 1870" by John D. Rockefeller, William Rockefeller and Henry M. Flagler; three periods, 1870 to 1882, 1882 to 1899 and 1899 to the filing of the bill). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/1 ↩︎
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (decided May 15, 1911), statement of the bill ("Standard Oil Company of Ohio, and sixty-two other corporations and partnerships, as also seven individuals, were named as defendants"). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/1 ↩︎
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (decided May 15, 1911), summary of the petition's averments on the trust of 1882 and the 1899 acquisition by the New Jersey company of the shares of the defendant companies. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/1 ↩︎
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (decided May 15, 1911), statement of the bill ("a complete mastery over the Oil industry, controlling 90 per cent of the business of producing, shipping, refining, and selling petroleum and its products"). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/1 ↩︎
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (decided May 15, 1911), opinion of White, C.J., opening paragraph ("The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and thirty-three other corporations, John D. Rockefeller, William Rockefeller, and five other individual defendants prosecute this appeal"). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/1 ↩︎
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (decided May 15, 1911), concluding part of the opinion ("Our order will therefore be one of affirmance, with directions, however, to modify the decree"; the court below "to retain jurisdiction"). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/1 ↩︎
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (decided May 15, 1911), opinion of Harlan, J., "concurring in part and dissenting in part." https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/1 ↩︎
Yale University, Obituary Record of the Graduates of the Undergraduate Schools, Deceased 1915 to 1920, entry for Oliver Hazard Payne, B.A. 1863, pp. 295 to 296 (treasurer until 1884; board thereafter; death June 27, 1917; nephews). https://archive.org/details/1915t20obituary00yaleuoft ↩︎
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), decree Section 2 as set out in the opinion ("the seven individual defendants"; "Oliver H. Payne"). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/221/1 ↩︎
Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, vol. 1 (1904), p. 57. https://archive.org/details/historyofstandar01tarbuoft ↩︎
Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, vol. 1 (1904), p. 168. https://archive.org/details/historyofstandar01tarbuoft ↩︎
Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, vol. 2 (1904), pp. 112 to 113. https://archive.org/details/historyofstandar02tarbuoft ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Mis. Doc. No. 106, 49th Cong., 1st sess. (1886), testimony of L. A. Russell, p. 221, and of L. C. Cole, p. 42. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/SERIALSET-02346_00_00-008-0106-0000 ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Report No. 1490, 49th Cong., 1st sess. (July 15, 1886), https://www.senate.gov/about/origins-foundations/electing-appointing-senators/contested-senate-elections/pdf/75_Jul_15_1886_Payne.pdf; U.S. Senate, "Henry B. Payne (Ohio)," Contested Senate Elections. https://www.senate.gov/about/origins-foundations/electing-appointing-senators/contested-senate-elections/075Henry_Payne.htm ↩︎
"O. H. Payne Dies in His Town Home," The Evening World (New York), June 28, 1917, p. 15. https://www.loc.gov/resource/sn83030193/1917-06-28/ed-1/?sp=15 ↩︎
Exxon Mobil Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1999 (filed March 23, 2000), Item 1 ("Exxon Mobil Corporation ('ExxonMobil'), formerly named Exxon Corporation, was incorporated in the State of New Jersey in 1882"; merger of Mobil Corporation into a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon on November 30, 1999) and SEC header (former conformed name Standard Oil Co of New Jersey, date of name change 1972-11-23), accession no. 0000930661-00-000656. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/0000930661-00-000656.txt ↩︎
Chevron Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024 (filed February 21, 2025), note to Item 1 ("Incorporated in Delaware in 1926 as Standard Oil Company of California, the company adopted the name Chevron Corporation in 1984 and ChevronTexaco Corporation in 2001. In 2005, ChevronTexaco Corporation changed its name to Chevron Corporation"), accession no. 0000093410-25-000009. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000009341025000009/cvx-20241231.htm ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VI ("Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon), Socony-Vacuum Oil Company (now Mobil), Standard Oil Company of California (Socal), The Texas Company (now Texaco), and Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf)"). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), statement of Thurman W. Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, March 26, 1942, p. 4309 (the four agreements of November 9, 1929; "division of the fields," four-party, coordination and German sales agreements; Exhibits 360 to 364-A, appendix pp. 4561-4580). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, pp. 4309-4310 (allocation of fields; I.G. turning over patents directly concerning oil production, including synthetic gasoline). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4309 (two patent pools, one for synthetic rubber and chemicals controlled by Germany, one for synthetic gasoline controlled by Standard Oil). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, pp. 4307-4308 ("these arrangements were not entered into with any desire to help Germany. The sole motive was an attempt on the part of the Standard Oil to get a protected market, to eliminate independent competition, and, finally, to restrict world production in order to maintain that control"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4310 (letter signed by Mr. Teagle, Exhibit 367, appendix p. 4584); U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 7 ("Walter Teagle of Standard"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, pp. 4310-4311 (The Hague Memorandum; letter of Frank A. Howard of October 12, 1939, Exhibit 368, appendix pp. 4584-4585). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), testimony of W.S. Farish, March 31, 1942, p. 4374 (Standard-I.G. and Jasco holdings of 80 and 50 per cent; patents originated with I.G.; legal title left in I.G.). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Farish testimony, p. 4375 (assignment to an American trustee; German 20 per cent interest in Standard-I.G. bought at "book value ($20,000)"; Jasco settlement). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
Office of Alien Property Custodian, Vesting Order No. 1, "Vesting of Property of I.G. Farbenindustrie, Standard-I.G. Co., and Others," signed by Leo T. Crowley, March 25, 1942, 7 Federal Register 2417 (March 31, 1942) (Exhibit A, items 1 to 14 and schedules A to D of patents; issued under Executive Order 9095, 7 F.R. 1971). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1942-03-31/pdf/FR-1942-03-31.pdf ↩︎
Office of Alien Property Custodian, Annual Report for the Period March 11, 1942 to June 30, 1943 (Washington: GPO, 1943), Exhibit A, "List of Vesting Orders Issued by the Office of Alien Property Custodian, Mar. 11, 1942 to June 30, 1943," first entry (interest of I.G. Farbenindustrie in Standard Catalytic Co. and Jasco Inc.). https://archive.org/details/officeofalienpro00unit ↩︎
Office of Alien Property Custodian, Annual Report for the Period March 11, 1942 to June 30, 1943 (Washington: GPO, 1943), p. 97 (German interests in American patents and cartels; "acquired a substantial influence in American industry"; synthetic rubber among the industries listed). https://archive.org/details/officeofalienpro00unit ↩︎
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), p. 325 and note (agreement of 1928 among Standard (New Jersey), Shell and Anglo-Iranian in Germany; marketing subsidiaries of Leuna and I.G. Farben; Deutsche Gasolin A.G. "owned 50 percent by Standard (Now Jersey), and 50 percent by I. G. Farbenindustrie"). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2 ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4312 ("I. G. Farben had the deciding voice on policy questions with respect to buna synthetic rubber"; four rubber companies and one chemical company, 1932 to 1934; Goodrich negotiations of 1932). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4312 (letter of Frank A. Howard to E.J. Sadler, February 6, 1940, Exhibit 371, appendix p. 4589); the same letter at pp. 4589-4590. https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4312 (butyl licensing). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4307 (Exhibit 359, release issued by Standard Oil on March 25, 1942, appendix p. 4560-4561; "The developments made under these agreements have advanced the progress of American industry and its ability to meet the war emergency"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold statement, p. 4308 (refusal to let the British have a rubber sample as late as 1941). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Exhibit 441, information in the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, appendix pp. 4693-4697 (defendants; Standard and General Motors each owning 50 per cent of the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation, "sole producer of tetraethyl lead," p. 4697). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), Harvard Caselaw Access Project, https://static.case.law/us/309/cases/0436-01.json. ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Howard letter of February 6, 1940 (Exhibit 371), appendix pp. 4589-4590 (Ethyl G.m.b.H. "owned 50% by the British Associated Ethyl Co. and 50% by I. G. Farbenindustrie," payment of "nearly $900,000"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), committee summary, pp. 4825-4826 (memorandum signed by E.J. Gohr, August 1, 1939, Exhibit S. 69, appendix p. 4907; letter of R.P. Russell to E.V. Murphree, August 11, 1939, on the process design of the "D. A. P. G. catalytic cracking plant"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Farish statement, March 31, 1942, p. 4360 (items 3 and 4 of the charges Farish listed; "This is true and as a German corporation, operating in Germany ... it could not have done otherwise"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), committee summary, pp. 4827-4828 (memorandum of Frank A. Howard to Messrs. Teagle and Farish, Exhibit S. 75, appendix p. 4916; "Thus Standard met with difficulties in developing aviation gasoline for our own Army because of the cartel agreement," p. 4828). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), testimony of Adolf A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, April 3, 1942, pp. 4506-4508 (Lati and Condor; request of March 1941; conference of April 14, 1941). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, March 27, 1942, p. 4345 (information, complaint and consent decree filed "day before yesterday"; nolo contendere; fines of $50,000; exchange with the chairman); consent decree of March 25, 1942 indexed at p. 4346. https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, pp. 4346-4347 (royalty-free licensing under the rubber and toluol patents; transfer of know-how; no provision for the Attorney General or the court to pass on future relations with I.G.; "in the sum of millions of dollars and at the cost of its future domination of the industry," p. 4347). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Arnold, p. 4328 (royalty-free licensing and compulsory licensing after the war; cost to the company "possibly $10,000,000. I think their release says $6,000,000"). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Exhibit 440, "Final Judgment," United States v. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) et al., District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, appendix pp. 4677-4687 (defendants named at p. 4677; paragraph (14), dissolution of Hydro Patents Co. and Hydro Engineering and Chemical Co. one year after entry, p. 4684; Alien Property Custodian consent and compulsory licensing, p. 4686). https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 11 (Rubber) (Washington: GPO, 1942), Exhibit 441, information, paragraphs 34 and 35 (Hydro Patents Company and the Mutual Licensing Plan of July 11, 1930), appendix p. 4702. https://archive.org/details/investigationofn1942unit ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), pp. 29-33 (Report of the Attorney General to the National Security Council relative to the grand jury investigation of the international oil cartel, January 1953): pp. 29-30 (Federal Trade Commission resolution of December 2, 1949; subpoenas duces tecum of January 1950; staff report filed October 1951; instruction of June 23, 1952); p. 31 (cartel since 1928); p. 32 (committee of State, CIA, Defense and Justice). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), p. 24, Table 9 (crude oil production of seven international companies, 1949: Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) 1,317.7 thousand barrels daily). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2 ↩︎
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 27-28 (pipeline ownership: Creole Petroleum Corp., "a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)"; Trans-Arabian Pipe Line, Jersey 30 per cent, Texas 30, Standard of California 30, Socony-Vacuum 10; Interprovincial Pipe Line and Imperial Oil). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2 ↩︎
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 31-32 (interlocking directorates; Aramco board of three members each from Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), Standard Oil Co. of California and Texas Co., one from Socony-Vacuum and one unaffiliated; summary: four of the seven companies own all the shares of Aramco). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2 ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 32 (Justice Department report of January 1953: "an indictment could have been returned on the basis of the Federal Trade Commission's staff report and a small number of documents in the possession of the Department of Justice"). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), pp. 5-6 and 29 (Federal Trade Commission material on production curtailment and on Navy prices). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 10 (1933 Saudi concession; Standard of New Jersey 30 per cent and Socony 10 per cent of Aramco stock; loans totaling $273,000,000; eighteen-year contracts; ratio 3:3:3:1). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 7 (Achnacarry Agreement of September 1928; Walter Teagle of Standard, Sir Henri Deterding of Shell and Anglo-Persian; "as is" basis; "Standard's fear of the American antitrust laws" and the parties' decision not to sign the final agreement). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 118-119 (Aramco in 1944 to 1946; Standard of California and Texas as owners; Ras Tanura refinery; production of 21,296 barrels daily in 1944 and 58,386 in 1945). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2 ↩︎
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 119-121 (agreement in principle in December 1946; formal agreements of March 12, 1947; condition of settlement of the red-line controversy by March 12, 1951). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2 ↩︎
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), pp. 122-124 (stock subscription agreements of March 12, 1947; Jersey $76,500,000 and Socony $25,500,000; guaranty of $102,000,000 in bank loans; effective December 1948 after the withdrawal of the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles suit in November 1948; limited veto; "nearly one-half billion dollars"). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa, Document 850, Clayton to Dunn, April 7, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d850 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa, Document 892, Eddy to the Secretary of State, Jidda, June 21, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d892 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Volume VIII, The Near East and Africa, Document 920, Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, August 8, 1945. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d920 ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 33 ("A decision at this time to terminate the pending investigation would be regarded by the world as a confession that our abhorrence of monopoly and restrictive cartel activities does not extend to the world's most important single industry"; letter of Harry S. Truman to Attorney General James P. McGranery, January 12, 1953). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. V (policies of "prosecution of the International Petroleum Cartel Case" and "creation of the Iranian Consortium"; announcement of July 17, 1952; subpoenas of August 1952 against 21 companies; Acheson memorandum of April 16, 1952). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VI (Truman letter of January 12, 1953; civil complaint filed April 14, 1953 in the District Court for the District of Columbia naming Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil Company of California, The Texas Company and Gulf Oil; transfer to the Southern District of New York at the defendants' request; Hoover appointed; National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 875b of August 6, 1953). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VII (transfer of authority in October 1953; letter from Harden, December 4, 1953; National Security Council decision of January 14, 1954; opinion of January 20, 1954; clause 28 of the Participants Agreement; Emmerglick memorandum of August 19, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, Document 397, Butterworth to the Department of State, London, December 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d397 ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 61 (memorandum of John Foster Dulles, January 8, 1954, following the meeting of the National Security Council). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), p. 62 (memorandum to the files, Stanley N. Barnes, January 13, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, Document 411, Brownell to the National Security Council, January 20, 1954 (action pending as Civil No. 86-27, Southern District of New York). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d411 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, Document 413, Hoover to the Secretary of State, January 21, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d413 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, Document 449, Aldrich to the Department of State, London, April 1, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d449 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, Document 458, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, May 8, 1954. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d458 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, Document 490, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, August 5, 1954 (joint Iranian-British statement: compensation of 25 million pounds payable over ten years, free of interest, payments not to begin before January 1, 1957). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d490 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, Document 496, Henderson to the Department of State, Tehran, September 21, 1954 (single-article bill introduced by Finance Minister Amini). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d496 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, Document 502, Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran, October 28, 1954, editorial note (agreement in principle signed August 5, 1954 between the Government of Iran and the International Oil Consortium; ratified by the Iranian Senate on October 28, 1954, 41 votes to 4, with 3 abstentions). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d502 ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (committee print, February 21, 1974), preface by Senator Frank Church, p. VIII (memorandum to Barnes, September 15, 1954; Statement of Claims of 1961; consent decrees against Gulf, Exxon and Texaco; dismissal as to Mobil and Socal without prejudice; Emmerglick, September 15, 1954). https://archive.org/details/TheInternationalPetroleumCartelTheIranianConsortiumAndU.S.NationalSecurity ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala, Document 189, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Washington, June 16, 1954, 11:20 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d189 ↩︎
Colby, Gerard, and Charlotte Dennett. Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil. HarperCollins, 1995. ↩︎
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6 (Washington: GPO, 1952), p. 27 (Creole Petroleum Corp., a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP57-00384R000700130001-2 ↩︎
Executive Order 8840, "Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Executive Office of the President and Defining Its Functions and Duties," July 30, 1941. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-8840-establishing-the-office-the-coordinator-inter-american-affairs-the ↩︎

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