The_Info_Web/40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/HSCA.md

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---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-09
title: HSCA
aliases:
- House Select Committee on Assassinations
- HSCA
- Select Committee on Assassinations
tags:
- Event
- JFKAssassination
- MLK
- Government
- Investigation
- 1970s
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
summary: "The House Select Committee on Assassinations (1976-1979) reported that Kennedy was 'probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy' and found a 'likelihood of conspiracy' in King's death."
start: 1976-09-17
end: 1979-01-02
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[Thomas N. Downing]]"
reverse: true
start: 1976-10
end: 1977-01
role: chairman
fn: 1
- type: head_of
with: "[[Henry B. Gonzalez]]"
reverse: true
start: 1977-01
end: 1977-03-08
role: chairman
fn: 2
- type: head_of
with: "[[Louis Stokes]]"
reverse: true
start: 1977-03-08
end: 1979-01-02
role: chairman
fn: 1
- type: head_of
with: "[[Richard A. Sprague]]"
reverse: true
start: 1976-10-04
end: 1977-03-30
role: acting chief counsel, then chief counsel
fn: 3
- type: head_of
with: "[[G. Robert Blakey]]"
reverse: true
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
role: chief counsel and staff director
fn: 1
- type: investigated
with: "[[James Earl Ray]]"
start: 1977-03-30
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 4
- type: investigated
with: "[[Carlos Marcello]]"
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 5
- type: investigated
with: "[[Santos Trafficante, Jr.]]"
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 6
- type: investigated
with: "[[Jimmy Hoffa]]"
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 7
- type: investigated
with: "[[Jack Ruby]]"
start: 1977-06
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 8
- type: investigated
with: "[[Yuri Nosenko]]"
start: 1978
end: 1979-01-02
fn: 9
---
The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) was a special committee of the U.S. House of Representatives created by [[House Resolution 1540]] in September 1976 to reinvestigate the murders of President [[John F. Kennedy]] (November 22, 1963) and Dr. [[Martin Luther King Jr.]] (April 4, 1968). It filed its final report in January 1979. The report reached conclusions on both assassinations that differ from the earlier official findings of the [[Warren Commission]] and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], and its acoustic finding in the Kennedy case was disputed by a [[National Research Council]] panel in 1982.[^10]
### Authorization and membership
The House adopted House Resolution 1540 by 280 to 65 on September 17, 1976, during the 94th Congress.[^11] The resolution followed the April 1976 report of the Senate select committee led by [[Frank Church]] ([[Church Committee]]), which found that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] had withheld from the Warren Commission information about United States plots against [[Fidel Castro]] and that the FBI had conducted a counterintelligence program ([[COINTELPRO]]) against King and the [[Southern Christian Leadership Conference]]. The new committee was constituted for the months remaining in that Congress and expired on January 3, 1977.[^1] [[House Resolution 222]], passed by the House on February 2, 1977, reconstituted it for two months, and [[House Resolution 433]], approved on March 30, 1977, continued it through the 95th Congress.[^1]
The first chairman was [[Thomas N. Downing]] (D-Virginia), who served from October 1976 until he retired in early January 1977.[^12] [[Henry B. Gonzalez]] (D-Texas) then became chairman. [[Louis Stokes]] (D-Ohio) was named chairman on March 8, 1977, to replace the chairman who had resigned.[^1] The Kennedy subcommittee was chaired by [[Richardson Preyer]] and the King subcommittee by [[Walter E. Fauntroy]].[^1] The final report was submitted over Stokes's signature in a letter dated December 29, 1978.[^10]
### Chief counsels and the Sprague dispute
[[Richard A. Sprague]], a Philadelphia prosecutor who had been chief prosecutor in the Yablonski murder case that convicted [[W. A. Boyle]], was named acting counsel by Downing on October 4, 1976.[^13] Gonzalez and Sprague clashed over budgets and funding in the early months of 1977. The separate views appended to the report, written by members who joined the committee after Gonzalez left it, describe the two men as spending "a good deal of time from January through March" 1977 "struggling over budgets and funding measures," with little time left for investigation.[^12]
*Newsweek* wrote in April 1977 that Gonzalez resigned as chairman following "a nasty clash" with Sprague, "in which most other panel members backed Sprague," and cited its own report of February 21, 1977.[^14] The *New York Times* reported on March 3, 1977, that Gonzalez "submitted his resignation yesterday," March 2, after accusing other members of trying to usurp his power; the Speaker, [[Tip O'Neill]], declined to accept it until he had spoken to Gonzalez, and it required approval of the full House.[^15] The *Washington Post* reported on March 29, 1977, that Gonzalez "quit the chairmanship and the committee on March 8," the day Stokes was appointed chairman, and quoted his speech from the House floor, in which he said "I think I have been treated shabbily" and attributed his treatment at least partly to racial discrimination.[^2] A *Chicago Tribune* report of April 3, 1977, quoted the same speech, in which Gonzalez said he had received no support from committee members or the Democratic leadership in his attempts to rein in what he called Sprague's "extravagant and arrogant behavior," and said that "within hours of Gonzalez' attack from the House floor, Sprague quit."[^16]
Sprague resigned on March 30, 1977, the day the House voted 230 to 181 to continue the committee under House Resolution 433.[^3] The separate views say that Sprague "left shortly thereafter" and that the committee's first priority was a new chief counsel.[^12] [[G. Robert Blakey]], a law professor at Cornell University with Justice Department experience, was appointed chief counsel and staff director in June 1977, and the investigations did not start until July 1977.[^1] Blakey was chief counsel when the final report was filed.[^10]
### The CIA interface
The agency handled its dealings with the committee through its [[Office of Legislative Counsel]]. A memorandum from the office sets out procedures for committee staff reviews of agency documents and interviews at headquarters. It states that the original notes taken by committee researchers were retained by the office, that copies went to the offices of interest for sanitization, and that the sanitized notes were then returned for forwarding to the committee.[^17] A separate memorandum, titled "Control of Draft House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Reports," concerns the handling of draft committee reports within the agency.[^18]
[[George E. Joannides]] served as the agency's liaison to the committee in 1978. A May 24, 1978, memorandum from the Career Management Staff of the Directorate of Operations to the Office of General Counsel and the Office of Legislative Counsel describes him as a GS-16 operations careerist with a law degree who, after major surgery, sought a position in one of those two offices.[^19] The agency's Honor and Merit Awards Board narrative for his Career Intelligence Medal, dated March 20, 1981, states that he continued in his assignment "until June 1978, when he was selected to assist the Agency's senior coordinator for work with the House Select Committee on Assassinations," that "he was rated Outstanding for his handling of this unusual special assignment," and that he continued in it until his retirement on January 12, 1979.[^20] On July 24, 1978, a CIA memorandum for the record lists Joannides among six agency officers who met [[G. Robert Blakey]] and Gary Cornwell on a Saturday morning at 0730 "to discuss activity in Mexico City planned by HSCA."[^21] A memorandum of November 24, 1978, records that [[Ann Goodpasture]] said Joannides had called to tell her that a committee investigator was trying to reach her.[^22] In November 1978 he also testified under cover at the espionage trial of [[William Kampiles]].[^23]
In 1963 Joannides had been the CIA case officer for the anti-Castro [[Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil]] (DRE), whose members had contact with [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] that year. Blakey and [[Jefferson Morley]], with other signatories including [[Don DeLillo]], [[Norman Mailer]], [[Gerald Posner]] and [[Anthony Summers]], wrote in a December 2003 letter that "in 1978, he served as the CIA's liaison to the House Select Committee on Assassinations," and that the agency "did not reveal to the Congress his role in the events of 1963, compromising the committee's investigation."[^24] In 2014 Blakey stated that "George Joannides was brought out of retirement by the Agency to specifically work as a liaison with our Committee," that he was tasked mainly with dealing with the committee staff lawyers [[Dan Hardway]] and [[Edwin Lopez]], and that the CIA employee who told Blakey that the agency could find no record of any such DRE case officer was Joannides himself. Blakey added that "I no longer trust anything that the Agency has told us in regard to the assassination," and that he had been wrong to accept the assurance of Director [[Stansfield Turner]]'s letter to Stokes of November 30, 1978, that the agency had provided all pertinent information.[^25] Hardway stated in a sworn submission to the House Oversight Committee in 2025 that "beginning in May of 1978, the CIA assigned George Joannides" to handle liaison with Lopez and himself, that the obstruction "escalated over the summer," ending in a refusal of unexpurgated access to files in violation of the memorandum of understanding negotiated in August 1977, and that in 1978 he was told nothing of Joannides's role in the Kennedy case.[^26]
In the Freedom of Information Act suit *Morley v. CIA*, the D.C. Circuit decided in 2007 a request that sought the Office of General Counsel records "pertaining to the selection of George Joannides as liaison to the [HSCA] in May 1978." The court described Joannides as a deceased CIA officer, and the agency told Morley it could "neither confirm nor deny" the existence of records about his participation in covert operations.[^27]
### Kennedy findings
The committee's findings on the Kennedy assassination were filed in summary form in January 1979. It found that Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, that the second and third struck the President, and that the third killed him.[^10]
The committee stated that President Kennedy "was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy," and that it "is unable to identify the other gunman or the extent of the conspiracy."[^10] It found that the Soviet and Cuban governments were not involved, that anti-Castro Cuban groups as groups were not involved though individual members may have been, and that the national syndicate of organized crime as a group was not involved though individual members may have been. On the Secret Service, the FBI and the CIA, it stated in Finding I.C.5 that they "were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy," after Findings I.C.3 and I.C.4 had stated that "the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved."[^28]
The committee found that agencies and departments of the U.S. government "performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of their duties." It found that the Secret Service "was deficient in the performance of its duties," that the Department of Justice "failed to exercise initiative" in supervising the FBI investigation, and that the FBI was "deficient in its sharing of information with other agencies and departments." On the CIA it found that the agency "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination."[^10] It found that the Warren Commission "failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President," a deficiency "attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government," and that its conclusions were "presented in a fashion that was too definitive."[^29]
### The medical and firearms evidence
Volume VII of the hearings, published in March 1979, contains the report of the Forensic Pathology Panel, chaired by [[Michael M. Baden]], chief medical examiner of New York City, with the dissent of [[Cyril H. Wecht]] and the majority's response, and the report of the Firearms Panel.[^30]
### The acoustic evidence
The conspiracy finding rested on the acoustic analysis of a [[Dallas Police Department]] radio recording of November 22, 1963, which was recorded on a Dictabelt for channel 1 and a Gray Audograph disc for channel 2. The committee contracted with [[Bolt, Beranek and Newman]] (BBN) in May 1978 for the analysis, which was supervised by [[James E. Barger]].[^31] The BBN report printed in volume VIII records that the committee's request was made on May 12, 1978, that the channel 1 tape covered 12:28 to 12:34 p.m., and that the channel 2 tape was intermittent and carried the communications of Chief [[Jesse Curry]]. The Dallas reconstruction fired test shots from the book depository and from behind the fence on the grassy knoll in [[Dealey Plaza]], and BBN matched them against the impulses on the 1963 tape.[^32] The committee's acoustic hearings included Barger's testimony of September 11, 1978.[^33]
Barger estimated that the impulses on the dispatch tape included motorcade impulses with 99 percent probability, and he gave a 50 percent chance that any one of the matches was invalid. In his September 1978 testimony he put the probability of a grassy knoll shot at 50 percent.[^31] In July 1978 the committee had asked the Acoustical Society of America to recommend reviewers, and it selected Professor [[Mark Weiss]] of [[Queens College]], who had served on the panel of experts appointed by Judge [[John J. Sirica]] to examine the White House tape recordings, and his research associate [[Ernest Aschkenasy]]. In mid-September 1978 the committee asked them to refine the work. They modeled a microphone on a motorcycle moving at about 11 miles per hour and found a sequence of impulses matching a shot from the grassy knoll to within 1/1,000 of a second.[^34]
Weiss and Aschkenasy computed, "with a certainty factor of 95 percent or better," that a shot was fired from the grassy knoll.[^35] Their written report to the committee of February 1979 gave binary correlation coefficients of 0.79 and 0.75 within a window of one millisecond, and located the microphone on Elm Street about 97 feet south of the book depository and the source of the shot about eight and a half feet west of the corner of the stockade fence.[^36] The report gives a further figure of 76 percent, the product of a 95 percent chance of a rifle-level noise and an 80 percent chance that the N-wave was caused by a supersonic bullet.[^34] On this basis the committee concluded that the cause of the impulses was "probably a gunshot fired at the motorcade."[^34]
In separate views, [[Samuel L. Devine]] and [[Robert W. Edgar]] each wrote, "I saw little evidence of a conspiracy" and "I saw little evidence of a second shooter," and that until further study of the acoustics work was undertaken each would "stand by my belief that Lee Harvey Oswald acted as the lone assassin." The separate views quote [[Marvin E. Wolfgang]], professor of sociology and law at the University of Pennsylvania, who wrote on January 2, 1979, that it was "premature and inappropriate" for a federal committee to make a major policy decision on the basis of the acoustic findings. They also quote [[Francis K. Davis]], dean of science at [[Drexel University]], who wrote on January 8, 1979, that the 95 percent confidence claim was "grossly exaggerated."[^37]
The Department of Justice asked the [[National Research Council]] to review the evidence, and in the fall of 1980 the council established its [[Committee on Ballistic Acoustics]], chaired by [[Norman F. Ramsey]] of Harvard University. Its members included [[Luis W. Alvarez]], [[Herman Chernoff]], [[Robert H. Dicke]], [[Richard L. Garwin]], [[Paul Horowitz]] and Alfred Johnson of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The panel met on January 31 and February 1, 1981, with Barger, Weiss, Aschkenasy and the FBI acoustician Bruce E. Koenig. An FBI Technical Services Division report dated November 19, 1980, and released on December 1, 1980, had found that the acoustical evidence "did not scientifically prove" that the Dictabelt contained gunshots.[^38]
In 1982 the council published the panel's report. It states that the acoustic analyses "do not demonstrate that there was a grassy knoll shot," that there is "no acoustic basis for the claim of 95% probability of such a shot," and that the impulses attributed to gunshots were recorded about one minute after the President had been shot, a timing derived from a crosstalk on the recording that Steve Barber of Mansfield, Ohio, had called to the panel's attention. It concludes that "reliable acoustic data do not support a conclusion that there was a second gunman."[^38] In 2001 D. B. Thomas published a reanalysis in *Science & Justice* that supported the committee's conclusion, and in 2005 Linsker, Garwin, Chernoff, Horowitz and Ramsey replied in the same journal that the paper contained serious errors, corrected errors in the council's own report, and reaffirmed its conclusion.[^39] The acoustic evidence remains contested among researchers.
### Organized crime and the Warren Commission
Volume IX of the hearings is the committee's organized crime staff material.[^40] The report states that [[Johnny Roselli]] and [[Sam Giancana]], both of whom took part in the CIA plots against Castro, had been murdered by the time of the investigation, and that the committee was ultimately frustrated in its attempt to determine the details of those plots. It states that "there is reason to speculate" that the Mafia continued to appear to participate in the plots "just to keep the CIA interested."[^41] The committee found that the CIA should have provided the Warren Commission with the details of the AMLASH plot against Castro, since Castro may well have known of the plot by November 22, 1963.[^42] It found that the CIA-Mafia-Cuban plots had "all the elements necessary for a successful assassination conspiracy" (people, motive and means), and that the CIA-Mafia plots, like the AMLASH plot, should have been aggressively explored in the 1963-64 investigation.[^41] The report also quotes FBI electronic surveillance of a December 3, 1963, conversation in which Giancana's lieutenant Charles English told him that the FBI was "gonna start running down Fair Play for Cuba."[^43]
The report names "most likely" the family bosses [[Carlos Marcello]] and [[Santos Trafficante, Jr.]] as the organized crime figures who might have been involved.[^43] It states that Marcello had "the motive, means and opportunity to have President John F. Kennedy assassinated," and that the committee was "unable to establish direct evidence." It describes as the critical evidentiary element the existence of credible associations linking [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] and [[Jack Ruby]] to Marcello's organization, and it lists Oswald's uncle Charles "Dutz" Murret, a minor underworld gambling figure and an associate of organized crime figures affiliated with the Marcello organization, acquaintances of Oswald's mother, and a call to the Marcello lieutenant Nofio Pecora from Ruby on October 30, 1963. It found [[David Ferrie]], who worked for Marcello's lawyer G. Wray Gill, with Marcello at the New Orleans courthouse on November 22, 1963. It recounts a September 1962 account by the informant [[Edward Becker]] of a threat by Marcello against the President at Churchill Farms, states that the FBI never investigated it and tried to discredit the informant, and says that the committee found the informant had a questionable reputation for honesty. It states that the FBI never maintained electronic surveillance of Marcello despite two attempts, and that Marcello denied involvement in executive session. The committee concluded that "it may be said that it is unlikely that Marcello was in fact, involved in the assassination of the President," and added that his motive and links to Oswald and Ruby, coupled with the failure of the 1963-64 investigation, "precluded a judgment by the committee that Marcello and his associates were not involved."[^5]
The Trafficante material begins with the Cuban exile [[Jose Aleman]], who told the *Washington Post* in 1976 that Trafficante had said in a 1962 conversation, which also touched on the prosecution of [[Jimmy Hoffa]], that the President "was going to be hit." In a March 1977 interview with the committee Aleman said that Trafficante made clear he was not guessing, that a crime was being planned, and that Hoffa would be principally involved. In September 1978 he reaffirmed this and then, after stating that he feared reprisal, testified that the remark might have meant "a lot of Republican votes" in 1964. Trafficante denied the account in public session on September 28, 1978. The committee found it difficult to understand how Aleman could have misunderstood or why he would fabricate the account, but doubted its validity, and concluded that it was "unlikely that Trafficante plotted to kill the President, although it could not rule out the possibility of such participation."[^6]
The report also examined the 1959 contact between Ruby and Trafficante at the [[Trescornia]] detention camp in Cuba. Trafficante was held from June 6 to August 18, 1959, and Ruby's first Cuba trip began on August 8, 1959. The report said that the importance of a Ruby-Trafficante meeting there "should not be overemphasized," that the most such a contact would show was a brief meeting, and that no one had suggested the assassination was planned at Trescornia in 1959.[^44] It later stated that the committee had "developed corroborating evidence that Ruby may have met with Trafficante at Trescornia," and that there was considerable evidence that it did take place. [[Lewis McWillie]] testified that he visited another detainee at Trescornia in that period and possibly saw Trafficante there, and Trafficante testified that Ruby had no reason to visit him.[^6] On Hoffa, the committee found motive, means and opportunity, examined the account of [[Edward Partin]], and concluded that "the balance of the evidence argued that it was improbable that Hoffa had anything to do with the death of the President."[^7]
The report's general conclusion on the organized crime figures is that knowledge or availability through association "falls considerably short of the sort of evidence that would be necessary to establish criminal responsibility for a conspiracy."[^45] The same section lists as one of three possibilities that organized crime was not involved, and states that Oswald was not likely a hired killer.[^45]
### Jack Ruby
The report states that Ruby was not a "member" of organized crime but had "a significant number of associations and direct and indirect contacts with underworld figures."[^8] It states that the committee "believed that Ruby's shooting of Oswald was not a spontaneous act, in that it involved at least some premeditation," and found it less likely that Ruby entered the Dallas police basement without assistance. It concluded that Ruby probably did not come down the Main Street ramp, as the Warren Commission had found, and that his most likely route was the alleyway and stairway leading to the basement garage. The committee was troubled by the apparently unlocked doors along the stairway route, the removal of security guards from the garage area shortly before the shooting, and a Saturday night telephone call from Ruby to his closest friend, [[Ralph Paul]], in which Paul responded to something Ruby said by asking him if he was crazy.[^46]
### New Orleans and Cuban exile groups
In New Orleans the committee found that [[Guy Banister]]'s firm occupied an office in 1963 in the Newman Building at 531 Lafayette Street, that another entrance to the building was at 544 Camp Street, the address Oswald stamped on his [[Fair Play for Cuba Committee]] handouts, and that the Cuban Revolutionary Council had also been an occupant. It stated that during the summer of 1963 Ferrie frequented 544 Camp Street regularly as a result of his working relationship with Banister, that there was at least a possibility that Oswald and Banister were acquainted, and that it was puzzled by Oswald's apparent association with Ferrie in light of Ferrie's connection with G. Wray Gill and Marcello. It found the witnesses at Clinton, Louisiana, "credible and significant" and was inclined to believe that Oswald was in Clinton in late August or early September 1963 in the company of Ferrie, if not [[Clay Shaw]]. On the Cuban exile student group, it concluded that there had been no relationship between Oswald and Carlos Bringuier and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil with the exception of the confrontation over Oswald's distribution of pro-Castro literature, and tended to agree with Bringuier and others that Oswald was seeking to infiltrate their ranks.[^47]
### Nosenko
The committee investigated the defector [[Yuri Nosenko]] and stated that it was certain Nosenko lied about Oswald, "whether it was to the FBI and CIA in 1964, or to the committee in 1978, or perhaps to both." It was unable to resolve the Nosenko matter, found that his conduct had "virtually ruined him as a valid source," and limited its conclusion to describing him as an unreliable source. The report criticized the CIA's hostile interrogation of Nosenko, which included solitary confinement from 1964 to 1968.[^9]
The testimony of CIA officer [[John Clement Hart]], printed in volume II at pages 487 to 504, described the case. Hart stated that his study of the Nosenko case ran from mid-June to late December 1976, with four assistants and ten four-drawer safes of documents, and that he put together "the first full picture" of it. He testified that Nosenko was lodged on February 12, 1964, in a CIA-controlled house under guard in what was called friendly confinement, that a defector held there found 150 discrepancies between the 1962 transcripts and tapes, and that a "much more spartan" confinement, modeled on the treatment of the American professor Frederick Barghoorn in Moscow in 1963, followed. Nosenko was stripped to prison clothes, guards were told not to talk or smile, and his diet was weak tea, porridge, watery soup and macaroni. A first polygraph examination on April 4, 1964, used an artifact described to Nosenko as an electroencephalograph, and he was told afterward that he had failed; the CIA adjudged the result invalid. Hart testified that Nosenko remained in solitary confinement under constant visual observation until August 1967, that he was held 1,277 days and questioned on 292, and that [[Richard Helms]] set a 60-day limit on August 23, 1966. A second polygraph series in October 1966 kept Nosenko on the machine for 28 hours and 29 minutes.[^48]
The polygraph consultant [[Richard O. Arther]] analyzed the Nosenko examinations for the committee. His report, printed in volume VIII, states that he first visited the CIA on June 2, 1978, and was given no handwritten notes and no tape recordings, and that in his blind analysis several Oswald-related answers were flagged as lying indicators.[^49]
[[G. Robert Blakey]] later wrote to the *New York Times* that, as chief counsel from 1977 to 1979, he directed an investigation of Nosenko and concluded, "along with a unanimous committee, that Nosenko had lied to the F.B.I. and C.I.A. in 1963-64," and to the committee in 1978. He wrote that the committee reviewed [[Edward Jay Epstein]]'s allegations about Nosenko and the source code-named Fedora, and concluded, "contrary to Epstein's assertion[s]," that the bona fides of Nosenko were "not inextricably intertwined with those of any other defector."[^50]
### Mexico City and the Lopez report
The committee examined Oswald's trip to [[Mexico City]] in September and October 1963. The CIA's surveillance of the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic compounds in Mexico City was the subject of a staff study, "Oswald, the CIA, and Mexico City," by Edwin Lopez and Dan Hardway, known as the [[Lopez Report]]. Its conclusions state that a person identifying himself as Lee Harvey Oswald telephoned the Soviet Consulate on October 1, 1963, and visited the consulates five or six times, and that "the possibility that someone else used Lee Harvey Oswald's name" could not be absolutely dismissed. They state that the Mexico City station "definitely knew" of the contacts, that they were not accurately and expeditiously reported to headquarters before the assassination, that the CIA's photographic surveillance "probably obtained a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald entering either or both the Soviet and Cuban Consulates," that the CIA denies such a photograph exists, and that its disposition is unknown. The surveillance tapes were erased after October 16, 1963. The table of contents lists a section on the "Disposition of Production from the Operation."[^51]
The [[Assassination Records Review Board]] later stated that it had released 99 percent of the Hardway/Lopez Report.[^52]
### Volumes
The committee's Kennedy hearings and appendices were published in twelve volumes. Volumes I through V are hearing volumes, and Volume VI is an appendix to the hearings.[^40] Volume VI covers the photographic evidence. Volume VII covers the medical and firearms evidence, and Volume VIII the acoustics, polygraph, handwriting and fingerprint reports. Volume IX covers organized crime. Volume X contains the staff report "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies Against Fidel Castro," and material on David Ferrie and [[Silvia Odio]].[^53] Volume XI covers the Warren Commission, CIA support to the Warren Commission, the motorcade, and the military investigation of the assassination. Volume XII covers the Dealey Plaza conspiracy witnesses, the Oswald-Tippit associates, [[George de Mohrenschildt]], the depositions of Marina Oswald Porter, and a study of Nosenko. Volumes XI and XII were printed in March 1979.[^40]
### King findings
On the King assassination, the committee found that [[James Earl Ray]] "acted with full knowledge of what he was doing in the murder of Dr. King," and that his alibi and his story of "Raoul" were "not worthy of belief." It concluded that "there was a likelihood of conspiracy in the assassination of Dr. King."[^54]
The conclusion section states that the committee found it "highly likely that John and James robbed the Bank of Alton in Alton, Ill., on July 13, 1967," and that [[Jerry Ray]] knew of the robbery and assisted in distributing the proceeds. It judged the possibility of "the involvement of one or both brothers," [[John Ray]] and Jerry Ray, to be raised by three negative factors, and found strong circumstantial evidence of the involvement of a brother in a consulting capacity at the purchase of the murder weapon.[^4] The detail on the Alton robbery and on John Ray's foreknowledge of the escape is at pages 341 to 344.[^55]
The committee found "substantial evidence to establish the existence of a St. Louis-based conspiracy to finance the assassination of Dr. King." It reported that [[John Sutherland]], a St. Louis patent attorney, and [[John Kauffmann]] solicited the businessman [[Russell Byers]] in late 1966 or early 1967 with an offer of $50,000, and that a witness described a standing offer of $20,000 or $30,000 for killing King. The committee found no direct link to Ray or his brothers and no payoff, but believed that word of the offer likely reached Ray through the campaign activity of the [[American Independent Party]].[^56] It found that "no private organizations or individuals, other than those discussed under section B," were involved in King's death, and that "no Federal, State or local government agency was involved."[^54]
The committee found that the Department of Justice and the FBI "performed with varying degrees of competency and legality."[^54] It quoted the 1975 Justice Department task force, which described the COINTELPRO type campaign against King as "ultra vires" and "very probably" felonious, and found the electronic surveillance of 1963 to 1966 "particularly abusive." Examining the March 20, 1968, memorandum from G. C. Moore, chief of the Racial Intelligence Section, to [[William Sullivan]], it was "satisfied that the March 20 memorandum did not cause Dr. King to stay at the Lorraine," while stating that the FBI's intent in drafting it "remained an open issue." It found no evidence that COINTELPRO initiatives of the Memphis field office were tied to the assassination, and it stated in a note that it was unable to take testimony from Sullivan, who was killed in a hunting accident in 1977, and that when Sullivan testified before the Senate select committee "he had broken with the Director."[^57] The report cited indications that John Ray may have assisted his brother in the escape only in connection with its discussion of possible official complicity.[^58]
### Records and release
The Assassination Records Review Board reported that the HSCA's unpublished records were sealed under House rules for 50 years, until 2029, and that the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992 led to the opening of the Kennedy portion of the files. It stated that the committee took testimony from 335 witnesses in 38 days of public hearings, that it generated approximately 414,000 pages of records relating to the assassination, and that in 1992 the unpublished records resided with the House Administration Committee.[^59]
The board also reported that the committee concluded there was a "high probability" that two gunmen fired at President Kennedy, validating some of the Warren Commission's critics.[^59]
### Footnotes
[^1]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), "History of the Committee," pp. 9-10 (H. Res. 1540 and the Senate select committee findings on the CIA and the FBI; expiry on January 3, 1977; H. Res. 9; H. Res. 222 passed February 2, 1977; H. Res. 433 approved March 30, 1977; Stokes named chairman March 8, 1977; two subcommittees; Blakey appointed June 1977). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^2]: Lardner, George, Jr., *Washington Post,* March 29, 1977, report on the House floor speech of Henry B. Gonzalez and the Rules Committee vote, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^3]: Madden, Richard L., *New York Times,* dispatch datelined March 30, 1977 (House vote of 230 to 181 and the resignation of Richard A. Sprague), press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^4]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), "Conclusion," pp. 371-373. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^5]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 169-172 (Marcello). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^6]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 172-175 (Trafficante and the Aleman account). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^7]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 176-179 (Hoffa and Partin). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^8]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 149-150 (the Warren Commission and the committee on Ruby and organized crime). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^9]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), section on Yuri Nosenko, pp. 101-103, and p. 255. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^10]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary of findings and recommendations, Findings I.A to I.D (pp. 3-4), dated January 2, 1979, with the submittal letter of December 29, 1978. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^11]: House of Representatives, H. Res. 1540, 94th Cong., adopted 280 to 65 on September 17, 1976, as recorded in CIA Reading Room document 00419419 quoting H. Rept. 95-130. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00419419
[^12]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), separate views of Hons. Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar, pp. 493-494. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^13]: Office of Representative Thomas N. Downing, news release, "Richard A. Sprague named acting counsel," October 4, 1976, CIA Reading Room document 00544302. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00544302
[^14]: *Newsweek,* April 11, 1977, report on the committee, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00543522; the article cites a *Newsweek* report of February 21, 1977. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00543522
[^15]: Burnham, David, "Assassination Panel Wants 3 to Testify," *New York Times,* dispatch of March 3, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00026481. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00026481
[^16]: *Chicago Tribune,* April 3, 1977, press clipping in CIA Reading Room document 00543522. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00543522
[^17]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, memorandum, "Procedures for the Conduct of Reviews of Agency Documents and Interviews by House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Staff Personnel at Headquarters," routing slip dated May 23, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R000200030008-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r000200030008-9
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, memorandum, "Control of Draft House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Reports," CIA-RDP81M00980R000200050025-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r000200050025-8
[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Career Management Staff/DDO, memorandum to the Office of General Counsel and the Office of Legislative Counsel, "George Joannides (GS-16)," May 24, 1978, CIA Reading Room document 01138247. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01138247
[^20]: Central Intelligence Agency, Honor and Merit Awards Board, memorandum "Career Intelligence Medal, Mr. George E. Joannides," March 20, 1981, with the recommendation narrative, CIA Reading Room document 07176748. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-07176748
[^21]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Meeting with HSCA on Mexican Interviews," July 24, 1978, record number 104-10127-10019 (distribution includes "George Joannides/OLC"). https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov9-2017/104-10127-10019.pdf
[^22]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, OLC 78-3136, memorandum for the record, "Meeting With Ann Goodpasture," November 24, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R000300020019-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r000300020019-7
[^23]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum from AC/CCS regarding George Joannides and the trial of Kampiles, CIA Reading Room document 07176735 (catalog date November 8, 1978); Associated Press, "CIA Shrugged at Kampiles Plea for Covert Job, Spy Trial Told," *Washington Star,* CIA-RDP81M00980R000400080037-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-07176735
[^24]: Blakey, G. Robert, Jefferson Morley, and others, letter, "JFK's Assassination," *New York Review of Books,* December 18, 2003. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2003/12/18/jfks-assassination/
[^25]: Blakey, G. Robert, "The HSCA and the CIA: The View From the Top," address to the Assassination Archives and Research Center conference, 2014, with footnote citations to Turner to Stokes, November 30, 1978 (RIF 104-10150-10027), and Blakey to Carpenter, March 22, 1978 (RIF 180-10140-10065). https://aarclibrary.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/aarc-blakey-letter-09-2014.doc
[^26]: Hardway, Dan, submitted statement, May 20, 2025, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hardway-Written-Testimony.pdf
[^27]: *Morley v. Central Intelligence Agency,* 508 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2007), opinion filed December 7, 2007. https://static.case.law/f3d/508/cases/1108-01.json
[^28]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.B to I.C (p. 3). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^29]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.D.1 to I.D.5 (p. 4) and p. 256 (Warren Commission). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^30]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. VII (Medical and Firearms Evidence, March 1979), Report of the Forensic Pathology Panel (chairman Michael M. Baden; dissent of Cyril H. Wecht, Part VI; majority response, Part VII) and Report of the Firearms Panel (p. 353). https://archive.org/details/investigationofa68unit
[^31]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), "Analysis by Bolt Beranek and Newman," pp. 65-72. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^32]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. VIII, James E. Barger, Scott P. Robinson, Edward C. Schmidt and Jared J. Wolf, "Analysis of Recorded Sounds Relating to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc., January 1979 (foreword, request of May 12, 1978; sections 1.4 and 1.5, pp. 47-49). https://archive.org/details/investigationofa68unit
[^33]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. II, testimony of James E. Barger, September 11, 1978, printed p. 67. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0911_4_Barger.pdf
[^34]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), "Weiss-Aschkenasy analysis," pp. 72-75 (mid-September 1978 engagement; the +/-1/1,000 second match; the 95 percent and 76 percent probabilities; the conclusion that the cause was "probably a gunshot fired at the motorcade"). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^35]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. V, testimony of Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, December 29, 1978. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol5/pdf/HSCA_Vol5_1229_2_Weiss.pdf
[^36]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. VIII (Acoustics, Polygraph, Handwriting, and Fingerprint Reports, March 1979), Mark R. Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, "An Analysis of Recorded Sounds Relating to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Queens College, February 1979, sections 1.5 and 1.6 (pp. 10-11). https://archive.org/details/investigationofa68unit
[^37]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), separate views of Hons. Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar, pp. 491-497 (Wolfgang letter of January 2, 1979, and Davis letter of January 8, 1979, p. 497). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^38]: National Research Council, Committee on Ballistic Acoustics, *Report of the Committee on Ballistic Acoustics* (Washington: National Academy Press, 1982), doi:10.17226/10264: committee roster, p. ii; Executive Summary, pp. 1-2; Introduction and Overview, pp. 3-6; Conclusions, p. 34. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/10264
[^39]: Linsker, R., R. L. Garwin, H. Chernoff, P. Horowitz and N. F. Ramsey, "Synchronization of the acoustic evidence in the assassination of President Kennedy," *Science & Justice* 45, no. 4 (2005): 207-226, replying to D. B. Thomas, "Echo correlation analysis and the acoustic evidence in the Kennedy assassination revisited," *Science & Justice* 41, no. 1 (2001): 21-32. https://research.ibm.com/publications/synchronization-of-the-acoustic-evidence-in-the-assassination-of-president-kennedy
[^40]: National Archives, "House Select Committee on Assassinations Report: Table of Contents," and the hearing volumes as published on archive.org (investigationofa01unit through investigationofa05unit; investigationofa68unit, vols. VI-VIII; investigationofa09unit, organized crime; investigationofa10unit; investigationofa11unit and investigationofa12unit, printed March 1979). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/toc
[^41]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 114-116 (CIA-Mafia plots; "all the elements necessary for a successful assassination conspiracy"; Roselli, Giancana, and the "turnaround" account). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^42]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 112-114 (AMLASH and the committee's view that the plot should have been provided to the Warren Commission). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^43]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 168-169 (the 1963-64 investigation; Giancana and English, December 3, 1963; Marcello and Trafficante as the most likely participants). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^44]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 152-153 (Trafficante and Ruby at Trescornia; McWillie; Verdacia; Trafficante's testimony). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^45]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), organized crime summary and analysis, pp. 179-181. https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^46]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 156-158 (route into the basement; "not a spontaneous act"; assistance). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^47]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 141-146 (New Orleans: Ferrie, G. Wray Gill, Guy Banister, 544 Camp Street, the Clinton witnesses, and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^48]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. II, testimony of John Clement Hart, September 15, 1978, pp. 487-504. https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol2/pdf/HSCA_Vol2_0915_3_Hart.pdf
[^49]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. VIII, Richard O. Arther, "The Analysis of Yuri Nosenko's Polygraph Examination" (March 1979), pp. 187-196, paras. 18-20, 28-30 and 38-39. https://archive.org/details/investigationofa68unit
[^50]: Blakey, G. Robert, "Unpersuasive Case Against 'Fedora,'" letter to the editor, *New York Times,* September 27, 1981 (letter dated September 17, 1981), CIA-RDP90-00552R000100590002-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000100590002-6
[^51]: Lopez, Edwin, and Dan Hardway, "Oswald, the CIA, and Mexico City" (the Lopez Report), staff report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-10 (introduction and conclusions) and table of contents, as released through the Assassination Records Review Board. https://archive.org/details/OswaldTheCIAAndMexicoCity
[^52]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (1998), Part I, section C.5, "The Select Committee on Assassinations of the House of Representatives," and the discussion of the "Rule of Reason" (release of the Lopez report). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt
[^53]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings,* 95th Cong., 2d sess., vol. X (staff report, "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies Against Fidel Castro"), with David Ferrie and Silvia Odio materials. https://archive.org/details/investigationofa10unit
[^54]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings II.A to II.E (p. 5). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^55]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 341-344 (John Ray and the escape, pp. 341-342; the Alton bank robbery, pp. 342-344). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^56]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 359-364 and 372-373 (Byers, Sutherland and Kauffmann; the standing offer; the Buff Acres Motel; the American Independent Party). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^57]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 405-413 (FBI and COINTELPRO; COINTELPRO and the Memphis field office, p. 409; the March 20, 1968 Moore memorandum, pp. 410-411) and pp. 435-437 (electronic surveillance and the anonymous package; note on Sullivan at p. 436). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^58]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives,* H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), p. 428 and note (prison officials; "indications that John Ray may have assisted his brother in the escape"). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
[^59]: Assassination Records Review Board, *Final Report* (1998), Part I, section C.5, p. 3 (335 witnesses; 38 days of public hearings; approximately 414,000 pages of records; unpublished records held by the House Administration Committee in 1992). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/review-board/report/arrb-final-report.txt