The_Info_Web/40 - EVENTS/MAJOR_CONFLICTS/Cuban Missile Crisis.md

aliases	category	tags	summary	start	end	location	updated	relations
Cuban Missile Crisis Caribbean Crisis October Crisis	Intelligence Scandal	Event ColdWar Cuba Soviet USA Nuclear 1960s	Thirteen-day nuclear confrontation of October 1962, resolved when the Soviet Union removed its missiles from Cuba in exchange for a non-invasion pledge and a secret commitment on Turkey's Jupiter missiles.	1962-10-16	1962-10-28	Cuba / Caribbean	2026-10-26	type with reverse role start end fn participant_in Robert A. Lovett true listed among others present at the National Security Council meeting of October 21, 1962; attended a planning meeting on October 24, 1962 1962-10-21 1962-10-24 2

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a thirteen-day confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1962, precipitated by American aerial reconnaissance revealing the construction of Soviet nuclear missile launch sites in Cuba. The crisis began on October 16, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy was informed of the installations, and ended on October 28, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for American security guarantees and a secret agreement on American missiles in Turkey.¹

Background

The crisis had deep antecedents in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961, in which CIA-trained Cuban exiles attempted to overthrow Fidel Castro's government and were defeated within days, humiliating the Kennedy administration. The failed invasion reinforced Soviet and Cuban calculations that the United States intended further attempts to remove Castro.

Khrushchev's decision to deploy medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba responded to multiple strategic concerns: American nuclear superiority in intercontinental missiles, the presence of American Jupiter missiles in Turkey aimed at the Soviet Union, and the desire to deter a second American invasion of Cuba. The deployment was planned secretly, with Soviet personnel disguised as civilian agricultural workers.¹

The Crisis and Resolution

Kennedy's inner circle, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), debated responses ranging from an immediate air strike to diplomatic negotiations. Kennedy chose a naval quarantine - designated a "quarantine" rather than a "blockade" for legal reasons - requiring Soviet ships approaching Cuba to submit to inspection. Soviet ships initially appeared to be approaching and then turned back.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett attended the meeting of October 21, 1962, the 506th meeting of the National Security Council, where the minutes list him among the others present, and on October 24, 1962 he took part in a meeting that Walt Rostow described as the planning subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.²³ The planning meeting, with representatives of State and Defense and the Attorney General, considered how to handle Soviet vessels that had altered course and those still bound for Cuba.³

The most dangerous days came when U-2 reconnaissance aircraft were shot down over Cuba and Soviet submarines were depth-charged by American forces. Back-channel negotiations, including communication through Soviet intelligence officer Aleksandr Feklisov, helped establish the terms of resolution. The final agreement involved the public Soviet pledge to remove missiles, the American public pledge not to invade Cuba, and a secret American undertaking - revealed only decades later - to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey within several months.¹

The CIA's role during the crisis included the aerial reconnaissance that discovered the missiles and operational planning for responses including an air strike that ExComm ultimately rejected. CIA officer William Harvey ordered agent teams into Cuba during the crisis to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. Harvey testified that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that CIA Director John McCone then ordered the agent operations stopped.⁴ McCone's executive assistant, Walter Elder, described the episode as Harvey having "earned another black mark as not being fully under control," and said Harvey had attempted to get guidance from top officials during the crisis.⁴ Harvey was appointed chief of station at Rome effective on or about June 30, 1963.⁵

Aftermath

The crisis produced the Moscow-Washington hotline (the "red phone"), a direct communication channel between the Kremlin and the White House to prevent future miscommunications during crises. It accelerated negotiations toward the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The combination of the Berlin Wall construction in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 defined the peak of Cold War confrontation before the gradual development of detente in subsequent years.¹

Footnotes

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1. Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. W.W. Norton, 1969 (Kennedy's account as Attorney General and ExComm member). Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. W.W. Norton, 1997 (uses Soviet and Cuban archives). Blight, James, and David Welch. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hill and Wang, 1989. ↩︎

2. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, document 38, minutes of the 506th meeting of the National Security Council, October 21, 1962 (Oval Room; "Others: Mr. Robert Lovett"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d38 ↩︎

3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, volume XI, document 57, memorandum from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, to President Kennedy, October 24, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d57 ↩︎

4. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, p. 149 n. 1, citing Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81, and Walter Elder testimony of August 13, 1975, pp. 34-35. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

5. Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805 ↩︎