disinfozone/The_Info_Web
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions
The_Info_Web/10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Murray Watt.md

39 KiB
Raw Blame History

aliases category tags summary location relations created updated
Murray Watt
Murray B. Watt
Scotty Watt
Scotty
MAJ Watt
LTC Watt
Military
Person
Military
ArmyIntelligence
INSCOM
Stargate
GrillFlame
GondolaWish
Army military intelligence officer notified on October 27, 1978 that he was INSCOM's Grill Flame project officer, who ran the Fort Meade remote viewing unit and briefed Congress and Army leadership until 1981. Fort Meade, Maryland
type with start end role fn
employed_by United States Army Intelligence and Security Command 1978-10-27 1981 Grill Flame project officer and project manager in the human intelligence office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; major, lieutenant colonel by September 1979 3
type with start end role fn
reported_to Albert Hamel 1978-10-27 1979 Colonel Hamel, ADCSOPS-HUMINT, who selected him as project manager 3
type with start end role fn
reported_to Chad White 1979 1981 Colonel White, ADCSOPS-HUMINT, who signed or noted his memoranda 24
type with start role fn
member_of Grill Flame 1978-11-28 member of the Defense Department Grill Flame working group and of its objectives and protocol subcommittees 6
type with start end role fn
contractor_to Stanford Research Institute 1978-11-15 1981 INSCOM project officer for SRI's training of Army personnel in remote viewing 4
2025-08-05 2026-10-05

Murray B. Watt, called Scotty, was a major of military intelligence in the human intelligence office of United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) at Fort Meade when, on October 27, 1978, he was told that he had been selected as INSCOM's project manager for a new program. By September 1979 he was a lieutenant colonel. His signature blocks give his posts as "PPPA, DIRHUM, INSCOM" in 1978, and in 1980 "Chief, Special Activities Division, ADCSOPS-HUMINT" and "Chief, Special Actions."1

Description and posting

The writer Jim Schnabel described Watt as two decades older than Lieutenant Frederick Atwater, a tall, husky man with a bulbous nose and a Boston accent, whose temper was said to have left a cloud over his career: some years earlier, in Panama, he had struck a fellow officer who had insulted his wife. Schnabel wrote that Watt was never convicted of any offense, that he felt he had not been promoted as rapidly as he deserved, and that Atwater was told he had been chosen for an obscure and possibly temporary assignment because he had so little to lose. Schnabel placed the unit in a cramped office in building 4554 at Fort Meade, where Watt was commanding officer, and wrote that he later received his promotion to lieutenant colonel.2

Appointment and orientation, 1978 and 1979

INSCOM's first progress report, dated February 21, 1979, records that "sometime during the month of October 1978" Colonel Albert Hamel, ADCSOPS-HUMINT, was tasked by the INSCOM deputy chief of staff for operations to provide a project officer for a program "at the direction of the ACSI," that Major Watt was selected and "on 27 October 1978 was so notified," and that "there exists no written tasking between OACSI and HQ, INSCOM." A telephone call of November 1, 1978, which Watt recorded, established that Major General Edmund Thompson and the INSCOM commander, Major General William Rolya, had agreed that the Army staff would issue no written instructions, and that Lieutenant Colonel Kane of the INSCOM operations staff told him he would have "a virtual 'blank check' on how to proceed and what type of program to develop."3

His first visit to Stanford Research Institute (SRI), on November 15 to 17, 1978, was in the company of Scott Phillips of the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA). Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ gave the orientation, with Charles Tart and Edwin May attending. They agreed that SRI would train Watt as "INSCOM Team Chief," that he would screen INSCOM personnel for nominees to be interviewed by SRI staff, and that formal training of selected personnel would begin in April 1979 at one trainee per month. Puthoff and Targ conducted a remote viewing experiment with Phillips as the subject, which Watt wrote was "somewhat negative, at least to me," though "intriguing enough to warrant further exploration." His report ended: "I was very impressed with the results obtained thus far." He returned to SRI on December 12 to 15, 1978, meeting Puthoff and Ingo Swann.4

The report also records the unit-by-unit screening of INSCOM personnel, in which 251 were considered and 117 interviewed (warrant officers, officers and civilians of grade GS-9 and above who had at least 20 months left in service); the visit with Atwater to Aberdeen Proving Ground on January 12, 1979 to see AMSAA's Grill Flame work; and Atwater's attachment to Watt from the 902d Military Intelligence Group "because of previous research into this area during work on a separate project," which is the earlier program Gondola Wish. The report names a method for the interviews: they would serve as the "guise" under which project personnel could obtain viewpoints on parapsychology. Of the 251, an unstated number was selected; the Army's later chronology records that six individuals were selected and began training at SRI in April 1979.5

Committees

Watt wrote INSCOM's record of the first meeting of "the DoD Committee on Special Sensors" on November 28, 1978, as "MAJ, MI, GRILL FLAME Project Officer, INSCOM." Present, in his list, were Jack Vorona as chairman, two other officials of the Defense Intelligence Agency whose names are withheld, Bob Dailey of the Under Secretary's office, William Mehuron of the Navy, Watt, Major William Stoner of the Army staff, Colonel Al DeProspero of the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity and Dale Graff of the Air Force Foreign Technology Division. The committee adopted the name "DoD GRILL FLAME Committee"; Vorona "expressed concern that parapsychology activities within DoD elements were springing up all over" and directed the agencies to develop policy for turning off "exposures" as they came up; and the record notes "DIA will have 'Intelligence Oversight' responsibility; local IG cannot inspect without approval," with an oversight committee of the service intelligence chiefs, Vorona and Ruth Davis. Stoner raised the need for legal parameters. Watt was a member of the ad hoc committee on organizational goals and of the one on a protocol for experiments. The minutes of the Defense Intelligence Agency list the others present, including John Kramar of AMSAA.6

On March 8, 9 and 12, 1979, he attended a three-day work conference at Aberdeen hosted by John Kramar of AMSAA, with Colonel Garrison Rapmund of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Stoner, Lynne Taylor, Scott Phillips and, on one day, Atwater, to resolve the effect of the Army General Counsel's decision that all Army Grill Flame activity must comply with Department of Health, Education and Welfare guidelines and Army Regulation 70-25. His record states that the protocol developed for the Surgeon General depicted "only the involvement of AMSAA and that was done at my request. Leaving INSCOM out of the protocol eliminates one more security problem"; that he asked why INSCOM's part, which was "task oriented" and "in the applications business," had to come under those guidelines; that Rapmund said he would raise the issue with the Surgeon General's office; and that AMSAA and INSCOM personnel agreed to meet monthly to exchange ideas. AMSAA personnel also spent private early-morning sessions with him describing sessions they had run with grid coordinates.7

On March 23, 1979 he briefed Rolya and then the Under Secretary of the Army, Walter LaBerge, with Thompson, Rolya, Hamel, Colonel Gibson and Stoner present. His memorandum states that LaBerge "approved our actions to date and goals for the future" and cautioned that everyone involved maintain objectivity; the slides stated two working assumptions, that everyone has psychic ability and that INSCOM was not involved in research and development or experimental research.8 The Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the Surgeon General's Human Subjects Research Review Board met on March 26, 1979 and concluded that the SRI and AMSAA protocols were technology transfer and phenomenological validation, not research, and that human subjects regulations did not apply; Colonel Garrison Rapmund of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research attended.9

Between August 1 and September 27, 1979 his rank changed from "Major (P)" to lieutenant colonel in the signature blocks of his memoranda.10 On September 27, 1979 he and Atwater, then the project training officer, hosted the Grill Flame Department of Defense Science Evaluation Team at Fort Meade from 0900 to 1530; its chief, Manfred Gale, questioned him closely about the use of personnel, including availability, rotation and over-use of resources.11 On November 9, 1979 he presented a progress briefing to the team at the Pentagon, with 195 sessions completed to date, and recorded his opinion that at least two thirds of the members "were very negative," that "my word was no longer valid since they had classified me as a 'believer,'" and that "some members of the team don't want to believe that psychic behavior exists and refuse to really listen to any presentation on the subject matter."12 He briefed the committee on "INSCOM training and operational application of the remote viewing phenomenon" on November 27, 1979.13

His comments of February 1980, written after a telephone call of February 5 and in response to a request that bore on a letter Vorona was drafting to Lieutenant General Tighe, called the Grill Flame Scientific Evaluation Committee report "very shallow in nature," with "vague recommendations" and no "concrete constructive means of improving the overall DOD program... unless doing away with the program can be considered as a constructive suggestion." Of its annex on INSCOM's work he wrote "after all, we provided the committee with most of the data contained in the Annex." On the statement that useful data should not be attributed to remote viewing he wrote that the committee "owes us a possible solution. Luck?? Fraud?? Or whatever," and he observed that the minority "is more concerned about the possible loss of their credibility if they endorse the use of operational activities." Of the passage on handwriting, he wrote: "They do everything but call Targ a 'cheat.' Did they, in fact, question Targ on this handwriting issue?" He called the committee's paragraph that "things" had occurred which no one could explain "the key to the whole issue," and added: "at the working meeting held 30-31 Jan I outlined most of our major objections."14

Operations and tasking

The Army's chronology dates the first operational session to September 4, 1979, when a missing aircraft was located "within a 115-nautical mile radius of its downed location." Watt's November 1979 briefing listed among the operational tasks a project identified only by its initials, a "Cuba situation" and a "Korea situation." On December 5, 1980 he was the control analyst ("Murray B. Watt, LTC, MI, Control Analyst, Project 8035, Session DC-35") for a session on activity at a target given by geographic coordinates, in which the viewer was asked to move forward in time in three-day steps and to describe troops in trucks and vehicles in a valley; a later evaluation of a special analytic report by the Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center recommended that it go "to LTC Watt, Chief, Special Actions, ADCSOPS, INSCOM," and called the use of the information "an intelligence community 'first.'" A memorandum from the Army staff catalogued May 27, 1981, which recounts a telephone call of May 22, reported that after a helicopter crash on the Ecuador and Peru border in February 1981, the Fort Meade team had held five sessions in March 1981 and, "per guidance from LTC Watt," memory sketches were passed to the J2 staff of United States Southern Command, whose pilots later "identified several correlations between the actual terrain and the sketches."15

A briefing script that Lieutenant Colonel Brian Buzby wrote in 1984, after Watt's tenure, gives the office's own count of its early output: in 1979, a task force of five (a project manager, an operations and training officer, a secretary and two sources) conducted 79 operational missions, 43 of them on the Iranian hostage crisis; in 1980, after the unit had acquired "operational experience" and its own separate facilities, 386 missions, 154 of them on Iran; and seven collection projects for four sponsor agencies in 1979, 41 projects for six sponsors in 1980 and 20 for five in 1981. The Army's chronology records that the first Grill Flame operative attended the Monroe Institute's Gateway training on March 5, 1980.16

Schnabel wrote that Watt himself was the target in an early session of Mel Riley: Riley, monitored by Atwater, described the taste of chocolate and a glass jar of coins, and Watt, who drove them to a Volkswagen dealership a few miles from Fort Meade, sheepishly admitted he had been late to the target and had at the session's start been at a 7-Eleven, where he bought a chocolate bar beside a jar of coins for the March of Dimes. Watt handed Atwater a sealed envelope holding a photograph of an aircraft hangar in which the Army had hidden an experimental M1 Abrams tank, an operations security test. Schnabel wrote that Watt handled the bureaucratic end of the unit and kept in touch with the network of Grill Flame customers while Atwater turned tasking into viewing strategies, that he would lose his temper more than once over what he saw as lax protocols and the need to avoid the appearance of cheating, and that he signed for a large envelope delivered by two men in civilian clothes who arrived in black Defense Department cars, a target that concerned the acquisition of a Soviet T-72 tank. In Schnabel's account Watt later gathered the six full- and part-time members at a motel in Laurel, Maryland, and told them that a covert mission to rescue the Iran hostages was under way and that they would be known as ICLP, "INSCOM Center Lane Project."17

The Iranian hostage tasking, 1979 to 1981

Watt's memorandum of December 3, 1979, "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Involvement in Iran," records how the unit was tasked. On November 21, 1979 Jackie Keith, chief of the INSCOM Intelligence Collection Center, who was representing INSCOM on a Joint Chiefs of Staff task force on the hostage crisis, asked whether the unit's assets could help; Watt "explained that we did not want to get involved unless we were specifically directed to by proper INSCOM authorities." Keith obtained the approval of the INSCOM chief of staff, Colonel Carr, late that evening, because the deputy chief of staff for operations, Colonel Wilmot, was out of town. At 0715 on November 23 Keith gave Watt "a set of coordinates and a copy of TIME magazine (dated 19 Nov 79)" with a picture of two hostages, and the unit held its first two sessions that day. On November 26 Keith said Major General J. B. Vaught of the Army staff and Lieutenant Colonel Roderick Lenahan of the Special Operations Division of the Joint Staff wanted a briefing; Rolya approved it and said he would himself inform Thompson. Watt briefed them on November 28 and "cautioned them very strongly against using the output 'as sole source' when there was no other data available to confirm or deny our input"; they asked that session reports continue.18

On April 23, 1980 the unit moved into three rooms at the Best Western Motel on Fort Meade Road in Laurel, Maryland, at the request of the Special Operations Division, and ran 20 operational sessions in the following two days, with spot reports telephoned within an hour of each session; Watt ended operations shortly after 0200 on April 25, 1980, "when the news reached us that the attempt to rescue the hostages had been aborted," with the concurrence of Lieutenant Colonel Bob Morrell of the Division. His after-action report of May 2, 1980 listed as drawbacks the loss of sleep, the difficulty of typing reports, the need for one more room, that "the Project Manager carried too much of the administrative and operational burdens on his shoulders" and the project's need for an operations officer, and that the viewers had been "engulfed by the news media." One advantage was that "the commonality of mission importance seemed to achieve a psychological 'high' for group identification." He wrote that the unit had been on the problem for over five months, had completed over 120 sessions and submitted about 90 reports, and had "received very little feedback concerning the value of our efforts"; he strongly believed that someone from INSCOM's decision-making branch should press the Joint Staff "for a written assessment."19

On March 16, 1981 Watt sent Colonel White the final evaluation by Lenahan, covering November 23, 1979 through January 13, 1981. Of 202 reports, the Joint Staff's categories gave 7 positive, 59 possible or partial, 16 inconclusive, 112 negative and 8 administrative aborts; the INSCOM office's own reading of Lenahan's comments gave 26 positive, 37 possible or partial, 61 inconclusive, 76 negative and 2 aborts. Watt wrote that the Joint Staff rated 37 percent of the reports as having some correlation or use and that his office raised the figure "to only 45%," and that "in several cases our reports clearly stated that hostages were in specific buildings at specific times," which Lenahan, comparing debriefings of the hostages, found in error ("We concur!"), while reports that specific buildings were empty, which Lenahan said were correct, were rated inconclusive or partial ("We disagree!"). Among his lessons were that long projects produce a build-up of "overlay," that lack of feedback has a negative effect, that "for targets about which little is known, remote viewing information must only be used for guiding other intelligence collection efforts," and that data accuracy and analytic usability must be evaluated separately. He concluded that "the data/information provided to the user apparently was information that could not be obtained through normal intelligence collection channels" and that "the degree of success appears to at least equal, if not surpass, other collection methods."20

The joint program dispute, 1980

A paper of September 12, 1980 from the Army staff's Grill Flame action officer, Major Hay, to the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, whose stated purpose was to "prevent possible embarrassment to the Army," recounts that after Lieutenant General Eugene Tighe's letter of August 7, 1980 to Thompson, the Defense Department Grill Flame committee met on August 18 at DIA to approve a joint-service memorandum of understanding, a mission statement and a contract with SRI. Watt was on leave and Lieutenant Atwater attended for INSCOM; on August 27, Watt told Hay that INSCOM "could not concur with the MOU," and he and Hay drafted a substitute. INSCOM's objections, with which Hay agreed, included money: INSCOM had $150,000 for the fiscal 1981 effort and needed $30,000 for operations, leaving $120,000 for outside contracts, and DIA maintained that Army had verbally agreed to more, which Watt and Stoner disputed and Watt could document with a memorandum for record. They objected as well to DIA's decision to move its primary contract monitor to SRI at Menlo Park, California, taken before the memorandum was approved, because it ignored the Gale committee's recommendation that "dependence on the SRI approach should be phased out," because DIA felt "the Gale Report is biased," and because placing a DIA monitor with Puthoff and Targ "makes it difficult to deny DOD interest in PSI." The paper records that DIA appeared to believe Watt and Stoner "have it in" for Vorona's office, and that Hay did not.21

At the Defense Department committee meeting of November 13, 1980, which Watt recorded, SRI faced administrative leave for Puthoff and others unless funds came soon, and a participant whose name is withheld informed the committee that representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency had indicated their agencies might be interested in putting money into the program, whereupon the committee agreed to invite them as observers. Watt objected to SRI personnel being involved in operational intelligence problems and recommended that requests for "quick reaction reports" go through the committee rather than directly to SRI; he also recommended that the committee prepare a statement for public release "in case it is every needed," and, with Major Phil Partain of the Air Force, that the committee recommend that research and development needed to be carried on.22 On April 13, 1981 he and Atwater visited the School of Engineering at Duke University to learn of a computerized system for monitoring the psychological correlates of psi performance, received by Ed Kelly and John Palmer, who said that funding was expected from the McDonnell Douglas Foundation.23

Briefings

Watt wrote the record of his briefing of Representative Charlie Rose of January 16, 1980: "I briefed Congressman Charlie Rose... on the INSCOM GRILL FLAME Project," with Thompson, Vorona, "Jake Stewart, NSC Staff Member" and "Dick Giza, Office of Congressman Rose" present; "Page 3 of Incl 1 was not provided to the audience at the direction of MG Thompson," and Rose "encouraged us to continue with our program."24 On February 5, 1980 he presented the briefing for selected officers of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations, who said they were "glad to see that you have chosen to go operational on this subject matter rather than keep it in the lab." On April 10, 1980 he briefed the Air Force assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Major General James L. Brown, whose view was "it's necessary to continue, but we really need to have a better handle on the phenomenon."25

On June 2, 1980 Targ asked Watt's permission to provide earlier training sessions to McDonnell Douglas, which had "a new procedure for judging remote viewing sessions"; Watt relayed the request to Stoner, who approved it by phone, on the condition that the material be edited and carry no record of its source.26 On July 7, 1980 he briefed Lieutenant General Eugene Tighe, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, with Thompson, Wilmot, Admiral Kelln, Vorona and Puthoff present, and Tighe, in Watt's account, "stressed that we should be attempting to isolate personnel with proven talent(s) in given areas."27 At the status review of July 28, 1980, Watt reported that DIA was drafting a memorandum of understanding for a joint Defense Department program, that the unit would move to new space in the first week of August, and that all military members would be subject to rotation by July 1981; Rolya said the CIA appeared to be INSCOM's largest customer and he wanted a more balanced effort.28

His account of the update briefing of December 22, 1980 for the Under Secretary of the Army, Dr. Spiro, records that Spiro "was not satisfied that we had demonstrated any 'successes'" and that "the subject matter (parapsychology) 'bothers' Dr. Spiro"; LaBerge said "I support quiet, rational continuation of the program, but don't allow ourselves to get caught in the position of selling the program," and Spiro said that a one in a thousand chance justified the spending. On April 3, 1981, in the Dirksen Office Building, he briefed staff members Herbert Klein and Dan Childs of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for almost an hour, telling them that INSCOM had a nine-man task force working "out-of-hide" and that the Army had asked for five spaces in its fiscal 1982 program.29 He briefed Rose again on April 16, 1981 with Thompson, writing the record. Rose had concluded from Puthoff's briefing that the Army might wish to break off contact with SRI; Watt and Thompson answered that it did not.30

Relief and later references

On June 30, 1981, as "outgoing project manager," he gave the first Grill Flame briefing to the new commander of INSCOM, Major General Albert Stubblebine, alongside his successor, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Jachim; Stubblebine told them to be watchful of mixing operations and maintenance funds with research money, and Watt reported that the transfer of $130,000 to DIA had been held up because the Army and Defense Department general counsels could not agree on the human use issue.31 On July 22, 1981 his office initiated a military interdepartmental purchase request transferring $130,000 to the Defense Intelligence Agency for the joint DIA and INSCOM contract with SRI for fiscal 1981, a contract that, he wrote on August 18 and again on August 20 (the second time signing as "Ch, Special Actions Division"), was held on file only in the human intelligence office because of its sensitivity.32 On August 10, 1981 he recorded a telephone call with Thompson in which they agreed on the points to be resolved before any further SRI contract on the training and evaluation of remote viewing would be approved: that SRI state in writing what limitations were being placed on it; that SRI and Swann clarify in writing "who owns the right to Mr. Swann's new training program"; that INSCOM funding for fiscal 1982 stay at $195,000 and that INSCOM receive written assurance that it would be "offered the opportunity to have selected personnel trained using the new concept"; and that the selection of INSCOM trainees be a joint process between Swann and Grill Flame management, with Swann visiting afterward "to see that 'all systems are still functioning properly.'" Colonel Chad White and Thompson were shown as concurring.33 A letter of August 12, 1981 from the SRI contract monitor, enclosing material on the selection of sponsor trainees in Swann's training program, was addressed to Watt and Jachim jointly.34 On August 28, 1981 he presented INSCOM's briefing to the National Security Agency Scientific Advisory Committee, chaired by Willis Ware of the RAND Corporation, and wrote on September 1 that "I stressed that our effort was not research and development, but strictly operational in nature."35

The Army's chronology dates Jachim's assumption of the project manager's duties to October 1981; Schnabel wrote that Watt's tour was over and that Jachim replaced him in 1982.36 The Grill Flame master access roster of April 6, 1983 lists "WATT, Murray, LTC, INSCOM DCSOPS" as "Former G.F. Project Mgr." with inactive status.37 In December 1985, a Washington Post reporter described the Fort Meade program to Russell Targ as one that Stubblebine had overseen, "after Watt had left and Jachim took over."38

Footnotes

  1. INSCOM, "Summary Phoncon between LTC Kane, DCSOPS, INSCOM and MAJ Murray B. Watt; PPPA, DIRHUM, INSCOM," November 1, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410020-3; Watt, Murray, "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Briefing for DDO, CIA, 5 Feb 1980," February 6, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250053-6; Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, "Special Analytic Report," December 4, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060004-9. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001200410020-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000250053-6 and https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r000400060004-9. ↩︎

  2. Schnabel, Jim, Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies, Dell, 1997, chapters on the formation of the Fort Meade unit. ↩︎

  3. US Army Intelligence and Security Command, "INSCOM Project Grill Flame: Progress Report #1," February 21, 1979, with enclosures, CIA-RDP96-00788R001500040003-0 and CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3; "Summary Phoncon between LTC Kane, DCSOPS, INSCOM and MAJ Murray B. Watt," November 1, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410020-3; "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001100070001-3 and https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001100020001-8. ↩︎

  4. Watt, Murray B., "Summary of Visit to SRI International, 15-17 November 1978," and "Summary of Visit to SRI International, 12-15 December 1978," enclosed in Progress Report #1, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001100070001-3. ↩︎

  5. Progress Report #1, February 21, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001500040003-0 and CIA-RDP96-00788R001100070001-3 (including "Summary of Visit to AMSAA, 12 Jan 79"); "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. ↩︎

  6. Defense Intelligence Agency, S-1004/DT-1, "Minutes of the Meeting, DoD Grill Flame Committee," November 28, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000140013-2; Watt, Murray B., "Summary of Working Group Meeting, DoD Committee on Special Sensors (C), 28 Nov 78," November 29, 1978, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200240006-8. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000140013-2 and https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001200240006-8. ↩︎

  7. Watt, Murray B., memorandum for the record, "Three-Day Work Conference - AMSAA (8, 9 and 12 March 1979)," March 15, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240039-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240039-3. ↩︎

  8. Watt, Murray B., "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Briefings, 23 Mar 79," March 26, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240034-8, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240034-8. ↩︎

  9. Office of the Surgeon General, "Minutes of Ad Hoc Subcommittee of The Surgeon General's Human Use Review Committee Meeting, 26 March 1979," March 29, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100110002-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001100110002-7. ↩︎

  10. INSCOM, "Monthly Exchange of Ideas, Technical Advances and Future Plans: AMSAA and INSCOM," catalogued August 1, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240030-2; Watt, Murray B., "GRILL FLAME Update Briefing for COL(P) Wilmot, 17 October 1979," CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240022-1. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240030-2 and https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240022-1. ↩︎

  11. Watt, Murray B., "GRILL FLAME DOD Science Evaluation Team Briefing, 27 September 1979," October 5, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240025-8, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240025-8. ↩︎

  12. Watt, Murray B., "GRILL FLAME DOD Science Evaluation Team Update Briefing, 9 November 1979," November 15, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240001-4. ↩︎

  13. Defense Intelligence Agency, minutes of the DoD Grill Flame Committee, November 27, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130015-1; July 12, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130008-9; January 10, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100009-1. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection. ↩︎

  14. Watt, Murray B., "Comments Concerning 'GRILL FLAME SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION COMMITTEE REPORT,' dated December 1979," catalogued February 13, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000130025-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000130025-0. ↩︎

  15. "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8; Watt, "Update Briefing, 9 November 1979," CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240001-4; "Transcript Remote Viewing (RV) Session DC-35," December 5, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R000500350001-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r000500350001-9; Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, "Special Analytic Report," December 4, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060004-9; Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Memorandum for GRILL FLAME Project Manager, GRILL FLAME Operational Feedback," catalogued May 27, 1981 (the text recounts a call of May 22, 1981), CIA-RDP96-00788R000600300001-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r000600300001-3. ↩︎

  16. Buzby, Brian, "I am LTC Buzby, Project Manager for INSCOM Project Center Lane," briefing script, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700330002-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001700330002-7; "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8. ↩︎

  17. Schnabel, Jim, Remote Viewers, Dell, 1997, chapters on the first sessions of the Fort Meade unit, the Iran hostage crisis and the sealed envelope target. ↩︎

  18. Watt, Murray B., "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Involvement in Iran," memorandum for the record, December 3, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240018-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240018-6. ↩︎

  19. Watt, Murray B., "After-Action Report (Iranian Crisis 23-25 Apr 80)," May 2, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001000340008-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001000340008-7; memorandum for LTC Watt, "Events of 23-25 April 1980," April 29, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250035-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000250035-6. ↩︎

  20. Watt, Murray B., memorandum for Colonel Chad B. White, "GRILL FLAME Evaluation in Support of Iranian Hostage Situation," March 16, 1981, with tables, CIA-RDP96-00788R001000340001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001000340001-4. ↩︎

  21. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DAMI-ISH, information paper "GRILL FLAME," September 12, 1980 (reissued September 15, 1980), CIA-RDP96-00788R001700280017-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001700280017-7; also catalogued as CIA-RDP96-00788R001200020013-4 and CIA-RDP96-00788R001200020014-3. ↩︎

  22. Watt, Murray B., memorandum for the record, "DoD GRILL FLAME Meeting, 13 Nov 80," November 14, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000100001-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000100001-9. ↩︎

  23. Trip report, "12-14 April 1981, Durham, NC," April 15, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000260001-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000260001-2. ↩︎

  24. Watt, Murray B., "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Briefing for Congressman Rose, 16 January 1980," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100190001-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001100190001-0. ↩︎

  25. Watt, "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Briefing for DDO, CIA, 5 Feb 1980," CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250053-6; Watt, "Briefing to Air Force ACSI, 10 April 1980," April 22, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250031-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000250031-0. ↩︎

  26. Watt, Murray B., "Summary of FONECON between Russell TARG, SRI, and LTC WATT, 2 June 1980," June 3, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250037-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000250037-4. ↩︎

  27. Watt, Murray B., "Grill Flame Briefing for Director, DIA (7 July 1980)," July 8, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250039-2, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000250039-2. ↩︎

  28. Watt, Murray B., "ACSI/INSCOM GRILL FLAME Status Review, 28 July 1980," July 31, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250042-8, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000250042-8. ↩︎

  29. Watt, Murray B., "Update Briefing for Under Secretary of the Army, 22 Dec 80," December 23, 1980, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440042-7; White, Chad B., "INSCOM GRILL FLAME (GF) Briefing to Staff Members, Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 3 April 1981," fact sheet, April 7, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220024-5. Read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room STARGATE collection, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001100440042-7 and https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001700220024-5. ↩︎

  30. Watt, Murray B., "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Briefing for Congressman Rose, 16 April 1981," April 17, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R001100190007-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001100190007-4. ↩︎

  31. Watt, Murray B., "Initial Grill Flame Briefing to MG Stubblebine as CG, INSCOM, 30 June 1981," July 1, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700220001-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001700220001-0. The same memorandum is catalogued as CIA-RDP96-00792R000100140023-7. ↩︎

  32. Watt, Murray B., memoranda for the record, "MIPR #81-1001, dtd 22 July 1981," August 18, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00792R000100140051-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00792r000100140051-6, and "MIPR 81-1001, dated 22 July 1981," August 20, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00792R000100140052-5, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00792r000100140052-5. The contract is identified as DIA contract DSSW MDA 903-81-C-0292. ↩︎

  33. Watt, Murray B., memorandum for the record, "Army/INSCOM Contractual Position as Regards SRI-I, FY 82," August 10, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00792R000100140005-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00792r000100140005-7. ↩︎

  34. SRI contract monitor, letter to Lt. Col. Murray B. Watt and Lt. Col. Robert Jachim, August 12, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00792R000100140009-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00792r000100140009-3. ↩︎

  35. Watt, Murray B., "GRILL FLAME Briefing for NSA Scientific Advisory Committee, 28 August 1981," September 1, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200190001-9, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001200190001-9. ↩︎

  36. "List of Events from September 1977 to January 1986," CIA-RDP96-00788R001100020001-8; Schnabel, Remote Viewers, Dell, 1997, chapter on Stubblebine's arrival at INSCOM. The chronology's date column places "LTC Robert Jachim assumes project manager duties" between July 17, 1981 and November 20, 1981 and lists it as October 1981. ↩︎

  37. "Alpha List, Grill Flame Master Access Roster," April 6, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001200270013-7, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001200270013-7. ↩︎

  38. Memorandum for record, "Conversation via Telephone with Puthoff," December 10, 1985, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700030002-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001700030002-0. ↩︎