32 lines
No EOL
2.1 KiB
Markdown
32 lines
No EOL
2.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Dino A. Brugioni
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aliases:
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- Dino Brugioni
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- Dino A. Brugioni
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created: 2026-05-17
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updated: 2026-05-18
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category: "Intelligence & Government"
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tags:
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- Person
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- CIA
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- PhotoIntelligence
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- Israel
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- ColdWar
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- NuclearWeapons
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summary: "Dino A. Brugioni (1921-2015) was a CIA photo intelligence officer who analyzed U-2 reconnaissance imagery and identified early evidence of the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona in the late 1950s, noting that senior officials chose to look the other way."
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born: 1921-12-16
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died: 2015-09-25
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location: "Bevier, Missouri"
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---
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Dino A. Brugioni was a World War II veteran who served as an aerial photographer and later joined the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] in 1948. He was enticed by [[Arthur C. Lundahl]] to join his staff in the Photographic Intelligence Division, where he played a key role in analyzing reconnaissance photos, particularly from the [[U-2 Spy Plane]].[^1]
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Brugioni recalled seeing the first signs of what would become the Israeli nuclear reactor at [[Dimona]]. He and other photo interpreters observed the fencing off of a large, barren area, the construction of a new road, and significant subterranean digging and concrete pouring. They immediately suspected something unusual was happening, given the scale of the construction in the middle of the desert.[^1]
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Despite his fascination with the construction at [[Dimona]], Brugioni noted that the White House never encouraged further briefings on the matter. He prepared presidential briefing materials for Lundahl and knew the intelligence on [[Israel]] was reaching the top, but he never understood whether the White House wanted [[Israel]] to have the bomb or not.[^1]
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By the end of 1959, Brugioni and Lundahl had no doubt that [[Israel]] was pursuing nuclear weapons, and that President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] and his advisers were determined to look the other way. Brugioni and his colleagues chose not to raise questions about [[Dimona]], understanding that the hierarchy had decided to "play it cool."[^1]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 4. |