138 lines
18 KiB
Markdown
138 lines
18 KiB
Markdown
---
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aliases:
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- Menachem Begin
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- Menahem Begin
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- Begin
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- Prime Minister Begin
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- Menachem Wolfovitch Begin
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created: 2025-01-09
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updated: 2026-10-05
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category: "Political Figure"
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tags:
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- Person
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- KeyFigure
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- Israel
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- Nuclear
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- Likud
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- Irgun
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- Osirak
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- CampDavid
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- IranIsraelArms
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- OctoberSurprise
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- SamsonOption
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summary: "Irgun leader and Herut chairman who became prime minister in 1977, shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize, ordered the 1981 Osirak raid, and appears in the American record of 1980 Israeli arms offers to Iran."
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born: 1913-08-16
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died: 1992-03-09
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location: "Brest-Litovsk, Russian Empire (now Brest, Belarus)"
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relations:
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- type: head_of
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with: "[[Israel]]"
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start: 1977
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end: 1983
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role: "prime minister"
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fn: 2
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- type: head_of
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with: "[[Likud Party]]"
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start: 1977
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role: "leader of the list that won the May 1977 elections"
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fn: 2
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[King David Hotel bombing]]"
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start: 1946-07
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role: "Irgun leader"
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fn: 2
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- type: appointed
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with: "[[Ezer Weizman]]"
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start: 1977
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role: "minister of defense"
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fn: 7
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- type: appointed
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with: "[[Ariel Sharon]]"
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start: 1981
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role: "minister of defense"
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fn: 10
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- type: appointed
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with: "[[Rafael Eitan]]"
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start: 1981
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role: "special assistant for counterterrorism; also head of LAKAM"
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fn: 18
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Camp David summit]]"
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start: 1978
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role: "negotiated the Israel-Egypt accords with Anwar Sadat; Nobel Peace Prize 1978"
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fn: 1
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Osirak bombing]]"
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start: 1981-06-07
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role: "ordered and announced the raid"
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fn: 15
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- type: subject_of
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with: "[[Kahan Commission]]"
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start: 1982-09
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end: 1983-02-08
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role: "found to bear 'a certain degree of responsibility' for lack of interest in the Phalangists' actions at Sabra and Shatila"
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fn: 19
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]"
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start: 1980
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role: "alleged by Ari Ben-Menashe to have ordered its creation in the fall of 1980"
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fn: 12
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---
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Menachem Begin (born August 16, 1913 in Brest-Litovsk; died March 9, 1992 in Tel Aviv) led the [[Irgun]] underground before 1948, led the [[Herut]] party in opposition for the first twenty-nine years of the state, and was prime minister of [[Israel]] from the 1977 election until 1983. He shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize with [[Anwar Sadat]] "for jointly having negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel in 1978."[^1] The record of his government that bears on this vault consists of the American intelligence and diplomatic documents on the Osirak raid, the House task force's account of the 1980 Israeli arms offers to Iran, the report of the Kahan Commission, and passages in [[Seymour Hersh]]'s and [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]'s books on nuclear targeting, South Africa and Iran.[^2]
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### Irgun, Herut and the Labor establishment
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Hersh wrote that as a leader of the Irgun Begin was involved in the July 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel in [[Jerusalem]], headquarters of the British military; that the explosion killed eighty-two people, "including forty Arabs and seventeen Jews"; and that after the British hanged three suspected Irgun members a week later, Begin ordered the execution of two British sergeants held captive, whose bodies were booby-trapped and left hanging.[^2] He wrote that Begin and his family fled to eastern [[Poland]] in 1939, were arrested by Soviet troops and expelled to a Siberian camp, and were released in 1941 into a Polish contingent of the Red Army after the German invasion.[^2]
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In the 1950s the labor establishment treated his party as an opponent. Hersh wrote that in the mid-1950s the most hawkish factions in military policy were those of [[Moshe Dayan]] and [[Shimon Peres]], Ahdut HaAvoda and Herut; that Herut under Begin held that Israel's primary task was the redemption of biblical lands and a Greater Israel; and that [[David Ben-Gurion]], Dayan and Peres were "adamantly opposed to the fundamentalist views of Begin and his Herut Party." Herut's gains in the 1955 election came at the expense of [[Mapai Party]]; the General Zionists merged with Herut in 1966 to form Gahal, which merged in 1973 with three other right-wing factions to create the [[Likud Party]].[^3] According to Hersh, Ben-Gurion and Peres treated Begin "with contempt and ridicule throughout his career," and in 1977 Begin would not approach Peres directly about what Peres had arranged in South Africa.[^4]
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### The 1977 election and the nuclear establishment
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Hersh wrote that Likud's victory in May 1977 ended twenty-nine years of Mapai and [[Labor Party]] control and "brought to power a government that was even more committed than Labor to the Samson Option and the necessity of an Israeli nuclear arsenal," and that Begin's followers viewed the mainstream Zionists as having fought three wars without a grand strategy.[^2] By all accounts, he wrote, Begin had never visited [[Dimona]] before becoming prime minister and was not well informed about it, and his first briefings on national security were given by the outgoing prime minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]].[^2] In his chapter on Osirak Hersh wrote that Begin had since visited the underground facility at Dimona at least once and, according to Israeli officials, received a detailed memorandum on it in the days before the raid.[^5]
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Ben-Menashe, a civilian official in the External Relations Department of the Israeli defense ministry from 1977 to 1987 whom Hersh quoted, said that Begin "strongly endorsed Dimona's plans for the nuclear targeting of the Soviet Union" and "gave orders to target more Soviet cities"; in his own book Ben-Menashe wrote that one of Begin's first orders after taking office from Rabin was to target southern [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] cities including [[Yerevan]] and [[Baku]], and that Begin, who regarded [[South Africa]] as a pariah, sent [[Ezer Weizman]] to Pretoria in 1978.[^6] Hersh quoted Ben-Menashe that Weizman came back and said "We've promised these guys nuclear warheads," and that Begin answered in effect "Yes. Do it!"; another unnamed Israeli with access to defense ministry files said that Weizman signed an agreement before the 1979 tests for the sale to South Africa of technology for 175mm and 203mm nuclear artillery shells.[^7] Ben-Menashe is the only named source for the passages so cited on Begin's orders. Hersh also wrote, citing Israeli officials, that when Sadat met Begin in Jerusalem in November 1977 his first questions concerned the Israeli arsenal, that he sought a pledge of non-use against Egypt in a treaty, and that Begin did not reply.[^8]
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### Camp David, the KH-11 and Washington
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Hersh wrote that in March 1979 President [[Jimmy Carter]] decided to give Israel access to [[KH-11]] satellite photographs, and that some American intelligence officials suspected it was a reward for Begin's success at the [[Camp David summit]] with Sadat; he also wrote that in the Israeli view the agreement was made inevitable by the failure of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] to anticipate the fall of the Shah, and that it was the twenty-eighth in a series of formal Israeli and American intelligence ventures since the 1950s.[^9] In September 1981, Hersh wrote, Begin brought [[Ariel Sharon]] to the White House, where, according to Ambassador [[Samuel W. Lewis]], Begin proposed a formal alliance to President [[Ronald Reagan]], who said yes, to the shock of [[Alexander Haig]], [[Richard V. Allen]] and [[Caspar Weinberger]]; Sharon's plan included formal access to the KH-11, which Hersh wrote Israel wanted for its nuclear targeting of the Soviet Union, and the negotiation led by Weinberger "turned out a mouse."[^10]
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### Iran, 1978 to 1981
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The House October Surprise Task Force report of January 3, 1993 records the American-side documents on Israeli arms offers to Iran. On April 13, 1980 a high-level Israeli official told Carter in Washington that Israel had contacts in Iran that could help with the hostages if it were allowed to sell certain military equipment; Carter rejected the offer and obtained an assurance that Israel would observe the embargo, with Israel to advise the United States before changing its policy. On October 22, 1980 the Israelis told Ambassador Lewis that a deal for 200 tires for F-4 aircraft had been negotiated, and the State Department instructed the embassy to convey a message to Begin that the American government "recognize[d] the long-term significance" of an Israeli relationship with Iran but that Western allies prohibited exports to Iran while hostages were held. The Israeli government's own report to the task force stated that Begin raised the arms question with Carter and Secretary of State [[Edmund Muskie]] during his visit to the United States in November 1980, stressing that deliveries might help release the hostages, and that on November 21, 1980 he ordered that arms would not be supplied directly or indirectly to Iran until the hostages were released. On February 4, 1981 Begin told Lewis that future deliveries would use only Israeli equipment without United States components.[^11]
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Ben-Menashe's account differs. He wrote that Begin sent the emissary Ruth Ben-David, an old friend of the Ayatollah [[Ruhollah Khomeini]], to him in Paris in December 1978; that in April 1980 Begin gave "the green light for the sale to Iran of non-American military equipment," tires rather than technical parts, after which Carter telephoned Begin on April 27 to complain; that in September 1980 Begin sent Ben-David to Tehran to seek release of the hostages in exchange for Israeli arms guarantees; that in the fall of 1980 Begin ordered the military intelligence chief [[Yehoshua Sagi]] and the Mossad's acting director [[Nachum Admoni]] to create the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]; and that Begin "had secretly reached in principle" a cooperation agreement with [[William J. Casey]] in August 1980.[^12] Ben-Menashe is the sole source for these passages. The House task force wrote that credible testimony and documents showed Ben-Menashe "to be totally lacking in credibility" on the Casey and Karrubi meetings, that [[Rafael Eitan]] and Saguy told the Israeli government they had never met him, and that his Israeli military file showed work as a translator; Ben-Menashe was acquitted in New York in November 1990 on charges of conspiring to sell Israeli-owned C-130 aircraft to Iran.[^13] The Mossad's own list of directors gives Yitzhak Hofi as head from 1974 to 1982 and Admoni from 1982.[^14]
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### Osirak
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On June 7, 1981 the Israeli Air Force destroyed the reactor at Osirak. Hersh wrote that Begin "stunned his colleagues" by announcing the raid himself on June 8, and on June 9 said that "if the nuclear reactor had not been destroyed, another Holocaust would have happened in the history of the Jewish people"; that Mossad head [[Yitzhak Hofi]] and military intelligence chief [[Yehoshua Saguy]] had opposed the attack, "primarily because there was no evidence that Iraq was as yet capable of building a bomb," as had Deputy Prime Minister [[Yigael Yadin]]; that Saguy was not told of the mission until June 4; and that two weeks later Hofi gave a newspaper interview, cited only by title under censorship, complaining about politicians who compromised secret intelligence.[^15] Two days after the raid, at a British diplomatic reception, Begin said that the planes had also destroyed a secret facility forty meters below the reactor where Iraqi bombs were to be assembled; Hersh wrote that Israeli officials knew the description fitted a facility at Dimona and that government spokesmen said the next day that Begin had misspoken and the depth was four meters.[^15] Ben-Menashe wrote that Israeli intelligence had advised against admitting responsibility and that Begin, who had scheduled elections for June 30, made the announcement anyway.[^12]
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The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, publishing documents from the Reagan Library and the Israeli State Archives in 2021, reported that when the raid took place the administration was surprised; that Haig told the Israelis that the raid was a "serious complication" for the United States and that "President Reagan thinks the same"; that the Israelis learned that Weinberger favored a tough response; that the administration suspended delivery of F-16 aircraft pending a legal review; that Haig then proposed that Washington condemn Israel harshly but "draw the line on punishment"; and that a week after the raid Allen informed Reagan that the administration was "not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated US law" and that the issue should be treated "as a political rather than a legal question."[^16] Hersh wrote that Allen recalled Reagan as "delighted" and that the suspension of F-16 deliveries was lifted two months later.[^15]
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### Lebanon and the Kahan Commission
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Hersh wrote that Sharon, after the American refusal of the strategic plan, led Israel with Begin's support into the invasion of [[Lebanon]] in 1982; that before doing so Sharon placed loyalists in the intelligence services and the nuclear establishment; and that [[Binyamin Blumberg]] was replaced as head of [[LAKAM]] by Rafael (Rafi) Eitan, "Begin's special assistant for counterterrorism," who kept both jobs.[^17][^18] The Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut, reporting on February 8, 1983, recorded that the [[Mossad]] had been "made responsible for the link with the Phalangists." It found that Begin first heard of the Phalangists' entry into the camps about thirty-six hours after the decision, that it was "not incumbent upon" him to object, but that "for two days after the Prime Minister heard about the Phalangists' entry, he showed absolutely no interest in their actions in the camps," and that his "lack of involvement in the entire matter casts on him a certain degree of responsibility"; it considered it sufficient to determine his responsibility without further recommendation, and recommended that Sharon draw "the appropriate personal conclusions" and, if necessary, that the prime minister consider removing him.[^19] The commission also described the Mossad's approach to the Phalangists as more favorable than that of military intelligence, and wrote that the director of military intelligence knew that the defense minister, the chief of staff "and perhaps also the Prime Minister" accepted the Mossad's approach.[^19] See [[Sabra and Shatila massacres]].
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Ben-Menashe wrote that Begin resigned in 1983 three days before the visit of Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]], that he said he had personally let down the nation over the Lebanese war, and that Sharon had disappointed him.[^20] Ben-Menashe also wrote that after the death of Yekutiel Adam in Lebanon, whom Begin had picked as Mossad chief in 1981, Begin appointed a professional Mossad bureaucrat, Admoni, to shift power toward military intelligence, and that Rafael Eitan told him Adam's death was an inside job.[^12]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: "Menachem Begin, Facts," Nobel Peace Prize 1978, NobelPrize.org. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1978/begin/facts/
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[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M., *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*, Random House, 1991, chapter 19, "The Carter Malaise," pp. 259-260 and footnote. Full text read at https://archive.org/details/Sampson_Option
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[^3]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 3, "The French Connection," p. 38 footnote.
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[^4]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 20, "An Israeli Test," p. 274.
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[^5]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 1, "A Secret Agreement," p. 11.
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[^6]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 19, p. 260 and footnote (Ben-Menashe's service); Ben-Menashe, Ari, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, TrineDay, 2015 reprint of the 1992 edition, passages on the South African relationship. https://archive.org/details/profits-of-war-1992-ari-ben-menashe
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[^7]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 20, pp. 274-276.
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[^8]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 19, p. 269 footnote.
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[^9]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 1, pp. 3-6.
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[^10]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 21, "Israel's Nuclear Spy," pp. 286-288.
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[^11]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*, H. Rept. 102-1102, January 3, 1993, section X, "Alleged Quid Pro Quo Deliveries of Arms," pp. 197-206, quoting the report of the Government of Israel. https://archive.org/details/14148-h.rp.-1102
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[^12]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, passages on Ruth Ben-David and Khomeini (December 1978), the sale of tires (April 1980), the Joint Committee (fall 1980), the Casey agreement (August 1980), Osirak, and the Mossad directorship. https://archive.org/details/profits-of-war-1992-ari-ben-menashe
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[^13]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, section on Ben-Menashe (p. 97 of the report); Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 19 footnote on Ben-Menashe's service, arrest in 1989 and acquittal in November 1990.
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[^14]: Mossad, "History," list of directors. https://mossad.gov.il/en/history
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[^15]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 1, pp. 8-12.
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[^16]: Rabinowitz, Or, and Giordana Pulcini, "The Israeli Raid Against the Iraqi Reactor - 40 Years Later: New Insights from the Archives," Wilson Center, Sources and Methods, June 3, 2021, citing the Ronald Reagan Library and the Israel State Archives. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/israeli-raid-against-iraqi-reactor-40-years-later-new-insights-archives
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[^17]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 21, p. 287.
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[^18]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 21, pp. 288-289.
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[^19]: Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, Report, February 8, 1983, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Historical Documents, vol. 8: 1982-1984, document 104, sections on the background, the Prime Minister, the head of Mossad and the Director of Military Intelligence. https://syriaaccountability.org/content/images/wordpress/ISRAELMFA_Commission-Inquiry-Beirut_1983_EN.pdf
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[^20]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, chapter on the 1983 political upheaval.
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