The_Info_Web/10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Robert McFarlane.md

title	aliases	created	updated	category	tags	summary	born	died	location	relations
Robert McFarlane	Robert McFarlane Bud McFarlane Robert C. McFarlane Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane Robert Carl McFarlane	2026-05-17	2026-10-05	Intelligence & Government	KeyFigure Person NationalSecurityAdviser IranContra ContraWar NationalSecurityCouncil MarineCorps 1980s	Reagan's national security adviser from October 1983 to December 1985 who delegated Contra support and Iran arms contacts to Oliver North, pleaded guilty in 1988 to four misdemeanors and was pardoned in 1992.	1937-07-12	2022-05-12	Washington, D.C., USA	type with start end role fn employed_by National Security Council 1983-10 1985-12-04 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (national security adviser) 1 type with reverse start role fn appointed Ronald Reagan true 1983-10 named national security adviser after serving as deputy to William Clark 1 type with reverse start end role fn reported_to Oliver North true 1984 1985-12 North, McFarlane's deputy director of political-military affairs, ran the Contra support effort McFarlane delegated to him 1 type with start end role fn participant_in Iran-Contra Affair 1984 1986-11 organized third-country Contra funding, an early advocate of the Iran arms sales, and led the May 1986 mission to Tehran 7 type with reverse start end role fn prosecuted Lawrence Walsh true 1988-03-11 1992-12-24 pleaded guilty March 11, 1988 to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress; sentenced March 3, 1989; pardoned December 24, 1992 9

Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a United States Naval Academy graduate and Marine Corps officer who served as President Ronald Reagan's national security adviser from October 1983 to December 1985. Before that he had been deputy to his predecessor William Clark, counselor to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, a staff member of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, and military aide to Henry Kissinger when Kissinger was national security adviser to Richard Nixon. He commanded the first U.S. Marine battery to land in the Republic of Vietnam, completed two tours, received a Bronze Star, and resigned from the United States Marine Corps as a lieutenant colonel.¹ Lawrence Walsh's Final Report records that under Reagan the National Security Council staff "at times became operational, taking on primary responsibility for the execution of the Iran and contra covert operations," and that McFarlane "did not shrink from the operational tasks that were of high personal interest to the President," delegating some of them to his deputy director of political-military affairs, Oliver North.¹

Contra funding, 1984

On January 6, 1984 the National Security Planning Group approved "immediate efforts to obtain additional funding of $10-15 million from foreign or domestic sources," the current $24 million appropriation to the Contras being enough only through June; McFarlane was responsible for carrying it out with North and the NSC staff member Constantine Menges. On February 21, 1984 he warned Reagan that the program would have to be curtailed by May or June unless new money was found.¹² In late March 1984 William J. Casey sent him a memorandum urging that Israel and other countries be asked for weapons and money, and in April McFarlane sent the NSC staff member Howard Teicher to ask the Israelis; the mission was unsuccessful, and when Secretary of State George Shultz learned of it from the embassy in Israel McFarlane told him Teicher had gone "on his own hook."¹

In May 1984 he met the Saudi ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and explained Reagan's concern about the gap in Contra financing; days later Bandar volunteered $1 million a month. McFarlane obtained from North a Contra bank account number and gave it to Bandar. He later testified that he told Reagan and Vice President George H.W. Bush within a day or two, and that when he put the first contribution to the President on a card in the daily briefing book with the words that no one else knew of it, Reagan answered, in writing or orally, "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."¹ At the June 25, 1984 National Security Planning Group meeting, where Shultz quoted Chief of Staff James Baker as calling third-country solicitations an "impeachable offense," McFarlane said: "I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas [contras] until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." Walsh noted that none of the participants raised the fact that the Saudi solicitation had already occurred. Attorney General William French Smith ruled the next day that third-country funding was permissible so long as no U.S. funds were used and no repayment was expected.¹ The Boland Amendment of October 1984 then barred funds of any agency "involved in intelligence activities" from supporting Nicaragua military or paramilitary operations "directly or indirectly."³

McFarlane testified that in spring and summer of 1984 Reagan let it be known "very clearly" that the Contras were to be kept together "body and soul," and that he discussed the directive with his deputy Donald Fortier and with North; he said he told North that no one could "solicit, encourage, coerce, or broker the transmission of money" to the Contras. Walsh found that he assigned the work to North and that North kept him generally informed. A September 2, 1984 North request to approach a private donor for a "civilian" helicopter drew McFarlane's marginal note "I don't think this is legal."¹ Walsh's conclusion on the arrangement was that Reagan "put McFarlane in a difficult position," and that McFarlane "put his subordinates in an equally difficult position by delegating to them the operational tasks."¹

The writer Gary Webb reported that in January 1985, as the FDN spent its last batch of Central Intelligence Agency money and Contra forces retreated from Nicaragua into Honduras, McFarlane told the FDN leader Adolfo Calero it might be time to think about "cutting both our losses and theirs," after twelve months that had included the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, a bombing at Eden Pastora's jungle headquarters and exposure of a CIA-printed terrorism manual.⁴ In February 1985 the Saudis agreed to give an additional $24 million, according to the New York Times editors' chronology of the Committees' report; Walsh puts the Saudi total at $32 million for the period, with Taiwan adding $2 million.¹⁵

Contra memoranda and the 1985 letters to Congress

McFarlane received North's written reports throughout 1985. Walsh lists six "problem documents" that the NSC general counsel Paul Thompson pulled from the NSC's System IV file in August 1985 after Representatives Michael Barnes and Lee Hamilton asked about press reports of North's activity: a December 4, 1984 memorandum on Chinese SA-7 missiles shipped under false Guatemala end-user certificates and on a British security expert for Calero; a February 6, 1985 memorandum proposing that the Nicaraguan merchant ship Monimbo be seized or sunk; a March 5, 1985 memorandum on compensating Guatemala; a March 16, 1985 "Fallback Plan" in which McFarlane marked an additional $25 to $30 million from the Saudis "doubtful"; an April 11, 1985 memorandum reporting that Contra strength had grown from 9,500 to more than 16,000; and a May 31, 1985 memorandum on the delivery of lethal supplies.¹ On October 30, 1985 North's "Reconnaissance Overflights" memorandum, which told McFarlane that the intelligence would be air-dropped with two Honduran recoilless rifles to sink arms carriers, was marked by John Poindexter "President approved."¹

On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote Hamilton that "at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law" and that "we did not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary activities either from Americans or third parties"; his September 12 letter to Barnes and an October 7 reply to Hamilton's questions said North had not "used his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies." On October 17, 1985 he showed Barnes a stack of NSC documents that could not leave the White House; Barnes did not take up the offer, and McFarlane did not answer his request of October 29 for the documents.¹ North's secretary Fawn Hall later altered five of the six documents in November 1986.¹ Asked at North's 1989 trial whether he lied to Congress, McFarlane said: "At the time I didn't believe it but at the time I was wrong and I admit that," and explained that "you don't lie. You put your own interpretation on what the truth is."¹

The Iran initiative, 1985 to 1986

McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."⁶ In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant Michael Ledeen to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister Shimon Peres on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.¹⁵⁷

On July 3, 1985 David Kimche, director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in Washington, D.C.. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.¹⁵ Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of Charles Hill, Weinberger and Chief of Staff Donald Regan obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.¹ Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.¹

McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calling on you from time to time" and wrote that he trusted McFarlane would "still permit me to call on you." On December 7 he attended the White House residence meeting on Iran, and on December 8 he flew to London with North to meet Manucher Ghorbanifar, Kimche and Yaacov Nimrodi.¹⁵ He stayed in contact with North and Poindexter on the NSC's PROFs computer system from a terminal at his home. On May 25, 1986 he arrived in Tehran with North and others carrying HAWK spare parts, and, according to Walsh, a cake; the party left on May 28 without a hostage release. North's contemporaneous note records that they were "heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." After the trip McFarlane and North briefed Reagan, Bush and Regan; Walsh records that McFarlane "was concerned about North's revelation regarding the Iran/contra diversion, but said he shared the information with no one," and recommended to Poindexter that North be returned to the Marine Corps.¹

Exposure, plea and pardon

After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."¹ In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the Tower Commission; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.¹⁸

On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."¹⁹ After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.¹⁰ President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, Elliott Abrams, Duane Clarridge, Clair George and Alan Fiers.⁹

McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.⁸

Footnotes

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1. Walsh, Lawrence E. Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels, August 4, 1993), ch. 1, "United States v. Robert C. McFarlane" (citing McFarlane, North trial testimony, March 10 to 16, 1989; Select Committees testimony, May 11 to 13, 1987; SSCI testimony, December 7, 1986; NSPG minutes, June 25, 1984; Hill, Weinberger and Regan notes). https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎

2. Brinkley, Joel, and Stephen Engelberg, eds. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with the Minority Views, abridged edition (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1988), "Iran-Contra Chronology," entry for February 21, 1984. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit ↩︎

3. Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm ↩︎

4. Webb, Gary. Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion. Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it." ↩︎

5. Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., Report of the Congressional Committees, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit ↩︎

6. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm ↩︎

7. Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm ↩︎

8. "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84 ↩︎

9. Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm ↩︎

10. Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm ↩︎