The_Info_Web/10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Richard Babayan.md

aliases	category	tags	summary	created	updated	location	relations
Richard Babayan Babayan	Arms Dealers & Brokers	Person CIA PROMIS Inslaw OctoberSurprise IranArms Arms	Richard Babayan is an Iranian national, arms broker and INSLAW affiant whose 1992 testimony on 1980 meetings between William Casey and Iranian officials the House October Surprise Task Force rejected.	2026-05-14	2026-10-07	Florida	type with start end role reverse fn investigated October Surprise Task Force 1992 1993 deposed witness whose Madrid and Zurich testimony the task force rejected true 2 type with start role fn participant_in Inslaw 1991 affiant in INSLAW's 1991 bankruptcy court discovery filing (Exhibit 3: PROMIS acquisitions by Libya, Iraq and South Korea) 11

Richard Babayan is a former arms broker whom the journalist Ryan Gallagher described in 2011 as a Central Intelligence Agency "contract operative."¹ He was an Iran national who testified in 1992 that he had been told of 1980 meetings between William Casey and Iranian officials, and the October Surprise Task Force of the House of Representatives rejected that testimony.² His name also appears in the Inslaw litigation over the PROMIS software and in the accounts of Ari Ben-Menashe concerning arms and software sales.

October Surprise testimony

The task force met with Babayan among the living proponents of the allegations, and Craig Unger's October 1991 article drew on interviews with him. ³ In depositions dated September 18 and 19, 1992, Babayan testified that Mohsen Baranriz, whom he identified as an Iranian intelligence official, visited him in Paris in early August 1980 and told him of meetings that had just concluded in Madrid at the end of July 1980 involving Casey and Iranian officials. ⁴ Babayan said he knew in advance that Baranriz was traveling to Europe for meetings, although he "did not know the nature of these meetings." According to Babayan, Baranriz said that Casey told the Iranians the incoming Reagan administration would resume United States arms shipments to Iran in return for delaying the release of the hostages. Baranriz telephoned him three or four days after leaving Paris to report a second set of meetings involving Casey. ⁴ Babayan also testified that he had knowledge that Mehdi Karrubi and Hassan Karrubi were members of the Iranian delegation to Madrid, and that Baranriz told him he had come to Paris "to brief us on what he had seen" and then had to fly straight back to Madrid for further meetings in August 1980. ⁴

Babayan also testified under oath that he was aware of a September 1980 meeting at the Hotel Baur au Lac in Zurich, Switzerland, between Iranians and Americans. He named Baranriz, Sadegh Tabatabai and a "close person to Ruhollah Khomeini," whom he declined to name, as attending for Iran. He could not identify the Americans present, whom he said had expertise in military material because the meeting concerned Iran's need for spare parts. The task force located Tabatabai, who denied any knowledge of such a meeting, and found "no factual basis" for Babayan's allegations. ⁵

Unger reported in Esquire in October 1991 that Babayan, whom Unger described as an Iranian who began working for the CIA in the 1970s, knew that an agreement had been reached among the parties to ship United States-made weapons to Iran. The task force states that Unger relied on Babayan's claims to that effect. ⁶

Task force findings

The task force found that the only affirmative evidence for the alleged Madrid meetings was hotel records and the testimony of Ben-Menashe and Babayan. Of five people alleged to have independent knowledge of the Madrid meetings, three, Ahmed Madani, Arif Durrani and Heinrich Rupp, testified under oath that they had no knowledge of them. The task force found the testimony of Babayan and Ben-Menashe "wholly lacking of any credibility," and concluded that there was "wholly insufficient credible evidence of any communications by or on behalf of the Ronald Reagan Presidential campaign with any persons representing or connected with the Iranian government or with those holding American hostages during 1979-1981." ⁷

The task force gave three reasons for finding Babayan not credible. First, no one other than Babayan had named Baranriz in connection with the Madrid meetings, he declined to name other participants or to identify his sources for later Zurich meetings, and the task force found that his testimony about Casey's presence in Madrid was discredited by evidence that Casey was in the United States during the relevant period. Second, Babayan said he had been associated with a CIA "front company" in Switzerland called "Diwan," operated by an alleged CIA asset named "M.K. Moss." The task force determined that neither Babayan nor Moss had ever worked for the CIA, directly or indirectly. Babayan testified that he did not know who Casey was when Baranriz named him, and recognized him only when Moss, his "CIA contact" in Switzerland, showed him a large photograph; on seeing it, he testified, he remembered having seen Casey in Paris several weeks earlier, in June, walking with Albert Jobs. The task force recorded that when asked whether the Paris sighting could have taken place in July 1980, Babayan "maintained his position that it had occurred in July." The task force believed he was trying to "bootstrap" onto published reports of a trip by Casey, Jobs and Richard Allen to France and England in early July 1980. The task force also recorded that Babayan could not say where in Madrid the meetings took place, testifying that Baranriz "may have told me but I don't remember," and that, except for Casey, Baranriz gave him no names of other participants at the Madrid meetings. Third, the task force received reliable information from law enforcement that Babayan "has an extensive criminal record, including a history of engaging in criminally fraudulent behavior." ⁸

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee ran a parallel inquiry. Its special counsel, Reid Weingarten, released a 156-page report on November 23, 1992, which he described as his preliminary conclusions. It found the evidence insufficient to support the allegation of a secret Reagan-Bush deal with Iran, found that the prime sources had proven wholly unreliable, and found that Casey had been intensely involved in the hostage crisis. ⁹

Prosecutions

The task force described Babayan as "an Iranian national presently in jail in Florida on securities fraud charges" at the time of his September 1992 testimony. ² A letter of October 27, 1992, from Terry O'Connor, inspector in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Representative Lee Hamilton forwarded a criminal record check that the task force summarized as evidencing arrests in Florida for crimes "ranging from insufficient funds to grand larceny, racketeering, securities fraud, and misrepresentation to acquire narcotics." ¹⁰

The INSLAW filing discussed below described Babayan as "currently awaiting trial in Palm Beach, Florida, state court on criminal charges." It stated, on information and belief, that he had worked on behalf of the Department of Justice in a "sting" operation against local politicians in Miami during the 1980s. ¹¹

INSLAW and PROMIS

Babayan entered the INSLAW litigation as an affiant. The Third Supplemental Submission described him as "an Iranian arms dealer" and, in its account of his affidavit (its Exhibit 3), stated that he recounted information about the alleged acquisition and implementation of PROMIS by the governments of Libya, Iraq and South Korea; about the alleged involvement of Earl Brian in at least the Iraqi and South Korean acquisitions; about the alleged involvement in the Iraqi acquisition of former United States general Richard Secord; and about an alleged meeting between Brian and Robert Gates in Santiago, Chile. INSLAW stated, on information and belief, that Gates was then Deputy National Security Advisor and had been Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1988, when the meeting with Brian was alleged to have occurred. ¹¹ INSLAW's Third Supplemental Submission in Support of Its Motion to Take Limited Discovery, filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia (Case No. 85-00070, Adversary Proceeding No. 86-0069), stated that a telefaxed copy of a notarized Babayan affidavit was then available to counsel, and that the original would be filed when received from Babayan's counsel. ¹¹ The same submission refers to a claim made in February 1991 by Michael Riconosciuto. ¹¹

The special counsel's report of Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General, dated March 1993, addressed the claims about Brian and Hadron. It concluded: "In short, there is no credible evidence that Hadron ever tried to acquire Inslaw or PROMIS, except for William Hamilton's claim about his conversation with Dominic Laiti and his claims that Ben Cnaan told him about a meeting with a businessman with 'ties at the highest level of the Reagan Administration' ..." ¹²

On the claimed international distribution of PROMIS, the Bua report stated that its investigation "has not proceeded past the preliminary stages. We do not believe that it needs to." It added: "We were not disposed to conduct an international search of foreign governments and intelligence operatives on the basis of Ben-Menashe's allegations." ¹²

The Bua report describes two affidavits by Ben-Menashe, dated February 17, 1991 and March 21, 1991, in which he implicated Brian in the international distribution of PROMIS. In the first, Ben-Menashe said Brian stated at a meeting that he owned the rights to PROMIS and had allowed the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Justice Department and the "Israeli intelligence communities" to use it since 1982, and that in 1987 Brian consummated a sale of PROMIS to the Israel government "for internal use as well." Ben-Menashe also claimed that in 1989, in Chile, Carlos Cardoen told him that Cardoen had brokered a sale of PROMIS by Brian to a representative of Iraqi Military Intelligence. ¹² The Bua report states that by 1991, apparently on information supplied by Riconosciuto, Inslaw had adopted the claim that Brian was "given" the right to sell the software. ¹²

According to Gallagher, Babayan said that Brian was instrumental in selling PROMIS to the governments of Iraq, Libya and South Korea. ¹

The Justice Department release of September 27, 1994, reported that it found no credible evidence that Department officials conspired to steal INSLAW's software, rejected the claim that the company was owed further government payments, concurred with the Martinsburg, West Virginia, police that Danny Casolaro's death was a suicide, and recommended that the affair be closed. ¹³

Maxwell and the Australian contribution

Ben-Menashe alleged that in 1987 the flow of funds from PROMIS sales extended to Robert Maxwell's Australian business operations. According to his account, a contribution to the West Australian Labor Party passed through one of Maxwell's Australian companies and was deposited by the Pergamon Press Trust Fund in Moscow, with Babayan and Earl Brian acting on behalf of Hadron in facilitating the transaction. ¹⁴

Footnotes

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1. Gallagher, Ryan. "Dirtier than Watergate," New Statesman, April 2011. Mirror: https://rjgallagher.co.uk/2011/04/inslaw-case-dirtier-than-watergate.html. Original: https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2011/04/promis-government-inslaw. ↩︎

2. Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980 ("October Surprise Task Force"), 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, House Calendar No. 634, January 3, 1993, section "(v) Richard Babayan," pp. 76 and 99 (table of contents). https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force ↩︎

3. Joint Report, introductory section (task force met with Hashemi, Madani, Durrani, Rupp, Ben-Menashe and Babayan) and notes 62 to 66 (Unger, Esquire, October 1991, at 92). https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force ↩︎

4. Joint Report, section "(v) Richard Babayan," notes 68 to 74, citing the Richard Babayan deposition of September 18 and 19, 1992 (Babayan Dep. at 13 to 16, 25). https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force ↩︎

5. Joint Report, Zurich section, notes 535 to 538, citing Babayan Dep. at 32 and 33 and the Sadegh Tabatabai interview at 14. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force ↩︎

6. Joint Report, notes 62 and 66, citing C. Unger, "October Surprise," Esquire, October 1991, at 92. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force ↩︎

7. Joint Report, introductory findings on the alleged Madrid meetings. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force ↩︎

8. Joint Report, section "(v) Richard Babayan," pp. 99 and following, notes 408 to 415, citing Babayan Dep. at 5, 7, 15 to 18, 27 to 31. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force ↩︎

9. Walter Pincus, Washington Post, November 24, 1992, report on the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee special counsel's preliminary conclusions (reprinted by American Cybercasting). https://stuff.mit.edu/afs/net/user/tytso/usenet/americast/wpost/1645 ↩︎

10. Joint Report, note 415, citing letter from Terry O'Connor, inspector in charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Hon. Lee Hamilton, October 27, 1992, and App. at 574 to 580. https://archive.org/details/6199732-Joint-Report-of-the-October-Surprise-Task-Force ↩︎

11. INSLAW, Inc., Third Supplemental Submission of INSLAW in Support of Its Motion to Take Limited Discovery, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 85-00070 (Chapter 11), Adversary Proceeding No. 86-0069, undated, footnote on page 7 (affidavit and Palm Beach passage). Refers to February 1991 events. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInBriefSupportingDocs. Pages 6 and 7 and footnote 1 on page 7. ↩︎

12. Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, conclusions on Hadron and international distribution, Ben-Menashe affidavits, and the Michael Riconosciuto section (begins p. 42). https://archive.org/details/doj-oip-inslaw-1993 ↩︎

13. "New Report Finds No Credible Basis for INSLAW Case," Department of Justice release, September 27, 1994. https://irp.fas.org/news/1994/940927-555.htm ↩︎

14. Ari Ben-Menashe, Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). ↩︎