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Nikita Khrushchev
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev
Nikita S. Khrushchev
N. S. Khrushchev
Khrushchev
Political Figure
Person
Soviet
ColdWar
Communist
SecretSpeech
CubanMissileCrisis
U2Incident
Penkovsky
KhrushchevRemembers
ViennaSummit
Gittinger
1950s
1960s
Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) led the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964, delivering the 1956 Secret Speech, authorizing the Berlin Wall, and navigating the Cuban Missile Crisis before his 1964 removal. 1894-04-15 1971-09-11 Moscow, Soviet Union 2026-05-01 2026-10-07
type with role start end fn
head_of Communist Party of the Soviet Union First Secretary 1953 1964 1
type with role start end fn
head_of Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Premier 1958-03-27 1964-10-15 2
type with role start end fn
participant_in Paris Summit Meeting Soviet premier 1960-05-16 1960-05-17 10
type with role start end fn
participant_in Cuban Missile Crisis Soviet premier 1962-10-16 1962-10-28 22
type with role fn
relative_of Aleksei Adzhubei father-in-law 32

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was born April 15, 1894, in Kalinovka, Russia. He led the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 and served as premier of the Soviet Union from March 1958 until October 1964, when the Politburo removed him from all posts. He died September 11, 1971, in Moscow, in relative obscurity following his removal from power.12

Rise Under Stalin

Khrushchev rose through party ranks during the Stalin era and survived the purges that killed most of his contemporaries in the party leadership. After Joseph Stalin's death in March 1953 he outmaneuvered rivals including Georgy Malenkov and Lavrentiy Beria to consolidate leadership.1 On March 27, 1958, he succeeded Nikolai Bulganin as Soviet premier.2

De-Stalinization and the Secret Speech

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party convened in Moscow on February 14, 1956, and Khrushchev denounced Stalin's crimes in a closed session.2 The speech addressed Stalin's cult of personality, political murders, military failures, and deportations of entire peoples.1 Foreign delegates were ordered to leave the auditorium before he spoke. A few days after the congress the text was sent in seven copies, each of 58 pages in a red binder stamped "Top Secret", by military courier to the leaders of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania, with instructions that no copies be made.3

Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv wrote that Allen Dulles, at Dwight D. Eisenhower's order, appropriated about $1 million to procure the text and that agents in the European capitals failed to obtain it. In their account the Polish party chief Edward Ochab had copies made for his aides, and Victor Grayevski, a Polish Jew who edited Soviet and satellite news at the Polish news agency PAP and had visited Israel in December 1955, persuaded a girlfriend with a senior job in the party secretariat to borrow the Russian text. A friend whom Grayevski has not named photographed the 58 pages and gave the film to Israeli diplomats. An Israeli intelligence officer in Warsaw flew to Vienna, and within days in April 1956 the text reached Amos Manor, director of Shin Bet, who had it translated into Hebrew and examined for authenticity. Manor took it to David Ben-Gurion on a Friday afternoon in early April. Ben-Gurion decided to give it to the United States, and an Israeli courier carried it to Washington, where Dulles discussed it with his brother John Foster Dulles. Ray Cline, a former CIA deputy director, called the transfer "a first-class feat." On the Dulles brothers' recommendation Eisenhower decided that the text should be published, and it was leaked to American newspapers and wire services and broadcast in full, about 20,000 words, over Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Melman and Raviv wrote that Dulles later described acquiring the speech as the outstanding achievement of his career, and that Grayevski emigrated to Israel in January 1957.3

A different chain appears in a 2006 article by Melman in Haaretz. In that account Yaakov Barmor, a Shin Bet agent who had helped arrange Grayevski's travel to Israel, photographed the transcript Grayevski brought him. Issar Harel told Ben-Gurion that if the speech was authentic it was an atomic bomb. The photographs went by diplomatic courier to Izzy Dorot, the Israeli intelligence liaison in Washington, and only James Jesus Angleton, head of counterintelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency, was allowed to see them. The photographs reached Dulles by mid-April 1956, and after the CIA determined the text was authentic it sent the text to The New York Times in early June 1956.4 Matitiahu Mayzel, in the Journal of Israeli History in 2013, argued that the speech was never truly secret, that Israel was neither the only nor likely the first source to give the text to the West, and that Soviet political and intelligence agencies quietly made it known to Western intelligence and the press.5

A CIA briefing dated May 28, 1956, titled "Khrushchev's Secret Speech," opens with a section headed "Text obtained" and then outlines the speech's contents.6 In a February 1982 interview with the Israeli newspaper Maariv, Harel confirmed that the Mossad had passed the details of the speech to US intelligence.7 Richard Pearson's obituary of Angleton in The Washington Post in May 1987 described obtaining the text as Angleton's best-known feat.8

The speech's aftermath reached the satellite states. On October 21, 1956, Wladyslaw Gomulka took over the Polish party leadership over Soviet objections. On October 23 and 24 a revolt broke out in Budapest during the Hungarian Revolution, and Soviet military forces intervened. Imre Nagy was replaced on November 4.2 Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader, resisted the implications of de-Stalinization for the GDR throughout the late 1950s and 1960s.1

The 1959 Visit and the U-2 Affair

Khrushchev visited the United States from September 15 to 27, 1959.2 Eisenhower declined to authorize further overflights of the Soviet Union in part because he did not wish to raise tension before the visit. Khrushchev stressed the success of the Soviet Luna 2 rocket, which reached the moon on September 12, 1959, when he arrived three days later, and boasted of Soviet missile progress in private conversations with Eisenhower.9

On May 1, 1960, a U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union.2 Khrushchev announced the downing to the Supreme Soviet on May 5 without mentioning the pilot. On May 7 he revealed that the pilot was alive and had admitted the mission. Khrushchev later wrote that releasing the information gradually was meant to confuse the government in Washington, which kept to its cover story while it believed the pilot dead.10 On May 11 Eisenhower assumed full responsibility for the flight in a statement to the press.10

Gregory Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach attribute the failure to Richard Bissell and the Development Projects Division, which they describe as overconfident after almost four years of successful flights.10 When the Paris Summit Meeting opened on May 16, Khrushchev insisted on speaking first, read a long protest, and demanded an apology from Eisenhower. Eisenhower stated that overflights had been suspended and would not be resumed, but he refused a formal apology, and the summit ended.10

The Berlin Wall and Vienna

Ulbricht had pressed Khrushchev for permission to seal the border for years, and Khrushchev authorized it in summer 1961. Emigration to West Germany through Berlin's open crossing points had reached tens of thousands per month by summer 1961.11 The CIA's chronology records that the wall was erected between August 12 and 18, 1961, closing the borders of the GDR and stopping the largest outflow of refugees to the West since 1953.2 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told John F. Kennedy on November 21, 1961, that more than 3 million refugees had fled to West Germany from the Soviet Zone since 1945.12 Khrushchev's calculation, as Taubman reconstructs it, was that the Berlin Wall, while a propaganda embarrassment, was preferable to the collapse of the GDR as a viable Soviet client state, and the wall also ended the Western point that free movement between East and West Berlin represented a tacit concession of the failure of Soviet-style governance.1

At Vienna on June 4, 1961, Khrushchev told Kennedy that the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with the GDR in December if the United States refused an interim agreement, that access to Berlin would be subject to GDR control, and that force would be met by force. Kennedy ended the conversation by observing that it would be a cold winter.12

The CIA psychologist John Gittinger, developer of the Personality Assessment System, briefed Eisenhower before Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States and Kennedy before the Vienna meeting, and prepared "elite assessments" of the cultural and psychological makeup of foreign leaders.13 John Marks wrote that CIA officials used the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology as cover when they traveled abroad to study the behavior of foreign leaders of interest to the Agency, including Khrushchev, and that during the Cuban missile crisis Gittinger was summoned to the White House to advise on how Khrushchev would react to American pressure.14

A separate correspondence ran through Georgi Bolshakov. Khrushchev's first letter to Kennedy in what became known as the Pen Pal Correspondence, dated September 29, 1961, was handed to Pierre Salinger by Bolshakov at the Carlyle Hotel in New York on September 30.15 Bolshakov delivered another Khrushchev letter, dated November 9, 1961, to Salinger at the White House on November 11.16 On January 30, 1962, Kennedy lunched at the White House with Khrushchev's son-in-law Aleksei Adzhubei, then editor of Izvestia, with Salinger and Bolshakov present.17

Cuban Missile Crisis

In October 1962 Khrushchev's decision to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba was intended, in Taubman's account, to compensate for American strategic nuclear superiority and to deter a United States invasion following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961. The thirteen-day Cuban Missile Crisis (October 16 to 28, 1962) ended with a compromise: the Soviet Union would remove its missiles from Cuba in exchange for an American pledge not to invade Cuba and a secret undertaking to remove American Jupiter missile missiles from Turkey.1

On October 27, 1962, at the seventh meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, the President recalled that he had asked days earlier that consideration be given to withdrawing the missiles from Turkey. Under Secretary George Ball replied that the State Department had decided it could not raise the question with the Turks at that time for fear of a disastrous Turkish reaction, and that study was being given to whether any method could reassure the Turks if the United States offered to withdraw the Jupiter missiles.18

Back channels ran alongside the public exchange. An undated memorandum from the ABC correspondent John Scali to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research describes a lunch at which the Soviet counselor Alexandr Fomin proposed a settlement in which the Cuban bases would be dismantled under United Nations supervision, in return for a United States pledge not to invade Cuba.19 Fomin also said that the Cuban delegate to the Security Council debate had asked for no-invasion assurances in return for dismantling, and Scali wrote that he could not recall any such remark. On October 26 at 7:45 p.m., Scali told Fomin that he had reason to believe the United States government saw real possibilities in the proposal, that time was very short, and that the message came from very high places. Fomin asked whether UN inspectors could also check United States bases in Florida and the Caribbean. The account of that meeting, recorded in a four-page paper in the Sorensen papers at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, appears in the editorial note of the official record.20

On November 19, 1962, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy met with Bolshakov, who was ostensibly press attaché of the Soviet Union but reputedly one of the leading KGB officials in Washington and a direct link to Khrushchev. Kennedy warned him that unless the Soviet Union withdrew its bombers from Cuba, the United States was prepared to resume low-level reconnaissance of Cuba.21 Kennedy's December 14, 1962, letter to Khrushchev referred to "exchanges with and through" Bolshakov and said he was sorry to learn that Bolshakov was returning to Moscow. The letter described the private exchanges as an effort to improve communications between the two governments.22

Penkovsky

Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet colonel, met British and American intelligence officers in London. A CIA debriefing record of Meeting No. 15 with Penkovsky, held in London on May 4, 1961, survives in the CIA reading room.23 Penkovsky and the British businessman Greville Wynne were tried publicly in Moscow in May 1963. Penkovsky was executed on May 16, 1963, and Wynne received an eight-year sentence.2

In an interview datelined New York, November 13, 1965, Wynne said that Penkovsky's disclosures to British and American intelligence of Khrushchev's intentions during the 1961 Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuban crisis reflected the feelings of many highly placed Soviet officials against the former leader. Wynne said there was "a very strong connection" between Khrushchev's ouster and the Penkovsky case, and that others inside the Kremlin were providing the West with the same kind of service.24

Removal

On October 15, 1964, the Politburo relieved Khrushchev of all posts in the Soviet Union while he was on vacation. Leonid Brezhnev became party first secretary and Alexei Kosygin became premier. Pravda denounced Khrushchev on October 16.2 The coup was led by Brezhnev and Kosygin, who had grown increasingly concerned about Khrushchev's impulsive decision-making, his reorganization of the party apparatus, and the international humiliation of the Cuban Missile Crisis outcome. Khrushchev was allowed to retire quietly. He spent the remainder of his life under effective house arrest, dictating memoirs that were smuggled to the West and published.1

Scalar Weapons, Psi and Soviet Science

On January 14, 1960, Khrushchev addressed the Supreme Soviet on Soviet missile capabilities.25 The 1984 paper "STAR WARS Now!" by Tom Bearden argued that the Soviet Union had been weaponizing scalar electromagnetics for nearly three decades. Bearden cited a Khrushchev statement from 1960 and a later announcement of a "fantastic" weapon. The paper dates that announcement to 1968 in its text, and its notes cite a January 1966 New York Times report on it.26

At the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party in 1961, the congress at which Khrushchev again denounced Stalin, the delegate Darya Lazurkina told the assembly that she had consulted Lenin the previous day and that Lenin had said it was unpleasant for him to lie next to Stalin in the Mausoleum.27 Sheila Ostrander and Lynn Schroeder wrote that two Czech scientists told them Khrushchev had said, "We've already used ESP in space."28

Khrushchev Remembers

Khrushchev dictated reminiscences at his dacha at Dalneye on the outskirts of Moscow. Many of the tapes were smuggled to the West, where Little, Brown and Company published the first volume as Khrushchev Remembers in 1970 and the second as Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament in 1974.29 The memoirs were serialized in Life in four installments before the book appeared.30

In January 1971 about thirty experts on Soviet affairs, including the former ambassadors to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson and George Kennan, met at the State Department under the chairmanship of Ray Cline, director of the department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and concluded that the memoirs were authentic and had been released to the West without the approval of the Soviet leadership. The panel concluded that the material had been compiled from speeches, taped reminiscences, and other sources, and one participant described it as an echo of the 1956 secret speech. The specialists tended to doubt the theory that the memoirs were passed to the West under the sponsorship of a ranking Soviet official and the secret police. The reporter Terence Smith noted that Time, Inc., which acquired the material, had refused to shed light on how it reached the West.31

The columnist Stewart Alsop wrote in late December 1970 that Khrushchev's daughter Rada and her husband, Adzhubei, had recorded the reminiscences, that the KGB learned of the project probably in 1969, and that the Moscow correspondent Victor Louis then entered the picture. Alsop called Louis an agent of the KGB with no doubt at all and wrote that Louis had carried out several KGB missions, including a trip to Formosa to contact the Chinese Nationalists. Alsop wrote that Louis negotiated the sale to Time-Life for a sum on the order of $600,000, that the deal was signed and sealed at a meeting between Louis and the Life executive Murray Gart in a Copenhagen hotel room in August, and that it included the deposit of a large sum in a Swiss bank in the name of the Khrushchev family. Alsop also wrote that Louis had sold a version of Svetlana Alliluyeva's memoirs in the West and had negotiated the Western publication of the confessions of Gordon Lonsdale. From the Kremlinologists he consulted, Alsop concluded that a figure strong enough to defy Brezhnev must exist, and he named Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin, a former head of the KGB, whom he described as having played the key role in the deposition of Khrushchev.32

An unsigned intelligence commentary in the CIA reading room, written while the Life installments were appearing, held that the material could not have reached a mass magazine without some official connivance. It placed the negotiations for the material at the Hotel d'Angleterre in Copenhagen, and it found evidence that Louis was the salesman in the deal while stating that the circumstances were obscure. It reported that Khrushchev had officially denied passing any memoirs along.30

Footnotes

  1. Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. W.W. Norton, 2003. Khrushchev, Sergei. Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower. Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. Taylor, Frederick. The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989. HarperCollins, 2006 (on Khrushchev's authorization of the Wall). ↩︎

  2. Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Historical Staff Chronology 1946-65, Volume II, 1956-65," CIA-RDP85B00803R000200050003-5, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85b00803r000200050003-5. Entries cited: February 14, 1956 (Congress convenes, Khrushchev denounces Stalin); March 27, 1958 (Khrushchev succeeds Bulganin as Soviet premier); October 1956 (Poland, Budapest, Nagy replaced November 4); August 12-18, 1961 (Berlin wall); September 15-27, 1959 (visit to the United States); May 1960 (U-2 shot down, Paris conference); May 7 and May 16, 1963 (Penkovsky and Wynne trial, Penkovsky executed); October 15-16, 1964 (removal, Pravda denunciation). ↩︎

  3. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, "The Leak of the Century," The Washington Post, March 27, 1994 (adapted from their Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance, Hyperion, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1994/03/27/the-leak-of-the-century/2c3a48ca-5212-442b-a3a8-52e7703d4b26/. The cited authors credit Grayevski's and Manor's own confirmation. ↩︎

  4. Middle East Quarterly, article on Israeli intelligence and the great powers in the Cold War, https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/israel-and-the-great-powers-cold-war-role, citing Yossi Melman, "Trade Secrets," Haaretz, March 9, 2006. ↩︎

  5. Matitiahu Mayzel, "Israeli Intelligence and the Leakage of Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech,'" Journal of Israeli History, vol. 32, no. 2 (2013), pp. 257-283, https://doi.org/10.1080/13531042.2013.822730 (abstract at https://cris.tau.ac.il/en/publications/israeli-intelligence-and-the-leakage-of-khrushchevs-secret-speech/). ↩︎

  6. Central Intelligence Agency, "Khrushchev's Secret Speech," WSC briefing, May 28, 1956, CIA-RDP79R00890A000700050035-7, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79r00890a000700050035-7. The first section heading is "Text obtained." ↩︎

  7. "Former Chief of Israel's Intelligence Services Confirms Passing on to the U.S. Details of Khrushchev's Famous 1956 Speech," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 8, 1982, reproduced at Center for Online Judaic Studies, https://cojs.org/?p=5755. The statement was made in a weekend interview with Issa Harel in Maariv. ↩︎

  8. Richard Pearson, "James J. Angleton, Ex-Chief of Counterintelligence, Dies," The Washington Post, May 12, 1987, CIA-RDP90-00965R000604970001-8, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000604970001-8. ↩︎

  9. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974 (Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), chapter 4, pages 163-164, DTIC ADA355539, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA355539. The passage cites Andrew J. Goodpaster memoranda of July 7 and 8, 1959. ↩︎

  10. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974, chapter 4, "The Aftermath of the U-2 Downing," pages 178-179, DTIC ADA355539, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA355539. The passage quotes Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), page 507. ↩︎

  11. Taylor, Frederick. The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989. HarperCollins, 2006. The pressure from Ulbricht, the authorization and the emigration figures are attributed to this book. ↩︎

  12. Memorandum of Conversation, Vienna, June 4, 1961, 3:15 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis 1961-1962, Document 33, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v14/d33; Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 21, 1961, Kennedy and Adenauer, Document 219, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v14/d219 (the 3 million figure is Adenauer's statement). ↩︎

  13. Pat Lewis Copeland, "The CIA man," Tulsa Tribune, February 12, 1986, CIA-RDP91-00587R000100020015-5, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp91-00587r000100020015-5. The profile states the briefings of Eisenhower and Kennedy in its own voice. ↩︎

  14. John Marks, The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control (New York: Times Books, 1979), page 161 (the Society and foreign leaders including Khrushchev) and page 164 (Gittinger summoned to the White House during the Cuban missile crisis). ↩︎

  15. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, Moscow, September 29, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, Document 21, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d21. The editorial note cites Salinger, With Kennedy, page 198, and states that a Russian text dated September 28 was also given to Salinger on September 30. ↩︎

  16. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, Moscow, November 9, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VI, Document 23, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d23. The note states the text was delivered to Salinger at 12:15 p.m. on November 11 by Georgi Bolshakov, editor of USSR magazine. ↩︎

  17. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 30, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume V, Soviet Union, Document 150, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v05/d150. ↩︎

  18. "Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 27, 1962," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 90, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d90. ↩︎

  19. Memorandum from ABC Correspondent John Scali to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman), undated, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XI, Document 80, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d80. ↩︎

  20. Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XI, Document 85, citing a four-page paper in the Sorensen papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d85. Records Scali's statement to Fomin at 7:45 p.m. on October 26, 1962. ↩︎

  21. Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XI, Document 194, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d194. The note cites a memorandum by Robert F. Kennedy dated November 30, 1962, in the Robert Kennedy Papers, Kennedy Library, as cited in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), page 550. The papers are closed to researchers other than Schlesinger, according to the note. ↩︎

  22. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, Washington, December 14, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XI, Document 247, citing Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d247. ↩︎

  23. Central Intelligence Agency, "Meeting No. 15, London, England, 4 May 1961, with Penkovsky," CIA Reading Room, document 0000012403, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000012403. ↩︎

  24. Milt Freudenheim, "Ouster of K Linked to Discovery of Spy," Chicago Daily News Service, New York dateline, November 13, 1965, CIA-RDP75-00149R000600250041-7, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp75-00149r000600250041-7. The connection drawn is Greville Wynne's. ↩︎

  25. Central Intelligence Agency, "Current Intelligence Weekly Summary," January 21, 1960, CIA-RDP79-00927A002600020001-2, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-00927a002600020001-2. The item "Khrushchev's Latest Statement on Soviet Missile Capabilities" describes the speech at the opening of the USSR Supreme Soviet on January 14. ↩︎

  26. Thomas E. Bearden, "STAR WARS Now! The Bohm-Aharonov Effect, Scalar Interferometry, and Soviet Weaponization," April 24, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001900680014-4, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001900680014-4. The notes cite Max Frankel, "Khrushchev Says Soviet Will Cut Forces a Third; Sees 'Fantastic' Weapon," The New York Times, January 15, 1966. ↩︎

  27. Sheila Ostrander and Lynn Schroeder, Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), page 53. ↩︎

  28. Ostrander and Schroeder, Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain, page 91. The authors introduce the remark with "Supposedly." ↩︎

  29. Jerrold L. Schecter, "Khrushchev's Secret Tapes," Time, October 1, 1990, https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,971265-1,00.html. The excerpt is translated by Schecter and describes the reminiscences as dictated at Dalneye. ↩︎

  30. Unsigned intelligence commentary, "Did KGB Help to Sell K's Memoirs," undated, written while the Life installments were appearing, CIA-RDP88-01314R000300180019-4, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88-01314r000300180019-4. ↩︎

  31. Terence Smith, "U.S. Experts on Soviet Find Khrushchev Memoirs," Washington dispatch dated January 20, 1971, CIA-RDP88-01314R000300180017-6, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88-01314r000300180017-6. The clipping gives the Little, Brown publication date as December 21, 1970. ↩︎

  32. Stewart Alsop, "Who Is Moscow's Mr. X?," column, CIA-RDP88-01314R000300180018-5, CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88-01314r000300180018-5. The column is dated by its references to the removal of Gomulka "last week," Adzhubei's interview "in late November," and a party congress "next March." The column names Rada and her husband Aleksei Adzhubei as having recorded the reminiscences. ↩︎