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Captivity and the word brainwashing

The word "brainwashing" entered print through Edward Hunter, whose article in the Miami News on September 24, 1950, carried the headline "'Brain-Washing' Tactics Force Chinese into Ranks of Communist Party."² Hunter told the House Committee on Un-American Activities in a consultation on March 13, 1958, that during the Second World War he went into the Office of Strategic Services "as a propaganda specialist," serving in the China-Burma-India theater, and that after the war he returned to Asia as roving correspondent for the Cox newspapers. He said the Korean War "began after my discovery of brainwashing," that he wrote his book Brain-Washing in Red China before going to Korea, and that in Korea he "heard of American captured personnel broadcasting denunciations of their own country and confessing to a nonexistent germ warfare in a manner and in a language that fit exactly into the brainwashing pattern that I had found in China and the rest of Asia."³

John D. Marks wrote in 1979 that Hunter was "a CIA propaganda operator who worked under cover as a journalist." Marks interviewed Hunter shortly before Hunter's death in June 1978.⁴

The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the United States Senate Committee on Government Operations took up the subject in June 1956, with Hunter among the witnesses.⁵ Its opening statement put the Korean War figures on the record: "some 7,190 Americans were captured by the Communists," approximately one-third of whom "died while in Communist hands," and of the 4,428 who "survived and were repatriated, over 95 percent were subjected to a well-planned and well-organized campaign to destroy their belief in God, their loyalty to the United States and their faith in the democratic way of life."⁶

Testifying the same month, Harold Wolff, professor of medicine at Cornell University Medical College, said of the term that it "originated by Mr. Ed Hunter who interviewed Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, has caught the public fancy and has gained wide acceptance." He added that "many of the public speculations about brainwashing are not supported by the available evidence," but that "the Communists do make an orderly attempt to obtain information from their prisoners." Wolff appeared with Lawrence Hinkle, assistant professor of medicine at Cornell.⁶

Big Switch and the prisoners who did not return

The subcommittee heard Captain Bert Cumby of the United States Army, who had fourteen years of service and described the two exchanges of 1953 as "two intelligence operations in the Far East." The first, Operation Little Switch, exchanged sick and wounded prisoners and was "conceived in the spring of 1953." The second, Operation Big Switch, was the general exchange that followed the armistice; Cumby said it began "on the fifth of August 1953." Cumby testified that he was chief of an interrogation team on Big Switch.⁶

Cumby named Claude Batchelor as the leader the Chinese appointed for "the 21 Americans and 1 British" who did not return, and said Batchelor "brought the group into the neutral zone in North Korea." According to Cumby, Batchelor told him that "if the Soviet Union had wanted to stop the war they could have stopped it, but he said why stop it? There is a purpose behind it."⁶

The Defense Advisory Committee, 1955

The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War recommendation of July 7, 1955, recorded that "In the Korean War, no planned penetration of prisoners of war camps was achieved by the U.S. Armed Forces, and organized evasion-escape operations failed to materialize," that the CIA "possesses limited capability for supporting the organized recovery of prisoners," and that "There is question as to whether present Central Intelligence Agency responsibilities are compatible with its capabilities."⁷

On August 18, 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson wrote to Allen Dulles that "During the war in Korea no planned penetration of prisoner of war camps was achieved by the United States Armed Forces and organized evasion-escape operations failed to materialize." The letter said that the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War had suggested that further action was required, and that "The Central Intelligence Agency has specific responsibilities for certain operations in support of the recovery of prisoners of war, while others are the responsibility of the Military Departments." It requested an early conference.⁷

An undated Department of Defense action memorandum in the CIA's file, which refers to Wilson's letter to the Director of Central Intelligence as dated 15 August 1955, records the resulting meetings among the Defense office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA on "plans for the penetration of prisoner of war camps" and on the recovery of prisoners. The memorandum also records a negotiating position for Geneva on the accounting of prisoners captured by the United Nations Command.⁷

BLUEBIRD and the 1950 interrogation teams

Marks wrote that CIA Director Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter approved BLUEBIRD on April 20, 1950, and that "three months after" that approval the first team traveled to Japan "to try out behavioral techniques on human subjects, probably suspected double agents." According to Marks, the three men arrived in Tokyo in July 1950, about a month after the start of the war; the Office of Security ordered them to conceal their purpose from the American military authorities in Japan, using the cover that they were performing "intensive polygraph" work. Marks wrote that they tried the depressant sodium amytal with the stimulant benzedrine on each of four subjects, the last two of whom also received picrotoxin, and tried to induce amnesia. He wrote that "the CIA documents available on the trip give only the sketchiest outline of what happened," and that around October 1950 the BLUEBIRD team "used 'advanced' techniques on 25 subjects, apparently North Korean prisoners of war." By the end of 1950, Marks wrote, Morse Allen of the Office of Security had become head of the program.⁴

A CIA memorandum of the Inspection and Security Staff, dated June 1950 on the scan, states that the staff was prepared to send a BLUEBIRD team between July 2 and August 1, 1950, that the basic team had just been completed by the addition of a doctor-psychiatrist, and that the circulation of papers on the project should be kept to an eyes-only basis.⁸ A BLUEBIRD team memorandum to the Chief of the Inspection and Security Staff, dated November 27 on the scan, reports that the technique of drug application under cover of the polygraph "was very successful," names oral and intravenous sodium amytal as the drugs of choice, with Coramine or picrotoxin as stimulants, and recommends that the combination be continued.⁹ A memorandum of March 12, 1951, supplementing a report of February 23, 1951, lists the technical problems of the "B Team in the field" and states that the polygraph instrument "was used only as a cover."¹⁰ None of the three scans names the country in which the team worked.

The CIA memorandum on a special conference held at headquarters on August 8, 1951, records that its writer attended "under the misunderstanding that the conference was to have been a report on certain polygraph operations in Korea," and that the Agency could not "commit themselves policy wise." The conference concerned a project in Japan and Korea in which the Army had used a polygraph. The memorandum states that the psychiatrists and psychologists on the Korean project did not agree with the polygraph operator on the polygraph's effectiveness.¹¹

The 1977 Senate hearings on MKULTRA recorded the Select Committee's summary that BLUEBIRD was approved by the Director in 1950, and that "As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the project, another goal was added, the evaluation of offensive uses of unconventional interrogation techniques, including hypnosis and drugs." The summary described overseas ARTICHOKE interrogations using sodium pentothal and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of the subjects. It stated of the Navy's Project CHATTER, which began in the fall of 1947, that it "expanded substantially during the Korean War," with overseas experiments conducted as part of the project.¹² In the same hearing, Senator Richard Schweiker told John Gittinger of the CIA that "During the Korean war there was a lot of serious discussion about brainwashing techniques being used by the North Koreans." Gittinger answered that "by 1962 and 1963, the general idea that we were able to come up with is that brainwashing was largely a process of isolating a human being, keeping him out of contact, putting him under long stress in relationship to interviewing and interrogation."¹²

In August 1977 an Agency review of the Office of Security archives found eighteen cartons of material on Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke that had not been produced to the Rockefeller Commission or to the congressional investigations of 1975 and 1976. The cartons held about fourteen linear feet of ARTICHOKE and BLUEBIRD records. The review reported that it found no information that would "contradict or change the scope" of what had been furnished to the investigating bodies. It dated the project's start to early 1950 and its change of name from BLUEBIRD to ARTICHOKE to August 1951.¹³

Frank Olson, a civilian biochemist employed by the Army at Fort Detrick "in a cooperative effort with the CIA," was dosed with LSD on November 19, 1953, at a meeting of Fort Detrick and CIA personnel, according to a White House memorandum of July 11, 1975, addressed to Donald Rumsfeld. The memorandum places the drug program within "a much larger CIA program to study possible means for controlling human behavior," and records that "Great concern over Soviet and North Korean techniques in 'brainwashing' continued to be manifested into the early 1950's."¹⁴

Intelligence command in Korea

The CIA's chronology of its Korean operations records that in early July 1950 Office of Special Operations personnel "assume emergency role as military intelligence officers," and that on July 7, 1950, the United Nations created the United Nations Command under a United States commander. In September 1950, OSO dropped intelligence teams along the northern border of North Korea, and the Office of Policy Coordination opened a station at Tongnae. OPC placed stay-behind agents above the 38th parallel on October 28, 1950, began an escape and evasion program in November, and opened a guerrilla training camp in December. On April 10, 1951, a plan to combine OSO and OPC units in Korea into one CIA mission began; the units merged on July 2, 1951, into the Agency's first combined Clandestine Services field mission, the Joint Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK). Later entries record the establishment by the United States military of Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in Korea (CCRAK), the transfer of JACK headquarters to Seoul with bases in Pusan, Inchon and Seoul, and the closing of the Tongnae base.¹

The same chronology records a G-2 estimate by Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur's chief of intelligence, on October 14, 1950, that the Chinese Communists were "bluffing in their threats to enter the war." On April 11, 1951, MacArthur was recalled, and Willoughby was relieved as G-2 of the Far East Command.¹ In the 1951 Senate hearings on the Far East, George C. Marshall recalled "a consideration with General Smith of the CIA referring to some difficulty in relation to General Willoughby, General MacArthur's G-2."¹⁵

On April 25, 1951, Hans Tofte wrote to Walter Bedell Smith, then Director of Central Intelligence. Tofte said that a colleague he had met in San Francisco was "fed up w[ith] the Far East in general," an attitude that "coincides with that of many other old china-hands," and questioned that colleague's eligibility for "the number one" job in the area. The colleague's name is redacted.¹⁶ Joseph C. Goulden, the author of Korea: The Untold Story of the War, described Tofte in a review of Ernest Volkmann's Warriors of the Night as "the CIA guerrilla commander."¹⁷ In August 1966, press coverage of the CIA's suspension of Tofte, a native of Denmark, with pay, after classified documents were found in his Georgetown home, described him as having been "a leader in CIA operations in Korea and Japan during the" war. Radio TV Reports carried the story, in which Tofte said that about $19,000 in jewelry had disappeared from the house after the agency removed the documents.¹⁸

Operation Paper and the Kuomintang in Burma

Peter Dale Scott wrote in 2010 that in November 1950, with Chinese troops entering Korea, President Harry S. Truman approved a program code-named Operation Paper to prepare remnant Kuomintang forces in Burma, the so-called 93rd Division under General Li Mi, for a countervailing invasion of Yunnan. Scott wrote that the decision was made by a small group inside the Office of Policy Coordination, notably Desmond FitzGerald and Richard Stilwell, with former OSS chief William J. Donovan; that Alfred Cox, the OPC station chief in Hong Kong, directed the supply operation through the CIA proprietaries Sea Supply Inc. and Civil Air Transport; and that the OPC records that initiated Operation Paper "are still closed to public view." Scott also wrote that the troops were already involved in drug trafficking.¹⁹

A State Department memorandum of November 18, 1952, from Assistant Secretary John M. Allison to Under Secretary David K. E. Bruce, recorded that the Kuomintang troops had been in the Burmese province of Kengtung since early 1949, that a portion "was engaged in a highly unsuccessful operation into Yunnan in 1951," and that "Vishinsky accused the United States of aiding the KMT troops in Burma" in the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in 1951. It noted talk in the Burmese press "concerning alleged support of the KMT activities by U.S. citizens, unofficial and otherwise."²⁰ A second memorandum, of January 9, 1953, stated that the troops "were presumably regarded at one time as of potential value either as the nucleus of a guerrilla force which could move into and operate in China," and that "The initial reactions of the CIA and of the Ambassadors at Rangoon and Bangkok and the Chargé at Taipei have been obtained," all concurring in the desirability of helping bring about the troops' departure from Burma to Formosa.²¹

Bacteriological warfare charges, 1952

The Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates issued terms of reference on March 21, 1952, for a special estimate titled "Significance of the Communist Psychological Warfare Campaign Alleging Use of Biological Warfare by the US in Korea."²² On January 18, 1952, a B-26 bomber was shot down over An-Ju in Korea. By May 5, 1952, statements from its navigator, Lieutenant K. L. Enoch, and its pilot, Lieutenant John Quinn, admitting participation in bacteriological warfare had been "issued to the world through Peking," according to the International Scientific Commission, which was formed to investigate the charges after Kuo Mo-jo, president of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, appealed to the World Peace Council.²³

The Commission's members were Andrea Andreen of Sweden, Jean Malterre of France, Joseph Needham of the United Kingdom, Oliviero Olivo of Italy, Samuel B. Pessoa of Brazil, and Nicolai Zhukov-Verezhnikov of the Soviet Union. They signed the conclusion at Beijing on August 31, 1952. The conclusion stated that "The peoples of Korea and China have indeed been the objective of bacteriological weapons. These have been employed by units of the U.S.A. armed forces," and that some of the methods "seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese army during the World War II." The Commission wrote that it reached these conclusions "reluctantly." The same report states that the Commission "was unable to reach a firm conclusion" on an encephalitis epidemic at Shenyang and Anshan.²³

In 1998 the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun published Soviet documents copied by hand in the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation. The editors of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin wrote that the documents "have not been authenticated by access to the archival originals (or even photocopies thereof)," and that both commentators believed them genuine on textual analysis.²⁴ Kathryn Weathersby read the documents as showing that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ordered the Soviet delegation at the United Nations not "to show interest in discussing this question or even more in 'fanning the flames' of this question," and that "the entire leadership" decided to cease the campaign, "apparently because of the risk of embarrassment to the Soviet Union should the claims be revealed as fabrications." Weathersby wrote that "In short, the sources are credible."²⁴ Milton Leitenberg published a companion analysis in the same Bulletin.²⁴

The National Archives holds a 1952 film, Bacteriological Warfare in Korea, in records of the National Security Council and the CIA. It is catalogued as accusing the U.S. of having engaged in bacteriological warfare against Korea and China in 1952."²⁵

Fort Detrick, Unit 731 and the immunity arrangement

A report to the Secretary of War by George W. Merck, Special Consultant on Biological Warfare, titled "Origins and Development of a Biological Warfare Program," dates the Army's planning to July 1941, when the Surgeon General of the Army proposed a committee on the subject.²⁶

"The Report of 'G,'" a translation prepared for the Chemical Corps Research and Development Command at Fort Detrick, set out data on glanders experiments performed on human subjects by Unit 731 of the Japanese army.²⁷

The National Archives' 2006 volume Researching Japanese War Crimes Records, prepared for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, records that U.S. intelligence authorities located Unit 731's commander, Lieutenant General Shiro Ishii, in January 1946 and interrogated him and other Unit 731 members many times over the next year. It states that Lieutenant Colonel Murray Sanders completed the first postwar study on November 1, 1945, with no mention of human experimentation, and that Lieutenant Colonel Arvo Thompson of Fort Detrick, ordered to follow up at the end of December 1945, interviewed Ishii from January to March 1946. In the volume's account, Ishii hinted during the interviews that he would provide more information if granted immunity from war crimes prosecution; the State Department sought to limit the commitment, but "for the most part" U.S. military and intelligence officials "were receptive to a deal with Ishii in which the general would avoid prosecution in return for information about his work." After the Soviet Union began gathering evidence in early 1947, the volume records, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Department Civil Affairs Division, the State Department and Douglas MacArthur's headquarters "all attempted, to one degree or another, to shield Ishii and his colleagues from prosecution," and SWNCC allowed Soviet interrogation of Japanese specialists only with an American official present.²⁸

In the autumn of 1947 two Fort Detrick scientists, Edwin Hill and Joseph Victor, interviewed Ishii and other Japanese scientists "with the full support of" Willoughby, the same volume records. Their "Summary Report of B.W. Investigations" of December 12, 1947, stated that "no question of immunity guarantee from war crimes prosecution was ever raised during these interviews," while voicing concern that the Japanese were withholding information. The report stated that the evidence "represents data which have been obtained by Japanese scientists at the expenditure of many millions of dollars and years of work," that "Such information could not be obtained in our own laboratories because of scruples attached to human experimentation," that the data "were secured with a total outlay of 250,000 [yen] to date, a mere pittance by comparison with the actual cost of the studies," and that "It is hoped that individuals who voluntarily contributed this information will be spared embarrassment because of it and that every effort will be taken to prevent this information from falling into other hands."²⁸ The volume's authors wrote that Ishii "escaped postwar prosecution in exchange, apparently, for supplying the U.S. government with details of his gruesome human experiments," and that Professor Sheldon H. Harris believed the quid pro quo was approved by Willoughby and MacArthur in Tokyo and by their superiors in Washington. They wrote that several key documents outlining the U.S. acquisition of Unit 731 research data "have not yet been located."²⁸

The Interagency Working Group's 2007 final report to Congress stated that "in return for information on biological warfare, the United States was lenient with important Japanese war criminals," and recorded that the Simon Wiesenthal Center lobbied the Attorney General and the Pentagon for the release of documents on "amnesties granted to supervisors of Japan's biological and chemical warfare program in exchange for the data obtained from experiments conducted on humans in the infamous Unit 731." The report also records Harris's allegation, in a letter placed in the Senate record, that documentation at Dugway Proving Ground and Fort Detrick had been moved or destroyed; the Army told the Working Group that its searches "uncovered no evidence in support of the charge."²⁹

Israel and the war

According to Seymour Hersh, the United States was "preoccupied with the war, as well as economic and social conditions in Europe, and the political battle with the Soviet Union," and Israel publicly supported the American position in the Korean War. David Ben-Gurion secretly offered to send Israeli troops to fight alongside United Nations forces in South Korea, Hersh wrote, but Truman declined the offer, reportedly fearing it would lead to a security arrangement with Israel. Hersh also wrote that Israel's stance on the war angered Moscow and led to a rupture in diplomatic relations between the two nations.³⁰

Footnotes

CIA, "CIA in Korea 1946-1965, Volume III," July 1973, CIA Reading Room document C06146213, approved for release January 31, 2022 (chronology entries for June 25, 1950, July 1950, September 1950, October 14 and 28, 1950, November and December 1950, April 10 and 11, 1951, and July 2, 1951; later entries on JACK and CCRAK). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06146213 ↩︎
Edward Hunter, "'Brain Washing' Tactics Force Chinese into Ranks of Communist Party," Miami News, September 24, 1950, p. 2A. https://archive.org/details/hunter-edward-brain-washing-tactics-force-chinese-into-ranks-of-communist-party- ↩︎
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing): Consultation with Edward Hunter, Author and Foreign Correspondent, 85th Congress, 2nd session, March 13, 1958 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 5-6 and 14-15. https://archive.org/details/communistpsychol1958unit ↩︎
John D. Marks, The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and Mind Control (Times Books, 1979), chapter 1 ("Cold War on the Mind," pp. 22-24) and chapter 8 (Hunter) with the chapter notes. ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners, hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, 84th Congress, 2nd session, June 19, 20, 26, and 27, 1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), contents list (testimony of Edward Hunter, pp. 66 and 77). ↩︎
Hearings cited in note 5, opening statement and testimony of Captain Bert Cumby, Dr. Harold G. Wolff and Dr. Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr. https://archive.org/details/communist_interrogation_indoctrination_and_exploitation_of_the_american_military ↩︎
Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, "Committee Recommendations for Action," July 7, 1955; Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, to Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, letter dated August 18, 1955; and an undated Defense Department action memorandum on the recommendations of the Committee, CIA CREST document CIA-RDP85B00236R000400070013-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp85b00236r000400070013-0 ↩︎
CIA, Inspection and Security Staff memorandum, "Priority Requirement for Bluebird Team," June 1950, CIA CREST document 00148262. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00148262 ↩︎
CIA, Bluebird Team to Chief, Inspection and Security Staff, "Conclusions Concerning the Medical Phase of the Operations," November 27 (1950 per the scan), CIA CREST document 00149590. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00149590 ↩︎
CIA, "Bluebird Activity, Technical Aspects," March 12, 1951, CIA CREST document 00149615. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00149615 ↩︎
CIA, memorandum on the "Special Conference 8 August 1951," CIA CREST document 00144831. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00144831 ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification, joint hearing, 95th Congress, 1st session, August 3, 1977 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), the Select Committee's summary of the programs investigated (Project CHATTER; Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE) and the question and answer between Senator Schweiker and Dr. Gittinger. https://archive.org/details/jointhearing_project-mkultra_1977 ↩︎
CIA, "Description of Newly Discovered Project ARTICHOKE/BLUEBIRD Materials," 1977, CIA CREST document CIA-RDP81-00261R000300050005-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81-00261r000300050005-3 ↩︎
White House memorandum to Donald Rumsfeld, July 11, 1975, concerning the death of Frank Olson (olson_documents.pdf). https://archive.org/details/FrankOlson-CIA-LSD ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1951, testimony of George C. Marshall. https://archive.org/details/militarysituatio01unit ↩︎
Hans V. Tofte to Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, letter dated April 25, 1951, CIA CREST document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100200043-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100200043-3 ↩︎
Book review of Ernest Volkmann, Warriors of the Night (Morrow), sanitized copy, CIA CREST document CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170017-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302170017-4 ↩︎
Press clipping dated August 3, 1966, "CIA Official Under Probe Reports $19,000 Theft," CIA CREST document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100230005-7; Radio TV Reports, Inc., broadcast transcripts of August 3, 1966 (WTOP-TV, "Tofte Interviewed," and WRC Radio, "Quote Hans Tofte"), CIA CREST documents CIA-RDP75-00001R000400390060-6 and CIA-RDP75-00001R000400390066-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100230005-7 ↩︎
Peter Dale Scott, "Operation Paper: The United States and Drugs in Thailand and Burma," The Asia-Pacific Journal 8, issue 44, no. 2 (November 1, 2010), chapter 3 of American War Machine. Scott's account is https://archive.org/details/operation-paper-the-united-states-and-drugs-in-thailand-and-burma ↩︎
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce), "KMT Troops in Burma Problem," November 18, 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2, document 28. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v12p2/d28 ↩︎
Memorandum by Allison to Bruce, "KMT Troops in Burma," January 9, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2, document 30. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v12p2/d30 ↩︎
CIA, Office of National Estimates, "Terms of Reference; SIE-4: Significance of the Communist Psychological Warfare Campaign Alleging Use of Biological Warfare by the US in Korea," March 21, 1952, CIA CREST document CIA-RDP79S01011A000600050031-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79s01011a000600050031-5 ↩︎
Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China, Peking, August 31, 1952, conclusion and appendices. https://archive.org/details/isc-full-report-pub-copy ↩︎
Kathryn Weathersby, "Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea," and Milton Leitenberg, "New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis," with the editors' note, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 11 (Winter 1998). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/cwihp-bulletin-11 ↩︎
National Archives catalogue entry for Bacteriological Warfare in Korea (1952), NARA ARC 646593, as described in the archive.org copy. https://archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.646593 ↩︎
George W. Merck, Special Consultant on Biological Warfare, "Origins and Development of a Biological Warfare Program," report to the Secretary of War, National Archives copy. https://archive.org/details/activities-of-the-united-states-in-the-field-of-biological-warfare ↩︎
"The Report of 'G'," translation of Unit 731 glanders experiments on human subjects, prepared for the Chemical Corps Research and Development Command, Fort Detrick, as described in the archive.org catalogue. https://archive.org/details/fort_detrick-report_of_g ↩︎
Edward Drea, Greg Bradsher, Robert Hanyok, James Lide, Michael Petersen and Daqing Yang, Researching Japanese War Crimes Records: Introductory Essays (Washington: National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006), pp. 96-99 and notes 63-67 (citing NA RG 165, entry 468, "SANACC 351/3," and "Summary Report of B.W. Investigations," December 12, 1947, NA RG 175). The Hill and Victor figure is printed in the volume with an illegible currency symbol, read here as yen. https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/introductory-essays.pdf ↩︎
Interagency Working Group, Final Report to Congress, Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act, April 2007, chapters on Japanese war crimes records and the Army's records. https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/reports/final-report-2007.pdf ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapter 2. ↩︎

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