The_Info_Web/10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Dewey Clarridge.md at 706d8820a2df7ee175df7395cfabc7c1916e51ae - disinfozone/The_Info_Web

disinfozone/The_Info_Web

Fork 0

disinfo.zone 8db4f8486f

vault backup: 2026-10-14 15:45:14

2026-10-14 15:45:15 -04:00

31 KiB

Raw Blame History

title

aliases

created

updated

Latin American Division and the Contras

Clarridge headed the CIA effort to organize, fund, and direct the Contras. Gary Webb wrote that under Clarridge the agency assembled the scattered anti-Sandinistas factions into a unified force, created the FDN, and established the Costa Rican-based Southern Front under Eden Pastora, whom Clarridge recruited in 1981 to command it.⁴

Alan Fiers, the CIA officer who ran the Central American Task Force, testified that in early November 1984 Clarridge told him to cooperate with North, a directive Fiers said took him beyond the limits of the Boland Amendment restriction on aid.⁵ According to the Office of the Independent Counsel, Vincent Cannistraro testified as a defense witness that in June 1984 a meeting in the office of CIA director William J. Casey, attended by Clarridge, Joseph Fernandez and the contra leader Adolfo Calero, produced an assurance to Calero that the government would find a way to continue support after the Boland Amendment took effect.⁶

In late 1996 Clarridge told a British television crew that he had never heard of Ivan Gomez, the pseudonymous CIA agent in Costa Rica whom Carlos Cabezas identified as supervising Contra drug money.⁷ The 1998 CIA Inspector General's report stated that CIA records show a CIA independent contractor used the alias "Ivan Gomez" in Costa Rica in the 1980s, that the contractor's physical description differs significantly from the one Cabezas gave, that CIA records place the contractor in the United States during April and May 1982 when Cabezas placed the meeting, and that the contractor denied meeting Cabezas. The report added that a Nicaraguan newspaper had published a photograph of an individual named "Ivan Gomez" captioned as a CIA employee on August 8, 1984.⁸

Clarridge wrote in his memoir that at a National Security Planning Group meeting in the summer of 1983 the participants considered ways to destroy the MiG-21 aircraft the Sandinistas were expected to receive, including an AC-130 gunship strike and mines dropped into the Rio Escondido, and that President Ronald Reagan afterward took him aside and asked, "Dewey, can't you get those vandals of yours to do this job?" He answered, "I'm sorry, Mr. President, I don't think my vandals are quite up to the job."⁹

Harbor mining, 1984

Clarridge wrote that the idea of mining Nicaraguan ports came to him at the end of January 1984: "Sea mines were the solution. We should mine the harbors of Nicaragua, Corinto and the oil facility at Puerto Sandino in particular." He wrote that the devices were called firecracker mines "because they made a lot of noise but would not do much damage," and that the FDN was to notify Lloyd's of London after each insertion of mines.¹⁰ The agency leased an offshore oil-support ship, called the Mother Ship, which carried three Hughes 500 helicopters and two Q-boats below deck. Clarridge wrote: "On February 7, we mined the oil facility at Puerto Sandino." Two Q-boats released four mines and fired on the oil storage tanks, with helicopters standing by.¹⁰

On April 7, 1984, the Associated Press reported, citing congressional sources, that CIA personnel directly supervised the mining of Nicaraguan harbors from a ship 12 miles off the coast, with the mines laid by Latin American commandos operating from speedboats.¹¹ A Wall Street Journal report of the period described units operating from a CIA-controlled ship, composed of Salvadorans and other Latin Americans, and said the anti-Sandinista insurgents claimed credit for the mining; it placed mines in the harbors of Corinto and Puerto Sandino and at El Bluff.¹² Clarridge wrote that on the evening of April 5 Senator Barry Goldwater, who had been shown a Senate Intelligence Committee staff memo stating that CIA contract employees, not Nicaraguan contras, were involved in the mining, read the classified memo into the Congressional Record.¹³

The Argentine arrangement

Clarridge wrote that CIA intelligence showed the Legion, by then the FDN, was being trained, advised and equipped by a small group of Argentines from the Argentine Military Intelligence Directorate, whose presence in Honduras was facilitated by Col. Gustavo Alvarez, commander of the Honduran uniformed police and a graduate of the Argentine Army's Command and General Staff School. He described his own first step as cementing a relationship with the Argentines, a trip he made with the chief of the Central American Task Force, Jerry Svat, and two other officers. He wrote that the Argentines brought a psychologist and anthropologist to study the Miskito Indians, and that he suspected the Argentine interest in Honduras was related to the Sandinista haven given to Argentine Montoneros.¹⁴ Nicholas Schou's 2016 interview with Clarridge for Newsweek reported that the idea of a Contra force assembled and trained by Argentina's military government came to Clarridge almost immediately after he became chief of the Latin American Division, and that Clarridge counted the Contras' growth into the largest rebel army in the hemisphere as his proudest accomplishment.¹⁵ Clarridge also wrote of a visit by Brig. Gen. Mario Davico, director of Argentine Military Intelligence, and of his own question, "why would the chief of Argentine Military Intelligence be sitting in my office when the Argentine invasion went down?"¹⁶

The Tayacan manual, 1984

Clarridge wrote that the division contracted John Kirkpatrick, an ex-Army officer who had served in Vietnam, to prepare a course on how the contras should treat the civilian population and to train Nicaraguan instructors, and that the course was converted into a Spanish-language manual, with authorship attributed to Tayacan, a legendary Central American Indian warrior.¹⁷ He wrote that a copy of the original, unrevised manual was leaked to the Associated Press in mid-October 1984 and that he suspected the FDN director Edgar Chamorro, who denied it.¹⁷ In his account, he told CIA director William J. Casey, with Clair George present, "If you give me the reprimand, Congress will back off," while Casey was attempting to limit the effect of what he called the "Murder Manual" on Reagan's re-election campaign and Clarridge was concerned about morale in the Latin America Division.¹⁷ On November 9, 1984, President Reagan wrote to Casey that he had reviewed the report of the CIA investigation of the publication and distribution of the Tayacan manual and approved its findings and recommendations, and directed that within the agency one individual be accountable for each covert action and that field personnel operate under the supervision of the station chief.¹⁸

Iran-Contra and the November 1985 HAWK shipment

In the summer of 1985 the Reagan administration approved an Israel plan to ship weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. Israel shipped 504 U.S.-made TOW missiles to Iran in August and September 1985, and the hostage Benjamin Weir was released.¹⁹

In November 1985 Israel planned to fly 80 HAWK missiles on an El Al 747 into a European country, transfer them to other aircraft, and fly them into Iran. North enlisted retired Air Force major general Richard Secord to obtain the landing clearances and brought Clarridge into the mission to get a senior CIA field officer in that country to assist Secord.²⁰

Late on November 21, 1985, Clarridge sent flash cables to the field officer and his deputy. After the first flight was denied landing rights and forced to abort, the El Al aircraft was turned back, and Clarridge pursued a CIA proprietary airline for the flight, and he cabled CIA officers in an Asian country asking for help with overflight clearances. The cables identified the mission as a National Security Council initiative. Secord was known in the traffic by the code name "Copp."²¹

The Tower Commission recorded that Clarridge told its members he first became involved on the evening of November 21, 1985, when North called him for help obtaining an overflight clearance for an El Al 747. Clarridge also told a U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to contact a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge had been told was an alias for Secord.²²

On November 23, 1985, the field officer sent a cable reporting that the cargo Secord had described was HAWK missiles. Four people in the field officer's office recalled it, and the Independent Counsel found that the cable had been sent, although it was never located in the record. Clarridge and Clair George, then deputy director for operations, testified that they did not recall receiving it. Clarridge's secretary had kept carbon copies of the weekend's cables in an unofficial file, which she sent to him after the affair became public in November 1986.²³

Cannistraro testified that on November 19, 1985, North summoned him and Clarridge to a restaurant in McLean, Virginia, Virginia, and said he needed Clarridge's help to fly military equipment to Iran from a European country. Cannistraro testified that Clarridge said he already knew of the shipment. The Independent Counsel wrote that Cannistraro's testimony established that Clarridge knew of the arms shipment by November 19, two days before he testified that he first learned of the operation.²⁴

On November 23, 1985, at North's request, Charles Allen of the CIA showed Clarridge a packet of intelligence reports on Iranian arms negotiations, the A-K reports, and left them with him for about half an hour. Clarridge said that he recalled nothing in them about weapons. The Independent Counsel found that the reports referred repeatedly to HAWK, TOW, Phoenix, Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles and that none referred to oil-drilling equipment, the cover story North gave for the cargo.²⁵

One flight was completed. It reached Iran on November 25, 1985, carrying 18 HAWK missiles, which the Iranians rejected as the wrong type of missile. No hostages were released. Walsh's report states that Clarridge's action in the operation caused CIA officials to insist, after that weekend, that the President sign a covert-action Finding retroactively authorizing a CIA role.²⁶

Testimony and the case against Clarridge

Clarridge testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 2, 1986, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on December 11, 1986, and before the Tower Commission on December 18, 1986. He gave a deposition to the Select Committees on August 4, 1987. He testified that he did not get "a fix on" the cargo until January 1986, when Allen debriefed the Iranian go-between in the affair.²⁷ The 1987 congressional report lists him in its index of witnesses.²⁸

Clarridge described the use of the CIA proprietary as a straight commercial deal, a phrase that became the basis of one of the counts against him. Asked whether North had ever told him the cargo was military equipment, he answered, "No, and I can't say that he knew. I can't say for sure that he knew."²⁹

Robert Oakley, then director of the State Department's counter-terrorism unit, was asked by North to authorize involving the embassy in the European country. Oakley then telephoned Clarridge to say the State Department knew of the operation and that Clarridge should seek help from the foreign minister there. Oakley told investigators he had no doubt that Clarridge knew the cargo was weapons.³⁰

Edward Juchniewicz, the acting deputy director for operations, whom Clarridge said had approved use of the proprietary, told investigators that Clarridge "never told anyone a full story." Juchniewicz said Clarridge would dance around a question and would not tell Congress anything unless specifically asked.³¹

At the 1992 trial of Clair George, Senator Thomas Eagleton, who had questioned Clarridge extensively, was asked whether he assumed everyone testifying for the CIA would lie to Congress. He answered: "I didn't trust Dewey Clarridge. We knew he was lying."³²

The husband of a CIA employee who worked for Clarridge recalled that at a December 1986 CIA Christmas party Clarridge wore an "Ollie North is an American Hero" T-shirt. The employee recalled that Clarridge said he had "slipped something by Congress." She was not certain the remark was made at the party, but said he had made it a day or two after his congressional testimony.³³

On December 16, 1987, CIA director William H. Webster wrote to Clarridge formally reprimanding him. Webster told him he was "culpable in respect to his testimony before Congress" and for failing to keep his senior officials informed about the use of the proprietary airline. Clarridge retired from the CIA in 1987.³⁴

The Independent Counsel, Lawrence Walsh, also examined Clarridge's role in soliciting funds for the contras from a third country during a spring 1984 trip. Walsh wrote that CIA cables about the trip contradicted Clarridge's testimony that he had not solicited such funds, but the Independent Counsel declined to bring false statement or perjury charges on that point, for reasons set out in a classified appendix.³⁵

Indictment and pardon

On November 26, 1991, a federal grand jury indicted Clarridge on seven counts of perjury and false statements. Counts One through Three charged perjury before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 2, 1986. Count Four charged perjury before the House committee on December 11, 1986. Count Five charged false statements to the Tower Commission on December 18, 1986. Count Six charged perjury before the Select Iran/contra Committees, and Count Seven charged false statements in a deposition before committee staff.³⁶

Harold H. Greene, the district judge, ruled on December 10, 1992 that several of the counts were multiplicitous and ordered the Independent Counsel to choose between them. The trial had been set for March 15, 1993.³⁷

On December 24, 1992, President George H.W. Bush, who had earlier directed the CIA, pardoned six Iran-Contra defendants including Clarridge. Walsh's report says the pardon precluded a trial that "would have been the final Iran/contra prosecution."³⁸ The Independent Counsel's summary of prosecutions lists Clarridge among the "pre-trial pardons."³

In 1990 the Independent Counsel's inquiry named three subjects, Clarridge, Elliott Abrams and Donald Gregg.³⁹

Drug trafficking allegations, 1988

In April 1988 two staff members of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime interviewed Clarridge about allegations of Contra involvement in drug trafficking and about a Drug Enforcement Administration operation in June 1984 that photographed Nicaraguan officials loading cocaine onto a plane piloted by Barry Seal. A CIA Office of Congressional Affairs memorandum of May 3, 1988 records that "the hidden cameras were installed by the Agency on the plane in Miami." It also records that Clarridge recalled being asked by the DEA to install a hidden camera, that one of the men photographed was Federico Vaughan, an aide to the Nicaraguan interior minister, and that Clarridge was present at a briefing arranged by the DEA in North's office. The memorandum says Clarridge recalled that Paula Hawkins used the photographs in her re-election campaign, and that he said the allegations of Contra drug smuggling arose after he left the Latin American Division.⁴⁰

Later career and memoir

Walsh's report describes Clarridge as having left the European Division to become chief of the Counterterrorism Center. His former secretary still held his file of the November 1985 cables when the affair became public in November 1986.²³

His memoir, A Spy for All Seasons (Scribner, 1997, written with Digby Diehl), was described by Publishers Weekly as covering a 33-year CIA career that began in 1955 and ended in forced retirement.⁴¹ In it Clarridge wrote that he was posted to Istanbul as chief in July 1968, with a tour there from 1968 to 1971, and that in late 1977 a group of senior officers decided he would be assigned to Rome as chief in the summer of 1979, after a year as deputy chief of European Division/South and Italian-language training; the Rome chapter covers 1979 to 1981.⁴² He wrote that he proposed the Counterterrorist Center, drawing personnel from the Directorates of Operations, Intelligence and Science and Technology, and then became its head.⁴² The New York Times reported in 2011 that he used the pseudonyms Dewey Marone and Dax Preston LeBaron, that his memoir described efforts to engineer pro-American governments in Italy in the late 1970s, and that Richard N. Gardner, the former American ambassador to Rome, called him "shallow and devious."⁴³

Eclipse Group

In March 2010 Dexter Filkins and Mark Mazzetti reported in The New York Times that Michael Furlong, a Defense Department official, had set up a network of private contractors in Afghanistan and Pakistan under the cover of an information-gathering program, and that the contractors gathered intelligence on the whereabouts of suspected militants and insurgent camps for possible lethal action. A photograph caption with the report names Clarridge among the people connected to the network.⁴⁴

In October 2010 Mazzetti reported that a Pentagon investigation, carried out by Michael Decker, an intelligence adviser to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, concluded that Furlong had set up an "unauthorized" intelligence network and "deliberately misled" senior generals. The network operated under a $22 million contract run by Lockheed Martin, and one of its companies used American, Afghan and Pakistani agents overseen by Clarridge. The results of the inquiry were classified. Furlong said that nobody from the Defense Department interviewed him and called the inquiry "kangaroo court justice"; the Air Force inspector general was conducting a separate investigation into whether he broke laws or committed contract fraud.⁴⁵

In January 2011 Mazzetti reported that Clarridge ran the Eclipse Group from his home near San Diego, with agents code-named Willi and Waco, and had continued after the Pentagon ended his contract in May 2010. Clarridge declined to be interviewed but issued a statement likening the operation to the Office of Strategic Services. The report said that the security firm Clarridge was affiliated with, the American International Security Corporation, won a Pentagon contract ultimately worth about $6 million, which American officials said was arranged by Furlong, then the subject of a criminal investigation by the Pentagon's inspector general. It said Clarridge had been subcontracted in December 2008 by a security consulting firm working for the Times to assist in the release of the kidnapped reporter David Rohde, that his dispatches went to Oliver North and to the author Brad Thor, and that associates said he planned to have agents collect DNA samples from the Afghan president Hamid Karzai. Charles Allen, who worked with Clarridge at the CIA, was quoted as saying "We don't need privateers."⁴³

The Associated Press reported in September 2011 that Furlong and his boss Mark Johnson resigned in July 2011 after the Air Force inspector general told them they would face official censure, and quoted Furlong's August 12 resignation letter: "After 17 months of DOD investigations and an FBI investigation, it was determined that no criminal laws were broken." The AP reported that the CIA had alleged in late 2009 that the contractors were running an illegal covert spying network managed by Clarridge, that Furlong and Clarridge maintained to investigators that they were operating a legal network of paid informants, and that inquiries by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service continued.⁴⁶

Footnotes

Lawrence Walsh, Office of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "United States v. Duane R. Clarridge," introduction. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Clarridge's Role" section on his Latin American Division posts, 1981 to 1984, and his role in the November 1985 shipment. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, Summary of Prosecutions, "Pre-trial Pardons" (Clarridge entry). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm ↩︎
Gary Webb, Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion (Seven Stories Press, 1998), ch. 5, "God, Fatherland and Freedom." ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 15, "William J. Casey," account of Alan Fiers's testimony on Clarridge's 1984 directive. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_15.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 15, "William J. Casey," testimony of Vincent Cannistraro on the June 1984 meeting in Casey's office. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_15.htm ↩︎
Webb, Dark Alliance, ch. 5, account of Carlos Cabezas and the British television interview with Clarridge (1996). Sole source for the interview statement as written here. ↩︎
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation Concerning Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States, Volume I, January 29, 1998, findings on Cabezas and "Ivan Gomez." https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html ↩︎
Duane R. Clarridge with Digby Diehl, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (Scribner, 1997), pp. 243-245. https://archive.org/details/spyforallseasons00clar ↩︎
Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, pp. 264, 270-272. https://archive.org/details/spyforallseasons00clar ↩︎
James Rowley, Associated Press, April 7, 1984 (CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP90-00552R000303570109-5). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000303570109-5 ↩︎
"U.S. Role in Mining Nicaraguan Harbors Reportedly Is Larger Than First Thought," Wall Street Journal, 1984 (CIA reading room copy, document CIA-RDP86B00420R000501180013-3). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp86b00420r000501180013-3 ↩︎
Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, p. 276. https://archive.org/details/spyforallseasons00clar ↩︎
Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, pp. 201-203, 208-209. https://archive.org/details/spyforallseasons00clar ↩︎
Nicholas Schou, "The 'October Surprise' Was Real, Legendary Spymaster Hints in Final Interview," Newsweek, April 24, 2016 (updated June 7, 2016). https://www.newsweek.com/duane-dewey-clarridge-october-surprise-spies-cia-451611 ↩︎
Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, pp. 221-222. https://archive.org/details/spyforallseasons00clar ↩︎
Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, pp. 244, 291-294. https://archive.org/details/spyforallseasons00clar ↩︎
President Ronald Reagan, memorandum for William J. Casey, "Tayacan Psychological Warfare Manual," November 9, 1984, with National Security Council transmittal of November 10, 1984 (CIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP90B01370R001601970016-1). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90b01370r001601970016-1 ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Clarridge's Role in the November 1985 HAWK Shipment," opening section. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, HAWK shipment section, citing North's testimony of July 7, 1987 and Grand Jury testimony of February 1, 1991. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, HAWK shipment section, DIRECTOR cables of November 22 and 23, 1985 (notes 16 to 26). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
The Tower Commission Report (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), Clarridge section, citing his testimony of December 18, 1986. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "The 'Missing' Cable" section, including the note on the privacy-channel file kept by Clarridge's secretary. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Discussions With North" section, Cannistraro testimony and the Independent Counsel's conclusion. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "The A-K Reports" section. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 1, "Overview," note 119 (HAWK shipment and the CIA role). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Count One" discussion, quoting Clarridge, SSCI testimony, December 2, 1986, p. 20. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views (1987), index of witnesses, "Clarridge, Dewey R." https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress8701unit ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Count Two" and "Count Three" discussions, quoting Clarridge, SSCI testimony, December 2, 1986, pp. 14 and 73. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Discussions With North" section, Oakley's account of his call to Clarridge. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Admission Evidence" section, quoting Juchniewicz, FBI 302, March 20, 1991, p. 14. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Admission Evidence" section, quoting Eagleton, testimony at the trial of Clair George, November 5, 1992, p. 2317. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Admission Evidence" section, account of the December 1986 Christmas party. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, Count discussion and reprimand, quoting Webster's letter to Clarridge of December 16, 1987 and the memorandum for the record of the meeting. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, "Soliciting Third-Country Support for the Contras" section. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, opening section and "Counts" discussion (indictment of November 26, 1991). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, note 1 (ruling of December 10, 1992 by Judge Harold H. Greene) and note 9 (trial date of March 15, 1993). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 18, introduction to the "Counts" discussion (trial precluded by the December 24, 1992 pardon of six Iran/contra defendants; the trial "would have been the final Iran/contra prosecution"). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 24, "The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt," account of the 1990 review naming Abrams, Clarridge and Gregg as subjects. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm ↩︎
CIA Office of Congressional Affairs, memorandum for the record, "Interview of Dewey Clarridge by House Judiciary Committee Staff," OCA 88-1404, May 3, 1988 (CIA Reading Room 0001289872). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001289872 ↩︎
Publishers Weekly, review and book description of A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (Scribner). https://www.publishersweekly.com/9780684800684 ↩︎
Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, pp. 108-110, 168-172, 324-326. https://archive.org/details/spyforallseasons00clar ↩︎
Mark Mazzetti, "Former spy with agenda operates private CIA," The New York Times, January 23, 2011 (reprinted by NBC News). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna41218490 ↩︎
Dexter Filkins and Mark Mazzetti, "Contractors tied to effort to track, kill militants," The New York Times, March 14, 2010 (reprinted by NBC News). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna35867435 ↩︎
Mark Mazzetti, "Inquiry Finds U.S. Official Set Up Spy Ring in Asia," The New York Times, October 28, 2010 (reprinted by RAWA News). https://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2010/10/28/inquiry-finds-u-s-official-set-up-spy-ring-in-asia.phtml ↩︎
Kimberly Dozier, "Air Force employee resigns over alleged spy ring," Associated Press, September 27, 2011 (reprinted by NBC News). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna44683587 ↩︎

31 KiB Raw Blame History