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Raw Blame History

Early Life and Motivation

Pollard was an unhappy child in South Bend, Indiana, tormented and beaten in grade school for being Jewish. He told an interviewer that the "turning point" of his life came as a result of the Six-Day War, when he was thirteen. Israel's victory was "emotionally intoxicating" and triggered his lifelong obsession with Israeli security, and his fantasies of being part of it.⁵

He told fellow undergraduates at Stanford University that he had dual citizenship and was a colonel in the Israeli Army. Bragging and fanciful claims marked his years at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Boston, where he enrolled in 1977. He failed to earn his degree, and also failed in an attempt to join the Central Intelligence Agency. In early 1981, Pollard sought a job as a defense analyst with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, but AIPAC officials found his bragging about access to top-secret information inappropriate and "weird," and "got rid of him." There was a feeling that Pollard was part of a "sting" operation attempting to set up AIPAC, and he was clearly seen as trouble.⁶

Naval Career and Clearances

The 1987 damage assessment prepared by the Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee under the Director of Central Intelligence records Pollard's naval intelligence assignments from September 1979 to November 1985.² He began as a research analyst at the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center in Suitland, Maryland, and in February 1980 became a merchant shipping analyst and watch officer. In 1980 he volunteered for Task Force 168, the naval element responsible for human intelligence collection, and was assigned to collect information from a South African defense attaché. The assessment records that he admitted in July 1980 to having lied about his South African contacts in order to impress others. In 1981 he was assigned as a Middle East warship analyst in the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC-33).

In February 1982 his association with Task Force 168 ended, and his Top Secret clearance and access to compartmented intelligence were suspended pending a fitness-for-duty evaluation by a psychiatrist. The assessment quotes the psychiatrist's finding that Pollard was "thoroughly capable of handling the duties of his job and not a security risk." His clearance was reinstated on the order of the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command.⁷ In June 1984 Pollard began temporary duty with the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center of the Naval Investigative Service (ATAC, NIS), working a rotating watch. In October 1984 he was permanently assigned there as an analyst. The assessment describes him as an employee of the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO) and other components of naval intelligence for the whole of the period from 1979 to 1985.²

Recruitment and Scope of Espionage

Pollard offered his services to Israel in 1980 and 1981, but no serious Israeli intelligence official would consider recruiting an openly pro-Israel American Jew who worked for the American intelligence community, due to an unwritten law prohibiting the recruitment of any American Jew. However, Rafael Eitan, the aggressive new director of LAKAM, decided to change the rules after unproductive meetings with U.S. officials. He agreed with Ariel Sharon that the United States was holding back on intelligence essential to Israeli security, such as KH-11 photography, and recruited Pollard in October 1981. Pollard's recruitment was viewed by military intelligence as "the worst fucking thing Rafi could have done."⁸

The account Pollard gave investigators, as the 1987 damage assessment summarizes it, dates the relationship differently. The assessment says Pollard volunteered his services in late June 1984, after meeting Aviem Sella through a pro-Israeli activist who was an old friend of the Pollard family. He passed classified material to Sella at three meetings between June and August 1984.⁹ The defense sentencing memorandum says Pollard was put in contact with Sella in June 1984, that he provided material for several months without payment, and that compensation was agreed only in November 1984.¹⁰

The assessment places the turning point in Paris. In November 1984 Pollard met Eitan, described as the adviser on counterterrorism to the Israeli prime minister and the senior Israeli in charge of the case, and Yosef Yagur, Counselor for Scientific Affairs at the Israeli Consulate in New York, who replaced Sella as Pollard's direct handler. The assessment records that Eitan emphasized that Pollard should resign from naval intelligence rather than undergo a polygraph examination.¹¹ From late January 1985 Pollard made biweekly deliveries of classified material, on alternate Fridays, to the apartment of Irit Erb, a secretary at the Israeli Embassy in Washington. He met Yagur at Erb's apartment on the last Saturday of each month. The assessment says his monthly salary was raised to $2,500 in February 1985.¹²

Hersh wrote that in 1984 and 1985 one of Pollard's main assignments was gathering American intelligence relevant to Israel's nuclear targeting of the oil fields and Soviet military installations in southern Russia. Hersh wrote that this was hidden from Department of Justice investigators by Israeli officials. Pollard insisted in his Justice Department interrogations that his spying did not begin until July 1984, after a social meeting with Israeli Air Force Colonel Sella, who was one of his handlers.¹³

Pollard also gave the Israelis American intelligence on Soviet air defenses, especially the feared SA-5 surface-to-air missile system. He eventually turned over a copy of the U.S. intelligence community's annual review of the Soviet strategic arms system, known as the 11-38, which Hersh described as one of the most sensitive documents in the U.S. government. Pollard also provided Israel with the codes for American diplomatic communications, enabling Israel's signals intelligence agency to intercept cables and backchannel messages.¹⁴

The assessment states that most of the tasking Pollard received was intended to advance Israeli objectives. Sella and Yagur emphasized military and technical intelligence on the Soviet Union, Arab states, and Pakistan. At the Paris meeting, Yagur ranked Arab and Pakistani nuclear intelligence first, followed by Arab exotic weaponry including chemical and biological weapons, then Soviet air defenses, and then Soviet aircraft and air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.¹⁵ The assessment lists among Israel's gains Pollard's deliveries concerning the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters near Tunis, Tunisian and Libyan air defenses, and Pakistan's plutonium reprocessing facility near Islamabad. Pollard told investigators that Yagur said the RASIN manual permitted Israel to begin monitoring a communications link between the Soviet General Staff in Moscow and the Soviet military assistance group in Damascus.¹⁶

The executive summary of the assessment lists the Israeli collection requirements as Pollard gave them, "in descending order of priority," in the same sequence except that Soviet aircraft precede Soviet air defenses, and ends the list with Arab order-of-battle, deployments and readiness.¹⁷ The body of the assessment adds that "most of the tasking levied on Pollard by his handlers was intended to advance Israel's objectives," that Sella and Yagur "emphasized that Pollard should obtain military and technical intelligence on the Soviet Union, Arab states, and Pakistan," and that Yagur wanted to be told of Soviet reactive-armor technology and advanced Soviet SAM systems "so they could prepare for their appearance in Arab inventories." Pollard was also to telephone an emergency number and use the code word "20 percent" if he learned that war in the Middle East was imminent.¹⁸

Under the heading "What the Israelis Did Not Ask For," the assessment opens with the words "According to Pollard" and states: "The Israelis never expressed interest in US military activities, plans, capabilities, or equipment." It adds that they "did not ask for intelligence on US communications per se" (the RASIN manual excepted), communications-security deficiencies, cryptologic systems or keying material; that Pollard "was not tasked to describe the pro- or anti-Israeli biases of individual intelligence analysts, nor was he asked to slant his own analyses for Israel's benefit," and that "[t]he Israelis expressed no serious interest in other US espionage cases," although Yagur asked about the damage from the Morison and Walker/Whitworth disclosures in casual conversation.¹⁹ The assessment states that Pollard "apparently exerted the strongest influence on what was compromised by virtue of his own access, interests, and collection initiatives," and that in terms of the quantity of identified intelligence stolen over seventeen months, with most of it passed from January to November 1985, "Pollard's operation has few parallels among known US espionage cases." It states that most of the documents address "at least tangentially" issues of major concern to Israeli security, many of them concerning Iran, Iraq and the Iran-Iraq War, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and military developments in Israel itself. It records that Pollard on his own initiative supplied three daily intelligence summaries, among them the Middle East and North Africa Summary, which yielded roughly 1,500 messages between mid-July 1984 and November 1985.¹⁹

Eitan's own requests, as the assessment summarizes them, were of a different kind: information on the Palestine Liberation Organization's Force 17, CIA psychological studies or other intelligence containing "dirt" on senior Israeli officials, and information identifying the "rats" in Israel, "by which Eitan apparently meant Israelis who provided information to the United States." In debriefings that were corroborated by polygraph, Pollard said that Yagur, standing behind Eitan, "violently shook his head 'no'" at these requests and told him afterward that procuring such information would be grounds for immediate termination of the operation.¹⁸ The defense sentencing memorandum filed in March 1987 states that Eitan also asked for information regarding U.S. intelligence sources in Israel and for documents on U.S. knowledge of Israeli arms dealings with other countries, "particularly China," and of Israeli intelligence efforts in the United States, and that Pollard did not provide them "despite Eitan's threats of recrimination."¹⁰ The assessment records Pollard's recollection that Yagur on at least two occasions indicated that selected items of his intelligence were known and appreciated by "the highest levels of the Israeli Government."¹²

The assessment gives approximate numbers of compromised published documents and an estimated 1,500 current intelligence summary messages, among them the Middle East and North Africa Summary.²⁰ As the Washington Post reported in January 1987, federal prosecutors' sentencing memorandum described Pollard as having provided "Thousands of Pages" and said Israel had returned only 163 documents to the United States.²¹ According to the same report, the prosecutors' memorandum stated that the Israelis paid Pollard $2,500 a month, promised him another $300,000 in a Swiss account over ten years, and that he was eventually paid about $50,000.²¹ Hersh gave a different figure, attributed to federal prosecutors: eighteen hundred documents, an estimated 500,000 pages, before his arrest.²²

Operational Methods and Wife's Involvement

Hersh's account places Pollard's wife, Anne Henderson-Pollard, in the operation as well.²³ Ari Ben-Menashe wrote that Pollard received computer access codes for intelligence reports from Robert McFarlane, whom he called "Mr. X," through Iris, a LAKAM representative in Washington. Pollard would print the information, photocopy it, and give the copies to Iris, who would return the originals to the office. Ben-Menashe wrote that this allowed Israel to receive over a million pieces of paper, including reconnaissance satellite data, U.S. and Soviet aircraft information, and spare parts listed in secret catalogs.²⁴

The 1992 appellate opinion describes Anne Pollard's involvement differently. It recounts that when Pollard was questioned after being stopped, he used the code word "cactus" in telephone calls to his wife, who then removed a suitcase of classified documents from the apartment and contacted his Israeli handlers. The court called this "her only active involvement in Pollard's espionage."²⁵

To facilitate the transfer of documents, Pollard's handlers in the United States, who included Sella by mid-1984, arranged for the Israeli government to provide, through its embassy in Washington, photocopying machines for the reproduction of top-secret documents, including KH-11 satellite photographs. These machines arrived with special metal shielding to prevent the interception of electronic emanations.²⁶

KGB Connection and Arrest

Ben-Menashe wrote that some of the intelligence gathered by Pollard was passed to the KGB by Israel, with the authorization of Yitzhak Shamir.²⁷ He also wrote that Pollard was later identified as the spy in the arrest of Shabtai Kalmanowitch in late 1987.²⁸

The Federal Bureau of Investigation entered the case on November 15, 1985 and began a series of interviews with Pollard, according to the counterintelligence history "Decade of the Spy."²⁹ The appellate opinion records that agents of the FBI and the Naval Investigative Service stopped Pollard as he was leaving work and questioned him about the removal of classified material. During the interviews he lied and stalled for time, as his Israeli handlers had instructed him, while one handler left the country.³⁰

On November 21, 1985 the Pollards drove to the Israeli Embassy and requested political asylum. The counterintelligence history gives the visit as about twenty minutes, and says the Israelis refused them asylum. The FBI arrested Pollard when they came out.³¹ The appellate court records that the Pollards had gained entrance to the embassy compound at one point before the Israelis turned them away. Pollard was charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. sections 794(a) and 793(e). Anne Pollard was arrested a day later as an accessory. The couple was held without bail, and she was released on bail in February 1986.³²

Israel announced after the arrest that the news was a complete surprise and that it would cooperate with the United States. The counterintelligence history says a post-arrest Israeli investigation, codenamed Siren, was launched, and that a few days later Israel announced that the Pollard case was a rogue operation conducted by a few intelligence operatives.³³ The Post reported in May 1987 that Israel had branded the affair "a rogue operation" and disbanded the spy bureau.³⁴ A delegation of officials from the FBI and the State and Justice departments, including Abraham Sofaer, traveled to Israel in December 1985. The counterintelligence history says Israel did not give up its stonewalling until the delegation threatened to return to the United States.³⁵

On December 21, 1985 Israeli officials told the New York Times that Eitan had been removed from his post as head of the Liaison Bureau for Scientific Affairs, which was being dismantled, and was expected to retire quietly.³⁶ The Christian Science Monitor later reported that Eitan had been made head of the Israel Chemicals Company, one of the most prestigious executive positions in Israeli industry.³⁷ In 1998 the Israeli government stated that Pollard had served as an Israeli agent handled by senior members of the Scientific Liaison Bureau, known in Hebrew as Lekam.³⁸

Plea, Sentencing, and the Weinberger Submissions

Pollard sought to plead guilty in order to minimize his chance of a life sentence and to enable his wife to plead as well, which the government was otherwise unwilling to allow. The government would make a plea offer only after Pollard assisted the damage assessment and submitted to polygraph examinations and interviews. The plea agreement bound him to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. section 794(c), and the government agreed to recommend "a substantial period of incarceration and a monetary fine." Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. accepted the plea on June 4, 1986, after questioning Pollard at great length about his understanding of the rights he was surrendering.³⁹

Pollard's first memorandum in aid of sentencing, dated August 20, 1986, "submits his version of the offense in aid of sentencing by the Court."⁴⁰ While awaiting sentencing, Pollard gave several interviews to Wolf Blitzer, a reporter for the Jerusalem Post, without first submitting his comments to the Director of Naval Intelligence as the plea agreement required. The government cited the interviews as evidence that he could not be trusted to refrain from disclosing national secrets.⁴¹

The prosecutors' sentencing memorandum recommended a "substantial" prison term. It named three Israelis granted immunity from prosecution, Eitan, Yagur and Irit Erb, and a fourth, Sella, as an unindicted co-conspirator.⁴² The government's reply to Pollard's memoranda, dated March 3, 1987, disputed his account of the harm he had caused and stated that he had identified thousands of classified documents.⁴³

The government also submitted a highly classified declaration by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger cataloguing the damage Pollard had done and opining that the damage had been "substantial and irrevocable." The day before sentencing, Weinberger submitted an unclassified supplemental declaration, executed March 3, 1987, which stated in part that "[i]t is difficult for me, even in the so-called 'year of the spy,' to conceive of a greater harm to national security than that caused by the defendant."⁴⁴⁴⁵ The declaration argued that "the punishment imposed should reflect the perfidy of the individual's actions, the magnitude of the treason committed, and the needs of national security." It also stated that "his loyalty to Israel transcends his loyalty to the United States." Weinberger wrote that Pollard had acknowledged, when confronted with a polygraph examination on February 25, 1987, that he had provided or confirmed information in a February 15 Washington Post article.⁴⁶

Pollard's counsel characterized the Secretary's words, "perhaps accurately," only as "rank hyperbole." Judge Williams, dissenting from the appellate majority in 1992, wrote that the repeated use of superlatives in the Weinberger memoranda "implied an appeal for the maximum."⁴⁷

Chief Judge Robinson sentenced Pollard to life in prison on March 4, 1987 and sentenced Anne Pollard to five years.⁴⁸ Pollard did not appeal the sentence. His Rule 35 motion to reduce it was denied.⁴⁹ The appellate opinion records that an affidavit by Alan Dershowitz stated that Goldberg, a retired Supreme Court Justice, had discussed the sentence with Chief Judge Robinson, who purportedly told him that Pollard had provided Israel with information demonstrating American knowledge of certain details of Israeli-South African defense cooperation and that this had "weighed heavily" in the sentence. Dershowitz claimed that Pollard never provided the Israelis that sort of information, and the affidavit asserted that Goldberg inferred that the government may have made improper ex parte submissions. Chief Judge Robinson declined to recuse himself, stated that the allegations of ex parte contacts were untrue, and refused without a hearing to let Pollard withdraw his plea.⁵⁰

Post-Sentencing Litigation

Pollard's first motion under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 was filed on March 12, 1990. It sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the government had breached the plea agreement at sentencing and had linked his wife's plea to his own.⁵¹ The district court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in 1992.⁵² A second section 2255 motion, filed on September 20, 2000 by new counsel, alleged ineffective assistance by sentencing counsel. On July 22, 2005 the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Circuit Judge David Sentelle, held that the second motion was untimely and declined to grant a certificate of appealability.⁵³ The same opinion held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review claims for access to classified documents needed for a clemency petition to the President, and it vacated the denial of counsel's request for access.⁵⁴

Clemency Applications

The counterintelligence history "Decade of the Spy" records that President George H. W. Bush denied clemency in January 1993, President Bill Clinton in March 1994, and Clinton a second time in 1997, when he cited Pollard's lack of remorse and said that shortening the sentence after ten years was unwarranted and would not serve the goal of deterrence.⁵⁵ Israel granted Pollard citizenship in 1995.⁵⁶

The Office of the Pardon Attorney wrote on March 14, 2011 that Pollard, through counsel, had applied for commutation of sentence on October 15, 2010, and that the application remained pending.⁵⁷ On December 21, 2010 former Attorney General Michael Mukasey wrote to President Barack Obama asking that he commute the sentence. Mukasey wrote that former CIA Director James Woolsey and former Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Dennis DeConcini "are familiar with the information Pollard disclosed and the circumstances of its disclosure" and "have expressed firmly their belief that his sentence should be commuted," that "the highly unusual submission to the sentencing court of affidavits from Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, seeking a heavier sentence than requested by the prosecutors despite Pollard's guilty plea and cooperation," as discussed in a submission by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb, "is deeply disturbing," and that "a life sentence can only be considered utterly disproportionate to the crime."⁵⁸

Ben-Menashe's Claims and the "Mr. X" Allegation

Ben-Menashe's claim that Robert McFarlane had been recruited by Rafael Eitan and was "the famous Mr. X in the Pollard case" reached print through a 1991 Esquire article, "October Surprise," by Craig Unger.⁵⁹ The article attributed Ben-Menashe's statement that McFarlane and Earl Brian had a "special relationship" with Israeli intelligence, and that McFarlane had been "recruited by Rafi Eitan," to a sworn affidavit that Elliot Richardson submitted for one of his clients, the Inslaw computer-software company. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that nothing in the affidavit supported the article's following sentences making McFarlane out to be an equivalent of Pollard, and that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship.'" The same opinion records that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."⁶⁰ McFarlane sued the magazine. The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire on January 30, 1996. The judgment rested on a finding of no actual malice and on the dismissal of the claim against Unger for want of personal jurisdiction.⁶¹

The opinion describes Ben-Menashe as "a self-professed former Israeli spy and a major source for conspiracy theorists," and records that the Esquire article quoted intelligence officials and journalists calling him a "fake" and a "con man."⁶² The same opinion notes that "[i]n Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."⁶³

In McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, decided August 16, 1996, the same court affirmed summary judgment for the publisher of Ben-Menashe's 1992 book Profits of War on the ground that McFarlane could not show actual malice. The opinion summarizes the book's allegation that McFarlane played an important role in the October Surprise negotiations and was an Israeli spy, and states that "the entire October Surprise story was thoroughly discredited" in the joint report of the House task force that investigated the allegations, H.R. Rep. No. 102-1102 (1993).⁶⁴

Israeli Inquiries

After Pollard's arrest, the top Israeli leadership denied having any knowledge of his activities. Pollard himself argued that his Israeli handlers told him that "Israel's dependence upon a 'special source'" had been mentioned at Israeli cabinet meetings. He also stated that he was routinely provided with lists of intelligence items wanted, coordinated and prioritized by the heads of all the various military intelligence services. Much of the material he supplied, such as satellite photographs and communication intercepts, was clearly not being transferred through official channels.⁶⁵

The Los Angeles Times reported on November 29, 1985 that Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shamir had been meeting daily to review the internal investigation, and that the essential elements of the case were believed to be clear to the three.⁶⁶ In late February 1987 the Israeli embassy spokesman Yossi Gal said that Shamir had reiterated on a recent visit to Washington "that this was a rogue operation that was not authorized and against the will of the government."⁶⁷ In a report from Jerusalem published March 11, 1987, Thomas L. Friedman quoted Shamir: "The State of Israel has no connection with Pollard or his family."⁶⁸

The Knesset's intelligence subcommittee, chaired by Abba Eban, and a two-member cabinet panel chaired by Tel Aviv lawyer Yehoshua Rotenstreich reported on May 26, 1987. The Post reported that neither panel found evidence that the leadership knew of the operation, but that both found the senior political leadership responsible for failing to uncover and end it. The seven-member subcommittee singled out Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his predecessor Moshe Arens, and said that Shimon Peres, Shamir and Rabin shared responsibility for the government's failure to live up to commitments made to the United States after Pollard's arrest. The Post reported that, contrary to government statements at the time, the subcommittee's report said the affair was "not a rogue operation" but one conducted by Israeli officials using official resources.⁶⁹ The subcommittee accused Eitan of "a gross excess of authority" and said Sella "excessively involved himself on his own initiative." It indicated that Sella may have lied in his testimony about the extent of his role, and it criticized the Army Chief of Staff, Moshe Levy, and Amos Lapidot for allowing Sella leave to take part in what they surmised was a sensitive espionage mission.⁷⁰ The Rotenstreich panel contended that the "ruling troika" of Peres, Shamir and Rabin "did not take care to clarify facts sufficiently before transferring them to the U.S. authorities." The Post reported that the troika had reportedly pressed Rotenstreich to hand in his report after learning that Eban's was to be released, in the hope that his findings would be milder.⁷¹ Shamir told reporters that the government had no intention of resigning and that "the mountain was really a molehill and the earth did not move."⁷²

The Israeli Cabinet adopted the Rotenstreich findings, which held the entire government collectively responsible for failure to know that a secret spy unit in the Defense Ministry had hired Pollard.⁷³ Rabin and Peres attacked the subcommittee as politically tainted. The subcommittee's report accused Rabin of failing "to follow up or increase supervision as he should have done" during the fourteen months when Pollard was active, and the Post reported that it criticized the promotions of Sella and Eitan, who became chairman of the country's largest state-owned company.⁷¹

The Post reported that Sella had been indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987 for his role in the affair.⁷⁴ Hersh wrote that after American protests Sella was instead named head of the Israel Defense Forces staff college, and that he later retired from the air force.⁷⁵ The Post reported that Sella's promotion to command one of Israel's largest air bases had set off a storm of controversy in the United States, and that he eventually resigned from the new post, citing his concern for U.S.-Israeli relations.⁷⁶

The Israeli officials most tarnished by the affair were Eitan and Sella. Eitan did not suffer financially. He was subsequently named to a high administrative position with the Israel Chemicals Company, an appointment authorized by Ariel Sharon.⁷⁷ Hersh wrote that Sella was promoted to brigadier general after his return from the United States and assigned as commander of Tel Nof, the site of Israel's nuclear-ready air force squadron.⁷⁸ The Christian Science Monitor reported that the committees criticized the government for appointing Sella commander of Tel Nof Air Force Base after his involvement in the affair became known.⁷⁹

Aftermath and Sella's Account

Pollard refused to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington for six months before finally giving up Sella's name as part of a plea bargain. It is not known whether prosecutors realized at the time that Sella's mission was linked to nuclear intelligence. Hersh wrote that Sella was indicted in absentia in March 1987 and declared a fugitive from justice in June 1990, and that the Israeli government refused U.S. demands for his extradition.⁸⁰

Sella has given friends and colleagues an account of his involvement that is more credible, but still far short of the whole story. He claimed he was recruited to try to control Pollard, who was drowning the Israeli intelligence bureaucracy in documents. Sella, who had almost completed his Ph.D. in computer science at New York University, believed his technical training would be an asset in evaluating and perhaps winnowing down Pollard's materials. He knew that Pollard had been recruited long before 1984, but was eager for the assignment, believing it would advance his career. He checked with his superior, Major General Lapidot, who assured him that Pollard was not a rogue and that clearance for his new assignment had been obtained from the defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Once involved, Sella complained that Pollard "was running crazy" and "was giving him things he didn't want and didn't need."⁸¹

Leonard Garment, hired by Israel to represent Sella, attempted to resolve the affair. He was pressured by a six-man Israeli delegation, including Chaim Joseph Zadok, Meir Rosenne, Elyakim Rubinstein, Ram Caspi, Avraham Shalom, and Hanan Bar-on, to file a factual proffer that downplayed Sella's involvement. Garment eventually withdrew from the case, stating he was unsure whether his client was Sella or the Israeli government. With his withdrawal, the Israeli government ended its attempt to protect Sella, effectively ending Sella's career.⁸²

Parole and Departure

Pollard was released from prison on November 20, 2015 and placed on parole. His conditions included a curfew, an electronic monitor that tracked his location, limits on the jobs he could take, and a prohibition on leaving the United States.⁵⁶⁸³ On November 20, 2020 the Justice Department announced that he had completed his parole. The Parole Commission said there was "no evidence to conclude that he is likely to violate the law." His lawyers, Eliot Lauer and Jacques Semmelman, said that he was "now a free man in all respects."⁸⁴

On December 30, 2020 Pollard and his wife Esther arrived at Ben Gurion International Airport on a private plane provided by the casino owner Sheldon Adelson. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu greeted them and presented them with Israeli identity cards. Pollard said, "We are ecstatic to be home at last after 35 years."⁸⁵

Footnotes

United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Arrest of November 21, 1985, plea of June 4, 1986, and life sentence. ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Introduction, paragraph 2, and the career box headed "Pollard's Assignments and Security-Clearance Actions, With Naval Intelligence, 1979-85." ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Background narrative: payments of $1,500 to $2,500 a month during the last twelve months of the espionage. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Hersh's account of the 1981 recruitment, which Pollard and the Israeli government are said to have dated later. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's account of his childhood and of the Six-Day War, as Hersh reports it. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. AIPAC's reaction to Pollard's applications and conduct, as Hersh reports it. ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Career box entries for February 1982 through October 1984. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Account of the 1980-81 offers and of Eitan's decision to recruit Pollard in October 1981. ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraph 5 (late June 1984 volunteering; Sella meetings June to August 1984). ↩︎
Defendant Jonathan J. Pollard's Second Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), filed early March 1987. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc7.pdf Discussion of the sequence of contact and compensation, including the November 1984 agreement on $1,500 a month. ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraph 6 (Paris meetings in November 1984; Eitan's emphasis on resignation rather than a polygraph) and paragraph 7 (Yagur as direct handler). ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraph 7 (biweekly deliveries to Irit Erb's apartment, monthly meetings with Yagur, salary raised in February 1985). ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's claim that his spying began in July 1984 after a social meeting with Sella; the nuclear targeting assignment. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Soviet air-defense material, the 11-38 review, and the diplomatic codes. ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 51 and 52 (Israeli tasking priorities and the Paris list). ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 79 to 82 (Israeli gains from the compromised material; the RASIN manual). ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Executive Summary, paragraph 11 (collection requirements in descending order of priority). ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 51 to 53 (the tasking assessment, the Paris list, Eitan's supplementary requests and Yagur's reaction). ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 58 and 63 to 66 ("What the Israelis Did Not Ask For"; the overview of compromised material). ↩︎
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (October 30, 1987; sanitized release, National Security Archive copy). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/7332518/National-Security-Archive-Doc-13b-Foreign-Denial.pdf. Also released through the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel: https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf Paragraphs 11 and 12 (approximate numbers of compromised published documents and an estimated 1,500 current intelligence summary messages). ↩︎
Howard Kurtz, "Spy Papers Kept by Israel, Court Told," Washington Post, January 7, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000403620007-3 Prosecutors' sentencing memorandum as reported, including the 163 returned documents. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Figure attributed by Hersh to federal prosecutors. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's wife's role in the operation, as Hersh relates it. ↩︎
Ari Ben-Menashe, Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). Lending copy: https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm Account of Iris, the access codes and the copying method. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Narrative of the stop and the telephone calls; the court's characterization of Anne Pollard's involvement. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Photocopying machines supplied through the Israeli embassy. ↩︎
Ari Ben-Menashe, Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). Lending copy: https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm Claimed transfers to the KGB and the Shamir authorization. ↩︎
Ari Ben-Menashe, Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). Lending copy: https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm Claim that Pollard was later identified as the spy in the Kalmanowitch arrest. ↩︎
"Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf Entry on the FBI's entry into the case on November 15, 1985 and the interviews. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Background narrative of the stop, the interviews and the lies told in them. ↩︎
"Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf Account of the embassy visit and the arrest. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Arrest on November 21, 1985; Anne Pollard's arrest the following day; the charges; the bail history. ↩︎
"Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf Israeli post-arrest response and the Siren investigation. ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," Washington Post, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Israel's official characterization of the affair as a rogue operation, and the disbanding of the bureau. ↩︎
"Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf The December 1985 delegation and Israel's eventual cooperation. ↩︎
Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, December 22, 1985 (Jerusalem dateline December 21). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302120025-0 Removal of Eitan and the dismantling of the bureau. ↩︎
"Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Eitan's later executive post. ↩︎
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Government statement on Jonathan Pollard," May 12, 1998, Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, vol. 17 (1998-1999), no. 35. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc13.PDF ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Plea negotiations, the plea agreement (paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b)), and the June 4, 1986 plea. ↩︎
Defendant Jonathan J. Pollard's First Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), dated August 20, 1986. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/A-Pollard6.pdf Pollard's account of the offense. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Pollard's interviews with a Jerusalem Post reporter before sentencing and the government's objection to them. ↩︎
Howard Kurtz, "Spy Papers Kept by Israel, Court Told," Washington Post, January 7, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000403620007-3 Government's recommended sentence, the immunity grants, and the unindicted co-conspirator. ↩︎
Government's Reply to Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), March 3, 1987. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/A-Pollard9.pdf Government's response to Pollard's memoranda. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json The classified in camera declaration ("substantial and irrevocable") and the unclassified supplemental declaration. ↩︎
Supplemental Declaration of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, United States v. Jonathan Jay Pollard, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), executed March 3, 1987 (unclassified). http://www.irmep.org/ila/pollard/03041987weinberger.pdf Paragraphs 1 and 2. ↩︎
Supplemental Declaration of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, United States v. Jonathan Jay Pollard, Crim. No. 86-0207 (D.D.C.), executed March 3, 1987 (unclassified). http://www.irmep.org/ila/pollard/03041987weinberger.pdf Paragraph 4 (loyalty; the February 25 polygraph and the February 15 article). ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Dissent of Judge Williams on the Weinberger submissions. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Sentences of March 4, 1987: life for Pollard and five years for Anne Pollard. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Rule 35 motion and the decision not to appeal. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json The Dershowitz affidavit, the Goldberg conversation and the South Africa reference, and the district court's refusal to recuse or hold a hearing. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 416 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005), decided July 22, 2005. https://static.case.law/f3d/416/cases/0048-01.json Procedural history of the March 12, 1990 and September 20, 2000 motions. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992), No. 90-3276, decided March 20, 1992. https://static.case.law/f2d/959/cases/1011-01.json Affirmance of the denial of the 1990 section 2255 motion. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 416 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005), decided July 22, 2005. https://static.case.law/f3d/416/cases/0048-01.json Holding that the successive section 2255 motion was untimely and that no certificate of appealability would issue. ↩︎
United States v. Pollard, 416 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005), decided July 22, 2005. https://static.case.law/f3d/416/cases/0048-01.json Holding on the clemency-access petition and the vacatur. ↩︎
"Decade of the Spy," undated counterintelligence history extract, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 407, Doc. 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc14.pdf Denials of clemency in January 1993, March 1994 and 1997. ↩︎
Matthew S. Schwartz, "Jonathan Pollard, Who Sold Cold War Secrets To Israel, Completes Parole," NPR, carried by Georgia Public Broadcasting, November 21, 2020. https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/21/jonathan-pollard-who-sold-cold-war-secrets-israel-completes-parole Release on November 20, 2015, the end of parole on November 20, 2020, and Israel's grant of citizenship in 1995. ↩︎
Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, letter to Grant F. Smith, FOIA Request No. 2011-036, March 14, 2011. https://www.israellobby.org/pollard/03142011Pollard_release.pdf Commutation application of October 15, 2010 pending. ↩︎
Michael B. Mukasey to President Barack Obama, letter of December 21, 2010. https://www.israellobby.org/pollard/12212010Mukasey.pdf Request for commutation; the Woolsey and DeConcini views; the Weinberger affidavits. ↩︎
Craig Unger, "October Surprise," Esquire, October 1991 (article quoted at length in the opinion cited below). McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996). https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json ↩︎
McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json The article's passage on the Inslaw affidavit; the court's finding that the recruitment clause and the following sentences are not in the affidavit; McFarlane's non-dispute that Ben-Menashe made the assertions to Unger. ↩︎
McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json Affirmance of the judgment for Esquire and the dismissal of the claim against Unger. ↩︎
McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json Description of Ben-Menashe and of the Esquire article's treatment of his credibility. ↩︎
McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json The opinion's note on persistent allegations about an unnamed second American. ↩︎
McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 1996), Williams, Ginsburg and Rogers, JJ. https://static.case.law/f3d/91/cases/1501-01.json ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Pollard's account of what his handlers told him about cabinet discussion and intelligence priorities. ↩︎
"Pollard" report, Los Angeles Times, November 29, 1985. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000504890020-7 ↩︎
The Washington Post, February 28, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000403620005-5 ↩︎
Thomas L. Friedman, "Shamir Says Pollard's Fate Is No Concern of Israel," The New York Times, March 11, 1987. CIA CREST copy: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302120009-8 ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," Washington Post, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The two reports of May 26, 1987; the subcommittee's statement that the affair was not a rogue operation. ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," Washington Post, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The subcommittee's findings on Eitan and Sella, and its criticism of Levy and Lapidot. ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," Washington Post, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 The Rotenstreich report's statement on the troika; the pressure to file it; Rabin and Peres's response to the subcommittee; criticism of Rabin's supervision and of the Sella and Eitan promotions. ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," Washington Post, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Shamir's remark to reporters. ↩︎
"Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Cabinet adoption of the Rotenstreich findings and the collective-responsibility finding. ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," Washington Post, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Indictment of Sella by a federal grand jury in Washington in March 1987. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's assignment to the staff college after American protests, and his later retirement. ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," Washington Post, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 Sella's promotion and his resignation from the Tel Nof post. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Eitan's post at the Israel Chemicals Company and the Sharon authorization. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's promotion to brigadier general and his assignment to Tel Nof. ↩︎
"Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html Committees' criticism of Sella's appointment to command Tel Nof Air Force Base. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's fugitive status in June 1990 and the Israeli refusal of extradition. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Sella's account of his role as Hersh relates it, and Pollard's conduct once Sella was involved. ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapters 21 and 22. Garment's engagement, the Israeli delegation, and his withdrawal. ↩︎
National Security Archive, "Jonathan Pollard: Revisiting a Still Sensitive Case," Electronic Briefing Book (Richelson, December 14, 2012; reposted November 24, 2020). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2012-12-14/jonathan-pollard-spy-case-cias-1987-damage-assessment-declassified Parole conditions, including the travel restriction, as stated in the November 24, 2020 posting. ↩︎
Matthew S. Schwartz, "Jonathan Pollard, Who Sold Cold War Secrets To Israel, Completes Parole," NPR, carried by Georgia Public Broadcasting, November 21, 2020. https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/21/jonathan-pollard-who-sold-cold-war-secrets-israel-completes-parole Parole Commission statement and the lawyers' statement. ↩︎
Associated Press, "Reports convicted US spy Pollard arrives in Israel," December 30, 2020. https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/world/2020/12/30/reports-convicted-us-spy-pollard-arrives-in-israel/ Arrival on December 30, 2020, the reception and Israeli identity cards. ↩︎

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