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category tags aliases summary born died location created updated relations
Political Figure
Person
Iran
OperationAjax
SAVAK
KurdishOperation
ArmsSales
HostageCrisis
SafariClub
Trident
ProjectFlower
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
Mohammad Reza Shah
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
Shah of Iran
the Shah
Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979, returned to power by the 1953 coup, partner of Nixon and Kissinger in the Kurdish program, and admitted to New York Hospital on October 22, 1979. 1919-10-26 1980-07-27 Tehran, Iran 2025-08-05 2026-10-14
type with start role fn
participant_in Operation AJAX 1953-08-13 signed firmans dismissing Mohammed Mossadegh and naming Fazlollah Zahedi prime minister 6
type with start role fn
appointed Fazlollah Zahedi 1953-08-13 prime minister by royal firman 6
type with role fn
relative_of Princess Ashraf Pahlavi twin sister, who with Schwarzkopf pressed him to sign the 1953 firmans 5
type with start role fn
participant_in Safari Club 1976 Iran listed among the member states by Prince Turki al-Faisal 32
type with start role fn
participant_in Project Flower 1977-04 signed the Israeli-Iranian oil-for-arms contracts with Shimon Peres, including the missile project, per documents published by Iranian students 31
type with start role fn
subject_of Pike Committee 1976-02-16 the Kurdish covert aid program examined in the committee report 23

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, also known as the Shah of Iran, ruled Iran for nearly 40 years, from his accession during the Second World War until his departure on January 16, 1979.1 His throne was restored in 1953 by a coup that removed Mohammed Mossadegh, and his government relied on the SAVAK security service. By November 1979 he was in the United States for medical treatment, and the decision to admit him became a subject of dispute involving the Jimmy Carter administration, Henry A. Kissinger and David Rockefeller.

Return to power, 1951 to 1953

By 1952 the American embassy in Tehran had concluded that a government to replace Mossadegh could be installed only by a military coup. On July 31, 1952, Loy Henderson reported that any alternative to Mossadegh could be brought to power "except perhaps by military coup," and that the officers best placed to lead one were Fazlollah Zahedi and General Hedjazi.2

In March 1953 Henderson assessed the Shah's own part in such a move. He wrote that the Shah would "undoubtedly be frightened at thought of military coup being attempted in his name" and would probably try to discourage it, and that a failed attempt would be likely to complete the ruin of the Shah and the dynasty.3 On April 15, 1953, the embassy reported that the Shah had been postponing a meeting with Zahedi from day to day.4

The Central Intelligence Agency's history of the operation, known as TPAJAX and later as Operation AJAX, was written by Donald Wilber in March 1954 and released in 2000. The National Security Archive posted it as part of its Iran coup briefing book. Wilber describes a plan in four steps. Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah's twin sister, was to urge him to dismiss Mossadegh and to tell him she was in contact with American and British officials. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, formerly head of the American gendarmerie mission in Iran, was to bring the Shah two royal decrees (firmans), one dismissing Mossadegh and one appointing Zahedi, and to get the army's commitment to the crown. A British agent whose credentials the Shah accepted would reinforce the message. Kermit Roosevelt, representing the President of the United States, would then urge the Shah to sign.5

Wilber records that the Shah refused at first. On August 10 he said that while he approved of the plan for action he would sign no papers. After pressure from Princess Ashraf and General Schwarzkopf and several meetings with Roosevelt, the Wilber history records, the Shah signed the required firmans, and action was set for August 16.5 A security leak in the Iranian army then caused the chief of the Shah's bodyguard, who had been assigned to seize Mossadegh, to be overwhelmed by loyal units. Wilber describes the Shah's flight to Baghdad as "an act of prudence" that had been at least partly foreseen in the plan.5

A British memorandum in the Foreign Relations volume dates the firman dismissing Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi to August 13, 1953, and says it was conveyed secretly. The opposition press later published photographs of it. The same memorandum says the firman was carried from Ramsar to Tehran by Colonel Nasiri, commander of the Imperial Guard, who delivered a copy late on August 15 to the officer in charge of the troops at Mossadegh's house and was arrested as he left; it records the belief that junior Guards officers with Tudeh sympathies disrupted the plan.6 On August 18 Henderson reported that Mossadegh had asked him whether the Shah had issued a firman removing him as prime minister.7 The same day Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith wrote to the President that "it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his constitutional power in signing the firman replacing Mosadeq." He added that "the old boy wouldn't accept this and arrested the messenger and everybody else involved that he could get his hands on."8 The Shah arrived in Rome from Baghdad in the early afternoon of August 18.9 On August 20 the embassy in Rome reported that he was to leave Rome for Baghdad around midnight, arriving about noon on August 21.10 An airgram from the Tehran embassy in January 1973 described the episode as the time "when the Shah was forced to flee the country only to return two weeks later when Mossadeq was ousted."1

On October 9, 1953, Henderson reported that the Shah had expressed willingness to sign the necessary firmans if Zahedi requested them.11 The oil arrangements that followed were recorded in the State Department files of late October 1954, when the Shah signed the oil bill.12

SAVAK

SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar) served as the Shah's internal security and intelligence service. A February 1971 airgram from the Tehran embassy recorded that Iranian young people widely assumed the CIA had aided SAVAK when the Shah first organized it, and that the "invisible hand of the CIA still wields considerable influence on, if not outright control of, SAVAK." The airgram also reported that SAVAK "is feared by most Iranians."13 The November 23, 1979 summary of Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) conclusions lists, among its points, publicizing links between some present Iranian leaders and SAVAK.14

The Kurdish operation, 1972 to 1975

On May 30, 1972, in Tehran, Richard Nixon and Kissinger met the Shah. The memorandum of conversation records the Shah saying he feared the Soviets would establish "a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists." When Kissinger asked what could be done, the Shah replied: "Turkey needs strengthening. Iran can help with the Kurds."15 The aid went to the Kurdish insurgency of Mulla Mustafa Barzani in Iraq.

In June 1972 the NSC staff, the CIA and the State Department worked through the question. On June 7 Harold Saunders wrote to Kissinger that "the balance is fairly fine on the question of whether we should support the Kurds," and advised that Kissinger should not meet Barzani's representatives personally, since that "comes so close to involving the President at least by implication."16 A CIA memorandum of June 12 to Richard Helms said that the policy of non-interference had been confirmed "not only by the State Department but by Dr. Kissinger's office as well."17 On July 28 Alexander Haig forwarded to Kissinger Helms's proposal: about $3 million from the United States over one year and about $2 million in supplies, with Iran also contributing. Haig recommended informing only the 40 Committee principals and to "avoid any paper and tell them that the President wants this done."18

Kissinger later described the origin of the program in a memorandum to Nixon of September 6, 1973: "You will recall that you initiated financial and military support to the Kurds in August 1972 in response to an appeal from the Shah."19 His memorandum of April 11, 1974 said that since then the United States had provided, "through the Iranians," a monthly subsidy, and that "the underlying purpose was to keep the Iraqi Government tied down and to limit its capacity for adventures abroad."20 On June 24, 1974, the CIA proposed $8.06 million for fiscal 1975, and Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve it.21 On March 16, 1975, after the Iran-Iraq agreement, Brent Scowcroft sent Helms, then ambassador to Iran, a message instructing him to tell the Shah that the United States was prepared to provide the March subvention, and to answer Barzani's message with the words "our prayers are with them."22

The Pike Committee, the House Select Committee on Intelligence under Representative Otis Pike, examined the Kurdish operation as one of three covert cases. Its report, printed in The Village Voice on February 16, 1976, states that the program ultimately involved some $16 million and was apparently endorsed by the President after a private meeting with the Shah and Kissinger. John B. Connally, then about to take a major role in the President's re-election campaign, personally advised the Shah that the United States would cooperate. The report states that there was no Forty Committee meeting at which a formal proposal could be discussed and voted on. It says Kissinger "personally restrained the insurgents from an all-out offensive on the one occasion when such an attack might have been successful." After the Iran-Iraq border agreement the United States dropped the Kurds. The report charges: "The President, Dr. Kissinger and the foreign head of state [the Shah] hoped our clients would not prevail," and concludes: "Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise." A high American official later explained to the committee staff that "covert action should not be confused with missionary work."23

Arms purchases and aircraft

In May 1972 the Tehran embassy recommended that the United States make available at least three squadrons of F-15s, with possibly two to four F-14s equipped with Phoenix missiles per squadron.24 A memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush to Kissinger of May 18, 1972 attached a talking paper noting that since 1969 the Shah had focused on follow-on aircraft to replace his American-supplied F-4s, and that "these aircraft are barely out of the research and development stage."25 On April 27, 1973, Deputy Secretary of State Rush reported from Geneva on a ninety-minute audience with the Shah, in which he outlined plans to go ahead on the Trident and B-1 weapons programs of the United States.26

On July 20, 1973, the Senior Review Group discussed the Shah's visit. William Clements of the Department of Defense said that the Shah wanted to ride in an F-14 while he was in the country, and that "he has indicated he wants to buy a squadron of F-14s and F-15s at some point."27 Four days later the memorandum of a conversation records the Shah's belief that he needed sufficient air power, including F-14s, F-15s and possibly A-10s, to deter his enemies.28

A briefing memorandum from Alfred L. Atherton Jr. to Kissinger of November 10, 1975 listed friction points with Iran. It described Project IBEX as "a large electronic system which will give the Iranians an ELINT capability." The Department of Defense had suggested that IBEX be placed under foreign military sales, because it was responsible for overseeing the integration of Iranian communications under the Seek Switch program. The memorandum records that the Iranians said how IBEX was managed was "our bureaucratic problem to resolve," and that they would not accept delays or added costs.29

Israel and Iran, 1958 to 1979

Reuven Shiloah, the founder of the Israeli intelligence services, pursued a "peripheral" alliance policy from 1957. The Turkish scholar Yusuf Suha Sonucu wrote that in the autumn of 1957 the Iranian embassy in Paris sent the Israeli embassy a note asking for a secret meeting at deputy prime minister level, that in January 1958 Shiloah carried a letter from David Ben-Gurion to Tehran, and that in April 1958 an Iranian delegation headed by a deputy of Prime Minister Manouchehr Eghbal was received in Tel Aviv by Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir. Following a meeting of prime ministers in Ankara on August 29, 1958, the heads of the three intelligence services met in Ankara in late September or early October 1958, and the tripartite arrangement known as Trident was set up among Mossad, Turkey's National Security Service (MAH, later the Turkish National Intelligence Organization) and SAVAK. Sonucu reports that the services divided tasks against Gamal Abdel Nasser and Soviet influence, with Iran contributing on the Persian Gulf and Iraq and Turkey on Syria, and that the service chiefs met twice a year. He also reports that after Ben-Gurion's approach to Washington the Central Intelligence Agency financed a two-story building in Israel as the Trident center, with Iranian officers on the "blue" floor, Turkish officers on the "yellow" floor and Israelis on the ground floor.30

Sonucu cites Haggai Eshed's biography of Shiloah for a CIA report on Israel's security, found in the American embassy in Tehran and published by Iranian revolutionaries in March 1979, that described Trident as an arrangement among Mossad, the Turkish service and SAVAK whose ministers met twice a year. He writes that after the Iran-Iraq agreement of March 5, 1975, the Shah told the Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal that the Nasser threat had gone and that Iranian intelligence and the army had been in contact with Israel, and that in the first months of the new regime Mossad director Yitzhak Hofi said Israel had wanted to keep Iran in the arrangement and had offered it free tires for its F-4 Phantoms.30

According to documents published by the Iranian students who held the American embassy after November 1979, the Shah and Shimon Peres, then Israel's defense minister, signed one of six oil-for-arms contracts in Tehran in April 1977. The contract code-named Flower covered a surface-to-surface missile project. The Israeli papers, in English, were published in paperback in Iran, and the volume on the missile project was supplied to The New York Times in 1986. The documents state that the aim was to extend the range of an Israeli missile developed in the early 1970s and to replace American-supplied parts so that Israel could export it without American approval. The missile carried a warhead of 750 kilograms and a range of up to 300 miles; shipments were to go through a Swiss company to central Iran, with an assembly plant near Sirjan and a test range near Rafsanjan. In the record of General Hassan Toufanian's July 1977 visit to Israel, Ezer Weizman tells him that Iran must have a missile, and Moshe Dayan raises the sensitivity of the Americans to missiles of that kind, which with a 750-kilogram head could also be regarded as nuclear-capable. Toufanian, the Shah's arms procurer, told the Times that the Israelis never said explicitly that they had a nuclear capability but that it was implied, and that Iran made a down payment in oil in 1978. A July 1978 summary of a conversation between Admiral Kamal Habibollahi and the Israeli navy commander Michael Barkai mentions enhancing Flower so that the missiles could be launched from submarines.31

Toufanian and Habibollahi told the Times that the recorded conversations were genuine, and Weizman did not deny that the documents were authentic. The spokesman for Israel's Foreign Ministry called them falsified documents spread by the Tehran government. Gary Sick and Harold Saunders told the Times that they had not known of the project. Israel halted the cooperation when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in February 1979.31

The Safari Club

Turki al-Faisal, the former head of Saudi intelligence, said in a speech at Georgetown University on February 3, 2002, that in 1976, after Watergate, the American intelligence community was "literally tied up by Congress," and that a group of countries got together and established what was called the Safari Club. He stated that the Safari Club included France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Iran, with the aim of sharing information and countering Soviet influence, especially in Africa.32 Heikal wrote in 1982 that the club was the idea of Count Alexandre de Marenches, head of the French SDECE, and that an agreement among the five governments was signed by Sheikh Kamal Adham, director of intelligence, for Saudi Arabia, General Nematollah Nassiri, head of SAVAK, for Iran, the director of intelligence for Egypt, Ahmed Duleimi, director of intelligence, for Morocco, and de Marenches himself for France. He wrote that a copy of the agreement was found in SAVAK's archives after the revolution, and that the proposal to make Algeria a founding member came to him in an interview with President Houari Boumediene.33

The 1978 warnings and the revolution

Ari Ben-Menashe, who worked for Israeli intelligence, wrote in his memoir that under the Shah Iran maintained good relations with "moderate pro-American Arab countries" such as Egypt, Jordan and the Emirates, and that by 1978 the Shah's rule was threatened by widespread discontent over corruption, rising prices and the failure of his White Revolution to address food production. He added that the infrastructure of Tehran could not handle its traffic.34

Ben-Menashe also wrote that Israeli intelligence warned of an impending revolution and the Shah's overthrow as early as 1978, that American analysts dismissed the warnings, and that in December 1978 the CIA and SAVAK enlisted Israeli aid in a plan to assassinate Khomeini, which the Shah rejected, fearing further bloodshed.34

The Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979, which Ben-Menashe describes as a tumultuous upheaval in the Middle East and a new threat to Israel's existence. He wrote that the regency and supreme military councils were unable to function and that Shahpour Bakhtiar, the last prime minister, proved helpless; that Khomeini arrived in Iran on February 1, 1979, and declared an Islamic republic on April 1; and that the Israeli embassy in Tehran was then handed over to the Palestine Liberation Organization.34

Medical treatment and the admission to the United States, 1979

The Shah entered the United States on October 22, 1979, for diagnosis and evaluation of his medical condition at the Cornell medical facility in New York; the statement read by White House press secretary Jody Powell on December 15, 1979, gives that date, adds that he entered Wilford Hall Air Force Hospital at Lackland Air Force Base on December 2, and announces his departure for residence in Panama.35

The Special Coordination Committee recorded on November 5, 1979 that "the Rockefeller group, which is managing the Shah's affairs, has increased the security around the Shah." The New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center released a medical update on him the same day.36 A National Security Council meeting record of November 6 states that he "has a tube implanted in him and also has cancer of the neck and could not easily be moved."37 The editorial note in the Foreign Relations volume on Iranian withdrawals from Chase Manhattan Bank records that David Rockefeller, "a friend of the Shah, had lobbied for the Shah's acceptance into the United States for medical treatment."38

A memorandum from Ambassador Hermann Eilts to Carter of November 21 recorded questions about the Shah's health, including whether he had cancer and how serious it was.39 At a National Security Council meeting on November 23, the minutes record the question whether Zbigniew Brzezinski should talk to David Rockefeller.40 A November 24 memorandum from Under Secretary of State David D. Newsom to Cyrus Vance records that the Rockefeller organization would arrange transportation for the Shah's planned trips to Mexico.41

On November 26 Vance sent Carter a memorandum noting that a television interview by George Ball "inspired a number of inquiries on Henry Kissinger's advice." Ball had said on NBC's Meet the Press on November 25 that the Shah might not have been admitted to the United States were it not for the "enormously obnoxious" pressure exerted by Kissinger. The Chicago Tribune reported the same day under the headline "Report Kissinger Tells Shah to Stay." Carter wrote in the margin that the press reported he had met "to soothe an angry Kissinger."42 On December 1 Vance's memorandum recorded plans for moving the Shah to Wilford Hall Hospital at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio.43 A January 15, 1980 memorandum from Steven Oxman recorded the prognosis that the Shah's cancer could metastasize at any time and lead quickly to death.44

An undated memorandum from Hamilton Jordan to Carter, Vance and Brzezinski, written in January 1980, summarized the account given by Panamanian emissaries of their meetings with Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh on January 7 about the Shah's presence in Panama. According to that summary, Ghotbzadeh described the seizure of the American embassy as an "American conspiracy" involving "Rockefeller, Kissinger and others," who intended to create a crisis for Carter that would lead to the election of a Republican "controlled by Kissinger and Rockefeller."45

On March 30, 1980, a message from the Swiss ambassador to Iran reported that the Shah had been transferred to Cairo, and that, according to the ambassador's information, Kissinger had organized the move.46 On April 1, 1980, the record of an Oval Office meeting noted that Abolhassan Bani-Sadr had said in a March 31 speech that Kissinger was responsible for the Shah's move to Egypt.47 The Shah died in Cairo on July 27, 1980.48

Footnotes

  1. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, document 1, Airgram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, January 9, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d1. ↩︎

  2. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, document 192, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, July 31, 1952. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d192. ↩︎

  3. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 313, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, March 6, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d313. ↩︎

  4. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 324, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, April 15, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d324. ↩︎

  5. Donald Wilber, Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953, written March 1954, released by the CIA in 2000. Posted by the National Security Archive as Iran Coup Briefing Book 28 (November 29, 2000), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/; text copy at https://archive.org/details/CIA-Mossadeq-Iran-1953. First disclosed by James Risen in The New York Times on April 16 and June 18, 2000. The CIA's mid-1970s internal history The Battle for Iran, released in 1981 with references to TPAJAX blacked out, was posted by the National Security Archive with those references restored on August 19, 2013 (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/). ↩︎

  6. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 362, British Memorandum (undated), recording that the firman dismissing Mosadeq and appointing Zahedi was issued on August 13, 1953, and that the opposition press published photographs of the royal firman. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d362. ↩︎

  7. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 347, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d347. ↩︎

  8. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 346, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the President, Washington, August 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d346. ↩︎

  9. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 348, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 20, 1953, reporting telegram 571 from Rome of August 18. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d348. ↩︎

  10. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 350, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 21, 1953, editorial note citing telegram 613 from Rome, August 20. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d350. ↩︎

  11. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 374, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, October 9, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d374. ↩︎

  12. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume X, document 502, Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran, Washington, October 28, 1954, reporting that the Shah signed the oil bill on the day the Tehran embassy informed the Department. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d502. ↩︎

  13. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, document 116, Airgram A-56 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, February 22, 1971. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d116. ↩︎

  14. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979-September 1980, document 54, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting, November 23, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d54. ↩︎

  15. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E-4, document 200, Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 30, 1972, 5:35 to 6:35 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d200. ↩︎

  16. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E-4, document 313, Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Staff to Kissinger, Washington, June 7, 1972, "Message from Shah on Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d313. ↩︎

  17. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E-4, document 315, Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, CIA (Waller) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, June 12, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d315. ↩︎

  18. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E-4, document 321, Memorandum From Haig to Kissinger, Washington, July 28, 1972, "Kurdish Problem," attaching Helms's memorandum of July 18, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d321. ↩︎

  19. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, document 233, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1973, "Increased Assistance to the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d233. ↩︎

  20. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, document 246, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, April 11, 1974, "Further Support for the Kurds in Iraq." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d246. ↩︎

  21. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, document 254, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, June 24, 1974, "Fiscal Year 1975 Support for the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d254. ↩︎

  22. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, document 281, Backchannel Message From Scowcroft to the Ambassador to Iran (Helms), Washington, March 16, 1975, with the oral message to Barzani. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d281. ↩︎

  23. Pike Committee, Report on the Central Intelligence Agency, as printed in "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," The Village Voice, February 16, 1976, Case 2 (Arms Support). Released through the CIA CREST database as document CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5; text at https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5. The Kissinger restraint passage, the Iran-Iraq border passage and the "missionary work" remark appear in the printed introduction by Aaron Latham, which quotes the report. ↩︎

  24. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E-4, document 187, Telegram 2642 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, May 6, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d187. ↩︎

  25. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume E-4, document 195, Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to Kissinger, Washington, May 18, 1972, with attached talking paper "Sale of F-15/F-14 Aircraft." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d195. ↩︎

  26. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, document 14, Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush) to the Department of State, Geneva, April 27, 1973, "Conversation with Shah." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d14. ↩︎

  27. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, document 23, Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, July 20, 1973 (participants include William Clements for the Department of Defense). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d23. ↩︎

  28. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, document 26, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 24, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d26. ↩︎

  29. FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, document 147, Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Kissinger, Washington, November 10, 1975, "Issues Between the U.S. Government and Iran." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d147. ↩︎

  30. Yusuf Suha Sonucu, "Periferi Doktrini Bağlamında Türkiye-İsrail İstihbarat İşbirliği," İsrailiyat: İsrail ve Yahudi Çalışmaları Dergisi, no. 3 (Winter 2018), pp. 12-60, citing Haggai Eshed, Reuven Shiloah: The Man Behind the Mossad (Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 308-310; Yossi Alpher, Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), pp. 11-15; Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv, 1987), pp. 1322-1333; and Ofra Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 44-46. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/672649. ↩︎

  31. Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal With the Shah," The New York Times, April 1, 1986, as reprinted in the CIA reading room, CIA-RDP90-00965R000705970013-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000705970013-3. ↩︎

  32. Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, special address, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, February 3, 2002 (transcription by Paul Dyer). https://web.archive.org/web/20030402032839/http://www.ccasonline.org/publicaffairs/turki_02032002.html. ↩︎

  33. Mohamed Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 113 and author's note. https://archive.org/details/iranuntoldstoryi00hayk ↩︎

  34. Ari Ben-Menashe, Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network, Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015). ↩︎

  35. Jimmy Carter, "Shah of Iran: Statement by the White House Press Secretary on the Shah's Departure From the United States," December 15, 1979. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/248279. ↩︎

  36. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 2, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting, Washington, November 5, 1979, including the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center update of November 5. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d2. ↩︎

  37. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 8, Record of a National Security Council Meeting, November 6, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d8. ↩︎

  38. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 30, Editorial Note (Bani-Sadr announcement of November 14, 1979; John Kifner, "Iran Defends Move To Withdraw Funds," New York Times, November 15, 1979). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d30. ↩︎

  39. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 43, Memorandum From Ambassador Eilts to President Carter, Washington, November 21, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d43. ↩︎

  40. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 51, Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, November 23, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d51. ↩︎

  41. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 57, Memorandum From Under Secretary of State Newsom to Secretary of State Vance, Washington, November 24, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d57. ↩︎

  42. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 60, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, November 26, 1979, citing "Report Kissinger Tells Shah to Stay," Chicago Tribune, November 26, 1979, p. 2, and Robert G. Kaiser, "Vance Briefing Aimed at Soothing Angry Kissinger," Washington Post, November 27, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d60. ↩︎

  43. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 76, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, December 1, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d76. ↩︎

  44. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 149, Memorandum by the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Oxman), January 15, 1980. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d149. ↩︎

  45. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 144, Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and Brzezinski, undated, with Jordan's summary of notes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d144. ↩︎

  46. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 228, Message From the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State, Tehran, March 30, 1980. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d228. ↩︎

  47. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 233, Record of an Oval Office Meeting, April 1, 1980, recording Bani-Sadr's March 31 speech. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d233. ↩︎

  48. FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, document 326, Editorial Note: "On July 27, 1980, the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, died in Cairo." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d326. ↩︎