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Peres's rise to influence began in late 1953, when David Ben-Gurion appointed the then thirty-year-old Shimon Peres as director general of the ministry of defense. | 2026-10-12 | 1923-08-02 | 2016-09-28 | Wiszniew, Poland |
Shimon Peres was a prominent Israel politician who served as Defense Minister and later as Prime Minister. He was a key figure in Israel's political and military landscape for decades, playing particularly significant roles in the country's nuclear program and various covert operations.1
Early Career and Nuclear Program Leadership
Peres's rise to influence began in late 1953, when David Ben-Gurion appointed the then thirty-year-old Shimon Peres as director general of the ministry of defense. In this pivotal role, Peres, alongside Ernst David Bergmann, became instrumental in driving Israel's nuclear weapons program, which was publicly presented as research for peaceful purposes. Recognizing the financial challenges of such an ambitious undertaking, Peres, Ben-Gurion, and Bergmann sought private financing from wealthy American and European Jews to fund this secret endeavor.2
As the architect of Israel's nuclear ambitions, Peres was effectively the father of Israel's nuclear program in the mid-1950s. Working under David Ben-Gurion, he believed that Israel needed nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Arab countries. Understanding the technical requirements, Peres knew that no plutonium weapon could be made without a reprocessing plant, and that its construction was impossible without French commitment.2
Peres also insisted on the creation of a new intelligence agency, initially known as the Office of Special Tasks, to provide security for the nuclear project at Dimona; its director, Binyamin Blumberg, a former military intelligence officer, was handpicked by Peres, and the office was placed bureaucratically inside the defense ministry. It became known in the mid-1970s as the Science Liaison Bureau, or LAKAM.3
International Nuclear Partnerships
Peres's diplomatic efforts proved crucial in securing international support for Israel's nuclear program. He traveled to France to secure assistance for Israel's nuclear ambitions, and in 1956, he flew to France to secure a weapons-grade nuclear reactor and technology for a nuclear bomb from Charles de Gaulle. Beyond the French connection, Peres also arranged for the sale of high-performance French bombers to Israel in 1955, bypassing diplomatic niceties.2
Expanding Israel's nuclear partnerships further, Peres initiated military cooperation with South Africa in 1959. This arrangement involved South Africa selling uranium to Israel and later financing parts of Israel's nuclear program, creating a mutually beneficial relationship that would support Israel's nuclear development for years to come.1
Documents obtained by Sasha Polakow-Suransky record meetings in March and June 1975 between Peres and P.W. Botha. According to the Mail & Guardian article on the minutes, Peres offered the nuclear-capable Jericho I missiles and their warheads to Botha "in three sizes."4 A top secret agreement dated March 30, 1975, signed by Botha and Peres, contains a clause stating that "the very existence of this agreement" is to remain secret.5 The office of President Peres has said that "there exists no basis in reality for the claims published this morning by the Guardian" and that "Israel has never negotiated the exchange of nuclear weapons with South Africa."6
Controversies and Covert Operations
Peres's career was not without scandal. According to Ari Ben-Menashe, a telegram intercepted by Unit 8200 in 1976 revealed details of bribes paid by a Lockheed Aircraft Company representative in Israel to Defense Minister Peres. Ben-Menashe wrote that the sum involved was $3.5 million, deposited in one of Peres's brother's business accounts in Europe, that he discovered the telegram, and that the information was subsequently covered up by Israeli military intelligence superiors.1
The 1980s brought new controversies involving arms sales to Iran. In 1980, William J. Casey invited Peres, then Labor Party leader, to participate in secret meetings concerning arms sales to Iran. Peres secretly met with Mehdi Karrubi in Madrid, actions that drew sharp criticism when they came to light. When Menachem Begin learned of this unauthorized diplomacy, he warned Peres that such actions without government knowledge would be considered treason.1
Prime Ministerial Tenure and Arms Trading
In 1984, Peres became Prime Minister as part of a bizarre coalition agreement with Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud Party, where they would share the roles of prime minister and foreign minister. During his tenure as prime minister (1984-1986), Peres appointed Amiram Nir as his counterterrorism adviser, a decision that would have significant implications for Israel's covert operations.1
During this period, Peres sought to expand Israel's involvement in international arms trading. He worked to open a competing arms channel to Iran to gain control over the profitable arms sales and to undermine the Iran-Israel Joint Committee. This involvement extended to the broader United States policy of arming both Iran and Iraq, with Peres encouraging Bruce Rappaport to buy military equipment from Israel and divert it to Iraq.1
Despite his involvement in these controversial arms dealings, Peres also supported diplomatic initiatives, including the idea of a peace conference with the Palestinians. However, this proposal was blocked by Yitzhak Shamir and the Likud Party, reflecting the ongoing political tensions within Israel's coalition government.1
According to Haaretz, when Avraham Tamir, director general of the Prime Minister's Office, appointed Shimon Levinson chief security officer in May 1985, those who recommended Levinson included Peres, then prime minister. Levinson was arrested in May 1991 and sentenced to 12 years for spying for the KGB.7
Later Political Developments
The legacy of Peres's covert operations continued to create complications even after his prime ministerial tenure. Nir's death in 1988 was believed by Israeli intelligence to be a Central Intelligence Agency operation to prevent his testimony from embarrassing Peres, Ronald Reagan, or George H.W. Bush, highlighting the international ramifications of the arms trading networks Peres had helped establish.1
Peres's long political career eventually faced a significant setback in 1992, when he was ousted as leader of the Labor Party by Yitzhak Rabin, who then replaced Yitzhak Shamir as prime minister after the national elections, marking the end of an era in Israeli politics.1
Footnotes
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Ben-Menashe, Ari. Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015). ↩︎
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Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. Chapter 2. ↩︎
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Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991, p. 62 (creation of the Office of Special Tasks, Blumberg as director) and p. 205 (renamed the Science Liaison Bureau, LAKAM, in the mid-1970s). https://archive.org/details/Sampson_Option ↩︎
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Chris McGreal, "Revealed: How Israel offered to sell SA nuclear weapons," Mail & Guardian, May 24, 2010. https://mg.co.za/article/2010-05-24-revealed-how-israel-offered-to-sell-sa-nuclear-weapons ↩︎
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South African History Archive, "Declassified documents on apartheid South Africa-Israel talks on nuclear weapons," May 25, 2010, SAHA Collection AL2878, item A3.2.1. https://www.saha.org.za/news/2010/May/declassified_documents_on_apartheid_south_africa_israel_talks_on_nuclear_weapons.htm ↩︎
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"Israel denies 'nuclear exchange' talks with SA," Mail & Guardian, May 24, 2010 (AFP). https://mg.co.za/article/2010-05-24-israel-denies-nuclear-exchange-talks-with-sa/ ↩︎
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Yossi Melman, "Why did a top Israeli intelligence officer join the KGB?," Haaretz, November 12, 2009. https://www.haaretz.com/1.5056541 ↩︎